# SYSTEMS DESIGNED FOR INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING AND COLLECTION SPECIFIC TO ORGANIZED CRIME FIELD

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Abstract: Under the contemporaneous conditions caused by the set of illegal operations performed on large areas by criminal structures of network type, with great action capabilities and specific activity of collecting, analyzing and disseminating data and information used in decision making process, becomes a particularly important activity both at leadership and the execution levels of the integrated system security and national security. In this article we will detail all important aspects related to the collection and processing of information specific to cross-border organized crime.

**Key words:** security and national security, space of informational interest, business intelligence, transnational organized crime, gathering, processing and disseminating information.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

The whole activity of collecting, processing and disseminating data and information in the informational area of interest is a matter for specialized informational units, hierarchically organized (tactical, operational, strategic, political-military, etc.) basing on a number of priority requirements or critical data and information set by the governing structures of hierarchical echelons.

The succession of stages in informational activities, particular for information sources, decision makers and beneficiaries form an informational cycle, involving every level, providing information superiority and the opportunity to conduct all types of operations (crisis response, risk management and asymmetric threats anti and counter terrorism, combating transnational organized crime, etc.).

Within the system of prevention and combating the phenomenon of transnational organized crime the collection and dissemination of relevant data and information in the area of interest can become very important due to the unexpected and subversive nature of criminal structure actions, quick shifts of as well to the hidden effects induced by them.

For these reasons, it is very important that the whole process of collecting and disseminating data and information, specific to combat cross-border organized crime, to rely on constant adaptability and flexibility against the threats and risks.

The efficiency of informational process will influence also the opportunity and effectiveness of specialized structures reacting, even before the crisis in area of responsibility.

However, in such asymmetrical cases, conventional indicators, which are targeting the specific way to collect and select of information, can sometimes be irrelevant due to the high degree of uncertainty of the measures and actions taken by potential adversaries, and therefore we should establish new indicators to render the necessary potential to prevent and combat terrorism and cross-border organized crime structures.

An approach of this type, involves a particular management structures, of safety and national security, a specialized and assiduous tactics and Staff training, from peacetime, at both national as well as in other areas, ally or coalition system, respecting the proper substantiation of efficiency criteria indecision making.

As a conclusion, it should be understood that the specific activity of collecting, processing and disseminating information regarding the situation in some areas of strategic interest should remain continuous, so that in crisis situations, specialized structures will receive timely information in order to act effectively.

The priorities of information needed to prevent and combat cross-border crime shall be established according to the needs and interests of ensuring national security and public order, the weight and nature of asymmetric threats and risks, on the characteristics and trends in the security environment of high vulnerability, on the position and attitude of internal and external actors, and the abundance of information resources available.

It should be noted that the priorities of intelligence is established in accordance with the activity / operation purpose, the nature and rank of threats and vulnerabilities that can be subjected for the security system, and it depends on the impact of collateral risks that could amplify crisis or unconventional threats .

To ensure an efficient management of the intelligence structures, another important condition is also the appropriate organization of data and information collection activities.

For this purpose is required detailed and clear description of the all involved structures responsibilities because any uncertainty or the existence of gray areas can cause serious malfunctions, structures overlapping, neglecting or declining tasks or skills.

The task to establish the area of responsibility for authorities belongs to the echelons of activity informational systems.

In this respect, coordination becomes an essential factor in the activity of management systems of cross-borders organized crime.

Focusing efforts is intended both to stimulate the employment of intelligence structures and to grow their expertise in gathering information from criminal organizations or groups too.

Threats against these structures, being asymmetric, requires a higher attention for their continuous tracking, both at the national and

the transnational level, especially for structures with tasks in the field.

To elaborate management of the operational situation documents for the national territory, they shall include in particular information upon: policy, ideology, leadership, organization, structures and their area of location, operating methods, training bases, logistics, sponsors, endowment arms, sources of supply, bonds of cooperation and international relations, action plans, features, objectives targeted and their implications on safety and national security etc.

The activity of intelligence collection is a highly complex process. This is carried out by the sources of information which are looking, identifying and collecting data and information which are then subjected to a process of analysis, interpretation and integration within specialized departments.

Integrated national safety and security system has the following sources of information (\*\*\*IPS-3, Doctrina pentru informații, contrainformații și securitate a armatei, 2005:20): official sources, human sources, technical sources and public sources.

The use of personnel in collecting data and information is performed related to the nature and character of network or organized crime groups' activity.

Without exception in all cases, should be used specialists trained to collect intelligence, regardless of practical work: HUMINT - human intelligence, IMINT - information obtained by analyzing images from different sensors; SIGINT - information obtained through the telecommunications and OSINT - information from open sources (internet, media, publications, etc.) (Stan Ioan Constantin, 2007:51). For success, it always requires the application of appropriate methods of choice for agents and how to cooperate with them.

Regardless of the means used and the practical ways of operating, the integrated safety and national security shall provide sources of information collection and selection of the specialized structures of SRI, SIE, DGIA and DGIPI.

The structures of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI): conducts technical and informational activities to combat and prevent organized crime; executes intervention missions against crime for destroying or preventing their attacks; participates in restoring the legal order; share information with other specialized structures, in accordance with rules established by CSAT.

The structures of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) are conducting special missions in foreign intelligence related to national security and they are defending national interests; they use appropriate means and methods to obtain, check, evaluate, recover and store intelligence and data related to national security; they are running counter-intelligence specific activities or personnel or own protection in the country or abroad; they are controlling the entire operative, diplomatic courier, security, state code, financial assurance, technical and sanitary materials.

The structures of General Directorate of Intelligence and Internal Protection (DGIPI): are running specific tasks of purchasing, centralization, processing, dissemination, data and information protection related to the operational situation and assessment of risks and threats against the public safety and order; coordinates the gathering of intelligence about potential threats and asymmetric risks to the safety and public order, ensure dissemination of information to structures of integrated security and national security and in the National Intelligence Community; cooperates with other specialized structures from other institutions which participate in the exchange of information for the fight against transnational organized crime.

The Structures of General Directorate of Defense Intelligence (DGIA): are conducting specific tasks to ensure, establish, plan and target priorities on information requirements; provides collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of important information for the national defense and security; are running information centralization of activities related to the potential asymmetric risks and threats to the national security and defense; cooperate with other specialized structures of the

institutions with responsibilities in the field, in order to achieve data exchanges of information needed to combat organized crime; ensure the transmission of information to the National Intelligence Community and to other subsystems of the integrated national security.

Basically, the special activities for collecting intelligence, by the structures with responsibilities in this area, comprises search-processes, identifying, obtaining and gathering information (\*\*\*Doctrina naţională a informaţiilor pentru securitate, 2004:25) to prevent and combat domestic or cross-border organized crime.

Searching Intelligence on the phenomenon of organized crime is a process that establishes and directs specialized structures on areas of informative interest and the sources from where you can reap obtain, collect or produce information necessary for decision and action, and to prevent and combat cross-border activities.

*Identifying* the system of risks and asymmetric threats to national security, is a very complex activity, specific for informational structures, by which they are documented on the situation of potential opponent in the sense of knowledge, evaluation and control its actions, which may affect national security.

Collecting intelligence represents the activity conducted by structures in the purpose of sampling representative data and information for the domain addressed (in some open sources, studies, publications, etc.) and to establish the type of response necessary to counteract or prevent specific actions of organized crime cross-border structures.

Obtaining intelligence about criminal structures involves the use of methods and procedures to access data that may be accessible only by the use of specific means (most often under the authority of a document / warrant issued by a judicial authority. Situations of this kind require means and technical systems equipped with sensors to collect data and information (Frunzeti Teodor, coordonator, 2011: 717-719), ready just in border areas,

borders or back, noting that those sensors should be adequate to detection of information for purely operational interest.

The specific activity of search, identification, collection and obtaining information upon the criminal structures should provide a better understanding of the level of risk and asymmetric threats in the field of cross-border organized crime and own domestic vulnerabilities, dysfunctions and targeted objectives, the structure of criminal forces and directions of their action, the type of business and their character (nonviolent or violent) and their implications for national security.

It is very important to remember that the intelligence activity contains both organizational issues and problems of knowledge in different forms of potential adversaries. The question of potential opponent is the axiomatic element, regardless the type of action. This is where the conspiratorial character, subversive and elusive of all structures with criminal nature, aspects that highlight the important role of informational structures in combating the scourge of organized crime activity.

Intelligence processing is the activity through which all data collected from border areas of informational interest are processed and converted into information. For this there should be a database of integrated and national security, which accumulates information and continuously update them while measuring their processing.

Intelligence processing resulted from data obtained by sources may include the following activities: sorting, analysis, evaluation, interpretation and integration of data and information.

Sorting is a kind of administrative activity in which data can be taken out and then grouped into categories or types of risks and specific threats to areas of organized crime. It is important that, after this process, specialized structures to understand the level of addressability, reliability of information and the degree of networking within the information system.

Assessment is the appreciation activity of intelligence after their contents and reliability of the sources. From this point of view, can yield reliable information or a lower degree of reliability. At this stage of processing, information obtained shall be selected as follows: real and credible information (this can be further analyzed), probably true and credible information as possible; improbable and unreliable information that remain pending (they can be subject to further analysis with other data obtained through exchange of information with some specialized structures).

Intelligence analysis allows selecting items with significance in preventing and combating cross-border organized crime, which are correlated and combined with known emerging events, from which we can draw conclusions.

Intelligence integration is the specialists' specific mental process (center of gravity or the core of processing activities), which is facilitating both the accurate data interpretation and the selection of upper level which they can address. After integration, information and data can be interpreted to give valuable intelligence for the field and the appropriate response in action plan.

Intelligence examination can solve the following issues: clarifying the significance of information and data; anticipating the likely future trends and influences; conclusion if they amend or confirm the already known (especially if they show some increases risk), if it is necessary to supplement research sources and for how long.

In fact, you have to answer a few questions, so? Who did what and why? What consequences can derive from this? In what sense has acted? If everything is or not clear? This may be the final step in data analysis and the last real opportunity to forestall some attempts disinformation. However, it is necessary to put the following question too: interpretations and responses are fair or rather are those variants that criminal organizations gathered from us? From here, may result decision to request additional data or not.

At the end of the process all the raw data can be transformed into information that can be the fundamental key of knowledge objectives in informative process. In this respect, the ability of prevision can be one of the important conditions for the efficient conduction of actions to combat and prevent transnational organized crime phenomenon. All information resulting from the data processing activity will allow decision makers to anticipate, a strategic prevention of state authorities about any possibility of the occurrence of such transnational or national criminal actions or warning / alarm about the probability of asymmetric threats. Decision making of the state can estimate the type of preventive or preliminary action can be carried out to suppress criminal structures.

For the ongoing threat, structures and specialized services can move to annihilate the criminal structures right from the beginning. Considering that the phenomenon transnational organized crime can occur with all forms (from illicit material trafficking to the illicit people trafficking, from smuggling to cyber attacks), becoming a global phenomenon particular to modern society, requires that the intelligence activity of specialized structures have a constant regard to these types of threats. Moreover, the activity of information should specify very quickly, the nature of potential and actual threats represented by the structure of criminal nature.

The proper estimation of threats is very important because is the key factor in a decision taken by the state authorities in connection with the dynamics of the measures taken. These measures should be included in a plan detailing the contingencies (emergency or crisis). If seriousness is overrated, efforts will be exaggerated, and the consequence will weaken the credibility of the concerned intelligence service; if gravity will be minimized, some measures taken are inadequate, the result being the same, weakening the credibility of the intelligence structures. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to ideology of criminal organizations with all their ramifications.

Only a thorough understanding of their motivations, the potential influence evolved and aggressive ways of action will have an active role in preventing and reducing the threat and dangers to international democratic world.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Democratic States must intensify specific measures to combat the scourge of organized crime expanded at a global scale. Plans should be drawn up based on the correct definition of asymmetric threats based on data and information available at the time. Resources should be assigned on the basis of realistic estimates and then be taken concrete measures both in training and in local and international cooperation. All this cannot be supportive if the authorities are not convinced of the existence of specific threats. The intelligence activity will face many difficulties, especially in the early stages of growth of asymmetric threats when it comes to issue of allocation of additional resources.

Dissemination of processed information involves opportune and undistorted transmission to all beneficiaries (\*\*\*IPS-3, Doctrina pentru informații, contrainformații și securitate a armatei, 2005:31-32) of all information collected in the computer system, which will go through the normal chain of processing and evaluation, so that they can be distributed to beneficiaries quickly and in a usable form.

Only such intelligence activity could play a major role in fighting and preventing transnational organized crime.

Useful information must arrive accurately at the important decision structures and in the time required that can facilitate preventive action to disrupt planned actions of a potential opponent. In this respect, the use of alarms should be appreciated by all services of the military-political structures as a top priority and the staff directly involved must pay attention both to collection and information processing and to evaluate each specialized fragment of information that would indicate or suggest the possibility of an operation with criminal nature.

One can appreciate that the activity of information insurance of system for combating organized crime should be regularly evaluate in order to achieve the necessary feedback to increase the quality of decision act and effectiveness of response in action plans. Equally important is the focus of specialized teams from all structures, dealing the actual work of collecting data and information, especially of data with high degree of risk, their experience can turn the work done with passion in a true art.

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