



"Henri Coandă"
Air Force Academy



"Babeş-Bolyai" University
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"Henri Coandă"
Association for Research
and Education

Redefining Community in Intercultural Context



Selection of papers presented within the 9th RCIC Conference, Cluj-Napoca, 7-9 May, 2020
European Cultural Community

Vol.9 no.1 / 2020

"Henri Coandă" Air Force Academy Publishing House

Redefining Community in Intercultural Context

rcic'20

*Selection of papers presented within the 9th International Conference
Redefining Community in Intercultural Context RCIC'20
European Cultural Community, Cluj-Napoca, 7-9 May, 2020*

Brasov
vol.9, no.1/2020

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'Henri Coanda' Air Force Academy Publishing House

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ISSN 2285-2689

ISSN-L 2285-2689

First cover: The Kidnapping of Europa Mosaic in the Zeugma Mosaic Museum, Gaziantep, Turkey. This map suggests the South-Eastern roots of Europe.

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Culture & Communication

THE CULTURAL ROOTS OF EUROPE AND EU

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Abstract: *The name 'Europe' implies an intercultural identity that is felt so much that, within its borders, the notion of 'foreigner' has undergone a profound change over the centuries and now retains a merely legal and administrative sense. The use of the same term 'foreigner' to indicate a citizen of a different European nation has almost disappeared. Plural participation is essential in creating wider affiliations: the European identity comes from more restricted and hard-fought identities, but is becoming the identity of an extended group within which tensions are going to ease and bonds of solidarity are going to be accepted as normal among different European nations. The use of a plurality of languages as instruments of communication, in the inevitable pluralism of a European community, is the acceptable solution, provided that the expressive possibilities of minority languages are not stifled, with the term 'minority' applying to all the national languages spoken only in Europe. Individuals become bilingual so as to respond to specific functional demands existing in their situation of life, to meet certain communication needs that are imposed on them by the social reality. All the nations that make up Europe have a European sense of geographical belonging. If a political-administrative bond, that of the EU, is also added, then Europe itself is configured as a voluntary, shared sense of belonging that strengthens the bonds of the European identity itself.*

Keywords: *EU; intercultural identity; plural participation; bonds of solidarity; European identity*

1. INTRODUCTION

The European population is made up of a set of peoples characterized by different languages and cultures. Although in the current age populations have become homogenized thanks to the speed of certain aspects of information, specific cultural and political diversities remain that are often more divisive than unifying. In spite of this, the peoples that decided to form a union feel the need to share their humanity with other peoples, and even in their historical, linguistic and – in general terms – cultural specificity, they acknowledge the bond ensuing from their feeling of being Europeans by right of soil (*jus soli*) and culture. For single nations, the cost of their specific identity has been a substantial number of wars, peace treaties, cultural exchanges and particular attractions, leading overall to a positive assessment of the construction of a common Europe made up of peoples with histories encountering other histories, and of languages that have always found a vehicular language able to overcome borders without losing individual identities. So we have come to a position where we see a united Europe, sharing the desire to partake in the present and

future of a common history. The inhabitants of Europe are generically Europeans: those who are Italian, German, Romanian etc. are also European, and are so simultaneously with their primary identity, which more precisely determines this. The wider identity is less meaningful than the specific one, which is more personal and all-embracing. One could say that the states converging in the EU are twice as European as the states remaining outside it. In fact, every citizen of the European Community has a double affiliation: one relating to the community, meaning a social affiliation, and one geographical.¹

As a sociologist, it is indispensable for me to start from the notions of community and society concerning every individual (Tönnies, 1966). The community is the core to which a person is bound

¹ "Europa" and "Asia" are the names of the children of Oceanus and Thetis, and they appear in the 7th century b.C. in Hesiod's *Theogony*. So they belong to mythological characters and have no geographical reference. Nonetheless, "Asia" corresponds to a Semitic word meaning "Orient". Originally the name "Europe" was probably used by the Greeks to indicate the territory to the north of the Mediterranean Sea.

for good or ill from birth, and the individual goes toward society “as if into a foreign land”. Blood ties, neighbouring relationships and friendships are the foundations of a community. Society is juxtaposed to community as the expression of a contract drawn up for specific and practical purposes, a contract that the parties may revoke at all times and within which they never lose their individuality and the sense of being in reciprocal competition. Within society, everyone works toward their own advantage. Each person tends to maintain agreements and contracts and is apparently open to others, accomplishing what Tönnies calls “conventional society life”, based on a diffused formal politeness. We all seem to be reciprocally helpful, but in fact we are busy assessing the advantages that are possibly entailed by relations (Mazzara, 2000: 42). These are the grounds upon which both the economy and the higher expressions of societal organization are based, which, as such, are opposed to the concrete and natural reality of the community. The direction is thus toward more complex forms of sociality. This idea is the basis of the ways with which an increasingly wider sense of belonging is accomplished, and consequently the definition of non-belonging and how to relate to it. Between the individual psychological dimension, i.e. perceptions, motivations and emotions, and the structure of social affiliation, there is a constant bidirectional interaction. We perceive the other person by ascribing each to the category to which they belong, therefore not in their pure individuality, but within the general type to which they belong. This allows the person to be seen not merely as an individual, but within the roles (and appearances) that he/she takes on in society. Every individual finds he/she has multiple affiliations at the same time, and the number increases according to the complexity of the society (Weber, 1974).

Society is the repository of a confrontational charge that encourages the multiplication of associative instances and cultural differentiation. The grouping of a community is based on relationships of solidarity, while society presents itself as an antithetical pole: the ties of solidarity are transformed and replaced by relations of a legal and economic – or in any case formal – kind (Tessarolo, 1990).

When studying groups that are homogeneous in themselves, but strongly opposed, we may observe that the differentiation of each group in itself generates assimilation and draws the members of different groups nearer to one another, causing a weakening or dissolution of the restricted

circles, both through the individualization of partners within the circles and through the extension and connection with more distant partners. The widening and the trend to extension leads to fragmentation among the elements of the groups that were previously homogeneous; differentiation increases with society’s progress, and so does assimilation, meaning the process of coming closer to the other lineage (Simmel, 1982: 54). The extension of the group affects the freedom of its members: the more the group is individual, the less so are its members. A greater differentiation of the social field corresponds to a lesser differentiation of the personal field. The width of the group guarantees a wider margin for formations and deformations. The amplitude of the circle, in fact, weakens the individual because identity starts to diminish and it becomes difficult to ask oneself: who and what am I? (Simmel, 1982: 59).² The local identity is not in contrast with wider identities, even if in wider identities the ties of solidarity are less strong and therefore become less binding.

2. LIVING WITH DIVERSITY

Community and society display vitality, although with a varying degree of intensity of the feeling of belonging. As its basis, this reasoning retrieves the ancient bonds that existed among European communities. These communities share an ancient history made of a succession of wars and peace treaties, reciprocal aid and distancing. But at a certain point in recent history, and precisely at the end of the Second World War, in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was agreed by Roosevelt and Churchill. In 1951 the Treaty of Paris was signed by six founding members, thus creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In 1957 the Treaty of Rome marked the establishment of the European Economic Community and of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). In 1967 they became part of the European Communities (EC), a long process – involving several treaties – that was finalized in Maastricht in 1992. A common currency was

² A weakening of identity or belonging may lead to the fear of being “gobbled up” or assimilated, losing one’s identity. That is how being European has brought many states of the EU to a sovranist government. According to the intellectual and journalist Bernard-Henry Lévy, one such example is the success of Brexit at the British referendum: it is not a victory of the people, but of populism.

implemented in 2002, while the current name and structure were adopted with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. There are currently 27 members, because other member states joined the first 15.

In a united Europe the importance of supranational languages grows, meaning the languages that – due to their spread – are useful in exchanges with speakers of the different varieties of local languages. Bilingualism is always a phenomenon of an individual nature in the first place, since it is the individual who is bilingual and not the community to which he/she belongs. Individuals become bilingual so as to respond to specific functional demands existing in their situations of life. Belonging to a group means speaking a certain language, and understanding others implies speaking the same linguistic variety or the same official language. Besides facilitating economic exchanges and acquaintance with others, these positions can also avoid linguistic conflicts between neighbours. The changes taking place in contemporary society have brought each subject to take on several roles, therefore the role of speaker is also included in the increasing range of possibilities offered by society to the individual. The obligation to study a language, though, leads to triggering the fear of losing one's identity. Languages change gradually and continuously all over the world. This is no reason to ingenuously fall into the trap of the myth of a single universal language, because individuality and creativity are unsearchable elements even when we refer to languages (Sapir, 1969). In order to understand the problems generated by language differences, the functional roles taken on by language need to be grasped. To gain acceptance of the plurality of languages, a plurality of roles must be designed (Francescato, 1981, Fishman, 1975 and Tassarolo, 1990). The plurality of cultures in the EU is one of many factors making the improvement of communication possibilities within the EU itself more complicated. De Grève (1982) makes a distinction between "civilization" and "culture", interpreting the two as a bi-univocal relation. The word "civilization" expresses permanent and unitary values, while the term "culture" refers to variables that are historically and geographically conditioned. Multilingualism is a form of respect for diversity and traditions. The EU is something that is added to the states, whose characteristics it respects; and its motto "United in diversity" respects this necessity, ascribing equal dignity to the various languages, while promoting the learning of a number of European languages (at

least three) starting in childhood³ (Tassarolo, 2007). The EU declares that it respects cultural and linguistic diversity and is committed to safeguarding Europe's cultural heritage (Constitutional Treaty with three paragraphs). None of the member states would accept the imposition of a language. Instead, some languages have been accepted and have acquired the status of community language, even though they are not official languages in their respective country (Catalan). Multilingualism may be seen, from time to time, as enriching or hindering: cultural enrichment that is protected and highlighted, or an obstacle when English monolingualism is required in a committee. Absolute equality among languages is not functionally possible, while controlled multilingualism is possible.

It makes sense to speak of European identity, even if Europe is not homogeneous, because the nations that form it have common roots. We could think that an imposed identity is replaced by an identity originating from a gradual break-down and re-composition of the small differences: after all, modernity equals differentiation, splitting, breaking down, multiplication of singularities (Cristin, 1997). Such multiplication reflects the image of an identity born from division and fracture, and that consequently – just like a plural identity – follows Leibniz's formula according to which diversity is compensated by identity (*Varietas identitate compensata*). A form of dialectic existence in which singularities coincide, although they remain such, in a globality that in turn constitutes a new wider singularity does not relate only to the cultural sphere, but also to the political one (Cristin, 1997: 21).

The European common root has developed through divisions and fractures relating to both the cultural and the political sphere, both of them inherently plural. This plurality emerges when the word "Europe" is pronounced: with it we refer to a very broad area and to a very heterogeneous ethnic and cultural environment (over twenty peoples and almost as many languages), a set of states whose characteristics differ greatly in both a political-social perspective and in a production-industrial one. Economic, political and cultural multiplicity is Europe's dominant feature. The relation between unity and plurality may be resolved as a comparison or as a dialectic synthesis. The expression "plural identity" may also be

³ The languages should be: the mother-tongue as first language, English as third, and a middle language of choice.

investigated in a phenomenological way, gathering all the spheres we mentioned and thus showing the growing dynamic inherent in the situation, highlighting its link with action; it generated it and in turn has the ability to reproduce or eliminate it. Many historians have discussed the basic feature of European civilization as one of discord, variety and struggle. But struggle, instead of becoming a principle of immobility, may be seen as a “cause of progress” (Guizot, 1973).

Europe is a varied, rich and complex civilization that never fell under the rule of an exclusive principle in which the different elements of the welfare state combined to the point of being established for living together. Cristin (1997) observes that Europe expresses a double character of unity and diversity distinguishing it among the continents. Starting from this tension, modern civilization is the result of countless local civilizations, happily united into a single stream. According to Gadamer, it was Europe’s privilege to have to – and find a way to – live with diversity, more than other countries. This idea was previously Montesquieu’s, who in the 18th century comprehended Europe as a “nation” composed of many nations (1991: 22). We agree with Cristin (1997) on the need to find a logic capable of demonstrating the need for Europe’s identity to continue constituting itself as a plural identity, also entailing a union of the political and philosophical aspect, so as to allow it to take responsibility for respecting the inherent plurality. Philosophy should respond both to the needs of multiplicity and to those of liberalism, like Husserl’s phenomenology, where respect for the plurality of ideas and goals is accompanied by respect for the freedom of individuals and their choices.

Heilmann (1982) observed that the complexity of the European situation does not stem only from the remarkable number of “major” and “minor” languages,⁴ even if we see this area in a unitary perspective that is limited to the West. But complexity may be seen with a social-political view, organizing the languages in Europe into a hierarchy of independence; and with a view of a psychological nature concerning the speakers’ awareness. Europe has a unitary matrix as regards civilization (meaning the permanent and unitary values). Such a matrix is subject to the same debunking assaults that identify civilization and technology, leading to a levelling of cultures (i.e. the variables that are historically and geographically conditioned). Resorting to one or

more languages as an instrument of communication for the inevitable multilingualism of a European unity will be an acceptable and fruitful solution, provided it does not stifle the expressive possibilities of minority languages in a consumerist levelling – where “minority” languages are not only those of the small groups of traditional minorities, but also less prestigious (or less widespread) national languages. If Europe does not continue to corrode the matrixes of its own culture, but recovers them whole, and succeeds in granting all – majorities and minorities of various kinds and weights, in a spirit of tolerance – equal freedom and dignity, then a solution will also be found for the linguistic problem, without shocks and without victims.

3. COSTRUCTING STABLE BONDS

When considering and criticizing the binding power of institutions, it is important to remember that they also afford different possibilities. The discussion on action and social structure leads to a basic concept of sociology: the construction of reality. People who act create social reality through their thoughts and actions. The structure of such reality coming into being is partly or completely separate from the people who created it and live in it. This brings us to agree with Goffman (2007: 25) when he uses the expression “dangerous giants” to refer to individuals, because they have the ability to act and consequently the potential to discontinue and destroy the structures in which they live, even if those who act are often not aware of their power (Ritzer, 2013). Discrimination may sometimes be considered the only possible way to solve problems due to the lack of recognition and representation, and therefore shared justice. In this case, discrimination becomes a powerful social trigger for the creation of ad-hoc social policies aimed at integrating the minorities that, in order not to be discriminated, will submit to the rules of the majority.

Bauman speaks of “imagined communities” and affirms that all communities are imagined and the global community is no exception either. But imagination becomes a powerful and coagulant force if it is supported by institutions such as collective self-government and self-identification, as is the case for modern nations and the sovereign states to which they gave origin.

Adopting a single language is not conducive to developing the values and contents of different cultures, but the preservation of cultural differences is, although this generates high social

⁴ The total number of languages is 27.

costs and controversies in the political sphere. In the light of what Simmel said, a multilingual education contributes to a less rigid position for the speaker. Plural participation is essential in creating wider affiliations. The European identity comes from more restricted and hard-fought identities; more and more, it will be the identity of an extended group within which tensions are going to ease and bonds made more binding among the nations that form Europe (Tessarolo, 2007).

In the current age, the fragmentation of reality into a plurality of opinions is prevalent, and this is precisely why the trend is to behave as guarantors, so that protecting and not justifying becomes the mainstay of human rights. The problem of human rights concerns some rules (Bobbio, 1984). The first has to do with the fact that the majority is always right; the second with the minority that is always due to an act of magnanimity by the majority; finally, the third rule is the alternation in governing the community.⁵

4. ADDENDA AS CONCLUSION

I finish this article on Europe in a grave moment – not just for Europe, but for the whole world – due to the Covid-19 pandemic, spreading in Italy with unexpected intensity. My thought goes to what history teaches us on aid and unity among peoples. When Ireland suffered the terrible famine causing death and migration between 1846 and 1848, some help (three ships loaded with food) came from a Turkish sultan. In these extremely difficult weeks, Italy is asking for face masks and respirators; China, which was affected only shortly before, responded. Italy and the Vatican City had been the first countries to send face masks to China a few weeks earlier.

In the Italian Constitution, Article 2 recognises “the inviolable rights of the person, both as an individual and in the social groups where human personality is expressed. The Republic expects that the fundamental duties of political, economic and social solidarity be fulfilled”. “Solidarity” is a key word lacking in the vision of the EU. In a crucial time as now, however, thanks to a pandemic, it seems to be impossible to only look at the sphere of economic relations, and human rights are being placed at the forefront.

⁵ The phrase “human rights” is used here, although in classic thinking the form should underline the binomial person-society in its double combination: *persona pro societate* and *societas pro persona* (Coccopalmerio, 1989).

The words spoken in Italian by European President Ursula von der Leyen were comforting: “Dear Italians, I would like to tell all of you fighting against the virus that you are not alone. Your example and your effort are valuable for all European citizens. In Europe we are following what you are doing with concern but also with profound respect and admiration. Italy is part of Europe and Europe suffers with Italy. In this moment, in Europe we are all Italian.”

It is my hope that such sharing and distribution of nationality will always exist, also for the positive aspects involved in the life of each Member State.

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ANTI-SEMITISM, ADIEU? ON THE POSSIBLE ABANDONMENT OF THE ANTI-SEMITIC STRATEGY BY THE FRENCH NATIONAL RALLY UNDER MARINE LE PEN

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Abstract: *This article analyses the implications of the change in the National Front's top leadership over the traditional anti-Semitic stances of the party. By studying the main reforms implemented by Marine Le Pen, this article shows that the dropping of anti-Semitism is at the same time not only a tactical move but not necessarily a genuine substantive change in the party's ideology. Rather, like the party's name change into the National Rally, it is a discursive adaptation on one hand to a general evolution of the French society (anti-Semitism being less entrenched in the public consciousness) and on the other hand to the particular conditions of the 2010s dominated by an increasing concern about the social, cultural and security-related consequences of the non-European and especially Muslim immigration to France.*

Keywords : *far-right; anti-semitism; French politics; strategy; adaptation*

1. INTRODUCTION

The election of Marine Le Pen as head of the National Front in January 2011 closed a page in the history of this political party and opened a new one. By her political style, her lifestyle, her speech and her ideas, Marine Le Pen did everything to place herself in a double apparently paradoxical hypostasis: on one hand, the heiress of her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, founding president of the National Front since 1972, and on the other, the champion of the radical change of a National Front, a party that was politically isolated because of its backward-looking belonging to the extreme right. Against a number of expectations and forecasts, far from producing the image of a schizoid politician, this double hypostasis enabled Marine Le Pen to unite around her project and personality a sizable part of the electorate and of public opinion which extends beyond the traditional voters and sympathizers of the FN, renamed into the National Rally (RN) in 2018 (Ivaldi, 2018).

In this context of “dis-demonization of the FN”, among the ideological components which have been subjected to a radical revision, anti-Semitism occupies a particular place, since it was a historical mark of the party and, at the same time, one of its major vulnerabilities. In this article, I will analyse the reasoning that led to the revision

of the National Front's anti-Semitic discourse and the effective and possible implications of this process. In order to do so, I will first study the classic position of the National Front on the “Jewish question” and the particular circumstances which led to the need to amend it. Then, I will analyse the way in which the FN's discourse was revised by Marine Le Pen in an effort of “democratic normalization”. Finally, I will try to review the possible wider political consequences of such a shift in this party's discourse.

2. NATIONAL FRONT'S ANTI-SEMITISM – FROM A PROFITABLE STRATEGY TO A CUMBERSOME BURDEN

The diversity of approaches to National Front's anti-Semitism allows us to identify at least two major sources that have fed the Frontist ideology at different moments of time and at different levels. Even if these sources are themselves multiple and heterogeneous, we can still try to draw their general outlines.

First, there is the historical legacy of the traditionalist and ultra-Catholic far right, whose origins go back to Joseph de Maistre (De Maistre, 1796) and which feeds on a double rejection: that of the excessive universalism of the Enlightenment and that of the excesses of the 1789 Revolution. If throughout the nineteenth century, this current was

embodied by the royalist party and other counter-revolutionary movements, it was historically reluctant to openly manifest anti-Semitic positions, with some exceptions (Teste, 1910). There are two reasons for this. First, the existence of a series of wealthy businessmen of Jewish origin, sometimes ennobled (the most famous of which were the two great donors, the barons Alphonse de Rothschild and Maurice de Hirsch), who financially and symbolically supported the royalists, especially after the fall of the Second Empire (Irvine, 1989:95). How could the party which benefited from the generous contributions of Jewish donors make anti-Semitic propaganda? Then, because of the possibility to be criticised as being the future restorers of a political-theocratic regime that could return to inquisitorial and anti-Semitic ultra-Catholicism and all this precisely when the party wanted to appropriate the sympathy of the voters less steeped in bigotry and religious exclusivism (like Bonapartists or former moderate Republicans) (Dufeulle, 1883). This attitude would nevertheless change in the last decade of the 19th century, especially after the bitter defeat that the royalists suffered in the legislative elections of 1889, where they made a tactical, informal and ideologically costly alliance with the populist movement of General Boulanger (Fuller, 2012:30-46). Since it had now become clear that any possibility of regaining power through the elections was too distant a horizon, the royalists, now led by the Duke of Orleans, who was reluctant to pursue both traditional rules and strategies of the Royal House and of the party, quickly adopted nationalism and anti-Semitism as the pillars of their new doctrine. Meanwhile, the vast majority of Catholics and a most traditionalist royalists proceeded to the *Ralliement*, by now recognizing the republican order and leaving therefore very little room for manoeuvre to the legitimists and other relentless hardliners.

The Dreyfus Affair, which served as a catalyst for all anti-Semites, determined the formalization of the new strategy of the tough and mainly crypto-royalist right, in which anti-Semitism occupied a central place (Winock, 1982: 157-185). Since then, there has been a radical right and no longer a royalist right, because by the end of the century most leaders of the traditional monarchist movement had already distanced themselves from the new party line, while on the ruins of the royalist organization rose up major figures of boulangism or even anti-Semitic leftism, like Paul Déroulède, Maurice Barrès, Edouard Drumont or Charles Maurras. From this point to the formation

of the traditionalist, nationalist and anti-Semitic leagues of the interwar period, there was only one step (Sternhell, 1978).

It is in this rather indirect and strategic way that the radical fringe of traditionalists and monarchists rallied openly anti-Semitic positions and prepared ideologically and electorally a key component of the political heritage of the National Front (Chebel d'Appollonia, 1988). Historically, there were among the nationalist-traditionalist-catholics of the National Front two attitudes with regard to anti-Semitism. On the one hand, central figures, such as Bernard Antony, who officially rejected anti-Semitism, while defending traditional and Christian values, but who practiced "academic" anti-Semitism, through historical-religious revelations (Anthony, 2007). Very influential in the FN in the 1990s, Antony and his organization "Chrétienté-Solidarité" did not exacerbate though their anti-Semitism and preferred to favour socio-religious themes, while attacking "anti-Christian and anti-French racism". On the other hand, many were those who did not hesitate to motivate their anti-Semitism by taking ultra-Catholic positions. This is the case of the group crystallized around Roland Gaucher, former member of the National Front's Political Bureau and former director of *National Hebdo*, who declared himself "a fighter for the Christian International" in his war against "the Jewish International" (*National Hebdo*, 1989).

We can nevertheless conclude that anti-Semitism is an ideological stance that has characterized only a part of the traditional-catholic frontists and that the virulence of their anti-Semitism is far from being comparable to that of others types of far-right militant groups.

The second source of Frontist anti-Semitism is more recent but quantitatively much more important and qualitatively more intense. This anti-Semitism is structured around what historian Nicolas Lebourg calls "the radical far-right", meaning a series of small groups which sought to make their way in the tumultuous political life of the years 1960-1970 and of which a part ended up integrating the National Front at the time when the purely revolutionary strategy finally proved to be losing (Lebourg *et al.*, 2014). Groups such as Jeune Nation, Occident and Ordre Nouveau have swept over French politics by taking anti-communist, anti-leftist and anti-republican positions, in the 1960s-1970s context of great ideological and militant confrontations. Significant events such as the Suez Crisis or the Algerian War influenced the ideological attitudes of the radical

far-right and enabled it to position itself in relation to the establishment, but also in relation to the “institutionalized far-right”. In the wake of French withdrawal from Algeria and, then, in the context of the Arab-Israeli wars, the non-revolutionary far right is increasingly forced to put on hold its anti-Zionist (but not necessarily anti-Semitic) discourse. This phenomenon is more salient within the National Rally led by Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, who intensively cultivated the revengeful feelings of the *Pieds Noirs* (the Frenchmen who have forcefully returned from Algeria after independence) and therefore anti-Arabism and anti-Islamism, but also among a series of royalists and even former WW2 *pétainists* (Birnbaum, 2006).

To differentiate themselves from this new “moderate” line, the radical far-right has increasingly positioned itself in an anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist logic (“green fascism”). They wanted to make these two themes the nodal points of a discursive articulation which would allow them to gather and mobilize the exalted young people, the former militarists, the irreducible anti-Semites, the anti-communists and other categories likely to be seduced by radical militancy. Radical far-right figures who have become famous, like François Duprat, and who later joined the National Front, ensured the leadership of these factions whose anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist speeches were often accompanied by public violent actions. Once this factionalism was suppressed or self-repressed, the National Front, which had become the main party of the non-revolutionary far right, was able to bring together most militants of the ultra-right-wing groups, which proved to be particularly useful in the construction of the party's territorial and professional networks (Mișcoiu, 2005: 44-45).

Radical far-right Anti-Semitism increased especially after the Six Day War, denounced as an Israeli aggression. It was no longer a question of repressing anti-Semitic positions while making anti-Zionist rhetoric more credible; on the contrary, according to the strategy proposed by Duprat, it was necessary to constitute an anti-system front which made revisionism, Holocaust denial, anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism the pillars of the identity of the new political edifice (Dély, 1999). The actions of the State of Israel and the manipulation of public opinion through the post-Holocaust victimization of the Jews were “undeniable proof” of the existence of an international Jewish conspiracy targeting France. The denunciation of the Israeli aggression in the Middle East would therefore be less effective if it

were not supplemented by the questioning of the Holocaust and by the complete revision of the theses concerning “imaginary victimization of the Jewish people”. This revisionist work was certainly facilitated at the end of the 1970s by the publication of Robert Faurisson's notorious Holocaust denier theses and by the consequent opening of a controversy on freedom of expression, which would be refused to citizens who wished to express “alternative” opinions on the Shoah (Faurisson; 1999). The Faurisson Affair reinforced the anti-Semitic positions of the radical far-right and reconfirmed the “merits” of its revisionist strategy.

On the other hand, for diverse historical reasons, the leaders of the old nationalist-revolutionary current were not in the majority within the National Front. With the (unexpected and violent) death of François Duprat and the party's gentrification in the 1980s, the strategy advocated by the radicals drowned in the whole of the ideological nebula of the far right. Anti-Semitism turned into a topic of average importance, being rather the prerogative of major frontist leaders, including Jean-Marie Le Pen, who has been repeatedly condemned for revisionist and anti-Semitic remarks. But anti-Semitism is now only part of the logic of “controlled slippages”, which are supposed to both provoke public opinion and recall the fundamentals of the far right. This allowed the National Front, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, to bring together both those nostalgic for *pétainism* in the 1940s, *poujadism* in the 1950s and national-revolutionarism and neo-paganism in the 1960s and 1970, without alienating or shocking neither the royalists and some other traditionalists, nor those nostalgic for French Algeria (Mișcoiu, 2005: 63-77).

This strategy began to show its limits at the end of the 1990s, notably during the split of the National Republican Movement, led by the former No. 2 of the Front, Bruno Mégret (in December 1998). Being above all an interpersonal conflict, the episode of the split of the MNR is however revealing of the deadlock of the frontist strategy. All the reproaches addressed by the Mégret's camp refer to the rigidity of the leadership and the confinement of the FN in the isolationist political logic of the far right, an attitude which has jeopardized any effort to participate in majority coalitions in the local or regional councils and made surreal the possibility of concluding a governmental alliance with the right. The use of anti-Semitism is one of the themes criticized by the dissident faction, since it was a subject which

caused a general outcry and therefore contributed to the political isolation of the FN.

After the defeat in the second round of the 2002 presidential election, the FN's anti-Semitism became a burden. Surveys that could not escape Jean-Marie Le Pen have shown that the rejection of the FN was based on a few images stuck to its president, the most terrifying of which were that of the anti-Semite, that of the violent man, that of the anti-Arab (Sofres, 2002). Moreover, between the rejection of Islam "officially" adopted as a strategy by the FN and the traditional anti-Semitism of the party, cohabitation becomes less and less possible, while the security-related issues radicalized public opinion: they hypertrophied Islamophobic fears and validated the demand for ultra-severe security policies, like the ones practiced by the Israeli state. Without having decided on the matter, Jean-Marie Le Pen tried to moderate his speech for the 2007 elections, by making concessions in particular with regard to Islamism and by softening his stances in matters of security. But since he was in competition with the institutional right wing candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, who had taken up the hard core of the 2002 frontist topics, Le Pen made a disappointing score (11%) and missed the opportunity to have altered his image of anti-Semite in a positive way (Mișcoiu, 2009: 188-191).

3. MARINE LE PEN OR HOW TO TURN THE PAGE ON FN'S HISTORIC ANTI-SEMITISM

For Marine Le Pen, the strategy of dis-demonization dates at least from the informal entrenchment of the idea of her succession at the controls of the FN, meaning just before the 2007 presidential elections. If this strategy did not work in 2007, it was for two reasons. First, it was too new, to the point that it even surprised the National Front militants, as shown by the episode of the presence of a young West Indian woman on a poster through which the party was attacking the failure of the social and cultural integration policies. Then, even if the strategy was not necessarily bad, the person supposed to embody it back then – Jean-Marie Le Pen – certainly did not have the necessary profile and did not go on the paths of moderation and modernization to the end. From the moment she was assured of succeeding her father, Marine Le Pen's attitude was going to be radically different. While knowing that the hard liners of the party were going to be initially reluctant in the face of an abrupt change, she initially staggered the reforms in homeopathic

doses (2007-2009), by ensuring control over the apparatus of the party and giving herself a stature of national leader through her entrenchment in Hénin-Beaumont, in the deprived mining area of the North (Le Pen, 2011). It was only during a second stage and following a series of satisfactory results (in the municipal elections of 2008 and in the European elections of 2009) that she began changes in strategy, while taking care not to upset the various sensitivities of her party and in particular to provoke negative reactions on the part of her father, which could have jeopardized the formal succession. Finally, most of the expected changes took place after she was elected at the January 2011 Congress and the after the change of the FN's whole management team.

What was the essence of these changes and what was the place occupied by anti-Semitism in the new ideological context? If the general strategy was dis-demonization, the ideological essence behind this strategy is anchored in the convictions of Marine Le Pen and of her colleagues of the new management team. In economic and social matters, the new FN is significantly more to the left than the old one, while advocating solidarity, the fight against "world finance", the return to the "social elevator" and protectionism. From a social-cultural point of view and with regard to identity themes, the differences are less important: the same insistence on the dangers of immigration and insecurity, a similar traditionalist conception of the family and a roughly equal dose of intransigence in relation to intellectual, sexual or cultural emancipation, at least during the first years of "Marinism" (2011-2015). Finally, in foreign policy, the same rejection of "Euro-globalism", the same contempt for the Obama's United States and the same hypercritical attitude towards China.

If there is a difference, it lies rather in the appearance and the political style of the two Le Pens. Dis-demonization works mainly because Marine is a woman, she belongs to another generation, sporting a more relaxed face, more easily seducing young people, emphasizing less ideological hard cores and clinging to themes more in line with the current concerns of the French citizens. The ultra-secular turning point of 2010 is indicative of the strategic chameleonic transformation of the FN, more capable than before of conforming to the citizens' demands and expectations of the moment (Mișcoiu, 2012:100-116).

It is in these terms that the issue of the FN's inflection on anti-Semitism should be addressed. For Marine Le Pen, it would firstly be useless and counterproductive to persist on a "detail" which,

far from providing support, could largely harm her political project, by shattering the whole strategy of dis-demonization. Indeed, the atmosphere of the past ten years has been marked by an escalation of issues related to identity and immigration, where the thorny problems of the integration of Muslim communities have brutally arisen (Mişcoiu, 2015). At the same time, there have been no incidents involving the Jewish community, which has been repeatedly cited as an example of “successful integration”. Thus, attacking a “perfectly” integrated community would have been a misstep that Marine Le Pen was wise enough not to make.

It is though obvious that the new FN leader was raised in an environment permeated with anti-Semitism. In their book, Caroline Fourest and Fiammetta Venner describe the Le Pens’ traditional hostility towards the Jews, which sometimes resulted in competitions for the identification of “Ikey heads” who appeared on TV (Fourest & Venner, 2011: 53). But, unlike her father and the other frontist leaders born before the Second World War, Marine Le Pen did not necessarily internalize anti-Semitism as a constitutive element of her vision of the world, but rather as a way of resisting to the wide rejection that the activity of the National Front aroused within the political class and the French society. Anti-Semitism *à la Marine Le Pen* is rather connected with to the cosmopolitan “elitocracy” which has isolated its family and its party. That said, this anti-Semitism is not systematic but instrumental and appears to be devoid of the virulence that has traditionally characterized her political family since the end of the 19th century.

The choice to abandon (at least temporarily) anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism can also be explained by the positioning of the FN/RN president within her political party. In order to mark her differences compared to the “dinosaurs” of the Jean-Marie Le Pen generation, Marine assiduously cultivates ambiguity in her attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, by taking positions that can be considered to be almost balanced, to the dismay of historic anti-Zionists like Alain Soral, who did not hesitate to accuse her of “having become a part of the Israeli system” and to slam the door of the FN (Fourest & Venner, 2011:349).

By moving away from anti-Semitism, Marine Le Pen was able to force the resignation or withdrawal of a series of members of the old National Front guard. This was first the case of Carl Lang and his followers (including especially some former members of the governing bodies of the FN: Martial Bild, Martine Lehideux, Bernard

Antony, Jean-Claude Martinez and Fernand Le Rachinel), who deplored the “socialist” drift imposed by Marine Le Pen. After a traumatic process of reorganization, this group founded in 2009 a party more anchored in the traditional values of the extreme right, the Party of France, which obtained insignificant results in the next years’ elections (Faye, Mestre & Monnot, 2010: 6).

The final momentum of the last “ultra” of the old FN was their attempts to tighten the lines around Bruno Gollnisch – former Number 2 of the party and counter-candidate of Marine Le Pen for the presidency of the FN – while brandishing the danger of contamination of the FN by “Jewish cholera”. Even if Gollnisch has distanced himself from his viscerally anti-Semitic supporters, Marine Le Pen was able to pose as a victim of... anti-Semitism and thus obtain a Republican coat of arms to win the internal election hands down (with two thirds of the votes casted by the party’s militants). Attacks by radicals like Marc George and the entire anti-Marine campaign orchestrated by the radical far-right weekly, *Rivarol*, and peppered with sexist and anti-Semitic insults have served the cause of the dis-demonization of the new FN, who, unlike the former, was said to be so republican and non-anti-Semitic that it became itself the object of attacks by anti-Semites.

4. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS: FULLSTOP OR POINT-VIRGULE?

Like all of the political actions she initiated, the renunciation – as temporary as it may be – to anti-Semitism is framed in the logic of a discursive strategy rather than in the logic of an essentialist doctrinal reconstruction. Adapted to the comings and goings of post-television politics, Marine Le Pen is less the woman with unshakable political convictions than the heiress of a political empire designed for the dimensions of her father and which she strives to carve out to her size. Intuitively, anti-Semitism was no longer a profitable strategy and therefore had to be at least temporarily abandoned. As it was not “written in the DNA” of Marine Le Pen and as her opponents within the National Front used it to the extreme, anti-Semitism could easily be ruled out for the time being from the party’s discourse.

However, the depth and the irreversibility of this abandonment should not be overestimated. If the new “rally generation” is undoubtedly less affected by anti-Semitic culture and education, it would not remain indifferent if electoral or symbolic capitalization based on the use of anti-

Semitic themes became possible again. Admittedly, for the moment it is above all a part of the radical leftists who denounce globalization, imperialism, anti-Islamism and the tyranny of bankers – so many themes which lend themselves better to be articulated through social and economic anti-Semitism. But, as was once the case with anti-Islamism, anti-Semitism should remain a valuable ammunition, usable if the opportunity arises again.

What Marine Le Pen will have to avoid are above all the partial and inconsistent uses of anti-Semitic comments, in the absence of a well-thought-out strategy for returning to anti-Semitism. The political context of the late 2010s and of the early 2020s is far from a good opportunity to return to anti-Semitic discourses. The way it looks today, the cultural climate is not favourable to a new change of strategy. This allows us to conclude that the period of the National Front's founding anti-Semitism seems to be over, but that the door to anti-Semitic ideas is still open.

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EVERY OBJECT HAS AN OWNER – TAKING RESPONSIBILITY ON THE FUTURE OF LOOTED ART

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Abstract: *This paper aims to analyze the difficulties of conducting a provenance research for Nazi era looted art, in order to function within the premise that every object has an owner. Public and private collections worldwide contain an unknown number of objects for which there is no provenance, no history. Therefore, there is no understanding of who owned these objects. The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the axiom that no object is heirless unless it is labeled as such. Every object begins with an owner, its maker or its creator. Therefore, once it leaves its original, primal owner, the path of the object will be either licit or illicit depending on the circumstances of its removal, transfer, transactions that it was subjected to and the larger historical context in which these movements or translocations took place. This paper begins with a brief history of Nazi's organized plunder. The paper then moves to describe Provenance research and its importance within the field of Looted Art of Nazi Era. Furthermore, the paper reviews the efforts made by various actors, to raise the issue of looted art to an international level, and the attempts made to set various European Governments Cultural agendas. We will then discuss the Gurlitt Trove, which will lead us to describe the German national initiative, and raise questions as for what can be done to change the ongoing situation within European Culture, what can be done with lack of due diligence and can there be change by increased scrutiny of the trade.*

Keywords: *Provenance Research; Looted Art; Nazi Era; Heirless Object; European Culture*

1. INTRODUCTION

A new display at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art tells a surprising story of how a painting, seized by the Nazis in 1933 from the Jewish German media mogul Rudolf Mosse, entered the Israeli museum's collection 60 years later.

The painting, "*From Darkness to Light*" (1871) by the Dutch painter Jozef Israels, was identified by the Mosse Art Research Initiative in 2017. The painting was sold at an auction in 1934 and resurfaced on the market in 1993, when it was bought in good faith by the Tel Aviv-based art dealer, Meir Stern, an Auschwitz survivor himself. Stern sold the work to a private collector who donated it to the museum the same year. The case illuminates the challenges still involved in identifying and restituting Nazi-looted art. The Mosse Art Research Initiative is a provenance research project, which was set up by Mosse's heirs and the German government.

All through history, plunder and pillage of cultural assets was an integral part of war. Cities which contained private and public collections of

valuable goods were looted through time. The rise of the National Socialist party (NS) in 1933 showed to us all how a national revolution can be a cultural revolution as well as political or economic one. The forbidden fruits of this so called revolution have haunted us till this day and age.

This paper aims to analyze the difficulties of conducting a provenance research for Nazi era looted art in order to function within the premise that every object has an owner. This paper emphasizes that every object begins with an owner, its maker or its creator, and once it leaves its original, primal owner, the object will be either licit or illicit depending on the circumstances of its removal, transfer, and transactions that it was subjected to and the larger historical context in which these movements or translocations took place. This paper begins with a brief history of the Nazi organized plunder. It describes what consists of looted art and then moves to describe Provenance research and its importance within the field of Looted Art of Nazi Era. This paper will review the efforts made, by different actors, to raise the issue of looted art to an international level, and the attempts

made to set various European Governments Cultural agendas. We will then discuss the Gurlitt Trove, the story which brought the issue of provenance research, and its importance, back to the public international debate. The Gurlitt Affair will lead us to describe the German national initiative compared to Israel's helplessness in the situation, and raise questions as to what can be done to change the ongoing situation within European Culture, how we can create a cultural education towards due diligence, which should be integrated into the daily routine of anyone who handles cultural, artistic and ritual objects, and how we can increase scrutiny of the trade. The paper concludes by arguing that every object has an owner and to be true to that axiom research has to be conducted into the history of the objects so that something is known.

2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

2.1 The Nazi's Organized Plunder. Several scholars state that the theft of cultural property during WWII was not a mere incidence of war, but an official policy. In 1933, after Hitler's appointment as Chancellor (on January 30th 1933), the Nazi affiliated Combat League for German Culture held their first meeting in Stuttgart. New ideas were then revealed - the national revolution above all was a cultural revolution. Nazi art looting would not have been a war priority if Hitler and Goering were less passionate for the arts. In that case it would not have happened in the methodical manner and on the overwhelming scale it did in Occupied Europe (Feliciano, 1997:4).

Looted Art consists of artworks, including paintings, prints and sculptures, as well as other cultural property plundered from Jews by the Nazis, their allies and collaborators. It includes Judaica, meaning not only the ritual objects but also libraries and archival materials relating to Judaism and to Jewish organizations and Jewish life generally (Fisher, Weinberger, 2014:3).

During WW2 the Third Reich amassed hundreds of thousands of objects from occupied nations and stored them in several key locations in Europe (Kurtz 2006: 12-18). Several scholars review the following entities who carried out the plan to collect the appropriate art of Europe: **The Sonderauftrag Linz (Linz Special Commission)** – Operated directly under Hitler in order to turn the Austrian town of Linz into Europe's art capital. It was achieved by theft, confiscation, and forced sales. For example, the Rothschild collection in Vienna was seized for this purpose of serving as the core of the museum's collection. **The**

Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (Special Command Force of Reich Leader Rosenberg) or ERR - The Nazi looting agencies, created in 1939 by Alfred Rosenberg. Rosenberg, chief ideologue of the Nazi party, was authorized to collect libraries and archives that would become the core of the Institute for Biological and Racial Studies in Stuttgart and the Institute for Jewish Research in Frankfurt – both branches of the Nazi "Hohe Schule" he planned to establish after the war. In late 1940 the ERR was authorized to seize all property belonging to the Jews of France (Kurtz 2006: 20-24). **Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring** - Göring who was an eager and greedy art collector, controlled the ERR for a short period of time. Göring chose for himself the best of the confiscated artworks, mostly from what had been gathered at the Musée du Jeu de Paume in Paris. **Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer-SS, head of the Gestapo and the Waffen SS** - In order to establish the prehistoric roots of the Aryan race, Himmler led plunder operations in Poland and the Baltic states, focusing on archaeological items. By controlling the Reich's Security Main Office (RSHA), his men were ordered to loot every archive and library. At the end of WWII and even after, huge quantities of looted art and cultural goods were found by allied forces. A special task force was assembled by allied forces to handle the goods and first step was to transfer the goods to collection points. Collections points were established all over Germany, transferred goods were to be sorted and later on to be returned to their rightful owners. There was no controversy over what should be done with the object which had been seized or without compensation from the overrun countries. Those were to be returned to the countries from which they were taken. The question of how they should be returned had no simple answer (Nicholas, 1995:407). In May 1945 an immediate return of a number of universally recognized works of art had occurred, a program of "ad interim" restitution was to be agreed upon between the U.S. Army and the respective recipient nations. For the Americans it was an unwanted burden and they wanted a quick and unilateral action. By late June 1945, the principle of ad interim return was approved and reaffirmed at Potsdam (Nicholas, 1995:408). United States Military Law no. 59 went into effect in November 1947. It provided the legal basis for internal restitution. Similar restitution laws went into effect in France and in the Netherlands as well. Military Law 59 aimed for a "full and speedy" recovery, but the regulations adopted made it difficult to achieve.

On the one hand, there was a strict deadline for filing petitions for restitution (December 31, 1948 which was later extended to May 1, 1949) and on the other hand, it involved complicated and expensive procedures, which prevented many from claiming their property. Governments placed the burden of initiating and proving claims on the victims and their heirs. As we well know, most of them were struggling to survive and rebuild their lives again. They were mainly occupied with looking for their lost relatives and the remains of their families. By early 1947, several hundreds of paintings and drawings, thousands of Jewish ceremonial and ritual objects, and innumerable books remained in the Collecting points, unclaimed by the representatives of France, Holland, Italy, or any other European countries from which the Nazis had looted the artifacts. All these so called “displaced objects” were to be transferred to charitable organizations. Property at the American zone that was identified as having been looted from Jews or Jewish communal institutions but remained heirless and unclaimed was released in June 1948 by the Americans, to the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO) (Sofer, 2003). JRSO’s goal was to institute proceedings in the American occupation zone for the restitution of heirless property of murdered people and dissolved organizations that had been pursued on racial grounds under the Nazi regime. The assets obtained in this manner were distributed by JRSO to Jewish institutions and organizations, primarily in the USA and Israel (Steinberg, 2009). Kagan and Weismann, who worked for the JRSO, reported that in February 1949, the Munich Collecting Point of the U.S. Military Government transferred to the JRSO eleven crates containing nearly 700 art objects. These were shipped to New York and were transferred to the storage rooms of the Jewish Museum in the city for examination and appraisal by experts and art dealers. Thirty-five old paintings that had undergone restoration were shipped to the Bezalel Museum in Israel. The remaining objects – among them some 100 paintings, 150 drawings and prints, 200 miniatures, a number of carved angels in wood, and a large figure of St. Ambrosius – were offered at a public sale in New York. The existence of the collection was publicly advertised so as to enable individual owners or their heirs to come forward, and several paintings were indeed claimed and withdrawn from the sale (Kagan, Weismann, 1949:31). The unclaimed items from the Munich collection point were distributed by the JCR as follows: 40% to Israel, 40% to the United States, and the remaining

20% to be divided between the Jewish communities of England, South Africa, Canada, and Argentina, where large congregations resided (Narkiss, 1954).

2.2 Provenance Research and A New Awareness. At the end of WWII, looted objects kept on changing hands, were transferred to dealers, art galleries and museums collections, and various private hands. Ultimately, it was up to the receiving governments of each nation if and under which circumstances they would return the objects to its rightful owners.

In recent years we can see that, museums in Europe and in United States have received and resolved an increasing number of restitution claims, for works of art in their collections, particularly the returns of Nazi era looted art. Such claims forced the collections handlers to clarify how those objects provenance, therefore, looking into their history of ownership – conducting provenance research. Provenance is the history of ownership of a valued object. It tells the story of the object’s journey. A full provenance provides us with a documented history of an object that can help prove its ownership, assign the object to a known artist, and establish the object’s authenticity. It is often used to establish an object’s value.

A new awareness of the increasing value of art and of the legal possibilities of recovering Jewish property arose in the late 1990s. Until then the world had 30 years of a relative silence. Europe post war was a wounded nation trying to rebuild itself. The unification of Germany in 1990 and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 were followed by a number of goodwill agreements between Germany and the countries of the former USSR, as well as the opening of official negotiations on repatriation (Konstantin & Kozlov, 1991). Several books were published regarding cultural and art restitution, books which mapped out the scope of the Nazi’s plunder and the subject of looted art and the destruction of cultural heritage during WWII.

Significant developments can be found between the end of the 1980s and the 1990s. Among these developments we can find ICOM Code of Professional Ethics and in particular Principle 2.3, which deals with Provenance and due diligence, an international symposium named *The Spoils of War—World War II and Its Aftermath: The Loss, Reappearance, and Recovery of Cultural Property* was held in New York City in 1995 (Simpson, 1997), this international symposium addressed another dimension of the

war and elevated the topic to a public forum. But in 1998 a clear statement concerning art restitution, confiscated by the Nazi regime in Germany before and during WWII, was made for the first time. The Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art was held from November 30 to December 3, 1998 and was attended by 44 states' representatives, 13 nongovernmental organizations, art museums and auction houses. The conference goal was to discuss Jewish losses in particular, including artworks, books, and archives, as well as insurance claims.

44 countries endorsed the Washington Principles and the task laid on each country was to adopt these principles to their own judicial system, and to legislate appropriate laws. Only 5 countries initiated some moves to implement the Principles to their internal laws, but only Austria legislated in 1998 the Federal Art Restitution Law. In 2009, Austria updated and amended its Restitution Law in order for it to be less restrictive. The Restitution Law allows state-run museums to de-accession artworks if they are proven to have been looted or otherwise misappropriated. In November 2018 the German Lost Art Foundation organized a follow up conference to mark the 20th anniversary of the Washington Conference to take stock of progress and examine what remains to be done to improve access to the just and fair solution. Twenty years on, and Nazi-looted art is still regularly restituted and many families are still seeking stolen art and cultural artifacts.

The main criticism over the Washington Principles is that firstly these Principles are not legally binding, second, the principles were devised only for public institutions and museums and some of the terms used are vague on purpose. The principles focus on artworks which were "confiscated by the Nazis" and other forms of dispossession during the Nazi dictatorship can equally be resolved in a "just and fair" manner. In 1999 the European Union issued the *Resolution 1205 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe* (PACE 1205/1999). The Assembly added its weight to the process of restitution of looted Jewish cultural property to original owners or their heirs (individuals, institutions or communities). It called for the organization of a European conference, further to that held in Washington on the Holocaust Era assets, with special reference to the return of cultural property and the relevant legislative reform.

In October 2000, The Council of Europe held the Vilnius International Forum in Lithuania as a follow-up to the Washington Conference of

December 1998. As a result, the Vilnius Forum Declaration was drafted. All participated governments were asked to reach just and fair solutions to retribute looted art. By 2001 the American Association of Museum's (AAM) published its seminal Guide to Provenance Research (Yeide *et al.*, 2001). Even before these written guidelines, museums were conducting Provenance research but its focus was different. The years 1933-1945 needed to be dealt differently, but did not receive the extra care needed. Some museums chose to turn a blind eye to this gap in information and received works of art from donors or purchased them while taking a chance on what the future will hold (Steinberg, 2009).

In 2009 a non-binding declaration was issued by 47 countries, agreeing on measures to right economic wrongs that accompanied the Holocaust against the Jews and other victims of Nazi persecution in Europe, i.e., the Terezin Declaration. The Terezin declaration is neither a treaty nor legally binding international agreement. A year later, 43 of the signatories (excluding Belarus, Malta, Russia and Poland) endorsed a companion document, the *2010 Guidelines and Best Practices for the Restitution and Compensation of Immovable (Real) Property*, which set best practices for immovable property. According to the guidelines, restitution of the property itself (*in rem*) is preferred, however when that is not possible, payment or substitute property that is fair and satisfactory is possible.

2.3 The Gurlitt Trove and Germany National Initiative. On September 22, 2010, Cornelius Gurlitt returned from Switzerland to Germany. German customs officials stopped him at the German–Switzerland border holding a large amount of cash. He claimed that he carried the allowed amount of cash over the border, explaining the money was proceeds from a sale of a painting. Suspicion of illegal actions led to a search warrant of his apartment in Munich. While searching his apartment, German custom found more than 100 framed art works and more than 1,000 unframed art works. The collection was left to Cornelius by his father Hildebrand Gurlitt. The Germans realized the importance of their findings, and demanded a full understanding of its ramifications before announcing their findings to the public. The collection was hidden for almost 70 years, sold piecemeal to cover 81-year-old so called "owner" Cornelius Gurlitt's medical bills. Cornelius's father was Hitler's art dealer. He traded art, mainly in Paris from 1941 to 1945, as one of four agents

tasked by the Commission for the Exploitation of Degenerate Art with selling the modern art which Hitler thought was un-nationalistic. Gurlitt's task was to liquidate funds through the modern art's sale and then purchase masterpieces for Hermann Goering's personal collection and Hitler's planned Linz museum. While doing so he built his own private collection by cheating his employers and work unauthorized transactions. Most of the collected art, it seems, was purchased in coerced sales or confiscated from Jewish houses, or from artists and collectors of degenerate art Hoffmann. (2018). After 1945, the Gurlitt family spent three years in house arrest until he convinced the authorities that he himself was prosecuted by the Nazis for his paternal grandmother who was Jewish. They let the family go and by 1948 they moved to Dusseldorf, where he became the director of a museum. His art collection returned to him in 1950 and was even part of a New York exhibition on 1956.

The Gurlitt Scandal, once broken to the public, had a hard effect on the German government. The legal ramifications were so complicated that German authorities, while trying to understand how it should be dealt with, hid the discovery for a year. Once the story broke to the public, the undealt provenance research of Nazi looted art was raised again at the public debate. Public criticism was directed at public institutions: against museums, libraries and archives. The Gurlitt story was not the first one, the interest had already been awakened worldwide in the 1990s, initially by scholarly publications and in 1998 by a Egon Schiele's painting *Wally* (Heus, 2018). Another famous restitution case was the Adele Bloch-Bauer painting (later a Hollywood film). Not all cases have a happy ending, curators find themselves torn between their wish to do the right thing, and their concern about giving back a work of art which is of great importance to the unity of the collection they are in charge of (Steinberg, 2008).

In Germany the initial preoccupation with the subject of looted, confiscated art came to light with the German Unification. After the Washington Conference of 1998, in December 1999, the declaration to identify and retribute cultural assets confiscated by the NS especially from Jewish property was adopted by the federal government of Germany, the federal states and local umbrella organizations. Since the year 2000, an infrastructure has gradually been established in Germany, which has facilitated the necessary urgent exchange between experts as well as the financial support of provenance research.

Between 1998 and 2000, the first provenance research team in Germany began working in museums. In November 2000, a small circle of four provenance researchers met for the first time and founded the provenance research working group. Its aim was to encourage mutual exchange and thus facilitate research. During the years the group continued to grow and by 2014 amounted to 90 researchers (many from Austria and Germany, only one from Switzerland). By 2018 it grew to 200 researchers. Since 2006, the "Federal Office for Central Services and Unresolved Property Issues" handles looted art that is still in German governmental possession, including the Remainder of Stock CCP (Central Collecting Point) covering among other objects, approximately 2,300 paintings, sculptures, or graphics. In November 2007, culture minister Neumann created the *Arbeitsstelle für Provenienzrecherche/-forschung* (Bureau for Provenance Investigation & Research) which is jointly financed by Germany's regional culture foundations. In response to the Gurlitt affair and its collection which needed to be identified, in February 2014 Germany's culture minister Monika Grütters proposed the establishment of a *Deutsches Zentrum Kulturgutverluste – German Lost Art Foundation*. The center aims to research public institutions as well as private ones that adhere to the Washington Principles. In 2019 it published a *Guide on Provenance Research in Germany*. Furthermore, in 2019, the Foundation published the first volume of "Provenire". It presents 40 paper results and experiences of provenance research on Nazi looting in Germany and contains material from 10 years of research in cultural institutions, which was funded by the Foundation. The second volume will contain the research work on the Gurlitt Trove and is scheduled to be published in April 2020. In January 2020 the Foundation opened a *Help Desk* - a central point of contact in Berlin for enquiries from those whose cultural assets were seized as a result of persecution under the National Socialist regime, and their descendants.

It seems that Germany has understood the importance of Provenance research.

2.4 What Does the Future Hold? On October 4th, 2018, the Center Organizations of Holocaust Survivors in Israel, the Claims Conference and the Ministry of Equality of Israel held a conference on the future of looted art in Jerusalem, Israel. The goal of the conference was to put this issue of looted art again on the agenda of the various Governments. Provenance Research is about

learning the complex history of an object as well as about being ethical and addressing the problem of illicit ownership.

On January 17, 2019, the European Parliament passed resolution 2017/2023(INI) on cross-border restitution claims of works of art and cultural goods looted in armed conflicts and wars. The EU resolution refers, among others, to the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, the Vilnius Forum and the Terezin Declaration, which were mentioned above. It states that there is no complete list of artworks restituted in recent years, and artworks that are still missing, and waiting to be returned to their rightful owners or to their heirs. This resolution touches the problematic area of private law and the insufficiently developed dimension of it, both at an international and European level. The European Parliament stated that it is time to put an end to the years of convolutions and nuances if a responsible and ethical European art market is to be established. It called on the Commission, in this regard, to identify civil law measures to help overcome the difficult problems encountered by private parties seeking the restitution of works of art genuinely belonging to them. It called on the Commission to develop a new debating framework for the identification of best practices and solutions for the present and the future. The European Parliament stated that provenance research is closely linked to the due diligence obligation applicable when acquiring works of art and constitutes a major concern for all the actors in the art market as acquiring stolen artworks knowingly or through negligence, is punishable under certain national laws. Care should be taken to create a comprehensive listing of all cultural objects, including Jewish-owned cultural objects plundered by the Nazis and their allies, from the time of their spoliation to the present day. The EU Parliament urged the Commission to support a catalogue system, to be used also by public entities and private art collections, to gather data on the situation of looted, stolen or illegally obtained cultural goods and the exact status of existing claims. It urged the Commission to support digitization projects that would establish digital databases or connect existing ones in order to facilitate the exchange of such data and provenance research. Furthermore, it has considered that to enable proper provenance research, a documentary record or a transaction register that is as detailed as possible needs to be created. The Parliament urged the Commission to encourage provenance research activities

throughout the Union and to support it financially. It was also suggested that the Commission will organize a discussion forum in order to exchange best practices and find the best solutions for the present and the future.

The question remains, how can we achieve an appropriate solution to the issue of Nazi era looted art? What is a just and fair solution? What approach will serve the cause better - a legislative one or a diplomatic one? Will the European Union (EU Parliament and the Commission) move further in this area?

A study in the field of provenance research of Nazi looted art will aim to contribute an important tier to the currently available knowledge. It will enable access to a new perspective and interpretation of the international policy which takes place in the provenance research and restitution of Nazi looted art. The main research objective is to develop a policy model for European countries in regard to handling Jewish owned looted art. This policy model will hopefully be able to function along the premise that every object has an owner. The research will focus on the behavior patterns of focused European states with regard to provenance research of Nazi looted art. The research will explore and map selective states activity and will attempt to put into place which set of rules, standards, and practices have been used by the European countries who wish to address provenance research of Nazi looted art. The research aims to develop propositions regarding what needs to be done to create a more ethical moral international society and to offer insights that would form an important component in creating a government's strategy in cultural diplomacy.

3. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Culture heritage cannot be effectively protected without the market transparency and due diligence. Every artwork has an owner, might be its maker of its creator, but no object is heirless unless it is labeled as one. Once an object leaves its maker/ creator it is connected at any given point to a person, to a location and to a date. Therefore, an object always has an owner, whether identified or not.

Dealing with provenance research of looted artwork is a long, expensive and complex process. There are legal issues and many difficulties in finding heirs. States need to make the efforts and seek justice despite the passage of time. When it comes to looted artworks the wheels of justice turn slowly and it is the duty of leaders to turn them faster. Governments need to be encouraged to

adopt the Washington and Terezin principles into their legal systems and legislate appropriate laws. Acts of research must be carried out at national and institutional levels so as to determine which works are looted art. We need to remember that behind every confiscated, looted work of art lies the fate of an individual. Without engaging with basic exercise of due diligent the problem of provenance research will remain unsolved. The stories of these so called heirless objects need to be told, as they are our past and therefore our presence.

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DAILY PRACTICE AS A CREATOR OF COMMON SHARED VALUES

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Abstract: *This abstract sets out to highlight how Social Psychology, over the last seventy years, has demonstrated various functional ways in which groups different in terms of ethnicity, religion, sexual preference, economic and cultural level can interact without conflict (Mazzara, 2017). Although pioneering, the studies of W. Allport in the 1950's succeeded in intercepting concepts, among which the 1954 Theory of Contact, a theory which identified four fundamental elements through which diverse groups might relate to one another both positively and efficiently: positive and pleasant interaction, similar status, possibility of prior consciousness and institutional support. Successive studies of non-conflictual inter-group behavior, such as Pettigrew and Tropp (2000), Tajfel and Turner (1979) and Turner (1979), also have Allport's four elements at their base. Considering Allport's vision, one may deduce that multi-culturalism (interaction between differing social groups and their mutual recognition) is to be regarded as an enriching exchange for all groups in as much as each one helps the other. Should this contact occur within this favourable framework, it is highly likely that this interaction can reduce prejudice effectively (Sherif, 1966). Thus, when speaking of multi-culturalism, one is not speaking of an abstract idea but of one which is concrete and based upon reciprocal exchange/help. This leads to the recognition to exist with parity both as a group and as a culture; this represents the creation of daily practice which, with time, will become common values (Sartori, 2000).*

Keywords: *Gordon W. Allport; Multiculturalism; Prejudice, Theory of Contact*

1. INTRODUCTION

In the years the studies of the social psychology showed that can give a valid scientific contribution for the study of social policies that analyzing the relationship among people groups of different nature by ethnicity, sex and gender (Brown, 2001). In the last forty years, issues relating to civil rights and multiculturalism have been one of the main themes of both the psychological and political sciences (Clichres, 2009). The Contact Theory of Gordon W. Allport (1954) gave a scientific frame of reference for the development of social policies relating to inclusion between groups. Over the years the theoretical conception of multiculturalism has undergone several interpretations. In the 1970's and 1980's prevailed ethnocentric theories, while today the prevailing theories try to find the values which can be shared of the different groups that live in the same society.

2. EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BETWEEN THE EARLY 1900s AND 1950s

1908 is the date generally traced to the birth of social psychology. This is due to the publication of

the first two manuals of the discipline: *Handbook of Social Psychology* by Edward A. Ross and *Social Psychology* by William MacDougall (Amerio, 1995). In 1931 G. Murphy wrote the book "Experimental Social Psychology" where for the first time have been analysed the results of empirical research, made in all previous years, inherent the relationship between heredity and environment. This review focused on identifying if there was differences between individuals due to the race and gender. The authors conclude that what discriminated against one group over another was not ethnicity and gender but schooling and urbanization.

in the other words, neither a simple racial nor a simple national explanation of the result will be suffice. On the contrary, the data show that there are within each race "good" samples and "bad" samples; that there are within each nation good samples and bad samples (Murphy, 1937:67)

The book *Experimental Social Psychology* also delineates the scientific results achieved as well as between differences between race and gender and also the difference within the white ethnic group. The eugenics considered Hierarchically the Anglo-

Saxon and northern European peoples more smarter than the all other peoples of European (Horsman, 1997).

If on the one hand social psychology had managed to demonstrate scientifically that there were no differences between: races (based on biological aspects), between peoples within the same ethnic group and gender attitudinal differences on the other hand the prejudice was, in daily life, the most widespread tool for intergroup relations within society.

In the modern era Gordon W. Allport can be considered the scholar who define the concept of prejudice. Allport introduced a methodology that, dynamically, combined on the one hand aspects of context: historical-economic, socio-cultural and "situational" and on the other hand the way in which individuals organize and substantiate knowledge by processing the stimuli of the context.

Given the dynamic nature of the various aspects mentioned above, Allport considered prejudice as a normal and not pathological thought process (as Adorno did later). For Allport, prejudices allow the individual to master the extreme complexity of environmental stimuli (context) and to act effectively in relation to them.

Allport in his bias theory has analysed:

the generalization process the constant tendency of the human mind to extend the observations made on the few available events to large series of events.

the process of categorization, that is, a grouping of stimuli and events in sets as homogeneous as possible.

stereotype is formed from the combination of the generalization process and the categorization process. For Allport, the stereotype has a descriptive value of the category in that it represents the assessments and expectations that were formed during the generalization process.

Allport in his analysis concerning inter-group relations underlined how the concepts of: in-group, (relations between members of the same group), out-group (relations between members of different groups) and favoritism for in-group (subjects of the same group who perceive themselves more favorably than the subjects of the other groups). The concepts mentioned above is the elements that triggering the process of categorization and consequently of prejudice and discrimination. In 1954 Allport defined the *Theory of Contact*, a theory which identified four fundamental elements through which diverse groups might relate to one another both positively and efficiently: positive

and pleasant interaction, similar status, possibility of prior consciousness and institutional support.

In 2006 the empirical validity of the *Contact Theory* was unequivocally highlighted by the meta-analysis of Pettigrew and Tropp who examined 515 studies for a total of 250,494 participants from 38 different nations.

In the United States between the 1960' and 1970', the *Contact Theory* had an application effect to try to control and reduce the forms of racism that hindered the recognition of civil rights

In 1954 the United States Supreme Court, in the *Brown v. Topeka's Board of Education* accepted the requests from the Browns. The ruling in favor of Brown ended racial segregation in American schools. Allport was also very impressed by the fact that in the ruling *Brown v. Topeka's Board* there was a clear reference was made to the results of the social sciences (for an analysis of the relationship between Allport's theory and his civil commitment see de Carvalho, 1993).

In those years social psychology had defined three different model for define coexistence within the same society of communities that are different from each other for history and traditions. The three approaches were:

(1) Assimilation is required of minority communities to adapt to the rules of the dominant group of society. The assimilationist approach emphasizes the cultural aspect in terms of values:

- patterns of behaviour
- Conception of the state
- Conception of social order

(2) Merger The creation of a homogeneous people (meeting pot). In other words, the different ethnic present in the society dissolve into each other. The "melting pot" will create rise to a different society with autonomous characters both from a biological and a cultural point of view.

(3) Cultural pluralism each group belonging to society has the right to maintain and enhance its roots. In other words, democracy is achieved through tolerance and mutual enrichment in a perspective of cultural pluralism. (Kallen, 1924).

3. GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF THE MULTICULTURALISM

Thanks to the favourable decree of the Constitutional Court (*Brown v. Board of Education*) the struggle for civil rights was invigorated. One of the main-players in this struggle was Martin Luther King who, as leader of the *National Association for the Advancement of Colored People* (NAACP) undertook a battle based

upon non-violence which led to the approval of the *Civil Rights Bill* of 1964 and the *Voting Rights Bill* of 1965 (Kennedy, 1989; Kennedy, 1989).

King's idea of the integration of rights was based upon the concept of "*American creed*" which in turn was centred on the concept of *Democracy* as first put forward by Tocqueville and later by Myrdal in the 1940's.

The element which lay at the base of democratization was the "heterogeneity" of the American people who had been rejected by their homelands, and this "heterogeneity" allowed for the proliferation of a common sense of freedom and opposition to central power. (Ciaralli, 2016:44).

This concept of democracy manifested itself

through the exercising of the political rights and civil responsibilities [colonists] were invested with by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution (Sartori, 2000)

Despite this, in *The Democracy in America* Tocqueville noticed how deeply-rooted racial segregation was in American national character.

The most civil and most avid population of the world had driven the Redskins to extinction and the presence of a black population "was the greatest of all evils which threatened the future of the United States. (Tocqueville, 1835:329)

Bearing this in mind, non-violent methods won; they did not break down the constituted system, they made that system aware of the fact that it was acting incorrectly and not heeding the ideals of the Constitution.

This led to multiculturalism's being a much-debated topic in those years; at the end of the 1960's American society began to question all the values upon which its society was based, that is, *white Anglo-Saxon Protestantism* 7.

From the mid 1960's, groups other than the NAACP in the fight for civil rights began to appear. These new groups looked upon *affirmative action* as something formal but insubstantial (Mammarella, 1984). For this reason, such groups recognized that *New Left* ideas combined with a more radical and violent approach constituted the most effective way to acquire rights.

One of the most widely-known radical groups of the period were the *Black Panther Party* (BPP) 10 which, in 1967, published its *Ten-point Program*, the first point of which included the following statement: "We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black

Community." Underlining their constitutional right to freedom, the BPP would have to accept all other aspects of the constitution. Since the BPP considered the *Black Community* as being distinct from other communities in American society, this implied non-recognition of the Constitution and hence, an antagonistic approach towards the *State*.

After the declamation of their *Ten-point Program*, the BPP began armed patrols in the San Francisco Bay Area. These patrols were introduced to defend themselves from the Police who the BPP regarded as being "representative of a government from which one had to protect oneself, even using arms" (Benvenuti, 2016).

The strategy of struggle used by the King and the BPP may correspond to the two extreme conceptions today present in the struggle for civil rights in terms of ethnicity, religion, sexual preference, economic and cultural level.

While King used the tools already present in the democratic order to achieve his goal in order to achieve integration, (albeit slow, but lasting) he applied the vision of Cultural Pluralism. On the other hand, radical groups used a fundamentalist strategy that often resulted in violence. That is, the root groups implemented undemocratic forms of dialectics as they were not tolerant of others and saw no prospect of enrichment in taking into consideration the themes and cultures of the other groups that were present in society.

The choice of an approach that reflects assimilation or merger or pluralism corresponds to the political vision of a society. Democratic societies today have a pluralistic approach (cultural pluralism). This does not mean that there are no major problems for implementation in daily practices. The pluralistic vision is based on the concept of full equality of individuals from which it follows the elimination of the barriers determined by belonging to both the majority and minority groups.

The concept of equality between men is an integral part of human rights which are a pillar of all the constitutions of democratic nations. Nonetheless, in the current cultural debate there is the possibility of maintaining barriers and differences as it is supported with different motivations both by those who believe in the value of mixing cultural pluralism and those who are afraid of it. The positive social values of tolerance and integration can be recalled at the basis of a hybridization strategy as well as one of reaffirming the differences.

The set of these contradictions, reported in the terms of the current debate, can be read as the

consolidation of "differentialist racism". This form of racism rejects the category of race on a biological basis (classical racism), but emphasizes the cultural (ethnic) differences with which the idea of coexistence is associated more or less as possible between them.

Differentialist racism is not only operated by the majority group but can also be done by minority groups as the BPPs did towards their society. So if up to the mid-1900's racism was only possible by white men (as it is based on biology) today we are witnessing forms of racism on the contrary, that is, by the minority groups that impose, without wanting to find any form agree, their views to the majority.

The deliberative policies of democratic nations implemented over the past sixty years have tried to mitigate as much as possible the discrimination suffered by some minority groups in society by the majority group.

Giovanni Sartori defines deliberative laws as:

Corrective and compensatory policy designed to create, or seek, equal opportunities, that is, equal starting positions for all. Therefore the objective of the affirmative actions is to cancel the differences that disadvantage and then restore the difference blindness of the law equal for all. So the goal still remains the "undifferentiated citizen (Sartori, 2000:73).

From the 1960's to the mid-1980's, in the United States was made programs for the integration of the various ethnic groups of the American society. These programs were based on the concept of color blindness which is:

The term color blindness express the idea of a non racial society wherein skin colour is no have consequence for individual life chances or governmental policy. Central tenets of colour blindness included non discrimination, due process, equally of opportunity, and equal protection of rights under the law. (Schaefer, 2008:320).

For example, in public schools were dictated that in the primary and secondary school classes no was permitted predominance of an ethnic group but that all the ethnic groups residing in that region should also be present (on a percentage basis).

In New York, public school students were subject to long journeys between one district and another in the city so that classes were made up of the various ethnic groups in the city.

In those years in the Bronx there was a very high crime rate compared to the other districts of the city. This differentiation was reflected in the

interaction between students from the Bronx and those from other districts. This differentiation was due to a prejudice. The bronxites were considered violent and dangerous. The colour blindness policies actually conflict fully with Allport's contact theory as the students did not have a status (similar socioeconomic) and did not have prior direct knowledge. In everyday practice this led to heated quarrels among students from the Bronx with those from other districts. These school policies have brought about a negative effect or the birth of *re-segregation*:

The tendency of individuals to seek mainly the company of their own kind and to oppose more or less explicitly to the various cooperative integration programs (Mazzara, 1996:178).

Today, fifty years later, there are many studies on the negative effect that this type of policy has had (Donnor, 2013).

4. EUROPE AND POSSIBLE EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION POLICIES

The example of the Unites Stated social policies allows us today to be able to identify which are the winning and losing strategies for good social integration. At the same time, social psychology has shown which scientific elements produce positive contact between groups. Nevertheless today we have problem for the establishment of valid social integration policies. The problem previously mentioned can be traced back to two factors: little attention to the errors committed by certain social policies and the lack of consideration of the social sciences for the benefit of an ideological interpretation of scientific data and the foundations of human rights. In 1969 Sartori wrote:

In the other terms, we are required to conceive ideology as a dimension or an aspect of politics which may, or may not, be found to apply to real world. For this purpose ideological politics will be opposed her to pragmatic politics, i.e. , pragmatism will be used as a designation for non-ideology (Sartori, 1969:399).

The possible social policies reflect the conception that the various states have of the concept of multiculturalism. Sartori argued that two visions of multiculturalism can be given. A first view of multiculturalism is understood as a fact that simply records the multiplicity of various cultures. In this sense, multiculturalism does not

pose problems for a pluralist conception of the world. Multiculturalism is understood as one of the possible historical representations of pluralism. But if multiculturalism is given a (priority) value,

then the discussion changes and the problem there is. The problem arise because in this case pluralism and multiculturalism immediately enter a collision course (Sartori, 2000, p. 56).

More multiculturalism does not automatically mean more pluralism. If a given society is culturally heterogeneous, the term pluralism incorporates it as such. But if a society is not, pluralism does not feel obliged to multi-culturalize it. Pluralism values diversity and considers it enriching. But it does not imply that diversity is to be increased, and it certainly does not imply that the best possible way is a diversified world in ever increasing diversification. Pluralism arises from the concept of tolerance. The latter concept does not exalt the high and the otherness: it accepts them. This means that pluralism defends but also slows down diversity (Zanfarino, 1985).

Pluralism urges that much assimilation that is needed to create integration. Furthermore, being tolerant, pluralism is not aggressive and is not warlike. But if in a peaceful way it fights disintegration.

A second vision of multiculturalism is a neo-Marxist theoretical vision of English and French origin that has established itself in colleges, universities, with the introduction of Cultural Studies.

The result of this vision has had two distinct results over time:

1. In the 1970's and 1980' there was a negating conception of pluralism developed through ethnocentric theories (Diop, 1974).

2. At the end of the 1980s was developed social theories that sustained that the different ethnicities could have a democratic dialectic in the society and at the same maintain of the culture of origin.

The most recent theories such as that of Benhabib are very accurate from a theoretical formal point of view but difficult to implement in practice. (Hughes, 1993).

5. CONCLUSIONS

Nowadays, in order to create social policies that support integration, we have the opportunity to take advantage of both tested scientific instruments of social psychology, and examples of previous social policies, whether successful or unsuccessful, made in various countries of the world.

We could be inferred that the difficulty that exists in establishing social policies that are effective is not due to science, but to the ideological approach by those who govern the legislative framework. The question we ask ourselves is that if science is subject to interpretation, how can it be possible to create inclusion policies that are really necessary and not just ideological.

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THE PROTECTION OF ORTHODOX PATRIMONIA IN TURKEY

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Abstract: *From the current international press we are dealing with current crisis issues, but in addition to focusing on major international and national events, the influence of religion must not be overlooked. In order to preserve religious cohesion, it is essential to protect the Orthodox heritage. As European citizens, it seems normal for us to have rights and to respect our ethnical, linguistic, religious values, etc. We offer rights to national minorities and we support pluralism, including religious pluralism. But, how do the Orthodox people from Muslim countries such as Turkey, feel, for example, from this perspective? The paper is focusing on the study of the Orthodox churches in Turkey, on the attempts by the Greeks from the country of origin (or other Orthodox people) to support the Greeks from Istanbul in order to ensure the protection and survival of Orthodoxy in the cradle of Old Byzantium. It is also important to take into consideration the existence of the Syrian Orthodox Church. The case study is based on the status of the "museum" of Saint Sophia. In many processes of everyday life, religion plays an important role and can influence the system both directly and indirectly through the mentality of the population. Although Atatürk attempted a secularization at the level of the Turkish state, unfortunately, the influence of Muslim religion and diminishing the rights of religious minorities is now increasingly felt. I had chosen this theme, because it seemed an interesting topic, there is not enough research about it in our country, but it is also a worrying topic in the light of the latest events. Also, the events from the European Union's neighborhood have left their mark, influencing its functioning (for example, Turkey was considered a buffer country in the refugee crisis). The paper is focusing on the study of the Orthodox churches in Turkey. The project aims at studying the way in which Orthodox heritage in Turkey is protected. In this respect, the paper is looking at the historical context, at the analysis of the religious minority rights, at the evolution of the status of the churches in that state. Also, it is important to take into consideration the existence of the Syrian Orthodox Church.*

Keywords: Turkey; orthodoxy; cultural heritage; minorities; Saint Sophia

1. INTRODUCTION

The paper aims to study how the Orthodox heritage of Turkey is protected. In this sense, the historical context, the evolution of the status of the churches in the respective state, the situation of the Orthodox religious minorities and the case study are investigated. The problem identified is the increasingly problematic non-observance of all the rights of the Orthodox, as well as the postponement of the restoration by the Turkish state of the churches (a category which mainly includes the postponement of the restoration of Saint Sofia, which currently has a different status). In order to solve this problem, both the efforts of the countries involved in respecting minorities and the efforts of the Turkish community are important.

The presentation of the theoretical part represents an important section that exposes both the interest of the European communities for the Christians in Turkey, as well as the generalities

regarding the Turkish state regarding the heritage of the Orthodox places of worship and will result in the creation of a framework of understanding for the applicative section. The ethnic groups of the Orthodox religious minorities and their percentage will be highlighted. In this way, one will be able to observe better the numerical relation between the orthodox Christians and other religious cults. In this way, you can see how many Orthodox in the Turkish state is Romanians, how many Greeks, Russians or Armenians, etc.

An important role for the Christian communities in Turkey is played by the Syrian Orthodox Church, which is why it analyzes its organization and how it positively influences the activity of Christians.

The status of St. Sofia has changed over time, even functioning as a mosque for a period. The case study analyzes how this status evolved, as well as the rich Christian culture that hides behind the minarets that the Turks raised in order to diminish

its spiritual importance of Christian origin and to reassign it to a Muslim triumph. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that these communities have tried to survive over time and to keep the ancestral religion unchanged. It becomes thus visible how the issue of minority rights in Turkey is approached and what problems the Orthodox have encountered in the efforts to preserve religious heritage.

2. THE CONTEXT

The Balkan space is one par excellence heterogeneous, with a plurality of nations and religions, etc, and in defining a culture it can be very important to have dimensions: substrate layer - cultural layer. It may prove an unconscious collective or an important contribution to the phenomenology of the Balkan spirit, dominated by the psychology of rebirth.

The drama of ancient mysteries was founded on sacrificial death and rebirth, and the Balkan religious spirit was constantly characterized by optimism. Trans-community care had a result as a transformation of a personal collectivity for multiplication. Admire the Christian to value the subjective experience of the lives of transcendence, the values of the morals of the communes and the religious language of universalist vocation, and the ancient Greek psychological types have been changed by the metamorphosis of the self into the Christian sense. Moral values such as humility, renunciation, love of neighbor (from Christianity) gave the Balkan culture an impulse to spread extraversion, but also spread tolerance. (Citeia, 2005).

At the end of the thirteenth century and the present century in the fourteenth century, the Turkish union of the Kaia tribe, having the leader of Osman, a conqueror presents positions of the Byzantine Empire, laying the foundations of the Ottoman state and establishing its capital at Bursa. After the disintegration of the Seljuk emirates, the Turks subdued Asia Minor under the leadership of Orhan (1326 - 1359). During the Sultan Murad I (1360 - 1389) the Turks began the conquest of the European continent. Initially in the Romanian Country (1369), later it occupied the present-day city of Edirne in 1371, and during the period of Baiazid Yıldırım (1389 - 1402) and conquered Macedonia, then the Bulgarian countries from Târnovo to Vidin. In 1402, Timur Lenk offered opposition in the region. After the restoration of powers, the areas of Anatolia were conquered. Later they managed to be in Greece, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania. In 1453 they ended the existence of the Byzantine Empire. The conquests

continued with the defeat of the Hungarian kingdom (1526), the siege of Vienna (1529), the occupation of Kurdistan, Mesopotamia (1514 - 1534), Syria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, etc. in the coming years.

The Ottoman Empire disintegrated as a result of internal decomposition and a lost territorial sea since 1774. (Macrea, 1964: 738 - 739). The struggle of the peoples of the Western Balkans against national and social oppression intensified until the end of the eighteenth century, once it began to remain. Traditionally, modern relationships. The most significant armed action was in 1804 when the Serbs rebelled under the leadership of Karagheorge. In 1815, Serbia became the autonomous principality of Ottoman sub-sovereignty. After the defeat of Turkey in the Russian-Romanian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina take care of the redemption in 1876 at the Portion, they gained independence. Croatia remained under Austro-Hungarian control and occupied an occupied area with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in 1908 annexed them. (Macrea, 1964: 878 - 879).

Subsequently, changes by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk focused on six major directions, namely: the republic, nationalism, populism, statehood, secularism and revolution. The followers are changing and can extend more time during the presentation of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It is possible to qualify and present religiously, and abolished institution of religious learning, forbidden behavior, and coverage of women, which are distinct for religions. At the same time, women received voting and candidacy bonuses for parliament. It is a model adopted by the Swiss, Italian and German legislatures, changing, thus, they can be surrounded by religious values spreading liberal principles. (Nasra, 2017). Indirect security, immediately following, by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople can be reached harmoniously.

It is also known as St. George's Church and is considered one of the most important Orthodox buildings in the world. (Istanbul Tour Studio, f.a). In this framework in 2015 for safe protection and survival of the orthodoxy in Istanbul, the Russian Orthodox through the State Duma deputies and the retrocession of the Holy Sofia to the Orthodox Church. This is declared to be pre-edited for the ownership and coordination of the inter-factional parliamentary group for the protection of Christian values, Sergei Gavrilov. In that situation, there is a Russian-Turkish relationship that is in a "process of resistance", initiative and friendly mutual

proposed being of particular importance. The Russian side considers that it is possible a future reference to the question about St. Sophia, another old Christian world, an old Byzantine cathedral associated with the history of the universal Christian church. Russia should endeavor to participate in the financing, but it wanted, held and implemented them to be above politics. (Ortho Christian, 2015). Besides the edifice of Orthodoxy in Istanbul, St. Sophia, Orthodox faith has been preserved over time and with the help of the Greeks in the Phanar district of Istanbul.

Phanar is an area in the middle of the Golden Horn in Istanbul's Fatih district. The streets in the area are full of historic wooden houses, churches, and synagogues from Byzantine and Ottoman times. Its name comes from the Greek language and means lantern. During the Byzantine period of the city was placed a column-shaped monument that was surrounded by a lantern. After the fall of Constantinople on May 29, 1453, the Phanar neighborhood became the home of most Greeks who remained in the city. The Greek inhabitants were called Phanariots. In 1599 the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople moved to the area and is still located there. Therefore, Phanar is often used as a stereogram for the Ecumenical Patriarchate just as the Vatican is used for the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church.

Under the Ottoman rule, the Ecumenical Patriarch was responsible, as an ethnographer, for all Orthodox in the Ottoman state, assuming all administrative and legal responsibilities in civil cases concerning Orthodox Christians. Thus, the Fenar was the center of the Orthodox Christian culture under Ottoman rule. So, the chair of the Ecumenical Patriarch is St. George's Cathedral. The Greek Phanar Orthodox College was founded in 1454 and is located near the cathedral. In the sixteenth century a Greek school, the Great School of the Nation, was established. This is a high school nowadays for the ethnic Greeks living in Istanbul.

3. THE ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES

The social changes created by the existence of a minority in a society are best seen if the dominant group's power considerations maintain the minority's existence. If power and material exploitation are not present, the dominant group is often generous or lacking in concern to allow the minority group to follow its path, which can often create incentives for social change. For example,

while the strong dominant group in society wants the accumulation of wealth or the maintenance of political ancestry, the weak minority group can focus on acquiring knowledge, which in the long run becomes stimulants of social change. Tolerance is most often practiced by groups that control power, and the result is their destruction in some cases. Historian Edward Gibbon supported this idea in studies on the relations between Romanians and Christians in the card of the later stages of the Roman Empire. (Rose, w.y).

By clearly specifying the differences between people, but with the same rights, minorities are supported, regardless of their type.

There may be a level of subjectivity in the debates on ethnicity and religion. In the relationship between majority and minority, several factors influence. In addition to the demographic and sociological aspects, the distribution of power must not be lost sight of. (Brie, 2011: 11 - 12). In the case of discussions on religious minorities, the EU has prioritized discussions on the agenda for effective integration. (Horga, Brie, 2011: 13). The issue of minority rights is taken seriously in the member states, but also in the case of EU candidates.

According to the 2018 census, Shiite Muslims are in the Turkish state at 80.5%, Shiite Muslims 16.5%, Koranic Muslims 1%, spiritual but not religious 1%, others 0.8%, Christians 0.2 - 0.3%. (***, 2017). Among the Christian denominations we can mention the following religious orientations: Eastern Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, Syrian Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant).

There is also an important Jewish community made up mainly of Jews from Sephardi, and within Judaism, there is a small community, Ashkenazi. (United Nations Population Fund, 2006). Throughout history, there have been various events that have made their mark on the demographic structure of the country.

The First World War, the genocide of Syrians, Assyrians, Greeks, Armenians, and Chaldeans, the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey (Andriotis, 2008), and the emigration of Christians (Greeks, Armenians, etc.) to foreign countries (especially in Europe and America), which actually started at the end of the 19th century and they grew in the first quarter of the 20th century, especially during the First World War, they gradually led to demographic changes. (Middle East Quarterly, 2001). Taking into account the relatively current international crises, there were more than 200,000 - 320,000 people with different Christian denominations, accounting for about 0.3% of the

population of Turkey (Central Intelligence Agency, 2007), including an estimated 80,000 Eastern Orthodox. (Doğan & Yavuz, 2008) There have been no significant changes since the census.

In Turkey, regarding the rights of minorities, the pseudo-consultative policy was used following requests and pressures from the European Union. Turkey has created a responsive image to meet the criteria, but in fact, it has not created any significant support measures in the accession negotiations process and has continued its traditional policies for minorities. The Turkish state started cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, but within the cooperation, the main basis was to support tolerance and eliminate discrimination against Muslims. Secondly, there are restrictive measures regarding work and, implicitly, minorities are discriminated against (Toktaş, Aras, 2009:697), including religious ones.

Unfortunately, the Romanian authorities do not know what the number of Orthodox Romanians in Turkey is or do they estimate it vaguely. Following the decision to build a mosque in Bucharest, it was tried to find out more information about the Orthodox Romanians in Turkey. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no way to identify the Romanian citizens based on belonging to one religion or another because they are not obliged to declare their religion within the embassy. Thus, he cannot draw up any record according to their religion. The State Secretariat for Cults declared that the Secretariat has no powers with regard to non-country believers. The Patriarchate, however, estimates that there are approximately 14,000 Orthodox Romanians in the Istanbul region and that hundreds of thousands of Romanians are passing through Turkey, most tourists annually. Father Sergiu-Marcel Vlad, of the Parish Church of Paraschevi Pikridion in Istanbul, said that during the big holidays it is necessary to keep the service in the courtyard because a large number of believers participate. The Romanians from our country have been involved since 2002 so that those in Istanbul receive land for the cemetery in the Kilyos area on the outskirts of Istanbul. The cemetery was received as a reciprocal reaction to the fact that the Romanian state offered to the Turkish-Tatar community various lands in Dobrogea. The Romanian cemetery has an area of 3000 square meters and is located about 40 km away from the church. Also, on the basis of reciprocity, there were discussions regarding a new Romanian church after the decision to build a mosque in Bucharest. (Ilie, 2015).

1. THE STATUS OF CHURCHES

Regarding the general framework of the church structures, in the Romanian Orthodox Church, but also in the other Orthodox churches, the bishops are divided into several administrative steps; the patriarch is the ruler of the whole Patriarch, he is the greatest bishop, but not from the point of view, but administratively; later, the Metropolis is the next in the church administration. Nine metropolises belong to the Romanian Patriarchate, six in the country and three in the diaspora. These are run by one metropolitan, with the only exception that the Metropolitan Church of Muntenia and Dobrudja is also led by His Holiness Father Daniel.

The metropolises consist of archbishops and bishops, and the archbishops are the most important bishops in a metropolis and are led by archbishops. For example, in the Metropolitan Church of Muntenia and Dobrudja there are three archbishops: the Archbishopric of Bucharest, the Archbishopric of Targoviste and the Archbishopric of Tomis. Also, the one that extends over the residence of the metropolitan is also governed by it.

Abroad there is the Metropolitan Church of autonomous and old-style Bessarabia and the Exarhat of the Plains based in Chisinau, with an archbishopric and three bishops. Also, it would be worth mentioning the Romanian Orthodox Metropolitan of Western and Southern Europe with an archbishopric in Paris and two bishops, one in Rome and another in Madrid, which also deals with Portugal, but also the Romanian Orthodox Metropolitan, of Germany, of Central Europe. and the North with an archdiocese in Germany and a bishopric of Northern Europe in Stockholm.

There are also the Romanian Orthodox Archdiocese of the two Americas, based in Chicago, the Romanian Orthodox Bishopric of Australia and New Zealand in Melbourne, as well as representatives of the Romanian Patriarchate: Romanian Settlements from the Holy Places (Jerusalem, Jordan, and Jericho), The Romanian Orthodox Parish in Sofia (Bulgaria), as well as the Representation of the Romanian Patriarchate to the European institutions (Brussels). (Aniculoaie, 2009).

Among the most important Orthodox churches in Turkey can be specified: St. Andrew's Church in Krisei (transformed into mosques), Chora Church (museum), Church of Christ Pantocrator (transformed into mosques), Church of Christ Pantepoptes (transformed into mosques), Palace of Athiocos (ruins), the Church of the Virgin of Pharos (ruins), Gastria Monastery (transformed into

mosques), Saint George Church (active), Saint Irina (museum), Saint Sofia (transformed into mosques, now a museum), Saint John's Church The Baptist (transformed into a mosque), Stoudios (ruins), St. John's Church The Trullo Baptist (transformed into a mosque), St. Mary of Blachernae Church (active), St. Mary of the Mongols Church (active), Bulgarian St. Stephen Church (active), The Church of St. Demetrius in Feriköy (active), Turkish Orthodox Church (active), Saint Muceniță Paraschevi Church (active). Of all, St. Sophia has the largest historical load. It is said that Justinian built St. Sofia in order to overcome it in beauty. In 1400 and 1600 it suffered a deterioration process. (Darlymple, 2013: 60). The Holy Sofia or the Church of the Holy Wisdom is a landmark in the history of architecture. Byzantine architecture is highlighted inside with mosaics and is represented by marble columns and coatings of great artistic value. The temple itself was very rich and beautifully decorated, the architects of the church were Isidor of Miletus and Anthemius of Tralles, who studied geometry at the University of Constantinople. These influences spread and resisted in Orthodoxy, in Catholicism, but also in the Muslim world.

Saint Sofia has a central dome of 31 meters, slightly smaller than in the Pantheon. There is an optical illusion and the dome seems to be suspended in the sky through an uninterrupted archway that is located on arched windows. Windows help the interior full of colors to be flooded with light, and the vault is supported by pendants, ie four triangular sections that solve the problem of placing a round base on a square shape. The weight of the dome is transmitted through pendants to four massive pillars in the corners. At the western end, that is, at the entrance and at the end of the east, that is, at the liturgical part, the arched openings are extended by semi-domes, in turn, suspended on exedra. The string of architectural elements is unparalleled in antiquity.

The structure was severely damaged by earthquakes. The dome collapsed after an earthquake in 558, and its replacement gave way in 563, but there were other partial surprises in 989 and 1346.

For more than 900 years Saint Sophia represented the chair of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, but also the main venue for imperial ceremonies. At the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the church was transformed into mosques by Ottoman Turks, under Sultan Mehmed II. The iconographic mosaics of the church were covered with plaster because Islam considers blasphemy the representation of human forms. For about 500 years, Istanbul's main mosque was the inspiration

for the Ottoman mosques in Constantinople such as Şehzad, Suleyman and Rustem Pasha. (Orthodoxwiki, 2013). In 1935 he acquired the status of the museum. It was included in the UNESCO World Heritage List among the other monuments of the historical center of Constantinople in 1985. (Ortho Christian, 2015).

5. CONCLUSIONS

In short, it seems that Muslims, already a majority in some countries and political minorities "retrievable" in other countries, they expand and will expand continuously to enjoy all the political, social and economic benefits that this position offers. Although long ago only the majority population was 100% privileged, then by the emphasis on human rights in the West, they made minorities a valuable category in certain countries, both politically and socially, but also economically, although Turkey is not a country open to other religious minorities, the connection between it and the European Union has determined will make various small efforts to support including Orthodox Christians. The numerical relationship between Orthodox Christians and other religious cults has been observed. They do not have a significant share (only 0.2%) but compared to the population of Turkey which large, their number cannot be neglected, yet they do not have the rights that other Christian communities have. In countries with a solid democracy, the status of St. Sofia has changed over time, even functioning as a mosque for a period. The rich Christian culture that hides behind its minarets that the Turks raised to diminish its spiritual importance of Christian origin is evident in the containers. This is an important symbol. Christian communities have tried to survive over time and not to change their ancestral religion despite various oppressions. Although there are not many in number compared to the territory of the Turkish state or the number of believers, the churches in the former Ottoman area work and manage to leave under their dome faithful who do not shy away from asserting their religious identity in a predominantly Muslim country.

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CONVERGENCES BETWEEN THE TRADITIONAL MOTIFS OF THE ROMANIAN AND MEXICAN TEXTILE HERITAGE

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Abstract: Under its various forms, tradition is an integral component of every nation's culture, it is that which every generation inherits and subsequently passes onwards. An important role in its perpetuation can be attributed to the textile heritage and, by extension, to the women who weaved and stitched traditional motifs across the ages. The symbols found on traditional clothing used to have a double purpose: they were both apotropaic, meant to protect the wearer, as well as ornamental, meant to be decorative and aesthetically appealing. This has been true around the world, as people everywhere gazed at the sky, observed the nature that surrounded them and then chose signs and symbols with which to represent what they were seeing. In the present day there exists a worldwide trend of returning to traditional values in a form adapted to modern tendencies. Ethnologist Nicolae Dunăre has undertaken ample research of traditional Romanian and European popular ornaments, in a continuous global comparison. The painter Frida Kahlo reclaimed Mexico's great variety of indigenous motifs when she wore the costumes. Bearing this in mind, we shall analyse some motifs found on textiles from Romania and Mexico, both countries with a vibrant popular culture, in parallel, observing whether or not commonalities exist. We shall also transpose said motifs in a digital format by way of vector drawing.

Keywords: embroidery; traditional; textile; symbol; Romania; Mexico

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the ways by which traditional ornament has reached modern times was that in every corner of the world women weaved and stitched these motifs, transmitting them from generation to generation, which, fortunately, is still occurring (fig. 1). They performed this as a means of sustenance, but also as an artistic act, thus contributing to the cultural heritage of their own nation, but also to the common, universal one. Although modern society has the means available to mechanize such manufactories, it is consider it imperative that these arts and crafts are perpetuated. They may significantly contribute to the development of creative industries, a sector which will see major growth in the near future because of the increasing demand for women's jobs.

The theoretical framework of this study has its starting point in the fact that ornamental elements and motifs tend to have a universal character and can be found in multiple geographical areas.

...it is precisely the permanent character of the aspiration towards beauty, in the Romanian people

as well as the people of all continents, unveil some very significant convergences in the methods of systemizing the invaluable cultural and artistic heritage that is traditional ornament. (Dunăre, 1975:41).



Fig. 1. Stitching women. Left – Maria Szabo, Brașov, România, Photo: Anisia Szabo, Right – Francisca Torres Hinojosa, Morelia, Michoacan, Mexico, Photo: Rebecca Devaney

Nicolae Dunăre (1975:48) classifies traditional ornament in the following: the ornamental element

- the simplest, indivisible part, which can exist independently of the decoration (leaf, petal, branch, stem, fruit, star), the ornamental motif made out of two or more ornamental elements, divisible in elements from the same thematic group (flower), and ornamental composition, constructed out of two or more ornamental motifs, which can be part of different thematic and stylistic groups. Style refers to the form: geometrical, free or mixed. From a stylistic point of view, ornaments may be: abstract, cosmomorphic, geomorphic, phytomorphic, zoomorphic, anthropomorphic, skeuomorphic, social, mythological, religious, emblematic. (Dunăre, 1975:41)

The idea behind this project appeared as the result of a common passion and an existing collaboration attempting to save and then pass on traditional motifs. This study's objectives are the identification of common points in traditional motifs from the textile heritages of Romania and Mexico, through the analysis of textile elements from both countries.

2. METHODS AND DATA

At the moment the best method of ensuring the continuity of traditional ornament consists in transposing it into a digital format by a vectorial method. To this end we have been utilising the graphical software CorelDraw, with the help of which we have drawn, to scale and maintaining original colours, the models that we have chosen for our study, saving them as digital images. All figures in this article have been obtained by this method, having however been shrunk to the allowed dimensions.

The vector file format may be edited by any kind of CNC (Centre with Numerical Control) and made available for use in a variety of applications, ranging from textile, furniture, interior design elements, graphics, etc. Concurrently, the models may be manually stitched using the drawings themselves.

With an eye to comparative documentation we utilized data from previous projects we took part in and which consisted in initiating a database with traditional elements, motifs and compositions from South East Transylvania. In particular, these projects aimed to recover signs and motifs stitched on the shirts of Junii din Șcheii Brașovului and on various costume parts from the so-called Carpathian Gate (Bran - Moieciu - Fundata) and the surroundings of Brașov (Făgăraș, Rupea).

3. SIMILARITIES

Situated many thousands of kilometres apart in very different geographical, environmental and cultural regions, Romania and Mexico are both nations with a very old history of embroidery. While in Romania we have the ie (the traditional women's shirt, rich in ornament), in Mexico we find the huipil (a sleeveless tunic), as well as the "colonial-style" blouse (blusa or camisa in Spanish), inspired by the European chemise, which has replaced the huipil in many communities and is often found with richly embroidered yokes and sleeves.

Analysing the models we have digitised in the last few years and going through numerous photographs with textiles stitched and woven in Mexico, we identified the following similarities:

The vine leaf and grape bunch are a symbol of eternal life, of talent and of the promise of salvation. The vine leaf in particular is an originally pagan symbol that was adopted by Christianity. (Lungu, Puskás, 2017:61) (fig. 2).




Fig. 2. The "Wine leaf" motif. Upper – Men's shirt of a June Roșior din Șcheii Brașovului, Romania; Lower – Sampler, unknown, mid-19th century, Mexico, Victoria and Albert Museum, London

In Mexico, floral decorations are widely used, especially on the women's clothing. "I paint flowers so they will not die" - Frida Kahlo.

Among the motifs embroidered on the Oaxaca huipils, many bear the influence of pre-Hispanic drawings. These multicoloured embroidery tell mythical stories mixing a certain vision of the cosmos to that of nature and the deities that surround these populations. Colours, shapes and textures give meaning to the symbolic life of representations: a place, a season, a feeling (Pepiot, 2019).



Fig. 3. Floral motif. Upper – Shoulder towel worn by girls, Rupea area, late 19th century, Ethnography Museum Braşov, România, exhibit „Siebenburgen embroidery from Szöcs Karoly collection”; Lower – Mexican Blouse Traditional Embroidered

In popular art there exists a certain number of ornamental motifs with a similar thematic, not only within the limits of an ethnographic area or of a nation, but also on far extended areas of time and space. Among these, “tree of life” (Dunăre, 1975:24).

Triangular urns of flowers, surrounded by birds, are a stylised version of the universal and ever-popular “tree of life” foliage motif. The idea of a “World Tree”, important in many cultures, was part of the cosmology of the Aztecs, the Maya, and other ancient civilisations of Mexico (2018) (fig. 4). The “North Star” motif also referred to as “The wing of the mill” or “The eight point star” and symbolizes the wheel of time and the regenerative energy of the universe (Corduneanu, 2012b). It is the guide, the only fixed star on the night sky, a mark for shepherds and sailors alike, without which they would get lost (fig. 5).




Fig. 5. The “North Star” motif. Upper – Men’s shirt, Veneția de Sus, Făgăraş area, Romania; Lower – Sampler, unknown, mid 19th century, Mexico, Victoria and Albert Museum, London



Fig. 4. Birds composition. Upper – Women’s shirt, Bihor area, România, IE Vie collection; Lower – Huipil, unknown, 1800s, Oaxaca State, Mexico, Museum Victoria and Albert Museum, London




Fig. 6. The “Tree of Life” motif. Upper – Carpet, 1866, National Museum of the Romanian Peasant, Bucureşti, Romania (2010); Lower – Nahua wool-embroidered tomicotón from Hueypan, Tlatlauqui, Puebla, from Museo Frida Kahlo, Mexico (2008)

The tree of life symbolises the cyclical character of cosmic evolution: death and rebirth. It is also considered a symbol of the relationship between Earth and Sky (Lungu, Puskás, 2017:61) (fig. 6). The roots of the tree lie in the ground, thus allowing a journey into the subterranean world, while the branches grow towards the sky, constituting a connection to Divinity.

The shepherd's hook, frequently used in pairs of 2 or 4, means that the lost sheep has returned to its herd (Corduneanu, 2012a). This motif, which takes the shape of the letter S, has been stitched by functionally every people that have ever practised transhumance (fig. 7).



Fig. 7. Motif with “The shepherd's hook and scissors”.
Upper – Women’s shirt, Șirnea village - Fundata, Romania, Mărioara Voinescu collection; Lower – Sampler, unknown, mid 19th century, Mexico, Victoria and Albert Museum, London




Fig. 8. Woman representation. Upper – Romanian motif named “The girl’s hora”; Lower – Sack bag from Museo Frida Kahlo, Mexico (2008)

The idea of a human being is most often represented in Romanian popular art as a woman (Antonescu, 2016:244).

The girl’s hora is an ancient ritual, with ties to the Moon, seduction and fertility (Corduneanu, 2012c) (fig. 8).

In Mexican embroidery, human figures appear with relative frequency. They feature prominently on the embroidered napkins.



Fig. 9. Upper – Motif with meander from women’s shirt, Rucăr area, România, Georgiana Andrei collection; Lower – The N-shaped serpent on a Huipil (women’s tunic), unknown, 1850 – 1907, Oaxaca State, Mexico, Victoria and Albert Museum, London

The meander illustrates the geometric decor that is widely used in European popular art. Being an ornamental motif with very old roots, characterised by a sinuous line, sometimes composed out of volutes or spirals disposed consecutively or sequentially, it symbolizes eternity. It is found on every type of decorative item and in all ethno-folkloric areas, on elements of popular architecture, ceramics, stitches and embodiment, tools and utensils, painted eggs, religious items, etc. (Antonescu, 2016:423).

The N-shaped serpent is strongly reminiscent of the pre-Hispanic feathered serpent (2018). Among the Aztecs, whose beliefs are the best-documented in the historical sources, Quetzalcoatl was related to gods of the wind, of the planet Venus, of the dawn, of merchants and of arts, crafts and knowledge. He was also the patron god of the Aztec priesthood, of learning and knowledge (Smith, 2001:213). Though strikingly similar, these

two motifs are categorically part of differing thematic classifications (Fig. 9).

In addition to flowers, other natural themes appear in woven or embroidered motifs, including birds, both in Romania and Mexico (Fig. 10).




Fig. 10. Bird motif. Left – Table cloth and towels, village Araci, Bârseiland, România, Csulak Magda tome; Right – Embroidery on Huichol pants from Museo Frida Kahlo, Mexico

A general symbol with many possible interpretations, the bird embodies liberty and the happiness of an unconstrained being; it functions as the emblem of the love-lorn, an allegory of the freedom and uncaring nature of youth. There also exists a belief that the figure's presence has beneficial, protective powers (Antonescu, 2016:497).

The results of this study are also disseminable into a practical work: for instance, a public exhibition that would contain all the models present in this paper, manually stitched. We intend to work on this exhibition between May and November 2020 and to subsequently present it at the Etnovember 2020 Festival, a prestigious multicultural event which takes place every year in Braşov, organized by "Transilvania" University and the City's Townhall. Thus, these motifs would carry, besides the fascinating tale of their symbols, thematic and style, a personal fingertip: that of the emotions and experiences of us, the women who will stitch them.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this study has been to identify commonalities in the motifs of Romania's and Mexico's textile heritage. Although the sample of studied motifs was small compared to the vast pool of existent embroideries, we have identified many common symbols, including phytomorphic, zoomorphic and anthropomorphic motifs, among

others, a fact which clearly indicates that commonalities between the two cultures, one belonging to Central and Eastern Europe, the other to Hispanic Latin America, do indeed exist.

Regardless of the area he inhabited, man has always been a lover of nature, which he took with him through the symbols on his clothing and other textile elements. Precisely because of this it is imperative that we maintain and perpetuate this heritage, an act that is as much the duty as it is the honour of every generation

4. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank Cristian Lungu for his help translating the paper in English.

The Romanian motifs from the present paper will be part of a larger research work included in Antonela Lungu's PhD thesis, in which she will more widely approach Perspectives on the Development in Furniture of Some Traditional Romanian Motifs of Textile Heritage from Bârseiland and Its Surroundings.

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ALL LIVES MATTER: JUDICIOUS HUMANISM

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Abstract: *The world has become a global village with diversity of peoples, cultural traditions, worldviews, customs, and lifestyles. Advances in sciences, technology and medicine, strengthened by fierce competition and consumerism, have led to public debates concerning international trade, economic independence, environmental crisis, and cultural conflicts. Bias is embedded in socio-cultural constructs and worldviews that societies have formed over a long period of cultural establishment and in accordance with evolution in time and space. These factors have resulted in unequal and oppressive treatment of women, minorities, the disabled, and the poor by ruling elites. However, all humans have common needs and wants, and yet are unable to communicate in a manner that can be universally understood. This paper will explore the complex nature of life: biological, sociological, cosmological, and spiritual, and will argue that social groupings, including class categories, are simply socio-political and man-made constructs. Social groupings can be deconstructed or replaced through the teaching of an “all-inclusive” and “interdependent” existence and a conscience-based or judicious humanistic value system that will promote recognition of and respect for others. Drawing from ancient philosophies of India, the paper suggests a judicious humanism for sustenance of all lives. The dignified treatment of all lives matters for all-inclusive welfare (security, health, comfort, and happiness) because every being contributes to the totality of existence.*

Keywords: *social-constructs; judicious; human; humanism; worldview*

1. INTRODUCTION

The paradoxical and unpredictable nature of life, marked by diversity and uncertainty and humanity's limited capacity to understand and define life in any language, has been the root cause of suffering. The very nature of life constitutes a process—coming into existence, growth, and finally going out of existence. By the time humans come up with solutions, new problems arise. At the present time, all lives have been impacted by the problems of devastations caused by both humans and natural disturbances. A part of human suffering is caused by humans themselves due to ignorance, biases for their own kind, diverse ideologies, fierce competition, consumerism, and abuse of power. Advances in sciences and technologies have multiplied the problems of modern humanity. Scholars in various fields, both in sciences and humanities, have been expressing their concerns over the direction of human destiny.

Yuval Harari, in his book *Sapiens* (2015: 3), explains the terrifying historical saga of the human species to help us understand who we are and what made us this way. He relates the development of humanity to three revolutions: cognitive, agricultural, and scientific. He shows that

humanity has not been around that long when compared to the lifespan of our planet. Furthermore, he expresses his concern that humanity, as we know it, may not continue for that long in current form. The universe came into existence about 13.5 billion years ago in the form of matter, energy, time and space, and six hundred thousand years ago at least six sentient human species inhabited the earth. Today there is just one, the humans (Harari, 2015: 3-14).

Harari's historical analysis of humanity highlights the results of ambition combined with capacity for scientific and technological advancement and the inability to cope with the results of these achievements. No doubt the discrepancy between human adjustments and the advances of sciences and technologies are affecting human health. Harari's study of humanity focuses on humanity's capacities for discovery and development of the external world. However, he does not discuss human existence as it relates to external realities. All problems of life are not embedded in the advancement of sciences and technologies, which arise from creativity and imagination. Nor does the problem of suffering lie completely in human's inability to race with the fast-moving world. Suffering originates from *not*

knowing and *not understanding* the very nature of reality, which is philosophically referred to as ‘absence of true knowledge’ or *ignorance* as the basic cause of human suffering (Robinson and Johnson, 1982).

According to socio-linguistic and semantic interpretations of the problems of modern humanity, science and technology created the necessary language to communicate their new concepts, whereas we have never studied man-as-a whole scientifically. According to Korzybski (2010: 3), we need to establish “the science of man-as-a-whole, embracing *all* his activities: science, mathematics, physiology, biology, and psychology.” However, creation of the science of humanity for and by humanity will require too much time. Moreover, the task seems to be impossible in the face of the evolutionary nature of life and human’s inability to know the nature of an all-inclusive existence on various levels: individual, societal, global, and cosmological. Due to these limitations, it seems reasonable to use existing sources of knowledge such as philosophies, ideologies, and socio-cultural histories of our ancestors, whether they be Europeans or Indians, in dealing with the issues of our times. All lives of the past were subjected to life’s pain and affliction because suffering is universal. Moreover, all humans have common attributes. All the sciences have a relationship to human nature.

Establishing hypotheses for building theories, both in natural and social sciences, is of primary importance. Analyzing and establishing theories about life is a part of the discipline of philosophy. The objective of the paper is to provide a philosophical understanding of human nature based on Indian thought as a foundational ideology for human conduct. The long-term goal is to contribute to a broader understanding of a human as a member of humanity and the universe in order to improve personal and social wellbeing. The globe is in need of humans who are not just educated elites but also judicious actors who can change the world for the better.

2. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The study of humanity is carried out by different disciplines—biology, psychology, sociology, and anthropology in the framework of their disciplinary apparatus. Biologists see humans as biological beings, and sociologists see humans as social beings. These disciplines study humans from the outside, as objects of experiments or of

analysis. However, in order to plan the future, one must know the self and personal potentialities and limitations, both as an individual and as a species. However, for knowing oneself, scientific knowledge alone is surely insufficient and yet cannot be ignored. Thus, a coherent or logical system of ideas can never be derived from science nor arrived at without science (Dobzhanski, 1967:3-11).

Indian philosophical treatises on human nature and scientific analysis of humanity are complementary and differ only based on linguistic terminology and semantic interpretation. Construction and critical examination of a system of beliefs are part of the discipline of philosophy, which is defined as the “science of the whole,” by Bertrand Russell (1945). Indian languages, both Sanskrit and modern Indic such as Hindi and Marathi, define philosophy (*tattvajnan*) as a body of basic foundational principles or rules inherent in human nature and essential to or binding upon human society in relation to the workings of the cosmos-- time, space and physical environment (Jungbare, 2014:15-26). In simple words, all humans belonging to the group of humanity are governed by natural laws operative on all levels of existence: individual, societal, and cosmological, expressive of interconnectedness, interdependence, and the changing nature of life, marked by uncertainty and probability (Capra, 1997 & 2000).

This paper builds on the Indian philosophical tradition that sees humans not in terms of dualities and mutual exclusions, but rather in terms of inclusivity and mutual relationships.

The approach is *wholistic* and *syncretic* and does not reject any idea but incorporates all ideas. Therefore, the approach is non-hegemonic and while by no means perfect, the methodology is still broad and inclusive. Although humans have immense capacity to see and understand worldly phenomena, no person, no one culture, and no single discipline can conceptualize the nature of the totality of existence—how humans came to be; how they will transform; what is the meaning of life, and what is the end goal of existence. There are no final answers to these questions, and probably there never will be any in precise and objective terms (Dobzhanski, 1967). From our experience, we know that the human condition will never advance to such a state of perfection that there will be no problems and no suffering as problems and suffering are fundamental to life. Such problems have been discussed throughout India’s diverse philosophies from 3000 BC.

3. HOLISTIC HUMANITY'S DIVERSE FACETS: UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS

No two individuals think, speak or act in precisely the same manner. The nature of human life is marked by its elemental constitution: Genetic-biological, familial-socio-cultural, and environmental-cosmological related to evolution in space and time. Diversity of constantly changing existence, inclusive of humans, is incomprehensible and immeasurable. The phenomenon of diversity is a fact of life. In the Marathi language, there is a saying: *vyakti titkya prakrti* 'as many individuals, so many characters (human natures)'. The concept of diversity represents pluralism [vividhata] and differences [bhinnata]. Therefore, any description or definition of any life including that of a human can never be perfectly true for various reasons: First, the subject (human) cannot define the object (human) in its totality because of the subject's limited capacity to know oneself as well as others; Second, both the subject and the object are conditioned by various internal and external factors which are interdependent and interconnected; and Third, the reason is that life is marked by uncertainty and probability due to its being a process subject to constant changes.

3.1 Humanity: Biology and Sociology. A human being is not the product of its heredity or environment alone but represents a complex organism as a whole final result of the environment-genetic manifold (Korzybski, 2010). For humans, linguistic, semantic, and cultural issues represent powerful environmental factors. A human being is defined by culture against the person's own definition and identification of himself/herself. Individuals, being unable to deal with the divide between "what" they are and "who" they are, cause conflicts, which lead to socio-psychological disturbances. Ultimately, conflicting individuals end up harming their own lives. This phenomenon seems much more apparent in individualistic societies where humans are alienated from their families and culture-groups. The basic factor behind this condition of humanity seems to lie in the devaluation of human's worth and increasing loss of human dignity. Additionally, humans neither acknowledge nor accept the base qualities of human nature, such as hate or greed that create havoc and destruction. The following data on the destruction of human life by humans themselves is

illustrative of humanity's inability to cope with life's problems at the personal level of mind-body existence. The mind-body imbalance is the basic cause behind violent acts of harming oneself or others. According to the American Foundation of Suicide Prevention, (1) Suicide is the tenth-leading cause of death in the U.S., (2) In 2017, 47,173 Americans died by suicide; and 1,400,000 suicide attempts occurred, (3) In 2015, suicide and self-injury cost the US \$69 billion dollars.

Additional facts about suicide in the U.S.: The age-adjusted suicide rate in 2017 was 14.0 per 100,000 individuals; The rate of suicide is highest in middle-aged white men in particular; In 2017, men died by suicide 3.54 times more often than women; On average, there are 129 suicides per day; White males accounted for 69.67% of suicide deaths in 2017; In 2017, firearms accounted for 50.57% of all suicide deaths [Source: American Foundation for Suicide Prevention: <https://afsp.org/about-suicide/suicide-statistics/6-26-2019>]. It is necessary to note that this data may not be 100% accurate because suicide still carries with it a social stigma, which prevents families from reporting the painful loss.

3.2 Philosophical Analysis: Indian View. A human being is perceived to be a composite of mind, body and spirit. Psychologists, psychiatrists, and neuroscientists study the mind, that is considered to be the capacity of the thinking brain. Although dominating modern philosophical thought centers mainly on the rational and autonomous self, it ignores the self's conditional and nonintegrated facets: body, sensations, perceptions, feelings, and consciousness. These aspects of humans, when disturbed by external or internal environments, can cause problems.

India's ancient philosophies of the Samkhya - Yoga schools analyze a human being as a composite of two principles: *purusha* "consciousness/known mind" and *prakriti* "body/matter." The healthy relationship of co-operation is what makes a person function. The body is comprised of three *gunas* (attributes): *sattva* "purity," *rajas* "activity," and *tamas* "negativity." The proportion of these *gunas* is what defines a human's nature (Chatterjee & Datta, 1968: 261-262). Different individuals have different proportions of these attributes. A person with an angry personality is considered to have a larger portion of *rajas*, whereas a person with 90% of *tamas* is thought to be lethargic and negative. This theory of *guna* is comparable to the theory of humors in Greek philosophy. Common linguistic

expressions indicate the linkage between a person and his appearance and conduct: “He is green with envy.” “He is red with anger.” In order to maintain the mind-body balance or to actualize the higher portion of *sattva* “goodness/calmness,” the system of *yoga* (physical and mental exercises) has been proposed. The Samkhya system of philosophy provides a theoretical understanding of the concept of a ‘human,’ and *yoga* provides techniques for its healthy maintenance and function. Common people can easily understand this wholistic philosophical view.

However, different sciences will give us different explanations; for example, cellular biology will focus on an individuals’ own cells and bacterial and viral cells, their count and their interaction; whereas a chemist will explain a person’s behavior in terms of his/her intake of chemicals from food and drink. Regardless of the diverse languages used by diverse disciplines to explain the human phenomenon, human nature seems to be difficult to define due to its complex and changing nature.

3.3 Humanity’s Indefinable Nature. The word *humanity* derives from the Latin *humanitas* for “human nature,” comparable to the Sanskrit word *manavta* or *manushyata*, the attributes of what constitutes a human being. Indian philosophies have recognized the paradoxical nature of human beings, i.e. humanity’s creative and destructive powers. Humans can build beautiful buildings and can travel to different planets. This potentiality is so awesome that a human with this power can be thought of as microscopic reflection of the Absolute Power commonly referred to in the concept of Almighty God in the field of theology and religion. At the same time, Indian thinkers have feared humanity’s dark side, especially the instinct of killing resulting from other *negative* features of humanity: lust (*kama*), rage (*krodha*), ego (*mada*), envy (*matsara*), greed (*lobha*), and hypocrisy (*dambha*). These attributes make humanity imperfect and lead to the creation of poor mental habits causing suffering that is not essential to human nature.

Traditional ancient societies had developed ways or techniques for handling man-made suffering by defining every person’s role at every stage of his/her life and in accordance to the natural laws. Every person was valued for his contribution to the family and to society, which did not allow any mind to become void and therefore subject to psychological turbulence resulting in violence.

Urban and modern cultures throughout the world, which have adopted democratic philosophies for their governance, have been successful in providing freedom for humanity’s advances in sciences, medicine, and technologies. However, this has created two classes of elites: political elites with positional power, and social elites with monetary power. As a result, the value of a human being, his/her family and community is measured by these powers. Non-elite common human beings are neither respected nor are their physical, psychological and economic needs fully understood by the ruling elites. Ultimately, humans who cannot cope with the problems of life due to their limited physical-mental capacity, lack of economic resources and social support begin to feel worthless under the burden of societal expectations. The devaluation of other humans and the ready availability of guns and drugs make the problem of socio-cultural disturbances and resultant violence uncontrollable. Disturbed humans not only harm themselves but harm “others” as well.

3.4 Humanity’s Devaluation Leading to its Endangerment. Degradation of humanity’s innate dignity has been affecting human health and has been resulting in violent incidents at an alarming rate. In some cases motives are connected to young people’s mental health, whereas, in other cases, motives are connected to radicalization or actualization of extreme measures expressive of revenge against social injustices. Violent social conduct is due to abuse of freedom, individualism and humanity’s alienation from society. The following chart gives us some idea about the destruction of innocent humanity by a single human.

Table 1. Decreasing Value of Humanity & Increasing Incidents of Violence
Sources: Cooper & Abdullah (2015), Elinson (2015); Doombos, (2016), Williams, (2016); Wilts (2017), Ansari, (2017) Bustamante (2018), Griffin *et al* (2018), Jaeger, (2018), Wan (2018); Bogel-Burroughs (2019), Eligon, (2019), Eiserer, (2019); Svokos (2019), Murphy (2019)

Year	Location & Type of shooting	Agential-Efficient Cause	Instrumental Cause	Material Causes: Biology & Environment	End result: Destruction of Humanity	Recommended Resolutions
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ALL LIVES MATTER: JUDICIOUS HUMANISM

Oct.1, 2015 Cooper & Abdullah, (2015); Elinson, (2015)	Umpqua Community College, Oregon, U.S. -- mass shooting	26-year-old male student, son of mixed ethnicity-- father white and mother black, parents divorced; anti-religious; troubled by school-debt	*Semi-automatic rifle *Revolver	*Revengeful due to social rejection *Angry & frustrated * Isolated from family & friends * Violent conduct resulting from the deprivation of human needs—love, kindness, and self respect	killed-9 injured-8 10 deaths (9 + one gunman) The gunman committed suicide	*Humanization of humanity through the teaching of sound educational philosophy: *Ethics of diversity: Recognition of and respect for <i>all</i> lives regardless of their ethnicity, race, sexuality, mental disability, belief system, age, and the place of birth. *Teaching of the human dignity for the functioning of holistic humanity at all levels— personal/individual, societal, and the universal. * Teaching of non-violent inter-cultural communication. * Educational programs that center on dignity of <i>all</i> lives and conscience-based ethics should be introduced as part of the educational philosophy from the elementary school to colleges and universities.
June 12, 2016 Doombos, (2016); Williams, (2016)	Pulse Night Club, Orlando, Florida, U.S. --mass shooting	29-year-old male, religious, dislike for gays, lesbians, and LGBT community	Rifle, pistol,	Emotionally hurting person over the deprival of his spiritual source	Killed 49 Injured 53 The shooter was shot eight times	Conflicts between individual's beliefs and his external culture's ideologies are likely to result in violent outbursts, especially when violent means and methods are used. Reduction of violence lies in restricting access to guns and pistols in addition to various socio-cultural measures.
Nov. 5, 2017 Wilts, (2017); Ansari, (2017) Bustamante (2018);	First Baptist Church, Sutherland Springs, TX, U.S. --mass shooting	26-year-old male atheist, troubled over his own failures; was thought to be an 'outcast'	Semi-automatic rifle	Turned into violent personality	Killed--26 Injured—20 27 deaths (26 + shooter) Outcast turned into Psychopath	The shooter distanced himself from his religious community. The conflict between his ideology and his group's excluded him from belonging to his community. Inter-cultural communication may help resolve conflicts.
Feb. 14, 2018 Griffin <i>et al</i> (2018); Jaeger, (2018); Wan, (2018)	Marjory Stoneman Douglas High school, Parkland, FL, U.S. --mass shooting	20-year-old male, an orphan	Semi-automatic rifle	Deprived of parental love and care; damaged innate virtues	killed-17 Injured-17	Individualism with freedom without restraints and access to guns are the primary causes. There needs to be a change through educational philosophy that promotes values of humans and the teaching of duties and responsibilities.

Aug. 3, 2019 Bogel-Burroughs, (2019) Eligon, (2019) Eiserer, (2019)	Walmart, Elpaso, TX, U.S.	21-year-old male, white Nationalist	Semi-automatic rifle	Hatred for Hispanic population, anti-social, with authoritarian tendencies	Killed-22 Injured-24	The problem lies in the indiscriminate use of weapons. Resolution: promotion of judiciary humanism of human value and dignity.
Aug. 4, 2019 Svokos (2019); Murphy (2019)	Ned Peppers Bar Dayton, OH, U.S.	24-year-old male, androgynous	Rifle	Hatred for women and girls, oppressor	Killed-10 (including the gunman) Injured-27	Members of the society at all levels—family, community, state, and nation must become active in guarding the welfare of <i>all</i> people.

Data: The above chart illustrates that during the period 2015-2019, incidents of mass shooting occurred in public places: a college, high School, night club, church, shopping center, and bar. Six young individuals between the ages of 20 and 29 killed a total of 133 and injured a total of 149 people through the use of rifles and pistols.

Causes: Perceived and/or assumed causes have been reported as racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, and hatred for the religion and ethnicity of the harmed humans. Personal causes mentioned include societal rejection, deprivation of love, care and kindness, and the feeling of frustration over failure to meet societal expectation.

Philosophical Analysis: All the causes related to *isms* are assumed causes and cannot be completely true for various reasons: First, reporting of the incidents is based on the reporter’s bias, motive and perception. Second, the reporter’s narration of the incidents is of *external* appearances of the incidents, which may differ from the truth. The knowledge obtained is empirical but not rational since the reporter did not talk to the harm-causing agent. Moreover, all the *isms*, specifically sexism and racism are lamentably salient for lay people, but virtually invisible for biologists. Therefore, ethics and science when conflated can create problems.

The human brain itself presents us with confusing claims: Differences between people are innate; and commonalities among all people are innate. If nothing in the mind is innate then differences between people’s minds cannot be innate. Simply put, human brain works however it works in the context of time and space. Each person is biologically unique. But natural selection is a process that feeds on that variation (Pinker, 2007: 447).

4. SPIRITUAL HUMANITY

In the above sections, how humanity’s dishonorable aspects which lead to conflicts between individuals and their social groups can harm collective humanity have been explained. However, humans have divinely unique qualities and good will to change the world from chaos to order, from oppression to freedom, and suffering to happiness through various human activities. This aspect of divinity or honorable humanity has been recognized and idealized by India’s cultural tradition (Junghare, 2017: 1-16).

At the present time, both scientific and technological revolutions have been contributing to further devaluation of life’s dignity. The humanity of ethicality is disappearing from our day-to-day lives. As a result, the concepts of truth, fairness, equality, justice, empathy, and kindness are also disappearing. Humans are becoming robotic with the loss of inner sanctity. This phenomenon is more prominent in individualistic societies, specifically in urban localities of the world. Indian cultural tradition, on the whole, has been reasonably humanistic, dealing with human needs, wants and frailties with humility. This characteristic is perhaps due to two reasons. For one thing, India is still more agricultural compared to so-called “advanced” nations and, therefore, close to nature. As a result, a large farming population can understand life’s dependency on nature’s proper functioning, which creates humility and respect towards *all* life systems. The second reason is the growth of India’s cultural diversity over her long history (5000 years), relative absence of wars over religious ideologies, and more importantly, her philosophical teachings. India recognized the ‘infinite’ value of a human life, its

ability to know the truth, and life's dependency on its natural and social surroundings.

Indian scholars wrote treatises or guidelines for humanity's respectful conduct towards diversity of beings (sentient) and things (elemental). India has continued age after age in progressive philosophical advance in the effort to understand life and reality. "India's concentrated study of the inner nature of man is, in the end, a study of man universal" (Radhakrishnan and Moore, 1957: xxx). India defined both human and humanity as "spiritual" at its core.

In order to activate and promote spiritual aspects of humanity and eliminate or control less desirable aspects, Indian thinkers produced treatises such as *dharma-shastra*, "the science of human's righteous conduct." This text provided a prescriptive ethics for human relations. Beyond the prescriptive idealism, the epic *Mahabharata* narrates tales within tales on complex human characters and their conduct in relation to other members of the extended family. The *Mahabharata* is a great big drama on interpersonal relations woven with the concepts of duties, and responsibilities in the context of diverse situations (Junghare, 2009: 36-54). Moreover, recent research in physical sciences, specifically on string theories in quantum physics, seems to be comparable to ancient Indian seers' extra-ordinary perception of what constitutes life and its relationship with the universe on the whole (Junghare, 2014:15-26).

5. UNIFIED UNIVERSE: ANCIENT INDIA'S IDEALISTIC SYNCRETISM

The Vedas and the Upanishads (1500 B.C.-800 B.C.) provided the foundation for the

understanding of the universe and humanity's relationship to its parts. In general, Indian tradition has concentrated on the spiritual, conceiving human beings as spiritual in nature and relating human life in one way or another to a universe, which is also spiritual in essential character. As contrasted with Western philosophy, with its analytic approach to reality and experience, Indian philosophy is primarily synthetic. The synthesizing tendency of the Indian mind brought into harmony religion and philosophy, knowledge and conduct, intuition and reason, man and nature, and God and man (Radhakrishnan and Moore, 1957:xxvii-xxviii). Metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, religion, psychology, facts, and values are treated in their natural unity as diverse aspects of one life and experience of *a single comprehensive reality* (Junghare, 2011:15-28).

In the present world of conflicts of socio-political and cultural ideologies, humanity's inconsistent conduct breaks the natural laws and creates problems of suffering which require the promotion of all-inclusive, holistic-judicious humanism such as that promoted by ancient Indian philosophies.

Constituents of the Unitary Existence

- Male and female
- Gay or lesbian
- Black and white
- Brown, yellow, red
- Young and old
- Non-Humans (Diversity)
- All animals
- All plants
- All microbes
- All elements: water, earth, air, fire, & space
- Sun, moon, stars, planets
- Eco-systems: Oceans, deserts, forests, rivers, mountains
- Rich and poor
- Elite and tribal
- Disabled/challenged



Fig. 1 Holistic Humanity. *Interconnected-interdependent existences - Unified One (Integration of Universal and Particular)* Source:Marina Challeen's "Diverse Universe", Hong Kong 2015 & "Colors of Peace", Madrid, Spain, 2016

All beings-humans, animals, plants, and microbes exist in the same cosmos, thereby creating problems of survival for the weaker species and helpless and

powerless humans. World economies have been essentially interconnected. In the 21st century, technology has allowed globalization to take on a bigger role in people's lives than ever before due

to Internet and transportation infrastructure. Individuals can access intellectual property created anywhere on their phones. Although this allows for a more efficient movement of goods and services, it tends to advantage large companies at the expense of small ones. Similarly, executives with powerful positions form a class of politically dominant group. Thus, the resultant problems of globalization are inequality, slavery, oppression, and exploitation of ordinary humans by rich industrialists, businessmen and executives in various cultures.

6. VIOLATIONS OF THE NATURE’S LAWS: ENDANGERED EXISTENCE

All life substances matter because they are equitable in nature. Each life is marked by distinguishing characteristics (biological), specific purpose (innate ability), and definite function.

Who can say a female is less valuable than a male? Young humans are full of energy, whereas, old people are full of life-experiences. All lives contribute to the totality of existence. Cosmos is an infinite net of interdependence between humans

and their environment (see Indra’s *Jewel Net--Web of Life* in Fig. 1). Nothing exists on its own. The linguistic construct of “child” depends on the concept of “mother.” Life is a chain of causes and effects. Humanity’s abuse of nature results in natural disasters, which become the cause of suffering. Suffering has increased at all levels: (a) cosmological – imbalanced ecosystems--various life species are becoming extinct. Air pollution is the result of industrialization; (b) global – ozone depletion; waste is overflowing – killing fish and animals with plastic; (c) technological advancement – humans are being replaced by robots; and (d) Socio-cultural: human beings are becoming victims of power abuses.

That the cosmos is in chaos can be seen through the following images presented below: (1) Millions of fish have died by eating human-created waste, mainly plastic products. People who ate the plastic-eaten fish may have become victims of ailments. (2) Helpless humans suffer from inhumane atrocities. (3) Effect of Industrialization on the globe’s human population: 33% of urban dwellers in China breathe toxic air equivalent to smoking two packs of cigarette per day.



Fig. 2 Cosmos in Chaos: Death and Destruction. source: “Man and Nature,” by Sam Johanneck and Christine Pavlicek, 2009

7. INNATE DIGNITY OF THE CHANGING EXISTENCE

The life process, if carefully observed, indicates some commonalities and some particularities in diverse existences. It is easier to form generalizations. However, life’s diversity in form and function is incomprehensible. Some things and some phenomena are not observable by our senses. Many things fall short of reasoning because of our limited capacity of knowing, understanding and analyzing. On the level of sensory perception, if we cannot know how our back looks like, how are we to describe it? Why

people are the way they are biologically cannot be explained by human reasoning.

On the ontological level, all beings and all things exist. We assume they existed in the past, they exist in the present, and they will exist in the future – only in different forms, content and function. This theory will be accepted if people understood life as a process subject to constant change. Due to ignorance and limited ability to know the true nature of reality, neither scientists nor philosophers can describe and/or predict life’s transformation in the future. People have no control on their being-ness (biology), and limited control on who they become in the context of environment. They do have some control on their

conduct. Humans can strive for a qualitative life of liberty, justice, and peace by establishing valid metaphysical categories and sound systems of ethics that will guard humanity's dignified existence at all times. The present conditions of life demand a sound value system in the context of advances in sciences and technology.

8. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The title of the paper, "All Lives Matter: Judicious Humanism," implies that all lives, inclusive of humans, animals, plants, and microbes matter for they contribute to the totality of existence. As discussed earlier, and noted by Korzybski (2010: 6), 'human nature' represents a very complex organism as the result of an environmental and genetic amalgam which gives rise to the problems of suffering: mental illnesses leading to suicide and gun violence and inequality arising from discrimination, oppression, and exploitation. In the modern era, all lives, both singularly and collectively, have been threatened through ill health, social conflicts, and natural disasters. Human problems are generally solved by socio-political leaders and educators with innovative ideas, but such leaders now have to have a broader global perspective than before, which must include recognition of *all* values of life upheld in different parts of the world.

Modern Humanity: Technology & Ethics. This century has been considered to be an age of biotechnology. Treatments for various diseases will advance steadily with the assistance of medical technology. However, humanity faces wide-ranging problems of medical ethics: dignified death, in-vitro fertilization, and conditions associated with certain disorders. The entrance of technology in the domain of life imposes mental stress, depleting our inner strength and leading to depression and other mental disorders. This is called "sickness of the soul" (Ikeda, Simard, & Bourgeault, 2003:XII). Given the positive and negative consequences of the technological revolution, people of our time have become increasingly concerned about health, one of the keys to happiness. Discrimination against vulnerable humanity has exacerbated the problems of social conflict, violence, and denial of human rights to the defenseless. Another issue for mankind is of nature and harmonious coexistence. Modern life has become divisive and fragmentary. What is the one cause for such deteriorating human

conditions? The answer lies in life's devaluation by humans themselves.

What we do every day makes for who we are. What we do every day determine not only who we are today but who we will become in the future. According to the Upanishads, "As is a man's will, so is his action, as is his action, so he becomes." (*Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* V. 4.5; quoted from Frawley, 1989:45). The central tenet of judicious humanism is to see that all lives are part of the universe and resolve to live in harmony. This is called "kratu" in Sanskrit, meaning intelligence in action (Frawley, 1989:45). Judicious humans have to be freethinkers and resolute actors, who can combine information with knowledge gained through objective science and technology into a new vision of reality.

8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am sincerely grateful to my respected colleague Elena Buja from Transilvania University of Brasov, Romania, for presenting an earlier version of the paper at the International Conference, *Redefining Community in Intercultural Context* (RCIC'19), Vlora, Albania, 2-4 May 2019; I would like to thank Professors Paul Quie and Bruce Downing for their foundational support, and Jonathan Awasom, Linda Johnson, and Alan Musielewicz for their continual encouragement and participation in the advancement of the Diversity-Ethics-Peace interdisciplinary studies.

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THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN THE CASE OF LIBYA. PERSPECTIVES AND ARGUMENTS FROM BRICS COUNTRIES

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Abstract: *The article focuses on the intervention in Libya and analyses the context in which Resolutions 1970 and 1973 were unanimously adopted in the United Nations Security Council. The main goal of the paper is twofold. First, we aim to discuss the relevance of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in the context of the Libyan humanitarian crisis and the swift response of the UNSC. Secondly, our research objective is to present and analyse the consistency of arguments formulated by BRICS countries (all of them members in the UNSC during the Libyan intervention) with respect to RtoP. The central research question is: what does the case of Libya reveal about BRICS' attitudes regarding the responsibility to protect civilians?*

Keywords: *responsibility to protect; BRICS; Libya; United Nations Security Council*

1. INTRODUCTION

The main goal of this article is to investigate whether the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) norm divides the members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and, by extrapolating, the states within the international community into two opposing camps. One group which favours the norm by strengthening a global responsibility to protect civilians and the need to use military force against governments which fail to protect the human rights of their citizens (or are themselves the perpetrators of abuse or crimes against humanity) is usually associated with the West. On the other hand, the countries commonly referred to as BRICS, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, are often analysed as revisionist actors in world politics, reluctant to employ military force against other state actors, and apparently opposed to the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) norm.

The Responsibility to Protect is often presented as a Western conceptual construction meant to safeguard civilians trapped in internal civil wars. In fact, the concept is the result of various debates and represents an attempt to reconcile state sovereignty and the rule of non-intervention in states' internal affairs (often favoured by BRICS countries), and intervention meant to protect innocent civilians who face imminent or unfolding violence on the territory of other states.

According to Oliver Stuenkel,

the discussion about RtoP today continues to be largely seen in the context of a pro-interventionist Global North and a pro-sovereignty Global South, together with the BRICS bloc (Stuenkel, 2014:7; Stuenkel, 2016:1).

Therefore, the question is whether the BRICS reject the essentials of RtoP as such, or merely Pillar 3 provisions, which they construe an assault on states' sovereignty.

The case of the Libya intervention is extremely relevant from at least two perspectives. First, the protests and brutal governmental reaction led to an imminent humanitarian tragedy which triggered the swiftest response of the UNSC. However, initial consensus among all members of the United Nations Security Council, including all BRICS countries, was replaced by dissent and by formulations of stark criticism from BRICS by the end of NATO's operation in Libya.

Therefore, the main research questions in this article are: What exactly is the point of dissent between the groups (Western states, on the one hand, and BRICS, on the other hand)? Do they perceive human rights differently or do they have opposing views on the means employed in order to protect human rights? What does the case of Libya reveal about these different views?

The article is organised into three main parts. The first briefly investigates the essentials of RtoP and the

three pillars included in the norm. The second presents the events in Libya in 2011 leading to the humanitarian crisis and explains the reaction of the UNSC. Finally, the third presents the criticism formulated by BRICS countries and attempts to identify the core issues of dissent.

2. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN THE CASE OF LIBYA

2.1 The responsibility to protect and its pillars. In 2000, following the initiative of the Canadian government, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established at the UN Millennium Assembly. In 2001, ICISS issued the Report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*. It stated that “sovereignty implies responsibility” by assigning the primary responsibility for the protection of people to the states themselves. Moreover, the Report argued that “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect” (ICISS, 2001:XI). The reconceptualization therefore entails the shift from “sovereignty as authority” to “sovereignty as responsibility.” The Commission also emphasized three responsibilities corresponding to specific phases: the responsibility to prevent (ICISS, 2001:19-27), the responsibility to react (ICISS, 2001:29-37), and the responsibility to rebuild (ICISS, 2001:39-45).

The framework of RtoP was officially incorporated by the United Nations in 2005 during the UN World Summit (Herța, 2019b). The UN General Assembly issued the World Summit Outcome Document. This was a unanimously supported resolution that endorsed the scope of the responsibility to protect. Article 138 of the document specifies the

responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” and emphasizes the responsibility of each state which “entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means (A/RES/60/1, United Nations General Assembly Resolution, World Summit Outcome, 2005: 30).

Additionally, Article 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document made clear pledges towards

collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (A/RES/60/1, United Nations’ General Assembly Resolution, World Summit Outcome, 2005: 30).

The responsibilities are centred on specific situations, such as mass atrocity crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing and other large-scale crimes against humanity. These conditions should not be mistaken for human security in general or human rights in general (Evans 2011:36). The responsibilities associated with all the above mentioned crimes against humanity are in fact consistent with legal obligations enshrined in the United Nations’ Charter and in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the latter has been ratified or acceded to by 152 States (as of July 2019). Alex Bellamy argued that, precisely because all the crimes mentioned in the World Summit Outcome Document were already prohibited, the principle attached to responsibility to protect was not “a new legal principle but rather a political commitment to implement already existing law” (Bellamy, 2011:22).

In 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released the report *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, in which he outlined three pillars attached to the three responsibilities (to prevent, to react, to rebuild). The first (called The protection responsibilities of the State) refers to the “enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement”, while pillar two (titled International assistance and capacity-building) pledges “the commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting those obligations” (Implementing the responsibility to protect, 2009:10-21). Pillar three (Timely and decisive response) refers to “the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection” (Implementing the responsibility to protect, 2009:22-28). According to many voices, the report of the Secretary-General “diluted the central defining feature of RtoP” (Thakur, quoted in Weiss, 2011:7).

Pillars 1 and 2 focus on the states' capacity and responsibility to protect human rights and therefore do not outline any imposition on state sovereignty. Pillar 3, however, mentions a "wide range of non-coercive and non-violent response measures" associated with Chapter VI provisions of the UN Charter, but also sanctions and "robust steps" associated with articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter (Chapter VII), referring to collective enforcement measures (sanctions or coercive military action). According to the Report,

"when a State refuses to accept international prevention and protection assistance, commits egregious crimes and violations relating to the responsibility to protect and fails to respond to less coercive measures, it is, in effect, challenging the international community to live up to its own responsibilities under paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome" (Implementing the responsibility to protect, 2009: 25).

2.2 The intervention in Libya. Peaceful demonstrations (inspired by similar actions across North African countries as part of the Arab Spring) began in February 2011 in Libya. Very soon, protests turned into anti-government demonstrations and demanded the removal of Muammar Gaddafi (Gebremichael *et al.*, 2018: 3). The protests were met with brutality by police and security forces and the opposition leaders retaliated. Very quickly, innocent civilians were endangered and violence mounted in three Libyan cities, Benghazi, Bani Walid and Darnah (Gebremichael *et al.*, 2018:3; Odeyemi, 2016:4). Gaddafi tried to shut down all protests and opposition by recourse to military force, called protesters "cockroaches" and in March threatened the residents of Benghazi that "soldiers would be coming tonight and would show no mercy" (Brockmeier, Stuenkel, Tourinho, 2015:4).

The perception within the international community was that innocent people in Libya were facing imminent violence and the response of the United Nations was extremely prompt. On February 15, 2011, the United Nations Security Council issued a statement in which it requested the Libyan government "to meet its responsibility to protect its population" (Brockmeier *et al.*, 2015:3). On February 26, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1970, in which the Council referred "the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to [...] the International Criminal Court", imposed sanctions (arms embargo, travel bans and asset freeze), and

deplored the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government (UNSC Resolution 1970, 2011).

A few weeks later, a no-fly zone was imposed under the normative umbrella of the responsibility to protect: on March 17, the Security Council issued Resolution 1973, in which military force was authorized to protect civilians and civilian populated areas. The need to protect civilians was expressed in paragraph 4 of Resolution 1973, in which the Council authorized

Member States [...] to take all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory (UNSC Resolution 1973, 2011).

Under the coordination of the United States, UN member states initiated military action on March 19 and the initial key element of the intervention was centred on the following humanitarian rationale: creation of no-fly zone and protection of civilians, authorizing UN member states to use "all necessary measures" for that aim. French, British and American forces began the operations with the goals of imposing the no-fly area and targeting Gaddafi's military targets. After a few weeks, NATO took over the military operation.

The swift reaction of the United Nations seemed to validate the responsibility to protect norm, but also appeared to show the readiness of the Council to address gross and systematic violation of human rights. Enthusiasm related to immediate actions was voiced at the time. UN Secretary General (UNSG) Ban Ki-Moon said that

Resolution 1973 affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community's determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own government (Tocci, 2015:1).

Susan Rice, who was the US Ambassador to the United Nations at that time, also commented:

I can't remember a time in recent memory when the Council has acted so swiftly, so decisively, and in unanimity on an urgent matter of international human rights (Tocci, 2015:3).

What most analysts and commentators noted was, of course, the consensus within the United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1973, which authorized the military intervention, was supported by ten members of the Council (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States) while five countries abstained (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia). No state vetoed the resolution and all BRICS countries (at the time all of them wererepresented in the Council) supported the mission in Libya.

Apart from the visible consensus among Council members that innocent Libyan civilians needed to be protected, UNSC Resolution 1973 was also unique. It was for the first time that the UN had authorized a military intervention with the aim of protecting civilians against their own government (Tocci, 2015:3; Dunne, Gifkins, 2015:522-523).

2.3 Criticism and arguments from BRICS countries. The initial support for the mission in Libya was gradually replaced by criticism from BRICS countries, as NATO decided to support the National Transitional Council of Libya, but more importantly to continue military action against Gaddafi even after his calls for ceasefire, which culminated with the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime.

In what follows, we will present some reactions from BRICS countries meant to capture the core issues of disagreement.

China criticized the lack of neutrality and lack failure to “respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the country concerned” and argued that “there must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil war by any party under the guise of protecting civilians” (Bellamy, 2011:20). In fact, China had always claimed to be “against the use of force in international relations” and in 2011 showed reservations with some aspects of Resolution 1973, but nevertheless supported it by abstaining from voting, partly because the League of Arab States and the African Union were adamant to support the no-fly zone measure (Odeyemi, 2016:9-10; Stuenkel, 2014:11-12).

Russia criticized the disproportionate use of force (Tocci, 2015), insisted that an immediate ceasefire had to be achieved and after Gaddafi’s death in October 2011 Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov “accused NATO of having overstepped the UN’s mandate to protect civilians with the attack on Gaddafi himself” (Stuenkel, 2014: 13). When

later Russia vetoed resolutions concerning reactions to the deteriorating situation in Syria, it pointed to “drawing lessons” from Libya to the unfolding Syrian crisis. In October 2011, Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin stated that

the situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience...It is easy to see that today’s ‘Unified Protector’ model could happen in Syria (Tocci, 2015: 20).

Brazil argued that “excessively broad interpretations of the protection of civilians” had to be avoided, because they “link it to the exacerbation of conflict, compromise the impartiality of the United Nations or create the perception that it is being used as a smokescreen for intervention or regime change” (Bellamy, 2011:20). Also, it affirmed the “need to protect civilians and respect for their rights” (Tocci, 2015:15). In November 2011, Brazil stated that

there is a growing perception that the concept of the responsibility to protect might be misused for purposes other than protecting civilians, such as regime change (Stuenkel, 2014:13).

India “expressed great concern over the welfare of the population of Libya” during the military intervention (Tocci, 2015:15; Stuenkel, 2014:11). Also, the Indian Ambassador to the UN Hardeep Singh Puri declared that “Libya has given R2P a bad name” (Tocci, 2015: 18). During the deliberations revolving around a resolution on Syria, India also drew some “lessons” from the Libyan case by stating: “the international community should facilitate dialogue and not threaten sanctions or regime change” (Tocci, 2015:18).

South Africa expressed concern over the fact that military action exceeded the “letter and spirit” of the resolutions. It also warned that constructive assistance should be provided without “advancing political agendas that go beyond the protection of civilian mandates, including regime change” (Bellamy, 2011: 20). South Africa’s Ambassador to the UN, Baso Sangqu, also drew conclusions, by saying that with regard to Syria the “trajectory, the templates for the solution were very clear; it was along similar lines to Libya” (Stuenkel, 2014:15). By the autumn of 2011, South Africa’s tone had become more virulent:

abusing the authorization granted by the Council to advance a political regime-change agenda does not bode well for the future action of the Council in

advancing the protection of civilians agenda (Tocci, 2015:19; Odeyemi, 2016:11).

According to some sources, various South African diplomats were even surprised that NATO had taken over the implementation of the no-fly zone measure and Pretoria stated that “the primary intention of resolutions 1970 and 1973 was to find a political solution to the Libyan crisis and not to enforce regime change” (Odeyemi, 2016:11).

Given all these statements and critique, what exactly is the point of dissent between the two groups, the Western states, especially USA, UK and France, on the one hand, and BRICS, on the other hand? Did they disagree over principles or means of implementation? What does the case of Libya reveal about these different views?

According to most analysts the bulk of opposing views rests on the second part of the military intervention and on the means employed for carrying out a humanitarian mission. Nathalie Tocci argued that the case of Libya revealed the “major concerns of BRICS regarding RtoP: state sovereignty, aversion to the use of force, and politicization and misuse” (Tocci, 2015:18). Others indicated the “NATO-ization of RtoP” (Rieff quoted in Brockmeier, Stuenkel, Tourinho, 2015:2). Given the above mentioned “lessons learned” from the Libyan intervention by BRICS countries, one could easily conclude that the removal of Gaddafi (and the idea that a humanitarian intervention ends in regime change) had a huge impact on BRICS countries’ attitudes to the situation in Syria (alongside other considerations such as Russia’s support for Assad and lack of international support for Gaddafi).

4. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

One conclusion could be the observation that all BRICS countries agree with the need to save innocent civilians and stop an imminent humanitarian tragedy, even when the perpetrator is the government itself, but they disagree with the forceful removal of the respective government. As explained by Nathalie Tocci, the BRICS countries did agree with the initial military response aimed at destroying the Libyan air force infrastructure and the Libyan army’s heavy weapons in order to protect civilians in Benghazi, because “all these measures were viewed as compatible with the UNSC’s no-fly zone and protection mandates” (Tocci: 2015:18-19). But, Tocci adds,

Had the NATO operation come to a halt when the Libyan forces ended attacks against civilian populated areas, withdrew to bases, and permitted unhindered humanitarian access, the BRICS would have likely been comfortable with the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1973 (Tocci: 2015:19).

Another aspect which exposes dissent between the Western group and BRICS is related to the provisions of Pillar 3 of the report *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, because it creates the opportunity for Western states to misinterpret and exceed the norm. As such, Pillar III, and not agreement on the need to protect civilians, even by using military force, constitutes the “gap between NATO and the BRICS” (Stuenkel, 2014:17).

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INTERCULTURAL ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY MODEL FOR CENTRAL AFRICA: THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

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Abstract: *The post-colonial relations of European countries and their former African colonies are complex and sensitive, in light of past memories, economic and political interests. Africans and Europeans maintain an ongoing dialogue at all levels on political, economic, commercial, humanitarian issues and more. Intercultural communication is of great importance, and fruitful dialogue requires an ability to bridge gaps and reach a high level of mutual understanding. Theoretical and practical models have tried to offer solutions to improve dialogue. For example, Hofstede's model describes six dimensions through which cultures of different societies and nationalities can be compared. Other theories help determine criteria for optimising comparability, and for better intercultural communication. This paper aims to present the component of intercultural communication from the Intercultural Economic Diplomacy Model for Central Africa. The model was developed as part of a PhD research "Intercultural Economics Diplomacy and Cross-Cultural Encounters in Central Africa after the Discovery of Natural Resources - The Case of Equatorial Guinea". The model aims to offer a practical tool for those who wish their intercultural cooperation to be more productive. The findings of the research rely on interviews and document analysis conducted with government members and senior officials in Equatorial Guinea and UN agencies. The paper argues that intercultural communication is of great importance in dialogue with Central Africa, and will present the main recommendations drawn from the findings.*

Keywords: *Intercultural communication; central Africa; economic diplomacy*

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, international interest in the Central African region has grown in light of its economic potential and the range of opportunities it offers. Many Central African countries enjoy natural resources in their territory, cheap and available labour and Local markets with unrealised commercial potential (World Bank, n.d.). These conditions create unique economic opportunities and many international factors seek to take part in this.

The immediate natural partners of Central African countries are the European countries that have ruled the region in the past. The culture of Central African countries has been influenced by European culture. Central African regulatory practices are similar to the practices of European governments (Ginio, 2012); African peoples speak European languages so that language is not an obstacle. In general, the former African colonies have a strong affinity for European countries that have operated in the region in the past. The relations

between the European countries and their former African colonies are complex and sensitive, in light of past memories and present interests (Young, 2016). Today, about five decades after the African states have gained independence, cooperation between Europeans and Central Africans is intensifying. Political and economic cooperation holds many opportunities for both parties. However, in order to succeed, it is essential to understand that this encounter of different cultural norms and behaviour should be evaluated accordingly. Productive intercultural dialogue is a prerequisite for success. Both parties of the dialogue should be well studied, and it is essential to understand their motives and cultural characteristics. The model of Intercultural Economic Diplomacy for Central Africa, developed in the framework of a PhD research "Intercultural Economics Diplomacy and Cross-Cultural Encounters in Central Africa after the Discovery of Natural Resources - The Case of Equatorial Guinea study" is intended to assist in the preparations for such intercultural dialogue and

offers a practical method toward work in Central Africa.

The original purpose of the model was to assist in formulating a strategy of economic diplomacy for representatives of countries and international organisations seeking to operate in the region. However, the model is also suitable for business factors, and for Central African officials seeking to prepare for intercultural encounters with Europeans and other foreigners. The model combines existing theoretical methods for defining cultural characteristics such as the Hofstede model of the six cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2011), and recommendations of local factors as a result of the present research. The paper will begin by describing the existing situation in Central Africa, the economic potential of the region and its cultural characteristics. The paper will present the model of intercultural economic diplomacy developed within the and the main conclusions of the research.

2. CENTRAL AFRICA AND EUROPE

The post-colonial relations of European and Central African countries are complex and sensitive, mainly due to colonial history. Most countries in the region gained independence in the 1960s, and some argue that for many years some European countries maintained indirect control of their former African colonies (Neuberger, 2011). Colonial language continued to be the official language. The colonial-era left many characteristics in the region, including European languages, religious influences, and more. Local government systems are based on European governance methods and are very similar to them. Some European countries relate to their former colonies and try to incorporate them into international organisations such as the Francophonie and Portuguese-Speaking Community (CPLP). European countries tended to support their former colonies in international forums by promoting African interests. Some European countries intervene in African politics in order to support governments and politicians and maintain their interests. The African countries benefit from the European support in international forums, but this poses a complicated dilemma to leaders. European support has a negative impact on their sovereignty, independence, and national pride (Neuberger, 2011; Young, 2016).

3. ECONOMIC INTERESTS

The Central African region has significant economic potential and many factors, countries and

businesses, want to integrate into the region's economic activities. The economic advantages of the Central African region include, among other things, a wealth of natural resources, cheap labour, emerging markets and a diverse consumer population (World Bank, n.d.). However, there are concerns among foreigners regarding the political stability of the region. In practice, the governance system of a presidential republic that is prevalent in the region allows relative short-term stability. Centralisation in bureaucratic processes is an advantage in terms of the foreign entities seeking to operate in the region since decision-making processes can be relatively quick. Another factor that increases economic potential is geopolitical stability. Colonial European countries arbitrarily set the borders of the Central African region at the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885 (Young, 2016). Once the countries of the region gained independence, they adopted, with no better alternative, the colonial borders. The colonial borders meant, in many cases, that on both sides, there is the same ethnic group, and the likelihood of violent conflict is not high. For countries that want to operate in the region, there are many opportunities in different areas, from the energy sector with oil and gas companies, executing national infrastructure projects, selling military and civilian equipment, and more.

4. CULTURAL EVALUATION

Culture can be defined in different ways. Culture is always described as a collective phenomenon, but it has been linked to different collectives, made up of a variety of individuals (Hofstede, 2011). Most researchers agree that culture can articulate standard cognition and joint action procedures, and that cultural phenomena include similar expressions of norms, art, self-perception, and more (Triandis, 1996).

Researchers have discussed whether universal categories can be developed through which cultural characteristics can be assessed. In the early stages, the discussion was about the level of economic development and modernisation of society (Lanski, 2016). Further researches have shown the profound relations between cultural and economic variables, for example, Liñán and Fernandez-Serrano (2014) argued that the cultural component accounts for about 60% of GDP per capita in EU countries. For a long time, researchers have tried to define dimensions through which national firms can be compared. The model developed by Hofstede defines six dimensions through which national

cultures can be compared (Hofstede, 2011): (1) Power Distance. Related to the different solutions to the fundamental problem of human inequality; (2) Uncertainty Avoidance. Related to the level of stress in a society in the face of an unknown future; (3) Individualism versus Collectivism. Related to the integration of individuals into primary groups; (4) Masculinity versus Femininity. Related to the division of emotional roles between woman and man; (5) Long-Term versus Short-Term Orientation. Related to the choice of focus for people's efforts: the future or the present and the past; (6) Indulgence versus Restraint. Related to gratification versus control of basic human desires related to enjoying life.

Bing (2004) describes a variety of practical uses for the theoretical models. Work teams can be trained according to the cultural environment in which they are intended to operate; understanding the norms in different societies and adjust how they work; organisations will be able to develop work practices tailored to local culture, and more.

The basic unit for the analysis is the state. Most social researchers see the nation-state as a cultural framework. States encourage cultural homogeneity. Since early history, nations have been an expression of cultural similarity, as in ancient Greece or Egypt (Ronen & Shenkar, 2017). Triandis (1996) notes that almost all theories and data of contemporary psychology come from the western population (Europe, North America, Australia, etc.). However, about 70% of the world's population lives in non-western cultures. Data from non-western regions indicate that each culture can have its psychological characteristics, and for genuine worldwide research, data from all places should be combined.

The six-dimensional theory proposed by Hofstede has evolved over the years, and additional tools have been added to it, such as the theory of basic human values (Schwartz, 2012).

Hanel and Wolfradt (2018) say that people tend to believe their worldview reflects the way others see the world. They believe that people tend to relate to the values of other members in their family, city, and country.

The model presented in this paper uses existing theoretical tools together with data obtained in the field to develop a strategy that will work in the cultural context of the Central African region.

5. METHODOLOGY

The data that was in use during the work on the research was collected in the framework of a

doctoral research "intercultural economic diplomacy and cross-cultural encounters in Central Africa after the discovery of natural resources- the case of Equatorial Guinea". The research attempts to understand, via the local perspective, the history of the region and the changes it has undergone since the discovery of natural resources, to define the cultural and business characteristics, and to develop a working model for external factors wishing to operate in the region. The main goal of the research is to develop an intercultural economic diplomacy model, with recommendations based on the regions' unique characteristics. The main research question is what components might comprise a model of intercultural economic diplomacy for Central Africa. The research was carried out in the qualitative approach. The qualitative research collects its data from the natural system and allows the understanding of personal experience, actions, and motifs, rather than examining existing theories (Hays & Wood, 2011). The qualitative approach attaches importance to the meaning of things in the eyes of the participants (Shkedi, 2003), and in this work refers to the African's subjective perspective. The data was collected in the natural system, in Equatorial Guinea, through in-depth interviews and document analysis. Twelve in-depth interviews were conducted with senior ministers and officials in the past and present Equatorial Guinea, and with senior UN officials operating in Central Africa. The interviewees selected to participate in the research are those who can contribute to the research because of their current role or unique experience. The interviewees were chosen based on a personal acquaintance or appropriate recommendations of reliable local people with suitable backgrounds.

The research approach is a case study, which assumes that it is possible to investigate a specific case and learn about the entire group (Yin, 2012). This research investigates the case of Equatorial Guinea, but the conclusions are also relevant to other Central African countries.

The qualitative research consisted of three stages. The first stage aims to describe historical, economic and diplomatic processes, the second stage aims to examine the intercultural economic relations of Equatorial Guinea with the international community, and the third stage aims to develop a working model for Central Africa. The research tools were, in all stages, semi-structured in-depth interviews, document analysis, and a focus group discussion.

6. MODEL OF INTERCULTURAL ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY FOR CENTRAL AFRICA

The analysis of the findings, and the conclusions drawn from the discussion, enabled the formulation of recommendations for a model of intercultural economic diplomacy for Central Africa. The model combines existing theories with data, information and recommendations obtained from local factors during the research. The model suggests a method of a structured process for gathering and analysing theoretical knowledge and combining it with data from the field. The model offers tools to formulate a suitable data-based strategy for the region, and includes the six following phases:

Module 1. Political and diplomatic background: After selecting the target area, the material collection phase begins. The initial information comes from literature and digital sources. The information will be analysed to understand the country's position in the international system and the variety of forces that affect it. The emphasis at this stage is on understanding the country's place and interests in the international arena.

Module 2. Investigating the Economic Environment: Study the local economic structure based on official information published by the state and information from international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank. Understanding the influence of the existence of natural resources, if any, on the state in economic, social and diplomatic aspects. Study of two economic parameters: The degree of economic dependence on the export of the natural resource, and the level of economic exposure to fluctuations in prices of commodities and exchange rates. At this point, it is recommended to visit the site for information verification and initial contacts.

Module 3. Mapping the decision-making environment: Most Central African countries are a presidential republic. The president is the head of state and holds extensive powers. To a large extent, understanding the president's motives and familiarity with his immediate surroundings will enable a better understanding of the state's conduct. Studying a leader includes knowing his biography, his motives and the people around him. It is essential to understand his ethnic affiliation and his relations with his extended family. In Central African countries, the decision-makers are exposed to external pressure and these factors should be identified and mapped.

Module 4. Economic Diplomacy Strategy: For countries and international organisations working in Central Africa, economic diplomacy offers a variety of tools. At the political level, it is advisable to examine the possibilities of influencing the country through economic pressure levers. On the economic level, it is advisable to explore the possibility of promoting economic interests through political pressure or support in the international arena. On the other hand, for Central African countries the use of economic diplomacy tools is an opportunity to gain support in various international forums through the assistance of countries operating in their territory, as well getting their support to advance national economic interests.

Module 5. Characterising Local Culture: It is advisable to study the cultural characteristics of the Central African region. At the state level, the specific characteristics of dominant ethnic groups must be recognised. It is advisable to characterise the local culture according to existing theoretical models.

Module 6. Intercultural aspects: The purpose of this phase is to characterise the intercultural encounter and to increase mutual understanding towards collaboration. Foreign culture will be characterised according to theoretical models with the same tools used to characterise culture in the African country. A comparison will be made between the different national cultures, and a framework will be created to identify differences and cross-cultural gaps. Given the data obtained, strategy and recommendations for working in a different cultural environment will be formulated.

7. THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

The research demonstrates the importance of intercultural communication for factors seeking to operate in Central Africa, and that mutual cultural understanding is a prerequisite for success. Various studies have shown that intercultural communication is essential to the success in international trade, and for management in a different cultural environment (Ng and Lillevik, 2017). For years, economics and culture were seen as different and distinct areas, but today the relations are clear (Reuveni and Gordon, 2012).

Through storytelling and descriptions of events, as well as learning from various actors' practical experience, the socio-cultural context can be better understood. However, professional guidance is required to move from emotional experience to

professional insights (Soderberg, 2017). The model attempts to address this need.

The Cultural, economic research attempts to explain why nations with similar political and natural characteristics have different economic performance (Rongxing, 2012), and in the present research attempts have been made to formulate a working method to allow to overcome difficulties and to understand the causes better. Jonasson and Lauring (2012) argue that differences in individuals' cultural values create problems in intercultural communication, and the present research findings support this. Therefore, not only the differences between nationalities but also the differences in the values of individuals must be noted. Foreigners in Central Africa do not always manage to communicate well, and the differences in communication styles create obstacles. The present study, conducted in Equatorial Guinea, shows, for example, that representatives of US and Chinese companies operating intensively in the country have communication difficulties with the locals. For Europeans, especially from countries that have ruled the region in the past, there is a definite advantage in intercultural communication compared to others operating in Central Africa. The effects of European culture, left by the colonial countries in the region, is still evident and facilitate the mutual ties. The language, the methods of governance, the structure of the educational systems, and more, create a convenient platform for better intercultural communication. However, the Africans still had much sediment from the colonial era, and that is a disadvantage for Europeans. It is essential to understand how the locals in Central Africa perceive the colonial era and respect their feelings.

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CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN RISK PERCEPTION AND RISK COMMUNICATION. A CASE STUDY ON THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK

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Abstract: *The aim of this paper is to analyse cultural differences in attitudes towards perceived risk, during public health emergencies. In order for risk communication to be effective and to properly address people's expectations and fears, political, social and economic factors should be taken into consideration. Moreover, since we consider cultural backgrounds to highly influence communication strategies, the main research questions of this paper are: to what extent cultural dimensions, such as high and low uncertainty avoidance or power distance, are visible in risk communication, and how the message is conveyed in cases of public health emergencies.*

The focus is on the discourse of state representatives or public institutions, such as ministries of health, in the context of the recent COVID-19 outbreak.

Keywords: *risk perception; cultural differences; public health emergencies; COVID-19 outbreak*

1. INTRODUCTION

Although making an evaluation of the COVID-19 outbreak crisis communication might seem premature at this point, since the crisis is still ongoing and we did not go through all three pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis phases, we consider important to analyse the communication practices in certain key moments of the crisis, not just at the end, in order to be able to draw pertinent conclusions on the entire crisis communication. Also, since some of the purposes of this paper are to analyse the uncertainty and the risk awareness conveyed in the messages to the population, we consider this period of multiple unknown factors, such as the climax of the crisis, the medical solutions available, or the social and economic impact, to be opportune for our study.

The methodology of this study consists in analysing public health emergency communication by combining theories in cultural dimensions and risk perception with critical discourse analysis. A starting point of our study is the cultural theory of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky on risk perception. For the cross-cultural analysis, we made use of the work of Geert Hofstede, one of the most quoted researchers in the domain of intercultural management and communication. We focused mostly on three of the cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede, namely uncertainty

avoidance, power distance and individualism versus collectivism.

The research questions of our study are to what extent these cultural differences are noticeable in the statements of authority figures and websites of public institutions, or if there is a more universal, global approach to risk and crisis communication. In trying to identify to what extent communication is influenced by social and cultural characteristics, we made a comparison between the official websites of Ministries of Health and several statements made by government representatives, in France and the United Kingdom.

2. RISK AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS - THEORETICAL ASPECTS

2.1 Risk, Danger and Crisis. Risk is a term that is widely and frequently used, and, although it generally refers to the likelihood that a negative outcome will occur, the perception regarding that outcome makes it also fairly subjective and polyvalent. According to the cultural theory of risk, which was introduced by anthropologist Mary Douglas in the late '60s and developed by Douglas together with Aaron Wildavsky (1982), risk and danger are culturally driven ideas. It refers to the cultural reasons that make people react in a certain way to a real and perceived danger and how they form judgments in this respect.

Bringing into discussion the notion of *risk* and how it evolved throughout the time, Douglas states that it became preferable to the one of *danger* in political discourse as “plain danger does not have the aura of science or afford the pretension of a possible precise calculation” and “risk seems to look forward: it is used to assess the dangers ahead.” (Douglas, 1994:25-26). Mary Douglas proposed a framework for cultural comparisons based on two dimensions: grid and group. The grid dimension describes how people take on different roles in a group, the amount of control and forms of stratification the members accept. The group dimension refers to how strongly people are connected together, how strong or weak the bonds between them are (Douglas, 1970/2004:57-71).

On the group/grid scheme, four distinctive values or ways of life emerge: individualism, fatalism, hierarchy and egalitarianism, based on which social life and organizational behaviour are conducted, and, more generally, which represent the reasoning behind the formation of choices and preference. (Douglas, 1978, Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982)

Another aspect that we are going to discuss in relation to risk perception is the lack of direct connection between the likelihood of a danger and the perceived severity of the danger. Logically speaking, the more probable a negative outcome is to occur and the more acute that negative outcome, the more people should perceive it as dangerous and fear it. However, the situation is much more complex. We will use the study of sociologist Franck Furedy, who asserts that “often people's perception of what constitutes danger has little to do with the real likelihood that they will suffer a misfortune from that source” (Furedy, 2006:23, 2006). He explains that one of the reasons why officials and experts fail at properly communicating risk is that attitudes, which cannot be characterized as rational or irrational, are shaped by a variety of influencers that are “part of the prevailing social and cultural climate” (Furedy, 2006: 25).

Furedy notices also some universal tendencies, such as the tendency to be more exposed by the media to the worst case scenario and towards an exaggeration of the scale of the threat, as well as an increased fear of violent crimes, of side-effects, of environmental and health related dangers, such as epidemics and viruses. This “promotion of fear” is doubled by a decline of trust in humanity, which is not necessarily an increase of consciousness of risks, but more an increased suspicion of hidden interests behind a potential unrevealed risk and of powerlessness. (Furedy, 2006: 30-38)

After presenting an anthropological as well as a sociological standpoint on risk perception, we will focus next on a psychological perspective, namely the one of Paul Slovic. Slovic asserts that public attitudes, though less informed than those of experts, are of utmost importance as they mirror legitimate concerns and how much people are willing to accept, which, if not properly taken into account, lead to ineffective risk communication. One of the most important factors in laypeople's risk perceptions and attitudes, as opposed to those of experts, is considered to be the dread factor. The factor *dread risk* is defined by a “perceived lack of control, dread, catastrophic potential, fatal consequences and the inequitable distribution of risks and benefits” (Slovic, 2000: 225).

Slovic gives the example of laypeople's opposition to certain technologies, such as nuclear power, to illustrate the discrepancy between the scientific probability of death caused by an incident in this domain and the risk perception associated to it. The benefits of this technology are generally considered to be small and the risk of a potential catastrophic event to be extremely high, in spite of the lack of evidence in that direction, as risk is not quantified as number of fatalities. (Slovic, 2000: 229-231)

Since the case we are going to analyse falls under the category of public health emergencies, the position of the World Health Organization on risk communication cannot be disregarded. Gaya Gamhewage, a senior expert in the World Health Organization - Hazard Management Department, in a 2014 Introduction to Risk Communication, outlined three main tendencies that have influenced the field of risk communication in the 21st century, namely the less trust granted to experts and authorities, the shift to on-line sources and social networks as sources of health advice and the increase of citizenship journalism in the detriment of well-sourced new stories of the past (Gamhewage, 2014:1).

Making reference to Slovic's studies on the perception of risk, Gamhewage summarized some of the main factors that increase public outrage in emergency situations. This level of outrage is believed to increase if a hazard:

- Unfamiliar and/or new (like a new disease, radiation, new drug)
- Involuntary (when risks are forced on the public such as in a compulsory immunization programme)
- Affects future generations (causing or being perceived as causing infertility)
- Cannot be seen or otherwise sensed (radiation, germs)

- Catastrophic in consequence (death, disability, major economic or environmental loss)
- Unfair in the distribution of harm and benefits (affects one group like children, or women)
- Potentially fatal (could lead to death) (Gamhewage, 2014:3)

Hence, the COVID-19 pandemic seems to meet all these criteria to determine a high level of public outrage. Since crises are complex phenomena that take many forms, the term is not universally defined, but, for the purpose of this article, we will use the definition given by crisis communication expert Timothy Coombs, who delineates crisis as the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization's performance and generate negative outcomes" (Coombs 2007:2-3). This definition brings forward the perceptual nature of crises and validates the inclusion of socio-cultural factors in the analysis of communication strategies.

2.2 Cultural Dimensions Theory. Since cultural backgrounds highly influence communication strategies, in this sub-section we will make a brief presentation of the cultural dimensions used in the case study. The contribution of Geert Hofstede to the domain of intercultural communication is unquestionable and, being one of the most quoted authors of the field, we consider unnecessary to present the context of his studies and to justify the choice of using the cultural dimensions that he identified as guidelines of analysis for the current study (Pop-Flanja, 2015:173-178). The cultural dimensions that we are going to use in our case study are: Power Distance Index, Individualism versus Collectivism and Uncertainty Avoidance Index, and Long-Term versus Short-Term Orientation.

The Power Distance Index (PDI) refers to the manner in which people from a particular culture relate to social inequality, to the interdependencies between the subordinates and the people in a superior position. In high PDI societies, people in a lower hierarchical position do not feel uncomfortable if their superiors have a bigger degree of control and decision-making power over them, there is a high degree of obedience and respect. In low PDI societies, there is a limited dependency between superiors and subordinates, which make formalities and status have a less prominent importance. (Hofstede, 1996:40-60)

The dimension Individualism versus Collectivism (IDV) deals with the dependence of an individual on the group or groups that s/he

belongs to. In a highly individualistic society, the task is more important than the inter-group relations and the relations between people are more limited. On the other side of the spectrum, in societies with a higher degree of collectivism, the interest of the group prevails, groups are strongly connected, with well-integrated individuals, and there is a strong accent on a participative type of management. (Hofstede, 1996:68-86)

The Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) focuses on the attitude of a society to uncertainty and the manner in which uncertain situations are tackled. In low UAI cultures, people consider that uncertainty is part of their lives and that there is little they can do to influence it. Hence, individuals are more open to risk-taking and to innovation. In high UAI cultures, people strive to control the future, they have a strong need for security and there is a high confidence in specialists and their knowledge. Hofstede points out that avoiding uncertainty is not equivalent to avoiding risk. To support this idea, he gives the example of high road speed limits in high UAI countries, as the priority is to avoid the uncertainty and the stress caused by wasting time and not the risk of accidents to occur (Hofstede, 1996:133-149). This dimension is nevertheless relevant to our study as, even though avoiding uncertainty and avoiding risk are not equivalent concepts, communicating risk is influenced by attitudes towards uncertainty.

3. CASE STUDY: A CROSS-CULTURAL RISK COMMUNICATION COMPARISON BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UK

Even though the COVID-19 outbreak can be considered a crisis situation from many perspectives, the increasing number of cases worldwide (Worldometer, 2020) lead us to presume the crisis did not reach its climax. Moreover, crisis and risk are terms that cannot be studied separately, and crisis management can be placed as a continuation of risk management (Lesenciuc, 2008:105-107). Risk communication is proactive, can be included in the pre-crisis phase and, since the messages we are going to analyse are addressed mostly to the people not suffering from, or unaware of having contracted the virus, but being at risk of contracting it, and considering the perception of risk to be more approachable from a cultural point of view, the theoretical background of this paper was mostly related to risk communication.

The above-mentioned Frank Furedi discusses also the COVID-19 outbreak, which he calls a disaster without precedent. The unprecedenced

not consist in the scale of the destruction and losses, but in the manner in which governments, international organisations and communities have responded to it. “All of these responses are influenced by society’s broader cultural script on risk and uncertainty”, Furedi states, a script characterised by a shift from resilience to vulnerability, the psychologisation of everyday life, a heightened sense of existential insecurity and the need to cultivate courage. (Furedi, 2020)

In order to make a cross-cultural comparison of the risk communication in this context in the case of France and Great Britain, we will analyse the official websites of the Ministries of Health of both countries and several statements of Prime Ministers Édouard Philippe and Boris Johnson, in the interval 14-26 March 2020.

Even though the number of people diagnosed with COVID-19 was higher in France in that interval (Worldometer, 2020), we consider the level of threat to be similar and the difference in the number of cases not to influence cross-cultural aspects of risk communication.

Since the cultural dimensions used as points of reference in the case study are those identified by Geert Hofstede, we consider relevant to present the country comparison scores for France and the United Kingdom:




Fig.1 Hofstede Insights, Country Comparison France and the UK (Hofstede *et al.*, 2010).

There is a fairly big difference between the scores obtained for power distance (68 France – 35 UK) and uncertainty avoidance (86 France – 35 UK) and a smaller difference on the scale individualism – collectivism (71 France – 89 UK).

Hence, we will start our analysis with the Power Distance Index. Cultural theory assumes that a culture is “a system of persons holding one another mutually accountable” (Douglas, 1994: 31). This degree of accountability can be interpreted in correlation to the cultural dimension

power distance, as it refers to the extent to which individuals relate to and accept authority. High power distance can be interpreted as more expectation of accountability from the superior. Low power distance can mean placing more accountability on the individual. This is an important aspect that should be taken into consideration when conveying messages to the population. How should the message be structured? More in the direction of: to control or limit a negative possible outcome, we, as authorities, are taking these measures and you, the citizens, are expected to take a certain action –as in high power distance societies people do not feel uncomfortable when receiving instructions- or: we, as authorities, recommend you, as citizens, to take a certain action—as a recommendation is more empowering than an expectation.

Also, it is relevant from the same perspective to see to what extent citizens are expected to obey the law, what is their expected degree of obedience. Hence, we analysed the websites of the Ministries of Health of both countries. In the case of France, which scored fairly high on PDI, rules and regulations are clearly presented, but we did not identify any penalties for not obeying the rules. In the case of the UK, information on law enforcement and penalties for not obeying the rules is available repeatedly on the website of the Ministry of Health:

The relevant authorities, including the police, have been given the powers to enforce them – including through fines and dispersing gatherings

or

if the police believe that you have broken these rules – or if you refuse to follow their instructions – a police officer may issue you with a fixed penalty notice for £60 (reduced to £30 if paid within 14 days)

and even stipulations for not complying with the penalties:

For both individuals and companies, if you do not pay, you may also be taken to court, with magistrates able to impose potentially unlimited fines. (UK Government, Department of Health & Social Care, March 2020).

Power distance can also be visible in the level of formality used when addressing citizens, as it illustrates the attention paid to hierarchy and rank. Using the above-mentioned websites, we can observe that on the French website the language

used is, as anticipated, more formal and neutral. For example, information on everyday life, work-related activities or travel is available in the sections *Les Mesures Prises Par Le Gouvernement [Measures Taken by the Government]* versus *Coronavirus outbreak FAQs: what you can and can't do*. Moreover, the English website gives detailed answers to questions such as *Can I see my friends?* or *My boss is forcing me to go to work but I'm scared of coronavirus. What should I do?* Similar information is offered on the French website in less detailed and more general sections such as *Everyday life: Je ne dois pas rendre visite à ma famille et à mes amis [I should not visit my family and friends]* and *Mon employeur est tenu d'adapter mes conditions de travail pour assurer ma sécurité [My employer is required to adapt my work conditions to ensure my security]*. (Gouvernement de la République française - Ministère des Solidarités et de la Santé; UK Government - Department of Health & Social Care March 2020).

As previously stated, we can notice on the country scores chart a fairly big difference between the levels of uncertainty avoidance for the two countries. UAI is believed to influence the level of bureaucracy. High uncertainty-avoidance countries, in trying to minimize the unknown, implement rules and regulations, whilst low uncertainty-avoidance countries feel more comfortable in unstructured situations and tend to be more tolerant of change (Serafeim, 2015).

This difference can also be noticed in the two cases above. As posted on the official website of the Ministry of Solidarity and Health in France, citizens are expected to make a written statement on the reasons for leaving their houses. If the purpose is professional, the employer is also required to fill in a similar statement, declaring that the presence of the employee at the workplace is indispensable. (Gouvernement de la République française, Ministère des Solidarités et de la Santé, March 2020). In the UK, such statements are not required from citizens, even if they are recommended to adopt a certain preventive behaviour and leave their houses for limited purposes.

Next, we will focus on two official statements made by Prime Ministers Édouard Philippe (on 25 March 2020) and Boris Johnson (20 March 2020). Our observations are not based solely on these two statements, but we will make use of them to exemplify our findings. Prime Minister Édouard Philippe gives more detailed information in his statement than his British counterpart, albeit his statement is followed by those of other ministers that present the emergency decree adopted. After

highlighting the prime concern to be for the medical system, he clearly presents the legal measures that have been taken to offer support to businesses, to ensure wages and salaries, to protect the socially vulnerable persons and to optimize public services.

Boris Johnson's statement, one of his most memorable from this interval, provides fewer facts and more rhetoric. Though he reassures citizens that measures are taken, there is more ambiguity on what those exact measures are. Indeed, just as Philippe, Johnson is also accompanied by the chancellor responsible for economic and financial matters, but it is the message of the Prime Minister that is the subject of our analysis. Johnson states:

I set out the ambition of this government to turn the tide against coronavirus within 3 months. [...] We are going to do it with testing. We are going to do it with new medicines, and with new digital technology that will help us to see the disease as it is transmitted, and thereby, by eliminating it, to stamp it out. (UK Government, PM Boris Johnson statement on coronavirus: 20 March 2020)

We can observe in this section elements of persuasion such as involvement, setting a clear goal and a problem-solution type of approach, but no clarification from his part on what is the advancement in the medical or technological fields. Throughout the speech, we also have several examples of empowering words, empathy or appeal to nationalism ("I know how difficult this is, how it seems to go against the freedom-loving instincts of the British people"), but the informative elements are scarce.

Hence, we can observe in these two statements a higher tendency of avoiding uncertainty in communicating risk from the French Prime Minister than from his British counterpart, though both admit the severity of the situation and none of them claim being fully prepared to handle it.

Since similarities have been brought into discussion, we can identify in the two statements other common features such as the reassurance that the institutions are aware of the state of affairs, the presentation of the measures that were taken and the justification for taking those measures, the appeal to nationalism and to solidarity, or the appreciations showed for the efforts made both by public institutions and the citizens in fighting against the pandemic. Another aspect worth examining is to what extent the two officials bring forward a pessimistic or worst-case scenario in their statements. According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention of the US Department of

Health and Human Services, one of the recommendations given in order to understand how audiences assess messages in a crisis, in case of severe outbreaks, is to avoid playing worst-case scenario. The recommendation is to

stick to the known facts. [...] If the facts are not known, don't fall into the *what ifs*. Instead, describe the steps you are using to get the facts and help the audience deal with the uncertainty while all the facts are uncovered. Speculation weakens credibility and may create needless anxiety (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014: 59).

In the statement of 20 March, Boris Johnson says that: "People whose lives can, must, and will be saved", implying that people are expected to lose their lives, as not all can be saved. An even more fatalistic approach is visible in his statement from 23 March:

Without a huge national effort to halt the growth of this virus, there will come a moment when no health service in the world could possibly cope; [...] To put it simply, if too many people become seriously unwell at one time, the NHS will be unable to handle it - meaning more people are likely to die, not just from Coronavirus but from other illnesses as well. (UK Government, PM Boris Johnson statement on coronavirus: 23 March 2020)

Édouard Philippe is more cautious in making such predictions in his statement, he places more emphasis on the idea of control, and, even though he acknowledges the severity of the situation

C'est évidemment d'abord un choc sanitaire [...] Mais c'est aussi, et ce sera de plus en plus, un choc économique, un choc social. Nous ne sommes qu'au début de la crise... [It is obviously first of all a health shock [...] but it is also, and it will be more and more an economic shock, a social shock. We are only at the beginning of the crisis...] (Gouvernement de la République française, Discours de M. Édouard Philippe: 25 March 2020)

there is no reference to an expected increase in the number of deaths and the word *death* does not appear in the message addressed to the French citizens.

Returning to the analysis of the two websites of French and Health Ministries, it is interesting to observe the recommendation regarding the social distance that should be kept between people: one meter for France versus two meters for the UK. (Gouvernement de la République française - Ministère des Solidarités et de la Santé; UK Government - Department of Health & Social Care

March 2020). Using a universal approach and without taking cultural factors into consideration, we could be tempted to presume that the UK's decision is stricter and more risk-preventive, that this measure was taken in order to prevent even more people from contracting the virus. However, putting these measures into a socio-cultural context, the difference can be explained by how personal, social and public space was understood before the outbreak, in terms of proxemics - the space that people feel comfortable with setting between themselves and others - (Hall, 1966), the individualism-collectivism index explained above or other socio-cultural factors. Since individualism was brought into discussion, except for some isolated instances as the one above or the degree of reluctance towards obeying rules, we did not notice appreciable differences from this perspective between the two official websites and statements.

3. CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, we do not claim having been able to take into account the full context that framed the statements of Prime Minister Édouard Philippe and of Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and we do acknowledge that multiple factors, such as political contexts or the personal communication style of each speaker, shaped the speeches in their current form.

Nevertheless, we consider that the objective of identifying in the statements of the two officials and on the websites of the French and British Ministries of Health common communication strategies, as well as indicators of cultural adaptation, was achieved. Hence, in the messages conveyed to the publics, we identified discrepancies in the uncertainty avoidance displayed, in the level of formality and bureaucracy, in the expected level of obedience from the citizens, in the perception of social space, and in the approach towards presenting worst-case scenarios. Our case study confirmed that risk perception and cultural factors are of utmost importance in analysing risk and crisis institutional communication in public health emergency situations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, as communication in these cases goes far beyond the simple transmission of information to the publics.

As future directions of research, we propose an in-depth comparison between the communication strategies of more culturally diverse countries, as well as an analysis of the manner in which messages were conveyed by supranational institutions, such as the European Commission.

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BETWEEN WORK IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

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Abstract: *Over the past decades, there have been many global changes, which have led to a massive growth in immigration, mainly from developing countries to developed countries. This phenomenon is caused mainly because of the lack of job opportunities in the developing countries, along with other factors. As a result, many people who strive to improve the conditions for them and their families choose to leave their homes and travel to other countries, where they hope to start a better life. This leads to a growing number of work immigrants in many countries around the world. In Israel, the number of work immigrants is growing every year, causing social and political disturbances, and making the Israeli population develop hate towards these immigrants. By exploring the history of this phenomenon and its reach throughout the world, I hope to set the background which will help me understand the phenomenon as it is evident in Israel today. The present article wishes to address the subject of work immigrants in Israel, to develop a new framework for thought regarding the foreign and domestic policy about work immigrants and asylum seekers and to explore the way these immigrants are treated in Israel.*

Keywords: *immigrants; refugees; globalization; work immigrants*

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the issue of working immigrants has extensively preoccupied the world population in general and the population in Israel in particular. In our present age, we are experiencing symptoms of globalization that are frequently manifested in the State of Israel as well as in many European countries. This involves massive numbers of working immigrants who are coming from third world countries, due to frequent threats of an “economic sword”. In most cases, it is a real sword that endangers the safety of the immigrants and their families in countries such as: Syria, Sudan, Eritrea and others. The globalization age is mainly characterized today by accessible information, large part of which is available through the internet. Moreover, this information is moving at the speed of light, as the experiences of the first immigration pioneers are transmitted to those left behind, raising questions as to whether they can come, what will happen to them, how will they live and other questions.

I have chosen to explore this issue due to several reasons. The first is my position in the national imprisonment organization of the State of Israel (National Correctional Services). My current position is operational control officer, entrusted with making operational inspections related to the security of imprisonment facilities as well as of

facilities for illegal infiltrators. Some of these infiltrators are refuge seekers from countries which pose a clear and immediate danger to their life. However, the majority of them are working immigrants, who are threatened by an existential danger from an economic point of view but not by an obvious danger of death.

The second reason is my interest in the far-from-simple demographic situation of the State of Israel. The country has a considerable number of minority groups living in it and endangering its Jewish identity. Moreover, Israel is surrounded by Muslim countries on all its sides and these countries have groups of extreme Islamists. I have no intention of harming any religion. I only express my worldview about a radical religion, i.e. referring with dismissal and condemnation to the use of religion in order to harm others.

The third reason that I see as the focus of attraction to engage in the present study, is the economic aspect. The State of Israel is a country under development, and the large number of working immigrants might pose a threat to its economy, development, welfare policy, employment for its citizens, health services, community services and so on.

I deem it right to emphasize that Israel is a multi-cultural country. Most of its citizens have come from various countries. Some of these countries are developed but the majority are

countries, whereby the culture has not yet developed and their economy is not prosperous. At present, we are witnessing the disappearance of the culture prevalent in the countries, in which lived the Jews who immigrated to Israel during the 1960s, 1970s and the beginning of the 1990s.

The main goals of my study are: (1) To develop a new framework for thought regarding the foreign and domestic policy about work immigrant/ asylum seekers; (2) To explore the constitutional aspects of the way work immigrants in Israel are being treated; (3) To explore the human right issues related to the work immigrants phenomenon in Israel; (4) To explore the cultural issues involved in this phenomenon. The main research question is: which factors could construct the framework for thought about Israel's policy regarding work immigrants' phenomenon?

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 Aspects within multicultural communities.

The world today is a changing world. Boundaries are becoming more open and the lines between cultures are beginning to fade gradually. This can be seen more prominently in counties around the world, which are becoming multicultural and multilinguistic, as a result of the mixture of different cultures in the same country. For example, in Serbia, the population has changed over the years due to immigrants from different countries, traveling to Serbia and moving there. According to the 2011 census, the population in Serbia was comprised out of Roma, Hungarian and Bosniaks, all living together and sharing the rights and responsibilities of the country (Basic & Markovic, 2018).

The meaning of multiculturalism in a changing global climate mainly means, that different countries, especially developed countries, are accepting people from different countries and embracing them into their country and into their culture, allowing them to become a part of it, while incorporating parts of their (the immigrants) own culture in to their "new" culture. That creates a new atmosphere, which includes parts of different traditions and cultures. Another result is the fact that different people from different countries bring with them different languages, which causes a multilinguistic surrounding, which forces the countries to foster strategies that incorporate these languages into their everyday life (Ravazzani, 2015).

However, that is not necessarily the case in most developed countries. In these countries, as mentioned before, the number of immigrants from developing countries is growing all the time, and

as a result, developed countries are becoming more multicultural. However, one prominent outcome of this phenomenon is a growing social rage and frustration against these immigrants. Local population in the developed countries are blaming immigrants for social problems and mistreating them, treating them as threats to the local population and even depriving these immigrants of basic human rights. Over the past few years and even decades, many countries in America, Europe and the Middle East, which has welcomed many immigrants, have begun to take steps against this immigration wave, such as building walls across the country's boundary, in order to keep immigrants out (Marsella, 2009).

2.2 Immigration Theories. As mentioned earlier, the current world is a global one, where the boundaries are open and subject to constant change. As a result of these changes, over the past few decades, the concept of immigration has grown dramatically and nowadays, people are more frequently leaving their homes, in order to explore other, sometimes more lucrative and safer, options for living their lives. This sometimes result in some countries becoming a home for a large number of immigrants, especially developed and wealthy countries. However, this phenomenon can cause a disturbance in the hosting state, especially when this country is a welfare state, which is fixated on supplying its citizens with social benefits and political and financial stability. But, when the population is increasing by large amounts of immigrants, it can cause a social, political and financial problem for the country and its limited resources (Freeman, 2011).

When talking about reforms and policies which countries need to do in order to deal with the growing phenomenon of immigration, the focus is on two main issues: immigration control policy or immigration regulation; and immigration policy, which refers to the conditions which the state provides in order to resident immigrants. These issues are determined by each state and its specific elements which comprise the states' rules and regulations. For example, the national identity of each state can be a determining factor for its immigration policy. The national identity focuses on historical and political sociology, and uses it in order to determine the states' views regarding, among other things, immigration and immigration policy (Meyers, 2000).

After we've discussed the problems and concerns that can be caused by immigration, especially large-scale immigration, it is important

to understand why, in the face of such adversities, do people still choose to immigrate and leave the life they know behind, only to move to a place where they might not be accepted. We would like now to examine the incentives which cause people to migrate. The main incentives are money and jobs. A person will be more willing to change his entire life, if he knows that he has a better job, with better financial rewards waiting for him. Also, employment status plays a part in the decision to migrate. A job which may offer the same money, but a better position, or a better social stand, might cause a person to choose it, even if it means that in order to take it, he would have to leave his life and start over in a new place (Rodriguez-Pose, Ketterer & Castells-Quintana, 2015).

The biggest question regarding immigration theory in the multicultural world we live in today is- if a country enables immigrants to enter it, live, work and integrate within it, how should it treat them? what are the rights that immigrants should get from their new country? The answer to this question is not clear and decisive, nor is it a simple one, and it depends on a number of factors. For example, if the immigrants arrive to a certain country during a time of financial and social flourish, then they are likely to receive many benefits, be treated like citizens and will be able to find employment easily. But, if the immigrants arrive to a country during a depression and financial struggle, where work is hard to find for the local population and the struggle to survive is evident for everyone, that it is likely to assume that the immigrants will be encountered by hostility by the local population and also by hardship by the government, in a desire to keep the available jobs and resources for the citizens (Parvin, 2019).

2.3 Work Immigrants- Legal Aspects. As we have seen thus far, the number of immigrants which are traveling around the world each year is rapidly growing, while a large number of those immigrants are work immigrants, meaning that they leave their homes in order to find a better paying job in another country, which will hopefully will improve their lives and the life of their families, which are often left behind. Most of these work immigrants come from third world countries, mainly in Africa, which is due to the fact that despite the birth rate is growing all the time, the labor market is weak and the job opportunities are scarce, so that people have no chance but to try to find work in another country, preferably a developed one, which has a larger chance of finding a good paying job (Coleman, 1992).

Another point of consideration when discussing the case of work immigrants is the fact, that because they come to a certain country in order to work, this group is one of the biggest in terms of percentages in the labor market. As a result, this can cause a serious problem between the immigrants and the local population, which might discriminate against them due to the fact that most of them are working, and in jobs that are not filled by members of the local population. In Finland, for example, that is the case in regard to the Russian and Estonian speaking immigrants, which are part of the Finnish labor market, but not part of the Finnish society, due in part to resentment by the natives (Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind & Perhoniemi, 2007).

As mentioned, work immigrants come to a certain country out of one reason: they want to work and earn money, most times in order to send to their family, which was left behind. As a result, they take on whatever job they can find, even of this job is dangerous and unsafe. As a result, the chances for a work immigrant to get hurt and injured during work are especially high. Other factors which influence the degree in which the work immigrants are at risk during their work could be linguistic barriers and cultural factors. So that begs the question- why do the authorities allow work immigrants to keep entering the country and risk themselves? In Italy, for example, despite a big economic recession which has affected the country's economy since 2008, the authorities have continued to increase the number of work permits until 2010, mainly due to the entry of eastern European countries in to the European union and because of a growing need for foreign, cheaper, manpower (Girauda et al., 2019).

The importance of immigration policy in developed countries, especially those who are receiving large numbers of work immigrants, lies in the very fact that these immigrants are essentially taking the jobs of the local population, most times for less the money, which makes it more profitable for the employers. In Malaysia, for example, which is slowly becoming one of the largest Asian countries to receive work immigrants in it, the number of undocumented and illegal work immigrants, along with legal ones, is growing every year, which makes it hard for the government to change the existing immigration policy and the existing labor laws, in order to benefit the legal working citizens and immigrants in the country. As a result, the country and the government are trying to establish a legislation and a social, economic and political reform, which will reduce the country's

dependence on the immigrants and foreign workers, and limit the distribution of work permits to these workers (Del Carpio *et al.*, 2015).

3. CONCLUSION

This article has focused on the concept of immigration in the global era and the outcomes of this phenomenon for the hosting countries, as well as for the immigrants themselves. The review of the literature has shown that around the world, as people travel more and more from country to country and create new cultures, which are mostly made out of immigrants, the world is constantly changing and we, as a society need to change with it, in order to keep up. However, that is not necessarily the case when dealing with work immigrants. For this group, the local society should form and create rules which will help them find a place and a job, in order to better their lives on the one hand, but in a way that will not damage the local population and its possibility to get a job, on the other hand. This is a tricky situation, because the government and the people which are responsible for the decision-making need to consider the best interest of both sides, and establish a framework which will aid them both, which is not an easy thing to accomplish.

When writing this article, I have learned that the Israeli government is dealing with a growing number of work immigrants, which some arrive in the country as refugees and remain in it over time. As a result, the country is forced to find solutions so that they will be able to get work and support themselves, in order to not become a financial burden on the country and its social services, all without harming the job possibilities available to the local population of the country. This is a difficult task, and one that the country and the decision-makers struggle with on a daily basis. I believe that in order to better handle the situation, the Israeli government needs to establish clearer immigration laws and close its borders, so that the local population will not be damaged and harmed by the lack of jobs. Also, I believe that the government should establish tougher punishment against illegal immigrants, who come into the country to find work in an illegal way, and send them back to their countries, or maybe even imprison them for a period of several months, in order to allow the financial system of the country to heal and recover.

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Linguistics.
Discourse
Analysis

CULTUREMES, AGENTIVITY, CONTRASTIVITY

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Abstract: *The three concepts mentioned in the title of the article, Culturemes, Agentivity and Contrastivity have been used and studied in various domains of linguistics, such as syntax, semantics, semiotics and cultural studies. The language and the culture of certain peoples can be investigated through many and various methods, but if we choose a method that leads to identify some language universals, all the results and researches could lead to conclusions benefiting to human knowledge, generally speaking. Languages and people are not so different; the study may highlight common thinking, common experience of life, or quite the opposite, in the same circumstances. That is why we need various approaches of the phenomena and different theories to analyze fact of life and facts of language.*

Keywords: *cultureme; agentivity; contrastive approach; phraseological units*

1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of cultureme is relatively new in the field of language sciences and it is claimed by intercultural studies, linguistic studies, social studies, translation studies, language acquisition studies. We end the list here, because many other domains may find some interest in that concept.

Trying to define the concept, we will not be surprised to find that the concept fits to each domain, but in each domain it has a different meaning and it covers different areas: culture, civilization, language origin, language structure.

In point of language and civilization, we intend to approach two cultures and two civilizations that are not so distant, from a geographic and a linguistic point of view, being both Indo-European languages. We intend to contrast English and French culturemes, obviously not all of them, in order to identify similarities, if any, and differences, if any, between these two cultures and languages. As thinking and knowledge is expressed in language, we intend to find if there is some connection, influence or difference in point of culturemes. The linguistic form of some culturemes are phraseological units, so we intend to compare linguistic forms of culturemes and their structure in both languages, English and French. The most appropriate theory to be used seems that of Agentivity across languages. The common ground of all these concepts will be that of phraseological units. Phraseological units may contain different approaches of reality through

language by different languages, but it also may reveal common points of view in different languages. It is not only a matter of culture, but also a matter of language structure.

2. CULTUREMES AND AGENTIVITY. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPTS

2.1 Culturemes. The concept of cultureme is a transdisciplinary one, being used in literature, in cultural studies, in the theory of translation and in foreign language acquisition.

If we compare the numerous definitions given to that concept, we find something in common, whether it defines the concept as “the minimal, indivisible unit of culture: rituals, values and stereotypes” (Jaskot and Ganoshenko, 2019) or as “cultural facts and cultural interferences” (Motoc: 2017) in the field of cultural studies, or as “atoms of culture” (Moles, 1967, in G. Lungu Badea, 2009), or as “cultural references or cultural markers” (Pamies: 2017), we find differences and similarities in point of approach and methodology. In addition to these fields mentioned above, there is another one, that of translation studies. Within this domain, a cultureme is considered to be the minimal unit of culture, the smallest unit of cultural reference or cultural information (Lungu Badea, 2009) to be transferred from one language to another through the process of translation. In the same field, some other related terms and concepts appear, such as cultural allusion, cultural terms,

ethnonymes and folkloremes, as well as frozen sequences, proverbs, proper names or surnames. These terms covering the respective concepts are approached, by some linguists (Coman, Selejan, 2019), from the point of view of translatability or untranslatability. Indeed, it is difficult to translate from Romanian into English “De 1 martie i-am oferit un martisor” (For the 1st of March I offered her a gift/a trinket/a symbol of spring and renewal.) The word *gift*, according to an English dictionary Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (1995) is too general (something that you give someone on a special occasion or to thank them); the other suggestion, *trinket*, is closer to the meaning of *martisor*, denoting a piece of jewellery or a small pretty object that it is not worth much money. Again, the English equivalent is only a partial one for the following reasons: in point of meaning, some sememes are missing. The small object is offered in Romania only on the 1st of March and only to women, regardless of the age. It is, therefore, a matter of translatability caused by some cultural differences between Romanian people and British people.

Another example is that of “Babele de martie”. Let us say that we can translate this collocation as “The old women of March”, so, from the translation point of view, the problem is somewhat solved. A foreign visitor in Romania will not be able to understand the meaning of the respective collocation without a proper explanation concerning this old custom, well known within the area inhabited by Romanians. How can a foreigner know that, in Romania, people use to choose one day between the 1st of March and the 9th of the same month and thus they are able to predict whether the following year is a good one or a bad one, according to the weather of the very day they have chosen?

Some other examples are to be found in Romanian literature, in the well-known stories of Romanian writers, for instance Ion Creanga’s stories. Any Romanian is able to understand a sentence like: “Asta e ca povestea cu drobul de sare”, (This is something like in the story with the lump of salt), an allusion to Ion Creanga’s story from “*Human stupidity*”, with reference to a young mother’s fear that the lump of salt placed in the kitchen could fall and kill her baby, while the danger invoked was not real or imminent.

Some of these phrases, sentences or cultural allusions are difficult to understand outside the area they originated in. Some other phrases are known and used in various cultures, languages and geographic areas. Anyone understands the French sentence “*Cherchez la femme*” in the context of

searching for the reason why a murder was committed and having as a supposition that a woman is at its origin; or “Time is money”, referring to the fact that an action worth doing should lead to money earning, otherwise it is not worth doing it at all.

What we have to bear in mind while reading various approaches to the concept is that the cultureme is specific to a language, to a culture, to a community of people sharing the same values, habits or customs, and more often than not, the same historical past, the same geographic area and civilization.

In this respect, it appears as an obvious fact that people from various geographic areas perceive facts from reality in different ways, and this is reflected in various linguistic forms. Dealing with the concept of cultureme, scholars tried to classify them (Molina: 2001, in Motoc: 2017, Jaskot and Ganoshenko: 2019, Lungu Badea: 2009), taking into account that they are difficult to understand for an obvious reason, that of cultural differences. The categories of culturemes identified by the authors mentioned before vary in number, but they generally overlap, covering all the fields and aspects of extra linguistic reality. These categories are (Molina: 2001): (1) Natural environment: wildlife, climate, atmospheric phenomena; (2) Cultural heritage, such as real or fictional characters, historical events, religion and religious beliefs, occupations; (3) Social culture, habits, forms of address, politeness, moral values, greetings; (4) Linguistic culture: proverbs, sayings, usual metaphors, interjections, insults, cursing.

To these four categories, Jaskot and Ganoshenko (2019) add two other categories, the denotative culturemes, which overlap those mentioned by Molina, and the connotative culturemes, those related to associations and personal experience.

As for her, Lungu Badea (2009) suggests an association of formal criteria and functional criteria. The linguist chose as formal criteria simple culturemes (common or proper nouns compound nouns) and compound culturemes (syntagms and phraseological units); the functional criteria are, according to this linguist: historical criteria and current criteria.

As we can see, the differences identified in the three attempts of classification are the result of the choice of criteria and of their possible combinations.

2.2 Agentivity. Agentivity is a concept that can be approached from the syntactic point of view and from the semantic one. The syntactic point of

view was first discussed in Tesnière's *Eléments de syntaxe structurale* (1959) and his metaphor concerning the structure of a sentence is well known and well noted by future scholars. Briefly, Tesnière compares the sentence to a drama, in which we have an action, expressed by the verb, some actants, expressed by nouns, and circumstances expressed by circumstantial determiners. In Tesnière's view, the verb is the central and most important part of the language and of the sentence, and all the other constituents, the actants and the circumstantial determiners depend on the verb, being situated at an inferior level. This conception is not too far from that of traditional grammar. According to traditional grammar, there is a logical opposition between subject and predicate, a fact that makes impossible to consider subject and predicate as being on the same level. The subject and the objects are on the same level, depending on the predicate, and they are interchangeable. Lucien Tesnière goes further on with his theory, identifying types of verbs according to the number of actants surrounding them. He identifies verbs having no actant (the verbs describing meteorological phenomena), verbs having one actant (Alfred tombe./Alfred falls down.), verbs with two actants (Alfred frappe Bernard./ Alfred hits Bernard.) and verbs with three actants (Alfred donne un livre à Charles./Alfred gives a book to Charles.)

The concept identified by Tesnière as an actant, a participant to the action or the process described by the verb is to be found in Charles Fillmore's theory as a *case* (Fillmore: 1968). He considers his study "a contribution to the study of formal and substantive syntactic universals" (Fillmore, 1968:22-24) considering that "the grammatical notion 'case' deserves a place in the base component of the grammar of every language". His statement is based on the fact that "grammatical features found in one language show up in some form or other in other languages". He states that "The sentence in its basic structure consists of a verb and one or more noun phrases, each associated with the verb in a particular case relationship" (Fillmore: 1968:42). Assuming that case is a grammatical universal category and that each case relationship occurs only once in a simple sentence, Fillmore identifies a set of cases that appear most frequently as they are "a set of universal, presumably innate concepts which identify certain types of judgments human beings are capable of making about the events that are going on around them, about such matters as who did it, who is happened to, and what got changed". In this first

attempt of classification of the cases, he identifies cases such as Agentive, Instrumental, Dative, Factitive, Locative, Objective. Later on, he will refine the Dative case, distinguishing between the Beneficiary and the Experiencer, and the Locative case, which he dissociates in Source and Goal. Fillmore's study is important because, in a certain way establishes some kind of linguistic bridge between the syntactic approach and the semantic one. Another important fact to be mentioned about Fillmore's case theory is the difference he felt compelled to point out between "effectum" and "affectum" as it is revealed in the sentences:

- (1) John built the table.
- (2) John ruined the table.

Using the interrogation with *to do*, he concludes that, in the first example, the table is the "effectum" object, while the same test cannot be operated in the second example, referring to the table.

In the same direction, of trying to prove the existence of one of the cases, namely the Agentive, Cruse (1973) uses the same interrogation system with *to do* for the set of sentences:

- (3) John punched Bill.
- (4) The vase broke.

The same test leads Cruse to distinguish between a "do clause" (sentence 3) and a "happen clause" (sentence 4) and finally to identify the Agent in a sentence. John is quite a good incarnation of an Agent, because the test *to do* gives a satisfying result:

- (5) What did John do?
- (6) What John did was punch Bill.

Cruse makes it clear that John is a *doer*, being the animated agent of an action. What is not clear is if John is an intentional animate doer. He refines his analysis trying to introduce modifiers, such as "accidentally", "carefully", "automatically" and others cited from studies of his predecessors. His conclusion is that Agentivity is in a strict relationship with animateness and volitivity.

Important advances on the study of Agentivity were made thanks to the works of Gilbert Lazard (1994) who continued the syntactic approach and offered a thorough view on what he calls the tools of Agentivity, consisting in morphemes attached to nouns, indications integrated in the verb form or word order. His study deals extensively on the structures of Agentivity and the conclusion is that this structure is to be found in most languages,

especially European languages. More than that, his research revealed that sentences describing actions are the most common in languages and these sentences are at the basis of a typology of Agentivity (Lazard, 1994:61). In his opinion, the most relevant criterion used to define Agentivity is the position the actant occupies in relation to the verb. He concluded that Agentivity is a language universal. A remark should be made about Gilbert Lazard's research. He extended the study of Agentivity markers, such as morphemes attached to a noun and Agentivity markers integrated in the verb form, beyond the limits of a sentence. He extended it to a complex sentences that includes, in most Indo-European languages, markers of continuity of actants contributing to accomplish the action, process or event described by the verb. It is also important to mention that Gilbert Lazard (1994:129-169) used in his study some concepts such as semantic classification of verbs, verbs having one actant, two or more actants and expressing a state, a process an action or an event. He could conclude that various types of process, action, state or event are in close relation to the number of actants necessarily required to their accomplishment or, in other words, with the Agentivity structure.

As we previously mentioned, Agentivity can also be approached from a semantic point of view, and in this case we speak about semantic roles. From this point of view, a semantic role consists of the semantic function assigned by the verb to its arguments (Neveu, 2010). The semantic roles are classified on the basis of combinatorial valences of verbs with possible arguments. Various theoretical frameworks lead to various classifications of semantic roles and that is why we chose the one given by Frank Neveu in his *Dictionnaire des sciences du langage* (2010:256-257). Thus, he identifies:

- the agent, animated, volitive, initiator of the action;
- the patient, animated, undergoing the action initiated by the agent, being affected by it;
- the theme, an entity continuously changing, moving, localized but unaffected by this localization;
- the source, the entity from which a movement takes place;
- the goal, the entity towards which the action is directed (the destination point);
- the place, the specific environment in which an entity is localized;
- the experience, animated, the place where a psychological, emotional or affective process takes place;

- the instrument, inanimate, used to perform the action, involuntarily;
- the beneficiary, entity, animated, benefitting from the action described by the verb.

Other theoretical frames may lead to other classifications, to other actants or names given to the actants. At this point, we may as well come back to Fillmore's classification (1968), since the classification we mentioned previously (F. Neveu, 2010) refines Fillmore's Locative case, discerning a Source, a Goal and a Place and introduces the case Theme, that could be useful from a contrastive point of view.

Regardless of the point of view of our approach, the actants can be identified in many languages, especially Indo-European languages, such as English and French. On these bases, we can establish common features and differentiating ones.

3. CONTRASTIVITY AS A METHOD IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE SCIENCES

Contrastive analysis is a method used to compare two languages in contact. Depending on the intended goal, contrastive analysis may be oriented towards language acquisition, towards the theory of translation, or, as in our case, towards identifying language universals.

In the context of language acquisition, the two languages in contact have definite positions: one is the source language and the other is the target language. Their comparison, in point of lexical units, in point of syntactic structures, in point of culture and civilization is meant, on the one hand, to lead to efficient methods in second language acquisition. On the other hand, this contrastive study is meant to give the student solutions to avoid his mistakes and to correct them. From this point of view, research is oriented especially towards the differences between the two languages in contact and it is the teacher who is supposed to find the most appropriate ways in his teaching activity to make it successful.

Contrastive analysis is also used in translation and, in this case, the comparison is supposed to point out the differences between lexical, syntactic or semantic structures of the two languages in contact. This time, the specific goal is to find the correct equivalent of a structure from the source language in the target language. In the theory of translation, the most important thing for the translator is to find the right equivalent, the one that corresponds from the point of view of the meaning, of the language register or from the stylistic point of view.

3.1 Contrastivity and Agentivity. Agentivity, being considered a language universal, can be the object of contrastive analysis, a means of identifying its various structures and linguistic expression in two different languages.

The following analysis will point out the various means in which Agentivity is linguistically expressed in French and English. In this comparison, Agentivity will play the part of *tertium comparationis*.

We chose to compare Agentivity as it appears in phraseological units, such as frozen sequences and proverbs. Phraseological units are specific to a language, to a people, to a human community and they are the linguistic expression of extra linguistic facts. Phraseological units are made up of several lexemes, they are characterized by idiomaticity and they are used by the native speaker of a natural language, being difficult to understand by a non native speaker of that language. The non native speaker of a foreign language is supposed to acquire not only a foreign language, but also a lot of facts and knowledge referring to the culture, the civilization and the customs of the people or the community currently using that language.

Proverbs are such an expression of a specific culture and they are “a particular case of a frozen sentence, characterized by a certain rhythm, by metaphorical features, by semantic and pragmatic ones” (Connena: 2000). It is considered that proverbs express general knowledge acquired by a community or a people sharing the same geographic area. Nevertheless, some of the proverbs are intercultural. We can find the same proverbs in both languages, if we compare facts related to facts of life, to friendship:

- (7) A leopard cannot change its spots.
- (8) Chassez le naturel, il revient au galop.

- (9) Rolling stone gathers no moss.
- (10) Pierre qui roule n’amasse pas mousse.

- (11) A friend in need is a friend indeed.

(12) C’est dans le besoin que l’on connaît ses vrais amis.

Analyzing proverbs from the point of view of Agentivity is not so simple, as proverbs are mostly complex sentences, unlike the examples used by most scholars. Though, we can take into account Gilbert Lazard’s statement (1994) that in most Indo-European languages there is a continuity of markers of the actants taking part in the action, process or change of state that can be noticed in subordinate sentences. These markers can be

pronouns, number markers identifiable in the verb form or in a noun form.

In order to find some linguistic manifestation of Agentivity, we need proverbs that contain a verb expressing an action, a process or a change in a state.

A lot of proverbs contain the verb *to be /être*, so, we are not going to take them into account. They denote a state, which is important in point of contrastivity, but they do not point out actants. *A friend in need* from example (11) or *les vrais amis* from example (12) do not perform any action, nor does *the leopard* (example 7) that has no animated equivalent in French, where the meaning is expressed by using a more general term (*le naturel*, a noun used to express habits, good or bad, especially bad, attributed to some persons from their first to their last day).

In very many cases, the actant has not a precise, definite reference in reality, in the extra linguistic world. Let us consider the following examples:

- (13) As *you* make your bed, so *you* must lie on it.

- (14) Comme *on* fait son lit, *on* se couche.

- (15) You can’t make an omelet without breaking some *eggs*.

- (16) On ne fait pas d’omelette sans cases des *œufs*.

- (17) As *you* sow, so *you* shall reap.

- (18) *Qui* sème le vent récolte la tempête.

In these examples, *you* (Eng) and *on* (Fr) or *qui* (Fr) do not refer to a specific person, they have a generic meaning, they refer to a generic person.

The examples in which we can find the same actants in both languages are very rare.

The case that appears most frequently in both languages, English and French, is the *theme*. It is that entity that moves, changes and is localized, without being affected by its localization.

- (19) Don’t put the *cart* before the horses.

- (20) Il ne faut pas mettre *la charrue* avant les bœufs.

- (21) Don’t put all your *eggs* in one basket.

(22) Il ne faut pas mettre tous *les œufs* dans le même panier.

- (23) Rolling *stone* gathers no moss.

- (24) *Pierre* qui roule n’amasse pas mousse.

The contrastive approach of Agentivity could be further studied through another approach, that concerns the verb, its semantic features and its possibilities of accepting a varying number of actants.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The study of culturemes and agentivity is a matter that concerns language universals. A language spoken in a certain geographic area is common to people who share a historic past, traditions, customs or mere habits. Peoples of various parts of the world may have different traditions for celebrations or mourning, religious or atheistic. It is important to know these aspects and to be able to understand them in the context of learning a foreign language, of translating from one language to another or in a more scholar purpose, of studying two languages and two cultures in contrast, in order to identify language universals. Contrast does not always mean that differences are to be expected. Similarities can also be identified, and this is to be investigated from the point of view of culture and language.

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PRAGMEMIC DIALOGICALITY AND ITS ROLE IN REVISITING DERRIDEAN ITERABILITY

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Abstract: *This study traces the concept of binary oppositions in ancient Rome and its role in determining cultural identity in the Flavian age. The very concept of imperial vs. periphery was elemental in separating the emperor from his centre, Rome, and the remote periphery. It was for the first time in the Flavian age that the emperor was not directly connected with the main centre of civility and the entire empire, Rome. The concept of binary oppositions became pivotal in determining identities and in creating new ideologies that dominated the ancient world for centuries. This very concept further expanded its power in later millennia to become a fundamental guarantor of stability for logic, philosophy and ideology." Applied to the Roman empire, it is easy to see how the centre and periphery are not purely geographical, but fit into a series of binary oppositions underpinning Roman ideology."(Zissos, 2016, p:224) As such, Rome was one of the main metropolises that introduced the concept of binary oppositions, depending mainly on the intrinsic concept of linearity. Jacques Derrida, the postmodernist thinker, tried to debunk the very idea of linearity in his theory known as Deconstruction through enforcing his coined concept known as iterability. This study further explores the vulnerability of Derridean iterability, which is the main pillar of Derridean Deconstruction, if seen from a pragmemic prism. By revisiting past correspondences between John Searle and Jacques Derrida, regarding the very idea of deconstructing texts, one can pinpoint salient aspects in Searle's logic that were not fully crystallized at the time. By adopting a new approach to understanding speech acts today, especially from the prism of Jacob Mey's Pragmemic theory, one observes that the idea of iterability, repetition of context in particular, is a spurious one. According to Mey, speech acts do not exist outside their nurturing context (Mey, 2010); meaning that a speech act on its own is a helpless verb that carries out no action without being pertinent to a unique context of situation. Having considered this new understanding of speech acts, one could re-evaluate the concept of deconstruction in its entirety; hence deconstruction does not exist in the actual world of contextualised pragmemes. In Pragmatics, language, whether written or spoken, is seen as a form of behavioural action, depending vehemently on the uniqueness of contexts. Every context is unique in its existence, creating thus a chain of unique pragmemes in their respective contexts. The idea of iterability as such fails to represent this intrinsic element in human language, which is the uniqueness of the situated context. This study will answer the following question: Do speech acts exist as such as influential verbs in context or as distinctive entities called "Culturemes"? The study also concludes with emphasizing the efficacy of the Roman concept of binary oppositions, which is preponderantly influential in human thought.*

Keywords: *pragmeme; Derridean deconstructivism; cultural schemata; cultureme*

1. ROME AT THE PERIPHERY. EARLY FOUNDATION OF BINARY OPPOSITIONS

The identification of being "at home" with the city of Rome was, by the Flavian period, inadequate to the structure of the empire. It was no longer even notionally the case that Rome was distinguished from all other cities as the place where Romans were at home and not at war. Rather, Rome became the focus of a campaign as much as other military centers. Even something as fundamental for Tacitus as the narrative structure of annalistic historiography is threatened by centripetal civil wars, as annalistic history typically begins with the city and moves on

to the year's campaigns. The civil wars of 68-69, which reversed the military direction from moving outwards from Rome to moving inwards toward Rome, threatened the annalistic structure of Roman historiography as much as Rome itself (Pomeroy 2003:364).

2. DERRIDEAN DE-CONSTRUCTIVIST PROJECT

A writing that is not structurally readable-iterable-beyond the death of the addressee would not be writing. Although this would seem to be obvious, I do not want it accepted as such, and I shall examine

the final objection that could be made to this proposition. Imagine a writing whose code would be so idiomatic as to be established and known, as secret cipher, by only two "subjects." Could we maintain that, following the death of the receiver, or even of both partners, the mark left by one of them is still writing? Yes, to the extent that, organized by a code, even an unknown and nonlinguistic one, it is constituted in its identity as mark by its iterability, in the absence of such and such a person, hence ultimately of every empirically determined "subject." This implies that there is no such thing as a code of iterability-which could be structurally secret. The possibility of repeating and thus of identifying the marks is implicit in every code, making it into a network that is communicable, transmittable, de-Cipherable, iterable for a third, and hence for every possible user in general. (Derrida, 1988)

2.1 Defining iterability in a Derridean sense.

In Signature Event Context, Derrida sets the scene for a retaliatory response against the logical positivism of speech acts, as envisaged and classified by John Searle in his book *Speech Acts*, which based on John Austin's posthumous book *How to Do Things with Words*. The main critique set against speech act theory is that it gives a specific privilege to performative verbs over constative verbs, giving this particular category of verbs as such a special powerful status. Derrida as such finds in this kind of classification of specialized verbs as a pseudo-representation of verbs that can be themselves iterable (repetitive signs-metaphysical positivism).

2.2 The role of iterability in deconstructing binary oppositions.

Derrida uses his term 'iterability' in such a way as to debunk Searle's argument that speech acts perform verbs thanks to their special status. Modern studies in Pragmatics have shown that the very theory of speech act, as envisaged by Searle, has itself some erroneous aspects, especially the syntactic account given to this very important pragmatic theory. Derridean deconstructivist theory mainly aims at annihilating the very idea of centre, origin, or reference. It tries as such to debunk classical dichotomies so as to find new meaning for the ever-deferred signifiers. By creating a reversal move from the signifier to the signified, Derrida succeeded, theoretically at least, in creating a chasm in the logical foundations of any text, namely binary oppositions. My argument in this paper is that Derrida's critique against Searle might not work very well in the context of the new findings in pragmatic studies.

2.3 Event, signature, context" and Derrida's rivalry with Austin and Searle.

As far as the internal semiotic context is concerned, the force of the rupture is no less important: by virtue of its essential iterability, a written syntagma can always be detached from the chain in which it is inserted or given without causing it to lose all possibility of functioning, if not all possibility of "communicating," precisely. One can perhaps come to recognize other possibilities in it by inscribing it or grafting it onto other chains. No context can entirely enclose it. Nor any code, the code here being both the possibility and impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity). (Derrida, 1988).

Iterability thus represents the pillar around which the whole concept of Deconstruction revolves. Creating reversibility in binary oppositions can only be possible through accepting the idea of a repetitive sign and a repetitive context. Reversibility of binary oppositions thus paves the way for cancelling linearity in human thought. According to Wittgenstein (1997),

In most cases, meaning is use' serves as a vital corrective for the impulse to launch into vague metaphysical speculations premised on the misuse of words.

3. JACOB MEY'S PRAGMEMES AND THEIR ROLE IN MATERIALIZING SPEECH ACTS IN CONTEXT

According to Mey, the theory of pragmatic acts [. . . focuses] on the environment in which both speaker and hearer find their affordances, such that the entire situation is brought to bear on what can be said in the situation, as well as on what is actually being said. The emphasis is not on conditions and rules for an individual (or an individual's) speech act, but on characterizing a general situational prototype, capable of being executed in the situation; such a generalized pragmatic act I will call a 'pragmeme'. The instantiated individual pragmatic acts, [. . .] 'practs', refer to a particular pragmeme in its realizations. (Mey, 2003) In this line of thinking, the emphasis is not so much on rules for correct use of language, or on felicity conditions for individual acts of speaking, but on general situational prototypes of acts that are capable of being executed in a particular situation or cluster of situations. Such a generalized pragmatic act is called a 'pragmeme', (Mey, 2010) Pragmemes then

are social entities used by interlocutors to achieve their communicative goals.

4. CULTURAL SCHEMATA

According to Sharifian, the concept of ‘schema’ has been very widely used in several disciplines and under different rubrics, and this has led to different understandings and definitions of the term. For cognitive linguists such as Langacker, schemas are abstract societal representations. (Sharifian, 2014:62)

Cultural schemata, according to Palmer (1996) and Sharifian (2014), are the genuine operators of language; human meanings are, therefore, cultural enactments, imposed by their respective cultures. According to Fairclough (2003), social agents are the main mobilisers of the masses through the conceptualisation of discourse. As such, culture is eventually regulated by discourse-makers and manipulators who impose their ideology. The cultural pragmatic schemata resemble an umbrella of superordinate clouds of social codes, which regulate human behaviour at an interactional level.

The other element of this current analytical framework consists of speech acts. Some linguists understand these to be powerful verbs, capable of inciting action when uttered in a particular situation. Al Mutairi, Al Sharoufi and Dashti state that The other element of this current analytical framework consists of speech acts. Some linguists understand these to be powerful verbs, capable of inciting action when uttered in a particular situation. This outlook, however, has been severely criticised by Mey (2010), who attributes the power invested in a speech act to the power of the context itself. Cultural schemata thereby impose their own power on the formation of discourse, as stipulated by social agents and in order to produce powerful pragememes, “which represent contextualised speech acts” Al Mutairi *et al.*, 2019)

Cultural schemata thereby impose their own power on the formation of discourse, as stipulated by social agents and in order to produce powerful pragememes, which represent contextualised speech acts: “A pragememe is a sociocultural product, rather than a stern-fixed linguistic term (Al Sharoufi, 2013:97). The reproduction and the use of pragememes, which constitute the third element of Sharifian’s framework, also depend on the way interlocutors negotiate meaning in discourse (Sharifian, 2016)

Speakers and listeners are actively involved in a negotiating process that leads to creating a cycle of

actively changing contexts in which speech acts win their legitimacy of being real doers of action in real-time situations. Particular cultural repertoires in human societies facilitate language with a wealth of contextual resources that can help anchor meaning by favouring particular speech acts to other ones. (Al Sharoufi, 2013)

The final element of the analytical framework is the pract. Being the product of higher cultural schemata, practs establish a social order for classifying and normalising societal relationships: ‘discourse may be seen as providing the vehicle through which power/ knowledge circulates and discourse strategies as the means by which the relations of power/knowledge are created, maintained, resisted and transformed’ (Motion and Leitch, 2007:265). A pract thus is the manifestation of a contextualised speech act, which does not exist out of its nurturing context.

4.1 Semantics: cart and horse. A pragmatic description cannot depend on a particular language’s semantics, in particular not on that language’s always idiosyncratic lexicalization—just as one cannot build a theory of speech acting on what is available in the form of so-called ‘canonical’ speech acts in a particular language. Therefore, by starting out from semantics, and then filling our semantic needs by looking for what is available in the language, we are putting the semantic cart before the pragmatic horse. By contrast, if you start with pragmatics, you are where the real action is: the users. Pragmatics always comes first, and pragmatics constrains semantics, not the other way round. (Mey, 2010)

4.2 Linearity and its indispensable role in validating pragememes in context. *Pragememes, practs, and allopracts as empirical manifestation of empirical events.* Another contribution of applying the pragmatic cultural schema is to help diversify public relations literature and hopefully reinforce the critical approach to the public approach – as opposed to the functionalistic approach, which still dominates the scene. A critical approach will instead demonstrate that cultural pragmatic schemata play a major role in producing appropriate and effective pragememes; thereby leading to the most appropriate practs being uttered in various public relations contexts. The pragememes used by the public relations officers in their interviews for this study were primarily socio-cultural, rather than discursive products for enforcing, legitimising and naturalising the interviewees’ perceptions of the

job itself, their position and role in their department, and both the process and message that they sought to convey to the public, as dictated by the government. This profound use of pragmemes calls for consecrating Cultural Pragmatic Schema: Adherence to professional values Speech act/event: Assertive speech act Pragmeme: Show professional skills Pract: 'I talk with confidence and knowledge about the Minister, because I know, I see, and I judge/evaluate'. Language use is the main producer of pragma-cultural meanings in discourse. Such a radical pragmatic perspective is deeply entrenched in cultural schemata, the latter being the generators of genuine meaning in discourse. (Al Mutairi *et al.*, 2019) A pragmeme is a pure societal product which, if contextualised, achieves its expected goals. One would also stress the idea that pragmemes are localized and contextualised acts that are encapsulated in their cultural schema. This phenomenon necessitates, therefore, a new concept that encapsulates both the idea of a contextualised speech acts and that of uniqueness. Pragmemes or contextualised speech acts function, in fact, when all pertinent cultural repertoires are in action at the moment of

producing utterances. As such, the emergence of cultureme as a linear concept contributing to the production of pertinent pragmemes becomes the ultimate manifestation of cultural pragmemes. A cultureme thus is a societal entity existing at the intersection of a specific cultural schema and a localized speech act. It is the physical manifestation of a high-level cultural schema directing the usage of a specific speech-acting performance into qualifying a specific pragmeme to execute a specific *pract* in its pertinent context.

4.3 The pseudo-foundation of iterability as a permanent generator of signifiers. In light of the pragmatic theory, it is impossible to accept the idea of iterability in producing efficacious pragmemes in context. If adopted, Derrida's iterability would never allow efficacious and pertinent Culturemes to play their communicative role in context, hence they are first and foremost unique and unrepeatable signs in human discourse.

The below example clearly shows that the cultural schemata applied in Arabic are drastically different from what an English counterpart might look like:

Example 1

Cultural Pragmatic Schema: (Arabic / Tasgheerul Nafs)=(Belittling oneself as a polite strategy)
Speech act/event: Agreeing for a compliment
Pragmeme1: REASSIGN THE COMPLIMENT TO THE COMPLIMENTER
Pract (Lawla da3mikum la ma wasalna lima nahnu feehi)= (Without your invaluable support, we would not have reached this position today)
Pragmeme2: REASSIGN THE COMPLIMENT TO GOD
Pract 2: Ma nahnu illa waseelatan yusakheruha Allah fal hamdu washkru lahu) = (We are only a means that the Almighty bestows upon his believers. Thank God)

Example 2

Cultural Pragmatic Schema: (English) Replying in a Polite Manner
Speech act/event: Agreeing for a compliment
Pragmeme1: REASSIGN THE COMPLIMENT TO THE COMPLIMENTER
Pract1 (I appreciate your good wishes)
Pragmeme2: RETURN THE COMPLIMENT
Pract 2: You're most welcome

In English, interlocutors do not mention God or any reference to any deity. This drastic pragmatic difference affects the production of *practs* respectively in the sense that communication takes a different direction when persuading, agreeing, complimenting, etc. Any speech act thus is regulated by the higher cultural schemata, which in turn affects the use of appropriate pragmemes that contribute to producing the most appropriate *pract*. Knowing and being aware of different cultural

repertoires in both languages will help communicators avoid drawing one-to-one comparisons between Arabic and English; as such they will become more conscious users of both Arabic and English.

5. METHODOLOGY

The very concept of iterability, repetition, casts doubt on the efficacy of speech acts as envisaged by

John Searle. May be one of the main vulnerable aspects of speech act theory is the special status given to speech acts as powerful verbs that can carry out action on their own. Jacob Mey in his paper ‘Reference and the Pragmeme’ succinctly explains that pragmemes are social entities that cannot exist without a pertinent context (Mey, 2010). In order to clarify this outlook further, I want to draw upon an important study conducted by Zahraa Adnan and Fadhil Al- Murib who have investigated the concept of Gossiping in *The Scarlet Letter*. They have analysed a number of instances in the novel where speech acts are clearly manifesting gossip as being produced by speech acts

Depending on the analysis of the data of the study, the following conclusions are introduced: (1) Gossiping is an activity that is concerned with the affairs of a third party. (2) The speech acts of telling, stating, and criticizing are employed to trigger gossip. (3) Telling and stating, as pragmatic strategies, are connected with serving the function of conveying information. (Adnan & Al-Murib, 2019)

My argument in this paper is that those specific speech acts, explicated by Adnan and Al Murib contribute to producing gossip through the power of the context in which they operate, as such they have a further actional dimension, which I characterize as “Cultureme”.

6. RESULTS

Zahraa Adnan Fadhil Al- Murib use a number of examples from the *Scarlet Letter* to show the

emergence of specific speech acts that contribute to producing gossip. I will introduce some of those examples and will situate them in their communicative slots to determine the contextual impact in transferring them into Culturemes, and not sole speech acts.

Excerpts from the *Scarlet Letter*:

“Goodwives,” said a hard-featured dame of fifty, “I’ll tell ye a piece of my mind. It would be greatly for the public behoof, if we women, being of mature age and church-members in good repute, should have the handling of such malefactresses as this Hester Prynne.” (Hawthorne, 1852, p. 46)

In their commentary on the above excerpt, Zahraa Adnan Fadhil Al- Murib state that

The hard- featured dame, the gossip, starts the gossip by using the speech act of telling to convey information. The gossipee is realized by existential presupposition which is triggered by the definite noun phrase, Hester Prynne. (Adnan & Al-Murib, 2019)

Gossip is achieved here due to recognizing the speech act of **telling** in its context, triggering as such a pragmeme, a situated speech act, that specifies the needed *pract*, the physical contextualised manifestation of the speech act used, and reaching as such the ultimate form of the **Cultureme** that represents the actual manifestation of the pragmeme in its actual context.

The following table shows this process:

Cultural Pragmatic Schema: Gossiping about ill-reputed people
Speech act/event: telling the misfortune of Hester Prynne
Pragmeme: Agreeing for the gossip
Pract : <i>I’ll tell ye a piece of my mind</i> (the physical enunciation of the utterance)
Cultureme: Affirmative answer (I’ll tell ye a piece of my mind) enunciated in that specific context where the congregation of Puritan believers are beholding the misfortune of Hester Prynne before their eyes. Hester is standing on the scaffold awaiting the verdict of the Puritanical court over her crime of begetting an unlawful child.

The above table shows that the emergence of the cultureme “I’ll tell ye a piece of my mind” is not a mere utterance; on the contrary, the process of producing this cultureme relies upon a general cultural schema in the Puritanical society at the time that an ill-reputed person is prone to suffer from people’s gossip, producing as such a speech acts of **telling** a gossip. This telling produces a **pragmeme of agreeing the gossip**, meaning there is a solidarity on the part of the listener to accept the gossip. This

agreement encourages the gossip to say “I’ll tell ye a piece of my mind”, which would not have been enunciated by the gossip unless all the pertinent contextual repertoire is available. In this particular example, the repertoire is manifested in Hester’s presence on the scaffold and being punished for her misdeed of begetting an illegitimate child. The act of telling the gossip in this contextual circumstance is called (**Gossip telling cultureme**). The concept of cultureme thus is a highly encapsulated one in

which all situational, paralinguistic features like pronunciation, gestures, and proximity, and contextual features are included. Although a pragmeme is a contextualised speech act, a cultureme is a pragmeme produced in accordance with the application of highly specific cultural schemata.

Excerpt 2:

“People say,” said another, “that the Reverend Master Dimmesdale, her godly pastor, takes it very grievously to heart that such a scandal should have come upon his congregation.” (Hawthorne, 1852:46)

Adnan & Al Munib state that

The gossipper is another dame who starts the gossip by utilizing the speech act of stating to achieve influence as the gossip includes talking about norm-relevant standards. The gossipper is master Dimmesdale. It is triggered by existential presupposition (a definite noun phrase). (Adnan & Al Munib, 2019).

The following table shows the cultureme produced in this situation:

Cultural Pragmatic Schema: Gossiping about ill-reputed people
Speech act/event: Stating the misfortune of Hester Prynne
Pragmeme: Agreeing the gossip
Pract : <i>People say that the Reverend Master Dimmesdale, her godly pastor, takes it very grievously to heart that such a scandal should have come upon his congregation.</i> (the physical enunciation of the utterance)
Cultureme: Stating the utterance that <i>Reverend Dimmesdale takes the situation grievously to his heart upon his congregation, and enunciated in that specific context, creates the second cultureme.</i>

This example shows that **the act of stating the misfortune of Hester Prynne** is agreed upon by the interactants, producing as such **the pragmeme of agreeing the gossip** and triggering the enunciation of the **pract**

People say that the Reverend Master Dimmesdale, her godly pastor, takes it very grievously to heart that such a scandal should have come upon his congregation.

Enunciating such a pract would not have been possible without considering all the pertinent contextual repertoires available, reaching as such to the ultimate **Cultureme**.

Excerpt 3

Cultural Pragmatic Schema: Gossiping about ill-reputed people
Speech act/event: Criticizing the misfortune of Hester Prynne
Pragmeme: Agreeing for the gossip
Pract : <i>She hath good skill at her needle, that's certain," remarked one of the female spectators; "but did ever a woman, before this brazen hussy, contrive such a way of showing it! Why, gossips, what is it but to laugh in the faces of our godly magistrates, and make a pride out of what they, worthy gentlemen, meant for a punishment?"</i> (the physical enunciation of the utterance)
Cultureme: Criticizing Hester Prynne implicitly and enunciating the pract in that specific context creates a further cultureme.

“She hath good skill at her needle, that's certain,” remarked one of the female spectators; “but did ever a woman, before this brazen hussy, contrive such a way of showing it! Why, gossips, what is it but to laugh in the faces of our godly magistrates, and make a pride out of what they, worthy gentlemen, meant for a punishment?” (Hawthorne, 1852, p. 49)

Adnan & Al Munib state that

The gossipper is a female spectator. She presents the gossip by an implicit criticizing of the brazen hussy (the gossipee that is presented by employing the existential presupposition). This gossip serves to impart knowledge.

The above example further shows how implicitly criticizing Hester for her ill-deed

continues to be part of that public trial of Hester Prynne before the Puritan congregation to further

buttress the dramatic situation and to further incriminate Hester and to justify the punishment she is about to suffer for the rest of her life. **The Cultureme of criticizing Hester Prynne implicitly** would not have been possible without all the surrounding circumstances and contextual repertoires that contribute to the production of effective Culturemes. It is evident thus far that Hawthorne uses effective Culturemes in *The Scarlet Letter* in very specific contexts of situation. This specificity of usage indicates that the production of Culturemes happens only in **unrepetitive contexts**, meaning that every produced Cultureme is a unique result of applying effective pragmemes in their pertinent contexts. No Cultureme is produced without a repertoire tailored for the sake of a specific high-order cultural schemata. The answer to the question at the beginning of this paper: Do speech acts exist as such as influential verbs in context or as distinctive

entities called “Culturemes”? is that Culturemes are genuine manifestations of situated speech acts, pragmemes, and they are unique entities relying almost entirely on unrepetitive contexts of situation.

7. CONCLUSION

Understanding cultural schemata thus and their role in generating practs in either verbal or written discourse is important for creating contextualised unique meanings. It is worth mentioning that “Cultural schemata are represented in a heterogeneously distributed fashion among the members of a speech community” (Sharifian, 2016) Cultural pragmatic schema produce speech acts that in turn produce specific pragmemes, which can be manifested in various practs that are encapsulated in their effective Culturemes as per the following figure:




Fig.1 Cultural pragmatic schema

8. BACK TO BINARY OPPOSITIONS

Having explicated the importance of context and its uniqueness in producing linear meanings using efficacious Culturemes in their pertinent contexts, the Roman intellect proves itself as

efficacious as ever in presenting binary-oppositional meanings analogous to those first created between Rome and its peripheries, a binary system that helped people rationalize their thought and found their linear philosophies.

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VISUAL DISCOURSE AS A CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL REFERENTIAL

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Abstract: *In the configuration of scientific theories, visual discourse has a special role, that weaves its way between invention and discovery. For the most accurate account of material reality, science uses images, both verbal and visual. In this sense, what Peirce called icons or symbols, namely: models, diagrams, photographs, graphs, sketches, metaphors, analogies, equations are defining for the foundation of science. They function as "hypericons" or "theoretical images" that give images a central role in the models of mind, perception and memory. The abundance of images in contemporary society implies a non-critical acceptance of the power and influence of mediated images, similar in a way to that attributed to mythological symbolism. The role of the present study is to argue about the importance of dialectics word - image in scientific discourse and to reflect on how the image becomes an echo chamber for human thought, populating it and determining its most intimate resorts.*

Keywords: *visual discourse; eidetic cleavage; ideological signification; hypericons*

1. INTRODUCTION

In the circumstances of the exponential increase of information, the contemporary world is mostly under the sign of image. Visual discourse and iconic coding, increasingly used in science and realized through diagrams, diagrams, graphs, photographs, pictures, provide a synthetic, economical and easily readable data storage and facilitate any communication process and any investment with meaning. Visual discourse is present even in the language that is most distant from visual images, such as science. Thus, a pre-existing text, which can generate certain interpretations either in its spirit or in an autonomous direction, determines the appearance of the image. In this respect, a scientific idea is presented wrapped in an envelope of the imagination, which is of an affective nature, and the intentionality of the discursive thinking is accompanied by the spontaneous production of the images. We could talk about a network in which verbal reason and expression combine, according to an intrinsically logical movement, with the visual image. Such an approach is subject to iconic communication.

2. ICONIC COMMUNICATION AND PERCEPTIVE GRIDS OF MEANINGFUL INVESTMENT

According to Charles Peirce, the iconic signs are the defining ones for the foundation of science,

and these include on the one hand the models, the diagrams, the photographs, the graphs, the sketches, and on the other the metaphors and analogies. In addition, they function as "hypericons" or "theoretical images" that give images a central role in models of mind, perception and memory (Peirce, 1990:277, 282-290).

The iconic sign functions as a perceptual structure similar to that of the object to which it refers, in Umberto Eco's conception. It does not have the same physical properties as the object, but has a conventional character. As for communication, it lies in the mechanisms of perception itself, and not in the relationship between code and message. Thus, based on perceptual codes, by selecting certain stimulus - after other have been eliminated - the receiver can construct a perceptual structure similar to that of the object. Terms like *resemblance, analogy, motivation*, are used by U. Eco to define the iconic sign, it considers that the dependence of the sign on object is at the origin of the sign, and the semiotic report is constructed by putting at stake the conventional elements (Eco, 1972:188). In this context, the cognitive psychology analyzes the primary processing of visual information, then focuses on the mechanisms involved in recognizing the figures, obtaining the three-dimensional image of an object, identified and recognized.

Communication through iconic signs implies the existence of perceptual grids, socially and culturally

determined, which guide the production and reception of iconic signs and which are necessary in order to identify certain aspects that make meaningful investment and interaction possible. Therefore, any iconic sign, which is the effect of encoding a perceptual experience, requires a learning process. In the paper, *Signs, Language and Behavior*, C. Morris speaks of the *gradual nature of iconicity*: “iconicity is a matter of degree” (C. Morris, 1946:191), not in the sense of differential parameter for a taxonomy of signs, but to introduce a discourse on the degree of convention or codification of iconic signs. Thus, although the icon characterizes what it denotes and is similar to the denoted object, and the iconic signs represent the referent analogically, the iconicity knows a gradation in the relation to the referent.

Regardless of the scientific cognitive approach, it involves a visual component: “science in general uses images as part of its cognitive apparatus” (Mitchell, 2015:54). This side of the visibility, in which the image has a central role, must be understood phenomenologically: the image has a quasi-presence and it participates in a certain degree of reality. “We might then want to speak, with phenomenologists like Bachelard and Merleau-Ponty, of the “onset” of the image or, with Wittgenstein, of the “dawning of an aspect”. But only an immaterial, phantasmatic conception of the image that treats its being in what Derrida described as a “hauntology” can capture its spectral nature” (Mitchell, 2015:58-59). We speak in this sense about an eidetic cleavage, generated by the intimate essence of the image: on the one hand it designates something we see (a diagram, a graph, a sketch), and on the other hand something we understand, as a significant relationship with something beyond itself, which it expresses in its own way (as metaphors and analogies). If the first aspect involves understanding the image in the realm of empirical investigation and abstract, rational, even mathematical modeling, the second one, on the other hand, implies the understanding of the image as a social and cultural construct, which gives birth to the realm of interpretation and appreciation. As noted W. J. T. Mitchell (2015:58):

The images we should be concerned with in science are not just the pictures, graphs, and physical models, but also the metaphors that provide pictures of a domain of research - the universe “as” a heat-engine or a clock or a ball of string - pictures that need not be made visible or drawn graphically.

3. SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE AS A VISUAL DISCOURSE

To relate to the cultural and social dimension of the image implies to refer to the human as “a combination of experiences, information, readings, imaginations re-mixed and reordered in various possible ways” (Calvino, 2019). In this sense, the visual discourse is part of the visual memory of the human individual, the latter being determined by the multitude of his direct experiences and by the repertoire of images reflected by the culture in which he lives. So, if the sign and the concept are connected by the person's perception and the concept and the object are connected by the person's experience, then the sign and the object are connected by the conventions, or the culture, of the social group within which the person lives. Thus, we are talking about a *cultural and/ or ideological referential*, which functions as “a system of representations and fundamental attitudes whose assumptions we are not aware of” and which “the ordinary man does not confess, but only follows”, representations and attitudes which “silently governs any culture and, implicitly, any ideology” (Boşun & Borşa, 2004:75).

The cultural and ideological referent refers to those constants of thought around which the mental organization is constituted: “To the extent that people have access to reality only through their referential, it can be said that after changing the referential, they react to a different world. The constitution of the world (‘the horizon of reality’ attached to the horizon of life) takes place concomitantly with the articulation of a cultural horizon, populated by cultural paradigms, sub-paradigms and meta-paradigms, which in turn are compatible with specific languages. From this interpretation it is impossible to remove ideology, the main product of cultural paradigms (in a sense analogous to the way in which scientific theories are the product of disciplinary paradigms) (Boşun & Borşa, 2004:78). In this respect, we are talking about what Goussier called “horizons of reality”, which are determined in the last period more and more by a discourse of the visual, due to the exponential increase of the information and the use of the image, especially as a result of the development of media and ICT. The scientific discourse itself is constituted in the visual area, determining the frames of a certain type of cognoscibility:

but the referential, precisely by its nature, is not perceived as referential: it constitutes the world of the subject, for which 'naturalness' it is able to achieve put his hand in the fire; we are talking about 'horizons of reality' (Gonseth), as they are constituted as a theater of action, perception, experimentation and enunciation, we can better understand why a referential means a world, why changing the referential means changing the world. Changing the referential forces people to see reality with another eye, oriented in a new direction (Borçun & Borşa, 2004:78).

From a sociological point of view an ideological message involves reporting to a *plurimondism principle* (Borçun & Borşa, 2004:92), since it must be differentiated according to the social group to which it is addressed. It implies, on the one hand, the concrete knowledge of the life horizon specific to the group, and on the other hand the establishment of the ideological referent generated by the cultural horizon.

4. THE MITIZING DIMENSION OF THE IMAGE

The proper meaning of a sign, the denotation, is an agreement among the people that they will share the meaning of the sign among themselves. Such meanings appear through social conventions; therefore a sign can have more denotative meanings. In cases when a person has to choose a meaning, it will make the decision by referring to the context of the sign. For signs are generated by myths and in turn serve to maintain them. The term "myth" must be understood in its popular sense, in the sense that it refers to beliefs which are demonstrably false. Myths can be seen as extended metaphors. As metaphors, myths help us to raise awareness of our experiences within a culture. They express and serve the ideological function of *naturalization* (Barthes, 1977:45-46).

The abundance of images in contemporary society implies a non-critical acceptance of the power and influence of mediated images, similar in a way to that attributed to mythological symbolism. The myth must be understood in Barthes's terms, as "language" (Barthes, 1997:15), as a way of meaning or system of communication:

language needs special conditions in order to become a myth (...) we must uphold with determination that myth is a communication system, it is a message. We see that myth cannot be an object, a concept or an idea; it is a way of meaning, a form. It will be necessary, later, to put this form of historical limits, conditions of use, to reinvest the

society in it: but first, we must describe it as a form. (...) Therefore, anything can be a myth? Yes, I think so, because the universe is endlessly suggestive. Any object in the world can go from a closed, moved existence, to an oral state, open to appropriation (Barthes, 1997:235).

Based on the image, which involves several ways of reading, the myth is associated with a social use:

A tree is a tree. Yes, of course. But a tree said by Minou Drouet is no longer a tree, it is a tree adorned, adapted to a certain kind of consumption, a tree invested with literary allowances, with revolts, with images, in short, with a social use that adds to the pure matter. (...) in the image there are many ways of reading: a sketch lends itself to meaning much more than a drawing, an imitation more than an original, a caricature more than a portrait. But here it is no longer a theoretical way of representation: it is about this image, proposed for this meaning (Barthes, 1997:236).

Under the impact of new technologies the mythical dimension of the image is involved in an interdisciplinary approach, the borrowing of research methods from different fields (such as: physics, mathematics, biology, linguistics, computer science, geometry and sacred geography, ecology, etc.) in other domains and the diffusion of concepts being the most frequent of the means chosen by the researchers from different disciplines (Crăciun, 2015:41-42). Under the impact of modern technology, the transition from an analytical model to a synthetic thinking model takes place. We are witnessing the increase of the mathematical degree of the scientific knowledge, this assuring a superior internal organization, as well as the possibility of using some synthetic explanatory models in the cognitive constructions. Moreover, the interference and inter-influence of the fundamental sciences with the applied ones, of the theoretical sciences of nature with the socio-humanistic and technical sciences, is manifested, even at the level of methods (Pârveu, 1981: 9 - 10).

In the construction of scientific theories, metatheoretical perspectives are elaborated, the meta-scientific dimension gaining an increasing role in contemporary science. The general philosophical concepts are replaced by metatheoretical concepts and criteria, elaborated in the form of systematic logical-methodological theories or models. The studies of thinkers coming from the field of philosophy, such as I. Prigogine, A. Robinson, N. Chomsky or I. Rawls are relevant in this regard.

The amount of scientific information has increased enormously in the last period, and the information has become an indispensable, increasingly important source in terms of economic growth and social progress. We are witnessing an information explosion, as a considerable number of scientific journals, patents for inventions, catalogues and commercial brochures, research reports, books, dictionaries and terminological disparities are accentuated every year. The amount of scientific information (internationally, nationally, regionally, locally) is becoming more and more leading to the increase of information-documentation difficulties. In addition, many research papers are published partially or not at all, and the publication is often repeated, in different forms of communication. As for access to scientific information, which is becoming increasingly necessary, sometimes it is very difficult (Răboacă & Ciucur, 2004:100).

In this context, we are talking about the phenomenon of globalization of science, which, against the background of the development of new information and communication technologies, generates interrelations between discursive topics and image, which have a defining role in terms of contemporary scientific research. Phenomena such as: globalization of economic life; deepening the international division of labor; emphasizing international economic, social, political or cultural relations as a whole; exacerbating the conflict between the increasing needs of each nation and the limited resources of the planet; the increasing problems of environmental protection (Răboacă, Ciucur, 2004:97) find a degree of communicability and applicability at the level of visual discourse, constituting themselves in an iconic language.

5. CONCLUSIONS

In contemporary society, the image is increasingly used as a means of communication, and the visual discourse is present in any scientific approach, which has led to an ever closer approximation the image of language. The research methods used in this context, discovered in the

field of linguistics, have surpassed the study of the language, gaining universal applicability. The problem of the legitimacy of extrapolating the border between language and image (between linguistic and iconic), due to the use of linguistic methods, began to acquire general applicability. Currently, there is a frequent use of images, of the iconic sign in the field of sciences, extrapolated from the sphere of advertising, propaganda and consumption, which is why the iconic language has become the object of study of various researches.

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OUR EUROPE: THREE POST-COMMUNIST WRITERS ON CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE DENIAL OF HISTORY

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Abstract: *The paper focuses on Central Europe's problematic philosophical relationship with history by bringing together three different post-communist viewpoints on Central Europeanism which seem to spotlight a certain distrust in history as a key element in any relevant understanding of its cultural specificity. The primary sources proposed for analysis consist of three authoritative Central European writers' essayistic approaches to the said relationship – namely, Andrzej Stasiuk, Mircea Nedelciu and Gheorghe Crăciun's – as each of them provides a different paradigmatic standpoint on Central Europe's "historic pudency" and this attitude's role in re-defining Europeanism in the zone. The investigation's main purpose is to determine the way in which these discourses articulate around a distinct conceptual apparatus and build emblematic contemporary perspectives, adding up to pre-communist and late, 1980s (anti-)communist philosophical debates concerning Central European identity.*

Keywords: *alternative cultural identity; Central Europe; history; otherness; community*

1. ON CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE DENIAL OF HISTORICIST IDENTITY DEFINITIONS

1.1 Back to the 1990s: on Central Europe as an alternative community model. On their way to European integration, the struggling countries in the former "Eastern Bloc" had to re-examine their Europeanism closely after the fall of communism. But even with political and economic geography (now) on their side, analysts still had to quickly admit that historically generated cultural distances between East and West were bound to represent a considerable and enduring challenge.

In the 1990s, a good number of public intellectuals and communist dissidents in different countries tried to deal with this issue. The relevant viewpoints revolved (implicitly or explicitly) around three main paradigmatic visions: György Konrád's cultural perspective on a possible Central European community, exposed in *Is the Dream of Central Europe Still Alive?* (1984); Milan Kundera's "tragic" acknowledgement of an intra-European border, dramatically separating East and West after the Second World War, vehemently argued for in *The Tragedy of Central Europe* (published first in French in 1983, then in English in 1984); and Czesław Miłosz's analysis of *Central European Attitudes* (1986). Debated intensely by numerous reputed progressive, left-wing or right-wing anti-

communist or dissident intellectuals in the former socialist bloc, as well as by certain French scholars (Jacques Le Rider, Frédéric Mitterand)¹, the prototype of an alternative, Central-European identity captured the imagination of many.

In Romania, the "Third Europe" cultural foundation², intellectually headquartered around the West University of Timișoara and headed by reputed post-communist academics and/or writers such as Cornel Ungureanu and Adriana Băbe coagulated most of the relevant debates on the topic around a homonymous academic journal (as well as later projects) in the last decades of the 1990s. Prestigious international participation, mainly from France and central European countries, made the emergent foundation into a phenomenon at the time.

However, such discussions predictably faded (in Romania and elsewhere) with the advent of the new century – that is, with the gradual EU integration of the countries participating in the rather "dilemmatic" (Babeți, Ungureanu, 1997) re-assessment of this regional model. As the official online information page on the Schengen visa shows today,

¹ For references, see the "Bibliography" section.

² "A Treia Europă", my translation. The cultural foundation's title evokes a 1930s geopolitical federative project centered upon Poland, Romania and Hungary.

[t]he political divisions, during the 2000s, between the east and west Europe finally heal and 10 more new countries join the EU in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania joining in 2007³.

An indeed, in recent bestsellers on world geopolitics, such as Tim Marshall's *Prisoners of Geography* (Marshall, 2016:91-116), central European countries are plainly included (and actually mentioned, analyzed, in one word, "integrated") under (the chapter entitled) "Western Europe". Moreover, significantly enough, there is no mention of any "other" Europe, while Russia is treated separately. Thus, it seems that seen from the west – at least as far as theory goes – Europe is now both a geopolitical whole and a predominantly Western cultural space.

1.2 Synapses: on an intellectual tradition of anti-historicism in Central Europe. Nevertheless, the above mentioned 1980s and 1990s debates are still relevant to the day, but perhaps in a different sense. Beyond countless indisputably productive ideas, one could notice that many of the discourses produced by public intellectuals on the topic were marked by a rather intense negativism concerning history as a key to identity definition, an rather influential additional distress-causing factor to the dilemmas surrounding the already problematic and "vulnerable" projections of self-identity within the Central European space (Babeți, 1998:65-83). The first to identify and emphasize, among the main "attitudes" specific for the archetypal Central European identity model, a certain sense of history as threat, of *historic frustration*, combined with a "tinge of nostalgia, of utopianism, and of hope" was Czesław Miłosz (Miłosz, 1986:105-107).

On the other hand, a different, but relevant intellectual "vein" had been initiated earlier by Emil Cioran and his rather aggressive vision of historical minority as cultural insignificance in *The Transfiguration of Romania* (Cioran, 1936/1990). Re-published and mildly revised by its author in 1990, the book probably played a decisive role in the determining later Romanian psychologies of self-perception. Cioran's authoritative, nearly fascistoid definition of relevant cultural identity as heroically (i.e., belligerently) historical, and conversely, of destiny as "tragedy" or "fatality" with "small cultures", as well as his desperation with the Romanian "historical void" converged towards a specific type of *historical shaming*. This

³ See <https://www.schengenvisa.info/eu-countries/>, section "Brief History of the European Union". Accessed on March 30th, 2020.

violent and rather absolutistic cultural criticism plausibly articulated, in its turn, a durable syndrome of what I will call here *historic pudency*, i.e. a sense of shame about one's own historical insignificance – which was bound to durably affect later self-perceptions of identity⁴.

Of course, all anti-historicist standpoints (based on the idea of historical time as threat) are based upon a definition of history with a capital "h", of history as *longue durée* (Braudel, 1958), but they refer to slightly different historical experiences of political / cultural domination, also reflected in the distinct corresponding "metanarratives" of Central Europeanism (Lyotard, 1979). However, the narratives differ to some extent. *Historic frustration* – of which perhaps an arch-illustration could be Milan Kundera's judgmental *Tragedy of Central Europe* – is mainly connected to Central Europe's unfortunate 20th century political experiences – to communism, in principal, but may extend to both fascism and communism, and implicitly to the two World Wars (as it frequently does in Polish or Czech consciousness), or to the ensuing disappointment with Western policies such as the in/famous 1944 "Percentages agreement" between Stalin and Churchill. On the other hand, *historic pudency* originates mainly in a long-term historical experience of colonial exploitation – under which the socialist ordeal is often subsumed – and the relatively late achievement of political independence at national level, generating an oversized self-awareness regarding one's own nation's historical minority or even collective culpability (e.g., for not having properly resisted against the instauration of communism in 1945, or for not having generated outstanding/heroic intellectual dissidence etc.). According to another criterion (that of the direct object of denial), *historic frustration* is a metanarrative founded on the outwards-orientation of major historical guilt, while *historic pudency* is inwards-oriented; or, in other words: one blames an external factor (e.g. the world and its corruption or other, more concrete forces, such as Western superpowers), the other is an instance of self-blame (and self-abasement); one is

⁴ According to various researches conducted over time (see Webster, 1986:28; Sepi, 2013:12) Romanians can still be described as irrationally lacking in self-esteem; also, several researchers support the opinion that Romanians were "fed" with ideas able to generate a "national inferiority complex" during the Legionary period (see Webster, 1986:28; Nagy-Talavera, 1970:247 Barbu, 1968:147; Bobango, 1981:68f), an ideology to which Cioran's ideas in *The Transfiguration of Romania* are, unfortunately, surprisingly akin.

critical/judgmental, the other – auto-critical/self-shaming.

A third attitude that should be considered in connection with the idea of anti-historicism is what could be termed *nihilistic ahistoric contemplativeness* / *passivity* or, to simplify, *ahistoricism*. This is in fact a variant combining historic frustration and pudency, in the sense that it is the expression of an expanded, chronic philosophical disbelief or disappointment in history as adverse (i.e., in history still perceived as a “threat”). But in this case, *la longue durée* is passively understood as an ontological limitation; frustration is replaced by a fatalistic (simulated or authentic) disinterest in the mechanics of history altogether. The *ahistoric* outlook could therefore be defined as a compensatory de-valorization of history (interpreted as an adverse and incontrollable continuum) and the complementary valorization of historical minority. The latter is in this case understood as a resultant of a type of metaphysical awareness based on a deep(er) understanding of the vanity of all human actions in time. Hence, the denial of history is legitimated as a result of a wise, willful passivity, based on a nihilistic perception of heroic historical act.

In this sense, *ahistoric contemplativeness* is the reverse of (and sometimes, a reaction to) *historic pudency* or *historical shaming*. In Romania, ahistoric passivity was praised by national-socialists as a solution to the sense of historic shame generated by nationalist extremists and Legionary theorists, but the intellectual roots of ahistoricism actually extend further than that, into the first metanarratives of the nation as a homogenous entity (e.g. the mythopoetic interpretations of the folk ballad *Miorița* by Lucian Blaga and George Călinescu), popularized as such mostly during the interwar period. In terms of its conceptualization, let us bear in mind Constantin Noica’s theory in *The Romanian Sense of Being* (Noica, 1978/1996) as one of the classical examples to fit this category.

1.3 Nedelciu, Crăciun and Stasiuk: a choice of illustrations. Based on the theoretical distinctions proposed above, the choice of primary resources was one based both on similarities between the texts selected for analysis, and the nature of the differences between them.

To begin with, all three authors are well-praised post-communist fiction writers. Even if the two Romanians write a consistent part of their fictional and theoretical works during the 1980s (that is, under Ceaușescu’s regime), all three authors are

born around the 1950s, are Western-European (or Euroatlantic) judging by their sources of self-education having shaped their intellectual profiles, and do not correspond (or comply) to socialist-approved aesthetic (or aesth-ethic) paradigms. On the contrary, all three are, in this same sense, somewhat counter-cultural (Hărșan, 2016) – in an eastern definition of the term.

The selected texts themselves are also similar in form, in the sense that they are either proper essays (Stasiuk’s text in *My Europe* and Crăciun’s *Us and the West*) or highly essayistic in nature (the series of letters published by Nedelciu and Crăciun). The same goes for their content, for they feature analogous *topoi* of Central Europe’s problematic relationship with Europeanism and somewhat symmetrical attitudes towards them. As a parenthesis, a corpus of essayistic writing seemed, at the same time, more resourceful and relevant as a choice for the present analysis than sheer theoretical material (where discourse is typically artificially moderated), but more conceptually explicit than proper fiction.

As for the said differences, their nature is such that they turn the selected texts into exponential illustrations of the (today, commonly shared) anti-historicist attitudes described under section 1.2, attitudes presumed representative, as a premise of the present study, for the most popular, nearly archetypical Central European standpoints on Europeanism; this is why the exploration of these divergences is going to constitute the main focus of the present approach in the sections to come.

A last remark before proceeding to the said investigation of specific distinctive traits is the fact that the intellectual effervescence of the 1980s and 1990s concerning Central Europe (as opposed to Eastern Europe, i.e. the Eastern Block, as well as to the Prussian belligerent concept of *Mitteleuropa*, but rather indebted to Franz Joseph’s federalist dream) is the actual context in which the texts we are about to discuss were produced, and from which they stem.

Among perhaps the most notable epiphenomena of the debates fueled by the “Third Europe” group is the dialogue regarding Romanian Europeanism between Mircea Nedelciu and Gheorghe Crăciun. The exchange actually started as a debate on the enduring cultural differences between the three major former Romanian Principalities – more precisely, on the contrasts between Transylvania, on the one hand, and the old Kingdom (Moldavia and Wallachia), on the other. But as a reflection on Romanian cultural homogeneity, the epistolary dialogue unavoidably

turns into a polemic discussion on what Europeanism should mean in post-communist Romania, since Transylvania (along with Banat) is initially consensually assigned to a “more European” cultural paradigm than the other provinces, while the two Danubian principalities are thought to belong to an Oriental, Slavic cultural area, the so-called “Balkanic” model. Even if neither Nedelciu nor Crăciun directly contributed to *The Third Europe* project directly, the initiator of the exchange was the former, who had just written and published a “collective” experimental novel touching upon the theme of central Europeanism with Adriana Babeți and Mircea Mihăieș⁵. So it is only natural to assume that the correspondence he and his close friend, fellow writer and Brașov university academic Gheorghe Crăciun, primed in 1991, was actually prompted by the preoccupations of the Timișoara group. Most of the resulting texts, dated 1991, were published first in the Bucharest headquartered literary journal *Contrapunct*⁶, under the title *Provençal Letters – Late Returns*⁷; then, the dialogue was later integrated by Gheorghe Crăciun in his tome of collected works *The Reduction Scale Factor* (Crăciun, 1999), along with his last, unsent reply and his complementary essay *Us and the West*⁸.

In his turn, Andrzej Stasiuk’s *Logbook* (Andruxhovyč, Stasiuk, 2003:9-98) is part of a two-fold post-communist definition of Central Europe published as a self-standing booklet entitled *My Europe: Two essays on the Europe called “Central”*, where it constitutes a counterpart to Ukrainian fiction writer Yurii Andruxhovyč’s *Central-Oriental Revisions* (Andruxhovyč, Stasiuk, 2003:99-185). *My Europe...* originally appeared in 2000 and was translated into Romanian with the support of *The Third Europe Foundation* (Andruxhovyč, Stasiuk, 2003).

If we deliberately omitted here Andruxhovyč’s contribution to the theme, it is in principal out of (textual) space concerns, but also a consequence of the possibility of paralleling different or similar views on symmetrically

distributed themes with the other three writers. The selection was in this case more structural and functional than a qualitative choice. In a nutshell, his take on Central-“Oriental” Europe is a pessimistic point of view on the terrible separation signaled by Kundera in *The Tragedy...* Central Europe is depicted by Andruxhovyč as a desolate cultural landscape with no historical escape routes, both the historical past and the historical future of which seem to be lost indefinitely.

2. THEIR EUROPE: CRĂCIUN, NEDELCIU, STASIUK, ANTI-HISTORICISM AND THE GEOGRAPHICAL ALTERNATIVE

As far as the three more assertive (if some are still rather pessimistic) alternative visions of Europeanism are concerned, the following overview of their specificities and particular solutions will be structured according to two major coordinates: 1) the distinct representations of Western Europe as an ideal cultural design (or, with some, as an anti-model or an impracticable form); 2) the nature of anti-historicist identity definitions, and the original solutions they suggest.

2.1 Perspectives on the Western European model. Based on its desirability, the Western world-model is perceived differently by the three writers. “I am a Romanian intellectual who first got out of the country at age 40, in 1990. I am – I say this openly – a pro-occidental”, Gheorghe Crăciun writes at the very beginning of his essay *Us and the West* (1999:126). And indeed, he is the only one to unconditionally and fully embrace the Western ideal, who truly ultimately believes that “our Europe” (ideally) has to become one with the West, to learn the western ways and in the end, become the West. “If I am to favor anything, I favor civilization. I truly believe that *ex occidente lux*”, he asserts in his third letter (1999:124), evoking Eugen Lovinescu’s example as a prototype for profitable pro-western Romanian intellectual attitudes. In other words, for Crăciun, the West equals civilization – and this is no long division. In fact, in this sense, his reasoning – even though sensibly moderate, follows in Cioran’s footsteps, for culture is the result of civilization and must come as a consequence of historical experience and extroversion:

I am under the impression that the Western world learned to play with metaphysics and the Truth only after having secured a pragmatics of existence that defies any provisory arrangement and reduces the

⁵ I am referring to the novel *Femeia în Roșu* [The Woman in Red, my translation], authored collectively by the three writers mentioned above. The novel was first published by Cartea Românească publishing, in 1990.

⁶ Original version of the title: *Scrisori provenșale – Răspunsuri tardive*.

⁷ All English title and citation translations from Romanian or languages other than English are my own, for all bibliographic reference cited in Romanian in the “Bibliography” section.

⁸ Original version of the title: *Noi și Occidentul*.

uncertainties of everyday life to a minimum (Crăciun, 1999:131).

Moreover,

the apparent ruptures [in the Western way of life, R.H.] (wars, diseases, the various forms of state fragmentation etc.) are proper, *sui generis* means to secure the survival, the crystallization, the fine-tuning of the same unique idea. An idea that concerns, first of all, the organization of human life in controllable, precise patterns, based on the principles of rationality and efficiency (Crăciun, 1999:127).

Much in the same line, he argues – with an untranslatable pun – that “The weak component” in Eastern identity “is the Slavic component” (Crăciun, 1999:107)⁹, seen as prone to corruption and devoid of a coherent vision of *la longue durée*, which ultimately makes it insignificant (“a *cirlilai* world”¹⁰, as he irritably calls it). To sum up, the Transylvanian writer sees European integration as a necessity that cannot be compromised or negotiated with: in his view, we should copy the West – “to me, Balcanism seems neither funny nor heroic” (Crăciun, 1999:124), “I really believe in those forms devoid of substance”¹¹ (Crăciun, 1999:124) – and the model we apply should be absolute. This is why, for Crăciun, the idea of Central Europe is an insufficient half-model: “Our chance to rejoin Europe is the *Mittel* [Mitteleuropean, R.H.] way (a half-portion, then), a *Bitter* chance.” (Crăciun, 1999:109). The irony in the pun is obvious: Central Europe is a half-European model, a bitter pill signifying the East’s inability in the accomplishment of proper Europeanism, in fully meeting the high standards of the West. In the end, the pun *Mittel-Bitter* is a sore conclusion: the East will never be the West, and this cultural fact does not do the Easterners any favors.

⁹ Original Romanian statement: “Partea slabă a lucrurilor e partea slavă.”

¹⁰ In original: “o lume de *cirlilai*”. The word “*cirlilai*” is a lexical invention, suggesting a mass of insignificant, inconsequential entities, of cheerful nullities.

¹¹ This is a reference to Titu Maiorescu’s ideas in *În contra direcției de astăzi în cultura romană* [Against the contemporary trend in Romanian Culture] (published in 1868). Maiorescu was a major critic of any (socio-cultural) forms that simply copied what he thought to be the surface of the Western model, while the essence of it remained inapplicable. This theory is remembered as “the theory of forms without substance”.

The other two writers here in question are of a different opinion. Mircea Nedelciu is also pro-occidental, but his solution when it comes to the practical application of the Western model is more relativistic, in the sense that he prefers a middle ground to the duplication of an absolute model. He therefore favors a combination of Western and local frameworks:

(...) the work methods used by the French or the Austrians should be copied by Romanians, the same way that the Polish, the Czechs, Hungarians or Serbians are able to replicate them. (...) But for us to be able to accomplish anything in this direction, with our own specific means, it is insufficient to simply have the will to do it, we need to get to know ourselves better and distribute tasks in accordance to this knowledge,

Nedelciu states in his inaugural letter (Crăciun, 1999:104). Later on, he becomes more categorical on the matter: in his last (fourth) letter to Crăciun, as the polemic exchange had started to heat up, he refers to unadjusted cultural replicas (illustrated by using an optimistic parallel drawn by Crăciun between Cluj-Napoca and Wien against its initial purpose) in rather harsh terms:

The cities in the margins of empires are nothing but pale copies of the metropolis, representing ultimately nothing but *forms* (which resemble the metropolis, but are, of course, reduced by a scale factor), *devoid of the imperial substance* (power). (...) Today, you are forced to look for them [the similarities between the metropolitan center and the replicas, R.H.] insistently, to wish to find them with all your heart, to use all your historic knowledge in this sense, and in the end, to rather conclude on the fact that they remain a mere caricature. The nature of this resemblance remains that of a copy trying to mimic a model that cannot be reproduced. From the very beginning, a copy knows that it is nothing but a simplified portrayal of the model and therefore does not have the right to compete with its uniqueness, so it really has to stop before it becomes a carbon copy (Crăciun, 1999:120).

Instead, what he proposes as a solution is an alternative based on Fernand Braudel’s ideas concerning the “science of governing the margins” (Crăciun, 1999:118), and sides with the idea of an acculturation able to bridge Western and Slavic “components”, highlighting the fact that the Romanians’ first cultural accomplishments were facilitated by means of the influence of Slavic writing and models. Of course, the risk is, he argues, considering a statement by Cioran in this sense (Crăciun, 1999:111), to replicate the worst of the two

worlds instead of finding the right measure on this middle ground. But even though this “science of the governance of margins” might be more complex and subtle than what one would imagine, in his perspective, acculturation remains the most valid possible answer of all. Needless to say that ultimately, for Nedelciu, there has always been more than meets the eye about the insubordination of margins, i.e. their potential as an emancipatory force, as well as their openness to tolerance and alterity.

As for Stasiuk, he is probably the least pro-occidental of the three. Fascinated by the images and narratives of an ideal West as a child and throughout young adulthood, the Polish author claims that with the possibility of free (physical) travel (after 1990) came his utter disenchantment with the West:

The real geography is the way that leads South [towards South-Eastern Europe, the Danube Basin, R.H.], because the East and the West have been dominated by these two illegitimate sisters [political and economic geographies, R.H.], and my hungry soul will never be able to find anything there (Andrukhovych, Stasiuk, 2003:158).

For him, it is the universality of the center that brings about its lack of (sufficient) substance, the Centre becomes its own simulacrum:

(...) I am not a great supporter of life in the Center. To live in the Center is to live nowhere. When any direction is equally close or equally far, the human being becomes repulsed by the idea of travel, for the entire world starts to resemble an immense province (Andrukhovych, Stasiuk, 2003:111).

An opposite valorization of fragmentariness as an effect of acculturation than in Gheorghe Crăciun’s view (for whom it represents orientalism, much to the likeness of Turkish bazars) is also apparent with Stasiuk, who seems to be, unlike the Transylvanian writer, fascinated by the exploratory potential of heteroclitic juxtapositions, reunited, however, by the commonness of mental / cultural representation:

[...] it is out of such things that my Europe is made up of: details, a few seconds-long episodes, reminding me about this or that movie scene [...], and beyond this whirlpool of episodes there are glimpses of scenery, furtive glimpses at the map behind (Andrukhovych, Stasiuk, 2003:158).

The lively colorfulness of petty detail thus becomes a definition of the Central European space – as with Crăciun – but the connotation essentially

differs: such detail doesn’t represent the annoying, shallow “Balkanic frivolities” (Crăciun, 1999:113), but the very core of a living, breathing, resourceful multicultural space. In this sense, Stasiuk feels much more attached to the federalist Hapsburg utopia envisaged by Franz Joseph – but that is, he claims, only because the center (and its power) dwells further away from the actual geography around it than in Western republicanism:

This is why I side with the idea of monarchy, all over the world, everywhere (...). The more land the Emperor owns, the better it is for the commoners. (...) The further away the Master, the better (Andrukhovych, Stasiuk, 2003:162).

Thus, his understanding of the margin as a liberal space, based on a historically-induced fear of political structures of power such as the center, is extremely similar to the perspective on peripheries as spaces of relative freedom under totalitarianism. Mircea Nedelciu constructs throughout his fictional writings.

However, there are a few paradoxes in the two Romanian writers’ thinking that might be worth discussing here. On the one hand, Mircea Nedelciu evokes the discourses of the major intellectual critics of Romanian interwar Francophilia (such as Măiorescu) against the absolutism of Crăciun’s adherence to the Western model, while still calling upon postmodern French thinking (e.g. Braudel) to legitimate his relativistic attachment to the same model. In fact, he is a Francophile himself, by education (postmodern French theoretical schools of thought played an important role in his intellectual self-formation, see Hărșan, 2016).

On the other hand, Gheorghe Crăciun’s confessed perception of the real, physical West differs greatly in relation to his idealistic image of Western Europe. At first (i.e., in his first reply to Nedelciu’s inaugural letter), he willingly admits to an anxiety produced by the excessively orderly occidental cultural space, much in the same way as Andrzej Stasiuk does:

Last year, I spent a day in Munich, as I was transiting back home. I was returning from France, Belgium, where I had had the extremely definite feeling of being an *ausländer*. In fact, I believe that France is still practicable as a living environment; Paris is more intimate than Bucharest. But a modern German city, like Munich, where I had the distinct impression that every person is nothing but a clockwork mechanism? All to the nines, extra-proper, freshly out of the box, and over-preoccupied by very-very important – if petty, everyday – matters (Crăciun, 1999:109).

On the contrary, his later appreciation of punctuality and quantified time (that will be referred to in more detail in the next section) seems to contrast oddly with the cited description of Munich.

Nevertheless, the inconsistencies mentioned above may have their explanations. As far as Nedelciu's Francophilia is concerned, he actually never disavowed his attachment to Western (and especially, French) critical thinking. In fact, in his view, Central European space must be organized based on to-the-day Western theories of culture such as Fernand Braudel's – as long as they are not mindlessly transplanted, with no regard to the heteroclitic and rather specific local background. In fact, for him, it is not necessarily the "form", but the "substance" of Western thinking (and to be more precise, of the Western philosophies regarding the pragmatics of existence, such as socio-political organization and means of production, historical spontaneity), that should be replicated and adjusted to native needs.

As for Crăciun, the distance in time between the text of his first letter – in which he provides the cited description of Munich – dated 1991, and the much more categorical attachment to the Western matrix in his last "late return", otherwise coherent with the essay (dated 1997) apparently counts for an experiential evolution towards a deeper understanding and growing attachment in relation to the "mechanical" dimension of occidental Europe.

2.2 The denial of history and geographical alternative(s). To begin with, a first remark that needs to be made when it comes to their perception of Central European history is that all three writers basically agree upon its irrelevance in relation to *la longue durée*. Historical unpredictability and sinuosity are understood both as a fatal and permanent threat to the greatness of (any) civilization (so their perspectives are, at least to some degree, anti-historicist) and as a vacuum, a void in what concerns Central-European civilizational achievement. Unlike Konrád, none of them considers the Hapsburg alternative as an exponent of historical magnitude, even if they are all inclined to validate it as a somewhat valuable tentative to reach towards the West. However, since the central-oriental European space seems to be culturally incompatible with the aspiration to historical greatness, Mircea Nedelciu and Andrzej Stasiuk turn to an original, favorable investment with identity-related meaning of space and geography, over time and history, while Gheorghe Crăciun remains mainly pessimistic about the potential of both coordinates as far as non-western areas are concerned.

Perhaps the most open (when it comes to discussing ideal, rather than feasible solutions) to the idea of the necessity of historically meaningful (heroic) enterprises as "The" (only) way to European integration is Gheorghe Crăciun. His very description of the authentic (i.e., occidental) European "spirit" is related to the historicity and potential for (long) duration of human actions:

The very first thing about the Western man – the one who created this enviable type of civilization – is the bravery and self-confidence with which he has decided to oppose nature (...). But this is not just about market economy and civil society. This structuring basis is much more than that. It is historical, logical, anthropological. In the case of the Occident, the very basis of life is essentially connected to the medium and long duration of historical time, they become one with the very idea of history. There are peoples for whom the consciousness of their involvement in historical time is actually a guarantee of their existence. (...) History as a linear memory of the metamorphoses and advancements of an ethnic collectivity is bound to the idea of time and its exact quantification, down to the level of minimal human acts. Civilization is impossible without the normativity of time and the conventional definition of exact time in any activity (Crăciun, 1999:127).

However, in his view, this hopelessly contrasts with the Eastern perception of history and actions meant to endure:

But there are peoples for whom – due to their mythical and "feral" nostalgia for a collective consciousness – historical time is an insufficiency, an implacable and tragic transcendence. But (...) we, Romanians, didn't invent the mechanical clock. The orientation in time of the Romanian peasant is still essentially meteorological to this day. (...) At most, we have invented agrarian economy, agrarian civilization, and Man's integration in nature, his symbiosis with nature, the *mioritic*¹² spirit, and resignation (Crăciun, 1999:129).

Now, there is an obvious similarity between Crăciun's and Cioran's disgusted perceptions of the Romanian peasant and his "nature-friendly" universe; Crăciun's distaste for what Ernest Gellner would call "agrarian society" (Gellner, 1983/1997) is openly exhibited on various occasions, among which the most evident manifestations of his dislike of the agrarian landscape are, perhaps, related to his description of the personal experience of

¹² As defined by the mythical ballad *Miorița*; imbued in fatalism and passivity.

Wallachian floorless peasant homes, perceived as an utter culture shock: “The first time I saw such a clay-floored room, at Nereju, I was terrified. No, I actually burst into laughter for being so terrified” (Crăciun, 1999:108). The same incompatibility transpires as he cites an exasperate description of Romanian ruralism by Tudor Vianu (Crăciun, 1999:125-126), and in various other instances. However, a remainder of indulgence in this respect (since he was, himself, the son of a peasant and regularly returned to the village of Poiana Mărului, to work the land) is his attitude towards Transylvanian (Saxon) villages – featuring houses with proper floors and foundations, i.e. homes that demonstrate a Western (Saxon) minimal concern for historical durability; still, even this opinion is bound to evolve towards the more negative impressions on Transylvanian decay, expressed towards the end of his 1997 essay on Romanians and Europe. Nevertheless, space as seen by Crăciun never overcomes its status of mere visual expression of the historical void, of this “Secondary Europe’s” (Crăciun, 1999:134) vocational historic insignificance, as long as it remains unwilling to heroically (i.e., constructively and durably) oppose the vicissitudes of natural time. Thus, one could conclude that for Crăciun, the West can be defined as a space able (or at least, willing) to “fight back” against the irrationality of nature and time, while conversely, Central Europe is nothing more than the expression of historical fatality – or impossibility.

In the case of Mircea Nedelciu and Andrzej Stasiuk, the relationship between significance and time is defined in quite different terms. With Nedelciu, the impression of historical durability is a mere *fata morgana*, a nonsensically oversized representation of Man’s capacity to change the world. History is thus dismissed as irrelevant for any definition of identity, on the basis of an implicit, unspoken awareness with respect to Central Europe’s historical minority. Thus, a subtle indication of a refused/denied sense of historic pudency becomes apparent. For Nedelciu, just like for Stasiuk, a more sensible understanding of history is that of fragmentary, individual stories and gestures, of spontaneous adaptations to external conditions – in a word, of much shorter durations and permanently changing surroundings, as opposed to the ultimately destructive, vanity-revealing *longue durée*. This is why both Nedelciu and Stasiuk favor a rather spatial, geographical perception of time. While natural geography is durable, political and economic geography are interpreted as whimsical and unstable resultants of historical intrusion. What is in the “now” and

(especially) in the “here” is, along with nature and geography themselves, the only authentic, available certainty.

For Nedelciu, this is the “raw resource” to be used in order to achieve any plausible articulation of meaning and durable significance. In his defense of the Wallachian spirit, exposed rather pungently in letter number IV – as a reaction to Crăciun’s slight complex of Transylvanian superiority, there is a fascinating exegesis of the Romanian idiomatic expression “to build a stairway to Heaven” – which refers to the meaninglessness of heroic pragmatic effort (grandiose or not). The analysis is illustrated via a reinterpretation of the essential works of Constantin Brâncuși through which this perspective on vanity ends up being described as a “perspective of the stars”:

The so-called ‘writers of the [Bărăgan] plain’ are people who first opened their eyes on a scenery with no terrestrial landmarks: the fields are desolately flat, their borders meet the sky by day and by night become mere passages between the starry and the starless parts of the universe. The houses are nothing but huts or hovels [...], not offering any impression of solidity or durability whatsoever. The plants are annual, not perennial. When you grow up in such a space [...], your mind remains forever impregnated by a certain ‘perspective of the stars’. From this perspective, no building is strong enough to withstand the forces of nature [...], no power can escape its own vanity, all is in vain and can be [...] looked down upon, one can count on nothing and nobody on the long run. (...) The terminal point of any grandiose construction, this old Kingdom saying seems to suggest, is necessarily the void. (Crăciun, 1999: 121-122).

For Stasiuk, space is, similarly, an escape from the diabolical clutches of history: a space without territory, a nearly abstract reality is what determinately defines “his [Central] Europe”:

My obsession has always been geography, not history on who’s immense, half dead body we have been feasting for such a long time in this part of the world. Geography, on the contrary, was given to us [Central-Europeans, R.H.] as a revelation and is one of the very few things we haven’t yet managed to destroy. Political and economic geography are nothing but its bastard progenies. [...] They resemble the shadows on a dirty window pane and never manage to last longer than them, either (Andruhoviči, Stasiuk, 2003: 158).

On the other hand, there are a few tinges of historic frustration-type discourse in the fashion of

Kundera that can be easily identified here, as he refers to Poland's eastern and western borders (namely, to Germany, Russia and their ill-fated respective historical roles), in the sense that his rhetoric suddenly gains in judgmental tones and the discursive pitch visibly raises. However, a certain measure of sensibility manages to harness these sudden, brief but bad-tempered emotional side-slips.

Now, since I have detailed Nedelciu and Stasiuk's perspectives in a study specifically dedicated to the relationship between time, space and identity as represented in their writing (Hârşan, 2014), I will only state here that they are both exponents of a rather postmodern ahistoric contemplativeness the main feature of which is a highly aesthetic sense of the vanity of material entities, which results, in both cases, in a valorization of the ephemeral as tragic/ironic beauty as well as tragic/ironic narrativity, and therefore, essentially, as a source of (humanly-constructed) significance. But in their case, immaterial, imponderable structures are understood as the most viable, and thus, the most reasonable.

3. CONCLUSIONS: ON COMMON POINTS AND AUTHENTIC DIALOGUES

In spite of the ensuing polemics and decisive differences between the three perspectives briefly showcased here, a few essential points of confluence also become apparent which may represent a positive and workable compromise.

To begin with, a common perception of Central European "otherness" constitutes the premise of all three points of view. Either perceived as confusing and negative, or as enriching and positive, our part of Europe definitely possesses a specific charisma, confirmed both by Nedelciu's intuition of "a new fascination for the *cîrlilai* world" being born (Crăciun 1999:123) and by Andrzej Stasiuk's success in Western Europe. Intrinsically related to an acute sense of the vanity of things, acknowledged again by all three writers, this charisma is an implicit postmodern, secular revitalization of ancestral Christian worldviews (the Ecclesiast). Nonetheless, both its illustrations and final significance differ greatly. The two Romanian writers discover the agreement of Wallachian and Transylvanian elements by analyzing a folkloric scatological joke told by Crăciun, in which the world is basically defined, in its essence, as the overbearing presence of excrement/defecation (see Crăciun 1999:113-115,123); for Stasiuk, it is the wisdom of the gypsy nomads (with which he overtly identifies), never

inclined to settle down, that stands as a symbol of awareness, a "momentum of the ephemeron" (Andruxhovich, Stasiuk, 2003:168). But for Western Europe, the allure of such (usually) tragic-sarcastic visions of vanity is, in fact (as Stasiuk openly points out in the sequence cited above), the temptation of a reverse, heterotopic (Foucault, 1967/1986) image of oneself (i.e., of the West), an inverted portrait able to bring about a (much appreciated in Western thinking) constructive critical perspective.

But criticism, constructive or sometimes, (self) destructive is also a feature of these three discourses when it comes to self-analysis: historic pudency, whether turned into a rhetoric closing up on historic shaming (Crăciun), frustration (by spots, Stasiuk) or indifference (Nedelciu and Stasiuk) is proof of such self-analytical, rational reflexes, part of a generalized effort meant to compensate for all and any counter-illuminist (Berlin, 1997/2001), totalitarian nationalist mythopoetics having scarred Central Europe all along the 20th century.

Finally, another common point is a shared conviction that reasonable human constructive activity is key, it is the necessary and defining element in any meaningful enterprise against the arbitrariness of nature and history. Deemed either inaccessible (without the proper dose of effort, self-confidence and bravery to stand against it), as with Crăciun, or irrelevant (because it privileges the powerful and belligerent), as with Nedelciu and Stasiuk, a historicist definition of Central Europe is rejected as impracticable either out of sheer pessimism (Crăciun) or disbelief in its constructive value (Nedelciu, Stasiuk). Of course, the definitions as of to what "reasonable (i.e., durable) constructive activity" refers to vary (Crăciun bets on pragmatism, while Nedelciu and Stasiuk value a dynamic contemplativeness that could be re-termed as creativity, or more precisely, a type of narrativity).

But in fact, the beauty and richness of such dialogue, polemical as it may be, reside precisely in the differences of opinion, as well as in the acknowledgement of various, sometimes contrasting cultural specificity traits, or in the mere reflectivity of one's irrational blind spots, more than in its potential for definitive conclusiveness. Such an exchange, allowing for critical openness and mutual reflection, is in fact an authentically occidental approach to one's cultural identity. The tendency towards creative – and critical – cooperation/association (two of the discourses analyzed here articulate an epistolary exchange,

the other was published in association with a text produced by a writer of different nationality and worldviews) demonstrate in themselves a dialogic sensibility that renders them simply (as) European (as) Plato's or an entire tradition of colloquia and debates that shaped the Europe of today. And judging by the Western (welcoming) reactions to Stasiuk's standpoint, the dialogue can be declared – as it has always been – open, a dialogue to which our Central European alterity, defined by our specific historical experience of totalitarianism, by an older, particular understanding of multiculturalism and difference, and a distinct philosophical interpretation of the world and its significance, might abundantly contribute.

4. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author takes full responsibility for the contents and scientific correctness of the paper.

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THE EMBER OF THE HANDS – MEMORY AND TRANSMISSION THROUGH KENNINGS IN *HARALDSDRÁPA*

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Abstract: On 21 April 1042, the Varangian warrior and future king Haraldr harðráði blinded in public the Byzantine Emperor Mihail and his uncle Constantine. The episode is narrated by two of Haraldr's skalds: Þórarinn Skeggjason and Þjóðólfr Arnórsson. In spite of the substantial amount of analysis that has been produced on their stanzas, doubts about the participation of the entire Varangian guard still abound (Kari Ellen Gade 2009). My study answers the question by making use of memory activated through the corpus of kennings analyzed as units of repeated speech in the conceptual field of Eugeniu Coseriu's text linguistics. Essential dimensions of the internal dynamics of the text, the evocative relations represent the key problem of text linguistics. The appearance of a kenning in different texts represents, each time, an act of translation from a poetic memory to a communicative memory. Due to the reinsertion and reconfiguration processes which can be applied to them, the kennings gain new evocative functions, despite their conventional repeated nature. My study inspects the imagery in the kenning *glóðum handa* (embers of the hands) of Þórarinn Skeggjason's *Haraldsdrápa*, which also occurs in the kenning *glóðs Rínar* (the embers of the Rhine) in *Liðsmannaflokkr*, composed c. 1015-16. The analysis of kennings as units of repeated speech in *Haraldsdrápa* and *Liðsmannaflokkr* provides consistency through the activation of the evocative functions and a sharper focus on the broader perception of the collective memory as a shared body of knowledge in Old Norse poetry.

Keywords: skaldic poetry; text linguistics; kenning; memory; repeated speech

The corpus of texts surviving from medieval Scandinavia which contain vestiges about the important role of memory is quite large¹. The role of poetic sources as a vehicle for oral history in reconstructing the early history of Scandinavia is emphasized by Snorri Sturluson in the *Prologue* to *Heimskringla* (Hollander 3), though in skaldic poetry memory is never a passive recall of events. What it seems to me crucial in terms of memory is to explain how particular circumstances are activated in order to make sense of current events in poems and poetic recitation composed about kings and other chieftains. Rather than try to solve this problem by comparing contemporary sources to written reflections on a certain historical event, I propose an analysis from a linguistic perspective.

¹ Memory and oral transmission are clearly difficult terrains, but that has not stopped memory theory from becoming one of the central issues of cultural analysis of the past ten years, culminating in a recent *Handbook of Pre-modern Nordic Memory Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches* (Glaser et al., 2018). The interdisciplinary approaches of the case studies display the potential for future explorations in memory studies.

1. WHAT IS TEXT LINGUISTICS?

The introduction of a historical perspective in linguistic research is Eugeniu Coseriu's main contribution to the study of language², and this results in an integral view of language reality; hence the name integral linguistics. Starting from Wilhelm von Humboldt (1836/2008:82) and from the Aristotelian tradition, Eugeniu Coseriu conceives language as *energeia*, as creative activity. According to Humboldt, language is never a simple tool but it always contains a vision of the world; therefore, speaking a language means to assume, even without being aware, that vision. In the broad field of integral linguistics a text represents the product of the individual level of speech, considering that that language is (1) a generally-human activity, exercised by people (2) as members

² Eugeniu Coseriu (1921-2002) was a Romanian born linguist who researched Romance languages at University of Tübingen. As a researcher, he was concerned with problems of the philosophy of language following a Humboldtian and Saussurian heritage.

of a tradition of speech competence, (3) at a personal level.

Referring to the text linguistics as a hermeneutics of sense, Coseriu suggested that there is no universally valid technique for interpreting a text, since we are never capable of foreseeing what sorts of sign-relations are activated:

If we want to consider a particular text in its individuality, we can never know in advance what kind of sign-relations can be established within it. It is really possible just to draw up a list of the general possibilities at the disposal of the one who produces a text in order to make sense. But we are talking about an open list. We will always be able to record in our list completely new possibilities of semiotic articulation in interpreting a new text. There is no mechanical method to enumerate or predict all imaginable possibilities of achieving the proper meaning (Coseriu, 2013:163).

From the perspective of text linguistics, all languages are historical techniques of discourse because they belong to the traditions of distinctive cultures (Coseriu, 2013:120; Teoc, 2015:354). Tradition includes the mechanics of speech, but also language already spoken, fragments of ready-made discourse that can be reintroduced in new contexts and circumstances, often as idioms or sayings distinct from the formal usage of the language.

The Archimedean point of text linguistics is the double semiotic articulation in a text/discourse. Put simply, what is meant is not merely an extension of what is said. According to the first semiotic relation, a kenning initially signifies something that we understand because of our knowledge of the referent and the skaldic rules, and theoretically it is possible to understand the text on this first semiotic level. However, the full recovery of the proper meaning implies the accessibility to the second semiotic articulation by activating the evocative relations throughout the text. From a linguistic perspective, the first semiotic articulation is basically concerned with the factual knowledge of a language when, at the first reading, the kenning designates what we understand “as connoisseurs of these signs and the rules of their use” (Coseriu, 2013:120). The second semiotic articulation is achieved by analyzing the evocative relations established by the linguistic sign in a text.

According to Coserian linguistics, the evocative relations developed by the linguistic sign are as follows: a) relations of the sign with other

signs expressed in rhymes, alliteration, assonance; b) relations of the signs in the given text with signs from other texts (repeated speech); c) relations of the signs with historical context completed by the socio-cultural environment; d) relations of the sign with the knowledge of things activated when the designated term is already invested with semiotic (symbolic) value in a cultural space (Coseriu, 2013:105).

From the outset of Coserian linguistics, there are two subcategories of repeated discourse: repeated speech and proverbial words. Repeated speech concerns all speech that is communicated as phraseologisms (lexical idioms such as sayings, proverbs, and catchphrases) within the linguistic community, being a form of communication appealing to previous contexts. Proverbial words are small fragments from literary or nonliterary texts that are extremely familiar within the linguistic community and can even be reproduced by heart.

In my analysis the two kennings contribute to the creation of proper meaning materialized through the change of their original textual functions and the acquiring of new semantic functions, as a part of the “reinsertion and reconfiguration processes” (Dan-Terian, 2011:104) which can be applied to them. The main assumption of my analysis is the capacity of kennings to become agents of a cultural memory as linguistic and historical sources, through the activation of the evocative function in the conceptual frame of textual linguistics. My approach is therefore that of a linguist, but I have been strongly influenced by the methodological orientation provided by Kate Heslop (2014:100), whose most salient suggestion, to my mind, is that skaldic poetry is a communicative form of memory which turned into a cultural memory when it was collected and preserved as written testimonies of the past.

2. KENNINGS AS A REPEATED SPEECH

The kenning, a short phrase which replaces a noun of ordinary discourse, represents one of the hallmarks of skaldic diction. The association of the kenning corpus with memory is an ancient one, and derives principally from the kenning imagery which, according to Bergsveinn Birgisson (2012:285), “had profound mnemonic powers that helped to render the stanzas stable during their oral transmission”.

Snorri’s *Skáldskaparmál*, presented within a framing narrative set on a question and answer

dialogue between Ægir and Bragi, is the main source of our knowledge about kennings. Primarily concerned with creating an integrative cultural history rather than delivering a list of kennings, Snorri discusses the poetic language assigned to skaldic poetry by using pre-existing skaldic poetry, orally-transmitted, as the basis for his explanations of kennings. Regarding Snorri as the main source of information about kennings, inevitably forces the reader to confront the question of how a stable system of kennings which reappear in different poems can generate multiple and different interpretations and represent each time an act of re-creation.

Snorri's conception of kennings is very structural: a kenning can be understood as an allusion to an already existing sequence of known facts or mythology, it is always repeated in a more or less identical form, and from this perspective can be successfully ascribed to the analysis as units of repeated speech (Teoc, 2015:354). Moreover, the use of a kenning will always create a sense of identity, provided that it belongs to a cultural tradition preserved in skaldic poetry as cultural memory. According to Pernille Hermann, skaldic poetry encapsulates a certain representation of an event described in stanzas, rather than the event itself (for further discussion see Hermann 21). We need look no further than the kenning *glóðum handa* (the embers of the hands) to see how profoundly indebted a kenning is to its previous semantic frame in order to contribute to the articulation of the proper meaning in a new stanza, taking into account the fact that the metaphoric process of speech works with "signification entities already existing in speech" (Borcilă, 1997:67).³

3. THE MATERIAL

3.1 *Liðsmannaflokkur*. *Liðsmannaflokkur* depicts a military campaign in England led by Knutr the Great, King of Denmark 1015-1016, and all ten stanzas are cited as a continuum in *ÓHLeg* (1982: 48-53) and in the excerpts (*articuli*) from the *Lífssaga* of Óláfr helgi by Styrmir Káráson inn fróði 'the Learned' in *Flat* (Whaley, *Poetry from the Kings' Sagas* 1).

For the attribution of the *flokkur* throughout Óláfr saga, Óláfr Haraldsson, the future king of Norway, is considered the speaker of

Liðsmannaflokkur, whereas in *Knytlinga saga* the stanzas are seen as a collective collection of verses composed by the *liðsmenn*, the household troops of Knutr. However, *Knytlinga saga* does not place Óláfr in England during Knutr's 1016 campaign. According to Poole, Óláfr's last actions in England, as recorded by Sigvatr in *Víkingarvísur*, for instance, are placed together with Ethelred "and included a raid against the people of Lindsey in punishment for their having assisted Knutr" (Poole 1991:275). The most probable explanation for not placing Óláfr in England during the siege is provided by Moberg who suggested that the *Knytlinga saga*'s compiler ignored the Óláfr ascription because Knutr and Óláfr were enemies "for most of their lives" (Moberg, 1941:86; Poole, 1991:94).

Although each stanza is a testimony to the ingenuity and handiness of the skald, my research will focus on the third stanza, where the kenning *glóða Rínar* occurs:

Pollr mun glaums of grímu
gjarn síðarla arna
randar skóð at rjóða
ræðinn, sás mey fæðir.
Berr eigi sá sveigir
sára lauks í ári
reiðr til Rínar glóða
rond upp á Englandi.

{Ræðinn þollr glaums}, sás fæðir mey, mun gjarn síðarla arna at rjóða {skóð randar} of grímu. {Sá sveigir {lauks sára}} berr eigi rond, reiðr, upp á Englandi í ári til {glóða Rínar}.

{The talkative pine-tree of revelry} (MAN) who brings up the maiden will gladly rush tardily to redder {the harm of the shield} (SWORD) in darkness. {That brandisher {of the leek of wounds}} (SWORD > WARRIOR) does not carry the shield, enraged, up into England in a hurry, for {the embers of the Rhine} (GOLD) (Poole, 2012:1019).

In the transparency of the stanza, we read the cultural significances deposited in the text as a potential for creating knowledge, which is examined in the fragmentary form of the repeated speech. From this perspective, the material preserved in the third stanza resembles a typical Old Norse vision of a strong antagonism between the brave *liðsmenn* and the cowardly attitude of the "guardian of Steinvǫr", who preferred to stay at home instead of participating in the siege of London. By staying home "he is not only slow into

³ Mircea Borcilă suggests in his study "The metaphoric model in poetic texts" (1997) that there is always a surplus of meaning brought by metaphors in any language and any tradition.

battle, but is not present at all” (Poole, 2012:1019). According to Russel Poole (2012:77)

the stanza appears to express contempt” for this idle warrior and it is presented in the use of kenning for gold instead of Danegeld, “the silver pennies paid as Danegeld when Scandinavian warriors fought in English campaigns” (Poole, 2012:77).

Glóða Rínar is a straightforward kenning for gold, which encapsulates the myth of Ægir (see below under the evocative functions), and the voice of the skald in this stanza emphasizes that *glóða Rínar* (gold) can be accepted by the lazy guardian of Steinvör.

It should be also clear from Poole’s analysis that *Liðsmannaflokkur* is composed from the viewpoint of the warriors following a leader, which agrees with the story in *Knytlinga saga* crediting the brave warriors with authorship.

3.2 Haraldsdrápa. Closely associated with his brother Markus Skeggjason, Þórarinn Skeggjason, the author of *Haraldsdrápa*, is a skald about whom Snorri tells us little. Even less is known about him from other sources, as *Skáldatal*, which mentions only that he was a court poet of the well-known king Haraldr Harðrádi, who achieved military fame in the Varangian Guard⁴ but suffered the ultimate defeat in England at the Battle of Stamford Bridge.

Whereas Snorri’s saga is quite neutral in the descriptions of Haraldr’s relation to emperors, Byzantine sources indicate that Varangian guard displayed a considerable respect and devotion to him. For our purposes, the most important piece of information found in *Haraldsdrápa*’s verses is that Haraldr himself chooses to blind the emperor:

Náði gørr enn glóðum,
Grikklands, jofurr handa,
stólþengill gekk ströngu
steinblindr aðalmeini.

Jofurr náði enn gørr {glóðum handa}; {stólþengill
Grikklands} gekk steinblindr strongu aðalmeini.

The prince obtained even more {embers of the hands}; (GOLD) {the emperor of Greece} became stone-blind from the violent major injury (Gade, 2009:294)

The context is described by Kari Ellen Gade as follows: “the stanza refers to the blinding of the Emperor by Haraldr (and his men?)” (Gade, 2009:294). In this stanza, as Gade puts it, it is difficult to understand if the whole Varangian army participated to the event⁵.

Haraldr’s reputation as a Varangian is increased by his conformity to the paradigm of the Viking warrior, whose function within the Byzantine society was to fight in emperor’s service. However, this half stanza tells us that he deliberately subverts that model by blinding the emperor. A possible explanation for this attitudinal shift is that the emperor is a usurper of the Macedonian dynasty⁶, whose founder, Basil II, is highly respected by the future Norwegian king⁷. When Michael Kalafatos and his uncle sent Empress Zoe to monastery, the people besieged the palace, brought Zoe back and restored Macedonian dynasty. From this angle, *Haraldsdrápa* introduced us to the idea that a Viking could gain reputation in the Varangian guard not only by serving the emperor but also by publicly humiliating him. In Þórarinn Skeggjason’s half stanza the emperor’s cowardly behavior⁸ is seen as despicable and provocative for the members of the Varangian guard. Through the activation of evocative functions in my foregoing analysis, his behavior is juxtaposed with the *heimdragi* “stay-at-home” in *Liðsmannaflokkur*, where the coward misses out on expeditionary plunder, here stereotypically represented as gold through the kenning *glóða Rínar*. In Þjóðólfr Arnórsson’s *Sexstefja*, Haraldr himself is blinding the Emperor:

Stólþengils lét stinga
— styrjold vas þá byrjuð —

⁵ The emperor and his uncle were blinded on 21 April 1042, just the night before Harald left the Varangian guard and Constantinople.

⁶ The history of Scandinavians fighting for Byzantine army has been traced by Sigfus Blöndal in his study “Vaeringjasaga.” According to his research, the Varangian guard was established in 988, when the Macedonian emperor Basil II welcomed a large contingent of Varangians (Davidson, 1976:180). From that time on, the Varangians were in close relation with the imperial family and Macedonian dynasty whose last descendants were the Empress Zoe and her sister, Teodora.

⁷ During his service in Constantinople as a member of the Varangian guard, Haraldr gained the nickname *Bulgar-burner* (*Bolgara brennir*, see *Sexstefja*, st I), assigned in the past only to Basil II Boulgaroktonos.

⁸ The Emperor and his uncle have managed to flee and found shelter in Stoudion Monastery. Hoping to save their lives, they dressed like monks.

⁴ The Varangian warriors fought in all the major battles of the Byzantine Empire until 1204, when the Crusaders defeated them. Remains of this guard continued to fight for Constantinople until 29 May 1453, the day of the fall of the city under the Turks. Testimonies about the Varangian guard appear both in the documents of the time and in Scandinavian folklore.

eyðir augu bæði
 út heiðingja sútar.
 Lagði allvaldr Egða
 austr á bragning hraustan
 gráligt mark, en Girkja
 goðu illa fór stillir

{Eyðir sútar} heiðingja} lét stinga út bæði augu stólpengils; þá vas styrjöld byrjuð. {Allvaldr Egða} lagði gráligt mark á hraustan bragning austr, en {stillir Girkja} fór illa goðu.

”{{ The destroyer of the care (GLADDENER) of the wolf (lit. Heath-goer)} had both eyes of the emperor stabbed out; war was under way then. {The overlord of the Egdir} (NORVEGIAN KING = Haraldr) placed a hostile mark on the daring prince in the east, and {the ruler of the Greeks} (= Michael) travelled a dire road” (Whaley, 2009:118).

There are no narratives attached to these descriptions in Byzantine sources, but Þórarinn Skeggjason’s and Þjóðólfr Arnórsson’s recreation of the event is credited and confirmed by Snorri Sturluson, as his skaldic sources place the same emphasis on Haraldr himself blinding the Emperor. And yet we can still discern a good deal of the proper meaning residing in the kennings *glóða Rínar* and *glóðum handa*, as it has been understood by an audience contemporary to the authors of both stanzas.

4. THE ACTIVATION OF THE EVOCATIVE RELATIONS

The memory of a kenning is a matter that privileges visions, if we are to coin the Humboldtian term, visions which are expressed through signs and reside on a linguistic plane, where the full significance residing in a kenning is susceptible to become unraveled through the activation of the evocative relations.

After reading various interpretations on *Haraldsdrápa* I became convinced that the commentaries are missing the central role played by the kenning *glóðum handa* (gold) as a unit of repeated speech, whose previous occurrence is settled in *Liðsmannaflokkur*. By a process of recalling and commemorating the siege of London in 1015, as described in *Liðsmannaflokkur*, a visual image became imprinted upon the kenning *glóða Rínar*, bringing the historical moments of London siege and the cowardly attitude of the warrior who stayed home into the present of *Haraldsdrápa*, which describes the blinding of the Byzantine emperor who is deprived by his gold / *glóðum handa*. This process of internalising the performance of an event within a kenning enabled

Viking warriors to feel the immediate presence of their predecessors and to identify with them.

4.1 Relations of the signs with historical context completed by the socio-cultural environment. A comparative analysis between the content of the two kennings *glóða Rínar* and *glóðum handa*, both of them designating the gold, reveals the contrast between what is socially acceptable and what is not; a contrast made visible through the brave and the cowardly attitude. As underlined above, the brave warriors go to fight together, and are named in the skaldic poetry by a single term, *liði*, while the coward stays at home to guard his fortune. The results from analysis of historical and textual sources bring us new insight and knowledge regarding the meaning of *liði* in the skaldic corpus, concept on which *Liðsmannaflokkur* is structured, as a way of constant instruction in virtue.

The two examples of *liði*, for instances, provided by Judith Jesch’s analysis (2001) and presented below are describing a sea-battle in which a *lið*, as group of warriors, is identified by the name of its leader:

Sigv II,9 has *Sveins liðar* tying ships together before the battle of Nesjar, while Gísl I,12 mentions *Magnúss liðar* at the battle off Anglesey. It is noteworthy that all of the skaldic examples are in the plural, while all of the examples, both runic and skaldic, occur in genitival collocations, which correlates neatly with the practice, discussed above, of identifying a *lið* by the name of its leader (Jesch, 2001:202).

Apart from giving us a direct explanation of the linguistic function of *liði*, the two examples provide a more solid basis for revealing the strong cohesion between the warriors and their leader. Such allusions might represent a form of practical training and moral instruction⁹, and consequently, the recollection of such memories in skaldic poetry is shaping self-understanding for a warrior who belongs to a social group following a leader

The relations of the kenning *glóðum handa* with historical context, completed by the socio-cultural environment, reveals patterns and uses that can be recalled to elucidate the evocative relations within other texts related to Varangian activity in Byzantium. The analysis of the historical context of the scene depicted in *Haraldsdrápa* draws back

⁹ As Simon Nygaard argued, the ritual framework behind the performance of a poem could have created the social and the moral obligation towards the group (Nygaard, 2018:31).

to a Constantinople of the first millennium, as the capital of an empire that lived in the atmosphere of a total revival. In the atmosphere of this flourishing Empire, the first duty of the Varangian guard was to defend the emperor. Even when they left Constantinople in military campaigns they were primarily fighting to protect their emperor¹⁰ therefore, from this perspective, *liði* and *liðsmenn* seem properly to express the semantic values they hold as a Viking group fighting abroad.

Considering that it was customary to invite the Varangians to take the first plunder of a conquered fortress, and that they were also allowed to plunder the Imperial palace once an emperor died, the semantic interaction between *gold* seen as a treasure and the *ember* of the emperor's hands, must be read in the frame of the motivation and reward, as a unified understanding of the perception of *gold* in terms of plunder. The symbolic value of gold in *Haraldsdrápa*, shares a strong relation with *glóða Rínar* as unit of repeated speech, aspect which I will pursue through the analysis of the relation of the sign with the knowledge of things.

4.2 relations of the sign with the knowledge of things activated when the designate is already invested with semiotic (symbolic) value in a cultural space (Coseriu, 2013:105). In *Skáldskaparmál* Snorri Sturluson is perfectly clear about what gold should be paraphrased: gold is the Fire of the Hand, or of the Limb, or of the Leg, because it is red; but silver is called Snow, or Ice, or Hoar-Frost, because it is white (Faulkes, 1998:78). In addition, gold is called Ægir's Fire due to the following mythological tale:

Ægir went to Ásgard to a feast, but when he was ready to return home, he invited Odin and all the Æsir to visit him in three months' time. First came Odin and Njördr, Freyr, Týr, Bragi, Víðarr, Loki; likewise the Ásynjur: Frigg, Freyja, Gefjun, Skadi, Idunn, and Sif. Thor was not there, having gone into the eastern lands to slay trolls. When the gods had sat down in their places, straightway Ægir had bright gold brought in onto the floor of the hall, and the gold gave forth light and illumined the hall like fire: and it was used there for lights at his banquet, even as in Valhall swords were used in place of fire (Faulkes, 1998:101).

¹⁰ Sigfus Blöndal pointed out that as foreign mercenaries, Varangians were freed of local sympathies, so they could exert without any attachment, except to the emperor, duties such as the arrest of churchmen or aristocrats who would otherwise have enjoyed sympathy among the masses (Blöndal, 2003:243).

Further evidence supporting a connection between the sea and the gold is evident in Snorri's explanation of *nygerving*, the substitution of synonyms for the determinant. Snorri is describing in *Skáldskaparmál* 41/7–17 how by substitution of words of related meaning "the correspondence between the literal meaning of the kenning and what it actually refers to becomes remoter, so that the meaning of words is so to speak extended" (Faulkes, 1998: xxxviii). Consequently, a word for sea may be substituted for the name Ægir because the name is included in the semantic field created by the story of how the god of sea "used gold as a source of light when he entertained the Æsir to a feast" (*Skáldskaparmál*, ch. 33, in Faulkes, 1998). In this episode of *Liðsmannaflokkr* analyzed above resides an expression that mirrors a myth transformed into a metaphor¹¹ whose actualization relies on the skald's skill to master the context of the metaphor in such ways as to consciously elaborate the proper meaning of his stanza.

The occurrences of kennings for gold in skaldic poetry are often bound to kings or chieftains, however the term *glóð* (ember) does not set ahead such symbolic significance in *Haraldsdrápa*. Haraldr "obtained the gold" during the plunder started after the blinding of the Emperor. In contrast, the kenning goes beyond the boundaries of the first semantic level and brings a newly created circumstance into the structure provided by *Liðsmannaflokkr*.

Following the analysis of the textual linguistics, it can be inferred Þórarinn Skeggjason chooses the kenning *glóðum handa* to praise the attack of the entire Varangian guard and the blinding of the emperor for the reason that it strongly evokes the circumstances of *Liðsmannaflokkr* - a common attack abroad, which praises the *liðsmenn*'s bravery in strong contrast with a cowardly attitude.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The memory of a kenning is a matter that privileges visions expressed through words and

¹¹ As we know, in various parts of *Skáldskaparmál*, narratives are also included to account for the origins of some of the kennings by recounting the myths and legends that were thought to have given rise to them. In her article "Myten og metaforen: Inngangen til en (ny) skapende bevissthed i Norden (2002), Sanda Tomescu-Baciu starts from Lucian Blaga's vision on the relation between myth and metaphor, in the broader context of Giambattista Vico's notion that myths function as transformed metaphors.

resides on a linguistic level, where the full significance sedimented in a kenning is unraveled through the activation of the evocative relations. At the very scene of the events, the language employing kennings in skaldic poetry tangibly connects the warrior and the audience with mythological and historical events, in which the warriors are equal to heroes from the collective memory (see Rappaport, 1999; Nygaard, 2018). Due to the similar images actualized in the two skaldic stanzas, the cohesion among Varangian warriors expressed by reframing the kenning *glóða Rínar* in the second semiotic articulation of the kenning *glóðum handa* in *Haraldsdrápa*, is no longer seen schematically but as elements in a strong net of relations weaved by the evocative function of kennings.

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TWO SOLUTIONS FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE IN LEARNING-TEACHING ROMANIAN – UNITARY CONTENTS AND AN OFFICIAL ROMANIAN GRAMMAR

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Abstract: School textbooks do not clearly define grammar and its parts, leaving it to teachers to formulate them or not; and, if they find it useful to define them, the way they (Romanian language and literature teachers in general) do it is not unitary, which is understandable given that we do not have an official grammar. The fact that the Academy Grammars represented by default the official grammar that could be found, theoretically and practically, in school textbooks is obviously outdated for the reasons that we will present and argue. Consequently, given the current situation, our proposal is that an official grammar of the Romanian language should be established. As shown in this paper, our opinion is that there is no compatibility between the contents of the school grammar and the new academic treaties which are, on the one hand, inhomogeneous and sometimes contradictory in terms of both content and terminology and, on the other hand, sometimes insufficiently adapted to the very specificity of the Romanian language. Therefore, at present and in this form, they are not applicable in the pre-university didactics, which is why a decision must be made regarding the contents which will be of reference for textbook authors, teachers who are free to select the contents that they will teach, and students or any other person interested in studying the grammar of contemporary Romanian.

Keywords: Official Grammar, Morphology, Syntax, Romanian language, academic treaties, community; intercultural context; communication.

1. INTRODUCTION

In Antiquity, *grammar* was included in philosophy and logic, and it gradually detached itself and became an autonomous subject. This may be one of the reasons why this term still defines, on the one hand, the grammatical structure of a language, distinct from vocabulary, which puts thinking, written discourse and oral speech in order, and, on the other hand, all linguistic branches.

Undoubtedly, *grammar* (*grammaticain* Latin, *grammatiké* in Greek) –“the science of letters” or “the art of reading and writing” - is also related to vocabulary, word formation, phonetic structure of words, spelling and punctuation, morphosyntax, stylistics, pragmatics, rhetoric, logic, and any other science that deals in some way with words; however, we must not forget that, of all the fields listed above, only grammar has the primary role to take into account the morphological and syntactic rules according to which any speech in any field is built.

Therefore, a definition of grammar without referring primarily to its most important parts, *morphology and syntax*, cannot be conceived correctly and completely, especially since

grammar has been divided into *morphology* and *syntax* ever since ancient times.

Further proof in this regard is the majority of the definitions offered to us by the most important specialised publications which follow, with appropriate nuances, the direction established since the earliest times.

2. THE TEXT OF THE PAPER

2.1 According to the 1963 *Academy Grammar*, *grammar* is “a set of rules for modifying words and combining them into clauses and sentences” (GLR, 1966:11). The definition given in GLR (Romanian Grammar) is short, but comprehensive; the references to the two main branches of grammar are obvious: “for modifying words” clearly means *morphology*, and “combining” words into clauses and sentences refers to *syntax*.

Another feature of grammar resulting from the above definition is its accuracy, for it is a summation of “rules” underlying the construction of any discourse and which are characterised by logic and generally by invariability. Therefore, it is our opinion that the definition given by GLR is

consistent with what we understand by the concept of *grammar*; on the one hand, this definition is sufficient and comprehensive from a semantic point of view, and, on the other hand, it clearly sets grammar apart from all the other related branches.

2.2 As regards the concept of *grammar* in other specialised books, each author's definition is nuanced, but *overall* the essence of the definition given by GLR is preserved in each of them.

Iorgu Jordan states that: "Grammar is the study of a language's grammatical level, system and structure" (Jordan, 1956:325). The author emphasises that any grammar is *prescriptive*, i.e. it establishes a set of rules for the organisation and functioning of a language's system and structure, but this does not exclude the division of grammars into normative, descriptive and generative grammars (Jordan, 1956:325-328).

Mioara Avram uses a working definition according to which *grammar* includes two types of rules corresponding to its components - *morphology* and *syntax*- "a set of rules regarding the form of words and the changes in their form, on the one hand and, on the other hand, the combination of words in the communication process" (Avram, 1986:9).

Corneliu Dimitriu believes that "by *grammar* we understand the science dealing with word inflection and the combination of words into syntactic units" (Dimitriu, 1999:1).

Ion Coteanu is of the opinion that *grammar* is a "series of rules" based on which words are linked; it resembles a "...clockwork mechanism", for grammar must be organised according to a "pattern ... which lists, in a general and abstract form, all the rules of a grammar [...] and the concrete applications of the rules in the pattern and how to use them" (Coteanu, 1982:8).

Dumitru Irimia presents a relationship between the *grammatical system* and the *lexical system*, stating that: "The grammatical system consists of: 1. a network of coordinates and coordinate relations which, in terms of semantics and expression, it manifests itself by including the lexical system in the morphology-syntax interdependence relationship [...] 2. a network of grammatical signs, which ensures the relationship between semantics and expression, either within the morphemic and syntactic levels, in a relative (or absolute) autonomy, or in the interdependence between the two levels: *morphemes*, *relationship elements*, etc." (Irimia, 2008:16-17). By presenting the four levels -i.e. *semantic*, *morphological*, *syntactic* and *deictic* - at which parts of speech

reveal their identity in the *system-structure* dynamic, the author distinguishes the *morphological and syntactic perspective* from the other two (*semantic* and *deictic*), saying that it is described by "the position of linguistic units in the grammatical system" (Irimia, 2008:17).

2.3 There is a *somewhat* different situation in the new academic treaties.

GALR does not provide a clear, precise definition of grammar. In the *Introduction*, it is stated that the proposed description places the grammatical structure of the Romanian language between *system* and *discourse* and views *word* as a unit of the *system* but also of the discourse, and *statement* as a unit of the *discourse*, constructively dependent on the *system* (GALR, 2005:1). As a result, the first volume deals with *word grammar*, and the second volume deals with *statement grammar*.

GBLR is presented to us as a *grammar* which, according to its authors, is "open for didactic use", a (profoundly innovative!) *grammar* of lexical-grammatical classes, a *grammar* in which each part of the speech is presented from three perspectives: inflection, syntactics and semantics (GBLR, 2010:VII-XL). In the section dedicated to lexical-grammatical classes, it is stated that this new grammatical approach offers

the most clear example of perspective correlation and, in essence, of the difficulty, even the impossibility, for many phenomena, of being divided between morphology and syntax. (GBLR, 2010:4).

It is obvious that the *new grammars* combine what we call *traditional grammar* with *semantics and other branches dealing with word*, the importance given to them being, in our view, exaggerated. In addition, the principle according to which the study of the contemporary Romanian language must not lose sight of the "normative and pedagogical character of the future Romanian teachers' higher education" (Jordan, 1956:21) and which underlay the 1963 grammar does not seem to have been taken into consideration by the authors of the *new grammars*, although they state that the book is open *for didactic use* and that they have conceived those treaties with information to be introduced in the future curricula and text books for the Romanian language (GBLR, 2010:VII-XI).

In 1956, Iorgu Jordan pointed out the importance and the necessity of distinguishing between descriptive grammar, normative grammar, and generative grammar:

Descriptive grammar refers to sample and structures made as such, hence it is limited in terms of material and due to the finite number of formulated rules; he opposes both the normative and the generative grammars which, since they follow generic structures, aim at the creativity of the language. (Jordan, 1956: 327).

We refer to this distinction for we believe that GALR and GBLR do not take into account the systematic character that grammar description and analysis should have; on the one hand, this character gives grammar, as a science, the systematic feature, and, on the other hand, it facilitates both the learning and the application of grammatical rules. These should be well understood and properly assimilated so that, after learning, exceptions may be properly identified and addressed. However, what GALR offers us is a far too long line of exceptions, too few rules, and many of them with no practical applicability. We appreciate the *modern* character of the new grammar, but we cannot help noticing that, in terms of *didactic use*, applicability in the pre-university education, the difference between GLR and, implicitly, GALR and GBLR is way too big. That is why we ask ourselves: to what extent can this grammar be reflected in the theory and practice of pre-university grammar (and not only), to what extent can students improve their grammar and, implicitly, improve their written and oral communication, based on the information provided by GALR and GBLR?

Mioara Avram noted in 1986:

Grammar improvement is the gradual learning of secondary rules, which ensure both full correctness and enrichment and nuances of grammatical expression. [...] Hence, attention should be paid to the proper learning of grammatical rules in all their details! (Avram, 1986:12).

Our opinion is that this caution applies even today, but it seems that the authors of the *new grammars* are not of the same opinion.

The GBLR authors state: “The GBLR thus conceived supports the following categories of readers: (a) Romanian language and literature teachers [...]; (b) philology students from the Faculty of Letters and Foreign Languages [...]; (c) middle school and high school students who are interested in studying grammar [...]; (e) linguists and non-linguists who are interested in “updating” their knowledge on the grammatical description of the Romanian language; (f) foreign readers who are interested in studying and learning Romanian,

as well as in comparative research, since one advantage of this book is the description made from the perspective of the generally recognised modern grammatical theories.” (GBLR, 2010:X-XI). We believe that the target audience of GALR and GBLR must obviously be a specialised one (although, as we can see, the authors say otherwise!), which is why, among other things, we consider even title *Romanian Grammar* to be inappropriate, since a Romanian grammar should represent the Romanian language, define this language, relate to and be reflected in this language, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, reflect the peculiarities of this language and have a unitary character. Given that even the authors refer to the content of this academic treaty as a *proposed description*, we cannot help wondering why they did not call it *A Romanian Grammar*. The question is legitimate because the title and the publication year actually send an erroneous message, namely that this is the *new* grammar that can and must replace the *old one*. The reality is obviously different. The *New grammar* is meaningless without the *old grammar*. The leap is too high, too many stages have been skipped and, in its current form, it cannot narrow the existing gap between school grammar and university grammar. On the contrary, the gap has become larger because, from our point of view, school grammar should have been updated even with GLR concepts (for example, we consider it unjustified not to include the theoretical and practical elements of the *floating predicate* in school textbooks and curricula), and obviously this is no longer a priority, given that the new academic treaties, seen by some as the new grammatical approach, aim at a completely different direction.

3. CONCLUSIONS

Under these circumstances, we believe it is a great problem that, in the absence of a grammar declared as the Official Grammar, over time the *custom* was to consider the treaties published under the aegis of the Romanian Academy to be the reference theoretical and practical material for the authors of school curricula, textbooks, and for methodologists. The existing reality entitles us to state that, for unity and coherence purposes, we need to formally establish which is the *grammar of the Romanian language* because, although the authors of the new academic treaties state that these treaties are open for didactic use, it is obvious that, at this point and in their current form, this statement can only be...a mere statement.

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LOVE MAKES THE WORLD GO ROUND... BUT SO DO SECOND LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE

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Abstract: *The world we are living in—a world in which migration and technological advancements have become commonplace—is so interdependent and complex from the cultural point of view that all these changes have somehow marked our attitudes towards diversity and, consequently, the way in which we interact with one another and with people from other cultures. That is why, intercultural communicative competence has become a necessity for today's global citizens. Building on the three models of intercultural competence (Bennett's 1993; Byram's 1997; Deardorff's 2006), and by taking into consideration the opinions expressed by the students enrolled at Faculty of European Studies within Babeş-Bolyai University (Cluj-Napoca, Romania), on the one hand, and the opinions of the foreign language teachers working in the aforementioned institution, on the other hand, this article analyses the undeniable connection between second language proficiency and intercultural communicative competence, as well as the necessity of 'an intercultural mindset' (Bennett et al. 2003) for today's students, as well as the importance of the two elements for the global workforce.*

Keywords: *second language proficiency; intercultural communicative competence; university studies, foreign language teaching and learning*

1. INTRODUCTION

The world we are living in has been changing continuously and at a highly rapid pace for at least a decade now. Since the introduction of smartphones and the general advancement of technology, our lives have changed (for the better or for the worse, some might say), but, most importantly, the learning and teaching process have also undergone great transformations. In a time where everything is one click away, the methods of transferring knowledge to students and of building relationships (whether we refer to personal relationships or professional ones) have metamorphosized. Furthermore, globalization has affected not only the way in which we live and learn, but also the way in which we work, as the global workforce has greatly changed, in that it has become more international and mobile. Also, another factor that has affected our personal and professional lives is internationalization (the objective set, for instance, by many higher education institutions in order to attract more foreign students and to occupy a better position in

international rankings). Consequently, learning and speaking at least one foreign language besides one's mother tongue (second language proficiency) (European Council Conclusions, 2017:3), being able to understand cultural differences and to work and communicate across cultures (intercultural communicative competence) have become prerequisites of becoming truly global individuals.

In 1997, Michael Byram observed the fact that the specialists in intercultural competence did not include the language component in this ability, although it is common knowledge that language is the medium of transmission of a culture. That is why he made a distinction between intercultural competence and intercultural communicative competence, the latter meaning more than the simple transmission of messages from a sender to a receiver. Intercultural communicative competence also includes "establishing and maintaining relationships" (Byram, 1997:3).

Building on the three models of intercultural competence (Bennett's 1993; Byram's 1997; Deardorff's 2006), and by taking into consideration the opinions expressed by the

students enrolled at Faculty of European Studies within Babeş-Bolyai University (Cluj-Napoca, Romania), on the one hand, and the opinions of the foreign language professors working in the aforementioned institution, on the other hand, this article analyses the connection between second language proficiency and intercultural communicative competence, the necessity of ‘an intercultural mindset’ (Bennett *et al.*, 2003) for today’s students, as well as the importance of the two elements for the global workforce.

2. SECOND LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE – THEORETICAL ASPECTS

Language and culture are inseparable; consequently, “foreign language education is, by definition, intercultural. Bringing a foreign language to the classroom means connecting learners to a world that is culturally different from their own.” (Sercu, 2006:16) Several books have been published to explain and to advocate for the importance of intercultural foreign language education at all levels of studies (Byram, 1997, 2008; Byram and Risager, 1999; Corbett, 2003; Dearsorff, 2006; Feng *et al.*, 2009; Jackson, 2012, 2014; Liddicoat and Scarino, 2013; Risager, 2007; Sercu *et al.*, 2005; Soler and Safront Jordà, 2007, just to mention some of the most notable ones).

Before becoming proficient in a language, one must first acquire the basics. Among the theories that explain the way in which individuals learn foreign languages is the behaviourist theory. In psychology, it is known as the theory that explains the connection between human and animal behaviour (Pavlov’s dog experiment). In second language acquisition, this theory is used to explain how language learners remember, through the operant or behavioural conditioning (i.e. reward and punishment), specific linguistic constructs by repetition or imitation (e.g. the plural of nouns). Then, by analogy, they can acquire new grammar knowledge¹ or even new vocabulary².

For language learners to become proficient, however, they cannot rely on grammar structures only, but it is of utmost importance for them to acquire new vocabulary and all the skills they need

in order to become fluent speakers (listening, reading, writing, and speaking skills). To become proficient in a foreign language, learners have to be able to play with the words, to master the idiomatic expressions in their target language, as

figurative competence is an important component of L2 fluency and (...), in order to be proficient in a foreign/second language, an L2 learner needs to build a large repertoire of conventionalized expressions such as idioms, collocations, compounds, phrasal verbs, and other so-called multiword lexical items (Cieślicka, 2015:209)³.

To do all this, they also have to know some cultural elements of the language they want to learn, because language learners often rely on their own cultural background to predict, assume, or guess the meaning of words or phrases in another language. They sometimes even translate words and phrases in the foreign language they learn assuming that the English equivalent, for example, is identical or very similar⁴. This happens because of the

interlanguage of second language learners, i.e. the language produced by second language learners when they use their second language, which contains features that may be markedly different from the language of native speakers of the target language” (Jacobs and Renandya, 2016:16).

Another theory that plays an important role in explaining second language acquisition is Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, which comprises four stages (sensorimotor, pre-operational, operational and concrete operational) (Piaget, 1950). According to this theory, language learners build their knowledge actively by taking information not only from their language instructors, but also from their surrounding environment, by “explaining, debating, role playing, creating visuals, comparing and connecting” (Jacobs and Renandya, 2016:15). Therefore, a very important role is played by the language instructors who have to make sure they prepare the appropriate materials for the language learners.

³ For more on idiomatic language and the reasons why it is important for language learners to acquire figurative competence, see the author’s research: Nistor & Cotoc (2018:219-229).

⁴ In the case of Romanian students, many of them translate the Romanian term “proces” as “process” irrespective of the context they use it in. In Romanian, we use this term to refer to both the “series of actions or operations conducting to an end” (Merriam Webster online) and the “formal examination before a competent tribunal of the matter in issue in a civil or criminal cause in order to determine such issue.”

¹ For instance, in English, in the case of nouns of foreign origin and their plural forms, language learners can make analogies: e.g., thesis-theses → crisis-crises; memorandum-memoranda → curriculum-curricula, etc.

² Romanian language speakers can easily learn vocabulary in English if that vocabulary is derived from Latin, e.g. villa, antique, longitude, province, figure, popular, dense, etc.

Perhaps one of the most important theories of learning that can be applied to language learning as well is Lev Vygotsky's socio-cultural theory, according to which the zone of proximal development⁵ plays a very important role. Learners first work under guidance, and then, if they are consistent, they can become proficient. This consistency goes hand in hand with the learners' instrumental and/or integrative motivation⁶.

Proficiency can, therefore, be acquired through practice, and both learners and language instructors play equally balanced roles. Instructors have to put learners at the centre of the learning process (Gibbs, 1995; Hall and Saunders, 1997; Harden and Crosby, 2000; Lea *et al.*, 2003; O'Neill and McMahon, 2005), while also promoting "multilingualism, an awareness of the different varieties of English and exposing students to these varieties" (which mirror perfectly the speakers' various cultural backgrounds), "embracing multiculturalism and promoting cross-cultural awareness" (Renandya and Widodo, 2016:6). However, as previously mentioned, learners also have to be motivated and consistent in their work, and they also need an understanding of the culture whose language they are speaking/learning.

Since language and culture are two inseparable entities, learning about the culture of the target language becomes an essential part of language learning. Language instructors play an additional role of cultural mediators by exposing language learners to the culture whose language they are studying or speaking, and "they are now required to teach intercultural communicative competence (ICC)." (Sercu, 2006:16)

Initially coined by Hymes, the concept of "communicative competence" was introduced to refer to the ability of using grammatical competence, as well as to the ability of adapting language to specific cultural contexts, i.e. the sociolinguistic competence of language learners (Hymes, 1972). Later on, Stern (1983) argued that "language teaching is fast acquiring a sociolinguistic component, but still lacks a well-defined socio-cultural emphasis" (Stern, 1983:346), while in 1986 van Ek developed a "model of communicative ability", which included

six competences (...): linguistic, sociolinguistic, discourse, strategic, socio-cultural, and social" (van Ek *apud* Byram, 1997:10). Compared to "communicative competence" "intercultural communicative competence places more emphasis on contextual factors (Chen and Starosta, 2008:219). If "intercultural competence" emphasizes culture, "intercultural communicative competence" is the point where culture and language intertwine. Providing an exact definition for the "intercultural communicative competence" has proved to be a quite strenuous task, as various researchers state that language learners need to acquire several competences in order to become intercultural competent (Spitzberg and Cupach, 1984; Dinges, 1983; Collier, 1989).

Perhaps three of the most important models in intercultural communicative competence are those proposed by Bennett (1993), Byram (1997), and Deardorff (2006).

Milton J. Bennett introduced the *Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity* (DMIS), which differentiates between "ethnocentrism" and "ethnorelativism", where "ethnocentrism" places an individual's own culture in the centre of their reality, whereas "ethnorelativism" places one's own culture among many viable possibilities. Stage 1 (ethnocentrism) includes denial, defence, and minimisation, while stage 2 (ethnorelativism) includes acceptance, adaptation, integration.

The second model proposed for our research is that of Michael Byram (1997), according to whom intercultural communication in foreign language teaching always depends on a context; this context can be "between people of different languages and countries where one is a native speaker of the languages used; between people of different languages and countries where the language used is a lingua franca; and between people of the same country but different languages, one of whom is a native speaker of the language used." (Byram, 1997:20). Byram's Model of Intercultural Communicative Competence focuses on four major factor groups that are involved in the knowledge (*les savoirs*) necessary for intercultural communicative competence: attitudes (*savoir être*), education (*savoir s'engager*), skills to interpret and relate (*savoir comprendre*), and skills of discovery and interaction (*savoir apprendre / faire*) (Byram, 1997:34).

Last but not least, the third model of intercultural communicative competence is that proposed by Deardorff (2006), organised like a pyramid with four layers. The basic layer is represented by requisite attitudes (respect,

⁵ The zone of proximal development represents "the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers" (Vygotsky, 1978:86).

⁶ For more on this topic, see Gardner (1985); Dörnyei (2001, 2012); Brown (2000); Nistor-Gâz (2017).

openness, curiosity and discovery); the second layer comprises knowledge, comprehension and skills (listening, observation, interpretation, analysis, evaluation and the ability to relate); the third layer is that of the desired internal outcome (and it refers to the learners' adaptability, flexibility, ethno-relative view, and empathy); while the fourth and top layer of the pyramid is represented by the desired external outcome (i.e. behaving and communicating effectively and appropriately in various cultural settings/contexts).

3. SECOND LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE IN PRACTICE

To see how these three models apply in practice, we developed two online questionnaires, which were sent to the students enrolled at the Faculty of European Studies within Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca (Romania), as well as to the language instructors from the two language departments of the university (namely, the Department of Foreign Languages for Specific Purposes, and the Department for Modern Languages and Business Communication).

The questionnaire was applied as a method of obtaining a large quantity of information from various groups of people whose answers are relevant to our research topic. There were 60 bachelor's and master's degree students who filled in our questionnaire, as well as 11 language instructors from the two language departments. The questionnaire is structured into three large sections and includes factual, behavioural, and attitudinal questions, both open-ended and close-ended ones. The questionnaire was built on the three models of intercultural communicative competence of Bennett (1993), Byram (1997), and Deardorff (2006), with the purpose of gathering information about the respondents' background, about their attitudes towards and acceptance of various cultures, about their skills to discover new cultures and to integrate in them (if necessary), about their skills to interpret and to adapt to new cultures, all of them being related to education.

The first part of the questionnaire was built so as to cover the first part from each of the three models of intercultural communicative competence. All three models first look at the individuals' general perception of the other cultures, at their attitudes of curiosity, openness, at their readiness to dismiss stereotypes, to accept other culturally different points of view and other cultures, therefore, to move from ethnocentrism to

ethnorelativism. If one applies Bennett's model to language learning, one may interpret that the language learners are ethnocentric if they put their own culture at the centre of their intercultural experiences, if they ignore other cultures or if they refer to people from other cultures as "foreigners" or "immigrants" (Bennett, 1993), and if they are more prone to lending an ear to stereotypes. This idea is also supported by Byram's model, according to which people

are only concerned (...) with attitudes towards people who are perceived as different in respect of the cultural meanings, beliefs and behaviours they exhibit (...). Such attitudes are frequently characterised as prejudice or stereotype (Byram, 1997:34).

As such, respondents were first asked to define culture and cultural diversity. The answers varied greatly proving, therefore, that defining culture and cultural diversity is indeed a difficult task, and that "the word *culture* is used by many people in many ways" (Shaules, 2007:24), but the most widely used words in the answers given were "language", "values", "customs", and "traditions." Furthermore, the fact that 94.9% of the students and all the language instructors declared they had travelled abroad shows the fact that their answers were based on their experience with other cultures.

Another question that strengthened this result and whose purpose was to see the respondents' openness towards, their curiosity and discovery of the various cultures they know about was related to their contact with and openness to people from other cultures. 96.6% of the students and all the language instructors declared they have or had friends or colleagues from other cultures; 47.5% of the students declared they are always curious to find information about their colleagues' or friends' cultures, 42.4% declared they are only sometimes curious, while 10.2% declared they are never curious to find information about their colleagues' or friends' cultures. In the case of the language teachers, 63.6% of them declared they always look up information about their colleagues' or friends' culture, while 36.4% declared they are only sometimes curious about this aspect.

The respondents' openness to learn about other cultures, to become more openminded and non-judgemental about other cultures has also been analysed through another question in this first section, by which respondents were asked whether they had ever had prejudices related to other cultures. 36.4% of the language instructors and 33.9% of the students declared they had never been

prejudiced by the various existing stereotypes, 36.4% of the language instructors and declared they rarely had had prejudices, while 27.3% of the language instructors and 64.4% of the students admitted to having sometimes had prejudices related to other cultures. What was interesting to find out in our research was the fact that only 18.2% of the language instructors declared they were always able to dismiss their stereotypes after they had travelled to the respective country whereas 45.5% of them declared they had only sometimes been able to overcome those prejudices. This contrasts the students' answers, who, in 64.4% of the cases, stated that they were able to dismiss their initial prejudices.

Further on, they were asked whether they try to connect with people from other cultures with the purpose of learning as much as possible about their culture. No language instructor fully agreed with this statement, but 54.5% partially agreed with it, 36.4% neither agreed nor disagreed, while 9.1% expressed their full disagreement. The contrast with the students' answers is quite evident, as 35.6% of the students fully agreed with the statement and 33.9% partially agreed, which shows a higher degree of openness of students towards the establishment of a contact with people from other cultures. Through these answers we were able to see the respondents' requisite attitudes to becoming interculturally competent (Deardorff 2006), and we were able to see that they show openness to other cultures, as well as curiosity to understand and to discover different cultures. As such, we can say that students are more curious and open to learning about new cultures and they are more likely to tolerate cultural ambiguity.

The second part of the questionnaire was constructed so as to test the respondents' skills of discovery and interaction, their ability to become aware of the cultural dynamics, to develop intercultural sensitivity and to *savoir apprendre* new information about a culture by listening, observing, interpreting, analysing, and evaluating their experience with other cultures. We wanted to see if, when communicating with people from other cultures, our respondents are "ethnographers" (Sercu, 2006:19), i.e. if they study the behaviour of people from other cultural groups. As such, this second part contains mostly close-ended questions, where the respondents had to read some statements and to select the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with the given statements. Based on Deardorff's Pyramid Model of Intercultural Competence, we wanted to see the degree to which respondents have in-depth knowledge of the

different culture (obtained through listening, observation, and interpretation) so we asked them if they analyse the behaviour of people from other countries when they are in a group with people from various cultures. In this case, 27.1% of the students fully agreed with the statement, compared to only 9.1% of the language instructors; 54.5% of the language instructors partially agreed with the statement, compared to 42.4% of the students who gave the same answer.

Next, we wanted to see if the respondents are able to analyse, evaluate and relate to different cultural context and if they are affected to some degree by failures in intercultural communication, so they had to tick the degree to which they agreed with the following statement: "When a conversation with people from other cultures fails, I try to analyse the reasons why the conversation was not a successful one". 67.8% of the students and 72.7% of the language instructors strongly or partially agreed with this statement, while 22% of the students and 18.2% of the language instructors neither agreed nor disagreed probably thinking that it is not of utmost importance to analyse the reasons behind a failed intercultural discussion. This shows that the great majority of both students and language instructors have an interest in understanding other cultures and what they can do in order to improve their communications skills. This aspect is very important because it shows that both students and language instructors are committed to improving their knowledge and understanding of other cultures, because, as Sercu (2006) mentioned "the intercultural speaker is not a cosmopolitan being who floats over culture, much like tourists tend to do. Rather, s/he is committed to turning intercultural encounters into intercultural relationships" (Sercu, 2006:18).

Further on, we wanted to see whether the respondents are aware that body language plays an important role in communication by asking them if they try to analyse the way in which their interlocutors from other cultures use body language, and not surprisingly 70% of the students responded affirmatively, by strongly agreeing with the statement, while 63% of the language instructors agreed with it, partially or fully. The more visible difference between the two groups of respondents came with the following statement related to body language, where they had to tell us whether they believe that body language is different from one culture to another, and here, surprisingly (because up to this point students seemed more open to other cultures), the language instructors' experience came into play, and 81% of them agreed with the

statement, while only 66% of the students fully or partially agreed with it; however, they still confirmed that it is easy for them to learn about other cultures by direct contact with them, and language teachers supported this idea too, and this backs the idea that “being intercultural” means having “contact with people from different cultural backgrounds” (Renandya and Widodo, 2016:162). Cultural knowledge is, therefore, essential to correctly reading, interpreting and making use of verbal and non-verbal language and to using it in intercultural contexts.

Last but not least, in the third part of our questionnaire we wanted to see how language education impacts the acquisition of intercultural communicative competence, which “involves the fusing of language, culture and learning into a single educative approach” and which can be taught by language instructors by “developing with learners an understanding of their own language(s) and culture(s) in relation to an additional language and culture” (Renandya and Widodo, 2016:162). As previously mentioned, language and culture are two inseparable elements which, if not correctly handled, can lead to breakdowns in communication.

According to Newton *et al.* (2010), there are six principles for intercultural communicative language teaching. The first one is that language and culture are integrated from the beginning, being at the centre of foreign language education. 81.8% of the language teachers who responded to our questionnaire agreed with the fact that in the language courses they teach the information they give students about different cultures plays an important role in the teaching and learning process. The same percentage of language instructors mentioned that they strongly believe that it is essential for students to acquire intercultural competence irrespective of their field of studies.

The second principle presented by Newton *et al.* “engages learners in genuine social interaction”. This includes Byram’s skills of discovery and interaction, while “for language teaching to adequately respond to these views of language and culture it must provide learning opportunities that are themselves dynamic, experiential, and interactive” (Newton *et al.*, 2010:65-66). This statement is also supported by the answers to our questionnaire where more than 80% of the language instructors declared they carry out activities with their students where the latter are put in different cultural situations in which they have to identify solutions to various intercultural communication problems.

The third principle encourages and develops the exploratory and reflective approach to culture and culture-in-language; however, this principle can only be implemented if language learners already have at least an intermediate level in the language of a specific culture, because that level influences the degree to which they can explore the target language and how much they can reflect upon it. The language instructors who answered our questionnaire also agree with this additional remark, as 63.6% of them confirmed they always explain to their students about the strong relation existing between the students’ level of language competence and their capacity to understand the culture whose language they are speaking, while 36.4% confirmed they often explain this aspect to their students.

The fourth principle is that intercultural communicative language teaching fosters explicit comparisons and connections between languages and cultures, while the fifth refers to the fact that intercultural communicative language teaching “acknowledges and responds appropriately to diverse learners and learning contexts.” These two principles can be easily applied to multicultural classrooms, where learners have to interact with one another, share experiences, give examples, observe and analyse, developing therefore a cultural awareness. 81.8% of the language instructors who filled in our questionnaire have students from various cultures in their classrooms, and 90% of them stated that their students have the ability to see and understand cultural differences.

Last but not least, the sixth principle “emphasizes intercultural communicative competence rather than native-speaker competence”, which is one of the key elements of language learning and teaching. The best example is that of English, which is the current *lingua franca*⁷. In this case “the introduction to the national culture of a country where the language is spoken natively can serve as an example, but must be combined with developing in learners the methods to cope with other situations, based on this example” (Byram, 1997:20).

Furthermore, in today’s global world, where the movement of workers has become commonplace, “neither language nor education

⁷ In our research, 45.5% of the language instructors declared they always use English to communicate with people from other cultures, while 45.5% of them declared they use English most of the times in intercultural settings. In the case of students, 89.9% of them stated they always use English when they communicate with people from other cultures, while 8.5% of the declared they use English most of the times.

abroad alone makes someone interculturally or global competent” (Deardorff and Hunter, 2006:81). The more diverse this global workforce is, the more likely it is for communication among interlocutors to suffer from breakdowns. That is why second language proficiency and intercultural communicative competence are inseparable and have become necessary for a truly global worker to be able to collaborate across cultures. Studies have also shown that, for instance, the fact that someone resides abroad does not necessarily mean that they become proficient in the language of that country or that they acquire intercultural competence (Shaules, 2007; Jackson, 2012).

According to Jackson (2014) a truly global citizen and worker needs knowledge (*les savoirs*) related to a country’s geography, language(s), events, etc. This idea is backed by our research as well since the respondents to our questionnaire marked several items as being relevant in terms of becoming culturally competent: customs and traditions (76.3% of students, 90.9% of language instructors), cuisine (72.9% of students, 63.6% of language instructors), the language spoken by a specific culture (81.8% of language instructors), or people’s behaviour and attitudes (62.7% of students). Therefore, truly global workers and citizens have to be able to understand a variety of cultural elements, not only what comes at the top of the iceberg of culture, but mostly what goes below the surface of the water⁸.

Moreover, a truly global worker needs skills that can help them not only perform their jobs well, but also understand the culture in which they are working (research skills, critical thinking skills, communication skills, teamworking and problem-solving skills, coping and resiliency skills) (Jackson, 2014:318)

Last but not least, a truly global worker and citizen has an open attitude to learning about new cultures, to new opportunities, languages, and ways of thinking, is tolerant, culturally sensitive and empathetic, knows their own culture but is also able to appreciate other ways of being (Jackson, 2014:318), elements which therefore contribute to the creation of an “international mindset” and to avoid becoming “a fluent fool” (Bennett, 1997:16).

4. CONCLUSIONS

Second language proficiency and intercultural communicative competence go hand in hand, and they are the attributes of truly global citizens, who, in order to become so, need an “intercultural mindset”. Building on the three models of intercultural competence of Bennett (1993), Byram (1997), and Deardorff (2006), we designed two questionnaires: one was applied to the language instructors teaching at our university; the second was applied to the students studying international relations and European studies, who, due to the nature of their studies, will obviously need to rely on their second language proficiency, as well as on their intercultural competence in their future jobs. Moreover, the results of a study conducted in 2017 on students from the same field of study within Babeş-Bolyai University showed that a large percentage of the respondents also expressed an interest in working abroad after graduation (Flanja, Nistor-Gâz, 2017:70).

The findings of our current research showed us that both language instructors and students understand not only the terms of “culture” and “cultural diversity”, but also their importance for the development of the aforementioned intercultural mindset.

Furthermore, language teachers play a very important role in helping students acquire intercultural communicative competence, by teaching students to become more tolerant, to understand and treasure cultural diversity, by promoting human rights. Through education (*le savoir de s’engager*), students acquire the ability to analyse points of view, different ways of doing things or different ways of reacting to similar situation. That is why, in their turn, language learners have to continue being openminded and curious about other cultures, learning from each intercultural experience and interaction with people from other cultures, in order to fight stereotyping and prejudice by becoming tolerant, empathetic, and aware of the fact that love isn’t the only thing that makes the world go round, and that by being proficient in one or more foreign languages and by having an intercultural communicative competence they can also contribute to the future of the world..

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Intercultural Education

FROM INFORMAL TO FORMAL USAGE OF TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING ROMANIAN CHILDREN INTERCULTURAL AND DIGITAL COMPETENCES

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Abstract: *Taking into consideration the actual social changes that emerged due to unprecedented digital technology development and the increased usage of internet by more than 59% of global population, this article will focus on children and adolescents, estimated as being one in three internet users around the world (UNICEF report, 2017). Most of the researches over the habits and patterns of children and youth internet usage show that they are using it a lot, mainly for entertainment, being exposed to many risks, but also gaining lots of advantages. The gap between the rapidly development of technology and its integration within educational systems position the internet as an informal learning, less integrated in the formal school educational activities. This raise lots of concerns and schools need to adapt and include in the curriculum new subjects and transform the older ones in order to develop children competences needed for life in a digitalized future. The European Union established since 2006 a new educational reference framework in this direction, strengthening on eight key competences that should be developed through education. In the actual globalized inter-connected technologized world the digital and intercultural competences are on the forefront. In this direction, this paper will conceptualize on the bi-directional relationship between children digital communication and intercultural competences development, through the lens of informal learning brought by internet usage and formal education provided by school system.*

Keywords: *intercultural competences; digital competences; digital communication; formal and informal education;*

1. INTRODUCTION

The children and adolescents are living today in a multi-digitalized environment, being surrounded by devices connected to internet and adults on an “always online” status. Technology changed the way people live and work, having the power to re-shape the functioning of the main social institutions, as family and school alike. In January 2020, 59% of the world population is online and on the social network platforms are almost 50% of the world population - Facebook - 2.50 billion monthly active subscribers, You Tube - 2 billions, and WhatsApp 1.60 billion active users on the first places (Clement, 2020). The time spent online by an average user is 6 hours and 43 minutes daily, meaning we spent more than 40% of our waking lives using the internet (Kemp S., 2020). Other important aspects revealed by the same report are: 92% of the world’s internet users are connecting through mobile devices, even the other available technologies are not far behind, meaning that most people are using a variety of devices to go online; the usage of mobile apps is

extended to all aspects of our lives, only 9% of the mobile time being spent browsing web, the rest being used mainly for social communications, entertainment and games apps. (Kemp, 2020).

All these means that the distances, places, languages and cultural borders are almost vanished and the inter-connection between virtual and real world is emphasized. Under these circumstances the importance of having intercultural and digital competences become tremendous for all of us, being the key to adapt to the future and minimize the main discrimination of today: to be, or not to be online.

The focus of this paper is on children and teenagers - as heavily users of internet and related technologies - and the way are developed their digital and intercultural competences. The most recent research report from EU Kids network (2020) reveal comparative findings for 19 European countries: 80% of the children 9 – 16 years old are using daily a smartphone, with an average time spent online of 167 minutes / day, and with the 14 – 16 years old teens spending almost twice as much time online than 9 – 10 years old children. Their preferred activities are

watching videos and listening to the music, followed by communication, social network and online games. Using the internet for homework, browsing things to buy and news are on the last positions. (Smahel, 2020).

In Romania things are not so different, the same EU Kids Online research data for our country show that the internet is used by 84% children and teens 9 – 16 years old, mainly for entertainment and communication, 74% are users of social networks and their digital competences measured are comparable with the others European children. (Velicu *et al*, 2019). Being part of “Z Generation” and because internet is ubiquitous in their lives, they are taken the technology for granted, learning how to use it from the first year of life, in their own way, from their parents, relatives, friends and by themselves, long before the school curriculum includes informatics classes – now from the 5th grade, so around 11 years old.

It is obvious and dangerous the gap between the way children are using the internet and the way schools are integrated it within curriculum and its educational objectives. Having access to technology from the very small age, using social media and apps and online games the children are intensively participating to the popular digital culture that is mediated, produced and reproduced through globally networked communication technologies. They became prosumers - producing and consuming popular culture (Scolari, 2018) – being empowered in the virtual world, having agency as the adults, and the freedom to move, to find, to create, to share, to connect, to speak and make their voices heard. They need to become digital and intercultural literate and they are doing it through informal education. Additionally, being informal and circumstantial digital learning is not complete and as researches reveal, children are exposed to lots of internet risks: cyberbullying, sexting and grooming, access to improper violent and sexualized content, fake news, AdSense and influencers, addiction and physical and neuro-psychical diseases. Gaining digital literacy and developing digital competences are the main solutions to prevent and overcome all these, doubled by communication, personal development and intercultural competences.

On the other part, the Romanian education system tries to fulfil this gap through new formal specialized curriculum, starting from 2017, introducing informatics (TIC) classes from the 5th grade and transforming and adapting to the new social requirements all the gymnasium subjects, according to the European Union recommendations for each member state.

In order to analyse if the Romanian curriculum offer adapted formal education for developing children’s digital and intercultural competences a content analyse of the manuals will be realized searching for indicators of the digital and intercultural competences development in order to find if the Romanian children are also exposed to formal education regarding internet usage and intercultural understanding.

The starting premise of this paper is the relationship between informal & formal learning regarding digital and intercultural competences, conceptualizing on the bi-directional influences between them. Through the content analyse of the new gymnasium manuals related to these subjects, it will be revealed if formal education integrates and offers effective solutions for guiding and completing the informal education gained by the children through personal & individual usage of internet.

2. CONCEPT EXPLANATION & DEFINITIONS

In order to advance with the analyses of the above mentioned issues is tremendous to define and operationalise the concepts we are working with: intercultural & digital competences, formal & informal education, digital communication and virtual communities.

Intercultural competences: related with the globalization of the contemporary society, the concept of “intercultural competences” was in the debate centre for many scholars, the communication sciences being the most appropriate science for the definition we are looking for. Being related with a person capacity to interact and communicate with different others, we will conceptualize accordingly with the definition given by Spitzberg and Chagnon (2009) who define it as “the appropriate and effective management of interaction between people who, to some degree or another, represent different or divergent affective, cognitive and behavioural orientations to the world” (Spitzberg & Chagnon, 2009:7). Applied to the actual context and to the enhanced interactions between people from different cultures due to internet mediated extensive communication, the concept of “intercultural competences” is used interchangeably with “intercultural communication”, the two attributes “appropriateness” – linked to personal abilities as flexibility, empathy, open-minded, adaptability, language skills or cultural knowledge – and “effectiveness” – being related with the relevant contextual variables as shared goals, incentives, equality or agency. (Arasaratnam, 2016). These are in

line with the previous definition of intercultural competence given by Deardorff in 2006, as “the ability to develop targeted knowledge, skills and attitudes that lead to visible behaviour and communication that are both effective and appropriate in intercultural interactions”. (Deardorf, 2006). On this direction, the operationalization of “intercultural competence” should be understood as containing three dimensions:

- Knowledge: cultural self-awareness and specific knowledge about its own and other cultures, socio-linguistic skills, understanding globalization and its implications on local communities;

- Skills: listening, observing and evaluating using patience and perseverance, empathy and critical thinking

- Attitudes: respect to others, value cultural diversity without prejudices and stereotypes, openness, curiosity and see difference as a learning opportunity and discovery, as tolerance for ambiguity. (McKinnon S., 2018)

Researches proves that all these cannot be acquired in a short term, they are not naturally occurring phenomenon but a lifelong learning process (McKinnon S., 2018), meaning that children should be exposed gradually and constant to such information, in order to achieve intercultural competences.

Digital competences: on 18th of December 2006 European Parliament and Council established the general educational framework to be implemented within each member country educational systems, in order “to establish a common reference point that encourages and facilitates national reforms and further cooperation between Member States” (Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2006). There were established eight key competences, with equal value, to be offered through initial education and training to all the young people in Europe as the basis for equipping them for living and working in the future: (1) communication in mother tongue and (2) in foreign languages, (3) mathematical, science and technology competences, (4) learning to learn, (5) digital and (6) social-civic competences, (7) sense of initiative and entrepreneurship, (8) cultural awareness and expression.

In May 2018, the competences were revised and new recommendations for Member States were given, according to what was achieved and what should be done more, for better adapting to the new technologized life and build

a space where all young people should receive the best education and training, regardless of their background (European Commission, 2019).

There were reinforced the eight key competences, emphasizing their meaning as a combination of knowledge, skills and attitudes” (European Commission, 2019). It is explained that the

digital competence involves the confident, critical and responsible use of, and engagement with, digital technologies for learning, working, and for participation in society. It includes information and data literacy, communication and collaboration, media literacy, digital content creation (including programming), safety (including digital well-being and competences related to cybersecurity), intellectual property related questions, problem solving and critical thinking. (European Commission, 2019).

The operationalisation of the competence uses the same dimensions: knowledge, skills and attitudes:

- Knowledge: understanding of risks and opportunities offered by technology, of their functioning principles and develop a critical approach to the information and data made available by digital means;

- Skills – to be able to use the digital technologies for communication, access, filter, share, evaluate or create digital content;

- Attitudes – open-minded, curious, forward-looking for evolution in a reflective and critical way (European Commission, 2019).

As the intercultural competences, the digital ones should be developed continuously, starting from childhood as the children grows, accordingly to their needs and the technological evolution.

Formal & informal education: as the educational theories convey and in accord with OECD explanations of these concepts:

- formal education regards the systematic approach of learning in schools and universities, an intentional process based on a national curriculum, with established learning objectives, delivered by professional trained teachers;

- informal education regards all the life existence experiences which constantly expose the individual to learning situations, being un-organised, un-intentioned, without objectives and never intentional; it is often referred as learning by experience, or just as experience.

Starting from these it is understandable that a great majority of the activities and experiences

mediated through internet are accessed by individuals through informal learning, especially children interactions with technology is first copied from parents, modelling being one of the main mediation strategies that occurred within family environment (Hefner *et al.*, 2018)

Digital communication: in accordance with communication theories, in this paper we will adopt an exhaustive meaning of digital communication as all the types of interactive communications based on transmitting messages through internet connected devices, such smart phones, tablets, PC's and also on the virtual spaces that world wide web make available, from platforms, to socializing networks applications, blogs, or online games. The messages and devices capabilities are multimodal, meaning that text, pictures, movies or audio files can be communicated through words, images or audio files in various dynamic ways.

Virtual communities: the digital communications made possible the transfer of the traditional communities circumscribed geographically in to the virtual world, without place-related borders.

Virtual communities resemble real life communities in the sense that they both provide support, information, friendship and acceptance between strangers (Wellman, 1999)

having a variety of social and professional interests in common. There are lots of discussions regarding virtual communities, from different types of networks and purposes to their advantages and disadvantages, but for our interest, the most important is their existence and the fact they offer mainly informal learning for children and teenagers, who can access whatever community they consider, being exposed to advantages but also to lots of risks.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The starting premises of this article regards the informal character of the internet mediated communication and learning for children and teenagers, with uncertain and often negative results – as the researches point lots of risks for them due to the freedom and agency they acquire on virtual world. Parents are generally considered the main responsible for the digital mediation of their children, in order to enhance the positive side and advantages of internet for them, but the research results show that they are feeling insecure about

what to teach them, how to use it responsible and most of the parents find difficult to help children because they seem to know more regarding internet and it's difficult to control and restrict access or negotiate rules with teenagers. Parents believe that school should have a more important role in developing children digital competences. (Bartau Rojas *et al.*, 2018).

In the nowadays technologized world intercultural communication became the normality due to the extended access to virtual communities, so the relationship between digital and intercultural competences is implicit and bidirectional and educational systems worldwide should adapt their curriculum in order to equip children and teenagers with the competences needed for adult life in a society where maybe the “metaverse” will be the reality – an universe expanded through virtual-reality sustained by internet and augmented reality technologies (Wikipedia). Under these circumstances, the focus for developing digital and intercultural competences is moving on the educational system due to its main aim of offering equal opportunities for all the children.

3.1 Research question. Based on the above mentioned premises, our research question regards the way Romanian educational system succeed to adapt and make changes within this direction, after almost 30 years of continuously transformations.

Does the new educational curriculum starting from 2017 on gymnasium classes address the digital and intercultural competences in a formal way? What are the main directions used for adopting a future-oriented digital technological view in Romanian education?

In order to find answers to these questions will be used the content analyses research method, very useful for a deep and objective approach to the educational curriculum.

3.2 Research methodology. The research method of the content analyses was used in a quantitative manner for identifying the content related with intercultural and digital competences within the new Romanian gymnasium manuals in order to find how many references to these concepts exist and how they are presented.

The first step was the operationalization of the concepts, accordingly to the above mentioned explained concepts and the construction of the analyse grid based on the three dimensions of each concept: knowledge, skills and attitude. Taking into consideration the specific of the Romanian curriculum, tailored on curricular areas and study

discipline, and the limited resources for this analyse, were chosen three study disciplines: “Social Education” – for searching intercultural competences; “Informatics” for digital competences and “Counselling and Orientation” – for both type of competences. Because the new curriculum it was applied starting with the school year 2017-2018, these manuals were elaborated until now for the 5th, 6th and 7th grade in printed and digital versions, the digital being similar with the printed but having multimedia activities attached, available only if studied in digital format. There were analysed 9 digital manuals, one / subject / year of study. There were established two types of analyse units: the “lesson title” and the “multimedia activities”. Occasional subjects related with intercultural and digital competences could be also found in other manuals, from literature to languages, history or geography, but there are tangential to the subject, rare and it was decided to not be included in this primary analyse.

3.2 Research results. The content analyse was realised taking into consideration for each manual the number of units regarding development of intercultural and digital competences accordingly to the three dimensions established for each of them (knowledge, skills, attitudes) in order to measure and compare quantitatively the information offered on each year of study and also the degree of digitalization included.

Regarding the intercultural competence, the analyse shows that the associated skills are the most present, followed by knowledge and at a distance, by attitudes, proving that the new educational paradigm centred on competences and experiential learning is applied. The “Social Education” manuals content is centred on humans and children rights and the development of critical thinking in 5th grade and on intercultural education in 6th grade, so all the lessons are related with developing children intercultural competences, theory and practice exercise building the attitudes. On the 7th grade the manual content is centred on offering justice and political general functioning, relating with human rights and constitutional principle to be followed, so the relationship is also direct with the intercultural competence. The digital versions of the manuals include three additional types of digital content to be accessed if the classroom is equipped with technological devices: low interactivity materials – the pictures can be increased and some important docs – as the Constitution, the Human Rights Declaration, etc.; limited interactivity materials – additional quizzes

to be solved by clicking the answer and receiving instant evaluation; high interactivity materials – short movies to be played and discussed, increasing the interest, the understanding and memorability. As the analyse shows most of the materials are low interactivity, but the high interactivity ones are also well represented, all these contributing to the enhanced comprehension of the thematic, and also to the integration of technology in to the formal education.

Table 1. Intercultural competences analyse grid(Bratu *et al*, 2017, 2018, 2019 – Educație Socială – Manuale clasa a V-a, a VI-a, a VII-a, (Social Education – classes V, VI, VII); Radu *et al*, 2017, 2019; Popa E., 2018 – Consiliere și Dezvoltare Personală - Manuale clasa a V-a, a VI-a, a VII-a, (Counselling and Personal Development Classes V, VI, VII)

	Intercultural competences			Multimedia activities		
	Knowledge	Skills	Attitudes	Low interactivity	Limited interactivity	High interactivity
Social Ed. 5 th	15	17	14	64	45	38
Counselling 5 th	12	10	5	12	8	10
Total	27	27	19	76	53	48
Social Ed. 6 th	10	7	10	24	1	50
Counselling 6 th	9	16	12	43	24	39
Total	19	23	22	67	25	89
Social Ed. 7 th	11	11	11	63	26	22
Counselling 7 th	18	17	15	21	5	15
Total	29	28	26	84	31	37
TOTAL	75	78	67	227	109	174

Regarding the development of digital competences, the “Informatics” manual, build also on the principle of modern educational paradigm offer exhaustive knowledge and references related to the usage and understanding of how programs, applications and internet function, advantages and risks, potentiating in a positive way the children desire to use and know more. The digital manuals also contain low, limited and high interactive digital materials, but the number of movies is higher, offering additional interesting content to increase pupils desire to find more. It can be observed that here the accent is on knowledge, a little more than developing skills, finally the school reality and access to resources being the key, the teachers can easily contra balance these numbers if they have all the necessaire technology. Generally speaking, all the Romanian school should have at least one dedicated classroom for informatics

hours, and not only, but the technology they have and the discrepancy between number of pupils and number of pc's in some cases are barriers in accomplishing the educational objectives.

Tabel 2. Digital competences analyse grid (Ciocarú *et al*, 2017, 2019, Popa, 2018 – Informatică și TIC - Manuale clasa a V-a, a VI-a, a VII-a, (Informatics Classes V, VI, VII); Radu *et al*, 2017, 2019; Popa, 2018 – Consiliere și Dezvoltare Personală - Manuale clasa a V-a, a VI-a, a VII-a, (Counselling and Personal Development Classes V, VI, VII)

	Digital competences			Multimedia activities		
	Knowledge	Skills	Attitudes	Low interactivity	Limited interactivity	High interactivity
TIC 5 th	20	13	4	22	14	28
Counselling 5 th	3	8	2	7	4	5
Total	23	23	6	29	18	33
TIC 6 th	14	13	7	69	19	48
Counselling 6 th	4	3	2	6	7	12
Total	18	16	9	75	25	60
TIC 7 th	20	20	14	16	28	26
Counselling 7 th	6	5	6	4	4	7
Total	26	25	20	20	32	33
TOTAL	67	64	35	126	75	126

The “Counselling and Personal Development” manuals, dedicated for one hour/week with the class head teacher or school counsellor are following the objectives of holistic developing of children, the content being structured on four directions, accordingly with children age: self-knowledge and well-being, social and emotional development, learning management and career management. All these are strongly related with developing both the intercultural and digital competences, as the content analyse shows. Even the intercultural competence is much more sustained and represented through the content related with children personal development, also the digital competence is strongly developed through information related with advantages and risks of internet, but especially through the openness to continuous learning and search of knowledge, raising children interest to adapt to the technological world we are living in.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The content analyses proved to be a prolific search method fruitful for understanding the way formal education is adapting and integrate technology

and content related to development of intercultural and digital competences within classes, proving the efforts made by Romanian educational system for transform into practice the recommendations of European Union in this direction.

This research prove that intercultural competences are developed continuously starting from 5th classes, and even before, taking into consideration that subjects like “personal development” and “Civic education” are into the Romanian curriculum from the 1st classes. It is important it’s transversal approach, taking into consideration that the “Counselling and personal development” curriculum is focused on the same subjects and values, improving the intercultural related knowledge, skills and attitudes, but in a more personal and affective way. Even this study does not reveal the effects of all these actions, it proves the attention and interest given in this matter within the general, formal education. Also, the interweaving with digital competences is of great help for assuring the both competences development and an extra proof that Romanian educational system makes efforts to adapt to the new technologized society. The digital competences have become a constant within the curriculum, taking into consideration not only the informatics classes, but also the digital format and improvement of the manuals.

It should be considering also the limitations of this study, because these data should be related with the reality of the schools, to find how they are implemented by the teachers and how are received by the children, in order to have a real picture of the phenomenon and to measure if the change is really effective. There are still many obstacles in the educational system, especially regarding the development of digital competences at gymnasium, due to the uneven distribution of technological resources within the school network and to the lack of specialized teachers on this subject, taking into consideration that until 2017 this type if informatics classes were studied only in high schools.

Another improvement that could be made by future researches regards the in deep study of the quality of the digital resources attached to the manuals. They are useful and very easy to be used by any teacher, their existence is of great help and a way of digitalize education, but it should be verified their relevance for children, taking into consideration their digital development level and the digital communication and virtual communities they are using already.

5. DISCUSSIONS AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS

During these times of acute and rapid changes in the world and education alike, the importance of empowering children with intercultural and digital competences is vital, because it offers them the knowledge, skills and attitudes needed to perform in the technologized future, to enhance and use their potential for reaching success in a globalized world. This small research proves that the Romanian educational system makes steps towards this direction, introducing within its formal curriculum dedicated content for developing these competences.

Starting from the reality of children and teenagers, already users of internet and digital communication, members of vary virtual communities and exercising intercultural and digital competences in an informal way, this article is a starting point for researches on the way schools' attempts to formalize their digital behaviour and interactions, in order to increase the opportunities and minimize the risks of internet for them.

Through a content analyse on the manuals of the main disciplines related with intercultural and digital competences development it was proved that big changes were made and both the curriculum and the way is presented to children are adapted to the actual needs: the manuals content do not emphasize only the knowledge, but also the required skills and attitudes, and the print versions are doubled by the digital version of the manuals with supplementary digital interactive materials.

Future research may be focused on enlarging the research field on the entire set of new manuals, to measure if all these facilities are really used within classrooms, and if their effects are positive and the Romanian children are exposed to relevant formal education regarding internet usage and intercultural understanding, and the unbalanced relationship between informal & formal learning offered through internet is levelled through the changed curriculum.

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FLEXIBILITY AND CULTURE – A STUDENT PERSPECTIVE TO THE FUTURE KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS

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Abstract: *Future-ready students are the key-concept of “The future of education and skills 2030” project provided by OECD in 2018. It is well known that climatic changes, technological development and migration will transform the labour market in the next few years. Education is facing an important challenge: how to equip the students with the competencies, skills and attitudes of the future. According to the previous official document, the most important challenges of the human society are environmental, economic, and social. More than ever, we need to broaden our perspective from individual to community, from personal to collective interest. The working group members and partners proposed some design principles for curricula and education systems that include flexibility for the process design: the curriculum should be adaptable and dynamic, reflecting evolving requirements. Flexibility becomes an important value that will mediate the educational process. Therefore, we have decided to investigate the implications of cultural dimensions on flexibility and to highlight the flexibility in the stylistics profile of professors. The questionnaire-based inquiry was developed in the first semester of the academic year 2019-2020 among approximately 200 students from “Transilvania” University of Braşov. All students are enrolled in teacher training programs, so they can become future-teachers. Our findings show that flexibility or adaptability is considered an important value in teaching behaviour. Nevertheless, there is an inconsistency in students’ responses regarding the semantic content of the concept. Therefore, the teacher training programs should provide aspects regarding the cultural and intercultural dimensions of education.*

Keywords: *emotional factors; flexible mindset; cultural differences.*

1. INTRODUCTION

According to the explicative dictionaries, the flexibility represents the property of a person to adapt to the particularities of different situations. A specialized dictionary of psychology explains flexibility as a factor of intelligence and creativity that restructures the process of thinking in order to produce an effective reaction in relation to any new situation (Neveanu, 1978:273). Thus, older psychology dictionaries depict flexibility as the ability to orient thinking in as different directions as needed or the capacity to set new perspectives if required. The concept of flexibility is related to the development of thinking and creative thinking, to motivation and attitude. The implications of registering flexibility in the attitudinal area relate flexibility to learning, practicing and training. Therefore, flexibility is a pragmatic particularity depending on social learning. In the modern psychological literature, flexibility is a part of several models and explicative theories of emotional intelligence. For example, in the personality traits

model, adaptability is a domain of competencies including: the ability to test reality or to see things how they really are; flexibility or the ability to adjust feelings, thoughts and actions to the demands of reality; problem solving or the awareness of real problems and collaboration to solve them (Bar-On & Parker, 2011:358). The authors consider emotional intelligence a multiple factors assembly of aptitudes; flexibility is one of the ten factors (Bar-On & Parker, 2011:375-376). The mixed explicative model of emotional intelligence contains five dimensions with 25 social and emotional competencies; the second dimension deals with to be in charge of your own and includes the following competencies: self-control, honesty; conscientiousness; adaptability; innovative spirit (Goleman, 2018:143-165). One of the recent approaches to emotional intelligence identifies five domains of EI, including self-regulation with several components: postponing the decision and impulse breaking, troubleshooting; assertive expression of feelings; flexibility; directing nonverbal communication (Wood, R & Toley, H., 2003).

The relation between motivation and flexibility is enhanced in the development of *Achievement Motivation Inventory (AMI)*. The research instrument evaluates the motivation for performance. It investigates 17 dimensions, among which: flexibility, responsibility, self-control and self-discipline (Schuler *et al.*/ Miclăuș & Iliescu, 2007 cited in David, 2015:245). In a comparative study regarding the work profile, Romanians have lower level of flexibility than Germans (David, 2015:301). The summary of the psychological depth profile of the Romanians highlights similarities with peoples from developed democratic countries: appropriate intellectual and creative potential and a modern learning style; comparable emotional intelligence expressed as adaptability. The surface psychological profile reveals that the cultural environment have not favor the potential of the Romanians (David, 2015:304-305). The assumption is that a historical approach to the influence of the cultural environment on the psychological attributes explains some negative aspects like the lack of perseverance, the lack of trust and confidence in others, the lack of cooperation and selfishness, stubbornness. The positioning of the Romanian space at the confluence of several powerful empires have printed the psychological profile and have transformed the negative features into resilience mechanisms, into forms of passive resistance (David, 2015:310). In these conditions, flexibility is a resilience mechanism too, a form of adaptive resistance strongly influenced by the cultural environment.

One of the latest perspectives on the debated topic of socio-emotional intelligence relates it to the mentality or mindset (Dweck, 2017). There are two types of mindset: rigid and flexible. Several studies have identified a direct relation between the awareness of the importance of perseverance and challenges, and the flexible mindset (Dweck, 2017:21). The ability to transform challenge into success belongs to individuals with flexible mindset; the most important ingredients for creative achievements are perseverance and mobility (Dweck, 2017:23). Mobility implies adaptability. Therefore, only a flexible person will have a flexible mindset.

Some studies regarding teachers' mindset have divided it into two categories: deficit-based mentality and plus-based mentality; according to the deficit-based mentality, the winner takes all, meanwhile, according to the plus-based mentality everyone will achieve some goals (Raghunathan, 2017).

2. RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES

The research question that guided our study has been: *How culture influences the perception of flexibility in a student approach to emotional factors?* Therefore, we have set the following research objectives: (1) To identify how students perceive flexibility in the professors teaching behavior; (2) To verify the influence of culture in students' perception regarding flexibility.

3. AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO FLEXIBILITY

3.1 Procedure. The research was carried out in the first semester of the academic year 2019-2020. The aim of our study was to enhance the influence of the cultural environment on the perception of some emotional factors. In a broader perspective, the enrichment of flexibility with cultural determination will help to adjust the educational strategies in higher education in order to develop the competencies profile of students according to the demands and challenges of the 21st century.

2.2 Participants. The participants in our research are 209 students from *Transilvania University*. They are aged between 19 and 52 years (N=207; Missing=2; M=22,59; SD=6,11; Mode=20). From a gender perspective, 202 are females and 6 are males (N=208; Missing=1; M=1,97; SD=0,16). The students are enrolled in the second year (144) and in the third (64) (N=208; Missing=1; M=2,31; SD=0,46). Some of them declare to have work experience (46) and the majority have no work experience (162) (N=208; Missing=1; M=0,22; SD=0,41).

2.3 Measures. In order to identify the real image of the professors in higher education interactions from a student perspective regarding flexibility, we used a questionnaire-based inquiry. The research instrument has items related to several values of the postmodern education identified or willing to be identified in teaching behavior. The students have been asked to choose five values from a list totalizing twelve postmodern values: *cooperation, critical thinking, creativity, entrepreneurship, respect for different, empathy, pro-social behavior, rightness, self-determination, lifelong learning, sense of humor, flexibility*. The self-administered questionnaire has been completed as a current task of the seminar. Thus, the students have not been exposed to additional stress. The participation in the inquiry has been freely consented.

3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

Regarding flexibility as a perceived value in teaching behavior in higher education, less than 50% of the students have chosen this postmodern value (N=89; M=2,82; SD=1,52). Most often chosen score on Likert scale has been the equivalent of *least important* (25 respondents). However, 51,6% of the respondents consider flexibility as an important value in teaching behaviour: *less important* – 18, *important* – 13, *more important* – 14, *most important* – 19 students. The students' options regarding flexibility as perceived value in teaching behaviour are presented in Figure 1. The statistical analysis displays those 92 respondents willing to discover adaptability in teaching behaviour (M=2,98; SD=1,50). Most often chosen score has also been the equivalent of *least important* (23 students). The percentages of the respondents who express their desire to meet with flexibility in the teaching behaviour of their professors is higher: 59,0%. The options of the students are as follows: *less important* – 14, *important* – 18, *more important* – 16, *most important* – 21. Thus, 51,6% students declare flexibility is a value perceived in teaching behaviour and 59,0% students declare flexibility is a value they would like to record in teaching behaviour. A comparative approach of the results highlights similarities in the amount of the respondent who have chosen flexibility as important value in teaching behaviour: 42,5% - flexibility as existing value, and 44,0% - flexibility as desired value. The rate of more than 40% is significant since the listed postmodern values are well promoted in the pedagogical literature, in specialist current discourse, and in mass-media. Even if the semantic content is not always completely understood and properly used, concepts like cooperation, critical thinking, creativity, empathy are frequently encountered.

For a deepen analysis of the results, we have investigated the responses depending on age and work experience. The students who have frequently chose higher values are: 19 years old (N=8; M=4,38; Mode=5); 29 (N=1; M=3,0; Mode=3); 33 (N=1; M=5,0; Mode=5); 36 (N=1; M=4,0; Mode=4); 41 (N=1; M=5,0; Mode=5); 52 (N=1; M=3,00; Mode=3). The students who have chosen lower values are: 20 years old (N=39; M=2,59; Mode=1); 21 (N=26; M=2,85; Mode=1); 24 (N=2; M=1,00; Mode=1); 26, 28 (N=1; M=1;

Mode=1). In these terms, either the youngest respondents (19 years) or the more mature students (29, 33, 36, 41, 52 years old) have perceived flexibility as an important value in teaching behaviour. The analysis of the responses enhances a similar pattern for flexibility as desired value. Therefore, we may assume work experience has influenced the responses of the more mature students. The statistical analysis contradicts the assumption: 50% of the students with no work experience have chosen higher values for flexibility (33 from 66); almost 50% mature students have chosen lower values (10 from 22).




Figure 1 Flexibility as existing value in teaching behaviour




Figure 2 Flexibility as desired value in teaching behaviour

In order to realize the second objective of our study, we have started from the premise that culture influences the mental setting of individuals and cultural dimensions explain the differences between them (Hofstede, 2012). The research with the topic of a student approach to flexibility enables the access from the common professional image to real, manifested image of educators (Iucu,

2008:130). Our perception is strongly influenced by the cultural environment. Our depth and surface profile imprints our mindset and behaviour. The cultural imprinting affects our performance and, as a consequence, the teaching behaviour. If flexibility is an adaptation mechanism, then it contains a strong learning component. Nevertheless, the research regarding flexibility will need to be extended to a larger number of participants, to different levels of education. The data collected through the questionnaire-based inquiry will need to be enriched and validated through qualitative methods.

The inconsistency in the responses regarding perceived and desired flexibility might have origins in the deficient approach of the contemporary content of the concept of flexibility.

One of the limits of our study is the gender representativeness. The participants are 202 females and 6 males, which represent 97,1% and, respectively, 2,9% valid percentages. Another limit is students' specialization; all the respondents are enrolled in faculties in the field of humanities (Educational sciences and Letters).

4. CONCLUSIONS

The challenges of the 2020 are far beyond any educator could imagine. The predictions of the experts from the educational field worldwide have been available for the educational stakeholders since 2018, when the curriculum for the early childhood education was updated. The physical development and healthcare have become more important than cognitive skills. In the same year, 2018, OECD proposed new goals for the educational policies, a new competence profile, and a new learning framework (OECD, 2018). The competencies demanded by the next decade of the 21st century are related to attitudinal area: values, dilemmas, responsibilities. The socio-emotional competencies will be reframed according to the new reality and flexibility will be one of the most important emotional factors. The students enrolled

today in higher education belong to different generations, with different characteristics and personal attributes. They have been trained and educated according to different competence profiles. We can still add in their initial formation important acquisitions regarding flexibility.

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INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION-SUPPORTED BY CULTURAL- INTEGRATED PROJECTS

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Abstract: *Most often students are not interested in reading the piece of literature assigned by their teacher because they cannot identify with that particular work. Teachers of English as a second language (TESL) should teach the language in the context of its culture. Such an approach gives students, a familiar perspective of the world. Introducing students to the cultural context of the time is an extremely important teaching goal. This paper explores the benefits of a motivational teaching approach of a novel using New York city as a cultural context. Two Montreal four year secondary school groups were reluctant to reading Edith Wharton's Age of Innocence till the task was presented as part of a cultural project, a visit to New York. Students who finally received high grades were to be included in the project. At the end of the trip, these students had to compare their reading impressions on New York to their perceptions of the actual New York culture. Students benefited of deeply meaningful learning as they were connected with the culture of the city. Writing their final impressions was a reflection over their global understanding of the culture, not only about the past but also about the present.*

Keywords: *teaching; intercultural; perspective; education*

1. INTRODUCTION

Most often teenagers are reluctant to study topics that they do not personally identify with. They lack motivation, interest and do not make much effort to get involved in the lesson. Such experiences lead teachers to avoid certain classic literary texts. Even when choosing adolescent literature, not all students find those texts relevant and meaningful. In such cases, when planning the Learning and Evaluating Situation (L.E.S.), teachers need to consider a better way to structure their classes in order to enhance motivation. Many researchers have found their motivating way. The collection of the volumes entitled *Adolescent Literature As a Complement to the Classics* illustrates such approaches. Among them, John Kaywell thought of *Using Young Adult Literature to develop a Comprehensive World Literature Course around Several Classics* (Kaywell, 1995:111). Patrick Daniel explains her approach of *Using Killing Mr. Griffin as an Introductory Core Novel* in view of helping students "make connections to the characters in Shakespeare's *The Tragedy of Julius Caesar* (Daniel, 1995:146). Many other researchers have followed this concept of using other works of interest to teenagers. Another way of motivating teenagers is by

integrating a cultural project while teaching literature. It contributes to both their personal and academic development.

2. THE REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

When English teachers decide on the syllabus for the semester, they consider the criteria in the ministerial program, the specialization of the institution but also the type of study material (literary works). (Brown, 2001:72) thinks that motivation is difficult to install among students. He disagrees with some teachers' conclusions that "Motivation is the difference, I have heard people say, 'between success and failure. If they're motivated, they'll learn, and if not, they won't.'" Some other researchers, such as Gillian Lazar, insist on the importance of choosing the best way of presenting the outline of the course to students. He suggests the most relevant types of areas to be included in the lesson plan "biographical information about the author," "places, objects or other texts referred to in a text," "relationship of the text to the literary movements of its time," "historical, political or social background against which the text was written" (Lazar, 2002:38). Some researchers think that not only deciding the

pedagogical goals of the lesson is important but also having students feel that

“the activities chosen to be worked on during the class are meant to have a direct impact on them”¹ [...] “it’s the case in which students consider certain activities as complementary to their education because they correspond to their personal interests” (translation mine)² (Archambault & Chouinard, 2003:222).

The International Baccalaureate program, whose main objectives focus on international education, enables “people to better understand and manage the complexities of our world” and allows students to achieve success “in school and in life beyond the classroom”(2014:3). This program also explains that teaching approaches that value education “as the transformation of personal understanding and collaborative construction of meaning” contribute more effectively to a student’s overall learning. Supporting the same concept, Kimmel and Volet (2012:227) also think that

intercultural interactions represent unique relational, socio-emotional and socio-cultural activities with their own, specific underlying cognitive, motivational and emotional dynamics.

Jin and Erben’s findings of their intercultural project show that their students “developed self-reflection capacities, critical thinking skills, and greater sensitivity and respect for intercultural differences” (2007: 291).

Brown (2001:72) talks about the “intrinsic” motivation as possible to be acquired by considering two paradigms “behavioral,” which “stresses the importance of rewards, and the cognitive one, which” focuses on the sources of motivation and the power of self-reward. According to Michael Byram (2008:104), when studying a language, the learner is required:

to be familiar with the native context, and by implication that there was just one native context: ‘every language is situated in a socio-cultural

context and implies the use of a particular reference frame which is partly different from that of the foreign language learner; socio-cultural competence presupposes a certain degree of familiarity with that context. (van Ek, 1986: 41).

It’s only teachers and parents who could offer students opportunities for such an intercultural learning horizon. Getting familiar with the cultural context of the language studied enlarges students’ worldview in more other ways.

3. THE STUDY

This study was applied to two Montréal four-year secondary school groups of students, which would correspond to the age group of 16-17 years old. Students had been presented the outline of the English course during that semester. They had started to read the novel Edith Wharton’s *The Age of Innocence*, much to the chagrin of the students. They were tasked with having had to summarize the chapters they had read and then to analyze the readings and participate in group activities and class discussions.

During the third class, I came with the news that the English department had just got the approval for our request to go on a five-day trip to New York as a reward for students with high results in the English course at the end of the semester. I could see an amazing and impressive change in their attitude. Their complete involvement was evident and assignments started to be submitted on time. Knowing that part of the project consisted in comparing their impressions on the New York city’s life to what they perceived about the old New York presented in the novel, they became very interested in learning about New York’s history and tried to spot any description of it in the novel.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Creating any kind of contextual opportunities for the topics planned to be taught ensures students’ motivation for learning. When conceiving the lesson plans, teachers should think of including access to learning possibilities about the social context referred to in the book. They need to evaluate all details related to their course and also organize the classes according to the principles corresponding to both behavioral and cognitive psychological viewpoints.

Students were rewarded with the trip offering them an opportunity for further learning about the

¹ “[...] c’est à dire de percevoir que les activités proposées en classe constituent des moyens de les atteindre (Ames et Ames, 1991)” in original.

² “[...] c’est le cas lorsque les élèves considèrent certaines activités comme un complément valable a leur formation parce qu’elle correspond a leurs intérêts individuels” in original.

actual New York and also to explore such an experience as a group. All these aspects remind of Brown's presentation of the cognitive paradigm (Brown, 2001: 74).

Having to compare the old New York in the novel with the actual New York, students had the opportunity to express their views according to their way of thinking and feeling; likewise, they fulfilled their need for autonomy. A society that functions efficiently requires educated and experienced professionals with a wide view of the world.

The real-life in New York being analyzed was not only compared to the society as presented in the novel but also to the goals of the lesson. Interviewed, students showed much satisfaction willing to express themselves:

I loved to get so deeply involved in the project. I tried to visualize the story in the novel to make sure I was finally able to compare the old society to the actual. (Student 1)

It was not only about studying a piece of literature. Finally, it was about getting my mind and feelings better connected with the city in some way. It was also about me, about my perceptions. Really cool! (Student 2).

What I imagined is totally different. What I could see is modern, typical to the nowadays society. There is no feeling of high society and misogyny (Student 3).

Not only did students have a chance to visit New York, but they could also get into contact with people there as well as adjust their perceptions about the city to what they could really discover during their experience. Lara Lomicka notices Byram *et al.*'s statement that

the intercultural dimension in language teaching seeks to 'develop learners as intercultural speakers or mediators who are able to engage with complexity and multiple identities and to avoid the stereotyping which accompanies perceiving someone through a single identity' (Lomicka, 2009:1227).

Students could conclude that such a cultural framework is way more efficient to their understanding of the material studied during the English classes. They could relate their background knowledge to the real, actual culture they had learned about.




Fig.1. The impact of the intercultural project in the students' motivation

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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND INTERCULTURAL PEDAGOGY

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Abstract: *Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a widespread practice in the last several decades. CSR includes at present a very diverse range of practices from initiatives of local companies to multiannual programs of cross-border corporations. Recognizing the importance of this practice, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) published guidelines on social responsibility of corporations in its standard ISO 26000 on Social Responsibility. The description of this standard was made after a decade of consultations, and the standard can be adopted voluntarily by any organization. Unlike many ISO standards, there is no formal certification process. The paper presents the main features of ISO 26000 as well as how CSR is embedded in the culture of organizations in Romania and Slovenia with reference to synthetic research in the field. Emphasis is placed on how CSR can be used as a means of intercultural education, especially for employees of organizations who come from a different cultural background than the one they profess. This is especially important with the turn of unstable situations around the globe.*

Keywords: *corporate social responsibility; intercultural pedagogy; ISO 26000.*

1. INTRODUCTION

An exact date cannot be established when the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR abbreviation) appeared or when the first non-formal currents for promoting it appeared. It is generally stated that the first systematic initiatives were made in the 1980s in the United States. In Europe, it is considered that the first institutional effort to promote CSR dates back to 1982 when the Business in the Community initiative appeared in the United Kingdom. Then the first attempts were made to evaluate the role of business in community development and to improve corporate social responsibility. Overall, the first attempts were derived from the theory of business and society (Wartick & Cochran, 1985), where the authors discussed the Corporate Social performance Model with three areas, where one of the areas were the corporate social responsibility principles.

Over the last three decades, CSR has rapidly evaluated from a bizarre concept (difficult to understand, even disapproved by the management committees of many companies) in a daily way of thinking and activity. CSR now existed as a

regular practice both in the world of goodness and in society, as a useful tool in debating and finding solutions for a multitude of social problems. The spread of CSR was favored by several factors, of which it is worth mentioning: the ultra-fast evolution of information technologies, the process of globalization, the consolidation of "civil society," the strengthening of consumer rights and the increase of public distrust towards the functioning of the free market institutions.

The beginning of this millennium was marked by a series of CSR initiatives: e.g. the UN Global Compact (2000), the development of quality standards and the widespread adoption of CSR by international bodies, such as the European Commission (for which "Corporate Social Responsibility is a concept by which companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their operational activities and in their interaction with stakeholders on a voluntary basis").

There are numerous formal definitions, which characterize CSR through the following defining notes (see www.responsabilitate-sociala.org):

– The commitment of the organization to contribute to the economic development of the community by actively involving the employees,

their families, the local community, the large-scale society;

- Conducting community activities, with a high impact on society;
- A concept by which the organization decides to contribute voluntarily to the improvement of the community in which it operates;
- A transparent and responsible business practice towards the company;
- The relationship that a company develops with its wide range of stakeholders (actors involved). Clients, employees, community members, investors, and so forth are included in this category;
- An investment made by companies for the good of the community/society;
- A contract between the company and the business sector.

2. GLOBAL ADOPTION AND STANDARDIZATION OF CSR

At present, the involvement in the life of the community is a necessary dimension for any company that wants to ensure not only its commercial success but also the respect of the community within which it operates. In other words, a business initiative must include social responsibility as a quasi-mandatory dimension.

Concerning global CSR, it has been stated since January 1999, when UN Secretary-General, Koffi Annan, promoted the initiative *UN Global Compact*, which promotes ten universal principles of human rights, labor standards, environment, and anti-corruption. *UN Global Compact* urge the companies to embrace, support, and adopt, within their sphere of influence, a set of core values:

CSR is a commitment by which any economic entity (regardless of size) assumes in a 'standardized' way (Hristea, 2011:61-62) the care for:

1. The protection of the environment and the sustainable development of the society in the interest of future generations by conserving resources, ensuring the health and safety of the population, reducing the gender rights gaps, eliminating the exploitation of children, reducing poverty and increasing the education of the population.

2. Developing relations with employees by creating civilized working conditions, adopting measures regarding the health and safety of the employees, granting incentives for the personal and professional motivation of employees.

3. Promoting an honest attitude to business partners upstream and downstream, respectively, suppliers and customers.

4. Adopting transparent directions of action regarding the company's activity towards employees, consumers, community, and administration.

5. Involvement in the life of the community through active participation, development, and investments with precise destinations in this regard.

6. Ensuring human rights, including the fundamental right to work and social integration.

7. Respecting the rights of the indigenous population and involvement in improving the quality of life.

8. Application of anti-corruption measures.

Starting from CSR, the development of business now involves at least three objectives: (1) economic (i.e., creation of wealth for all, based on the means of production and sustainable consumption), (2) ecological (i.e., conservation and management of resources), and (3) social (i.e., equity and participation of all social groups).

From the adoption of the UN Global Compact, CSR has become one of the "hot topics" in the business field. The concept regarding contributions that companies make to the development of modern society, the "responsible" initiatives of companies, have been promoted through a wide variety of terms: *corporate citizenship*, *corporate philanthropy*, *corporate social marketing*, *community affairs*, *community development*, and so on.

Due to the increased interest for CSR, international standards have also emerged in the field, which can be adopted following an external audit (e.g., SA 8000) or only through a voluntary assumption (e.g., ISO 26000).

Social Accountability Standing 8000 (SA8000) is a standard for voluntary third-party audit, which sets out the requirements that organizations must meet, including establishing or improving workers' rights, working conditions, and a system of work. Therefore, only the premises where the activity is carried out can be certified. Part IV of the standard details the requirements regarding CSR.

International Organization for Standardization (ISO) entrusted in 2005 to carry a standard on CSR that included forming an international working group that, in coming years, included more than 450 experts and 210 observers from 99 member states of the ISO and 42 major international organizations such as *International Labor Organization (ILO)*, *United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)*, *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)*, *Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)* and so forth.

The resulting standard, ISO 26000, is meant to support all companies for achieving long-term economic benefits, bearing low social costs and generating minimal harmful effects on the environment.

ISO 26000 has paved the way for a new category of standards, based on the participatory and consensual approach. This standard aims to develop recommendations in the form of *Guidelines* and not a requirement in terms of compliance (compared to particular management system tools, such as the "certification" proposed by other standards (ISO 9000, ISO 14001). ISO 26000 standard defines Social Responsibility as:

the responsibility of an organization for the impacts of its decisions and activities on society and the environment, through an ethical and transparent behavior that contributes to the sustainable development, takes into account the expectations of the stakeholders, is in accordance with the existing and consistent law with the international norms of behavior, it is integrated throughout the organization and put into practice in its activities.

By adopting this ISO standard, we now have a globally accepted and credible definition that emphasizes the integration of environmental and social aspects into the activities of an organization.

ISO 26000 includes seven core subjects that organizations (government institutions, companies, unions, consumer associations, NGOs, and so on) must address in an integrated way. For each of them, the standard provides information on the purpose, relationship with social responsibility, principles, considerations, and related actions. The seven core subjects are (1) Organisational governance; (2) Human rights; (3) Labor practices; (4) Environment; (5) Fair operating practices; (6) Consumer issues; and (7) Community involvement and development.

Also, ISO 26000 outlines seven fundamental principles, which it advocates as the roots of socially responsible behavior: (1) Accountability; (2) Transparency; (3) Ethical behavior; (4) Respect for stakeholder interests; (5) Respect for the rule of law; (6) Respect for international norms of behavior; and (7) Respect for human rights.

ISO 26000 provides guidance rather than requirements, so it cannot be certified unlike several other well-known ISO standards. It is aimed at all types of organizations regardless of their activity, size or location. However, some countries have established national standards against which organizations can be certified (Thostrup, 2015:16).

Danish Standards has developed a Danish standard Social responsibility management system (DS 26001:2010) which was in 2011 superseded by the DS 49001:2011. It focuses on companies' CSR, with a local anchoring and it is based on the ISO 26000. The Austrian Standards institute developed and published in November 2011 *Gesellschaftliche Verantwortung von Organisationen (CSR) (ONR 192500)*, based on ISO 26000. These Standards are seen as a role models for a possible future ISO 26001 (Walker & Rasche, 2015, 129), standard that will provide requirements, against which organizations can be certified. Interestingly, the term ISO 26001 is quite common in professional literature, although this standard does not exist yet.

3. CSR IN NATIONAL CONTEXTS

Although CSR standards are intended to be universal, there are numerous national features in this area. Following is a brief report on the CSR situation in two states: the Republic of Slovenia and Romania.

CSR in Slovenia: Lack of national strategy vs. many civil initiatives

Slovenia, despite numerous EU initiatives, still does not have a formally adopted national CSR strategy. An overview of developments in the area of corporate social responsibility in Slovenia shows the great involvement of different stakeholders and the range of different activities carried out. This is reflected in the relatively large number of CSR organizations. Unfortunately, the CSR initiative is still setting its path to the highest government levels.

A private non-profit and independent organization Ekvilib (founded in 2003) has awarded the *Certificate for corporate social responsibility (Certifikat družbeno odgovorno podjetje; CDOP)* since 2016. These CSR certificate are based on the content of ISO 26000 and *Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)* indicators.

In 2020, in collaboration with The Association of Employers of Slovenia (ZDS), a call for proposals will be launched, which will allow 200 companies to participate in evaluations free of charge until 2022. Similarly, *The Institute for the Development of Social Responsibility (IRDO)* has been awarding the Horus Prize for the last 14 years, and in co-operation with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia conducts training and awards the *ECQA Social Responsibility Manager certificate: Socires*.

The branch of the *UN Global Compact*, called *The Slovenian Society for Sustainable Development* (Močnik, Crnogaj & Hojnik, 2016, 109), also operates in Slovenia.

European corporate social responsibility awards have already been awarded in Slovenia. *The Social Responsibility Network of Slovenia* (MDOS), in cooperation with its partners, awards the European CSR Award Scheme. Although the state promotes CSR, a national body responsible for notifying standards, *The Slovenian Institute for Standardization* (SIST) offered the ISO 26000 standard at great discounts.

The CSR survey of large enterprises in central European countries (Deloitte, 2016) showed that in Slovenia, as many as 96% of respondents believe that their companies have helped to address socio-environmental issues, where the average among countries was 84%. The greatest benefits of introducing CSR activities are cited by greater involvement of employees (70% in Slovenia, 65% overall), improved reputation (61% in Slovenia, 55% overall) and awareness of the importance of ethical conduct at work (44% in Slovenia, overall 46%). Only 35% of respondents in Slovenia believe that CSR will continue to develop and that the number of socially responsible companies will increase.

Kaučič (2013:69-75) has found only small differences in involving the CSR in strategy of Slovenian companies of different sizes. 60% of micro-companies, 63% of small companies, 65% of medium-sized and 63% of large companies have include a CSR strategy. In doing so, the companies surveyed stated that they opt for CSR practices because of external stakeholders, less because of internal ones. In contrast, there is a strong correlation of CSR and value added per employee. Higher value added companies have a clearly defined CSR strategy at 92%, while 77% of lower value added companies per employee do not have a CSR strategy. After an extensive review of the literature, the authors found a dearth of concrete research on CSR reporting in Slovenia.

CSR in Romania: lack of specific regulations vs. high level of reporting. The European Commission has recommended the need for a national framework and certain additional regulations, which take into account the transparency in the commercial act, competitiveness, the creation of incentives for the companies involved. They can appear in investment policy, in public procurement and are very important, regardless of whether they are large or small companies. The EC

recommendation is that all Member States , including Romania, introduce these additional measures in public policies.

According to a study published in 2014 by Economic and Social Council, Romania does not have a specific regulatory framework for CSR Companies; the only regulatory attempt being the one regarding the corporate governance of public enterprises, otherwise quite incomplete, by reference to modern CSR standards .

CSR is an increasingly present concept in the Romanian business environment sc. The main promoters of this process were the multinational companies, which also made in this field an adaptation of their own organizational cultures at local level. CSR initially imposed itself more as a fashion than as a result of full awareness of needs. As expected in a economic and social context emergent and unstable, CSR was valued in Romania more for his valences in trade than for ethical meaning. "In a market that was becoming increasingly competitive, players quickly discovered the potential of this dimension in the process of image building and consolidating the reputation, as well as the premise for commercial success in the short and medium term. In other words, the part to which the ethical balance - which is profitable in the CR activity - is normally inclined, remains a topic discussed and disputed. The problem is a global one ". (p.46)

The latest version of KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting (2017) attest an increase of 6% CSR reporting rates, to previous version to this report (2015), respectively from 68% to 74%. Romania is a part of the group of countries with higher CSR reporting rates than the global average (p.17). This increase is it as a result of the commitment to transparency by multinationals in the country. The EU Directive on Non-Financial Reporting transposed WAS finally into Romanian law in 2016, with low effects: "Despite this, many companies in Romania and across Eastern Europe are still just beginning to understand the topic and build their capacity to respond " (p.15) However, it is expected to see steady growth in CSR reporting in Romania and Eastern Europe over the next few years and improving quality as regulatory requirements, market pressure and increasing awareness take effect.

4. CONCLUSIONS

CSR was adopted as a global level more than two decades ago, following the announcement of

the UN Global Compact (1999). Subsequently, this practice has expanded, with numerous forms and subtypes of CSR, as evidenced by the two examples of CSR application (Romania and Slovenia).

Due to its spread on the planetary scale, there is currently a quality standard of the International Organization for Standardization - ISO 26000, which can be adopted voluntarily (no certification process required) regardless of the type of organization, field of activity and its size.

Although CSR approaches have developed in the last decades at an accelerated pace, it is still far from the time when the vast majority of businesses will follow this action model, which presupposes the assumption of at least three objectives: an economic one (wealth creation for all, based on the means of production and sustainable consumption), the other ecological (conservation and management of resources) and third, social (equity and participation of all social groups).

In order for CSR to become an implicit component of any business approach, a broad change of attitude regarding the way in which human activities are designed is really needed. This change is possible only through the involvement of intercultural pedagogy: "Formation of attitudes represents a complex and long-lasting process that, apart from understanding and internalization of values, implies an effective learning. The conative component of attitude is built on the cognitive one, energetically supported by the effective one. Intercultural education thus becomes more than an attitudinal assembly, it will be a state of mind, based on love and respect for humans" (Ilișoi, Nagy, 2017, 77), which is at the core of corporate social responsibility.

And let us not forget that with the onset of of unstable situations due to a global pandemic, corporate social responsibility will be ever more important and a wake-up call. As Polman (2020) states, "companies must rapidly transition to a way of doing business that does not destroy biodiversity and natural capital or there will be mor Covid-19s" (para. 1). Corporations will and need to play a leading role in social responsibility to all involved.

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TUTORING IS A PROCESS OF SUPPORT IN THE AREA OF INTERCULTURAL PEDAGOGY

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Abstract: *Qualitative analysis revealed the role of the tutor in the e-learning process. Training on the topic of tutoring skills was carried out among eighteen tutors in tertiary higher education. A successful tutor motivates students to achieve their goals, while having the appropriate knowledge and experience. As a coach, the tutor uses coaching and communication methods in their work. The main goal is an exchange of experience between professors, researchers, and practitioners in the field of community dynamics, especially in the area of intercultural pedagogy. Our end-goal is to improve the quality of education and, consequently, of personal and intellectual development. The development of ICT has made it possible for lecturers and students to be more connected, as well as to better communicate and interact with the student. Learning becomes a pleasure when the lecturer enjoys their work and encourages problem-solving of specific situations. The role of the teacher is changing. The teacher will acquire new competencies that a good tutor has, such as good communication and motivation skills, as well as ICT skills. Education takes place everywhere and in different environments, not just in the classroom, as learners increasingly assume the role of education organiser. Learning, therefore, is a lifelong process that takes place at different times, being no longer focused on the teacher or institution. The results showed that educators find that continuous training on tutor skills not only facilitates them in their teaching but also in better understanding the intrinsic characteristics and beliefs of mainstream and international students.*

Keywords: *intercultural pedagogy; tutoring; coaching; tertiary education; communication; system analysis; ICT; personal and intellectual development*

1. INTRODUCTION

According to the Bologna Process basic concepts the universities and institutions of higher education have been implementing the tutelage system to monitor students' work and offer study assistance and to systematically lead students through their studies, without strictly focusing on their study development or study problems, but their personal development as well.

This paper includes a qualitative analysis to determine the role of a tutor in the learning process. A training event titled Tutoring and Coaching Skills of Tutors was organised in February and March in 2016 with 18 tutors from higher education institution and faculties (Turnšek Mikačič, n.d.)

A tutor is someone, who listens and hears the students. That is someone, who not only looks at the students, but also sees the students. Tutor takes the role of a motivator, an advisor, of someone,

who assists in guaranteeing the quality of education. A tutor also presents suggestions to develop more effective study habits, which most students lack.

A tutor is a complete person with personal characteristics, values, abilities, skills, knowledge, motivation, and self-image on one hand and culture and values of an organisation on the other hand, which should complement each other, yet it often narrows the circle of potential candidates for tutors.

A successful tutor wants to motivate students to reach their set objectives. It is of utmost importance for a tutor to have adequate knowledge and experience, event skills form the area of pedagogical and didactic development of education to be acquainted with the approaches of successfully leading people and teamwork and listening to the student psychology. A tutor is acquainted with the student experiences, interests, insight at their level to properly advise their

working tempo and evaluate abilities and capabilities for independent work.

This paper will present the visions and the experiences of lecturer tutors, who were trained to learn, what is a tutor, what is their role as a tutor, and, which abilities, skills, knowledge and competences they need to be successful. Tutors realised the importance of designing a tutor plan, how to lead a tutor meeting, how to evaluate progress and a tutor's success, while introducing effective communication strategies.

The intention of this paper is to recognise the management and tutoring of individuals and study groups; to define the power of personal study style to build self-confidence and self-respect. An additional intent is the importance of the use of evolving information and communications technologies and to know, how to organise and manage a social event. Communication stands for active listening, motivating, recognising behavioural and other personality patterns, recognising own limits, inter-cultural proportions and obstacles, as well as problem solving.

2. THERETICAL OVERVIEW

2.1 Definition of Tutoring. Tutor is seen in a role of a *motivator*, *an advisor*, which contributes to improvement of quality of education. A tutor suggests a use of more effective study methods, which are often not used by the students (De Goeij, 1997). The essence of tutoring is to prepare *as many students as possible to successfully complete their studies* and direct them during their studies into the individual research activity, which also results in *improving the reputation of the educational establishment*.

A tutor guarantees the quality of education, monitors the student activity, their assignments and completed tasks. The quality of education is directly visible from the examinations, seminars and presentations by the students.

Lecturer tutors and student tutors are familiar with the following areas besides their professional knowledge. They also regularly upgrade their knowledge in these fields: recognising didactic approaches and several study strategies; recognising the concept of students with special needs (the options of lacking and adaptations); recognising communication strategies, basics of counselling, as well as problem and conflict solving, and motivating students.

Multiculturality and inclusion of foreign students into educational system are very important. Due to the altered social circumstances tutoring can

be one of the recommended approaches for students with cultural, social, and nonetheless material issues, and tutoring with its approaches and measure can offer a bridge to the solution.

Tutors facilitators accept the role of personal advisers, who accompany the students throughout the studies. They act as: me as a tutor standing across an individual student, via e-mail, during office hours, or at arranged meetings. They implement their *knowledge of coaching*. Individual approach is best used with students, who (a) lost their motivation for completing their studies; (b) who require individual assistance or further explanation of a subject; (c) have special needs or status. Experiences with tutees, when dealt with individually, are mostly positive and students reach their set objective.

Tutors moderators interact on the level of *many with many*. *The communication among students increases and the role of a tutor is decreased*. The introduction of student tutoring as collaboration among students contributes to strengthening mutual trust and collaboration (Moust, Bouhuijs, & Schmidt, 2001)

2.2 Role of Tutor and Mentor. Tutor is *usually* a higher education teacher. This additionally clouds otherwise unclear defined borders between tutors and higher education teachers. Higher education teachers shall have or are expected to have skills, which are necessarily assigned to a tutor. Is the hypothesis: every pedagogical worker is also a tutor, correct?

The role of a facilitator is very useful, who, with the help of interactions (i.e. scaffolding) achieves a student to independently understand and use the acquired knowledge. They see opportunities in long-distance tutoring and students(tutees) are warmed up to additional acquiring of specific knowledge. Their work as well as tutor's is evident in the gratitude of students. Tutors are concerned with lack of time for tutor work (Turnšek Mikačič, 2008).

2.3 Teacher Tutoring. A higher education teacher, who is a tutor and is skilled in coaching, directs the tutee to develop their potentials and alleviates the study subject.

As mentors of first year students at higher education institutions encounter with students through their mentor hours, they are almost always available, when students need assistance. They warn about student communication, which can lead to certain discrepancies. Tutor, who is skilled in modern methods of communication, always

confirms mutual understanding and expresses respect to students, their colleagues, and themselves (Radovan, 2011).

Teachers, who are tutors have doubts of leading 50 to 100 students. A tutor facilitator can lead from 50 to 100 students with the assistance of ICT tools such as using forums and emails, while when we need to communicate one to one or on an individual basis the maximum number reduces to 20 students.

2.4 Student Tutoring. Several forms of student tutoring have been described: introduction, objective, and student tutoring, and tutoring for foreign students. A tutor's reputation is also a promotion of an establishment, its professors and students.

The suggestion of higher education teachers is to train student tutors to cover all the areas needed. The role of teachers and current mentors would become a role of coordinators among student tutors. The interested should be trained for tutoring at the end of the first year and it would make sense to give one student each an area or an individual for several areas (Turnšek Mikačič, 2008).

Tutoring has many advantages, yet the general opinion is, a suitable student is not easy to acquire, who would be motivated enough for such form of tutoring. Higher education institutions have attempted, but it was very difficult to acquire a senior student, who was prepared to perform these assignments. Because the role of a tutor is respected and established, the student tutor is an advantage, because they gain experience and a positive reputation.

Use of student tutor for foreign students is a method of student tutoring a foreign student, who was assisted by a student for a second year of studies, who was also born in the same country.

2.5 Tutee and generations. Education opportunities may introduce new professional, didactic, and communication approaches, which are adapted to various generations. Generation Z have had more opportunities to use various tools in their educational experiences, are better educated overall in comparison to other generations and females have had a greater role in the workforce. Warren (2012) states that different generations were taught using different approaches (e.g. from linear, modular to constructivist environments); however it is important to note that Reeves (in Warren, 2012) further states that there are differences, but this does not mean that we need to use different technologies just because previous

generations were taught using different approaches. We need to remember that ICT are just tools to assist us and not the core of teaching. For more detailed information on differences in approaches among various generations are described in Pew Research Center's (2019) Social & Demographics Trends.

A tutee in a tutor process has a very complex role. The collaboration of tutees and their participation, which is specified in various levels, where each level demands certain professional knowledge, which is connected to specific methods of education.

They are expected independence, thinking abilities, consistency, professionalism and accuracy from future graduates. Students, at this level of study and in the current status of the educational system, dependent from directions and teacher directions. Students expect a lot from prepared materials, assignments with solutions, recipes in problem solving and quick management of subject themes before examination. This is the reason to direct students in the understanding of the function of human brain, its capacity and the models of regular studies, critical thinking, and active collaboration during the study process. The use of mind maps in studies contributes to a clear learning of the subject matter.

Interaction among students shall be created *to stimulate students to active transfer of knowledge to their classmates*, this reduces the passive monitoring of some of the students and an abundance of professor tutors and student tutors. Knowledge is strengthened not only with repetition, but with *the ability of passing it on to others*. This form stands for a wholesome and real community between the tutor and their tutees, where the interaction is one the level of many with many. *Communication among students is more spread than communication with their tutor*: with the increase of communication among students, the communication with their tutor is decreased. One suggestion is *more emphasis of specific teaching methods*: Tutee is not merely a passive part of the learning process, the tutee intervenes in the process and helps to create the process by their participation, as such, it is an interactive model. Accepting and conquering knowledge is not an individual process, but includes communication with other people. Learning is more active and interactive, therefore more effective (Turnšek Mikačič, 2008).

Participation is involvement, engagement of the tutees, which takes place on three levels: participation via information (spreading

knowledge); participation via setting opinions, encouragements, instruction (internal processes of opinion and decision making, versions); participation via mutual development of ideas and solutions (external opinion shaping, problem solving, decision preparing).

Collaborative (cooperative) studying with the use of, for example, the internet, designs a non-authoritative social environment for the students to exchange their knowledge freely and express their opinions. Group interaction, constant collaboration with a teacher, asynchronous communication with the help of special communication tools, integrated in the learning environment, where cooperative learning and construction of new knowledge occurs.

A tutor is concerned with *the active and central role of a student* (Radovan, 2011) in the learning process (learner directed training, self-study, independent learning).

A student must never have a feeling they are in any way positioned lower than the tutor. Just as well as a tutor can set clear boundaries and let students know, they are alone responsible for their results. Tutors and tutees can communicate in several ways. The increase of communication among students decreases the communication with a tutor. Teacher tutors meet the students, who begin studying just before their examination. When both parties, the tutor and the tutee, have a good connection, it is the tutor who directs the tutee prior to the examination and together they develop an adapted learning method.

The role of the tutee is mostly solving problems during their studies in a given time and to trust the tutor. If the students successfully pass their study obligations and tutors are successful in their work with students, then *the quality barometer* of the establishment begins to rise. When preparing an interview with the tutee, the tutor researches the choices, which are available or is familiar with answers and follows the understanding of the tutee. It is of utmost importance to actively listen and empathize with the person. A tutor is aware of the important tutor skill of recognising an essential problem and attempts at conquering the issue with the tutor in a way, they are both satisfied with the met objective. An objective is defined with individual smaller steps, which is reached by the tutee.

2.6 Tutor Competences Definition.

Fundamental competences of a tutor should be the fundamental competences of any teacher. Competences of study programmes are important among competences, particularly the general and

generic ones. A tutor's role is also a management role and development of these study competences as well as encouraging their development. Recently, connecting such competences to the content of the study programmes, explaining their meaning and role in specific professional competence has become neglected. This is an opportunity for tutoring (Hampel & Stickler, 2007).

It is very important for *a tutor to know their own competences* to be able to explain to the students the competences, which are offered by each subject in the study programme. *A student should be able to determine the competences of their future profession, which automatically effects the positive attitude towards the studies.*

The idea of a team of tutors with various competences at a high level is also recommended (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and can only lead to higher quality. The sole question is, how would student tutors accept such organization?

When designing a competence plan, the competences of the tutees as well as the tutors must be considered. Higher education teacher tutors have designed a matrix of their competences and marked the challenges they might expect in the future. The acquired competences should not be neglected but maintained and strengthened.

2.7 Competences Expected by Employers.

Tutors acquaint students with employers expectations in individual categories, which are then divided into values, skills and professional basic knowledge. Tutors examine the harmony of tutee's expectations to the expectations of the employers. Based on these findings tutors set their objectives in individual subjects. As organisers of practical education, tutors' also function as tutors with their company mentors. It occurs very often that company mentors (this mostly occur in organisations that seldomly deal with student work practice) rarely even know, what the students do or the assignments they are given. The situation is unpleasant, even though they explain everything in detail to the students before leaving for their practical work experience. Students also receive instructions and for their company mentors. Companies with experience or regular student work experience practice provide a different situation. Tutors, as organisers of practical education, visit the companies and discuss the performance of the work experience on the spot (Turnšek Mikačič, 2008). These visits are often used to determine the topic and agenda and discuss any outstanding items that otherwise may have not occurred.

2.8 Advantages of Tutor as Coach. It is

believed the mentor/tutor/coach combination is an excellent combination, but each construct has its own definition (D'Abate, Eddy, & Tannenbaum, 2003). The skills of coaching can be used in tutoring. A higher education teacher, as a coach uses coaching methods in their work, which is not connected to time-consuming work and specific strains for an individual. After a tutor is introduced to the coaching techniques and tools, they use these tools in learning, tutoring, communication, and in life. Coaching is partially similar to project management where the project team has its objective, poses questions, determines how to achieve the set objective, the activities that need to be performed, and designing a time sheet of these activities. Tutors also determine how to examine their success along the way, also to determine if the path is correct and if the set objective is partly fulfilled. With students, who wish to improve, this approach increases in self-confidence (Turnšek Mikačić, 2008). Even the students, who pass the assignment later (sometimes after a year or more) experience the task as not as difficult, but they just needed to begin. *If you want to reach your goal, you must take the first step.*

Additional advantages of being a tutor as well as a coach is in the scope of ones activities and can access students in a more professional and focused way. These are more individually oriented and aware of their role in providing directions. The presumption of a coach is that everyone has the solutions and answers within, they just need to locate their internal sources of energy to help them achieve their set objectives. (Turnšek Mikačić, 2008). It is those advantages that enable greater efficiency of the tutor and better performance in tutoring.

A vital role in maintaining the form of a tutor is lifelong learning (Macuh, 2013). The author defined a tutor as a unique personality, who builds their work and life on personal and business *excellence*. Coaching is a useful tool in bringing change at the personal and professional level as well as collective promotion.

Usually changes within an individual are difficult to introduce due to existing patterns, habits and beliefs, as well as identities, they live and cope with at a specific moment. Introducing change means facing the fear outside of our comfort zones, the area of the unknown, our fears, and the surroundings (Hayes, 2006; McDemott & Jago, 2012). Coaching as well as other tools assist individuals to stay away from being *stuck in their limited beliefs*, to keep them in the *flow* and in accordance with their abilities and demands. Students in the tutoring process are guided on their

way to perception, change and introduction of new efficient patterns, habits, approaches with the elements of coaching. After meeting with students, who wish to improve, but with patterns, habits and approaches that were unsuccessful, a tutor can *light up their curiosity, influence their growth of confidence*, even by complimenting something, they could create. The goal of a good teacher is to achieve, even with the least talented students, a standard level of knowledge, while leading others *to exceed that level with their own effort.*

Tutoring with coaching is implemented during each contact with the tutee. According to the research at the Pennsylvania High School Coaching Initiative (Otto, 2009; PAHSOI) conducted in the period of three years the teachers, who were regularly involved in coaching, reached great progress in several areas. A little more than 90% of teachers stated that coaching assisted them in understanding and using new teaching techniques. Teachers, who were regularly involved in coaching one per one, have reported to achieve great changes in teaching in practice, their students were more involved and excited to learn, and their attendance in classes drastically increased.

The method of work of a coach differs from tutoring. A tutor, who is familiar with work of a coach, acquires abilities and easier conduct in working on work assignments with students (Dragovic & Gorenc Zoran, 2019). The advantages of a tutor coach in comparison to classic tutoring is the personal approach, which results in quicker development of an individual and reaching higher set objectives. A tutor coach becomes a more active personality, creative and more ambitious as a result making them better decision makers. The advantages can also be found in the way of thinking and acting. Their activity is future-oriented and mutual collaboration reaches higher synergy effects

A true tutor makes the student feel as if they are allies, the student trusts the tutor and believes their issues and problems, they entrust them. This is achieved with active listening and encouraging, believing in the student, in their competence and success in reaching their goal. Trust is built on honesty and sincere communication. Acceleration of activity is seen in preparing a plan alongside the student. Accepting responsibility is something that is made clear upon their first meeting. It should be clear, they are aware of the responsibility and portrays how they themselves act, if things do not go as planned (Turnšek Mikačić, 2008). They lead by their own example.

Becoming a coach is an effective path towards

becoming excellent tutors in practice. Coaching encourages personal challenges and the abilities for decision making as well as greater self-confidence (Kalan, 2009). The creativity of a coach is perceived as an advantage. Mikačić Turnšek (2008) discusses that a tutor has the following characteristics of a coach: curiosity, empathy, and listening skills. Tutor continues to assist the tutee to reach their set objectives or exceed their expectations. They are positive towards their students and listens to their ideas and suggestions. They pose the right questions to encourage thinking about themselves, their work, and their progress. The skill of a coach to listen is more important than speaking (Dragovic, 2010;). Listening provides a tutor with an opportunity to research the tutee's personality and recognise their desire for personal growth.

A coach helps the tutee, how to see their own potential and encourages them to think about his excellent characteristics. This ability is very welcomed in tutelage as well.

2.9 Basic Concepts of Coaching and Tutoring and Career Plans. The coaching concepts following Turnšek Mikačić (2008) are: creating alliances (creating a relaxed atmosphere, active listening, trust between a tutor and a student); building trust (honest communication, conversation, also about tutee's student or life issues); acceleration of activity (active cooperation of all participants, motivation); accepting responsibility (responsibility is shared among both parties, student tutor, tutor is aware of their responsibility and they present the responsibility of the students at the mere beginning).

Tutors introduce the methods of creating alliances with students, trust, acceleration of activity and accepting responsibilities. Alliances with students are attempted by showing interest in their projects and explaining, as a tutor, that they (tutors) too want to learn something new. Trust is built by strictly abiding by what has been agreed upon and clearly state, they expect the same from the students. Acceleration of activities is necessary, when there is an irreconcilable obstacle on the path to the set objective. There is nothing wrong with going back a step or two to achieve a new momentum for the students.

Students during the tutoring process are also encouraged to develop *career plans* (Turnšek Mikačić, 2014). Each student should at least draft such a plan regarding the professional competences of the study programme that they are enrolled in. When creating a career plan, the role of a tutor

(tutor–teacher, tutor–programme leader and so forth) is vital, if not essential.

Career coaching has a very important role, as it provides an individual with an opportunity to design their own personal career and competence plan with personal characteristics, experience, knowledge, skills and objectives, which assist individuals in following their objectives and strengthens, their self-confidence, and trust.

2.10 Effective Communication in Tutoring.

The law of communication is that it is impossible not to communicate – all people communicate in one way or another. Silence is also a part of communication. Communication is based on the ability to listen, which should be a characteristic of both the tutor and tutee, and it is believed this ability is more important than speaking (McDemott & Jago, 2012; Turnšek Mikačić, 2008). Listening provides a tutor with an opportunity to research the tutee's personality and recognise their desire for personal growth. Listening provide the tutor with understanding of messages, tracking and the analysis of acquired data.

Communication has lately evolved into e-communication, where the use of ICT enables greater accessibility. A part of this is more effective study e-material and a quality transfer of feedback (Gorenc Zoran, Sarieva, & Harrison, 2009). *Feedback*, which can be nowadays given to a tutee by the tutors in the shortest period and is *a foundation for further work with the tutee* and enables faster examination of understanding and tracking, as well as leading the tutee to their set objective.

Active listening and observation, acceptance, giving feedback, recognising student/tutee personal characteristics and professional (prior) knowledge, as well as non-verbal communication (body posture, facial expressions, position of arms).

When applying tools of neurolinguistic programming in e-learning, one can also use the VAKOG (visual, auditory, kinaesthetic, olfactory, gustatory) representative system, word patterns, anchoring, objective setting strategies, language meta model, Milton language and so forth that supplements verbal communication (McDemott & Jago, 2012; Mikačić Turnšek, 2008).

Good communication is achieved with the tools of successful communication in teaching, but also as a tutor, which is recognising perceptive types, observing non-verbal communication, perceiving body language, use of the PRL tools (pacing, rapport, non-content leading and content leading), mirroring, use of non-burdening words, and giving feedback (McDemott & Jago, 2012).

The meaning of a wholesome communication is mostly accepting and giving feedback, which does not mean receiving and accepting it. Certain examples, when a student criticizes the work of the professors only means they have different criteria for themselves and others. This is very often in practice. Communication is a two-way influence. It is possible to be available for *feedback* and *feedforward* for it is a method to examine if the co-speaker heard the message clearly due to the several informational noises (McDemott & Jago, 2012). Tutors can define this as walking a mile in the tutee's shoes to research their model of the world.

Informational and communication technologies are increasingly more important method of communication with students. Their scope is designing, examining, multiplying, remembering, writing and coding, transfer and decoding such messages. The term technology applies to the technical means to design and transfer messages.

Moodle is a Learning Management System (LMS) that is open source and provides many useful opportunities besides basic content. Now, other LMS tools are available with various other functions, but in countries where LMS need to be translated, Moodle provides a greater variety of support than other LMS (Gorenc Zoran & Rozman, 2010). Moodle is a tool for creating dynamic on-line classrooms, ot is inclusive of students, as it provides a great variety of functions for a teacher/tutor to meet their set objectives.

Many teachers and students that are actively involved are older. Of course, technology individuals may require a higher learning curve. Due to the latest research, technologies enable *older people a transformation* into a more active and creative part of the population (Radovan, 2011).

As such, teacher tutors who would like to utilize technologies may use them to reach their goals; however, the tool should not outweigh the purpose (Gorenc Zoran, 2010) of tutoring. The use of technologies if appropriately implemented enables greater mutual connectivity between tutors and students, and better mutual communication and interactivity of students with their course content material.

3. METHODS

Based on the review of literature, three research theses were developed (see Figure 1), which are: (1) Tutor motivates the students in their educational process; (2) 2. Tutor alleviates studying by introducing methods of coaching and communication; (3) 3. Tutor introduces ICT tools

to adapt learning for new generations.




Fig. 1. Research Hypotheses.

Qualitative framework was used to examine eighteen examples of e-learning on tutoring skills in a one month period. Based on the research theses developed, a qualitative framework was used that was situated within focus groups. The study was carried out using conversations between the teacher, who was leading the training, and the higher education teacher tutors who were in training. The material was gathered and organised and transcribed, summarized, coded and categorized. More specifically, the qualitative analysis procedure was distributed in six steps: (1) material organisation, (2) definition of coding units, (3) open coding, (4) selection and definition of relevant concepts and categories, (5) relational coding and (6) designing the final theoretical formulation based on Glaser & Strauss guidelines (1967) and Strauss & Corbin's (1990) framework. Qualitative data was input into ATLAS.ti (ATLAS.ti Scientific Software Development GmbH) for coding and categorization. ATLAS.ti is a scientific programme, which assists in discovering complex phenomena, hidden in data.

4. RESULTS

The major categories for each of the thesis statements are seen in Figure 2 and are discussed in more detail below.




Fig. 2. Qualitative Analysis

4.1 Thesis 1: Tutor motivates the students in their educational process. Due to the *crazy* pace of life learning as pleasure is of great importance,

specifically in finding time to study. Comprehensive coordination is important for effective and successful learning. Some people find it in night-time or evenings, when they can take some time and stop their thoughts from scattering. The moment when a comprehensive reconciliation is achieved, people are in the flow and learn subconsciously. Lecturing is a challenge and a pleasure for the tutor themselves. Their responsibility is directing all energy into positive thinking and collaboration with the students. If they cannot see challenge and pleasure in what they do, *they cannot portray the student learning as a challenge and pleasure.*

The role of a tutor in a classroom is of key importance for the student's success. A successful tutor is someone, who can intermix ICT tools and e-materials with standard and traditional methods for encouraging students' activity. Learning becomes a pleasure, *when the tutor enjoys their work*, encourages problem solving of specific situations and realistic assignments; encourages logical thinking and teamwork; and encourages students to be more flexible and cooperative.

4.2 Thesis 2: Tutor alleviates studying by introducing methods of coaching and communication. Introducing coaching in tutoring can result in successful studies in the process of education. An inappropriate approach made by a coach can result in distrust, thus it is better to not have a coach, if they are not adequately qualified. *Certain elements of coaching can be used by tutors in their work*, particularly in higher grades or in later parts of the studies. Even more, the introduction of coaching as additional training would be more prominent.

Implementation is possible with students, who are part of the higher education study programme as part-time students. They perceive assignments of a coach as welcoming. The higher education teacher coach implements basic tools of *how to reach realisation of basic coaching concepts in tutoring*: Creating alliance, building trust, acceleration of activity, and accepting responsibility.

4.3 Thesis 3: Tutor introduces ICT tools to adapt learning for new generations. Informational and communication technologies are increasingly a more important method of communication with students. One of the advantages of ICT tools is also having all materials and communication tools for a particular subject in one place with access for all. ICT tools enables greater mutual connectivity between tutors and students, and better mutual

communication and interactivity of students with their course content matter.

5. CONCLUSION

The constructivist theory (Vygotsky, 1978) introduces changes in the roles of teacher and tutor as it defines the learning process as a social process, which encourages and demands, besides basic communication between the teacher and the student, communication among participants, colleagues, friends and such. technology has a supportive role, which enables connection between various sources of information at individual networks, where quick evaluation is very important due to the increasing scope of knowledge and experience.

Faced with the mix of generations the mission of lecturers and tutors is to adapt to the expectation of these different generations. Not to stagnate in methods and approaches in the past, but also to be ready to make changes.

Just as *education*, so will *tutoring* change. The standard and classic definition of education is no longer relevant nowadays, when having access to information at the touch of the finger. The best lectures of top universities, student online assistance, virtual and 3D technology is free of charge and available to contribute to the new approach in learning. Teachers and tutors will accept the role of a facilitator to teach students, how to navigate and evaluate the abundance of data that is projected onto each and every one of us on a daily basis. Teaching and learning in interdisciplinary teams will be of vital importance.

Information and knowledge is changing and evolving. The role of a tutor is altered to teach and prepare the students to *acquire new knowledge* and search *appropriate information* independently. The employers often expects this ability from their professionals, who have to *constantly learn and update their knowledge*. *The role of a classically defined teacher has partly redefined in a tutor*, who offers *support* to their students in their studies and searches and evaluates for new information. A tutor is needed in distance education as students are often on their own and need assistance.

Times are changing and so is the role of a teacher. A teacher is no longer just a teacher; they are individuals with professional competences and effective techniques of transferring knowledge to their students, as well as other competences and personality traits. Not only is the transference of knowledge important, but the role of the facilitator and teaching students how to find and evaluate

material – giving them the tools.

We know that education takes place anytime and anywhere, and never just in a classroom. Learning is a lifelong process and it no longer focuses on a teacher or an institution. It is recommended that a teacher acquires competences of a coach and tutor that has communicative and motivational skills as well as skills in ICT management.

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DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION AND CULTURAL CHANGE OF HIGHER EDUCATION

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Abstract: *Given the contemporary technological development, student demands and requirements and budgetary pressure higher education leaders have to find ways to adapt their institutions to these realities and make a cultural educational shift, to include here promoting different approaches to teaching and learning, exploring the predictive value of data, and acquiring technological solutions. This article uses digital storm model to explore some digital transformation trends for education, including augmented reality, gamification, personalized learning and redesigned learning spaces which are revolutionizing higher education and lead to a cultural shift in this domain.*

Keywords: *digital transformation; higher education; cultural change; digitalization*

1. INTRODUCTION

The world has never faced such a virulent crisis as this one caused by a killer virus generically called COVID-19. No one can say how long this crisis will last, nor how strong its impact will be on our future existence. However one thing seems to be certain, once caught, the COVID-19 virus will generate a new world, a world more adapted to the digital age in which we already live. The signs are more than conclusive, it is clear that many of the socio-economic activities of these days have moved into the virtual space, and the option of working from home is becoming more and more widespread. We shop online, we communicate with our bosses and everyone close to us online and we relax online without realizing that all of these will change our mindset, work style and lifestyle in general. From these evolutions, education is no exception, especially higher education which contributes to the maturation of the characters and the perfection of the students' mentalities. We have seen these days the teachers' concerns related to finding additional ways to move the meeting with their students from amphitheatres into virtual classrooms, to ensure the continuity of the educational process. But beyond these steps remains the question, what should universities do in the face of such a challenge? and, especially, how should they look at their future and the higher educational programs they manage?

The reality of recent years shows that higher education institutions have faced many problems

due to both the dynamics and the increasing complexity of the labor market, which have forced the adaptation of educational programs while optimizing their own funding sources, as well as meeting the expectations of the students related to the way they are carrying out the teaching-learning-research process. To meet these challenges, higher education institutions had to take radical measures that would bring them financial stability and maintain their level of academic excellence. At the same time, universities have begun to introduce digital technology which they have gradually integrated as a catalyst for all academic transformations. But, the main purpose of higher education institutions is to train future specialists from different fields of economic and social life in both the government and private sectors. Therefore, the main concern of universities should be to create that educational environment that offers students and researchers the most appropriate learning experiences adapted to the demands of the labor market, and this highly dependant on the successful use of the best technological tools. At the same time, universities are aware that they represent entities of the contemporary society, a society increasingly based on knowledge in which the widespread dissemination of information and communication technology gives rise to new learning requirements and demands new skills, in particular digital skills needed for employment, education and lifelong learning, self-development and participation in social life. Therefore, as contemporary society

becomes more and more dependent on digital technologies, what people have to learn and know is changing. This reality has led to the conclusion that a new vision is needed on the role and importance of digital technologies and learning that takes into account the changes and tendencies that transform the way people work, learn or prepare to give sense to the society in which they live; a society increasingly digitalised, more connected in the network and more based on knowledge (Punie & Cabrera, 2005).

In this context, the article uses digital storm model to explore some digital transformation trends for education, including augmented reality, gamification, personalized learning and redesigned learning spaces which are revolutionizing higher education and lead to a cultural shift in this domain

2. CONTINUOUS LEARNING FACILITATED BY DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY – A HOLISTIC APPROACH

It is an undeniable fact that most of the debates on the future of academic education focus on instrumental objectives that are related to adapting learning institutions and the workforce to the demands of the digital economy. As a result, in the academic practice such instrumental concerns have already become a serious challenge for all the actors involved: students, teachers, researchers, auxiliary teaching staff, etc. and, although it seems that everyone is concerned and involved, there is still much to be done to make those necessary changes to the academic field that will lead to the results expected by the contemporary digital society. We need to be aware that learning is important because of its contribution to the emancipation, evolution of humanity and the self-fulfillment of people. Therefore, among its objectives should be found not only those aiming at the formation of professional competences, but also objectives that aim at the formation of social competences, the development of critical thinking skills, knowledge exchange or cooperation techniques. Therefore, reflections on the future of learning in a digital and knowledge-based society should not only address instrumental questions, but also should raise more theoretical, normative and ethical issues related to learning and education: what do we need to know and learn? why do we have to learn? what kind of society do we consider when we expect people to have certain skills and competences?

Thus, as we have already shown, we need to become more and more aware that a new vision of digital technologies and learning is needed, taking

into account the tendencies that transform the way people work, learn and live. But, this vision should not be realized by an adaptive strategy based on reactions to the new requirements as they arise, but it must be realized by a proactive strategy that, considering the evolution of socio-economic trends of the future society, having the ability to anticipate future learning needs and requirements. Such a strategy should focus on the interaction between technology and changing environmental circumstances and allow the adaptation of higher education institutions through a real digital transformation. Only the mere acquisition of new digital technologies will not lead to the digital transformation of higher education institutions, as even the simple modernization of the educational management system will not achieve this goal. The digital transformation must be at the intersection of technology and institutional strategy and its main objective is to design the digital architecture of the university and the necessary IT applications, as well as to prepare the campus organizations and staff (students, teachers, researchers, auxiliary teaching staff, etc.) to achieve this objective.

Therefore, addressing the future of learning in a digital society must be a holistic one, as learning has become a lifelong activity that addresses future generations and a multitude of socio-professional fields specific to both the private and public spheres. Thus, implementing such a strategy should not be only the task of traditional formal learning institutions, such as existing schools and universities or training institutions, but should also encompass other forms of adult education, such as informal learning or learning the use of digital technology.

Experts of the European e-Learning Observatory HELIOS (Aceto *et al.*, 2006), advocate for a future strategy that will lead to learning beyond the traditional-sectoral approach based on digital technologies (HELIOS, 2020) promoted today. A knowledge-based society really creates the need for new digital skills and abilities. The European Commission has already identified digital skills as key competencies that people need for personal development, active citizenship, social inclusion and employment (LLP, 2007:7). It is important to note that the European Commission does not only refer to the so-called digital literacy, that is to learn how to operate this technology, but to the formation of higher order skills, such as knowing and understanding what it means to live in a digitized and networked society. This applies to both students and teachers, as well as trainees and training staff.

Given the European framework for lifelong learning, in the formation of digital skills and competences, universities play an essential role, which is why their digital transformation appears to be of prime importance. Moreover, the risks and threats to which contemporary society is increasingly subjected indicate the need to move many of the socio-economic activities into the online space, which means an acceleration of the digitalization process of the contemporary society. This statement is fully demonstrated by the recent coronavirus pandemic. We still do not know for sure what the company will look like after the COVID-19 crisis, but we know that the process of digitalization will continue and will increase both its pace and complexity.

3. GENERAL TRENDS FOR MODELING THE FUTURE PROCESSES OF ACADEMIC EDUCATION

In the years to come the world will face extremely important social and technological challenges, which will decisively affect future education and training processes. In the following we will present some of the most representative trends and challenges that significantly affect these processes. First of all, the processes of academic education specific to the knowledge-based society will be significantly modeled by the evolutionary trends of digital technology. Although such tendencies of modeling of learning processes exist and are already manifesting, it is expected that they will become more accentuated and set their mark more and more on all future education and training processes. Among these trends we can mention: the easier access to the broadband Internet, the use of blogs or web-blogs as major sources of information and communication by Internet users, the transformation of podcasting into the engine of so-called mobile learning, use of SMS and MMS services as sources of rapid information transmission, development of open source software/open source content, etc.

The development of digital technologies will also generate other tendencies that can contribute to changing the university educational landscape such as, for example, the convergence of digital infrastructures/technologies (integration of broadcast technologies, mobile phones, data and other computer networks), increasing the scope of alternative technologies such as wireless technologies (for example, wireless hotspots), convergence of content/media (eg newspapers, music, TV, blogs), development of multimodal

devices (for example, mobile phones that take professional pictures and simultaneously receive radio programs / tv), etc.

In addition, we must also take into account the existence of the European vision on the future information society, called ambient intelligence (which is based on the ubiquity of computers) which refers to the use of all the technologies listed above for connecting people, machines, computers and sensors in heterogeneous and ubiquitous networks (ISTAG, 2001). This vision of a smart environment through which proactive and user-defined services are accessible in a very intuitive way has important implications for learning because it can facilitate social learning through media-based, virtual learning synchronous environments (Burgelman & Punie, 2006:17-33).

Secondly, the education and training processes specific to the future society, based on knowledge will be significantly modeled by some social tendencies and challenges, among which we mention the change of skills and competences in the workplace, individuals lifestyle and learning trajectory, demographics, migration and lifelong learning. In addition, globalization, diversity and alignment of education and training systems are trends that academic education in the future knowledge-based society cannot escape. Higher education institutions will compete for the best students in the world and possibly for those who can afford to study abroad or access renowned educational models and brands. In this regard, education based on digital technologies could support this trend, providing access to high quality education, without the need for students to move abroad.

4. DIGITALIZATION – THE MAIN TENDENCY OF MODELING OF HIGHER EDUCATION

From the ones presented above it is clear that digitalization is the main tendency to model higher education that the society will need in the future. In other words, any modern university must put digitalization in the forefront of its future goals. The ultimate goal should be the creation of a digital institution in which educators, students, researchers and all ancillary staff use digital technology tools continuously to increase the quality and efficiency of academic teaching-learning and scientific research processes, which are becoming increasingly integrated and more collaborative. In this context, digital technologies are becoming key factors in adapting learning

experiences to future socio-economic realities. This raises serious questions about the responsible use of digital technology, as well as how higher education institutions can provide an easy environment for digital transformation.

In general, the issue of digital transformation of higher education is the subject of in-depth scientific research, but it is also the subject of pragmatic articles, generally made by specialists from companies such as SAP, CISCO, SAS, etc. In their opinion, digital transformation refers to “process and strategy of using digital technology to drastically change how businesses operate and serve customers” (SAS, 2020). George Westerman, principal researcher at MIT and author of the book *Leading Digital: Turning Technology into Business Transformation*, shows that

digital transformation marks a radical rethinking of how an organization uses technology, people and processes to fundamentally change business performance (Boulton, 2019).

Thus, digital transformation becomes a reality in all economic-social fields, including that of academic education, which can be understood as “changes that digital technology causes or influences in all aspects of human life” (Stolterman & Fors, 2004:687-692). This understanding of digital transformation as an intrinsic change - shows that digital transformation is not just about technology (Weill & Woerner, 2018) and even if it is a source of innovation, it is not synonymous with it (Kletzkine, 2018). This interpretation of digital transformation as the factor that affects all aspects of organization and functioning of an organization/university is decisive for how the leadership team of that organization plans and directs changes (Boulton, 2019). Therefore, the digital transformation of university education is a process by which the digital technologies introduced in a university determine a constant evolution of the working methods and the academic systems and processes within it, in order to produce an added value for students and beneficiaries. Often, the process has led to the adoption of new models of academic operation based on new revenue and expenditure flows.

As we have already shown, the digital transformation of higher education does not refer only to technology, but occurs through the interaction between university employees, academic teaching-learning and scientific research processes and digital technologies, being guided by a broader transformation strategy. Success comes

when fundamental promotion of a new model of academic operation. Universities that succeed in changing their mindsets, strategies and culture will be successful in promoting digital transformation efforts.

5.TRENDS IN DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION. TOWARDS A CULTURE OF DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION

As we have already shown, digital technologies will have an impact on all analytics and data management technologies are used in conjunction with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing and the Internet of Things that accelerate digital transformation. Even though many higher education institutions regard technology as a panacea for digital transformation, we emphasize once again that the success of this process is based on three main pillars: people, academic processes and technology (Kline, 2015).

A university can fully achieve its objectives of digitalization only if all three components of digital transformation - people, academic processes and technology - work in tandem. Approaching a digitalization strategy based on the three pillars means a major change in the organizational culture of higher education institutions that will ultimately lead to the socio-economic fields and will transform the way all socio-professional institutions and organizations operate. These technologies connect people and transform their way of social and professional interaction, and the current crisis caused by the COVID-19 virus seems to accelerate this process. Although it Figure 1 – Digital Storm model seems quite difficult to appreciate how digital technologies will evolve and influence the way in which higher education institutions operate, we will try to use the *digital storm model* (SAP, 2018), promoted by specialists from Systems, Applications, and Products in Data Processing - SAP to identify some evolutionary trends in digital transformation of higher education. The digital storm model was promoted by SAP specialists to describe the impact of digital technologies on some industrial areas. According to this model (see figure below), digital transformation involves three digital storm stages, so that all industries eventually reach what the model calls the *hurricane* stage. As can be seen, SAP specialists also refer to the higher education that they place directly in the third phase of digital transformation, a phase called *hurricane*. And this

is because, as in the industries mainly based on consumption (banking, commerce, telecommunications, media and entertainment) in higher education, as well, the key to success lies in increasing the added value of academic services and improving the overall experience of all their clients, especially to students, researchers and teachers. Thus, companies in these industries, for which digital transformation is crucial, will focus on business model innovation. This is also the case for higher education institutions.

We consider the digital storm model as a suitable model for our analysis because it has been tested by SAP specialists on a number of approx. 500 (SAP, 2018) of their clients company and it turned out to be extremely realistic. Therefore, using this model, we place higher education in the hurricane phase, and we suggest that higher education institutions formulate their own digital transformation strategies whose main objective is to transform the traditional academic business model into a new one where digital technology connects all personnel for the implementation of academic and administrative processes that are much more efficient and adapted to the realities of the future labor market. Even if the general perception is that the mere introduction of technology is a panacea, we must be convinced that the success of a digital transformation strategy is based on three main pillars: technology, academic processes and, not least, people.

When it comes to technology, the success of the digital transformation strategy is ensured when fundamental analytical and data management technologies are used in conjunction with emerging technologies such as internet of things, blockchain, augmented and virtual reality, artificial intelligence and machine learning, chatbots or cloud computing (Ferdinko, 2019) that represent true catalysts for digital transformation. From the perspective of the academic processes, the successful digital transformation strategy will be ensured when these processes will be based on combining traditional with augmented and virtual reality, artificial intelligence, gamification, personalized learning and redesigned learning spaces (Newman, 2017). From a human perspective, the success of the digital transformation strategy will be ensured when teachers, researchers, auxiliary teaching staff and students concentrate their efforts on two main directions. The first direction involves the transformation of the academic teaching-learning and scientific research services, which would mean the creation of new educational products while digitizing the existing products (Ferdinko, 2019). This direction should also focus on the use of digital means of communication between teachers and students. The second direction will need to focus on digitizing all the common operations of higher education institutions (Ferdinko, 2019). This category should include the admission of students, their registration in the study programs and the record of their participation in the courses and examinations, the management of the study programs, etc. In this category should also be included administrative services such as classes and




Fig.1 Digital Storm Mod. Source: SAP- The Digital Storm will Impact Every Industry (SAP, 2018)

For the other two digital storm phases the demands of digital transformation are more relaxed, although for the industries placed in these phases the final goal should be *hurricane*. For example, in the *high winds* phase are placed intensive industries which are more focused on innovating business processes and increasing labor productivity, while in the *severe storm* phase, we find those industries that focus on transforming the cost structure through automation and process innovation. However, in this phase we will find industries that have the objective of innovating the business model, but this will happen in time.

teacher allocation, educational and scientific research infrastructures management, etc.

It is more than obvious that technology makes a difference in the implementation of digital transformation strategies. However, without a change in the way people work and behave, technology cannot do much. In other words, without actively promoting a digital culture, that is, without breaking the barriers between traditional higher education and IT, digital transformation efforts will be doomed to failure. Universities should invest in IT culture and change management programs that prepare teachers and students, along with all academic staff, to work as comfortably with smart technology as they do with their colleagues. Increasing the share of digital technology does not mean that people will compete with these technologies for a job. On the contrary, when people learn to work with digital technologies, the prerequisites for improving the academic performance of higher education institutions are created.

Although cultural aspects decisively influence digital transformation, most organizations do not assume explicit attributions in this regard. Organizational change that aims to change the way an organization operates is not enough, it must be doubled by measures aimed at implementing new behaviors and attitudes of employees and which will cause a change in the culture of that organization. This will cause employees to give up old behaviors and adapt to new working conditions. Creating a digital culture within universities is difficult, but once created, the culture will support the adoption of digital technology. For true change to occur, it must be supported by all university staff, including students. Digital technology is important, but it cannot produce digital transformation without cultural change. Culture makes digital technology relevant, which is why culture cannot be overlooked.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Higher education institutions, as entities in the service of the contemporary knowledge-based society, have new learning tasks and requirements related to the widespread dissemination of digital technologies. Contemporary society is becoming more and more dependent on these technologies and this is reflected in what people have to learn and know. Therefore, the processes of academic education specific to the knowledge-based society will be significantly modeled by the trends of the evolution of digital technology. In this sense, in the education of future generations higher education

needs a new vision that takes into account the influence of digital technologies on the way people work, learn or prepare to give meaning to the society in which they live. This vision must be embodied in a coherent and proactive strategy of digital transformation of the universities, which takes into account the trends of socio-economic evolution of the society and has the capacity to anticipate the future learning needs and demands. Such a strategy should focus on the interaction between technology and ever-changing environmental circumstances and be based on three main pillars: technology, people, academic processes. Approaching a digitalization strategy based on these three pillars produces a major change in the organizational culture of the universities that will ultimately lead to the promotion of a new academic education model.

Therefore, the mere introduction of technologies does not solve the problem of digital transformation of higher education institutions, yet the introduction of these technologies holds an important weight in this process. Therefore, it is important, although not easy, to make appraisals on how digital technologies will evolve and influence the way in which higher education institutions operate. In our research we used the digital storm model, promoted by specialists from Systems, Applications, and Products in Data Processing - SAP, to identify several trends in the evolution of digital transformation of higher education according to the evolution of digital technologies.

This model places higher education in the hurricane phase, and suggests that higher education institutions formulate their own digital transformation strategies based on three main pillars: technology, academic processes and people, whose main objective is to transform the traditional academic business model into a new digital model. Therefore, the digital transformation of higher education marks a radical rethink of the way in which higher education institutions use technology and people and shape academic processes to fundamentally change their educational performance. Universities must provide students and researchers with the most appropriate learning experiences tailored to future socio-economic needs, and this depends on the successful use of the best performing digital technologies.

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EXPLORING GEOGRAPHIES OF EXCLUSION: AN INQUIRY UPON LIMITS AND GOALS OF INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION WITHIN COMMUNICATION SCIENCES PROGRAMS

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Abstract: *Contemporary turn of informational revolutions raised vivid debates about genuine competencies and goals associated to intercultural communication. Geographies of exclusion became connected with ascent of new imagined and virtual communities, reshaping the democratic accountability and sustainability of Eastern and Central Europe. In this context, the study is pursuing two key hypotheses. First claims that intercultural training, carried through interactive didactic activities, represents a vector for increasing democratic behaviour, while the second one sustains that cross-cultural oriented educational curricula influence the establishment of civic responsibility. The research explores the intercultural competencies acquired by undergraduate students enrolled in communication sciences programs, following topics as: representations and discourses of majority and minority cultures, landmarks of marginality and stigma and not lastly, effects triggered by intercultural training upon active citizenship.*

Keywords: *intercultural education, geographies of exclusion, intercultural competencies, narratives of identity, active citizenship.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The global scene has changed since 1980, when UNESCO released its statement upon role of communication in shaping global politics and culture. Entitled "Many voices, one world", the UNESCO proclamation tackled the increasing concerns raised by echoes of informational revolutions in subjects as cultural alienation, isolation of marginal groups and political tendencies towards homogenization and silent integration of alternative identities (MacBride *et al.*, 1980: 160-162).

The '80 inaugurated however a nexus of phenomena including multiplication of modernity games (Sachsenmaier *et al.*, 2002: 197), proliferation of classical social cleavages, *detritorialization* of political orders, rise of non-state actors and ascent of new identity patterns, overpassing the traditional landmarks of nation or ethnicity. All these trends can be related with the profound changes triggered by popularization of mass communication and rise of network societies (Castells, 2011:1968). A few decades later, the genesis of virtual diasporic communities, accompanied by segregation of urban cultures from

peripheral and marginal space, determined new fragmentation lines, the behavioural and cultural clauses of democracy being putted under scrutiny. In this context, the study aims to sketch an exploratory map of the interdependencies arisen amid intercultural competencies and civic accountability of youth, by measuring the impact of intercultural education upon topics as virtual activism, attitudes towards minority groups and discourses of marginality and stigma. By invoking the Romanian casuistry, the research intends to demonstrate the resilience of some pre-modern stereotypes in defining and circulating identity narratives and in establishing geographies of exclusion (Sibley, 1995: 109).

2. INTERCULTURALISM AND MULTICULTURALISM. RESETTling THE FRAME

2.1 Reconciliation in intercultural and multicultural dialogue. Even if the terms of intercultural education and intercultural competencies are widely used in communication sciences or media studies, perhaps they aren't yet fully understood (Fantini, 2000:26). Even so, the

interculturalists do agree upon what we may call as the dual nature of the intercultural communication, a notion which requires the simultaneous presence into different cultural realms. In order to develop competence in another culture it is imperative to assume a powerful reflection upon your own cultural frame. By overpassing the language barrier, the native world of a different community, individual or group may seem accessible, but these intuitive translations may conceal yet strong stereotypes. Initially the intercultural training was designed to respond to the exigencies of those who choose to work in international and intercultural contexts (Fantini, 2000:25).

Nevertheless it was the case of a well-educated minority, experiencing the openness of globalization and transnationalization. However, the picture evolved in recent times, when digitalization and glocalization remodelled the internal geographies and imageries of national and traditional cultures.

The borders divide from now on not only national identities, but increasingly different social and cultural groups. In many liberal societies or more recently consolidated democracies, the rural communities and the peripheral groups, excluded often from the digital turn of social life, started to develop isolated cultural patterns. The reverberations of these new inter-societal cleavages may be recognized in contradictory trends such as: ascent of populism, decline of cultural consensus, radicalization of youth or unprecedented civic effervescence, ended often in democratic erosion (Negri, 2020:1).

Step by step, the intercultural dialogue began to matter. It was a long way from the historically roots of intercultural doctrine, targeting the cross-cultural communication problems which hampered collaboration amid individuals living in overseas communities and immigrant groups (Sinicrope *et al.*, 2007:2), to nowadays wide spectrum intercultural challenges. Purposes of intercultural training expanded, this growing interest in identifying solutions for nation-states cultural dilemmas being confirmed by proliferation of related labels.

No matter if we speak about cross-cultural awareness, intercultural sensitivity, *ethnorelativity*, *pluralism* (Sinicrope *et al.*, 2007:2) or contemporary puzzle word, globalism, this emergent vocabulary confirms the presence of an interesting unification movement. The dissolution of the dividing line between multiculturalism and interculturalism can be explained by appealing the unforeseen permeability and porosity of the borders, multiplied in inlands and slowly dissolving in

regional and transnational settings. Previously clash amid multicultural arguments and the intercultural approaches was based on integration versus assimilation dispute. Yet, the already complicated topic of identity narratives, based on ethno-historical traditional imageries or on the contrary, stemmed from more diverse and polyvalent identity equations (Meer *et al.*, 2016:8), it is revisited currently in the light of new difficult interrogations.

The logic of the nation-based political order was questioned by ascent of deterritorialization and diasporization, influential political leaders announcing the failure of classical projects of multiculturalism. In only one decade, Merkel, Sarkozy and Cameron, to name only a few, heralded the end of multiculturalism (Farrar *et al.*, 1999:9). The disenchantment of the multicultural credo was however determined by a very narrow understanding of its purposes. The multicultural design assumed by many European nations claimed to maintain the hegemony of a coherent master narrative (Meer *et al.*, 2016:8). Digitalization, along with migration and awakening of various dormant group identities made that claim difficult to satisfy. European multicultural project wasn't contradicted only by disruptive ethnic and religious minorities, almost impossible to integrate, but rather was denounced by later developments of globalization phenomenon. Continuous atomisation of social life and the growing distances amid generational cultures fostered contemporary rejection of initial model of multiculturalism.

New network societies expel the hypothesis of a dominant identity narrative, designed to absorb and harmonize the subjacent cultural nuances. In this latter days, even national grounds are subject of multiple and multimodal cultural orders. Hereby, the claims of multiculturalism and interculturalism slowly overlap (Meer *et al.*, 2016:8). First term was seen as integrative and unifying, while the second one was perceived as more geared on interactions of varied identities, excluding the metaphor of the melting pot. Leaving behind the complicated theoretical and ideological scaffolding surrounding multiculturalism versus interculturalism debate, one conclusion tend to emerge. The distances amid intercultural and multicultural perspectives are blurred, as W. Kymlicka announced in the advent of tech and digital activism (Kymlicka 2012:7).

In this manner intercultural and multicultural competencies present themselves more interrelated and interconnected than ever, mostly in field of education and formation. Cross-cultural dilemmas are surrounding everyday experiences, starting

with assigning the definition of minority and stigma and ending with electoral behaviour.

More important, the development and use of these competencies will decide whether or not young citizens will succeed in adapting their mind-sets and world views into different cultural codes, securing the liberal democracy equation within polyphonic cultural geographies.

2.2 Defining the terms and identifying the relevant research hypotheses. A major challenge in assessing a synthetic cultural competencies model refers to the identification of a unified conceptual model. Such endeavour present itself as temerarious, due to multiple reasons: diversity of approaches and sources, presence of multiple research fields with different methodological traditions and not lastly fluidity of concepts.. Still, researchers tend to agree in characterizing cultural competences by invoking three major milestones (Fantini, 2000:27): 1. the ability to develop and maintain relationship, 2. the ability to communicate effectively and appropriately and 3. the ability to attain cooperation and compliance. This triadic structure proves that:

not only do these domains form part of “intercultural” relations, they are equally germane to “interpersonal” relations. The intercultural level, however, is further complicated when people interact across cultures because their commonalities diminish while differences increase dramatically.

Fantini’s perspective signalize however the complexity of the variables that govern human interactions, as regards different and foreign culture, global medium or even more and more segregated local pictures. We may find difficult to maintain relationship, or to cooperate and communicate effectively and appropriately not only with foreign individuals or minority groups, but also with different generational layers or emerging youth cultures.

Giving the fact that intercultural competence may be concurrently defined as “the ability to think and act in interculturally appropriate ways” (Bennet *et. al.*, 2003: 422), as well as assuming landmarks such as “curiosity and openness”, “knowledge of one’s self and others”, “skills of interpreting, relating, discovery and interactions” or critical cultural awareness (Byram, 1997: 88), one key query tend to detach. In which manner should be applied the cultural competences frameworks in analysis of contemporary societies, trapped under siege of digitalization and

detritorialization? And going one step further, to which critical research questions should this framework respond? No matter whether we appeal Ruben’s *Behavioural Approach*, grounded on seven dimensions of intercultural competences, including display of respect and empathy (Ruben, 1976:335), Byram’s *Multidimensional Model of Intercultural Competences*, revolving around key assumption of interpreting and relating with others experiences (Byram, 1997:90) or classical Developmental Model used by Bennet since early ’80 (Bennet *et. al.*, 2003: 422), all the theories mentioned above disclosed interesting correlation with subject of civic accountability.

The pursuit of abilities as tolerance, anxiety and uncertainty management (Gudykunst, 1998:228) and cross cultural adaption may have a true impact on active citizenship behaviour. The last term can be defined by addressing related concepts like community and voluntary action, promotion of equality and acceptance for different cultural identities or advocacy in favour of alternative identities (Hoskins *et al.*, 2008:386). Yet the studies carried in early 2000 upon active citizenship across Eastern Europe, showed a significant delay in developing civic awareness and civic literacy (Hoskins *et al.*, 2008:390. The evaluation of three indicators of civic engagement such as voting behaviour, membership in public organization and protest mobilization testified the resilience of a cultural gap. Countries as Romania presented high rates of voting, while the membership and the protest mobilization rates remain quite low (Hoskins *et al.*, 2008:391).

In this context, two essential research hypotheses came into prominence:

H.1: Intercultural training, carried through applied didactic activities, could represent a vector for increasing democratic behaviour, tolerance and civic engagement, raising awareness upon different translations and meanings of discrimination.

H.2: Evolutions occurred in formal education curricula and growing influence of cross-cultural medium may enable the establishment of cultural abilities promoting active citizenship.

Final section investigates the validity of previous research questions using the focus group matrix, in order to identify functional correlations appeared amid intercultural abilities acquisition and active citizenship behaviour in case of Romanian students, enrolled in communication sciences study programs. The terms intercultural education and intercultural abilities are preferred

due to their visibility and are not used in opposition with the multicultural perspectives. Rather, the research militates for a unifying and comprehensive approach.

3. GEOGRAPHIES OF EXCLUSION. LIMITS AND GOALS OF INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION IN CASE OF ROMANIAN STUDENTS WITHIN COMMUNICATION SCIENCES PROGRAMS

3.1. Context and relevance of research.

Romanian youth mobilization should represent an interesting inquiry topic, given the fact that vernacular democracy hosted recently the clash a two civilizational models. Last decade disclosed the confrontation of two divergent youth trends: one progressionist youth wave, motivated and empowered by environmentalist awareness (Pavlínek & Pickles, 2002:190) and a radical counterreaction, grounded on claims as socio-economic disadvantage, marginalisation and alienation (Gavrielides, 2018:31). However, the configuration of youth cultures in Romania was often depicted in simplifying terms, most risks of radicalization being explained as consequences of poverty, dysfunctional familial models and lack of social visibility. Once they felt misunderstood by society and deprived of rights, young Romanians become more exposed to domestic radicalization phenomena (Gavrielides, 2018: 31).

Yet, it is important to mention that there is a significant distinction between cognitive and behavioural radicalization: first stage refers to expression and promotion of radical ideas, while the second one implies the presence of radical actions (Gavrielides, 2018:31). At this very moment, Romanian perspective upon youth radicalization remains dominated by a cognitive pattern, but it doesn't expel the hypothesis of a behavioural mutation. All the more, ideological determinants of radicalization are not yet fully deciphered, the European landscape reflecting worrisome evolutions.

A reconceptualization of drivers for radicalization implies an on-going debate upon identity politics and its effects against young people (Harper 2018:12), the journey from cognitive radical affinities towards effective radical actions being sometimes difficult to measure. Ascent of populism and youth based disruptive political agendas, as ones already issued in countries as Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary, shadowed the initial optimistic perception upon digital politics, civic activism and claims for

political renewal. Although Romania still defy the lure of populism, the overall European picture speaks about young people scepticism, disavowal of formal, institutional politics and accentuated hostility against immigrant and minorities communities (European Commission, 2015).

Within the light of these ideas, an investigation dedicated to interdependencies raised nowadays amid purposes of intercultural education and improvement of civic accountability and awareness of young Romanians may offer a useful insight upon resilience and sustainability of democracy in the region.

3.2. Objectives, samples and methods of applied research. The applied research assumes a qualitative dimension, using the focus group methodology and concentrates on two central objectives:

Obj.1. Exploration of correlations appeared amid acquisition of multicultural abilities through formal education means and edification of civic and democratic values in case of young Romanians.

Obj.2. Analysis of effects generated by digitalization upon youth identity-building processes, including representation of marginality and stigma and definition of majority and minority groups.

The focus group sessions involved a group of 12 students (age 21 to 28), second year of study, enrolled in the Communication and Public relations programme. Also, the group beliefs and performative identities were successively investigated after a two weeks interspace, wherein they were expected to elaborate an individual essay upon intercultural abilities developed during their study programme. This intermediary step was designed to raise awareness upon role of intercultural conscience in assuming civic landmarks and in building democratic resilience and responsible action models.

The complex qualitative content resulted from the two focus group sessions was organized using the *Multidimensional Model of Intercultural Competence*, stated by Byram (1997:89). The multidimensional model consists in five layers of intercultural competences, starting with attitude factors ("ability to relativize one's self and value others") and including also elements as "knowledge of the rules for individual and social interaction", skills such as "interpreting and relating", associates skills as "discovery and interaction" and not lastly, a "critical cultural awareness" factor.

3.3. Results of the applied research. Bridging the gap between imagined geographies of exclusion and intercultural competencies, fostering democratic accountability. Asked to define the main intercultural abilities acquired through interactive and applicative didactic activities, the students tended to highlight elements as tolerance, decreasing stereotypy and diminish of disbeliefs about other cultures or even proximal groups.

Equally, the students affirmed that educational processes revolving around digital resources and intercultural debate topics increased their capacity to act responsible in civic and social contexts. Great majority of the students confirmed that social media, educational platforms and access to foreign literature granted them new interactional skills, but very few testimonies crossed the line of critical awareness. Even if most of the students has taken into consideration the acquisition of new intercultural skills as empathy and understanding of consequences of political decisions upon different individuals, placed in disadvantaged positions, their ability to operationalize these theoretical claims was quite modest.

Under these conditions, the very first research hypothesis, asserting that: **intercultural training, carried through applied didactic activities, could represent a vector for increasing democratic behaviour, tolerance and civic engagement, raising awareness upon different translations and meanings of discrimination,** was only partially confirmed.

Strong background clichés were circulated during the first round debate, the theme of majority and minority cultures raising contradictory responses. Some students claimed that minority cultures, especially those delimited by constrains as marginality and stigma (uneducated or deviant individuals) should be limited in expressing and accessing public decision tools.

Their explanation were targeting arguments as lack of political culture, affinities for populist voting behaviour or even generational tensions. Those types of imagined geographies of exclusion were diminish after the first debate and subsequent to individual training, but they still remain relevant. The intercultural abilities develop trough agency of interactive training (applied didactic activities) didn't cross the test of critical cultural awareness, even during the second focus group session. Marginality and stigma associated to certain socio-economic clusters continued to shadow other arguments as: membership within

specific ethnic groups, religious entities or in migrant or rural communities.

The focus groups reflected that minority and majority cultures were segregated through intervention of arguments as level of formal education and respect for rule of law, the ethnic, the religious and the cultural identities being perceived as less influential. The students manifested strong concerns for promotion of reformist politics, transparent economic policies and growing efficiency of public spending, but their individual contributions through means as volunteering, educational initiatives and ONG membership were still discrete.

Despite the positive outcomes of cross-cultural oriented educational courses, the narratives of the dominant group were still functioning, with some recent updates. This kind of relocation of stereotypes is more visible in case of accessibility within virtual communities. Almost a quarter of the students described the experience of online activism and participation in debate platforms in strong opposition with terms as age, education, income, economic medium.

More specific, they assumed that individuals living in the country side, appertaining to older generations or lacking basic educational and social skills, especially foreign languages competencies, are partially excluded from these new virtual communities. In the same time, it remains important to highlight the danger of reversibility in subject of intercultural openness.

Over 40% of the young people participating in the debates where sceptical about the role of attitude factors and interpreting and relating skills, in case of violent social tensions, escalation of ethnic agendas or religious confrontations. Under these circumstances, an intermediary conclusion tend to detach. The acquirement of multicultural abilities, competencies and skills generate what we may call a cognitive intercultural dimension. What is still lacking is the action pattern, enabling young people to test in practice their beliefs and limits in accepting the challenges of *critical cultural awareness*. The two focus group session enhanced the level intercultural responsiveness, but further steps are needed.

As regards the second research hypothesis, sustaining that **evolutions occurred in formal education curricula and growing influence of cross-cultural medium may enable the establishment of cultural abilities promoting active citizenship,** the focus groups revealed positive results.

In case of students enrolled in communication sciences programs in 2018, the formal education curricula comprise essential courses dedicated to development of intercultural abilities. First year disciplines as *Protocol and organisation of events*, *Rhetorics and argumentation*, *Law in communication* or *Conversational strategies in foreign language* offer a glimpse into different cultural landscapes, opening the road for a deeper understanding of intercultural challenges in communication sciences sphere. First semester of second year includes also disciplines oriented towards intercultural approaches as *Introduction in advertising* or *Strategies and techniques in public relations*.

The relevance of formal curricula in fostering intercultural abilities and active citizenship practices was demonstrated by identification of five key competences: attitude skills in relativize own culture in relation with different foreign cultural models, capacity to detach from traditional ethnocentric perspectives and to understand complex global issues as environmental governance, critical thinking aptitudes used in recognizing media manipulation and fake news, enhanced awareness regarding benefits and costs of voting (role of civil disobedience and long-term outcomes of protest cultures), and increasing openness in favour of interaction and collaboration with disadvantaged, vulnerable or marginalized groups. A peculiarly relevant tendency refers to the mixing of genuine intercultural competencies, as they were presented at the beginning of the focus groups, with civic related attitudes, which were intuitively corroborated with the first set.

The final conclusions, formulated at the end of the second focus group, reflected that 40% of the participants changed their initial perception upon discrimination and civic duties, also benefiting by a clearer perspective upon topics as active citizenship and civic engagement. In the same time 20% of the participants conserved their opinions and stated that some of the present exclusion lines, bases on criteria as education or participation within labour force, should be conserved. At the end of the study, two main set of actions were suggested: (1) Establishment of permanent volunteering programs within universities, in order to foster active citizenship and practical intercultural formation of young students and (2) Introduction within formal curricula of courses dedicated to themes as Human Rights, Anti-Discrimination Law and Intercultural communication and conflict resolution, (the host university offers similar training modules in the postgraduate cycle).

4. CONCLUSIONS

Discourses upon intercultural acceptance and cultural awareness are challenged in these latter days by reigniting communicational pathologies, consisting in fake news proliferation, ascent of suspicion, growing appetite for scapegoating and culpabilization of minorities or groups trapped at the social margins. This ongoing crisis highlighted however the necessity for cultivating intercultural skills and abilities in young people, as the behavioural clauses of democracy and active citizenship models will become essential in limiting future radical or extremis drifts. There is a genuine need to transcend the border between cognitive intercultural abilities and intercultural action and practices, because otherwise we may assist to a malign alchemy of crowd-pleasing politics and youth anti-system populism.

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'TO IB OR NOT TO IB'

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Abstract: *This localized small-scale ethnographic study addresses issues associated with students' choices to study in the International Baccalaureate Diploma Program (IBO: IBDP, 2020), rather than following a Ministry of Education (MEB) curriculum, at a mixed-gender secular high school in Turkey. This study examines the implications that curriculum choices have on students' pedagogic identity (Bernstein, 2000). Students' curriculum decisions are based on academic results, on a future they envision for themselves, teacher feedback, and school participation. Student commentaries provide evidence of factors involved in how students make the choice to study the IBDP and what personal effects those decisions may have. Teaching faculty anecdotal evidence offers background information to contextualize the students' choices. Dilts' Logical Levels model (1986) is used to deconstruct the decisions that students make within a wider cultural context. An argument is made that acceptance into the IBDP leads to an awareness of social differences and hierarchies, and that the logic of students' choices induces a positive selection of the more talented individuals into a group with a superior reputation, and how members of that group 'exert control over their perceived identity' (Kim & Loury, 2019).*

Keywords: *International Baccalaureate; diploma; curriculum*

1. CONTEXT

This small scale ethnographic study focuses on choices that high school students make to complete their junior and senior years at the Üsküdar American Academy, a mixed-gender secular high school located in central Istanbul, and the implications that those choices have on their pedagogic identity (Bernstein, 2000).

UAA students enter the high school at 14 years of age through an annual national competitive high school entrance examination, *Lise Geçiş Sınavı* (LGS, 2020). To be considered for UAA, entrants need to achieve scores within the top one percent of the approximately one million Grade 8 student test-takers, and, as a consequence, the students are bright, motivated, and high-achieving. The academic program is varied, rigorous and demanding, with high levels of student participation in clubs and sports to develop their non-academic talents. The school is fee-paying, educationally progressive, and under the auspices of the Turkish Ministry of Education (MEB).

Founded in 1876, UAA has a long tradition of promoting progressive education, and ranks as one of the top three high schools in Turkey, with high expectations and demonstrated academic success:

Our aim is to give a broad education and

foster students who are self-confident, fully developed socially and intellectually, fluent in English with knowledge of the culture behind the language and morally upright, global citizens,

and,

... to enable our students to select the university which best suits their character, ability and interests, ... and to further their education either in Turkey or abroad, and assist them in making the right decision in the final stages of this process. (UAA website, 2020).

Based on college acceptances of UAA seniors over the past five years, 42% of graduates are successful in their overseas university applications (UAA, 2020), with many students awarded either partial, or full scholarships. Graduates choosing to study in Turkey, advance to the highest ranked Turkish universities, with the majority of graduates accepted into faculties of either Engineering, Medicine or Law (UAA, 2020).

Students prepare themselves to sit the yearly Turkish university entrance examination *Yükseköğretim Kurumları Sınavı* (YKS, 2020), in addition to completing the requirements for the Ministry of Education high school curriculum, often supplementing this course of study by sitting

American Placement (AP) subject examinations (The College Board, 2020) if intending to study abroad, or, by following the IBDP curriculum, graduating with the Diploma, and also with an intention of studying outside of Turkey. Students in the IBDP earn two Diplomas; one from the IB in January (in the first semester of Grade 12) and the National High School Diploma on graduation in June. IBDP students must meet some additional requirements from the Ministry of Education.

The route to university is fraught with obstacles and the school supports students’ choices of options to reach their intended goals, and these aspects will be examined in further detail in the discussion.

2. THE INTERNATIONAL BACCALAUREATE DIPLOMA PROGRAM (IBDP)

The International Baccalaureate Diploma Program, for students aged 16 to 19, is described at the IBO website as, “an academically

challenging and balanced program of education that prepares students for success at university and life beyond” (IBO, 2020).

UAA has offered the IBDP since 2014, graduating the first cohort in 2017. All UAA Grade 9 students are eligible to apply for a place in the IBDP, and selection is based on the student’s GPA, teacher recommendation, and school participation. Students exit the program with the IB Diploma as well as the MEB graduation certificate.

In the IBDP, students study six subjects, one from each of the six groups. Three subjects are studied at Higher Level (HL) although some students opt to take an additional fourth HL, and the remainder at Standard Level (SL). HL incorporates a wider range of topics than SL and focuses on certain topics in greater depth. Students choose one subject from each of the 6 groups from the following table (Table 1). Level choices (SL/HL) are made at the end of Grade 10.

Table 1 (Uskudar American Academy IB Diploma Programme, 2020).

Group:	Subjects and levels (one subject from each group)
1	Turkish (HL or SL)
2	English A (HL or SL) English B (HL only)
3	Turkey in the 20 th Century (SL only)
4	Biology (HL or SL) Physics (HL or SL)
5	Mathematics (HL or SL)
6	Chemistry (HL) Economics (HL) Computer Science (HL) Visual Arts (HL) Business Management (HL)

There is also the IBDP core requirement including:

- The Extended Essay: An independent, self-directed piece of research leading to a 4,000-word paper.

- The Theory of Knowledge: TOK explores the nature of knowledge and the role of evidence, focused on the key theme of “how do we know what we claim to know?”

- Creativity, Activity, Service: CAS is a range of activities outside the classroom that complement and extend students’ academic studies. (IBO, 2020)

Each course requires 25 assessments of different types, over the two years of the diploma. Internal assessments (IA’s) are evaluated by the teacher at the school, and IB examiners mark the external assessment components (EA’s). IB

examinations are knowledge-based and criterion-referenced (IBO, 2020). The variety and quality of assessments further separates the IBDP from other curricula like AP or A-Levels (Mathews & Hill, 2005).

While the UAA high school population is homogenous Turkish, and might be considered as an L2 (second language learner) environment, English serves as the language of instruction, and the spectrum of student English ability levels range from fluently bilingual to functionally bilingual, with an IELTS average score of 7.4 in Grade 11. The IBDP is conducted in English with the exception of Turkish language courses.

Students entering Grade 11 choose to study either HL or SL, for example, English Language A (HL or SL), or English Language B (HL only). English Language B, designed as a language

acquisition course for students with several years of English, provides the necessary skills to enable students to communicate successfully in English (IBO, 2020). Language A is a literature course designed to develop an understanding of literary criticism including text analysis and literary conventions. As UAA is not an “English” or an international school, it is possible for students to take English B, although their abilities may be more closely aligned to the English A requirements. Students opt for English B as a route to a top course score of 7.

3. THE TURKISH NATIONAL CURRICULUM FOR HIGH SCHOOL

When students enter Grade 11, they choose one of four tracks: Turkish language–mathematics, science, social sciences, or foreign languages. However, UAA offers electives instead of academic tracks, giving students a wider range of options. Entrance to university is regulated by a national university standardized entrance examination *Yükseköğretim Kurumları Sınavı* (YKS, 2020) administered by The Council of Higher Education (Öğrenci Seçme ve Yerleştirme Sistemi, ÖSYS, 2020) and after which high school graduates are assigned to a university according to their performance. At the end of Grade 12, students take a high school finishing examination which they are required to pass in order to sit the *YKS* and continue on to their studies at a university. To make it into the highest-ranked universities, whether abroad or in Turkey takes careful, lengthy and detailed preparation on the part of the student and their family.

4. PEDAGOGIC IDENTITY

For Bernstein (2000), a pedagogic identity is constructed and projected for both students and teachers in a larger discourse, shaping pedagogic practice, and is

... concerned essentially with *contemporary resources* under conditions of cultural/economic change for constructing a sense of identity belonging to, and different from, and for the management of internal sense making and external relationships in time space and context. (2000: 205)

The IBDP serves as a highly visible externally branded curriculum, provided in relation, or some might argue, in opposition to the national

curriculum. It is the product “branding” that positions it in a hierarchy of curriculum options, and offers an alternative pedagogic identity due to its academic rewards, assessments, and distinction, all associated with the value of IBDP credential (Doherty, 2010:4). Parents and students have to choose between different curriculum, matching both student abilities and future aspirations to the pedagogic identities projected by different curricula. In this study, Bernstein’s pedagogic identity concept will be used to further understand how the IB Diploma distinguishes itself in the educational marketplace, and the implications for students as they make curricular choices.

5. DILTS’ LOGICAL LEVELS MODEL

Dilts’ Logical Levels Model (1986) can be used to deconstruct the decisions that students make within a wider cultural context. Perhaps the most widely known hierarchy is Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (Figure 1), where meeting an individual’s needs




Fig.1 The hierarchy of needs proposed by Maslow (1943)

goes from the bottom to the top, with the superior needs not met until the basic ones are sufficiently satisfied.

Dilts proposes a pyramid of neurological levels where changes produced at the superior levels of the pyramid produce a transformation in its subordinate levels (Figure 2).




Fig.2 Dilts’ pyramid of neurological levels. Diagram taken from Clarke (2007)

Beliefs and values support the individual's sense of identity, and serve to further identify with a larger system of which they are members, as UAA student, IBDP scholar, and Language A or B group. From students' collated comments, it can be seen that they are *very* aware of the distinguishing characteristics that define a group, school, even a program. In the Dilts' model, the identity level is the confirmation of a sense of self-worth and the self-realization that a person identifies with a particular group, often to achieve their ends, or mutual ends.

6. STUDENT SURVEY

It may be noted that UAA is a IBDP November exam school, versus May, so that Grade 10 students have a semester of adaptation, including acquainting themselves with the core course work (CAS, EE, and ToK), and then dive into their subjects in earnest in January. The later exam period allows Grade 12 students to send their Diploma results to prospective universities earlier in the academic year.

At the time of writing, there were 53 IBDP students enrolled in Grade 11 (33 females and 20 males), and, in Grade 12, 34 students (17 females and 17 males). For students in the Grade 12 cohort, there was a concern that they had not been given sufficiently detailed information on which to base their decision to study in the IBDP, and what the personal effects of that decision might be. In order to support students, and gather information related to the issues raised, IBDP Grade 12 English teachers devised anecdotal and open-ended prompts for a survey, and received approval to administer the anonymous survey.

Grade 12 students in December 2019 were asked to complete the survey which addressed four topics: (1) reasons for selecting IBDP; (2) academic issues in the IBDP; (3) choice and satisfaction; and, (4) reflection on the choices made. From a class of 34, 23 surveys were received. Teachers' comments were recorded in the notes taken during the review of the results of the student commentaries. Students had significant feedback on their science, mathematics, and Turkish language, courses and for the sake of brevity, the comments specific to those subject areas have been omitted in the collated responses:

Selection of IBDP

- ambitious academic demands
- advantage for entry into foreign universities
- higher status than MEB with more hours

- heavy workload/peak time demands
- lack of clarity choosing English A or B or A SL or HL
- IBDP oversold; lacks realistic time frame
- parent advice important

Academic issues

- multiple assessments at awkward times of academic year
- English A lacked focus on comparative literature
- English B too easy for level of language skill
- too much teaching with MEB mentality
- teacher emphasis on general feedback with a lack of formative assessments
- assessment needed more preparation, and focus on IB assessment
- some subject teachers not sufficiently IB knowledgeable
- grading discrepancies
- lack of continuity in teaching approach/content vs process lack
- of time to absorb multiple topics

Satisfaction

- teacher turnover created gaps in preparing for IB assessments
- too many topics covered superficially
- lack of intellectual freedom
- multiple assessments at awkward times of academic year
- use of cumulative assessment
- IB approaches to learning (AOL)
- core subject integration TOK EE CAS

Reflection

- stressful studying for IBDP while preparing for YKS at the same time
- supportive peers
- lack of personal time
- bonding with other IB students
- wider range of topics than MEB
- developed types of writing skills
- International perspectives used
- worked on self-management skills, and other types of skills
- more opportunities for different types of learning

Interestingly, this cohort despite their extensive commentary, achieved remarkable results: a combined average of 39 (from a possible 45): the world average is 29.65. 52% of UAA IBDP students received 40 or above, compared with 9.7% of students worldwide. The results are a

tribute to the quality of students, their determination, and the support and trust established with their peers and teachers. The end result separates the IBDP students from the MEB candidates in a number of significant ways which will be examined in the discussion.

7. DISCUSSION

At the outset it ought to be mentioned that although student participation was lower than expected, teachers in reviewing student comments found that their responses aligned to the four prompts and confirmed what they had heard throughout the year. Teachers also expressed their high regard for the honesty and forthrightness of the students' responses. Student responses ran from 200 - 400 words in length: they had a lot to share.

Responses indicated that students had an acute awareness of the appeal of the program for the academically ambitious. IBDP for this group was highly desirable as the program's reputation, combined with the institutional status, gave them an academic competitive edge over other candidates applying for places at foreign universities. Students who began in the IBDP and decided in the second year of the program to attend a Turkish university were in the awkward position of completing the program while at the same time preparing intensively for the Turkish national university entrance exam (YKS). Their comments show that this double whammy of high academic rigor and long hours after the school day spent with tutors left them stressed and questioning the choice to have embarked on studying the IBDP in the first place. A common thread that appeared across the student responses, regarding the choice of the IBDP, is the strong link established between the IBDP and intellectual rigor and academic standards. On the other hand, students commented that often the types and frequency of assessment emphasized traditional assessment practices in different formats, and tended to promote conservative ideas of educational standards with the IB exerting a high level of control of what is learned and how. They had wanted to know more about the workload involved.

However, the comments about coherence to the IB system, may also assist students in the formation of values that scaffold their emergent identity as "IBDP student", "IBDP Language A student" and, proceeding further, "successful IBDP student", or, finally, "IBDP graduate". This transition is partially due to engagement with the program, and is possible through communicative

socializing with friends, groups, in classes, clubs, and from the feedback of community members. Students from day one at UAA are oriented towards success, and make those values of the school compatible with themselves. The IB moniker is the icing on the pedagogic identity cake.

For Dilts, at the identity level, the focus is on self expression, self-consciousness, and establishing an ideal self, a self-image. This creation of an identity creates a feeling of "self-sense" (Dilts, 1996), and shows the ways in which an individual perceives him/herself being correlated with self esteem and self-respect. The social prestige associated with a program at school transfers to the individual, strengthening their self-esteem and confirming their self value (1996: 214), and could be said to lead to an unconscious acceptance of social differences and hierarchies, and, further, to a sense of one's place and to behaviors of self-inclusion in that group.

From comments received, it becomes clearer that this shift to a pedagogic identity is conferred by acceptance into the IBDP and by the completion of the requirements. However, given the ambivalence of student comments about the personal stressors they encountered during their two years in the program, success may be measured in different ways, and of course, from different points of view, different audiences, even accepting universities. This end result does not necessarily mean that the IB student has achieved more than the student who had chosen to study a national Turkish high school program.

The perceived pedagogic identity, however, goes further, and induces a positive selection of the more talented individuals into a group with a superior reputation. Despite the claims to produce internationally-minded world citizens, there may be an argument to be made that students perceive the creation of a veiled hierarchy in this educational programming.

Taking one aspect of IBDP discourse revealed by respondent comments, it can be seen that there is a construction of "IB students" as a homogeneous group, having particular qualities as articulated in the *IB Learner Profile* (IBO, 2020), to develop learners who are:

- Inquirers
- Knowledgeable
- Thinkers
- Communicators
- Principled
- Open-minded
- Caring

Risk-takers
Balanced
Reflective.

In constructing this type of in-group, there will also be an out-group. When students wrote their comments referring to “IB” they wrote in a voice representing a homogeneous group. The repeated presentation of IB students as embodying such qualities implies that other, non-IB, students may lack them. Creating this exclusive “us” marginalizes those outside the group, using a positive-us / negative-other discourse strategy (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001).

This cohort may represent a transitional group for the school: the first cohort to forthrightly question the IBDP approach, its relation to programs that other seniors follow at the school, and the effects that the experience had on them not only academically, but personally, and how it further could define their identity and future prospects.

8. CONCLUSION

This small-scale ethnographic study revealed issues associated with high school students’ choices to study the IBDP, in a specific local school context, based on the comments collected from a student survey. The comments, generated from four prompts, revealed that the students had different layers of awareness of their choice to study the IBDP, and the extent to which their choice had produced personal changes or awareness, including their real or perceived status at the school. One area of developing awareness was the tacit appreciation of the acceptance into what may be perceived as a hierarchical group, and with it, an acceptance of a particular type of pedagogic identity, a likely but unknown consequence of their choice.

Dilts’ Logical Levels Model (1986) was used to focus attention on the creation of a pedagogic identity. Student responses illustrated what the effects of studying in the IBDP are for them, and for their future. An argument was made that acceptance into the IBDP leads to an awareness of social differences and hierarchies; to an “in” group, and an “out” group. Such differences were also demonstrated in the student choice of either English A or B. It was further suggested that identifying student academic success in the IBDP school environment is a powerful contributing factor in the formation of a student’s pedagogic identity.

It was shown that students’ entry into the IBDP in this context, at the very least, creates an impression both within the group, and from outside

of it, that there is a selection of talented individuals into a group with a superior reputation. The realization of this exclusion or inclusion, has a powerful effect on their pedagogic identity given that the majority of UAA students accepted to study abroad originate from this group.

It is hoped that this small study may serve as a signpost for other IB schools seeking to further define the effects of student selection of, and participation in the IBDP, and may encourage further research into the effect that the program has on its learners personally, academically and professionally, and to what extent this process of identification supports the aim of the IBDP to develop internationally minded citizens.

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Security and
Intercultural
Communication

NEW DIMENSIONS TO SECURITY INSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE CONTEXT OF CURRENT GLOBAL CHALLENGES

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Abstract: *The European Union concept has evolved over the years from an economical platform for European countries, to that of a social and political structure. With new borders in the Western Balkans and with evolving challenges and threats in the form of inter-dependency, illegal immigration or pandemic outbreaks the EU has adopted unprecedented security policies. It is the aim of this paper to present current and future solution that the EU has to implement in terms of security in order to maintain its current status as a multidimensional structure that integrates 27 European Countries while playing a global role in major fields like economy, security and geopolitics. For this paper we have opted to use the descriptive method, trying to analyze data from European documentation (treaties, policies) and by doing so understanding what are the ways ahead, that the EU wants to follow in terms of security and defense.*

Keywords: *security, inter-dependency, immigration, economic growth*

1. INTRODUCTION

Ever since the Common Security and Defense Policy has been developed following the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European Union has undertaken more actions in terms of security and defense. Some member states have argued whether bringing a new security role for the EU is necessary considering that most member states of the EU are also members of the NATO organization and NATO has been ever since its conception one of the major organizations that has dealt with security objectives inside the European continent. The aim of this paper is to present where the EU can be complementary to NATO efforts in defense and what support can EU bring in means of security and defense in a world where challenges and threats have changed and evolved. For this reason the paper is organized in three chapters. In the first chapter we want to analyze what the implementations of the CSDP has actually meant for the development of the European Union role in defense. In the second chapter we want to present the differences and similarities that NATO and EU share and what can be some of the inputs that the EU can bring to the table in matters of security when communicating with NATO while not duplicating effort for member states that are part of both organizations while finally the third chapter is trying to look at

different challenges, risks and threats that are emerging inside the EU like immigration, border control, pandemic and biological threats, etc. At the end of the paper a series of conclusions and ways ahead will be proposed.

In the following chapters we are going to use the descriptive research methodology, by analyzing several European Union documents, policies and treaties oriented towards matters of security, foreign affairs and defense.

2. SECURITY INSIDE THE EU

2.1 The Common Foreign and Security Policy. Even though we have already mentioned the Common Security and Defense Policy as a document that enables the European Union to undergo actions in security and defense it must be mentioned that before the CSDP the document that established a role for the EU in terms of Security has been The Common Foreign and Security Policy.

This Policy has been implemented ever since the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, when the European Union has started to be organized under a three pillar system as it can be seen in Figure 1.

The European Political Cooperation Act from 1970 seemed insufficient for the EU to work on strengthening relationship between member states heading into the 90s and the Yugoslav War made

it clear the European Union would also need to strengthen its foreign policy. The Maastricht Treaty brought in three new pillars.



Fig. 1 The Three Pillars of the EU
Source: Pillars_of_the_European_Union.svg

The first pillar was The European Community in itself, which meant the development of several objectives such as:

1. The single market
2. Democratization of the Institutions
3. European Citizenship
4. Economic and Monetary Union which would

also mean the development of several other objectives like the development of single currency, a European Central Bank, single monetary policy and coordination of economic policies.

Another Pillar was that of Justice and Home Affairs with emphasis on closer cooperation in this particular field between member states. The third pillar was that of The Common Foreign and Security Policy which would enhance the idea of an eventual common defense policy. Defense and Security were strengthened in the CFSP under the Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon that followed. Even though the Three Pillar System ended in 2009 in Lisbon, the security challenge was not passed besides as a under the Treaty of Lisbon a position for a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was created together with a new Defense Orientated Strategy that would become the Common Security and Defense Policy. Thus the premises were created over a period of almost twenty years for the EU to have a major role in issues of defense.

2.2 The Common Security and Defense Policy. As part of the Common Foreign and

Security Policy, the CSDP became the European Union's main course of action in the field of defense and crisis management.

The CSDP has meant a leap for the European Union in terms for the European Defense Industry, for developing and External Action Service's Management and Planning Directorate and for developing four separate agencies including the European Defense Agency.

Perhaps one of the most important steps realized by the CSDP has been the development of the Permanent Structured Cooperation also known as PESCO in which 25 member states of the EU pursue the structural integration of their national armed forces.

Even though it was elaborated starting with 2009, the CSDP wasn't really put into action until June 2016 when the document entitled: *EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy' (EUGS) for 2016*. was presented to the European Council.

The EUGS document identified five set of priorities for EU foreign policy:

1. the security of the Union;
2. state and societal resilience to the East and South of the EU;
3. the development of an integrated approach to conflicts;
4. cooperative regional orders;
5. global governance for the 21st century.

Of course the EUGS is a document that is review yearly in order to improve and update the needs of the member states.

In the same year, 2016, the European Union through its member states reiterated its intention in strengthen EU cooperation on matters of external security and defense.

The first initiative that followed was the act called: Implementation Plan on Security and Defense, a document that make the previous objectives of the CSDP operational under the vision of the EUGS.

Furthermore a European Defense Action Plan was presented to the European Council that would also establish the development of a European Defense Fund. An European Defense Fund would be one of the controversial ideas presented inside the CSDP as several member states of the EU are already contributing to the NATO defense fund called NDPP. In the following chapter of this paper we will analyze whether the two funds can be correlated or whether they create a duplicating effort for those states that are members of both organizations.

As a conclusion to the steps undertaken by the EU in terms of security and defense with the help

of the CSDP, by 2017 a Military Planning and Conduct Capability structure was developed that would increase the European Union capacity to execute military missions.

In 2018, the PESCO initiative presented earlier also started to be implemented.

3. THE EU AND NATO

3.1 The Common Foreign and Security Policy. In terms of resolving security issues there are two ideologies inside the EU. The first one, the so called Carolingian Europe sustains that the EU should develop its own military sphere, so as to be able to independently conduct a full range of military missions. For such a possibility, member states should increase their own military capabilities, national defense industries, and military education schools and academies

The Atlantists base their ideology on the fact that Europe already shares a military organization in the form of NATO. Furthermore investing in another organization in matters of defense would only duplicate efforts from member states and would be a waste of resources. Their argument is that such an investment would also weaken the existing transatlantic link that has played a major role following the end of the Second World War and has allowed Europe to develop from an economical point of view.

Before the existence of the CFSP and CSDP there have been other documents linking NATO and EU. An initial agreement between the two organization was reached during the 1996 NATO summit in Berlin and created the basis for all future treaties.

The agreement was entitled: the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept and it was based on the idea of «divisible, but not divided» forces. Based on this principle there were gonna be structures and units belonging partially to NATO with European personnel that could also be used by the EU to respond to particular crisis that the European Union wanted to handle and did not involve NATO.

The treaty allowed the creation of a two tier system in which NATO had the first option to respond to a crisis and if the organization did not chose to actm than the CJTF forces could be used by the European Union for its own actions. Thourgh this agreement, for the first time in history the EU shifted from being just a soft power to being a hard power equiped with militay capibilities and having its own planning staff. Of course, the agreement would see to it that no

duplication of efforts would happen between the two organizations. From the Carolingian ideology point of view, the only setback was that the European Union woud take a back sit in this agreement, as NATO would be the organization deciding whether or not it would act first.

Just two years after the agreements were implemented in 1996, in 1998 the United Kingdom and France published the Saint-Malo Declaration for an integrated European military force. The United States took awarness of the document and ir responded by insisting that such a military integration would have to follow three principle in accordance to a future collaboration to NATO, and that would become the Three Ds principles which are in order:

- no *duplication* of structures that already existed within NATO;
- no *discrimination* of NATO members that were not EU members;
- no *decoupling* of the transatlantic link.

These ideas were taken and implemented in the NATO Summit held in Washinton DC, the following year in 1999.

In the previous chapter we presented the development of a European Union independent policy on defense which is the CFSP. In the same year of 1999, that document, the FCSP stated that NATO would still be responsible for the territorial defense of Europe and reconciliation. However, starting with the year 1999, the EU has its own responsibilities in terms of implementing missions such as those for peacekeeping and policing different treaties. It was in this period that the phrase “separable but not separate ” came to describe the relationship between the two organizations. This was the core of deal made in the NATO Summit in Washington DC, based on witch the EU would increase its own military integration while still relaying on NATO as a partner.

Because of pressure from Turkey the agreement from the 1999 Summit was changed again and shifted towards a more Antlantist ideology where NATO would still hold a higher role in European defense and such the Berlin Plus agreement came to life in 2003. This documents represents the core today for what the framework of collaboration between NATO and EU is.

Since 2003 as we have presented in the previous chapter the European Union has moved forward to developing its own policies in terms of defense.

The conclusions of the CFSP and the directions that the EU wants to follow in terms of defense

were presented in 2016 to NATO in the NATO Warsaw Summit and it consisted of 42 proposals that the European Council had adopted in matters of security.

As a ongoing conclusion so far, just by analyzing how the CFSP has evolved from 1999 to 2016 we can observe the decrease of support that the EU wants from NATO and the increase in its own military integration. The process has become an evolutionary one, and in terms of the two ideologies with which we have started the chapter, it safe to say, that starting with the year 2015, the European Union is living in a Carolingian Ideology.

The problem is as we can see in Figure 2 that there are European countries that are part of the EU and not part of NATO and countries that are part of NATO and not part of the EU.




Fig. 2 EU and NATO member states
Source: <https://creativecommons.org>¹

This situation has created challenges for both organizations and member states. For example, Denmark which is part of both organizations has opted to not sign the CSDP document and thus created a precedent inside the European Union, that has made EU leaders discuss about a multi-speed European Union where each country can decide for itself whether it wants to follow or not the general direction in which the European Union is heading towards.

A different situation is that of the EU member states that are not part of NATO. Out of the xi, five of them (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden) have adopted a position of neutrality in terms of military conflicts. Even so, they are still undertaking peacekeeping operations under the

United Nations flag. For these countries being part of the CSDP is an important step in developing their security interests. For the EU these countries represent an opportunity to increase the share of resources and experience in the general pool of forces and capabilities that are going to be developed. The countries still keep their neutrality and thus the agreement is beneficial to all parties.

Such an example of collaboration is the Nordic Battle group, which shares 18 units to the EU and brings together support from Finland, Sweden, Norway, Ireland and Estonia. A good example of this is the Nordic battle group, one of 18 such units at the disposal of the EU, which brings together troops from Estonia, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Norway. This particular battle group is an interesting example of NATO-EU collaboration because there are countries that are member of both organizations like Ireland and Estonia, while others like Sweden and Finland are part of just the EU, while Norway is part just of NATO. Even though the battle group represents a capability of the EU, Norway has joined it under the Nordic flag, as the battle group implies common objectives for all member countries.

While the collaboration between NATO and EU remains inevitable there are different visions of how the EU should increase its defense integration even more to become not just a regional player, but also a global one.

3.2 The European Strategic Autonomy Concept.

This concept has developed inside the EU as an idea ever since the CSDP has taken form starting with 2016. In order to develop security autonomy the EU would first of all have to establish its one operational headquarters. So far, member states have not managed to reach an understating on the matter so starting with 2020 for the time being only non-executive military mission HQ exist at the level of the European Union.

In order to achieve autonomy in terms of security the EU should develop one of the projects presented in the second chapter, that of PESCO. This agreement will allow the EU member states to invest more in developing their own military capabilities while using european defense industries at a higher level.

It is obvious that in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the EUGS, more modern military equipment is required and defense industries have to increase their role in the following years. For this the military capabilities of the EU also have to evolve and be transformed as the current level of ambition is a limited one and is

¹ Since the review of this paper was completed, North Macedonia has also joined NATO

still related to the 1999 declaration of the members states that requires the European Union and its member states to be able to deploy and sustain 60.000 corps.

One of the major topics in terms of defense is that of defense spending. Following the PESCO initiative starting with 2018 the creation of a European Defense Fund started, a Fund that would require three steps in order to develop as it can be seen in Figure 3.




Fig. 3 The European Defense Fund.
Source: The European Commission

This European Defense Fund is co-financed by the European Commission which wants to support joint defense industrial projects while also investing in research programs for collaborative defense across the EU.

The fund is supposed to then be developed in two large steps. The first will mean allocating money for research with a share of €90 million until the end of 2019 and then €500 million per year after 2020. The second step will mean investments in Development & Acquisition with a share of €500 million in total for the 2019-20 timeframe and then a second share of up to €1 billion per year after 2020.

Again the question of duplicating efforts arises. When it comes to the NATO budget, it is known that the US is the major investor with almost 60% of the budget coming from their part. But data has shown that European countries who may same to contribute small share to the NATO budget, if they were to be added up as part of the EU, than the budget share for the entire EU as part of NATO would be more than 35% of the total budget.

Two ongoing conclusions could be developed so far. It is up to member states to understand if they can afford from an economic point of view this integration in terms of defense, which as PESCO shows will be an expensive one and

secondly the EU should act as one entity when negotiating with US inside of NATO. If the EU managed to negotiate de new initiatives of the CSDP in the Warsaw Treaty as a whole, it should be able to negotiate its own objectives inside of NATO, as it is as a whole the second largest contributor the NATO budget.

4. THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL CHANGES

4.1 The EU as a global actor. In order to become a global actor, the EU has had to first and foremost become a regional player. As such efforts were made by the European Union to strengthen its activities in neighboring countries.

A first enlargement policy has meant an increased relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans. In terms of treaties and documents, the EU overlooked the signing of the Prespa Agreement reached by Athens and Skopje in June 2018.

It was also in the year 2018 that the European Commission presented a strategy gor an enhanced EU engagement inside the Western Balkans as well as enlargement initiatives for countries like Croatia that has since joined the EU and countries like Albania and North Macedonia that will be joining in the foreseeable future.

The strategy list a set of priorities and areas of cooperation between the EU and the Western Balkan States, taking into consideration the specificity of the region and the fundamental challenges that the states from the area need to overcome in terms of reforms, economic growth, social conditions, neighborly relations, etc. Another region where the EU has strengthened its role is east to its current borders, in countries like the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia.

Through the act known as the Eastern Partnership the EU has managed to invest in tarea and help train more than 20000 people, create more than 10000 jobs and offer financial supporter in more than 100000 loans to companies in these three states. The partnership also implies support in areas of governance, economy, social affairs and overall connectivity.

Another regional area of interest for the EU has been south of its current borders and a strong partnership has been created between the EU and countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria or Egypt. The partnership with these countries has included the promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human right, economic growth and social cohesion.

Besides these partnerships, the EU has also developed starting with the year 2016 a separate partnership with Tunisia, a country that has become the first Arab country in EU's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme.

The EU has also tried to assist Syria following a eight year conflict and war in the country and in the region. With funds up to 17 billion Euros allocated in humanitarian and development assistance starting with 2011, the EU has become one of the major contributors to the area. Eight years later, in 2019, the EU has renewed its support for Syria and the region by allocation funds up to 8 billion Euros for countries like Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey that have received refugees from the Syrian war.

One key element that has come from the Syrian support has been that of support for the refugees and asylum seekers that have fled Syria and the region and have travelled to Europe in search of new homes. Due to the fact that opening borders for the refugees has also meant an increase of illegal immigration for population that is outside of the conflict area, this particular decision has created controversy and disruptions inside the EU. Although the EU has managed to become a regional player, immigration policies like the one mentioned and poor management of other crisis situations has also taken the EU a few steps back in its trajectory to becoming a Global Power. In the following subchapter we will analyze the drawbacks the EU has met in different fields and the consequences of some of the actions that the organization has taken over the years.

4.2 Immigration and other challenges for the EU. Since the three pillar system has been abandoned and the EU has integrated more than ever in terms of politics, economy, justice and security several threats and challenges have emerged globally.

Looking at global challenges that the EU desires to handle as a whole we can list a series of issues that have tested the capacity of the European Union to respond in the last decade. While they integrate fields larger than those of defense, it must be said that security represents a spectrum that comprises not just defense policies, but also social-political issues, economy and finance and even the judicial system.

One of the main challenges for member states following the Syrian war has been that of immigration and illegal immigration. This challenge of immigration has led to an internal turmoil inside the EU that has rather divided the

organization that make it stronger. Euroscepticism has increased; The United Kingdom has left the EU after the Brexit vote, while countries that form the Visegrad group, like Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have become opponents of many of the EU policies towards immigration.

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has also increased uncertainty in the European project. The emergence of the Euro currency had left countries like Italy and Greece unprepared from a monetary point of view and the gap between these countries and the more economically powerful countries like Germany, France, Belgium and Holland was never closed.

The crisis determined a chain reaction that made Greece for example enter an unprecedented economic collapse from which it hasn't recovered fully even after ten years. This again has led eurosceptics to argue that the EU is not ready to act as a whole, but rather countries are left to deal with situations of crisis on their own. A new recession is predicted for the time frame of 2020-2022, but with the outbreak of the corona-virus pandemic, at the beginning of 2020, analysts consider that the recession will turn into a financial crisis with deeper effects than the previous financial crisis of 2007-2009. If the European Union will respond as poorly as it did in that previous case, then again it will demonstrate that cohesion is still lacking, and that the organization cannot answer as a whole to major situations of risk and threats.

Speaking about the Corona-virus pandemic that has global effects, another crisis for the EU is that of its internal and external borders. One of the EU's main attributes, the Common Schengen space, that is presented in Figure 4 has been highly affected due to the pandemic. The crisis has meant the suspension of the Schengen agreement and the closure of member states borders. Countries are left to deal individually with the virus outbreak, while no financial support or medical aid is being sent from the EU specific body.

Observing the trouble that the EU has in all these fields, and that true cohesion had not been obtained, it is apparent that the EU has not reached the status of a global player. The EU remains a regional power and therefore analyzing the treaties that define a new military perspective for the European Union, it seems that autonomy in security is for the time being just a concept, not reality.

Furthermore we have to take into consideration that member states of the EU, that are situated on

the eastern flank have increased their defense expenditures as requested by the NATO Summit in Wales 2014, while building more capabilities for the NATO Defense Planning Process. This has happened starting with the year 2014, following the Crimean Crisis, due to the fact that countries like Romania, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia have a different assessment of risk and threats due to their geographic position, compared to the western member states.

allocation to NATO's budget. For this the EU should take into consideration the needs and desires of the countries than form the Eastern Flank of NATO, while also trying to balance budget allocation requests between PESCO and the NATO budget so as to not put too much pressure on the member states that in the end all have limited resources available for allocation.

After analyzing several documents, treaties and policies that the EU has developed in the past 30 years in terms of security and defense, the general conclusion of this paper is that the EU should not seek to become a global player in matters of security, but rather strengthen its transatlantic cooperation and become if possible a unified regional player inside the European continent. The efforts imposed in the Balkan region, East and South of the EU borders has shown the potential that the European Union has to play this role if not globally at least regionally with success.




Fig 4. Schengen and Eurozone members from the EU and NATO States. Source: visualcapitalist.com

Observing all these different scenarios will allow us to draw some conclusions on what role the EU can afford to take regionally and globally in the current of context of emerging challenges.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND WAYS AHEAD

While integrated defense has its advantages at an European level, especially if we consider the benefit of defense industries as part of the new European defense fund, it is the conclusion of this paper that the EU should not try and reach autonomy in terms of security. Rather the EU should follow its own example of how it has negotiated its position as a whole inside the World Trade Organization and has managed to obtain advantages for all member states. The same principle should be followed in matters of defense, as the EU would be better off at negotiating its own interest as a whole inside of NATO. Even if the principles of the CSDP have been presented during the Warsaw NATO Summit, EU member states have still negotiated their interests individually. One key step for the EU in negotiating as an entity rather than as separate states would be that of the

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THE RESILIENCE STAGE OF SECURITY AND THE IMPACT ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE NATION-STATE. POST-WESTPHALIAN LOGIC

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Abstract: *It becomes obvious that for sovereignty to regain its position as the focus of security it has to be redefined in relation to "classic" sovereignty, grafted on the concepts of Westphalian logic, and reality proves that even the criteria of belonging to a state have changed. The hypothesis of the article is that in the period of time that has elapsed since the Peace of Westphalia until now, security has been and will remain indivisible and has experienced two phases, each of them consisting of several stages: the Westphalian phase, in which security is focused on the nation state, on its sovereignty and independence, with its related repetitive stages (tension, détente, preemption) and the post-Westphalian phase, very similar in forms of manifestation with the pre-Westphalian phase, in which the security places a greater emphasis on the citizens and in which sovereignty becomes limited or assisted, with the following stages: détente, preemption, resilience. The nation-state, with its core attributes - sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence - is situated in an outdated Westphalian logic, its inhabitants being rather witnesses to its avatars. The nation-state is undergoing a process of change in content and relevance at the actional level, in which its fundamental attributes are modified. Security, in the resilience stage, increases pressure on the state, which is on the verge of redefining its functional needs.*

Keywords: *security, sovereignty, détente, resilience, preemption*

1. INTRODUCTION

From the point of view of the international relations system, a retrospective view on the past four centuries of history reveals that in every century a certain power appeared¹, power that wanted to impose its own view on the international system, trespassing the order established by will and intellectual fervor. In the XVII century France, cardinal Richelieu coined the concept of nation-state as a modern approach of international relations. In the XVIII century, it was England's turn to introduce the concept of balance of power in Europe for the following 200 years. The beginning of the XIX century reestablishes the balance of power and unity in Europe under the patronage of Metternich's Austria; this order will be dismantled by Bismarck's Germany, guiding the diplomacy and international relations system to

a politics of force. Finally, the XX century will bring a new force that will dominate the international relations based on the fact that its values are universally valid and applicable. It was and still is the USA.

All this time, security has been and will remain indivisible (once you tear a thread, the whole fabric will unravel-A/N) and has evolved in two phases and several stages: the *Westphalian* phase, where security put an emphasis on the nation-state, on its sovereignty and independence, and its subsequent stages (tension, *détente*², preemption), and the post-*Westphalian* phase, where security puts an increased emphasis on citizens and where sovereignty becomes limited or assisted, and the subsequent stages are: *détente*, preemption and resilience.

Some of the truisms of world orders are the following: they are ephemeral; they aspire to permanence; their lifespan is shorter from one order to the other³; each order brought profound

¹ In a world order created in various historical periods, irrespective of how big the circle may be, the actors belonging to it will always make their political moves in a reductionist manner: in a system of five actors each will consider that it will be one of the three, in a system of three actors each will consider it will be one of the two, and in a system of two actors, each will consider that it will remain in the end.

² From French *détente* and means relaxation, recreation- A/N

³ Not taking into account a series of local and regional wars and only approximating the duration of world orders, the new order after the *Westphalia* Peace lasted 150 years, the world order after the Vienna Congress around 100 years, the new order after the World War II 40 years.

social changes and reestablished frontiers; they will never disappear, they just change or adjust; each political actor who shaped an order started from the fundament of exceptionalism and the will to fight for imposing these values on a continental or global level, converting other actors to their own lifestyle; no political actor who shaped an order came stronger at the end (except the USA); no political actor has peacefully passed the baton at the end of a world order; each order becomes anachronic; every time a major internal change takes place within an entity that makes up a system it is automatically followed by disorder.

Scanning history we notice that each stage, each international arrangement brought about a multiplication of the number of states and their ability to interact was greater than in the past. Therefore, will the next world order be the result of a disorder or of a passing of the baton that has a devolutive character? And will the newly appeared states (as a result of the disintegration of empires and decolonization) or the continental states (USA, China, Russia, India, Japan) be “the basic cell” of the next order? Time will give an answer, but a physics principle says that big objects will never revolve around the small ones.

2. STAGES OF SECURITY IN THE POST-WESTPHALIAN PHASE: DÉTENTE, PREEMPTION, RESILIENCE

In this chapter we will analyze the post-*Westphalian* phase of security and its stages.

The collapse of communism and USSR dissolution were the result of gradual accumulation of determining factors, among which the issue of human rights was one of the decisive causes (Molnar, 1990: *passim*), alongside with the political, economic, and military. The issue of human rights is the one that played, after the Cold War era, an important role in redefining the international security environment and international relations.

The genesis of human rights observance and of placing the individual in the center of society is actually the signing of the 1975 Final CSCE Act of Helsinki. The process was separately institutionalized with the Western European countries being the first to include the issue of human rights in national security strategies, turning the issue of respecting them into a preemptive means in order to ensure regional or international security (Badie, 2002: *passim*). Given the pressure of these evolutions, the instruments that the international community has to manage the

international security environment will diversify. For instance, the concept of “peace enforcement” will appear (Lebovic, 2004:910-934). This evolutive process minimizes the role of states and national sovereignty is somehow relativized. National security, by placing in the center the citizen, will change the way national security is designed and will justify at the same time the interference in the internal issues of other actors. Practically, there is a major change in the actional philosophy of international relations, where the observance of human rights is stronger than national sovereignty. It is the post-*Westphalian* “phase” of security that we currently live in, a phase where security has the individual in its center – as opposed to the *Westphalian* phase that has the state in its center.

The fall of the Berlin triggered a change in the structure of the international security environment. In the first post-Cold War decade until 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001, the security environment was characterized by unpredictability, compared to the Cold War period (Wohlforth, 1999:5-41). Within the state-sovereignty-security triad, given the mutations that took place at a global level as well as at the level of the concept of sovereignty and state, security focused on the individual. There will be an institutional transformation of the main international organizations and entities (ONU, NATO, OSCE, UE), followed by a major reconsideration of the actional objectives and means. In other words, human rights will transcend the idea of state sovereignty and security will enter a stage of *détente*, where the accent is placed on the individual.

As we mentioned above, the preemptive action replaced the reactive attitudes. During 11 September-1 May 2003 (the end of the Iraq invasion), security switched from the *détente* stage to preemptive action, the USA being the first to include the concept of preemptive action in its national security strategy; an entire doctrine on preemptive action was developed subsequently (Reisman, Strong, 2006: 525-550). This overlapped with the transition from maintaining peace processes and mitigating conflicts in friction and conflict areas to direct involvement in negotiating solutions for imposing peace. Now there are a lot of imperatives that become standard for any state that shares liberal democratic values: Security for whom? Based on what values and interests? How much security? Who defines risks and threats? What are the costs of security? What is the defined time span for developing preemptive actions?

Security expands its area becoming an aggregate that starts from individual-society-community and reaches all levels of the international dimension, local-regional-areal-continental-intercontinental-global. There appear various dimensions of security, from the political, economic, social, and military up to the human, cultural and ecologic dimension, from individual to global security. The security resources diversify and the security paradigms increase. The three types of security – collective, common, through cooperation – recalibrate their actional objectives and means by adapting to the current realities. The relevance of state and its sovereignty is decreasing at the level of international relations and of their impact upon security, also because subjects became non-state actors and hierarchy of security risks and threats evolved.

In the third phase, since the Iraq invasion (1 May 2003) until now, the focus of national security has fallen on the resilience ability of the state, i.e. on the correct understanding of the fact that there are threats, risks, vulnerabilities, hazards that cannot be eliminated, irrespective of the (offensive or defensive) measures that can be taken. It is a theory that belongs rather to the neorealist school of thought. The state must have the capacity to reinstall the proper security level in the aftermath of a major disruptive event. Because the role of national sovereignty is decreasing within the international relations system, one of the natural consequences is a diversification of the typology of actors who make up the international system. Besides the classic actors, nation-states and governmental organizations, also non-state actors diversify: terrorist groups, transfrontier mobster organizations, transnational radical religious groups, NGOs, corporations, etc. International organizations such as UNO, NATO, OSCE, EU adapt to reality following the actions of non-state actors; as a consequence, the agenda of state actors is dictated by that of non-state actors. Moreover, state actors “surrender” their sovereignty and that is why limited or assisted sovereignty is a new concept of discussion. For this reason security has entered the stage of state’s resilience in front of current and future threats, risks, vulnerabilities and hazards.

It becomes clear that for sovereignty to be again the main focus for security it must be redefined in relation to the “classic” sovereignty, based on the concepts of the Westphalian logic, and reality proves us that even the criteria for belonging to a state have changed.

We cannot speak now about the end of the end of the nation-state and a transfer of the individual to a universal citizenship that is beyond the rigors of belonging to a state. The nation-state, with its main attributes – sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence – belongs to an outdated *Westphalian* logic, nations being rather witnesses of its avatars. The nation-state is subjected to a process of change in content and relevance at an actional level, where its fundamental attributes are changed. Security, which is in the resilience stage, increases pressure upon the state that should now redefine its functional attributes.

3. RESILIENCE OF SECURITY

Before starting the discussion on the resilience of security we need to present a few concepts. We need to mention that there is no generally accepted definition of resilience; the term migrates to the exact sciences rather than humanistic and social sciences, given its attractiveness. Thus, in exact sciences resilience is defined as “the capability of a strained body to recover its size and shape after deformation caused especially by compressive stress; an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, *Resilience*), the term was later borrowed by ecology, defining the ability of a system to absorb changes without having its vital functions affected and to keep existing (C.S. Holling, 4/1973: 1-23).

For a better understanding, we find it useful the following explanation:

The «engineering/physical [dimension] refers to physical infrastructure and systems while psychological dimension refers to the social domain that focuses on the individual. We then turn to perceptions of *bouncing back* within the business/economic world-drawing from debates on business continuity management and business leadership/management. [...] This relates to the overall operations of business and the role of management. The final two sub-sections on ecological [...] looks at how research on ecological systems has found that bouncing back from shocks can be both static (strict ecological process) or dynamic (in socio-ecological systems) and the expression of resilience is dependent largely on the scale of enquiry (predator-prey interaction versus human interaction in natural systems) Similarly, [...] research on community resilience reveals the importance of adaptive learning and transformation» (Giroux & Prior, 2012:6).

Closer to our days the definition of resilience received a more comprehensive definition:

Resilience is currently much in vogue and is increasingly making its way into the domain of (national) security. However, the concept did not originate in security, but was imported from the disciplines of ecology and engineering. The popularity of the resilience concept among security experts is closely linked to the emergence of a world of risks rather than threats: Facing a variety of different risks – from natural hazards and the failure of critical infrastructures to terrorist attacks – policy-makers have recognized that not all disasters can be averted, and security can never be fully achieved. As a consequence, the focus has shifted from averting, deterring, and protecting from threats to mitigating the consequences should a disaster occur (Bara, Brönnimann, 2011:6).

In this context, “the concept of resilience offers an apt metaphor of how communities can resist damage and recover quickly from adverse events” (National Research Council, 2011:1).

At the NATO Summit in Warsaw in 8-9 July 2016, heads of states and governments adopted a declaration that says

(...) we are today making a commitment to continue to enhance our resilience against the full spectrum of threats, including hybrid threats, from any direction. Resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks. (NATO, 2016:1).

Back to the resilience stage of security, our analysis will refer to the transformation of the term sovereignty, implicitly of the term nation-state. The evolution of the international systems in the post-Cold War era led to a recalibration of its determinants: risks, threats, vulnerabilities, hazards. The relation of interdependence between the nation-state sovereignty and the system of international relations resulted in several stages of security. The resilience stage is the result of the pace of the changes and their radical nature that manifests globally. The pressure of security is transferred to state actors and the various organizations they are part of. Further on, each entity (nation-state or organization) develops institutional transformations that should grant them adaptability. In other words, the conceptual explanatory image of the international relations system, in the post-Cold War era, is as follows: the détente period coincided with peace maintaining and peaceful mitigation of conflicts, then the

preemptive stage meant imposing peace and active involvement in the effort to find negotiated solutions; the resilience of security stage should have the ability to absorb the “shocks”, continuing to function within functional parameters. All three stages belong to the post-*Westphalian* stage of security and lead to an “erosion” of the sovereignty of the nation-state.

The evolutive fluidity and unpredictability of the international security environment are the results of the increased relevance of the transfrontier and transnational non-state actors. They are in a direct determination relation with the state actors and their fundamental attribute, sovereignty, that lose relevance within the international system. “The transfer of sovereignty” of the state actors, through delegating some attributions to international organizations, generates the process of actor multiplication. This opinion is supported from many points of view:

(...) The argumentative scope is diverse, starting from the multiplication of centers of power and authority, the diminution of states’ ability to control their national economies as a result of globalization and interdependence, the inability to fully control information and ideas due to the technical-scientific revolution, up to an increased dependence of most states to foreign natural resources (Tuțianu, 2011:99).

The chain of change is the following: through non-state actors’ action, reality imposes organizations (UN, NATO, EU, OSCE) to adopt documents that should conform with the actional reality. Further on, organizations, through their actions, “affect” nation-states’ sovereignty, turning it into a “limited” or “assisted” sovereignty.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Retrospectively, the past five centuries seem nothing but a series of wars or preparations for wars so that an entity having a hegemonic vocation impose its will against the others. All this time, and possibly in the future as well, the international system has had to constantly transform and nations have always been in competition. Not even periods of peace could stop the processes of continuous change. The secular transformations of the balance of power lead us to the conclusion that the war coexists with the system of great powers. The war is inherent to the will for hegemony. No one can exclude the possibility of a war waged with

conventional arms. The only certainty is that the rhythm of transformations of the global balance of power will be more alert. No one, state or leader, can control the rhythm of change. Otto von Bismarck said that all great Powers “are traveling on the stream of Time,” but they “can steer with more or less skill and experience” (Pflanze, 1963:17). Practically, one cannot endlessly shape an international order, but one can extend the time for doing this. How? With skill and experience, just as Bismarck said.

The evolution of the concept of security was an integral part and shaped the international systems in various epochs. The peace of *Westphalia* and The Treaty of *Versailles* imposed a volatile international order, unlike the Congress of Vienna and the one dominated by the USA in the aftermath of the Second World War, which imposed a stable order.

Ex post facto, the new world order of the beginning of the XXth century started under *Wilsonian* auspices and ended under the same auspices, foreshadowing a new world order based on cooperation, collective action and the force of common principles. The USA proposed, for the third time in a century, an international arrangement upon which it should apply its own internal values. Wilson had dominated the Peace Conference in Paris and had proposed his allies collective security and self-determination; Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Henry Truman wanted to put an end to the expansion of communism and offered an American alternative to it; Ronald Reagan and George Walker Bush accelerated the collapse of communism and turned the USA in the only state able to act anywhere in the world. The new complex and dynamic world order of the XXI century shares similarities with the European system of entities prior to the Peace of *Westphalia*. The international arrangements will be based on a balance of national interests so that peace should prevail. The new world order has not yet been defined, it has not reached a final form because it fails to respond to a series of imperatives: What are its principles? What do these principles aim? How do these principles interact?

The end of the Cold War and the absence of a well-defined political-military-ideologic adversary that should oppose the USA will recalibrate the American priorities and the transfer of resources from the military field to something else, following an internal pressure. In this respect, the lack of a big threat will lead to the fact that each state who benefitted from security warranties from the USA

will assume a greater responsibility towards its own security.

The future world order will no longer be the privilege of a single state, the new construction will have to find a balance between the claims of the future actors involved and availability to impose and apply them. An important role in all this process will be played by the definition of the national interests of those involved. Once the interests of the future actors are defined and the balance between them found, we can speak of a new world order. It is clear that the generations who no longer have the memory of the Cold War or the Second World War will tend to other types of order, where the role of traditional actors, such as the USA’s organic involvement in Europe, will be diminished in building security. Some of the actors we know will tend to isolationism in various forms while others will raise.

In all this mix, security was either grafted on national causes or the result of certain shared principles and values. Each world order basically was given a choice: the power of loaded canons or the power of the word. The unilateral imposing of a global agenda offers both power and responsibilities, which in time trigger the wear of the respective state – its power becoming diffuse but its responsibilities becoming increased.

State sovereignty evolves concomitently with the functional needs of society. The post-*Westphalian* phase of security diminishes the importance of the nation-state and states must adapt to this reality. Even if it remains the main actor of the international relations system, the sovereign nation state will no longer exercise, within normal parameters, its attributions on an international level.

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ETHICS AND MANAGEMENT IN NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *Intelligence activities are a necessary and valuable tool for all nations, and it is important to succeed in achieving a comprehensive and coherent understanding of ethics role in the state interest and how leadership supports this role. The core of the debate on the ethics of the intelligence activity is in maintaining the balance between the good of the citizens - guaranteed through national security – and the protection of individual free will - ensuring individual safety and human rights. That is because, in times of national crisis, citizens are required to give up some of their rights and freedoms in exchange of personal safety or of the community they are part of. That is why the connection between ethics and intelligence is important, especially in the national security system. The devotion of intelligence officers to the country and their leaders have an undeniable role in preserving security of a nation. The intelligence community plays an important role in establishing the values that will govern the way the organization will be perceived, guaranteeing legitimacy in front of citizens. Therefore, the aim of the study is to address the importance of placing ethics in intelligence activities where the role of leadership in national security sector is a determinant of organizational ethics. From the decision-making level, the focus is on respecting the principles of the rule of law while prioritizing the implementation of sustainable action plans in fulfilling the mission of national security but respecting the universal values of human rights.*

Keywords: *security; intelligence; ethics; management; rule of law; human rights community*

1. INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, ethics is fundamental, especially given the uncertainty that nations are going through. Now that the whole world is one click away, news flows are running continuously and bilateral agreements among states have become the rule and not the exception. In this context, ethics means respecting what humanity believes, ethics must involve moral goals and means, especially in the case of strategic leaders who are guided by an ethos that defines and governs the military profession by constitutional principles and values. Goals may justify some means, but this is not always the case. In every organization, regardless of size, leaders are the example, including in ethics. In the military organizations, the climate in which the mandate is carried out starts from the top and influences the way instructions are followed. (Myers, Pierce, 2009:14).

2. THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

The main objective of the ethics study in the field of national security are the relations in the organization and how the personnel behaves in the

different roles it take on, including, first of all, the decision-making factor, the role of a leader (Ciulla, Price, 2005:1), an intelligence officer and to the legal advisor who comes to support the decision. Ethics in the intelligence activity has gained greater importance following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

However, there are issues related to the means employed to address this type of threats to national security, where a comprehensive understanding of the concept of ethics is needed. One of the basic reasons is the lack of consensus of the experts in defining the intelligence activity that leads to the conclusion that, in the broadest sense, it is both a process and a product, which can be defined both by the means and by results. (Bimfort, 1995:1)

The core of the debate on the ethics of the intelligence activity is the balance between serving the citizen and preserving national security because in times of national crisis, citizens are required to give up some rights and freedoms for preserving national security.

Private life is an individual attribute, guaranteed by human rights. When an intelligence about a person becomes an element in the intelligence activity, that person's private life

becomes a public good being inherently integrated into national security of the state.

For instance, the problem of the morality of mass surveillance¹ or the use of methods² of interrogation³ is justified by the necessity of protecting national security that is in fact the necessity to protect the community in detriment of individual security?

To prevent the abuse of the exceptional prerogatives granted by the community to the state intelligence activities, the focus is on maintaining the rule of law, an independent justice and decisional transparency in governance.

3. ETHICS AND MANAGEMENT

Law and morality references of our societies, therefore, historically, social obligations have been incorporated into the constitutional Law to which we must adapt our behaviour otherwise it will not come into effect and would be denounced by society, thus the state would lose legitimacy⁴.

The managerial needs are the incentives that led to the creation of tailored norms specific to the organization, different as for the degree of specificity in comparison to the law meant for the whole society, a normative designed to make the




Fig.1 Management process of situations where ethics play a key role

¹ The case of China, which carries out extensive measures of digital surveillance of its own citizens regardless from the environment from which digital data is captured; or the 2018 case of the United Kingdom that lost in front of the European Court of Human Rights due to the intelligence leaked by the former NSA subcontractor Edward Snowden on GCHQ methods of mass surveillance of telecommunications (note 1).

² The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatments or Punishments of 1987 defines torture as 'any act by which a person intentionally causes severe pain or suffering, of a physical or mental nature, in particular with the purpose of obtaining intelligence from this person or from a third party, intelligence or confessions, to punish the person for an act that the person or a third party committed or is suspected of having committed, to intimidate or pressure a third party, or for any other reason based on a form of discrimination, whatever it may be, when such pain or suffering is provoked by an official of the public authority or any other person acting officially, or by instigating or with the express or tacit consent of such people'.

³ Interrogation is a form of intelligence collection carried out by specialized personnel, only under special conditions, according to legal procedures, for example: such techniques can be performed on the battlefield when captured combatants of the opposing side are interrogated in order to obtain intelligence of immediate tactical value.

managerial objectives more efficient in the organization.

In the modern era, where threats have a strong transnational character, manager of national security organizations must be familiar with the processes and arguments that can most often determine the success or failure of public policy initiatives. These responsibilities have profound implications in determining the national security strategy from the perspective of the global economy, collective defence commitments and consideration for the public and private sector perspective. Therefore, at strategic level, the attention comes down to the guarantees of the unwavering exercise of the universal values of human rights, and in particular, in fulfilling the mission of national security while respecting the principles of the rule of law.

⁴ The Romanian Constitution (1991, modified in 2003, articles 54-57) provides that the fundamental duties are: loyalty to the country, defence of the country, financial contributions and the exercise of rights and freedoms in good faith;

Democratic societies have emphasized the need for control over the armed forces, being consecrated from the fundamental constitutional law by guaranteeing the instruments for democratic control over the activities of the armed forces.

Similarly, this principle of control exercised by civilians applies to intelligence services. Both the military forces and the intelligence services must carry out the activity under the rule of law and constitutional provisions (Moore *et al.*, 1990:139-141). Workers in the intelligence services carry out their activity under the pressure of great responsibility and often they face risks for their personal integrity in collecting intelligence of national interest. (Coyné *et al.*, 2013:27-37).

intelligence as a baseline, are both comprised by the democratic principle of rule of law that governs the legitimacy of intelligence services (Scheinin, 2010:1-33).

In post-communist Romania law no.51/1991 regarding national security sets the legal boundaries covered by what national security means as to what the Constitution sets as fundamental values to our society and outlines the competences of intelligence services by defining threats and procedural steps in the field of intelligence.

Although framework institutes conditions for carrying out the activities that are oriented towards respecting the citizen's rights. This could prove to be insufficient because the same law under




Fig. 1 Organizational ethics

That is why, the link between ethics and management is vital to any organization, especially in the national security system. The devotion of intelligence officers to the country and their leaders have an undeniable role in the security of a nation.

4. CHEQUES AND BALANCES IN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING. A ROMANIAN APPROACH

The legality and legitimacy of the intelligence gathering are important in democratic societies. Regulating the means of gathering intelligence while respecting the democratic principles can be achieved by assuming political responsibility in front of citizens (Otamendi, Estevez, 2016:4-6).

Intelligence activities and the accountability that derive from the state prerogative to gather intelligence, the need of an ethical approach in

conditions of secrecy could provide a legal cover for unethical practices. In order to ensure a balance of state power, directly related laws ensure that each intelligence service is bound to external review, both a form of supervision and control exercised by the elected representatives of the people, the Parliament.

The Romanian Intelligence Service published, in 2017, the Guide for Ethical Conduct which includes parts of conduct derived from the particularities and requirements of intelligence profession, conveying an unitary set of values, principles and rules able to contribute to the promotion and defence of national interests, providing appropriate practices and attitudes in a work environment that meets the special standards to ensure that relevant professional objectives aligned to the Romanian national security aspirations (SRI, 2017:1-14).

Although compromises can occur between exercising natural rights of a person and achieving public national interests, due to the emergency of the events and the efficient intervention of the secret services, these circumstances prove to be outstanding.

Even if the civil society could accept the exceptional means of achieving the national interests, they must be interdependent to the justification and necessity of the measures taken.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The increasing involvement of civil society in the way the activity of intelligence services is carried out demonstrate that several factors need to be taken into account when we are discussing how to maintain the balance between the primary interests of the citizen and the public interests of society as a whole (Martin, 2016:21).

The intricacy of the security ecosystem, the merger between national and international security and the technology revolution command for ethical and enhanced fact-based policymaking in intelligence gathering, while managing the risks that might appear. (Walsh, Miller 2016:345-368).

By all means, intelligence gathering is a necessary and valuable tool for all nations and it is important to succeed in achieving a comprehensive and coherent understanding of the role ethics plays in protecting state interests and how national security management supports this role.

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUST AND SHARING THE RESPONSIBILITIES IN MULTINATIONAL MILITARY COALITIONS

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Abstract: *The trust" has multiple links and is relatively easier to be built in peacetime, among soldiers belonging to different nationalities, through the polyvalent knowledge and extended common use. The conclusions of my research, conducted in the theatre of operation from Afghanistan, regarding of this subject are double. First conclusion is that the xeno-cultural images are very resistant to change and seems to be cultural constant values. The values and the images that are part of the cultural nucleus of a nation are remaining stable, with changes happening gradually. The second conclusion is that attitudes towards other different cultures are exposed to changing. In wartime, in extended stress conditions, the trust is eroding or strengthens depending on the common values, the forming process to become soldiers, a common history, organizational policies, etc. The distrust is generating frictions, separation; share the area of responsibilities and lowering the level of interoperability in a coalition.*

Keywords: *trust; responsibilities; military coalition; xeno-cultural images; interoperability*

1. INTRODUCTION

In military teams, relations are developed in time and there is a strong interdependence based on trust. The tasks of the teams are complex, it is a stress environment, and there are multiple opportunities to test different situations, together with the members of the military team.

The trust is a process, a built emotion (the same as loyalty), that you have it with respect to individuals and organization.

Trust concept comprises psychological and socio-cultural aspects. Building the trust is based on: (1) Prediction towards the way the others are behaving in the future in relation to us, an aspect that is based on our cultural, psychological and social evolution, on previous experiences, the emotional status in which we are, our own interests but also the way motivation of the other persons is perceived; (2) Prediction towards the way we will behave in the future in relation to the others. In this case we can choose an analytic behavior, rational, in which the advantages of such a kind of behavior are evaluated permanently and the dictated behavior for the persons with whom we are interacting, or we can choose a relational behavior, based on the knowledge we have in relation with the "category" from which they belong.

We can define the trust as being:

...a psychological state that manifests itself in the behaviors towards others is based on the expectations made upon behaviors of these others, and on the perceived motives and intentions in situations entailing risk for the relationship with these others (Costa *et al.*, 2001).

2. THE TRUST AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, PERSONAL AND/OR OF A CATEGORY

It is important to make the distinction in between trust and cooperation. We can cooperate also without trust in the team partners, but the trust is increasing the motivation to cooperate.

The need for trust is coming from the necessity to reduce the situational complexity. We need, as social human beings, to believe as the others have also constant, positive motivations towards us, in order to reduce expectations that we have towards the behavior of others. When we are referring to trust, we approach the aspect from two perspectives: the one of a direct report, personal (in which trust is built on interrelationship and validation of common experiences) and the one of trust that is functioning based on "category" in which that specific person is identified.

2.1. Trust as a personal construct. Acquired through direct interaction, this is built gradually, through accumulation of information. The

respective features are those which predicts and generate future behavior. The superior status is represented by the degree in which the others will fulfill our expectations in every situation, according to the attributes that we attached to their behavior. In the united groups with values and common objectives, with a high degree of interpersonal trust, a case in which there is an identification of the individual with the group (for example: US Marines).

Constants that are appearing in the studies related to *trust built through direct interaction* are the following: *time* in order to develop a common history and to observe the predominant behavior, *motivations, emotions and the exchange of relevant information*. The trust has three big components: *professional competence* (with three aspects: knowledge at the expert level, technical abilities and the daily performance [Barber, 1983]), *integrity and good will*. All those aspects are important in building the trust inside the teams.

To those three components are added factors related to the interaction process: communication, common values and objectives, identification of cultural similarities, etc.

2.2. The trust as a construct of a category.

An individual belonging to a certain category is offering for the members of another group the perception of trust based on the information they got with respect to that specific group (ethnicity religion, social role, position on the leadership scale, cultural context, etc.). It is in general the way to approach of the relationships in the initial phases of the multinational interaction.

The increase of the morale, common continuous professional training, progress stimulation and rewarding the success got are strong motivators in building the trust in the values of the organization and of the group to which they belong.

Situational uncertainty and stress, specific to the theatre of operations and crisis situations, are changing dramatically the level of trust.

3. BUILDING THE TRUST THROUGH COMMON TRAINING

Soldiers are having multiple chances to be promoted in the carrier, to train themselves and to develop, if they want that. The loyal chance is the main element in the motivation for the continuous training of the soldiers from the developed armies. The condition is that those chances to be correct, and the „Military carrier guide” and National Legislation also have to be applied correctly.

People are normally feeling not motivated and they think it is unjust when their needs and rights are ignored, and the circulation in both ways of the value „trust” is affected.

Adjacent to the military and specific training, in Romania, the efforts to consolidate the trust in the personnel capabilities have been objectified in the establishment of the Linguistic Training Centers, followed by the establishment of the Distance Learning Department in 2004. The third step in the training effort was represented by the establishment of the Simulation Training Center that has a major role in the common training, standardized of NATO soldiers. All those attempts in training are creating the feeling of belonging to a trained organization and also that of trust in the possibility to accomplish professional roles.

Expanding the content of the training courses and of the university programmes to include cultural competence issue and the leadership in multinational environment is representing the permanent improvement of doctrine and is a preoccupation of our Ministry of Defense. All of these are offering the initial image of the preparation and of the competence the soldier is having and the foundation on which are applied the communication programmes that generate trust, orientation towards objective and offers information about the niche on which the soldier can maximize with efficiency this competence.

3.1. Common experience acquired in *common exercises, in peacetime*, is relevant in the trust building process. Living together for extended periods of time in a common environment is creating conditions to manifest the basic individual behaviors and the learning through experimentation and exercise.

Testing the trust and of the interoperability inside extended multinational teams, *for a long period*, has been achieved in the first German-Nederland Army Corps (von Hagen *et al.*, 2006:15-51). The results of the study are relevant, because they consist the only research document conducted with the participation of NATO countries, for a ten years period. 1995-2005. René Moelker, Joseph Soeters and Ulrich von Hagen focused on two well-known hypotheses of claiming that *the frequency of the contacts*, and *mutual trust* are likely to facilitate the sympathy feelings in between the cultures. It is a case study on collaboration in peacetime.

Data is demonstrating that soldiers of both nations merged in their sympathy feelings and additionally the two hypotheses have been

confirmed. In general, the reciprocal images of the Dutch and of the Germans were positive (Soeters, 2006). The Germans and the Dutch that gave interviews have declared that *they had trust* the others, especially on the *professional side*.

The development of trust is depending on factors related to individuals, to category on which they belong, on situational risk factors and on the stress level of the personnel of the multinational military teams.

3.2. The environment that is characteristic to the theatre of operations is remaining the framework in which is tested the *validity of trust construct* in peacetime. Extrapolating the experience of German-Nederland cooperation *in the war environment*, the stress, different financial benefits, unbalanced distribution of the missions, the command provided by a single nation, have generated dramatic effects over the trust in between the mission partners, the same ones as in Munster. It is the clear proof that common training does not automatically generates trust and interoperability.

The issue of building the trust in between the coalition partners is complex. Elements like: personnel rotation, the busy geographic context or a very dispersed one, cultural differences, differences in education, religion, professional formation, in between the values of the national cultural dimensions, national military rules, the personal values, age, gender etc. are variables that are affecting the trust degree in between the coalition partners.

4. LEADERSHIP AND TRUST

Gail L. Zellman, Joanna Z. Heilbrun, Conrad Schmidt and Carl Builder have characterized the essential elements of the military culture as being

conservative, deep rooted in history and traditions, based on group loyalty, on conformity and orientated towards obeying the superiors (Zellman *et al.*, 1993:369)

Military organizations are “producing” individuals in which you have to trust because it can come a moment when you have to entrust your own life. When the organization is voluntarily divided in small groups, then we are talking about personnel trust level and not about the organizational one, and the fault is the negative influence of the leadership.

In general, the process of building a minimum level of trust is taking 5-8 months. Taking into

consideration this fact, it has been appreciated that the mission period for the leaders of certain ranks to be based on the importance of the position occupied, as follows: the commander of the mission to be rotated every two years, the heads of the structures every year, and the fighting units every six months. Knowledge and mutual trust in between the leader and his team is important, that is why the leaders from essential positions are accompanied by their own teams and in bigger execution structures (companies, platoons, etc.) they are deployed in the theatre of operations as they are working in the peacetime establishment. When the rotational periods are of 4-6 months, the level of trust is based only on the professional trust. The interaction in KAIA military Base is an excellent example of professional trust based on standards and procedures.

Trust cannot be dictated, is depending on the environment and on the context. In environments where there is a trust deficit, the leader is the one that is influencing the relations. In building the trust process, the leader has to decide what is better for the group on long time perspective and how much can be extended “the safety circle”.

Under the pressure of the political factor and of the survival instinct, a leader can make certain decisions that may affect the trust inside the organization, affecting also the reputation of the structure. Using such a kind of conduct each member of the organization will choose to protect himself/herself affecting dramatically the trust, the accomplishment of the mission and the entire culture of the organization.

The leadership style and the environment to which the members of the team belong are generating different trust degrees and kind of interrelationships.

GLOBE Study is offering a scientific understanding framework of the way in which leadership is exercised in those 61 studied states (62 from the cultural dimension perspective but, 61 from that of leadership style). Analysis generated 21 statistical scales of leadership that have been reduced to the final, to six styles of leadership. Those are: (1) The leadership style orientated on performance, named „*charismatic, based on values*” by the researchers in the GLOBE Study. This style is presenting the following characteristics: high standards, commitment, innovation, the support and inspiration of the team that is leading; (2) The style orientated towards the team: is cultivating proud, loyalty and collaboration among the members of the organization. The values of such a style of

leadership are cohesion and the common aim to accomplish the objectives. (3) The participative style: that encourages the opinions of the others in taking and implementing decisions, is comfortable with the delegation of the responsibilities and with the equality concept; (4) The human style: leadership is performed with generosity and compassion, patience, support, and preoccupation for the well being of the members of the team; (5) The autonomous style is an independent one, individual, and focused on his own interest; (6) The auto protective style (or for the protection of the group): position, procedures and rules are

important, a non-authentic behavior to save the appearances, concentrated on the safety and personal security of the group.

In the following table are presented those six styles of leadership and their positioning on the intensity scale, of the countries comprising the ten groups. The importance of those ten styles of leadership is special, because is facilitating the understanding of the understanding of the interaction inside military organization and the frictions that are generated from different style of interaction in between the leader and the teams.

Table no. 1. „Societal groups and the style of leadership”, Robert J. House (2004)

Orientation towards performance	Orientation towards the team	Participative	Human	Autonomous	Auto or group protective
<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>High</i>
Anglo	SE Asian	Germanic	SE Asian	Germanic	Middle East
Germanic	Confucian	Anglo	Anglo	Eastern European	Confucian
Nordic	Latin	Nordic	African	Confucian	SE Asian
SE Asian	American		Confucian	Nordic	Latin American
L. European	Eastern			SE Asian	Eastern European
L. American	European			Anglo	
Confucian	African	Latin	Germanic	African	African
African	Latin	European	Middle East	Middle East	Latin European
E. European	European	Latin	Latin American	Latin European	
	Nordic	American	Eastern European	Latin American	
	Anglo	African			
	Middle East				
Middle East	Germanic	Eastern European	Latin European		Anglo
		SE Asian	Nordic		Germanic
		Confucian			Nordic
		Middle East			
<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Low</i>
Orientation towards performance	Orientation towards the team	Participative	Human	Autonomous	Auto or group protective

High hierarchy and orientation towards obeying the rules and military regulations (a feature of the Latin Group), elitism and special respect paid to the position (a feature of the Anglo-Saxon Group) and excessive orientation towards the accomplishment of the objectives to which is added uncertainty avoidance and the exaggeration of rules (a feature of the Americans) are only few of the aspects of the military culture that generate situational uncertainty and mistrust and can represent other efficient instruments for the cultivation of trust if there is an area „commonly accepted”.

Power and responsibility are notions related in between them. Those who do not have

responsibilities are not motivated. Structures that are positively evolving are those, in which the behaviors and responsibilities are quantifiable, in which the leaders of the subunits have the proper power to the position and of the level of competence. In such a kind of structure, the information and experience is distributed to the team based on the principle “need to know” and is encouraged the solution and ideas circulation.

In general, the leaders are feeling comfortable with the idea of power but positive evolution inside the “infinite game” is possible only when there is a balance in between the distribution of power, responsibility, trust in the mission of the

organization and when the people are representing the top priority for the leadership and for the organization, on a long term.

In multinational groups it is important that members to understand in a unitarian way the fighting mission. The differences in understanding the missions (being fighting, humanitarian, advise or training) put in danger also the vision, the planning and the execution as the result of the intervention. In units/groups where there is not a solid foundation for trust, in which the language, the leadership style, competencies and skills, the utilitarian system from which they are coming the soldiers and the commanders are different, and the efficiency of that specific unit is reduced. The groups established ad hoc have reduced chances to survive in fighting, because they are not operating as a cohesive unit.

5. THE RELATION IN BETWEEN THE PRESENCE OF THE FEMALES IN THE MILITARY TEAMS AND TRUST

The role of the females in societies has been clearly defined, based on the reproduction function, sensibility and the care for the family.

This seems to be in antagonism with the integration and the trust of the group that is creating the idea that the introduction of women in the fighting teams is attracting a fracture in the cohesion of the group. The armies are traditionally conservative entities that do not respond to those changes in gender rapidly. How the small fighting unit can be affected by the admittance of the women among them? This question is focusing our attention to the following one: How the trust, cohesion and sexuality are interacting inside the multinational Coalition, especially in the small units like for example Special Forces? *Hyper-masculinity* item has a central role in sub-military culture, because has a link with motivation and cohesion.

Physical test are representing the first barrier in the selection process and in the integration of the women in fighting units. Impossibility to maintain the level of effort is perceived by the other members of the group as being poverty, a dilution of capabilities. A British study on this issue inside several armies, a research conducted in 2010, has established that in the countries where there is such a kind of option, only 1% of the women that are applying for positions in fighting units have fulfilled the physical tests. The studies related to the integration of women in different armies concluded that exists the possibility that such a kind of integration on the cohesion of the group.

After 2010, once with the revision of the policy related to the employment of women in British fighting units, there was the recommendation to be stopped, because there was a „potential risk to maintain the erosion of the mixed tactical groups engaged in fighting close operations of a high risk” (MoD, 2010). The danger is coming from different directions: the disruptive relations and the competition in between men for the attention of women. All these elements are leading to the decrease of trust and cohesion. Despite these, the reality of the theatre of operations has demonstrated that well thought personnel policies can achieve a harmonization of the contribution of the two genders in the operational process.

The reality of the theatre of operations proved that women are integrating well into the military teams, they are not generating major frictions inside the members of the team and they have a special role in gathering information especially in the very traditional countries.

6. TRUST – SECURITY OF THE PERSONNEL AND THE INTERACTION WITH LOCAL POPULATION

In the theater of operations one of the basic conditions to establish a real and efficient communication in between the personnel of the mission and the locals is by personal trust. The bigger threats on which the members of the tactical teams are exposed are leading indirectly, with unable to carry out their actions and to win the trust of the tribal leaders. This is happening because the force protection issue related to the teams is related to the presence of the armored vehicles, weapons and other subunits that are providing force protection. There is a mandatory condition generated by the personnel safety policies, but this is getting in contradiction with the expected way to interact of the population.

It's a two-way road, in which each side has survival rules. The interest of developing the trust exists on both sides but the possible effects of the actions resulting from cultural differences and/or the manifestation of extremist beliefs permanently threaten this objective.

Variables that are influencing the trust – case studies. The qualitative method used was **the case study** in which I used participative and non-participative observation. The first case study was conducted on two Romanian contingents made up of staff, and the second on a permanent structure of the General Headquarters of the Resolute Support

Mission composed of multinational personnel. The research was conducted in between 2013-2017.

The instrument used was „The linear knowledge and harmonization model of cultural interaction” (Palaghia, 2018).

In this material I will refer only to the observations and conclusions related to the trust variable. The case studies were extended to the cultural differences in the theater of operations.

Observation No. 1: The level of experience and of professional competence on which there are added the level of linguistic competence is affecting the quality of the process and the content of the communication. It is representing the basis for the multinational operations. „*The level of linguistic knowledge*” is the most important in the interrelationship process in multinational coalition. In this material I will refer only to the observations and conclusions related to the trust variable. The case studies were extended to the cultural differences in the theater of operations.

There were elements noted in the observation process that confirmed that some Romanian military, but also military of some southeast European armies felt marginalized in the process of operational planning or elaboration of conceptual documents, and their explanation was that

probably the talking rhythm and/or the level of knowledge of English language, especially the level of understanding and communication in writing are not at the expected level by natives, on which is added the deficiencies in knowing the SOPs.

There is a great desire to learn the procedures and increase the contribution to the conception process, efforts recognized and appreciated by the military of other contributing nations, but the fighting environment does not provide the time needed for the linguistic details and the procedure to be learned. The participating military must be fully trained when they reach the multinational structures. Only this way I can benefit from the trust of our partners. In the majority national structures, the nations that are minority have the tendency of separation and they will feel excluded, not used to the real capacity and, finally, frustrated.

Observation No. 2. Working culture. It represents the manifestation of the two cultural aspects: the orientation towards the achievement of the objectives versus the maintenance of social relations. There are big differences between how to perceive and apply this variable between nations, generating frustrations, altering trust between team members or between them and their leaders.

Observation No. 3. The way in which „strong nations” are watching „poor nations”.

The common history and the feeling that they belong to powerful nations induce a certain attitude among the military belonging to different nations. This attitude changes during the mission. At first, the military interacts openly, amicably, diplomatically. The stress level being low, the masking capacity is high. Time, together with trust (or lack thereof) and respect (or lack thereof) towards the skills of the coalition partners, acts in shaping group behavior. If gaps in communication are added to them, then the phenomenon of separation occurs. If, on the contrary the linguistic level, the preparation and the operational experience, the cultural knowledge, the respect and the confidence are combined, the phenomenon of integration in the group appears, with positive effects both on the psychic of the military and on the efficiency of the group.

Observation No. 4 “Common” History it can generate feelings of distrust and animosity between contingents. The importance of this aspect was among the first introduced in the process of preparing the premise and preparing the leaders. Knowing the ‘sensitivity’ of this type of interrelation in the coalition has led to the taking of additional precautions regarding the common areas of action of the contingents, a careful selection of the groups that provide certain areas and / or participate in common operations. For example, the fairly recent common history of conflicts between Turks and Greeks can be considered a source of mistrust. There is a high probability that, in stressful situations, any motive will be used as an outlet. Preparing the premise, operating in multinational structures, dividing by areas of responsibility, informal meetings are just some of the elements that generate balance in this aspect of collaboration.

Observation No. 5. Belonging to different political, social and military systems has generated differences in procedures, technique, very different values of the "distance to power" dimension, differences that affect the degree of trust. The consequence of the training of the personnel of different nationalities in totalitarian systems (in particular, the Eastern-European bloc) or long war zones (Afghanistan) has led to the development of a certain type of behavior that we have called „adaptive/survival behavior”.

The consequences of this behavior are: lack of trust in partners, respect only for people with special military skills (strong leaders), caution in statements, functioning in groups already known

and 'verified', the desire to meet the job requirements only as much as needed without initiatives, without making any effort to stand out. This attitude generates frustration at the level of the coalition partners who expect an involved and active participation. The knowledge gained from grouping nations participating in multinational missions by categories, according to Geert Hofstede's cultural values and dimensions, indeed facilitates easier interaction between contingents and can lead to friction avoidance and increased mission efficiency, but it is not a condition sufficient.

Observation No.6. Civil-military relation.

The deficit of trust lies in the fact that the command and subordination lines are completely different, the working procedures and interaction with the local population are different, the purpose of the mission is perceived differently, there is a wealth of information whose content is not intended to be known by one side or the other.

Observation No. 7. The „Lead Nation” Concept is proving to be the most effective approach to multinational missions. The validity of this concept was verified both through the case study conducted on the basis of KAIA and in Mazar al Sharif, Herat. The clear definition of the areas of responsibility, the unique management, the unique procedures prove to be the ways of diminishing the effects of the distrust within the coalition.

Observation No. 8. Respect – a component of trust. Respect has at least three dimensions: towards the uniform, with respect to one another and respect for oneself. The low endowment, the poor way of wearing the uniform and the attitude when it is worn is elements that show disrespect to the army of which the military is part.

The military must respect each other, regardless of gender, religion, sexual orientation, and ethnicity. Each military must respect itself through education, personal development, behavior. Everything is related to respect for the uniform, comrades and their own person. Lack of physical training, overweight are signs of disrespect for the soldier profession and are associated with laziness and lack of enthusiasm.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The trust and cohesion of the team results from the positive influence of/on its members and the combination of at least three factors: competence (members and leader), care (towards one's own person, team members and organization-mission and purpose) and communication in within the

team. When a team is cohesive, the level of trust is high. The major frictions in the interrelation of theaters mainly reside in: cultural identity and differences of values, conditions of accommodation and feeding, codes of conduct, differences between the systems of management and the forms of exercise of the discipline, differences in terms of beliefs political, wage differences and other benefits, the nature of the relationships between officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, how women are viewed in different cultures, differences in military training and experience in the international environment and theater of operations, differences in goals, staff turnover too fast.

Different ways to solve the military conflicts (by fighting or through a humanitarian approach), force protection, accommodation facilities, personnel policies, the way to communicate, can generate also frictions inside the Coalition.

The level of linguistic competence, experience at the international environment, and the availability of the native speakers to adjust the rhythm, to formulate the ideas in a simple manner are factors that are influencing the communication inside the coalition. The stress level and the type of the group (mixed or a nation) are imposing the pace of communication.

For the personnel that is functioning in the military context, having similar values of sub-military cultures is difficult to accept opinions, the role, and the importance of some civilian organizations. The main problem here is the different way in which the subject „*classification of the information and the way is distributed*” is understood by the two types of organizations.

All those elements are affecting the trust dimension inside multinational military organizations. The strategies to achieve an acceptable level of cooperation inside the coalition known in sociology, separation and integration, are functioning in the theatre of operations. Military organizations are functioning over extended periods of time and together are developing an isomorphism resulted from common experiences (experiential isomorphism), through the standardization of policies, doctrines, resources, training and programs, all these leading to the increase of military interoperability.

Dividing the areas of action based on contingents that belong to the same cultural group is a viable solution that reduces frictions in stress situations, in the theatre of operations alongside the uniformity of the technologies used are eliminating

the communication deficiencies and are increasing the level of trust in between the soldiers.

Extended common training generates cultural knowledge and is strengthening trust in between the soldiers. Together with a certain knowledge level of a language at the „professional level”, these elements are facilitating the cultivation of trust.

Essential elements of the military cultures such as: ceremonials and etiquette, discipline, professional ethos, cohesion and esprit de corps have been identified as existing in all the armies of the coalition. They are representing a cultivation instrument of the esprit de corps and the trust inside the Coalition. Cultivation of trust has multiple effects control exercised over the members of the team, and is creating conditions for creative thinking, is facilitating communication and cooperation, and is reducing the conflict level inside the teams.

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TRANSLATE CULTURAL HARMONIZATION AND KNOWLEDGE MODELS USED IN MILITARY TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

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Abstract: *The concern of the advanced armies related to the development of the cultural and linguistic capabilities that are allowing the soldiers to operate into multicultural context, is active and adapted to the realities of the theatre of operations and of the hybrid warfare. The development of the capabilities is imposing testing, training, education and opportunities to for those to be put into practice. Thus, there have been created evaluation instruments of the cultural abilities, in order to see the progress into the learning, education and cultural harmonization process. Each model is offering a path of socio-cultural knowledge. The new model „The linear knowledge and harmonization model of the cultural interaction” developed in the theatre of operation is helping to determine the cultural differences in the specific multinational military environment and can be used into the education process during both peacetime and wartime.*

Keywords: *model; cultural knowledge; theatre of operations; capabilities; cultural interaction*

1. INTRODUCTION

The interest for the identification of the component elements that are acting in order to generate and to show cultural phenomena, has caused the attention of the researchers of different specialties - anthropologists, sociologists, linguists, psychologists, etc.. Those have studied the issue and have created cultural knowledge instruments and models, taking into consideration different variables.

For researchers such as: Talcott Parsons and Eduard Shils (1951), Clyde Kluckhohn and Fred Strodbeck (1961), Edward T. Hall (1966, 1976), Geert Hofstede (1980, 1983, 1991, 2001, 2005), S. H. Schwartz and Peter B. Smith (1992, 1994, 2002), Hampden-Turner and Fons Trompenaars (1993, 1997), the cultural theme has represented a special interest, especially from the perspective of the cultural values and dimensions.

An important conclusion, resulted after cultural research, was that situational evolution, in the same culture, could be different, even if the sensory elements of the respective members of the group are nearly the same. Starting from this and extrapolating the issue to the specificity of the current military operations, the multinational participation, there have been advanced the following hypotheses: this disparity can be a barrier in the way of interoperability when are

necessary coordinated actions in multinational groups, but can act as a leverage in creative management of different conflict situations. The reality of the conflict zones has confirmed the validity of both hypotheses.

2. CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE MODELS (VALUES, NORMS, PRACTICES)

When we are talking about values, especially in multinational military environment we are taking into consideration the following aspects: *general values hold by the group under the observation, how strong is the belief in those values, what is the priority that the group or individual is paying to those values in comparison to other groups.*

2.1. In 1961, Clyde Kluckhohn and Fred Strodbeck has published an important anthropologic study in which they were presenting the variation of the cultural values for six dimensions: human nature, the relationship human nature, the relationships in between people, the relation with the space, the orientation on the axis of time, the reasons of the actions (Kluckhohn & Strodbeck, 1961) The big benefit of this study consists in the fact that is presenting the vast areas and different zones that are influencing cultural interaction from the cultural values perspective.

2.2. In 1992, S. H. Schwartz took as a premise the fact that *individual values*, irrespective of culture is resulting from the combination of the features of the two dimensions: „own interest vs. the care for the others” and „opening towards change vs. conservatism”. He stated that from this interaction of the two dimensions is resulting ten motivational values: universalism, good will, conformity, tradition, security, power, hedonism, achievements, stimulation and independence. It is interesting S. H. Schwartz’s and Peter B. Smith’s theory that stated that socio-economic development can increase the consensus of the values, while the democratization of the societies can reduce the consensus of those (Smith *et al.*, 2002).

2.3. Dimensions „Time” and „Space” have been analyzed by Fons Trompenaars (Present – Past – Future), Edward T. Hall (Polychromic – Monochromic), Geert Hofstede (Confucian Dynamism), Hall (Personal Space, Public - Private) and Fons Trompenaars (Specific - Diffuse).

2.4. Talcott Parsons has developed a set of dimensions for cultural differentiation, some of them being common with those of Hofstede (Triandis, 2012:34-45). Adding to cultural values and dimensions, numerous studies have treated specific *cultural attitudes and practices* that are making the distinction from a group to another, from a nation to another one. For example, the perspective over some life aspects is almost completely different in Muslim countries versus Western ones. The most important norms and/or cultural attitudes of the participating nations to military missions, that have to be analyzed when we are doing the „cultural portrait” of the group we are interacting with are as follows: female’s role / man’s in society, age, time, orientation towards future, the notion right / wrong, logic and emotions, styles of communication and body language.

3. MODELS

3.1. Normative cultural organizational model. In the harmonization process of functionality of the multinational military structures, they have been taken selectively cultural organizational models, on which it was built certain features generated by military subcultures. Organizational culture is a dynamic process, as have been stated by Richard Hagberg and Julie Heifetz (1998:277-281):

an organizational culture is operating at conscious and unconscious level...is a complex phenomenon that comprises symbols and symbolism, relations, behavior and values.

A very well known cultural model is that which belongs Fons Trompenaars and Turner (1993), called *cultural organizational QinetiQ model*. The value of this model is offering a perspective inside the mechanisms that are generating a change inside an organization.

The normative organizational culture is a feature specific also for the military structures. Norms and procedures inside such a kind of organization are predefined, and the rules and regulations are established.

Military organizations are not like the public or private organizations. As L. Joseph Soeters (2004:465) highlighted

...organizations in uniform are distinct ones. They are representing specific occupational cultures, in fact isolated by the society,

but is reflecting the culture of the society in which it exists. At the organizational level, as long as the contacts in between the military of a longer duration and more tight, the level of cultural understanding and of efficient application of the procedures is better. Without reciprocal understanding, procedures established before are more difficult to be implemented.

Practices and relationships that functioned during a complete rotation of the personnel inside theatre of operations is not mandatory to function in the next rotation, all of them being renegotiated continuously.

For the stimulation and the amelioration of this dialogue are necessary more than six months of participation into a theatre of operations of those respective individuals, the practice of a continuous repeated contacts with the local population, and also a more thorough specific pre-cultural training, without any soldierly procedural dogmas and political dogmas (Hentea, 2008:320)

3.2. Functional perspective - Edgar Schein’s cultural model „Iceberg model”- is approaching the cultural knowledge from the functional perspective (the creation of a community of those that are working in an organization and finding the means in order that such a kind of organization to function and to develop, in the context of functioning).

3.3. Complex models that are focused on cultural differences

3.3.1. Marelle DuPraw and Marya Axner used in the cultural knowledge process cultural classification groups of the cultural differences, generated by: style of communication, attitude vs. conflict, the approaching and the way to accomplish the tasks, the decision style, the availability to share information gained and the disposal for learning.

3.3.2. The cultural knowledge model through the comparison of the differences in the way leadership is delivered in Nord-European countries and South-Europeans ones – presented using two studies. In the first one conducted by P. B. Smith, & M. H Bond, *Social psychology across cultures*, Prentice Hall Europe, 1998, are investigated the cultural differences related to „style of management”, based on 17 North and South European countries. They analyzed the following dimensions: „Hierarchy and Loyal Implication in the activity of the organization” and „Equality and the Utilitarian participation”.

In the second study, Zandler in *Culture and Leadership Across the World, the Globe Book of In-Depth Studies of 25 societies*, 1997, it has been evaluated the preference of the personnel vs. the leadership style. The results of those studies are providing useful information related to the leadership style in the European countries (with the exception of the Eastern ones).

3.3.3. Fons Trompenaars (1993) comprising the group of Eastern European countries vs. Western Europeans ones. This study comprises fifty nations, a variety of personal values and intentional behavior. The conclusion of this study is as follows: the major lines of cultural separation are re-confirmed. On another hand, the Western European countries from the Nordic, English, Germanic and Latin groups that are tending to have bigger scores at the following items „Equality” and „Equal engagement”. In the same way, the Eastern European ones are tending to have bigger scores to the following items „Hierarchy” and „Conservatism”.

3.3.4. Cultural group model related to the attitudes associated with work – A study conducted by Simcha Ronen and Oded Shenkar (1985). Major European cultural zones, identified in this study are represented by the group of the countries influenced by English language (Ireland and Great Britain), the Nordic Group (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Germanic Group (Austria, Germany and Switzerland), the Latin Group (Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal and France) and the neighbors of the Eastern-European

Group (Greece and Turkey). Simcha Ronen and Oded Shenkar are taking into consideration eight previous studies, including Geert Hofstede’s study from 1980, studies that are measuring a series of attitudes and values associated with work, such as: the importance paid to the accomplishment of the established objective, the satisfaction offered by work, the managerial style, the organizational climate, the role in the working process and interpersonal orientation.

3.3.5. Yaw Mensah’s and Hsiao-Yin’s model – An extension of the GLOBE Study. The authors (2012) used various types of analysis in order to examine the observable attributes inside the GLOBE Study: ethnic distribution/racial, religious distribution, geographic proximity, language majority distribution and colonial distribution.

3.4. Sub-military cultural knowledge complex models

3.4.1. René Moelker, Joseph Soeters and Ulrich von Hagen (2013) wanted to determine if cultural interoperability is feasible, what conditions are favoring cultural interoperability and in what direction is developed. There is a research conducted in Peacetime with the participation of two NATO countries, in between 1995-2005. The authors of the study have been focused on two hypothesis of the intercultural theory, affirming that the *frequency of contacts* and *reciprocal trust* are likely to favor the sympathy feelings in between different cultures. The conclusions of the study are double. First is that the xeno-cultural images are very resistant to change and seems to be cultural constants. Values and images that are part of the cultural nucleus of a nation remain stable, with changes coming gradually. The second conclusion is that attitudes towards other cultures are prone to changing. The attitudes can be influenced by organizational policies. A basic condition for a successful military collaboration in between two nations is *reciprocal communication and understanding*, which is better resumed by the *sympathy concept*. David Hume is seeing this concept as being

a disposition of human mind, through which our ideas of pleasure, pain or passion can generate in the others diverse living impressions, in an equal proportion with our degree of identification with them and to produce the same feeling inside us (SEP, 2004).

Despite the fact that it does not existed more space for emotional identity in between the

members of different military cultures involved into the bi-national collaboration process, there is a common ground when we are talking about profession, objectives and standards. In order that those standards to fusion it is necessary, the increase of the share of the time spent together and that of the time allocated for collective exercises and for the permanent formation abilities

3.4.2. Checking the feasibility of the interoperability model, in Wartime. In the theatre of operations, the German-Dutch relationship got cooler and became public, in the newspapers, the attitude of the Dutch soldiers saying, „the Afghans are not the problem, the Germans are (...)” (Soeters *et al.*, 2006). It was a case of bi-national cooperation, in a multinational mission, but the contribution of the two countries was clearly unbalanced (Hagen *et al.*, 2003). The camp was crowded, and the Dutch soldiers’ tents have been isolated from the Germans. The Dutch have criticized the way the Germans led the mission and the tasks they ordered to accomplish. After the military personnel returned to Münster (2006>97-129), the Dutch and German commanders from the first Army Corp felt the need to pay a considerable attention to the improvement of the relationship in between the participating personnel to the mission in Kabul (van der Dunk, 2005).

The conclusion of this research is as follows: a long and common pre-mission training is proving to be an important element, but not always sufficient. The observed evolution in this case study does not represent a rule, but the tracked variables during the research can represent a cultural knowledge model.

3.4.3. Faur Marius Gabriel is proposing an „Informational-behavioral-action model of the cultural competencies”, a very useful model in the soldiers’ cultural formation process that are participating in a multinational mission. In the elaboration of such a kind of model, the author considered three psych pedagogic dimensions: cognitive, affective-motivational and actional. The importance of this model consists in the possibility for a guided formation of the leaders’ cultural competencies.

3.4.4. Cultural model in mainly standardized multinational operations. The study that was the foundation of this model was conducted in 2001, on the Kabul military airport KAIA (Afghanistan). The command of the airport has been on a rotational basis every six months, the styles of leadership were different, and the rules were clear, unique, standardized. The decision-making rhythm was

sometimes criticized; all the deficiencies have been linked to the complex multinational chain of command and control. Every operational unit accomplished its own tasks relatively independently and thus, the coordination costs have been kept to minimum. In total 25 nations are contributing with troops but none was dominating them as number. The activities at the airport are executed with success, the personnel is encouraged to report „provocations instead of problems” (a slogan made visible on banners and posters), a similar practice like in NATO bases. Uniformity of the Air Forces in relation to technology (for example, Blackhawks, F-16) is reducing variation represented by the human behavior and thus, the impact of the cultural factor is decreasing. Part of the Air Force operations, the tasks are based mainly on standard objectives in order to evaluate the rightness and the superiority of a certain solution. The execution of those tasks is, in general, expected to be influenced by the cultural diversity (Hamrick *et al.*, 1998:194-196). Despite of some problems, the soldiers from KAIA are, in general, satisfied with the mission and consider their activity as being „just a place to work”.

In the theatre of operations, being a stressed environment generated by uncertain situation, all the cultural differences in between the participants to the Coalition are worsens. A large number of elements that belong both to national cultures and to military sub-cultures are interacting: the impact of national composition, cultural distances, „the complex of the cultural treatment from above”, professional isomorphism, etc.

3.4.5. The linear knowledge and harmonization model of cultural interaction in the theatre of operations (Palaghia, 2018). This model results from the direct research conducted in the theatre of operations from Afghanistan, over and extended period, more than four years, by the author of this article. The aim of this article is to identify the cultural variables that are interacting and generate frictions in multinational military missions, their classification and the generation of an extended data base. This data base is used for the cultural training of the personnel participating in multinational military missions and of the students through post graduate and master courses.

After we studied the documents we identified the following variables that are influencing in certain degree the efficiency of the interaction inside the coalition: the knowledge level of communication language, the work ethics, religion, the level of expertise, the expected living standard, the context (high/low) from which they belong, gender, age, time management, orientation towards

the time axis, notion good/wrong, logic and emotions, communication and body language, survival/values of self-expressions, the different interpretation of the aim of the mission, the rotational system, hierarchy, specific professional training and pre-mission training, military factors that are determining the decisions, factors related to the management process, the formal/informal dimension of the code of conduct, the sympathy concept, professional isomorphism, the difference in terms of personnel policies, professional structure, the composition of the contingents, (religious, gender), physical and moral status, the way leadership is exercised and what is the fighting motivation. All those variables are component parts of the 14 groups that I identified as being important in the knowledge cultural process and, whose differences are determining the functioning level inside the Coalition.

The groups of the linear model are as follows: the level of linguistic knowledge, (English language, local language); „*common*” history of the participants to the mission, and the way this is known and perceived by the partners, the knowledge of your own culture; knowledge of the simplified cultural model of the nation from which the coalition partners are coming; the knowledge of sub-military cultures, common elements and differences; the values of the five cultural dimensions (Hofstede) for each country; the working relation; the time management relation; communication and body language; the way the mission is approached; the endowment level, the equipment, accommodation level, the eating level, doctrine, common procedures and their level of usage, the expertise inside the theatre of operation and the notion right/wrong in different cultures.

The conclusions of those gender knowledge cultural studies have been landmarks on which I guided myself in my research of the components of the cultural knowledge. Some nations are restricting the presence of women in the Army or they are just exclude (like in some Arab countries), while others are allowing them in all departments and branches, including their participation in fighting. In the theatre of operations, female soldiers proved they have a special role, the gender representing a cultural advantage increasing to efficiency of the capabilities. Women utility in the relation with the local population made that the definition of „women responsibilities related to work in theatre of operations” to modify.

The cultural models generated by religious diversity have supported the conclusions of my research. The knowledge of the religion is

increasing the operational capacity, the international level of engagement and the social balance (Azari *et al.*, 2010:585-603). When inside the mission we have soldiers familiar with the religious practices, is a proper framework for communication, the cultural barriers are eliminated and they are offering an opening to know other religions and to develop cultural sensibilities. Inter-ethnic and inter-religious differences exist, but they are not representing a problem in operations. Cultural knowledge from the religious perspective is a notion of a modern education that seems to be useful, thus the religious and ethnic membership tend to be accepted and not to generate major frictions.

The enumeration of the categories of the “Linear and harmonization knowledge model” does not mean that those groups have to be taught/accumulated/treated in this order inside the training/cultural knowledge process, but it should be considered based on their importance and their relation with the other. In the same time, each group comprises a plenty of variables that are influencing the actions of that specific group and/or generate reactions in the interaction with the elements of the other groups. This cultural knowledge model can be applied in the interaction of two or more cultures, both in soldiers training for the missions inside theatre of operations and for missions, operations and exercises executed outside of the theatre of operations.

4. CHECKED CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE INSTRUMENTS

4.1. From psychology. The most significant instruments used in the process of *testing intercultural performance and abilities* in the *pre-mission psychological testing phase*, but also in different stages of the professional training, are: Multicultural Personality Questionnaire, Intercultural Development Inventory and the Cultural Intelligence Scale. Those are highlighting the availability degree for multicultural interaction with the possible influence over the professional performances generated by the deficit of those abilities.

4.2. Belonging to complex domains.

4.2.1. The researcher who has a great influence in the *cultural values* domain, in the last 57 years is *Milton Rokeach*. The instrument created by him to measure the values, *RVS (Rokeach Value Survey)* is made of 36 items, grouped in 16, in terminal and instrumental values, prioritized items on each subject, based on their own scale of

values. This instrument was used also by other researchers to study different features of the values, such as: their relations, the behaviors, the attitudes. An important argument of RVS in supporting the importance of values is the fact that individuals are trying to maintain a constant opinion about them, an opinion that seems to reflect morality and competence. When his actions and belief are getting in contradiction with this constant, the individual is feeling dissatisfaction and the change is produced through his self image, group image, beliefs and actions in the same line. The values are guiding individual behavior, and sometimes are even stronger than his own interest.

4.4.2. Cross cultural adaptability model
Schmidtchen (2002) has developed the quantification instrument (1997) for the identification of the cross-cultural adaptability (CCAS) that comprises 53 items integrated in six domains: the openness to experience, attention to interpersonal relations, the identity sense, lining of personal objectives with the organization's ones, the way to resolve the problems and the cross-cultural expertise. The utility of this model lays in the fact that is offering categories of items that can be observed and tested during the multicultural interaction process with the aim to determine the degree of cultural adaptability.

4.2.3. Geert Hofstede – Cultural dimensions and knowledge of National Cultures. The instrument has been created with the aim to categorize different cultures belonging to different nations, cultures that at that time were found at IBM Company. Initially has identified 6 common dimensions, each with two complementary variables. He has created a valid instrument for the evaluation of the dimensions that, even was criticized sometimes, completed later, is still remaining a basic instrument besides that created by the GLOBE Study to know the National Cultures. „Interhuman relations” dimension was long time treated by Geert Hofstede (Individualism – Collectivism), (Distance towards Power) and Fons Trompenaars (Particularism – Universalism, Previous Traced Status – Acquired Status, Neutral – Affective). According to the conclusions of Geert Hofstede's cultural theory (1983:285-305), there are six dimensions that are explaining how different cultures are motivating their people and organizations.

It is essential to remark that Hofstede's cultural theory is used as a starting point in the recognition process of the fact that there are differences, to see the way those differences are manifesting inside military organizations and to try to apply this

knowledge in the optimization process of the intercultural performances.

Elron Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari (1999) stated that Hofstede's dimensions are relevant for multinational operations

...in hierarchic organizations such as armies, the item „distance towards power” can influence many aspects of interrelationship (Stewart *et al.*, 2008:16-20).

4.2.4. GLOBE Study, finalized in 2007, is highlighting cultural dimensions that are determining the style of leadership and behavioral models inside multinational organizations. It is a very useful study because is helping us in making behavioral predictions inside this big military multinational organization that is the Coalition Force. GLOBE Study has nine dimensions: orientation towards performance, avoiding uncertainty, collectivism as a group, distance towards power, equality in between genders, human orientation, institutional collectivism, orientation towards the future and servitude.

GLOBE is the most comprehensive empiric data study that is showing the relation in between culture and the leaders' behavior in different societies and organizations, using different qualitative and quantitative methods (GLOBE, 2012)

Even Hofstede's study was criticized by well-known sociologists (McSweeney B., Shenkar O., Schwartz S. H., Bilsky W. and Mansour Javidan, that were saying that in the analysis of a phenomenon, it should be used various qualitative techniques and that were taken into consideration insufficient aspects of the culture), the study is still remaining the dominant model of the cross-cultural research.

Besides the difference in the number of dimensions from the two studies, a major difference is represented by the fact that GLOBE Study is measuring two distinct aspects of the national cultures, *practices and values*, for each dimension resulting 18 cultural scores for each country that was part to the study, in comparison to Hofstede's five.

The two studies are not in a major contradiction, GLOBE Study supporting Hofstede's one. The only inadvertency seen is the dimension „Uncertainty Avoidance”. Since 2008, Sunil Venaik and Paul Brewer (2008:17), were publishing the following results of their common research

There is a major difference in between the following dimension „Uncertainty Avoidance” in between two studies and they are representing two

different totally opposed concepts because they are in a significant way negatively correlated

4.2.5. E.K. Bowman has published in 2002 a study that is presenting the relation in between cultural dimensions and the elements that are supporting team performance/groups (Bowman, 2002). It has been a research for 12 months in the military multinational mission from Bosnia. The author is pleading for the major importance of the variables such as cultural competence and adaptability inside the teams. Bowman has studied the relation in between the value of the cultural dimensions, leadership style and the cohesion of the teams. Besides Hofstede's research of cultural dimensions, the new aspect of the research conducted by E. K. Bowman is given by the fact that those were checked inside military organizations and in the operational environment.

4.2.6. In the number of September-October 2010 of the *Military Review* (2010), US colonel, Casey Haskins, proposed a simple model for cultural understanding (Bowman. This model is thought more than a list „to be checked” than an instrument of detailed knowledge of the local culture. This list is offering just a way a guided focus on objectives and/or actions. It is a positive attempt after various attempts to incorporate the cultural factor in the US Army Doctrine. IT was tried to create a cultural knowledge model, during which they concluded that a certain model cannot be applied in another area just for the fact that inside of the same country, tribal cultural differences are significant. Colonel Haskins is proposing an knowledge instrument comprising two parts: first a simplified model of the society and in the second part a list of questions that have the role to direct the observation process.

The first part is a copy of the societal model that belongs to Chirot that is also using Talcot Parsons's model. This part has also four parts interrelated: the political system, economy, social institutions and culture.

The second part on the list of questions is arranged on categories: groups and their identity, the way the decisions are taken, the belonging to a culture of honor and of a winners (or not), social norms and interaction. For each of them there have been identified constitutive elements based on which the questions were built.

4.2.7. The researches on the World cultural values are focused on the way the values of different nations and societies are changing in time and are offering an instrument for comparison and knowledge in between different cultures. The

project is conducted at the global level, by the Social Science Association, *Word Values Survey*, a global network comprising many universities and is led by professor Ronald F. Inglehart from the University of Michigan. They reduced the culture analysis to two basic dimensions: traditional values vs. rational-secular values and to survival vs. self-expression values.

Initially the researchers started from the idea that traditional values dimension vs rational-secular values are measuring the degree in which a society is valorizing religion or not. The researchers were capable to correlate a series of other values with religion, resulting that traditional values are reflecting other cultural features, not only religion. Those societies that are more traditional, have clear standards related to the family obligations and they are rejecting those things, such as the divorce. They are also very traditional. All these attributes are opposed to the rational-secular societies.

The second dimension, survival vs self-expression values is an indirect measure of the wealth of a society. Poor countries are presenting a greater survival mentality, while in the richest countries, exonerated by excessive worries related to the survival, have self-expressed values, being focused on the quality of life and wealth.

Ronald F. Inglehart and Christian Welzel, two of the main researchers involved in the study, used the two dimensions to graphically represent the way different nations and World civilizations were grouped.

5. MATHEMATICS OF INTEROPERABILITY

Cultural knowledge + Intercultural communication = Cultural harmonization = The increase of the level of interoperability in multinational coalition.

Cultural competence and intercultural communication are representing a key element in building the ratio with other cultures, representing the important abilities of the personnel from NATO and partners' military cultures.

Exemplifying, T.E. Lawrence has engaged himself in a long cultural search for the enemy, after Arab mutiny against Ottoman Empire in 1916, analyzing in depth local culture: geography, tribal structure, religion, social traditions, language, food habits.

Even „knowing the enemy” is one of the first principles of war, military and National Security operations are lacking constantly the thorough knowledge of the foreign culture and societies.

Livia Markóczy's theory is supporting the idea that we have already the capacity to work with persons from other cultures, but if

our overview is distorted by our expectations related to the necessary existence of the cultural differences. When we are expecting that individuals we are meeting to be radically different, with a behavior that sometimes is difficult to fully understand and we have the tendency to say that we are very different from the cultural point of view.

Majority of human behavior are universal, and if we are looking for cultural differences, we will find only obstacles, but if we are looking for commonalities, we will create bridges in between the cultures and will lay down the foundation for an efficient cooperation.

Christopher J. Lamb, in his speech related to motivation tactics in US psychological operations is highlighting the fact that basic principles of the cultural communication are transcending cultures. A relevant example is „my own interest principle” existent in all cultures (Lamb, 2005).

6. CONCLUSIONS

Those studies and models are offering the results of the miscellaneous research on the topic or/and lessons learnt but, the most important instruments for checking and/ or understanding of the cultural diversity in multicultural environments, instruments that will not be antiquated, but are completed or re-evaluated in the same time when the area of responsibility of the coalition forces and of the changes of the configuration of the Alliance. These are creating the vast foundation of data necessary for the creation of different learning models through simulation and virtual games, modern instruments with a complex usage of the variables from the existent studies.

We are considering the importance of the distinction in between cultural knowledge studies, models, and instruments. If the first two are representing very often systematic unchecked research and conclusions, points of view over some perspectives in approaching of the cultural issue, instruments are the extended results of the existing research, checked on representative samples. When we have to conduct cultural training of the personnel, we need to ensure that additional to the common knowledge and the highlights through certain actions resulted from the direct participation

into the theatre of operations; we are using instruments and data that are checked successively.

I appreciate that only through cultural knowledge and harmonization it can be created the misalignment foundation that is facilitating the situational perception not only through the lens of its own socio-cultural formation, but also through the “cultural lens” of the allies, which has a major impact over the multinational interoperability.

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ROMANIAN DECISION-MAKERS IN SECURITY POLICIES' PERCEPTION OF THE TERRORIST THREAT: ROMANIA AS A POTENTIAL TARGET FOR DAESH TERRORIST ATTACKS

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Abstract: *This paper aims at analyzing the Romanian decision-makers in security policies' perception of the Daesh terrorist organization and, particularly, of the potential effects of this organization on the Romanian national territory. In this respect, we designed a transversal qualitative research, conducted through interviews with 31 experts in security policies, 22 of which are Romanian, in order to assess their adequacy of knowledge in relation with the theoretical framework and, respectively, the perception of insiders from Middle East (political decision makers, diplomats, religious leaders, scholars, security specialists, intelligence analysts). The level of this perception assessment is very important because the decision makers in security policies need to know accurately the phenomena subjected to their own policies. Moreover, this knowledge should be neutral, not influenced by ideologies or media agenda setting. It is also very important to note whether security policies decision-makers are influenced or not by the sensationalist nature of packing information about Daesh attacks in classical or old media. In simple terms, this adequate perception of the widespread conflict in the Middle East, the escalation of the conflicts in the area over the last 40 years, the expansion and diversification of the forms in which Jihadist-Salafist terrorist organizations act are important elements in the balanced and correctly assumed position in relation with the national security policies. In a nutshell, Romania's readiness for terrorist attacks organized by Daesh or other similar organizations depends on the level of awareness of this threat by the Romanian decision-makers in security policies. Implicitly, the evaluation of these decision-makers' perception is one of the evaluation modalities of Romania's preparedness in the field of combating terrorist attacks.*

Keywords: *The Islamic State (Daesh); Middle East; terrorist attacks; Romanian national security*

1. INTRODUCTION

The Daesh¹ Terrorist Organization is the most feared group that has abandoned the classical direction of action and proclaimed the Islamic Caliphate. The claim of statehood invoked by such an organization surprised the Western countries, although in the Middle East it was not the first terrorist group aiming at the status of a state entity. One of such groups is Tawhid (or Islamic Tawhid) from Tripoli, Lebanon, almost unknown in Europe, but still active. The intended state is the proto-structure entitled Caliphate, a historical form of political organization, considered „successful” for the Muslim society. According to the Daesh

doctrine, a return to the “golden age” of the dawn of Islam is possible through *jihad*, which will end with a new transnational Islamic Caliphate, in which Muslim citizens must obey Islamic law *Al Sharia* in its strictest interpretation:

ISIS represents that form of ultra-orthodoxy that eschews nuance, sect, variations of opinion based on diligent reading (*ijtihad*) and demands, in the strict sense, submission (إسلام) to the only principles it regards as fully Islamic. Its model for enforcing this regime is not the bookish culture that grew quickly out of Arabia and Persia after the eighth century but the roughly hundred-year period of bloody succession wars and expansion following the Prophet's death in 632. (Hoffmann, 2015)

The Islamic Caliphate was proclaimed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on June 29, 2014. This was possible based on the Daesh increasing operational capacity and on its territorial expansion (Barna, 2015), respectively on the amplification of military

¹ Daesh was developed on the structure of the Al-Qaeda franchise in Iraq, later became the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), then, following the merger with Al-Nusra, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham/ Syria (ISIS).

successes (culminating in the occupation of Mosul).

Fortunately, the Daesh formula of territorially extended terrorist organization was defeated in March, 2019. Unfortunately, Daesh preserved sufficient operational capabilities to allow it to carry out terrorist attacks in various parts of the world, while withdrawing into the hard-to-penetrate space of the 'The Virtual Caliphate'. Different researchers opted for the distinction between the two phases of the existence and manifestation of Daesh using a classical notation for successive versions of computer software: Daesh 1.0 and Daesh 2.0. The concept of Daesh 2.0 illustrates the post-territorial status of the Islamic State, i.e. 'The Virtual Caliphate'. The term was promoted and studied as a potential phase of the Daesh's evolution, in a series of studies prior to March 2019, by Atwan (2015), Al-Istrabadi & Ganguly (2018), Sultan (2018). It was introduced in the Romanian specialized literature by Stoian-Karadeli (2019). Chronologically speaking, there existed a territorial version until March 2019, Daesh 1.0, and a virtual version, Daesh 2.0², starting with April 2019.

2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

In a broader research on the analysis of the Daesh effects on the regional security environment (El Benni, 2020; Lesenciuc & El Benni, 2019:29-40), we have analyzed separately the proposed effects of the terrorist threat on national security. We set as a general objective of the research: the analysis of the degree of the Daesh phenomenon knowledge/ perception by the Romanian decision makers in the field of security policies. The specific objective in connection with the direction that is the topic of this article is to analyze the relationship between the Middle East crisis perception and phenomena such as terrorism and migration within states that have become targets of terrorist attacks or desirable destinations for migrants. Furthermore, in relation with this specific objective, we focused the interest of our analysis on Romania and on the possible consequences regarding our national security, arising from the conflict in the Middle East. In this respect, we opted for a transversal qualitative research, conducted through an investigation based on interview with 31 experts (22 Romanian, 9 from Egypt, Israel, the Netherlands, Syria, Turkey,

United States of America and the Palestinian territory). In order to operate more easily and for an easier interpretation of the research results, we assigned numbers to each interviewee and pre-coded the variables: gender, religion, profession, age, and country of origin into an alphanumeric formula that allows anonymization of sources and easy reading of variables previously mentioned.

In reference to the methodological approach, the current research is not unique. We considered the model of similar designs in terms of identifying the perception of decision-makers in the field of US foreign policy on the role of the United States in the international system and, implicitly, of identifying the decisions, norms, commitments and long-term implications. The research was done by Naomi Bailin Wish (1980:532-554) from Seton Hall University. Also, we considered the perception of political marketing tools by the decision-makers in cultural policy, in the case of Greek researchers Eleni Apostori and George J. Avlonidis (2010:111-134) from University of Economics and Business in Athens. The research based on a similar methodological design of the perception of Romanian decision-makers in the field of security policies on the Daesh terrorist phenomenon is however unique and can be a useful tool in their explicit engagement in designing or amending security documents.

3. RESEARCH RESULTS. ROMANIA AS A POTENTIAL TARGET OF TERRORIST ATTACKS

Several experts interviewed expressed the opinion that a real terrorist danger is unlikely for several reasons, including: Romania is not an attractive target:

Romania is not an area of interest for terrorist organizations. They plan the attacks so that the minimum of resources has maximum possible impact (20 MCOPa4+RO).

Diplomatically, Romania has had good relations with many countries from the Middle East; Romania has a very well developed intelligence system (10 MCOPa5+RO). There are several answers to claim the contrary. The interviewees stating it consider that the big wave of immigrants could create premises for Romania to become a target for terrorist attacks.

Also, given that Daesh has lost the territory of the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria and increased its activity in the virtual environment (including the

² Sometimes the ISIS 2.0 proposed by the head of Interpol, Jürgen Stock, is also used.

possibility of concentrating the terrorist attacks in Europe and in Romania, as well), there are favorable conditions for such attacks, among which there should be mentioned: the lack of an upgrade of the Romanian legislation in the area of intelligence; lack of coordination of actions carried out by institutions with responsibilities in combating terrorism; poor knowledge of terrorist organizations' ways of action; lack of training to identify and counteract terrorist actions and to support the authorities (04 MCOPa4+RO).

Another reason why Romania may become a target for terrorist attacks is its joining the anti-terrorist coalition that aims to take action up to the complete annihilation of international terrorism.

An interviewed expert claimed that Romania is not yet on the map of terrorist attacks because it does not have a strategic role in the Middle East conflict (31 MCOPa4+RO). This does not mean there are no threats, or that there were not attempts that have been thwarted, or that Romanian decision-makers consider the country protected under the Euro-Atlantic umbrella. The NATO membership leads to an increase in 'magnetism' in attracting terrorists (12 MCOPa4+RO). The optimistic answers reveal that Romania has a well-articulated specialized prevention system, and well-prepared forces to deal with terrorist attacks. Also, the main purpose of the specialized intelligence services is to prevent and extinguish the attack attempts. Romania was considered an example for good practices in preventing terrorist attacks (07 MCOPa4+RO, member of the Joint Standing Committee and the Senate for exercising parliamentary control over the activity of the national intelligence service). In this respect, Romania played a major role in the prevention of terrorist attacks, especially after it had warned against the attacks in Paris, for example. In terms of prevention, Romania is under the BLUE code (05 MCOOf6+RO), explicitly and fully explained by expert 05 MCOOf6+RO:

Since 2004, Romania has had a National Terrorist Alert System in order to support the process of planning counterterrorism activities at the national level, as well as to inform people about the level of terrorist threat. Currently, in Romania, the level of terrorist alert is PRECAUTIONARY (BLUE). The available information and the current events indicate a low risk of terrorist attack. However, Romania, as a member of the EU and NATO, is subjected to the same security risks as the other member states, as well.

One of the respondents considers that, like any other state, Romania can be a target for terrorist

attacks. These attacks might have approximately the same characteristics as those that took place in Western European countries. The very fact that there are or may be terrorists in transit through Romania is a risk, judging that, in order not to be captured, they could detonate themselves. That is why *The National Defense Strategy* (SNAp, 2015) includes among the Euro-Atlantic security dimensions the emergence of terrorist groups and the augmentation of migration:

The **emergence of terrorist groups** stimulates the phenomenon of Islamic radicalization at European level, highlighting the risks posed by the return to the EU territory of the European jihadists who were previously engaged in fighting or training programs in states with active terrorist issues.

Increasing **migration** from conflict or precarious economic areas has created challenges for the member states' ability to manage the flow of illegal immigrants and take over/ integrate them into local communities (SNAp, 2015:12-13).

Among the identified risks there exists one with low probability, but with a major impact, namely, the action of terrorist groups:

The radicalization of the extremist entities present on the Romanian territory can occur on the background of the accentuation of the extremist currents of ethnic, religious or other origin (SNAp, 2015:15).

This makes less probable its transformation into a target for terrorist attacks. Also, the Muslim population from Romania is not situated in the vicinity of extremist ideas. Moreover, the Muslim inhabitants in Romania would not be willing to provide support for the organization of such actions. Under the circumstances in which the American presence in Romania would become more consistent than now the possibility that Romania become a target of the Islamist terrorist attacks could also increase:

In general, Romania has no relevant image or impact in relation to the potential image capital that can be exploited by terrorist actions (compared to Western European countries). The terrorist attacks could occur in case of the increasing American presence on the Romanian territory – Kogălniceanu, Deveselu (n.a.: military bases). The most important aspect is the absence of *home grown terrorism*, while the lack of a local support makes planning a terrorist attack in Romania inappropriate. In general, we can be a target of terrorist actions by chance (06 MCOPU4+RO).

Given that Romania would become more attractive from a tourist point of view, the chances to become a target for terrorism would increase:

If Romania became a more important player within Europe or the entire world, we would expect terrorist attacks. Another way in which Romania could become a target would be the new height reached by tourism in Romania, but this is also not very likely in the future years (20 MCOPa4+RO).

One of the experts thinks that Romania will be subjected to terrorist threats 'from three horizons': as a member of the NATO and EU and as a part of Western civilization; as a country situated in the vicinity of Muslim strategic rift in the Black Sea and Balkan areas, not far from the Middle East, and as a participant in the global war on terror, within the US-led coalition. At the same time, it is possible for Romania to be specially considered by certain terrorist groups, networks and organizations, in order to use the national territory for certain network, infrastructure and logistics elements of the previously mentioned groups (02 MCOPU5+RO).

Moreover, one of the interviewed experts, 21 MISLR5+SY, stated on issues regarding the effects of spreading terrorism in Eastern Europe, including Romania, that there is a common guilt (including Romania) for not revealing the truth with regard to the Middle East. All these countries are guilty for maintaining a complicit silence on crimes against humankind:

Everyone is blamed for the existence of Daesh, everyone! This petty world, including Romania, is guilty of silence. [...] I am a victim of Daesh because the world is accustomed with prejudices. When people see a Muslim, they say terrorist. But there is no clear definition of terrorism. It does not exist! I ask, and I ask again, in order to answer you: what does 'terrorism' mean?

Overall, in the context of the loss of territory and of the Daesh virtual expansion through the Virtual Caliphate, the terrorist organization still remains a threat to regional and global security, with effects on the Romanian national security. It is necessary to identify the risks associated with this virtual expansion, in a wide range of scenarios (in the "three horizons" described above), to propose effective regulatory and action tools, able to respond to the new challenges (ISIS 2.0/ Daesh 2.0), to prevent and combat terrorist attacks, to advocate for a united commitment in international efforts to reduce or even to eradicate the terrorist

phenomenon. From this point of view, there is need for "strengthening international cooperation on counter-terrorism, based on a broader and deeper vision" (02 MCOPU5+RO) and for active approaches, including preparing people for such actions. All of these steps must be taken in strict compliance with international agreements, the principles of democracy and international law and

with the identification of a reasonable and effective balance between restrictions, coercion and punitive actions, on the one hand, and the unaltered protection of democratic freedoms and rights, including responsible transparency and the right to be informed, on the other hand (02 MCOPU5+RO).

Romania can and must play an active role in order to provide a correct and complete picture of the confrontations in the Middle East, near the areas of its immediate interest, the Extended Black Sea Area, and to contribute to the achievement of a legal framework necessary for the materialization of political decisions.

4.CONCLUSIONS

Through this study we intended to broaden the area of knowledge of the Daesh phenomenon, but, even more important, we managed to identify aspects related to the in-depth analysis of the phenomenon through the interviewed experts. The research method permitted the study of aspects or phenomena occurring in such opaque cultural spaces, whose realities are not correctly and fully reflected through old and new media and which, unfortunately, are not reflected in the Romanian specialized literature, either. The research allowed highlighting the differences in insiders' perception (i.e. natives in Middle East, directly or indirectly affected by the Daesh phenomenon, that know well the terrorist organizations form the interior of their own cultures affected by the effects of terrorist attacks) and outsiders' perception (experts with a potential decision-making role in security policies). From this perspective, the study highlighted the fact the interviewed experts know very well the terrorist phenomenon (including Daesh), except for some particular aspects, affected by the subjective perception or by ideological interests of their parties. The experts even succeeded to predict, based on facts and documents, the physical disappearance of the Islamic Caliphate and the appearance of the Virtual Islamic Caliphate.

The answers given by those who agreed to be part in the investigation based on interview helped to the in-depth understanding of the Daesh

phenomenon. We can conclude that the experts know very well the general issues. In general, the decision-making experts in security policies know very well the phenomenon, identified the manner in which Romania could be affected directly by terrorist attacks, or could respond to challenges posed by the phenomenon of migration.

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Media &
Security

SECURITY AND TRUST: A MEDIA-MEDIATED RELATION

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Abstract: *From a specific perspective, security has both an objective and a subjective side, the later meaning that a community is only safe if its members feel safe. Sir David Omand famously stated that security is "the citizen's trust that risks concerning their daily lives, either man-made or natural, are adequately managed, so that they are able to be convinced normal life can continue". Their perception, that of a nation's state of security, is directly related to the security-related perceptions of political decision-makers, security-related perceptions of the citizens and civil society, and to the public reflection of security issues. Starting from these assumptions, I think the media's role in creating perceptions at society level needs to be further explored, since it can either build or subvert trust in security organizations. There are two sides to this story. In one, the media is the proverbial bad guy, with its tendency towards sensationalism, multiplying messages without checking facts and confirming sources, political and economic biases, particularly in undemocratic countries or in developing democracies, where media owners are also involved in other businesses and even in politics. We are also concerned with the lack of security culture displayed by consistent parts of the media. In those cases, media isn't able to fulfill its role in correctly informing civil society, or that of democracy's watchdog. We are rather dealing with situation in which it misinforms – willingly or not -, induces or increases panics and hysteria, therefore actually eroding security. And there is also the positive side, in which the media can and sometimes is the good guy, with national security correspondents who understand the delicate lines of the field they are relating about. In this situation, media becomes a promoter of security by its additions to creating a real and valuable security culture. Media is also a good guardian for the democratic values and a valuable investigator, able to identify and reveal deficiencies in organizations dealing with protecting security, as well as able to press them to improve their communication. But this seems to be more a challenge than a constant reality, even in countries with consolidated democracies.*

Keywords: *communication; media; security; trust*

1. INTRODUCTION

There are many aspects and many approaches related to this wider subject of interest - media and security - which has to be seen from both sides or from both perspectives: that of the media and that of the services, as institutions designed to deal with security issues.

In order to be specific from the beginning, it is the basic interest of the media to find and present to the public subjects of interest about a variety of aspects, including those pertaining to national security, which are often the more tempting since the intelligence activity is generally veiled by requirements of secrecy. It is to our mutual benefit and to the general public's interest that it does so in good faith, with a certain degree of professionalism and significant efforts to genuinely research any topic from credible sources.

Honest media can act as a promoter for policy change, when it investigates thoroughly and actually

exposes real systemic problems most bureaucracies tend to have. It can serve as an amplifier of messages the general public and the authorities need to receive, and can generate and consolidate a security culture, without setting out to do so, just by informing honestly and ethically. Media reports are also a big factor in informing the political decision-making process, in which intelligence has lost the status of first and foremost authority some time ago. Media investigations and reports on national security issues are of real interest for intelligence services, too, therefore most democratic agencies have established solid departments dealing with open-source intelligence.

But there are also negative aspects to media reporting on security. Its relation to the security sector is, at best, tense, as, on one side, security works with secrets it doesn't want outed. American unionist general William Sherman would state, in conditions of war, "I hate newspapermen. They come into camp and pick up their camp rumors and

print them as facts. I regard them as spies, which in truth, they are. If I killed them all there would be news from Hell before breakfast". This is only to brighten the mood with a sarcastic joke, but, in fact, there is another side to the story: in its legitimate enterprise, often - not always - going towards sensationalism, the media can also appeal to different techniques – misinformation, disinformation, fabrication, fake news, fake stories. The effort to have a high-impact front page title or a breaking news, and of course, in the end, to make ratings is legitimate and almost normal in our current world, but up to a certain point. We can have a long talk and an ample debate where this point is or where it should be, and what it means to cross the line. Of course, there are legal requirements which ought to define the general limits within which media should act in a manner that is fair to society, in general, but in reality, in many delicate situations it was proven that media – knowingly or unknowingly, willingly or unwillingly - is abusing its role as a fourth power, under the pretext of free press and free speech.

In the real world, we are confronted with different scenarios, from good to terrible ones, which reveal complicated pictures and a variety/full spectrum of implications. Trying to be systematic in my approach, I will emphasize a few of them, which I consider the most relevant, at least from the intelligence practitioner's point of view.

2. FREQUENT SCENARIOS

a. **Honest reporting.** The ideal situation is that in which the media plays by the book, fulfilling its *raison d'être*. This is the best case-scenario, in which, working with experts and having the necessary know-how, the media is a good guardian for the democratic values, a valuable investigator, able to identify and reveal deficiencies in the activities of the organizations dealing with protecting security. The media is one of the factors that can keep the security sector in check, by publicly signaling what is being done inappropriately or missing in its current endeavors, and promoting positive change.

Some observers of the security enterprise have ranked media as an outside player – therefore active - in the process, alongside others such as academia, think tanks, lobbying groups etc, which witnesses the securitization process and has some instruments to adjust its functioning. Media with well informed, competent, and ethical journalists would fit this positive scenario. And this does not, of course, exclude incisive journalists, since it is a reality that

most bureaucratic institutions tend to not share information voluntarily, instead providing it only if asked.

In this ideal situation, the media has a very positive role, being a valuable contributor to democracy and to a healthy society, an actual "watch dog of democracy", a good observer, sensor, or whistle-blower. It also becomes a promoter of security by its additions to creating a real and valuable security culture and a trustful relationship among the actors involved, including the general public.

In this scenario, based on the media's correct work and valuable information, we can consider the following effects:

- The citizens are well informed and become knowledgeable in the security field, by understanding the basics about the level of risk exposure, the general purpose of security institutions (what they can or can't do, their obligations and limits, some of the methods they use to achieve their goals). And knowledge is particularly important, as a first essential step for building trust between a society which is based on the social contract, in which citizens agree to be protected by their institutions, for which they, in turn, ensure the upkeep, and the said institutions.

- Ensuring a healthy checks and balances mechanism, also a positive consequence of a media activated to do its job, namely to point out, investigate, and clarify situations and to demand appropriate measures. In this line, the first responders, by default, are the institutions responsible of the field, which have to act accordingly when the situations occur, taking into consideration both the internal public – their employees, and the external one: oversight authorities, customers, partners, the general public / citizens (when possible). At the same time, when media signals irregularities, there is another actor which must intervene: the oversight authorities, specialized committees generally made of politicians which have an institutional task to inquire into intelligence services' work. They must take over and also do their job in order to confirm, primarily, the legality and regularity, whether there were actual abuses related to the subject of investigation. After oversight authorities finish their own, official investigation, they have to inform in a very transparent way the Parliament and the citizens with the inquiry results and advances measures or recommendations.

Note: If any actors involved in this investigation (media, security institutions, and oversight authorities) identifies a possible crime, they are

compelled to inform immediately the law enforcement agencies.

As a **conclusion** at the end of this best-case scenario, in the natural process everybody does its job, playing their role transparently, in a coherent manner, and achieving positive goals, benefiting the greater objective to optimize/enhance security and to protect society, while also fulfilling the media's role to inform correctly and to guard democracy.

b. **The second situation** that can be readily identified starts from the same premises as the first scenario but, in addition, takes into consideration situations in which the media has gained access - direct or through an intermediate, voluntarily or not - to classified materials or other secret aspects of intelligence and security work: means, methods, plans, operations etc. And, although media has strict rules concerned with protecting their own sources and would, therefore, refuse to divulge them, according to domestic legislation in most democratic states, obtaining, possessing and publishing classified information is illegal. Therefore, we are stepping on shaky ground, on which, from the media's perspective, the end can be good, but the means - potentially illicit.

Should media organizations decide to publish all or parts of the identified aspects, as it usually happens, in full belief that they are doing it in public service, we can anticipate the following reactions:

b.1 **Legitimate whistle-blowing.** In case the publicized classified aspects are real, allegations are grounded, and illegal or abusive actions or measures are used by security institutions, this should be considered (under those specific circumstances) the right and legitimate thing to do. In any democracy, institutions are expected to work exclusively in the legal framework, even when their activities are concerned with very legitimate and legal objectives of national security interests. For security services, too, the end does not excuse the means.

Note: In their actions, the media are entitled to alert the appropriate responsible bodies, such as law enforcement agencies, oversight committees etc.; resorting to publishing classified information, even in a whistle-blower capacity, should only be a and last resort solution, if and when authorities have failed to take appropriate measures or, worse, have tried to cover up the situation.

Under those circumstances, we can consider the following effects:

- The public is informed about the means and methods used by security institutions and will understand their legal limitations. The very important lessons learned and repeated is that in

democracy the ends, even legal and legitimate ones, don't justify the use of all means and methods.

- The checks and balances mechanism is compelled to admit that its sensors don't work for all situations, and its representatives need to be more proactive in order to better understand the internal mechanism of security institutions and to prevent any similar event. To implement a lessons learned mechanism, this type of media actions can prove extremely useful.

- Security institutions need to understand that, regardless of how difficult the task, nobody can invoke actual national security reasons to defend its inappropriate use of illicit - even though sometimes handy and readily available - means and methods. And the even more important lessons for them is that, when they are caught "red-handed", this comes, alongside potential legal consequences, with a high price in terms of credibility for the institution and its leadership, and credibility is very difficult to restore.

To conclude, in this case, media's activities and reports are of real importance for the public, citizens and democratic societies' health and consolidation, even when doing so creates an apparent damage, by afflicting the credibility of security institutions and their level of trust, thus harming their capacity to fulfill their missions.

b.2 **Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.** In case the classified aspects media uncovers are real, but they point to security institutions making use of legal, legitimate instruments to achieve their legitimate missions, then the media's action of publicizing classified materials or information should be considered illegitimate and, to some extent, potentially illegal, depending on specific circumstances and on particular state legislation. In any democracy, institutions responsible with security matters are allowed by law, in order to perform their missions and achieve their objectives, to secretly use a variety of special means and methods, which may temporarily affect, in special circumstances, the rights and freedom of some citizens. Every country has the legal right to work for the defense and protection of its national security, as well as to promote legitimate objectives of national security interests.

Note: In its enterprises, in this case too, in which it has legitimate suspicions, the media should alert the appropriate responsible bodies, such as law enforcement agencies, oversight committees etc. and also ask for the point of view of the involved security institutions. In case media representatives obtain a reasonable explanation from the

responsible institutions about the potential impact and damage for security, but they nevertheless publish the data they have obtained, they have no legal right and legitimacy to do so.

Nevertheless, in western democracies, where media is a lucrative business, we were shown in many occasions that, with the desire to be the first, to have an exclusivity, to be ahead of competition, unverified information is made public, without further discussions with the “accused” party. News of the security field are rarer, since they come from a field working with secrecy, therefore they become a more valuable commodity, but they are also more prone to have a more significant impact, damaging institutions, people and legitimate security interest.

Under those circumstances, we are dealing with the following consequences:

- The public is informed about specific aspects of the security activity, which will generate and satisfy a false need to know. Reality has shown that normal people / readers will get confused reading this kind of data, mainly because they don't have access to the context, circumstances etc. In this situation, it is very important for people to learn that, in democracy, institutions have to do some of their security-related activities in secret, sometimes with special means and methods.

- The checks and balances mechanism is compelled to clarify the published aspects, and if everything in the security service's activity is correct and legal, they should support and protect security institutions in the public eye. In reality, in fact, for a variety of reasons, but mainly political ones, oversight authorities are not often inclined to make strong statements in order to protect and support the institutions in charge with security matters.

- Security institutions in this type of scenario have to learn a valuable lesson, that sometimes, regardless of how well they try to prepare, unexpected counterintelligence situations may still occur: leakages, traitors, mistakes and misunderstandings etc. And although, in some cases, they can seriously affect general trust, employee morale, and actual operations, alongside other consequences difficult to assess, security services need to continue their activity, aiming to protect themselves better next time. PR and public communication play a key role in this kind of crisis situations.

In conclusion, despite the importance of the media's activity for the general public and citizens in democratic societies, sometimes, for unreasonable reasons, the media may generate significant vulnerabilities in key security sectors,

which are often exploited by hostile entities, with unpredictable consequences. Needless to say that this also produces a negative impact in the trust relation which needs to exist among security institutions and other partners, including the citizens.

c. **Hidden agenda.** An entirely different situation, in which some media organizations have nothing or very little to do with professional media and its legitimate functions, even with its tendency towards sensationalism, multiplying selective messages without properly checking facts and confirming sources, it that in which media owners are involved in other businesses and in politics, trying to promote their interests by imposing the political agenda. In combination with a general lack of security culture, as displayed by consistent parts of the media, particularly in developing countries, this can greatly impact the security sector. In this case, references to national security issues are, usually (with very few exceptions), presented in an unprofessional manner, with low standards of knowledge and documentation, a lack of coherence, discontinuity, and in a perpetually negative narrative. No or very few resources are dedicated to correctly covering these subjects.

In this situation, the media is not playing a positive role in society and isn't able to fulfill its role of informing citizens in an objective and honest manner, but rather it is set in the general direction of a small group's agenda, and can only accidentally perform its task of guarding democracy. In its activities, this kind of media is often looking for a pretext rather than a subject, in order to have a reason to attack and assault the institutions in charge with security. There are cases in which no rules of professional deontology concerning dialogue and communication with the security institutions are observed. In this respect, there is no positive development towards a sustainable security culture. All those circumstances determine or cause a toxic environment, undermining a trust-based relationship among security actors, including citizens, by eroding the credibility of security institutions. Willingly or not, in particular moments, especially in crisis situations, this manner of making press induces or increases panics and hysteria, therefore actually undermining the security enterprise.

Note: Using a full spectrum of techniques, such as false accusations, misinterpretations, misinformation, disinformation, promoting intentionally falsity, partial truths, contradictory reports, distortion by omission of relevant facts, provocations, conspiracy theories, multiplying the

line of attack developed by hostile entities etc., some parts of the media or individuals from media organizations contribute and project a false or distorted image of the security institutions and their activity, with significant impact on their level of credibility. This type of media actions should be considered illegitimate and, in specific and clear circumstances, a significant vulnerability and, to some extent, illegal. We have witnessed numerous such examples, especially in the new, unconsolidated democracies, where, under the pretext of independent media activities, media moguls have developed criminal activities and promoted their own a political agenda.

Under those circumstances, the envisaged consequences are:

- The public is constantly misinformed and under pressure, due to a sensationalism-determined stream of breaking news, wow news, apocalyptic warnings etc., and, to a certain extent, it becomes captive and dependent of this kind of news. Striking titles without any real data or content can also develop a completely false perception about specific aspects of the security activity, which has nothing or very little to do with reality. Reality has shown that this type of audience will be very difficult to convince about the development of different security related phenomena and about the roles and activities of the responsible institutions.

- The checks and balances mechanism is also under pressure due to this kind of media approach, because, in most cases, oversight authorities, for example, are seen as mere instruments of the security institutions, with no actual capacities or propensity for exerting proper control in order to clarify false media accusations. In the same line, the oversight mechanism in place is almost constantly accused of being too soft in its conclusions, because security institutions allegedly influence and control its members, trying to cover up their supposed blunders.

Note: In fact, most members of the oversight bodies feel the pressure exerted by partisan media on their political party, and sometimes, despite ascertaining the reality based on facts and investigations, often respect party discipline and keep to its official narrative. And this excludes public manifestations of support for the targeted institutions in difficult circumstances, even if those institutions prove to have acted properly and legally.

Security institutions under this type of threat need to develop adequate measures, based on different contingency plans designed by variable geometry, in order to fulfill their missions in a very legal way. They have to adjust and learn this kind of

lesson, but can, sometimes, be under huge pressures determined by false accusations and uselessly dedicate valuable resources to counter them. They can and should, nonetheless, develop mechanisms of resilience to be able to overcome them, without becoming intimidated or, even worse, paralyzed; the general aim is not to let such attacks affect the job and its missions. On the medium and long term, coordinated and aggressive attacks of this type can severely affect the credibility of the security institutions and create damages to the current activities, and will definitely have other unpredictable consequences. PR and public communication also play a key role in this kind of false crisis situations.

In conclusion, in this author's opinion, this type of media is undermining its own *raison d'être*, the significance of media's activity for the general public and citizens and its role in democratic societies. For their agenda and purposes in the security field, which tend to have very little in common with the general interest and common good, this type of media generates many vulnerabilities in key security sectors, which are highly likely to be exploited by hostile entities, with consequences for national security. This type of media toxic role has a high impact on all partnerships security services painstakingly build, which is significantly detrimental to security, since trust is a very important element for developing a high standard activity.

3. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS

Further scenarios can, of course, be analyzed, but for the purpose of the current study, I think the above-mentioned are sufficient. Phenomena such as new media also deserve particular attention, which could probably be extended in a different study. Suffice it to say that new media allows decision makers and security services to gain access to points of view from areas of society which are not traditionally too vocal in their communication with authorities.

Both conventional and new media – but maybe more so the latter – are currently the battle ground for hybrid warfare, or the “war of words”, and can, willingly or unwillingly, be used as disinformation platforms. Through their own efforts to stop the spread of fake news, disinformation, manipulations, media organizations can become direct contributors to the security enterprise.

As to trust, there are two sides to it: that of the necessary trust needed for security to function effectively, and that of a potential trust-based

relation between the same community and media. Regarding the former, ex-Mossad chief Efraim Halevy very plastically stated, in his 2006 memoirs, that, when he became acting director of the famous agency, he was confronted with three crises:

the first was the crisis of **trust** between the political class and the agency I was about to run. (...) The second was a crisis (of **trust**) between the Mossad and the citizens. (...) And the third was a crisis within the Mossad itself, a resultant of the other too – the damages to the **trust** and self-esteem of those serving the agency (author's translation).

Lack of trust, at all levels, in Halevy's and our opinion, is a disease which can lead the entire security sector to disaster. And although lately most security services have developed their own communication strategies, which include direct contact with civil society, the academic society, their own accounts on social media, their own websites etc., they still need media – both conventional and new media – to convey their messages. Therefore, media is essential to building trust in security.

As to media-security trust, in my opinion, it is only normal that this relation should be a reserved one, from both sides. Too much trust from the media can lead to partiality and blindness to issues which, in retrospect and at closer scrutiny, may seem obvious. Without claiming there is much love between the American intelligence community and the American press and without trying to exonerate American agencies of an admitted failure, such a situation can be well illustrated by the manner in which the Iraqi WMD situation was reported by most independent media, which has accepted without much inquiry the premise that Saddam Hussein owned a nuclear arsenal, therefore agreeing war against Iraq was a legitimate action. The obvious way to go, now, seems for media to keep its prudent, scrutinizing attitude and use its own filters of analysis before reporting.

There is, nevertheless, a necessary relation of solid communication between the media and the security community, which is to the satisfaction of both parties: media needs information and it needs to also confront it with official sources, and thus it can also report correctly. Security services need to show a certain degree of transparency in order to gain public support and trust and to see their

missions come at a good end. And this relation needs to develop in time, with the security community accepting public criticism and acting on it, when it is justified, in order to prove it deserves trust, and with media keeping an open mind and listening to reason, while presenting the full facts.

In the reality of our contemporary world, with its alarming volume of disinformation, fake news, manipulations etc., security institutions are compelled to communicate with the general public more than ever. And the highest addressability environment for this is media, which also needs information from authorized sources and can help adequately communicate the risks and effective manners of preventing and countering them.

Therefore, partnership is needed between the security community and media, a partnership built on communication and respect.

Moreover, this consistent communication is quintessential in crisis situations, in which the media must be a solid partner of state authorities, having a positive role in promoting adequate messages, as well as the reasons behind them. Adequate reactions and potential solutions can also be collected from media reports in crisis situations, which can support decision-makers in adjusting their strategies. During crises and emergencies, a series of measures are typically needed regarding media activities, including those related to spreading fake news or information which could affect national security.

But for those particular situations, there is a definite need for building a relation of respect and trust between media and security services, which can become a cornerstone of the resilience mechanism the general public needs in order to overcome crisis.

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CHALLENGES AND LIMITS IN FORMING AND PROMOTING THE SECURITY CULTURE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL OF ROMANIA

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Abstract: *The contemporary security environment is in a continuous transformation, being complex and dynamic. The changes that take place in this environment, due to the interests and relevance of the political actors, have societal implications. In order to defend and promote our interests in a process of accelerated globalization, cooperation is the key word. If the emphasis has always been on the cooperation between the different security and intelligence structures, the need for cooperation is also felt between institutions and the citizen by creating connections based on trust and civic spirit. The hypothesis of the article is to identify the challenges and limitations in constructing a security culture project at the level of civil society, as the natural responsibilities of each citizen, to which both entities, authorized institutions and the citizen, must contribute: the authorized institutions - by creating an 'instruction manual', programs, trainings, round tables, specific conferences; the citizen - by creating a set of rules, patriotic and civic, created on his own initiative. Building a solid culture of security becomes a sine qua non condition for the challenges of the 21st century. In other words, the responsibility of the citizen, through their education in the field of security, seen as civic responsibility, must be a constant concern of the state. The security of a state should no longer be the responsibility of the military and civilian institutions, but also of the citizen. We need a culture of security strongly anchored in the realities of society, promoted responsibly, both at the level of the decision-makers and at the level of the ordinary citizen, but also for the creation of communication channels through which to transfer the know-how from the institutions to society*

Keywords: *security; security culture; intelligence; cooperation; know-how*

1. INTRODUCTION

The general security environment is nowadays described by non-conventional threats gaining more and more ground, where the lines between peace and war are blurred, where the frontline moves from the classic trenches to inside the homes of each citizens.

The concept of security itself went through a series of reforms over time, depending on the global trends. Back in the 90s, the Copenhagen School contributed to the conceptual widening by introducing the idea of societal security as such. Therefore,

Societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats (Weaver, 1993: 23).

In *People, States and Fear*, Barry Buzan (1991a) speaks of five aspects of security – military, political, economic, societal and

ecological. Although the narrow vision on security defines it in relation to the military, material capabilities and the state as the main actor, the changes in the security climate have led to conceptual redefinitions. Thus, visions were articulated according to which shades and contrasts of security proliferate in relation to elements not only military, but also political, economic, social and environmental. The actors involved in this dynamic are not only states but also non-state actors (Kolodziej, 1992:422-423; Buzan, 1991b:432-433). This comprehensive approach, though relatively recent, has been around before. The political, social and economic life was considered intrinsic to the survival of the state, but the Cold War period narrowed the vision (Katzenstein, 1996). Nations share vulnerabilities, especially with the emerging challenges coming from a new generation of threats developed by both state and non-state actors. Although it is the responsibility of the government to educate the general public in order to reduce vulnerabilities, it is the responsibility of the citizen to prepare, be

vigilant and eventually respond. In hence, to develop a security culture.

2. SECURITY CULTURE

Security culture

must be understood as a set of widely resonating ideas that have evolved out of a long historical experience and that are deeply rooted in the shared consciousness or «common sense» (Latham, 1998:132).

According to Colin S. Gray,

culture refers to the socially transmitted habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operations that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community (Gray, 1990:45)

and Kai Roer defines security culture as

the ideas, customs and social behaviors of a particular people or group that helps them be free from threat and danger (Kai, 2015:14).

According to those definitions, security culture can be analyzed by taking into consideration multiple aspects: cognitive, affective or emotional, evaluative, historical and emotional. It

is adaptable, it develops with the societal evolution and it is passed through generations by oral and written means of communication, as well as by supporting security values practices (Lungu *et al.*, 2018:66).

Security culture comprises three fundamental elements: technology, policies and competence. Technology is not limited only to tangible elements, but also includes mental models, standards and know-how; policies include written and non-written rules, laws and moral codes; competence is about the people who have the understanding and knowledge, who use technology who form and inform the policies (Kay, 2015:19). Every aspect of the security culture impacts the other two and their synergy can give us perspective:

The more we understand their formation and their continued interaction, the easier it is to understand how we can use them to build and maintain security culture (Kay, 2015:19).

Security culture can be divided into four distinct elements: a resonating set of beliefs about the nature of the international system, a set of perceptions regarding the external and internal threats faced by

the state, the beliefs about the role of the state in the international context and the ideas about the proper conduct of diplomats representing the state. All those elements are believed to be “highly resistant to externally directed efforts to affect change” (Latham, 1998:134).

Based on the *National Security Strategy* of the United States of America (NSS, 2017), which lays the groundwork of a ‘culture of preparedness’¹, Alexander Siedschlag (2018:1-40) proposes four dimensions of the security culture², included into the *Security Culture Model* (SCM). This model is illustrative in relationship with two coordinate axes: constitutive → regulative norms and cognitive → evaluative standards, meaning culture “seen as a factor in the perceptive definition of threat or in a response to threat, respectively culture as a concept to study the emergence or study the evolution of security domains” (Siedschlag, 2018:17) (*secularization* factor) or as a concept to study the governance perspective (*operationalization* factor). From this perspective, *security culture* can be understood as follows:

¹ This new term, ‘culture of preparedness’ (in relationship with *civic culture*, first defined by Almond & Verba (1963), with *strategic culture*, first defined in the context of Cold War by Jack Snyder (1990), or with *security culture*, as defined before) was introduced from very beginning – *Pillar I. Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life*: “We must build a culture of preparedness and resilience across our governmental functions, critical infrastructure, and economic and political systems” (NSS, 2017:7). As a priority action of promoting American resilience, to build a culture of preparedness means “This Administration will take steps to build a culture of preparedness, informing and empowering communities and individuals to obtain the skills and take the preparatory actions necessary to become more resilient against the threats and hazards that Americans face” (NSS, 2017:14).

² Alexander Siedschlag (2018:1-2) proposes, for better understanding of security culture, a very complex, systematic and comprehensive constructivist definition of culture, as follows: “The analytical concept of culture refers not to a certain end state but to peoples’ assumption about the world. Culture can be understood as a sum of cognitive forms by which members of social communities make sense of reality, attribute meanings of facts, as well as save and reproduce knowledge and their interpretation of the world. Culture thus describes ‘the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another’. In addition, culture reduces complexity not only in perception but also in decision-making, constraining the factual choice of options based on norms and values guiding assessment and expectations”.

Table 1. The meaning of security culture based on the *Security Culture Model (SCM)*, retrieved from Siedschlag (2018:18-19)

	<i>Culture as a factor in the perceptual definition of threat/ Constitutive norms</i>	<i>Culture as a factor in the response to threat/ Regulative norms</i>
<i>Culture as a security domain/ Securization factor Cognitive standards</i>	Security culture as a cognitive form by which members of social communities make sense of reality, attribute meanings to facts, as well as save and reproduce practical competencies (e.g., resilient communities debates).	Security culture as sets of individual (or proprietary) experience-based strategies associated to individual attributors of meaning and normative convictions; this concept is strong in explaining how existing strategies and courses of action may determine which policy goals are developed or met, rather than strategies and courses of action being allotted to defined goals
<i>Culture as a security governance/ Organization factor Evaluative standards</i>	Security culture as shared symbols on which citizens orient their action and which are a kind of software for operating interfaces between actors and overarching structures (i.e. federal, state, local, tribal and territorial agencies), flexible enough to reflect and adapt to new threats and challenges.	Security culture as the ideational representation of foundational decisions about basic normative values (e.g., the security versus liberty and freedom debate), which shape the normative arena in which homeland security takes place.

In general terms, including these four perspectives, security culture depends on the public assumptions about the world and about the threats to national security. There is a particular interpretation of risks and threats, despite the fact that security culture is seen as software of the mind, a set of ‘publicly available cultural practices’, a set of meanings, symbols, and discourses, or decision-making acts. From this perspective (a constructivist one), there is a direct connection between security culture and national security strategies, as Peter J. Katzenstein observed in 1996. Katzenstein “drew attention to the domestic societal prerequisites for the formation of national security strategies”, as long as the perspective from the 1990s has not changed substantially:

In the 1990s, based on a larger cultural turn of which the cultural theory of risk was one of the forerunners, the field of security culture studies became driven by constructivist approaches to international politics. The best example is Peter J. Katzenstein’s *The Culture of National Security* (1996), demonstrating how national security interests do not exist per se but a variety of actors are exposed to a variety of cultural factors in their threat response. The founding assumption of this approach was that “security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors” (Siedschlag, 2018:14).

The relationship cultural factors → security interests defines the relationship security culture → national security strategy, that is specific to each country. There are several examples of nations that have been subject to threats such as asymmetric campaigns, such as Israel, Spain or the United Kingdom, examples which prove the importance of

a well-informed public in tackling threats and withstand attacks of any kind.

The resilience of a nation is the result of an interinstitutional and social effort. Citizens and the civil society are contributing to the general effort of promoting and consolidating the security environment by sharing awareness, acknowledging threats and creating a vision that would ultimately transform the vision to policy.

The security culture, therefore, makes room among the individual concerns: the interest for the own security and of the close family, the interest for the security of the restricted community (religious, neighborhood, sexual orientation, ethnic, etc.), concern for the attribute of national security and sovereignty, understanding of the complex phenomena of globalization, concern for global security (equality of nations, cooperation between them, exclusion of terrorism or wars between conflict resolution solutions, climate balance and environmental protection etc.) and for the problems of humanity.

3. COOPERATION. LIMITS AND CHALLENGES

Cooperation is essential. The specialized institutions of the state should also concern the formation of the culture of security of the citizens, because understanding the mechanisms of preserving the security of the nation up to the individual level would greatly facilitate their mission; it is notorious that in the face of a security risk, the initiator/ initiators are one step ahead (the initiative belongs to them, they are the active factor)

of the authorities, who can anticipate to prevent, but cannot really take over the initiative and control the situation without having public support.

The institutions with responsibilities in national security have made some efforts for boosting security culture among citizens, as seen in the issue of preventing corruption or terrorist threats. In order to create adequate responses among citizens, to perceive that they are part of a consolidated social system with responsibilities. Among actions that can be undertaken on this topic we can include strategic communication activities, influence communication and various information events meant to raise awareness and aim to create and consolidate security culture (Mantea, 2019).

An effort to develop a security culture is stated in the Romanian National Defense Strategy. According to this programmatic document, security culture is to be built by a process of

continuous education, in order to promote values, norms, attitudes or actions meant to facilitate the assimilation of the national security concept (SNAp, 2015:21).

Although initiated by the state and its institutions, the civil society is also called to “openly debate security programs” (SNAp, 2015:23).

The institutions with responsibilities in national security and defence created internal structures with the sole objectives of communicating and educating the public, the public relations offices having the role of providing relevant information and updates on their respective activities. Such examples are the Public Relations and Information Direction of the Ministry of Defence (DIRP, 2020), the Communication Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Furthermore, contributing to the security culture, we find academic institutions that offer security programs for all levels of education, such as the programs of the National Defence Academy that are not only available for the military personnel, but also for civilians (CNAp, 2020) or the program of Global Security Studies within the West University of Timișoara (UVT, 2020). An important role in bringing all the interested parties at the same table is also attributed to non-governmental organizations that are bridging the gap between public and institutions or think-tanks that are providing independent analysis and perspective. Such relevant organizations include Informational Warfare and Strategic Communication Laboratory (LARICS), New Strategy Center, Center for Security Studies (Mantea, 2019), Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning (CPCEW, 2020).

When it comes to the challenges such cooperation might face, we should also have in mind the importance of developing a common threat assessment and educational objectives, while implementing a coordinated effort to educate and empower the public regarding its fundamental role in consolidating security.

The challenges might include denouncing acts of corruption without the risk of later transforming the honest citizen into a victim of the criminal group he denounced, and the antiterrorist vigilance that would not lead him to a behavioral background, in which he suspects that behind any bearded individual with a backpack is a suicidal jihadist.

In addition, security risks multiply and amplify at a sometimes dizzying rate and include phenomena typical of asymmetric conflicts, which can be fake news campaigns coordinated by a state entity or a non-state actor, human-trafficking, cyber-risks, manipulation of securities and commodity markets, financing and control of political parties, non-governmental and media outlets, etc., which are extremely difficult not only to be understood by the simple citizen, but also difficult to be avoided. Therefore, an educated public is a resilient one. Further than just denouncing fake-news that are spreading rapidly, encouraging critical thinking should be one of the aims of education at all levels.

One main challenge might be represented by the strategic communication efforts that are not matched by appropriate communication vectors, by the lack of adapted language, and by poor information management, and without proper measurements to assess impact might render useless.

A first attempt at measuring aspects of the security culture was made, in 2018, by ProSCOP NGO. The report, called “The Promotion of Security Culture”, publishes the results and the analysis of a survey from November-December 2017 which questioned 152 people working or interested in security issues. It revealed that about a third of the respondents are only occasionally spending time reading about security issues, most of them from online newspapers and magazines (62.5%), but also a whole 49.3% from the websites of the security institutions. Also, 53.9% of the respondents got their information from social media. 52% of them are considering social culture to be defined by its cognitive side, 50% added the immaterial heritage side and 47.7% the regulatory side. Asked which institution should have the main role in promoting security culture, 71.1% of the respondents said that defense and security institutions are to be tasked with this, while 2.1%

considered that this should be a task for every educational institution. The main barriers against promoting the security culture are considered to be the lack of interest (65.1%) and the security issues lingo (57.9%) (Lungu *et al.*, 2018:9-29).

LARICS, another NGO interested in security issues, published the results of a poll conducted by INSCOP Research in February 2018. This poll, based on the responses of 1000 people representative for all the population of Romania, measured key indicators of the security culture. Prone to a culture of insecurity, inclined to pessimism, localism and conspiracy. Romanians are vulnerable to new security phenomena, such as fake news. Although distrustful towards institutions, Romanians are not unsympathetic towards European Union or NATO (LARICS, 2018:18).

One of the opportunities underlined by the most recent crisis Romania has faced, namely the COVID-19 pandemic, has put tremendous pressure on the security culture of Romanians. Facing an extensive health crisis, Romanian society directs its hopes towards professional leaders of institutions, such as dr. Raed Arafat, secretary of state and head of the Emergency Situations Department, as it is revealed in a poll conducted by IRES between 7th and 8th of April, 2020 (IRES, 2020:5).

Although the Army was always trusted by Romanians, the afore mentioned poll reveals that a series of law enforcement and emergency situations institutions, surprisingly, are (re)gaining Romanians trust. The top is as follows: The Army (84%), General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations (75%), National Committee for Special Emergency Situations (68%), Romanian Gendarmerie (65%), Romanian Police (61%). At the opposite end, Romanians are very distrustful when it comes to the Government, trust level being only at 26% (IRES, 2020:11).

A follow-up would be interesting, in order to see the evolution of Romanians trust in law enforcement institutions during the COVID-19 crisis and if the levels will be maintained after the crisis would have been finished and the lockdown measures, lifted.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Cooperation is key and it is high time for citizens to understand that the proliferation of new generation threats is aiming their intimacy, their communities and homes directly. The trenches are now in front of each device connected to the internet, in each breaking news that might alter

economic behavior and, in each decision, to support institutions in their efforts to consolidate security.

Taking note of the increasing number of initiatives aimed to promote and consolidate a security culture in Romania, we acknowledge a positive trend of all these efforts, even though the topic is still associated with law enforcement and national security institutions, a coordinated effort across the whole government through the comprehensive understanding of security might contribute to the awareness and the responsibility of the citizens.

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THE ROLE OF STATE IN SUPPORTING NATIONAL IDENTITY

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Abstract: *Securing the concept of national identity is one of the wishes of any state that is currently trying to secure its situation for the future. The community must be aware of its shared values, of the elements that define it, which it has the duty to preserve and pass on to future generations. Each member of the community is part of a whole. This whole has value from the perspective of the unit it represents, as well as from the perspective of its uniqueness. The need to function as a whole for those who have developed a group identity, a national identity, finds its answer in actions taken by the state to protect, support and develop the national identity. The speech present in the public space and promoted by personalities of the public life has a major impact and is a former of opinions and attitudes. In the material we will make, we propose to highlight the active role that the speech of certain public persons, representatives of emblematic institutions, plays in protecting and promoting the national identity.*

Keywords: *communication identity, national identity, motivational discourse, discourse arguments, concepts and values, security*

1. INTRODUCTION

The identity is a concept that has been approached from different perspectives, it has been the subject of numerous debates and the more it has been explored, the more it has proved to be more ambiguous and difficult to define, due to the large number of contradictory meanings.

The national identity is a valuable topic in terms of the connection it makes with notions that are inseparable from the national state, such as the nation, the nationalism, the ethnic and the ethnicity. The elements of national identity, which help to differentiate between national groups, but which also help in the recognition from within, between community members, as belonging to the same national group, are a valuable asset, which the state is obliged to preserve and pass on to the generations to come. The preservation of the national identity is the assurance for the future of that state, it is the guarantee that as long as the population will identify itself as belonging to this state, it will exist.

The national identity is constantly undergoing transformation; it is fluid and evolves with the society. The study of identity has been approached in a variety of theoretical models, but the most representative approaches are those that the essentialism and constructivism have explored,

because they place identity at the centre of their analysis and have diametrically opposed perspectives.

The essentialism promotes the idea that objects possess certain essential properties that make them what they are, which determine their characteristics. From an essentialist perspective, the identity is a static, essential, permanent and collective characteristic, which is found in the same degree in all members of the group (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000:10), (Cerulo, 1997:86-387). The collective identity "pre-exists in the social actors", who have a determined social experience (Rusu, 2009:31- 44).

On the other hand, the constructivism approaches identity as a fact constructed by states, in relation to the interests of each one of them and to the existing power relations. The constructivism provided a critical perspective and assumed the fact that identities are constructed, multiple and fluid, which represented an evolution from the existing theories in the field of international relations up to that time, and facilitated research and clarification of underappreciated phenomena. The constructivists "were concerned to prove that identities can be changed through interaction and that this matters", but also that the definitions of identity can be changed, which "influences the security practices and ultimately the type of

anarchy" (Zehfuss, 2001: 323). One of the main constructivist authors who analysed in his articles topics such as: anarchy, national identity, the interests of the states, the relationship between state actors is Alexander Wendt. An important role in the constructivist approach is also given to the social actor, because, from the perspective of this theory, the world in which we live is a world created through the interaction of all social actors (Wendt, 1992: 399).

The concept of security traditionally refers to the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states against external military threats. Until 1990, the concept of national security had as its essence the military defence, so that, the concept would subsequently be extended to a wider range of threats, which concern areas such as politics, economy, culture, environment etc. By definition, the national security protects the concepts that refer to the defence of aspects of national interests and is closely related to the national state to which it offers protection. In this context, the national identity, this fluid and constantly evolving notion, which represents one of the central elements of the national state, needs to be defended by the fact that it is supported and promoted.

Taking as starting point the constructivist perspective on the concept of identity, in this article, we propose to identify the way in which the state plays its active role in protecting the identity, by identifying the motivational speech that exists at this moment in the Romanian society, motivational speech promoted by the state, through the institutions under its subordination.

We will try to identify what drives people identify themselves as Romanians? What is the motivational speech that is being promoted? And let us do an analysis of the speech from the perspective of the logic of the speech, but also from the perspective of the rhetoric of the speech.

2. CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY AND THE WAY THIS INFLUENCES THE IDENTITY

The constructivist conception focuses on the principles according to which the reality is constructed; it is a result of the interaction of the state actors and of the way in which they defines themselves.

From Wendt's perspective, the international relations are described as a social scene that enjoys communication and interaction between its units. The social context in which international relations are seen is precisely the one that supports the

interaction and does not allow the analysis of its institutions out of context. The structure of the system is in a clear dependence with the structure of its units, since the system and the units are constructed mutually.

One of the assumptions from which Wendt starts is that the structure of the system and the structure of its constituent parts are one and the same; as the system and its units are constructed mutually; complement each other to form the whole.

The constructivist theory is approached by Alexander Wendt in contrast with the theory that, at the time he published the article "*Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*", was majority in the field, namely the neorealist theory or the theory of structural realism. The author considers constructivism as a theoretical framework in which the fundamental elements of international politics are conceived as social structures. The identity is regarded as a constant fact that determines the behaviour of the international actors, although it can be partially modelled by this behaviour. Alexander Wendt has departed from the reasoning according to which the reference system is actually a constructed system. He argued that anarchy is not a constant structure that determines the behaviour of states, but it is a condition whose significance is itself conditioned by the aid relationships. The self-aid that states can provide for themselves is not the only possibility they have in international relationships, but only one of many forms of state identity and possible interest.

One of the issues to which the author draws attention is that social theories are not the ones that determine the content of theorising itself, but they are the ones that structure the "questions we ask about world politics and approaches ... to answer these questions". The manner in which the questions are asked, the perspective from which the answers are given, put the problem in a certain light.

The classification of research problems and strategies should be question-based, rather than method-based, and if we are not interested in forming identity and interests, we could find the assumptions of a perfectly reasonable rationalist speech.

Its objective should be to assess the causal relationship between practice and interaction (as an independent variable) and the cognitive structures at the level of the individual states and of the systems of states that constitute identities and interests (as a variable) - that is, the relationship between what actions do and what they are (Wendt, 1992: 423-424).

The criticism that Wendt brings to the constructivist researches up to him refer to the fact that they focused on issues related to ontology and construction and only on the secondary plane on the causal and empirical questions of how identities and interests are produced in practice, under anarchic conditions. The theoretical aspects were prioritised, and the practical aspects were of little interest, proved by point demonstrations, which answer the different questions which in turn involve difference standards of deduction. The importance of epistemology in positivist studies, of scientific realism or of post-structuralism has not been justified because it does not reach important aspects such as the structure and dynamics of international life. "The philosophies of sciences are not theories of international relationships". However, modern and postmodern liberals and constructivists had a different approach. They have raised a number of questions regarding the substance of international relationships (Wendt, 1992:425).

The neo-realists believe that the key variable that determines the main actions of the states is the distribution of power between states. Thus, from the perspective of the neo-realists, in the context of anarchy, the international politics is directly determined by the way the power is divided between states. However, from Wendt's perspective, the international relationships cannot be studied on the basis of the distributions of power between states, because the meaning of the international relationships is based on ideas, norms and practices. "There are collective meanings that constitute the structures that organise our actions" (Wendt, 1992: 397), as most of the aspects regarding the system of international relationships are socially constructed, being the result of ongoing processes of social practice and interaction. The anarchy and the self-aid are not caused by the structure of the international relationships, but are determined by the existing interactions between states and the way states perceive themselves and other states. The anarchy and the self-aid may or may not exist depending on these variables that relate to states. And if one of the important variables to which the state refers is its perception of itself, then one can conclude that the identity of each state is at the heart of Alexander Wendt's argument.

Although one of the constructivist assumptions is that the identity is constructed, through a long series of interactions, constructivism does not undermine the national state, despite the increasing importance of the non-state actors in world politics,

the constructivists assert that states remain masters of their sovereignty, and so they can resist collective identification more than other actors can. The basic assertions that constructivism makes as a structural theory of the international systems are: "(1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are mostly constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics" (Wendt, 1994:384).

The assertion that states are socially constructed can take different forms. From a security perspective, it is reaffirmed that provision of security is a key function of the state. The modern forms of security go beyond the state borders and no longer refer to the control exercised by a single actor, but end up referring to the control carried out by several actors, provided that they are not rivals and engage in collective institutionalised actions. "A collective security system is just that-joint control of organized violence potential in a transnational space" (Wendt, 1992:392). Such a system with regard to the exercise of collective security is represented by NATO. This system of collective security has a high degree of legitimacy among its members and a high capacity to implement its policies on them. The alliances are temporary coalitions of the states that have general interests, which come together to pool their means, in order to increase their defence capacity. The question that arises is what is the reason that justifies the coalitions after the threat disappears, why are they not abolished and how can their maintenance be legitimised if they were left without the purpose for which they were set up? The explanation is that, "in collective security systems, states make commitments to multilateral actions against non-specific threats" (Wendt, 1992: 394).

From a constructivist perspective, the concept of authority covers two primary aspects: the legitimisation concept, and the constraint concept. The first aspect involves the construction of the rhetoric that justifies the actions of the state and it is a preliminary step, and the second one, the constraint concept, intervenes in the situation where the first one was not effective and involves the firm action of the state, meant to impose the rules and restore the order. The two qualities are essential for the internationalisation of the state, on the one hand the identification of the state with regard to a certain function, which is most often the military or the economic security, and on the

other hand, an action to sanction all actors who "disturb the fulfilment of that function" (Wendt, 1992: 392). The result of the internationalisation of the state through such collective actions is that both the state actors, as well as the individuals that make up the state, will appreciate that it is normal for certain problems to no longer enter the sphere of action of the state, but to be solved at the international level. The external security has completed such a patch and alliances such as NATO enjoy full legitimacy, and the paradigm of the security is substantially changed, with states getting to play a much diminished role, for non-state actors to take over the world security scene.

The constructivism supports the idea that reality is constructed as a result of the interaction of the state actors and that social reality needs to be made aware, to undergo an internalisation process, in order to be finally communicated through language. As a result, the identification of people as Romanians and the elements that they consider to be defining in order to consider themselves Romanians are a way of constructing the reality in which they live and of self-identifying.

The state is that form of organisation of the society, which manages the legal rights and interests of the individuals, owns the sovereignty and is structured in the form of a combination of institutions that it coordinates and which exercises the state power in different forms.

3. ASPECTS THAT IDENTIFY PEOPLE AS ROMANIANS

A first direction that this paper proposes is to identify which are the most important landmarks that those who identify themselves as Romanians have, when do they consider themselves to belong to this people and how this is found in the motivational speech that the authorities promote in the public space. We intend to submit to the analysis what is it that determines the Romanians to consider themselves Romanians, their image about themselves, an image that determines them to identify themselves as Romanians.

Authors such as Bostock and Smith (2001) considered that national identity is closely linked to the following indicators: the collective perception on one's identity, namely the concept of "who are we?", approached on media channels; the continuity in time and space, confirmed by the elements related to the history of that nation; the existence of objectives, targets, precise and common goals that a nation proposes to achieve

and the existence of geographical, linguistic, cultural and religious limitations;

Anthony Smith (1991) also considers that identity refers to territory, culture, social and religious environment, traditions and language.

There is a relatively recent study on the perception of Romanians on their identity, carried out by a team of researchers under the coordination of Professor Luminița Nicolaescu, from the Academy of Economic Studies in Bucharest, which helps us to extract what are the elements considered to be those that the Romanians consider the definers for what they are, so that later we can observe how they are found in the speeches promoted in the public space.

The study, conducted during 2007, entitled *The Image of Romania under a magnifying glass! Country Branding and Rebranding*, analysed the internal image of Romania and identified the main elements associated by Romanians with national identity, a fact achieved with the help of 6 focus groups organised in Constanța, Iași, Brașov, Cluj, Craiova and Bucharest, followed by a sociological inquiry, which had the role "to identify the degree of generalisation of the focus groups results regarding the national identity of Romanians"; The sample chosen for the application of the research methods was made up of young people with a higher degree of education, starting from the premise that they have an increased interest in what the national identity means, have a greater awareness about their responsibility and have a greater motivation from the perspective of creating one's future in the country.

The results recorded in the research showed that the elements considered defining for belonging to a particular country are considered as "the national borders that administratively define the country, the inhabitants of a country, the traditions, the customs, the history, the achievements of a nation, the system of values that governs the country, the style of life, the status that implies belonging to a country and a language". The elements that were associated with the national identity were visual elements (coat of arms, flag), auditory elements (anthem or other traditional songs, language) and cultural elements (Nicolaescu *et al.*, 2007:4-10).

As a conclusion of the foregoing, people identify themselves as being Romanians for being born and living in a certain territory, because they speak a certain language, because they share certain traditions and customs, they have a common history, they associate certain common

elements of visual, auditory and cultural identification, and they have a similar style of life.

Having these elements of identification, the question must be asked, how they are explored at the discursive level in order to be able to promote national identity, to increase the positive perception, as opposed to the negative one, in order to value the self-esteem and satisfaction of a person how is Romanian.

4. THE SPEECH REFERRING TO THE IDENTITY ELEMENTS CURRENTLY EXISTING IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPACE

In an attempt to identify a series of representative speeches existing in the Romanian public space, which promote the Romanian identity elements, we analysed part of the messages communicated in 2019 by certain prominent personalities of the Romanian public and political life, as representatives of some emblematic institutions in Romania, in order to see how the elements we bring to attention are found in their communiqué.

Considering that each speech is prepared to be first and foremost appropriate to the event in which it is spoken, we made the selection of the speeches we analysed depending on the event in which it was delivered, events that are in themselves resonant and connected to the subject addressed.

In a first stage, we will pay attention to fragments from the speeches of the President of Romania, which refer to moments in history, talk about unity, about the need for a favourable image of Romania, about the value of the Romanian society, about the memory of those who have given their lives for independence, the sovereignty and the unity of the Romanian state, about the Romanian flag, as a symbol of our state, about the awareness of belonging to a set of nationally charged values.

The message of the President of Romania, Mr. Klaus Iohannis, transmitted on the occasion of the Day of the National Flag, held on 26.06.2019, is very emotionally charged and refers to essential elements, symbols and values for the Romanian national identity.

We celebrate, on this day, the National Flag, which, for over 170 years, represents for Romanians everywhere the symbol of our national identity, independence, sovereignty and unity (...) Our flag represents a binder of the past, present and future and reminds us of the sacrifices made by the whole

nation to have, today, a democratic and pluralistic state, in which the fundamental human rights are protected and the principles of the state subject to the rule of law are respected.

The flying of the Tricolour is, every time, an emotional moment, in which we live the pride of belonging to our nation. We identify the flag with peace, security and freedom, but we must not forget that this is also a symbol of the responsibility we all have for the development of our society.

By celebrating the Day of the National Flag, we have the moral duty to transmit to young generations, through our personal example, the awareness of belonging to our national values, as well as the fact that patriotism does not only mean the emotion of a holiday, but also taking responsibility to contribute to the progress of Romania.

Other occasions for communicating a message peppered with elements that refer to historical moments from the past was the Day of the Romanian Army when the President of Romania delivered, during the ceremony organised on 25.10.2019, an address with a strong patriotic content and the Speech of the President of Romania, given during the joint solemn meeting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate dedicated to the ceremonial of swearing in as President of Romania, from 21.12.2019, both events being exploited from a communication perspective.

We celebrate here, in Carei, 75 years since the liberation from foreign occupation of the last swath of Romanian land.

It is a cherished holiday, a special day in which we honour the blood offerings and sacrifices of all our heroes, who over time have fought and contributed to the defence of the national being and the independent, sovereign and unitary Romanian state.

101 years ago, the parents of our nation - the brave Romanians who dreamed, worked and died for unity - gave birth to the most beautiful and great Romanian project of our hardened history. The road was not easy at all in the century that has elapsed since the Great Union of 1918 (...).

When it will be difficult for us, let us to find support in each other, because we, the Romanians, wherever we are, we are a big family, united forever by the love of the country that gives us the strength to overcome any obstacle.

In order to continue the analysis of the speeches given by key personalities of the state, we selected the speech of the President of the Romanian Senate, Calin Popescu Tăriceanu, at the Annual Meeting of the Romanian Diplomacy - the

2019 edition, from August 2019, an opportunity for analysis and retrospection, used to praise the beauty and spectacularity of Romania, to underline the authentic Romanian narrative and to raise the value and ideals of the Romanian society.

Perhaps the most important bet I would have wanted to win in the next period is in another area, in the external image plane of Romania. It is enough to look at the reactions of those who visit us - this year we welcomed thousands of officials and experts from all over the world, not only from the EU and not just me, everyone. I often see them surprised to discover the spectacular realities, far beyond the image they had in their mental baggage upon arrival.

The solution of the image deficit that burdens the authentic achievements of our country does not, of course, consist in the construction of a country props made of pastel cardboard, located in a utopian and timeless space. However, the solution is to promote tactfully, but also firmly, the authentic Romanian narrative, while simultaneously accepting the good faith dialogue about what is, as everywhere, still to be corrected or to be transformed(...). Which is natural and beneficial, as long as the benchmarks and perspectives in the medium and long term are carefully, correctly, wisely chosen, but not in insulation from the ideals and values of the society.

The day of December the 1st, by itself a reference moment, was marked by celebratory events and representative speeches that marked the moment, and in this context, the speech of the President of the Romanian Senate, Mr. Teodor Meleşcanu, at the joint solemn meeting of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies, called for the reconnection with the past, national consciousness and unity.

I am glad that we can also celebrate today together the National Day in the Parliament of Romania, the supreme forum of our democracy. It is a day of memory that determines each Romanian to reconnect with history, with all that means our glorious past, with the heroes of the nation, with the sacrifice and courage of the Romanian Army and, not least, with the efforts of the entire Romanian intellectual and political elite, who contributed to the realisation of the ideal of national unity and dignity(...). But this day is not just about the past. It is also about our present and future as a powerful nation of the world map. The time has come to look at the present with the confidence that our powers can determine a great destiny for Romania. (...)

The same national consciousness in a common ideal could be noted 30 years ago when, in the face of

tyranny, we all brought to the knees the communist regime, first and foremost the contribution of the revolutionaries. We notice the same determination and the same momentum in recent years, when, in the face of economic and political crises, only united we could think and make the best decisions. I am very happy to see that citizens are increasingly active and involved in the life of society and, implicitly, in the future of our country.

The Annual Meeting of the Romanian Diplomacy - the 2019 edition, which took place in August 2019, was an opportunity also exploited by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramona Mănescu, to give a speech peppered with elements that refer to the image and the prestige of Romania, meant to create a certain type of feeling. The speech refers to the need to defend the image, identity and national values, emphasising two defining elements for the national state, namely language and history.

It is also an opportunity to examine our image in the perception of others: foreign guests, other institutions, the media, the business environment and even the general public(...)

We wish for Romania and its citizens, economic development, social peace, cultural wealth. (...)

In this respect, the need for an activity to defend our image, identity and values, the language and history of Romania, the vision between the place and the role of our country in the contemporary world, between allies and partners is added to the traditional duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all through a better and more effective strategic communication.

Because the information war becomes one of the powerful weapons of our century, we must develop the mechanisms of evolution and preservation of the image and prestige of Romania. (...)

The consular activity in the service of the Romanian citizens, together with the creativity of the cultural projects you propose, aimed at maintaining the connection with the Romanian citizens from abroad, must remain a priority.

Last but not least, we will bring to the fore two speeches from 2019, given by the historian Ioan Aurel Pop, President of the Romanian Academy, whose public speech is general confined to the area of history, scientifically arguing the formation and solid foundation of the Romanian state. Probably all the speeches of the historian Ioan Aurel Pop would be justified to be given as an example of a speech supporting the Romanian national identity elements, because they have, to a greater or lesser extent, related to the context, references to the

national symbols. In the speech delivered by the President of the Academy, the historian Ioan Aurel Pop, on 24 January 2019, at the Patriarchate Palace, on the occasion of 160 years since the Unification of the Romanian Principalities, titled suggestively, *The Political Union or since when are the Romanians Romanians*, the author put the focus on group consciousness, the one that made the Romanian nation identity itself as one and justify political unity. The main arguments are the language spoken by the groups of people, their Latin origin, their common Christian faith.

In the matter of the Romanian nation and of the conscience of the Romanians belonging to their people, things seemed to be cleared a long time ago, but - as you can see - they are not. However, you don't need to be a historian to reach some simple conclusions, without being misled. The groups of people are different from each other since the world was until now, and a reason for these differences has been - also from ancient times - the language. From the moment some people have realised that they speak another language in relation to other people and they have been aware of this, at the group level, there have been led the foundations of ethnicities, tribes or nations, as they are also called in the Bible(...) members of the elite, Romanians and foreigners alike - who knew what it means to be Romanian, who knew that Romanians come from Rome, that they speak a language similar to Latin and other Romance languages, that they are Eastern Christians etc.(...)

The arguments are part of ethnicity and show a certain group consciousness, well settled around 1550 (...)

It is true that Romanian intellectuals have spread the ideas of Latinity, unity and solidarity among the people; it is true that the edifice called Romania was built by the efforts of conscious and responsible elites, who planned the national political work. It is not rocket science to realise that a national community, in order to last, needs a shield, a shelter, that is, the national state to organise it, defend it, protect it and represent it in international relationships. The Romanian nation was not built from nothing, but from many and long centuries of work of the Romanian people upon itself. The elites cannot build a nation out of nothing, but they can organise a nation. (...)

The history of our union is the history of our life, and the political union in 1859 was the testimony of the power of a reborn nation.

The second speech of Professor Ioan Aurel Pop, which we pay attention to, was given in December 2019 in Cluj, on the occasion of the unveiling of the state of the poet Andrei Mureșanu,

the author of the lyrics of the national Anthem of Romania. It is an occasion with which the importance of this symbol of Romania is underlined and, at the same time, the inconsistency that has been shown by the repeated change of this identity element that needs continuity to mark the memory of generations is underlined.

...Andrei Mureșanu is the author of the National Anthem of Romania (the poem was initially called 'Un răsuneț') and it is good to underline the important of this symbol of Romania.(...)

In the last century and a half, Romania had six anthems, something that did not happen with any serious country in Europe. No wonder, by always replacing the anthems, we do not enjoy credibility and are not recognised by the world by our own symbols.

5. CONCLUSION

Within the analysis we proposed, we aimed to identify whether there is a speech based on the promotion of the Romanian identity elements, rhetoric addressed by prominent personalities of the Romanian political and public life who, given the functions they occupy, give weight to their message.

Having as a theoretical basis the constructivist conception that claims that reality is constructed, that it is formed through interaction and is influenced by the actions of the state actors, we have assumed that the national identity is also constructed, which makes the speech that promotes it have a high importance.

The added value of focusing on speech in the study of identity is given by the easy way in which the identity elements can be promoted within the speech and by the impact that the speech can have on the well-chosen audience. For these reasons, we have highlighted from the speeches given with the occasion of events, of personalities of the contemporary social and political life, fragments that highlight the communication of messages of continuity, unity, preservation of traditions and customs, valorisation of the common national elements of visual, auditory and cultural identification.

Strategic communication of some fundamental notions for the Romanian state, as they are the elements that define the national identity, needs consistency and coherence of the message. In order to be effective, a consistent and uniform transmission of a consistent message is required. The speech, as part of the communication, is a non-material resource partially explored in

Romania, as we have found in the article, and which would still have much more to offer.

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PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE

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Abstract: *The association between national security and pop culture might seem puzzling at first as the former category immediately brings to mind connections with fun and fiction, whereas the latter is linked with serious analyses and real-life relevance. Nevertheless, as this paper will show, exploring the complexity of American popular culture with regard to national security does prepare the ground for an interesting investigation. After all, media such as movies, video games and books represent great channels through which stereotypes about the activities carried out by intelligence and law enforcement agencies are reproduced, reshaped and reinforced among the general public. Popular representations of espionage, mass surveillance, terrorism or enhanced interrogation techniques are just a few examples that deserve to be analyzed as far as the discourse on national security is concerned. Therefore, it is the aim of this paper to look at some of the aspects related to national security through the lens of American popular culture.*

Keywords: *national security; popular culture; intelligence agencies*

1. INTRODUCTION

There is a very strong bond between culture and national security. This link is highlighted by various anthropologists who suggest that culture influences the activity of human beings in any society because it helps people to better adapt and increase their chances of survival. Thus, the analysis of the role of culture as the essence of social contract theories and of practical human organizations is closely connected with national security issues which influence both the individual person and the community as a whole (Gbadegesin in Oladiran & Adadevoh, 1991:96). From this point of view, it can be argued that the protection and expansion of a nation-state depend on the cultural context.

But how exactly do we define culture? Although various definitions tend to say the same thing, culture, much like intelligence, escapes a precise definition. The variety of meanings the word culture encapsulates can be explained by, on the one hand, the outstanding number of cultures across the globe and, on the other hand, its applicability to a large number of academic areas. Therefore, when we speak of culture, we refer to different things in different contexts.

The renowned Welsh Marxist theorist Raymond Williams was particularly interested in this matter and established four main uses of the term. The first one sees culture as a form of 'intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development'; the second one is synonymous with civilization, denoting a 'general process of social development'; the third indicates 'the objects of artistic production' - books, movies, paintings, songs; and the fourth refers to the anthropological meaning of the word culture - understanding a society by analyzing its shared system of behaviors, norms and symbols (Williams in Willmetts, 2019:801). For our research purposes, it is the third category, culture as artistic representation, that most interests us. This third interpretation is also the one that best describes the sub-category of culture that we commonly refer to as popular culture.

Over the last hundred years, American movies and books have probably been the most popular and influential media of culture in the United States. As Dan O'Meara *et al.* point out in *Movies, Myth and the National Security State*, these two channels have played a crucial part in envisioning the universe and in determining the vocabulary, setting the images, metaphors and creating the

mental maps, models, attitudes, and emotional frameworks through which Americans understood their own identity, their country, and its national security in the aftermath of the Second World War (O'Meara *et al.*, 2016:3-4).

US intelligence agencies have a long history of influencing cultural representations and molding how the public understands the way in which the state operates. As far back as the early 1930s, the FBI established an office to shape its image in film, radio, and TV shows. Ever since, the FBI press officers have been trying to mystify the workings of the Bureau by emboldening fictional representations that praise its activities. Other government agencies such as the Department of Defense, the Army, the Navy, the DIA, or the Drug Enforcement Administration followed in the FBI's footsteps and established media offices aimed at methodically securing sympathetic portrayals from media producers. The most recent members to join the trend have been the CIA and the Department of Homeland Security.

In light of this, we share Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon's contention that there are important elements to be unraveled as to what represents legitimate national security narratives and how they are reshaped and reinforced through the various channels of popular culture (Jackson, Nexon, 2003:144). To put it differently, we might argue that popular culture has essentially become an ideal stage on which national security scenarios are rehearsed and the politics of the national security state is analyzed.

Therefore, it is the aim of this paper is to look at some of the aspects related to national security through the lens of American popular culture. To achieve this, we will group some of the best known American artistic productions into three categories - espionage, war on terror/drugs and mass surveillance - and briefly comment upon them using plot analysis to better understand their perspective on the activities carried out by US intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

2. ESPIONAGE

There is a certain fascination with espionage among the American people that is reflected in the abundance of cultural products dedicated to this matter. Spy stories, for instance, are a staple of the American culture and it is not surprising that the two have been companions since the birth of the country. In fact, the first major American novel that dealt with espionage was James Fenimore Cooper's *The Spy*. Published in 1821, this was

Cooper's second novel and, through the story of a peddler named Harvey Birch, it shed some light on what it meant to be a spy during the Revolutionary War.

Nowadays, it is seldom that a few weeks go by without a new spy novel being published, with secret agents ranging from beautiful female agents trained to seduce their targets like in former CIA operative Jason Matthews's *Red Sparrow* trilogy, to the spies that operated amidst the turmoil of the Second World War such as the ones from Alan Furst's *A Hero of France* or *Under Occupation*. Some of the authors focus on non-fiction dedicated to the world of espionage like Larry Loftis in his 2019 *Code Name: Lise* or David E. Hoffmann in his 2016 *The Billion Dollar Spy*, while others continue to explore the complexities of spying through sequels and prequels to their former critically acclaimed novels, like gender-veteran John le Carré in *A Legacy of Spies*, his 2017 novel being both a sequel and a prequel to his 1963 bestseller *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold*.

Even teenagers have their own spies. The supremacy of vampires is challenged by the *Gallagher Girls Series*, which comprises five books published between 2006 and 2013 by Alice Carter. The stories focus on the Gallagher Academy for Exceptional Young Women, a school for the training of spies. Another example is Gail Carriger's novels from the *Finishing School Series* printed between 2013 and 2015. The series combines espionage with supernatural creatures such as vampires and werewolves through the story of a 14-year old girl who enrolls in Mademoiselle Geraldine's Finishing Academy for Young Ladies of Quality only to discover that the school offers more than just lessons in dance, dress, and etiquette, as it also trains the girls to deal with death, diversion, and espionage - in the politest possible ways, of course.

Spy mania becomes even clearer in television, where a growing number of movies and TV-series are winning prizes and viewers with their edge-of-the-seat stories of moles and mole-hunters and with their cliffhangers. Some of the aforementioned titles, such as *Red Sparrow*, have already been adapted for the screens, thus reaching an even wider audience. The *Mission Impossible* series is one of the best known American action spy franchises and follows the story of Ethan Hunt, an agent working for the IMF, as he is sent to carry out various missions around the world to ensure national and international security. Through the work of world-class auteurs, memorable stunts, adrenaline-packed plots and a haunting soundtrack

this, alongside James Bond, has become one of the most iconic series that depict espionage.

If we turn our attention to TV-series, *Homeland* has been one of the most celebrated shows winning 5 Golden Globes and another 55 other awards over the past 8 seasons. The series has even gained fans among the members of the former White House administrations; President Barack Obama confessed it was one of his favorite shows and former Vice-President Dick Cheney said that he could relate to a plot from season two. The series has been praised for its complex and well-written script which keeps the audience hooked and guessing as to how the unfolding of the action will affect the US national security.

Airing between 2013 and 2018, *The Americans* was another popular American TV-show. Created by Joe Weisberg, a former CIA officer, it is set in the early 1980s, just after Ronald Reagan's election as President, and tells the story of Phillip and Elizabeth Jennings, two KGB spies whose marriage was arranged. The couple move with their two children to Washington where they assume a double identity in order to gather information. As the series develops, their task becomes increasingly difficult as even the smallest mistake could cost them their lives.

Sometimes, espionage is served in the form of comedy as the audience is presented with kindhearted but inept protagonists that are given assignments which far exceed their abilities. Who has not heard of the famous *Johnny English* who, against all odds, successfully completed not 1, but 3 missions and ensured the safety of millions of people? Similarly, the *Austin Powers* trilogy parodies the very world of espionage by putting forward a character who is the total opposite of Ian Fleming's famous James Bond. While these are examples of British spies, they are, nevertheless, deeply ingrained in American popular culture.

Children are also consumers of cultural products that address the issue of espionage. Recent movies such as *Spies in Disguise* or *The Boss Baby* and TV-series such as *Spy Kids* or *Carmen Sandiego* combine humor and adventure into stories that appeal to preschoolers and grade-schoolers. Children are also very interested in spy equipment such as invisible ink pens, night vision goggles or laser trap alarms and dedicate a great deal of their time playing spy games, e.g. *I Spy with My Little Eye*; the CIA has even created their own webpage dedicated to kids: <https://www.cia.gov/kids-page>. Thus, boys and girls learn from a very young age what espionage

is all about and how it is connected with the security of a person or a community.

As we have seen so far, the theme of espionage is multidimensional and ubiquitous and, as a result it is dealt with at all levels of the media. This begs the question: what do all of these examples tell us? The most important thing to note is that the perception of espionage has constantly changed with the political and cultural context of the times and adapted to reflect the new zeitgeist. In the 1950s and 1960s, any fictional spy carrying out assignments for America or its allies was likely depicted as unmistakably heroic, even when involved in activities that might have drawn the criticism of civil libertarians. A good example, based on real characters and events, is that of advertising executive Herbert Philbrick who agreed to spy on the Communists for the FBI, and spent almost a decade of his life as a Communist, FBI spy, and Communist counter-spy. His autobiography became the basis for a drama series entitled *I Led Three Lives*, which aired between 1953 and 1956, at the height of the Second Red Scare.

There followed the Cold War spies such as James Bond and Matt Helm who were absolutely dazzling, driving their hot little sports cars and having countless affairs with young, beautiful women when they weren't chasing and killing Soviet agents. However, the disillusion with the Vietnam War and the disclosure of the CIA's recruitment of mobsters to murder Cuba's young communist leader, Fidel Castro, brought about a transformation of the fictional spies. Thus, they were turned into anti-heroes, cynical burnouts who botched their operations; examples are to be found in le Carré's *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold* or *The Looking Glass War*, where the spies are often portrayed as incompetent and morally indistinguishable from their communist counterparts.

Nowadays, spies and espionage come in a plethora of forms, from video-games such as the *Metal Gear* series or *No One Lives Forever*, in which players have the ability to control their spies and the missions they take on, to songs such as Ed Sheeran and Camilla Cabello's *South of the Border* whose video has been dubbed as a frivolous spy film which brings under the same roof all the features of the genre: a heist, a car chase, a fight, and a story that involves seduction and betrayal (Roth, 2019). One thing is certain: spies have acquired and will continue to acquire a special fascination as their activities continue to touch the everyday life of Americans.

3. WAR ON TERROR / DRUGS

When George W. Bush declared that the US was starting a War on Terror in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the nation had already been involved in a long-lasting war that started under President Nixon who, in 1971, declared drug abuse public enemy number one. While it is true that the two Wars have their share of differences regarding various social, economic and cultural aspects, we share Professor Oswaldo Zavala's point of view according to which they are both constructed on the same narrative pillars: a racialized enemy who comes forward from the margins of a subjugated foreign nation, allegedly setting up a transnational organization capable of pacifying the official institutions in that country, and penetrating the permeable US borders, which in turn validates the concurrent militarization of the US borders and the target country alike (Zavala, 2019). It is easy to see that for the last five decades these two issues have shaped the US national security policy and it is worthwhile exploring what popular culture has to tell us about them.

Let us turn our attention first to the War on Terror. Just from a quick glance at the outstanding number of books, TV-series, documentaries, movies, video-games, paintings and sculptures inspired by the 9/11 events, one cannot help but wonder how critical they were for the nation and for the imagination of its people. Famous TV-shows such as *24*, *The Unit*, or *Homeland*, bestsellers like Ken Kalfus' *A Disorder Peculiar to the Country*, Mitchell Zuckoff's *Fall and Rise: the Story of 9/11*, or Chris Adrian's *A Better Angel*, critically acclaimed movies like *Body of Lies*, *Zero Dark Thirty* and *Eye in the Sky*, songs such as Tori Amos' *I Can't See New York*, Beyoncé's *I Was Here* or Bruce Springsteen's *The Rising*, and videogames like the *Call of Duty* series are just a few of the cultural products inspired by the 2001 World Trade Center terrorist attack. As David Grondin points out, the stories told in these pop culture vehicles can elicit critiques of current American policies, while also inviting alternative narratives and accounts of what September 11, 2001, has represented for the American society (Grondin, 2014:1).

This is not to imply that writers and film makers were not interested in terrorism before the 9/11 attacks; on the contrary, there have been many books and movies dedicated to this issue and they were all correlated "with the waves and historical development of political violence" (Riegler, 2010:35). Thus, the 1970s put the

spotlight on hijackers and lone wolves with movies such as Hitchcock's *Saboteur*, Seaton's *Airport* or Frankenheimer's *Black Sunday*. With the US engagement in the Middle East in the 1980s and experiences such as the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings, the perspective underwent a change and the topic became ubiquitous among the public. Movies such as *Nighthawks*, *Invasion U.S.A.* and *Delta Force* now tackled religious fanaticism and communist infiltrators through a 'fight fire with fire' approach. Finally, the 1990s witnessed the arrival of action films which portrayed a lone hero who had to defeat single-handedly numerous terrorists who were depicted as ordinary criminals motivated by money rather than political ideology. Examples are abundant and include the famous John McClane from the *Die Hard* series and Casey Ryback in *Under Siege*.

The 9/11 attacks enabled American pop culture to reflect the changing face of terrorism and depict it more realistically. The attacks became a central topic or the historical backdrop for numerous works of art, which stand witness to the complexity of 9/11 as historical, political, and media event, and help to negotiate its cultural meaning (Bauder-Begerow, Schäfer, 2011). The cultural trauma experienced by the United States gave rise to an increasing number of portrayals of torturers that were seen as heroes. Practices such as waterboarding, walling or sleep deprivation, which until then were deemed reprehensible by a large majority of Americans, were now used by the US at black sites around the world, the most famous being Guantanamo. Thus, for a few years after 9/11, there was nothing the government would not do in the name of national security and the media was very fast to pick up on this and process it through its various channels.

Pop culture representations of the War on Drugs also underwent significant changes over the last four decades as the involvement of the US government grew stronger. The chief channel through which these representations were disseminated amongst the American people was Hollywood and the backdrop of the stories has almost always been Latin America. This is important because, as Thomas Riegler points out, cinema usually upholds the political and cultural status quo of the country from which it originates (Riegler, 2010:35).

After Nixon's declaration of war on drugs, one of the first movies that came out was *The Panic in Needle Park*. Starring Al Pacino, the movie follows the lives of a group of heroin addicts from New York City who often get in trouble with the law

because of their dependence; the movie obviously hints at the firm stance US society was beginning to take with regard to drug consumption. With Reagan sworn in as President and the signing of a national security directive that turned drug trafficking organizations into the new national security threat, the United States began a new chapter in the War on Drugs. As the public fear grew higher, Miami gained the status of the drug capital of the world where many drug lords from Latin America operated. It was against this backdrop that Brian De Palma released *Scarface* (1983), which narrates the rise and fall of Cuban migrant Tony Montana from a modest dishwasher to a powerful and violent kingpin. In its depiction of the Miami drug cartels, the film draws heavily on real members of the drug organizations, stressing the plight of the city's officials at the time. Virginia Vallejo's memoir, *Loving Pablo, Hating Escobar* (2007), which was adapted into a movie in 2017, also offers an interesting chronicle of the birth of Colombia's drug cartels during the same decade.

The beginning of the 1990s saw the United States government become more hostile, often employing unethical means in its attempt to win the War. This is probably the reason why the War started to lose support among Americans. The first years of the decade were marked by the climax of the famous Colombian drug cartels of Medellin, led by Pablo Escobar, and Cali, ran by the Rodriguez brothers. Movies such as *Clear and Present Danger* and TV-series such as *Narcos* and *Narcos: Mexico* present the reality of those days with the CIA and DEA being placed at the forefront of the fight against cartels. At the turn of the century, the US government started to realize that the War on Drugs could not be won and the focus should be on containing its effects rather than doing away with it. Movies such as the 2015 *Sicario* move away from the good vs. evil dichotomy of the War and present it as a lawless conflict. Thus, the movie concentrates on the American efforts to restore some order to the drug business and not to shut it down entirely. This time, it is the FBI's turn to step in and save the day.

More recently, the two Wars that this subchapter addresses have found common ground in what is known in literature as narco-terrorism. The concept was coined in 1983 by Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry and refers to acts of terror and violence committed by drug lords against the drug police of their own country in order to influence the policies of the government and to instill fear among the population (Thomas, 2009:1885). To some extent, narco-terrorism changes the geography of the war because

although it is traditionally a concept associated with South America, in contemporary policy, it has become increasingly linked to the regions of Central and Southeast Asia, more particularly with the drug-producing regions of the so-called Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle (Bjornehed, 2004:305). Nevertheless, with very few exceptions, the products of American popular culture do not necessarily focus on narco-terrorism per se, but rather see it as being part and parcel of the larger world of drugs.

Last, but not least, it is worthwhile pointing out the appearance, as far back as the 1930s, of a form of narco sub-culture at the US-Mexican border that comprises music and folklore. Known as narco-corridos, or drug ballads, they represent "a genre of Mexican folk/pop music that celebrates and chronicles the drug trade and the lives of high-level traffickers" (Campbell, 2005:326). The style of corridos has been compared to that of rap songs and their lyrics refer to particular events and include the names of real people and places. Among the most famous narco-corridos are Angel Gonzalez's *Contrabando y Traicion*, Tucanes de Tijuana's *El Mas Bravo de los Bravos*, Garardo Ortiz's *Los Duros de Colombia* and Oscar Ovidio's *El Corrido de Juan Ortiz*.

Although the War on Terror was officially declared over by the Obama administration in 2013 and the War on Drugs has been largely unsuccessful, their portrayal still captures the minds and imaginations of many Americans. It remains to be seen exactly how these complex issues will continue to be portrayed in American popular culture in the following years.

4. MASS SURVEILLANCE

We live in a century that is ruled by technology, a cinematic society obsessed with seeing so as to believe and this has facilitated the appearance of what many scholars have called a 'culture of surveillance'. Since Snowden's 2013 revelations about the NSA's global surveillance programmes such as PRISM and X-Keyscore, the Americans' cultural understanding of surveillance has expanded, the vocabulary associated with it demystified and they have come to understand how surveillance works through its representations in popular culture (Kammerer, 2012:99). But can anyone actually believe that they understand the complex operations and procedures surveillance involves just because they have read it in a classic novel or have seen a film about it? The answer is clearly no, yet the question does bring forward the

symbiosis between surveillance and US pop culture: while images of the former are abundant in films, songs, documentaries and novels, these, in turn, can influence the latter as the media has the power to shape people's attitudes, actions and behavior towards surveillance.

If we turn our attention to literature, George Orwell's *1984* is probably one of the most famous literary embodiments of the theme of surveillance. Indeed, many of the elements that characterize life in Oceania bear a striking resemblance with what is to be found in American contemporary society: the omnipresence of CCTVs in public spaces, at the workplace or in malls remind the readers of the telescreens and hidden microphones Winston Smith encounters every day. Similarly, privacy and human dignity are abridged, or eliminated altogether with reference to an ongoing war - on terror. John Twelve Hawks' 2005 novel, *The Traveller*, takes the idea of surveillance one step further and describes what will happen with it in a parallel future. Orwell's Big Brother is replaced by a secret organization called 'The Brethren' which believes that a society can thrive only through the control and stability offered by surveillance. However, there are people, such as the protagonist, Maya, who are willing to fight against this system and so the novel essentially depicts the epic struggle between tyranny and freedom. Other works that address the issue of mass surveillance are Dan Brown's *Digital Fortress*, Shane Harris' *The Watchers: The Rise of America's Surveillance State* and Dave Eager's *The Circle*.

Big Brother is very much present in movies, TV-series and documentaries as well. Here is what the opening narration of a popular TV-series, *Person of Interest*, tells its audience: 'You are being watched. The government has a secret system, a machine that spies on you every hour of everyday. I designed the machine to detect acts of terror but it sees everything (...) we work in secret. You'll never find us, but victim or perpetrator, if your number's up... we'll find you'. The message Americans get is that surveillance is the lesser evil that ensures the greater good. This seems to be the embodiment of Jeremy Bentham's idea of utilitarianism, a moral philosophy doctrine which argues that actions should be judged according to the levels of happiness and well-being their consequences generate. Thus, when it comes to surveillance, people should not adopt a categorical moral stance, in Immanuel Kant's understanding of the idea (right vs. wrong), but rather accept that it is necessary for the rights of some to be violated in order to ensure the safety of millions.

However, people are neither naturally inclined nor willing to give up their rights just because someone tells them they have to do so, even if that someone is the state itself. This is why, when Snowden came forward in 2013 and revealed the gross violations of Constitutional rights on the part of the government, the public's reaction was so divergent and polarized. Polls indicated that one-third of the American public believed Edward Snowden was a hero for leaking the information, another third thought of him as a traitor, and the rest could not make up their minds.

The 2014 Oscar-winning documentary *Citizenfour* tells the real story of how Snowden contacted journalists from *The Guardian* and *The Washington Post* and revealed thousands of classified NSA documents that opened the eyes of the world to the magnitude of the US surveillance programmes. Citizenfour is the code name Snowden used in his communication with the journalists and represents a direct hint at the 4th Amendment of the US Constitution which guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized" (*Bill of Rights*, 1791). His story also became the plot of Oliver Stone's 2016 movie, *Snowden*, which, un/surprisingly, failed to become a box-office success.

Also worth mentioning is the international success of the reality show *Big Brother* in which people are voluntarily placed in enclosed spaces to be under permanent observation. Participants are fully aware of the cameras and the aim of the show is entertainment rather than political commentary. However, the show received its fair share of criticism for its apparent support of surveillance as well as its use for the production of entertainment. To some extent, the show bears resemblance with a 1998 movie starring Jim Carrey, *The Truman Show*, in which an insurance agent learns that his whole life is in fact a reality TV show.

Lastly, American musicians have also attempted to make sense of the complexities of surveillance through their songs, the most representative genres being hip-hop and pop. This should not come as a surprise given that the FBI and the police have been spying on rap communities for decades. Lyrics such as 'Carry a telephone/Which can disclose/Name and location, /The address of your home' from Broken Water's

1984 warn Americans about the dangers of modern technology. Other singers, like New York rapper Heems in *Patriot Act*, are more direct and tackle the issues bluntly when they say that ‘Politics make victims for income/Parlor tricks, schism from system/(...)/That’s Patriot Act/That’s a privacy prison/That Pentagon/They vision is PRISM/Got what we ask for, someone to listen/Handcuffs smother our phone’. Glorifying Snowden’s revelations, the electro-pop music group Yacht launched a song called *Party at the NSA* which criticized the widespread domestic surveillance conducted by the NSA. The lyrics need no commentary: ‘Did you read my mail again?/How do you find the time? /I lost my signal yesterday,/ But it was never mine./We don’t need no privacy./What do you want that for?/Don’t you think it’ll spoil our fun/(...)P-P-P-Party at the NSA,/Twenty, twenty, twenty-four hours a day!/ There is a rainbow at the end of every P-R-I-S-M.’

As we have seen, modern US culture is inundated with the rhetoric of surveillance and the vehicles of pop culture reinforce the idea that mass surveillance is a must in today’s technology-driven society for the simple fact that it keeps people safe. Pop culture narratives, about what might happen if surveillance were not used by the state, offer protection and legitimacy to the act. Although the stories are fictitious, the advocates of surveillance consistently reach out to Americans’ imagination and hypothesize about the grim possible future of the country. Thus, it is of paramount importance that the government’s rationalization of security should always be balanced by the state’s moral and Constitutional obligation to respect the citizens’ rights.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The present paper has hopefully demonstrated that American popular culture provides valuable insight into the way in which three topics concerning national security are perceived - espionage, the War on Terror/Drugs and mass surveillance. Pop culture vehicles such as literature, cinema, television and songs have been at the forefront of American lives for the most part of the 20th and 21st centuries and it is precisely because of this that they have represented key elements in the promotion and representation of the United States approach to national security both at home and abroad. By exploring a small part of the outstanding variety of American cultural products regarding this topic, we are inclined to assume that Americans will continue to turn to

popular culture in order to explore and better understand the developments and intricacies of their national security environment. As a result of this interest, any changes to the US agenda on matters of national security will inevitably trigger their subsequent interpretation through the various channels of American popular culture. What the exact changes will be and how the mainstream media will illustrate them remains a mystery that will certainly be explored in future academic endeavors.

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THE SOCIAL MEDIA REVOLUTION THAT FAILED: LESSONS FROM THE ARAB SPRING

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Abstract: *In December 2010, when Tunisia set the tone for a wave of uprisings that shook the Middle East and overthrew two of its longest-standing and most entrenched rulers – Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Tunisia’s own president Ben Ali – many scholars, pundits, and media professionals hailed the events which would later be dubbed “the Arab Spring” as the unmistakable sign that the region, long considered a hotbed for authoritarianism and dictatorship, was inexorably moving towards democracy. And media, especially social media, but also Qatari TV channel Al Jazeera, were seen as the conduit through which western-style liberal democracy would spread throughout the region – to the extent that the events were widely regarded as a genuine “social media” revolution. Yet, less two years after the outbreak of the uprisings, it was gradually becoming clear that, by and large, the Arab Spring was failing to deliver the expected democratic outcomes, despite signs of progress in Tunisia and Egypt. So how and why did the social media revolution fail? How was it possible that, despite massive and exemplary social media mobilisation and television exposure, no meaningful and lasting change occurred in most of the countries affected, some of which (Syria or Yemen) descended into bloody civil wars? These are the main questions the present contribution aims at answering, starting from the premise that, in the case of the Arab Spring, the lesson to be learned is that, although social media may have been a necessary condition to achieve a certain level of mobilisation and spread the message, it was far from sufficient in bringing about democratic change or at least in sustaining the momentum needed for such change to come about and that, overall, in retrospect, it was credited with far too much potential and it certainly proved its limitations.*

Keywords: Arab Spring; social media; Al Jazeera; Middle East; democratisation

1. INTRODUCTION

The series of popular uprisings across the Middle East, known as the Arab Spring,¹ which started in Tunisia in December 2010 led to the ousting of four of the region’s most entrenched and long lasting dictators:² Tunisia’s Zine el Abadine Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh. The events were hailed, at the time, as the spark that would finally lead to the establishment of Western-style democratic regimes in a region that, until that point, had proven incredibly resilient to the export of democracy – or, to use

Leon Trotsky’s dictum, they represented a case in which revolution was impossible until it became inevitable (Haas, Lesch, 2013:2). The fact that all four leaders fell after massive, cascading social protests appeared to be a clear indicator that “the people”, i.e., *demos*, were finally exercising their power, i.e., *kratos*.

Traditional media (especially the Qatari-based television channel Al Jazeera) and social media (particularly Twitter and Facebook) played a crucial role in mobilising people, creating a sense of shared grievances across many different countries and social classes, and establishing a virtual space where people could communicate, organise themselves and voice their anti-government demands, to that point where the events were often referred to, by media professionals and political pundits alike, as a genuine “social media” revolution (Howard, Hussain, 2013:13; Bebawi, Bossio, 2014:1; O’Donnell, 2011). In the first half of 2011, the democratic momentum seemed unstoppable; yet, only two years after Egypt’s first free, democratic

¹ The name Arab Spring should not obscure the fact that these events were not isolated; rather, they were part of a culmination of decades-long struggles for human dignity in the region (Gelvin, 2013:241; Pollack, 2011:2).

² By the time of the Arab Spring, Ben Ali had ruled Tunisia for 20 years, Mubarak had been president for 30 years, Qaddafi had reigned supreme for 40 years, while Saleh had been president for 22 years when he was forced to resign in 2012 (Howard, Hussain, 2013:3).

elections which brought to power the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi, the region, far from becoming the budding democracy the world was anticipating, descended into the chaos, instability, and civil wars that had become the norm across the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) area for many decades. In other words, the “social media revolution” underlying the Arab Spring failed just as quickly as it had peaked, and the reasons behind this failure baffled political and media analysts for a considerable time. The uprisings proved to be far more successful in upending the status quo than in building better alternatives, while at the same time unleashing a wave of sectarian and political violence that has profound consequences to this day (Lynch, 2016:20-21).

The present chapter aims at examining the social media and Al Jazeera coverage of how the Arab Spring unfolded (section two) in order to answer the question of why these channels ultimately failed to contribute to the establishment of democratic regimes in the MENA region (section three), while the conclusions will highlight a few lessons to be learned from this – primarily the fact that digital media is, undoubtedly, a necessary, but insufficient cause of democratisation, especially in countries with little to no historical experience with democracy. The historical overview of the Arab Spring events in each country, although very useful in understanding the cause and effect mechanisms behind the protests and their aftermath, falls outside the scope of the present contribution and, at any rate, it is widely available in a variety of print and online sources.

Prior to the outbreak of the Tunisian uprising, the internet, mobile phone and social media had transformed politics across the MENA region, especially through the online mobilisation of young people, who used this outlet to express their discontent with the authoritarian regimes present in many of the region’s countries (Howard, Hussain, 2013:4). Civil society activists became well-known in the online environment, since this was largely independent of state control and many were pushed towards the internet precisely because of the inaccessibility of other forms of political communication through traditional media like radio or television, which were, for the most part, state-owned and heavily regulated.³ In the MENA

region, internet and social media users were young, educated, urban, and more politically active than the rest of the population (Howard, Hussain, 2013:10).⁴

Despite the evident diversity of the countries affected by the Arab Spring, three elements that explain the widespread use of social media for mobilisation were present in almost all of them: most of them had been very slow to democratise, they have rapid rates of technological diffusion, and local social elites used internet technologies to protest against the political regimes and manage information flows so as to avoid state censorship (Howard, Hussain, 2013:11). All across the region, once the uprisings started, protesters used digital media to publicise their opposition to political rule, thus accelerating the pace of events and helping build a constituency; in other words, social media served as kind of “information equaliser”, allowing people to tell compelling individual stories and to manage many organisational and logistic details necessary for an uprising to succeed, allowing the accomplishment of previously unattainable political goals; in turn, the regimes realised the potential of the online medium and used it widely in their counterinsurgency strategies, as I will show in section 3 (Howard, Hussain, 2013:18). The countries experiencing the most dramatic protests (Tunisia, Egypt) were among the most wired in the region, with large, young, tech-savvy civil society activists.

Digital media and the Al Jazeera coverage were instrumental in bringing the news of the Tunisian and Egyptian success to the attention of people in neighbouring countries and in helping galvanise popular protests in places like Libya, Bahrain, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen.⁵ While I do not subscribe to the view that the events of the

social media as a means of anti-government protest (Howard, Hussain, 2013:5).

⁴ The so-called “youth bulge” was larger in the countries affected by the most powerful and widespread protests in the region, i.e., Tunisia (42%), Libya (48%), Egypt (51%) and Syria (57%) (Haas, Lesch, 2013:3). Arab youth certainly had pressing grievances against their governments, including the systematic denial of basic rights, massive governmental corruption, extreme levels of unemployment, widespread poverty, and steady increases in the cost of living. There was also a general hopelessness that none of these conditions would improve without revolutionary political change.

⁵ For example, in Libya, the first assertion of the anti-Qaddafi opposition was formed online, on a website declaring the Interim Transitional National Council as an alternative government (Howard, Hussain, 2013:23).

³ Moreover, the affordability of internet access and the fact that content was hosted on servers outside the reach of state censorship also contributed the growing use of

Arab Spring were solely the result of the social media effect, I agree that its widespread use helped shape many of its outcomes: digital media were singularly powerful in getting out protest messages, in driving the coverage by mainstream broadcasters, in connecting frustrated citizens, and in helping them realize that they shared grievances and could act together to do something about their situation (Howard, Hussain, 2013:24). Moreover, they undermined the legitimacy of government forces by showcasing glaring examples of government oppression and violence through video materials shared on social media (Gupta, Brooks, 2013:8). In other words, social media did not cause the Arab Spring, but it certainly facilitated it.

Examining the unfolding of events in the first half of 2011, one can see five phases in the digital media coverage of the Arab Spring: the first is a *preparation* phase that involves activists using digital media in creative ways to find each other, build solidarity around shared grievances, and identify collective political goals. The *ignition* phase that follows involves some inciting incident, ignored by the mainstream state-controlled media, that circulates digitally and enrages the public. Next comes a phase of *street protests* that are coordinated digitally. A phase of *international buy-in*, during which digital media are used to draw in international governments, global diasporas, and especially overseas news agencies is next. This all culminates in a *climax* phase in which the state either cracks down and protesters are forced to go home (Bahrain, Iran), rulers concede and meet public demands (Egypt, Tunisia), or groups reach a protracted stalemate (Libya, Syria) and a final denouement of post-protest information in an ideological war between the winners and losers of any resulting social change (Howard, Hussain, 2013:26).

It is difficult to argue whether the Arab Spring would not have occurred in the absence of digital media – after all, popular uprisings all over the world had, in most cases, predated the emergence of the internet, yet one cannot deny that the unique narrative arc of the events, which caught many autocrats in the region by surprise, was fuelled, to a large extent, through a new kind of mobilisation made possible by the combination of social and traditional media coverage and the radically new way of communicating that digital media enabled.⁶

⁶ For example, social movements social movements and collective action networks shared strategies for direct political action, created regional and international news events that drew attention and

Social media became the scaffolding upon which the new civil society in the MENA region could grow and helped put a human face on political oppression (Howard, Hussain, 2013:34, 47, 124).

Traditional media across the world also integrated social media stories coming from the MENA region during the Arab Spring into their reporting, thus consolidating the rise of “citizen journalism”, marking a shift in the investigation and dissemination of news towards “alternative journalism” (Bebawi, Bossio, 2014:2-3, 16; Bebawi, 2014:123; Zayadi 2014:25; Atton, 2002:9).⁷

2. MASS AND SOCIAL MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ARAB SPRING EVENTS

2.1 Social media coverage and mobilisation.

As mentioned in the introductory section, the countries where the protests had the largest impact and involved the largest numbers of people (Tunisia and Egypt) were among the MENA countries with the largest and most active online spheres: in Egypt, for example, illegal political parties (the Muslim Brotherhood), radical fundamentalists, investigative journalists and discontent citizens met on social media and shared their grievances (Howard, Hussein, 2013:21; Etlig *et al.*, 2014:55; Jamali, 2015:43; Rutherford, 2013:40).⁸ In response, the government arrested bloggers, monitored online discussions, and shut down websites and internet access (Howard, Hussain, 2013:38).⁹ The Facebook campaign to

sympathy from neighbouring countries, and inspired others to join and celebrate their causes (Howard, Hussain, 2013:116). The Arab Spring is probably the most poignant example of protest as a “communicative action” (Bossio, 2014:11).

⁷ During the protests in Egypt, for example, there were many people involved in what we might call “journalistic practices”: eyewitness reportage of events, analysis of those events in the larger political context, and video, audio and social media updates of information. Some were paid as journalists for Egyptian media outlets, others considered themselves “unpaid” journalists, some were collaborating with mainstream news organisations and others defined what they were doing simply as important information dissemination in a time of crisis (Bebawi, Bossio, 2014:4).

⁸ For more details about Egypt’s blogosphere prior to 2011, see Radsch, 2014:77, 97.

⁹ Online protests, both in Tunisia and Egypt, allowed human rights abuses and government corruption to be more well-documented and broke the taboo against openly criticising political leaders (Howard, Hussain, 2013:40). In Egypt, the Kefaya Movement (translated as “Enough!”),

commemorate a murdered blogger, Khaled Said, started by a regional Google executive, Wael Ghonim, provided the catalyst necessary for Egypt's online protesters to coalesce (Rutherford, 2013:38).¹⁰ The first occupants of Tahrir Square were aware of the mobilisation and achievements of their Tunisian counterparts (brought to the streets by widely disseminated social media images of Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation in December 2010 (Doran, 2011:42-43) and formed a like-minded community: underemployed, educated, eager for change, but fed up with government corruption and repression. They found solidarity through digital media and used their mobile phones to call their social networks into the streets. Protests escalated quickly. Both government analysts and outsiders were surprised that such a large network of relatively liberal, middle class, peaceful citizens would mobilize against Mubarak so rapidly. The traditional Islamists, opposition parties, and union organisations were there, but liberal and civil society voices dominated the digital conversation about events and the public stages in squares around Cairo during the igniting phases (Howard, Hussain, 2013:21). Aware of the efficiency of this type of mobilisation, the Mubarak regime tried to disconnect the activists from the global internet infrastructure in the last week of January 2011, with relatively little impact on the protests. Soon afterwards, the Egyptian security services began using social media to obtain information in order to mount a counterinsurgency strategy and identify the protest leaders – a method used by regime authorities in other countries affected by the uprisings (Algeria, Bahrain, Syria, Libya, Oman).

It was not just the deaths of Bouazizi and Said that brought people to the streets of Tunis and Cairo, it was also the desire to share news about what was happening at a time when state-run broadcast media censored all information about the protests and help TV stations like Al Jazeera and

Western media to bring the events to the attention of the wider regional and world public. Most of the protests in most of the countries analysed here were organized in unexpected ways that made it difficult for states to respond. Demonstrators were relatively leaderless and not dominated by unions, existing political parties, clear political ideologies, or religious fervour. The street phase of social protest involved a strategic use of Facebook, Twitter, and other sites to identify the times and locations for civic action. Regimes sometimes adapted to this kind of planning and used the very same social media sites to track who would be mobilising where or to block particular pages and applications at chosen moments. For instance, Syria has blocked Facebook and Twitter on and off since 2007, but the government opened access in the midst of political protest, possibly as a way of tracking and entrapping activists (Howard, Hussain, 2013:28). More often than not, the state simply mismanaged information technologies in ways that allowed savvy activists to perform creative workarounds. Mubarak disabled Egypt's broadband infrastructure but left satellite and landline links alone, which did not seem to diminish the scale of the protests (Lynch, 2014:96). Gaddafi tried to disable his country's mobile phone networks (Markovitz 2014:9), but with multiple decentralised home-location registers, including a key node in the eastern city of Benghazi, rebels were able to reinstate the national registry showing which phone numbers linked to which phones.

By early January, the protestors' appeals for help and clumsily recorded mobile phone videos were streaming across North Africa, and protests in Algeria and other countries started to appear. By the time Ben Ali fled Tunisia on January 14, 2011, active campaigns for civil disobedience against authoritarian rule were growing in Jordan, Oman, and Yemen. In other countries such as Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, minor protests erupted on a range of issues and triggered quick concessions or had little impact. But even in these countries, opposition leaders appeared to draw inspiration from what they were tracking in Tunisia (Howard, Hussain, 2013:49). The wave of information on Al Jazeera helped raise the public's expectations about the success of the popular uprisings, as evidenced in the cascade of tweets about political change and the topical evolution of blog posts all over the region: a large number of people were following events live on Twitter as they unfolded, which made this social media platform a key tool in coordinating national and

the leading articulation of political protest, started online in 2004, being one of the first examples of widespread anti-Mubarak digital protests (Radsch, 2014:84).

¹⁰ Using this Facebook page, Ghonim and others organised popular demonstrations on January 25, 2011. The stated purpose of the protests was fourfold: ending poverty, placing a two-term limit on the presidency, firing the autocratic interior minister, and annulling Egypt's emergency law, which had been in place nearly continuously since 1967, and gave the government the right to imprison and interrogate Egyptians for up to six months without a warrant or attorney (Culbertson, 2016:828; Markovitz, 2014:25).

regional strategies, especially among the more educated and wealthier Twitter users in most of the MENA region, who were more likely to become opinion leaders (Howard, Hussain, 2013:49).¹¹

Many tweets involved personal stories of suffering at the hands of a tough and incompetent regime, something that could be called “affective news”, because most of the content included links to personal photos and narratives (Papacharissi, Oliveira, 2012). Some involved links to critical documentaries on YouTube or made reference to Facebook groups and news stories that did not paint the regime in a flattering light. With the earliest available records of Twitter feeds (January 2011), there are clear waves of political consciousness that connect key events, political sentiment, and protester turnout. Before the resignation of Ben Ali, more than 1,000 Tunisians were tweeting every day about political change in the country; as soon as he resigned, the interference of security forces with communication networks resulted in a steep decline in Twitter activity. What is surprising is, at least in the early days of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, a lack of mentions to traditional political parties and ideologies in the online sphere, where the names of Khaled Said and Bouazizi, or topics like liberty and human dignity, appeared far more often than those of opposition political leaders or references to Islamic precepts or Sharia. At the peak of events in Tunisia, there were 2,200 tweets about Ben Ali’s resignation from outside Tunisia (but within the region). In the subsequent months, the hashtags associated with conversations about political change in particular countries were often used by people in neighboring countries. In other words, people in countries throughout the region were drawn into an extended conversation about social uprising. As street protests arose in Tunisia and Egypt, then Yemen and Bahrain, and eventually Algeria and Morocco, people across the region tweeted in real time about big events (Howard, Hussain, 2014:54). This shows how the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian protesters’ political

¹¹ Throughout January 2011, there were in total 13,262 Tweets using the hashtag most prominently associated with Tunisia’s political uprising: #sidibouid. By scanning the structure of content and links of the Tunisian blogosphere, we can chart the progress of the idea of political reform. Many Tunisian bloggers wrote in French and Arabic. Moreover, distinct keywords and themes regarding economic grievances and democratisation arose preceding the popular uprising (Howard, Hussain, 2013:51).

demands influenced others across the region, and all over the world, to pick up the conversation about freedom and human dignity.¹² Thus, for instance, international pressure for Mubarak to resign started to mount after Twitter and Facebook helped raise awareness about the events in Egypt all over the Western world.

Between November 2010 and May 2011, the amount of content produced online by major Egyptian political actors increased significantly as they reacted to events on the street and adjusted strategy to compete for the affinities of newly freed Egyptian voters. Some observers have been sceptical of social media’s relevance to the evolution of political conversations in Egypt. But we find that in Egypt, Facebook and Western news media were central to online political discourse. Egypt’s major political actors often linked to social networking and news services. In fact, major Egyptian political websites were far more likely to link to Facebook or Western media sites like CNN than they were to each other (Howard, Hussain, 2013:56; Bossio, 2014:17, 25). YouTube was also a very important tool for spreading information about the Egyptian uprising around the world, after the first videos started going viral on January 25, 2011, and contributed to heightened moral outrage in the Middle East and around the world (Bossio, 2014:28; Lynch, 2016:125).

Even based on the few examples provided above, one can easily see that social media played a crucial role in the political uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. First, social media was pivotal in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring. Second, a spike in online revolutionary conversations often preceded major events on the

¹² #egypt became a space which supported a domestic and regional issue public tracking continuing developments in the country’s transition, at the time, towards free and democratic elections – an issue public whose interactions were predominantly in Arabic, with a smaller number of mainly English-language participants also participating and remaining linked loosely but notably to the Arabic mainstream of the community. #libya, by contrast, hosted a mainly English-speaking community which discussed events in that country’s continuing civil war from the outside and which contained few domestic or regional predominantly Arabic-speaking voices – or where it did, such voices remained marginal and disconnected from the English-language centre. If domestic and regional issue publics which were concerned with the situation in Libya at the time existed, they did so elsewhere – using hashtags other than #libya on Twitter, or indeed (and more likely) using channels of communication other than social media (Bruns, Highfield, 2014:53).

ground. Third, social media helped spread democratic ideas across international borders. But perhaps the most powerful evidence that digital media mattered in the Arab Spring comes from activists themselves. In both countries, Facebook users were of the opinion that Facebook had been used primarily to raise awareness within their countries about the ongoing civil movements, spread information to the world about the movements, and organize activists and actions. Surveys of participants in Tahrir Square demonstrations reveal that social media in general, and Facebook in particular, provided new sources of information the regime could not easily control and were crucial in shaping how citizens made individual decisions about participating in protests, the logistics of protest, and the likelihood of success. People learned about the protests primarily through inter-personal communication using Facebook, phone contact, or face-to-face conversation. Controlling for other factors, social media use greatly increased the odds that a respondent attended protests on the first day, and half of those surveyed produced and disseminated visuals from the demonstrations, mainly through Facebook (Howard, Hussain, 2013:65). The Tunisian blogosphere provided space for open political dialogue about regime corruption and the potential for political change. Twitter relayed stories of successful mobilisation within and between countries. Facebook functioned as a central node in networks of political discontent in Egypt. During the protests, YouTube and other video archiving centres allowed citizen journalists, using mobile phone cameras and consumer electronics, to broadcast stories that the mainstream media could not or did not want to cover (Lynch, 2014:101). The ease of sharing on the video platform and the gritty quality of the footage contributed to the idea that the images presented an authentic, unadulterated view of events (Iskandar, 2014:262). Social media alone did not cause political upheaval in North Africa. But information technologies, including mobile phones and the internet, altered the capacity of citizens and civil society actors to affect domestic politics (Howard, Hussain, 2013:66).¹³ In a sense, they became part of the essential toolkit used to protest for freedom and demand respect for human

rights which shifted from the online environment to the streets during the Arab Spring.

The Arab Spring events constituted both a “social media” revolution and a genuine revolution: what brought down Ben Ali, Mubarak, Saleh and Qaddafi was neither Facebook nor Twitter, but rather millions of people in the streets, standing up and ready to die for what they believed in (Friedman, 2011; Seib, 2014:182; Howard, Hussain, 2014:31). The catalyst sparked on social media would have most likely fizzled out and died in the online environment, had it not been accompanied by actual action in the streets and squares of the MENA region, so one should be careful about not assigning a more prominent role to social media beyond its very useful means of mobilisation and information, especially in the early days of protests. The revolutions were, ultimately, not about social media or technology, but about people acting to make changes on the ground (Culbertson, 2016:66).

Social media are the reason we have such good documentation of events: in the hands of activists, they became some of their most powerful weapons, also marking a shift in media power whereby mainstream journalists increasingly relied on social media in order to cover the events and access eyewitness accounts (Bebawi, 2014:136). More importantly, they are the reason that Egyptians had such excellent live coverage of what was going on in Tunisia, and also the reason that Moroccans, Jordanians, and Yemenis had coverage of what was going on in Egypt, just as Libyans and Syrians had coverage of what was going on in those countries, and so on (Bebawi, 2014:131; Culbertson, 2016:692; Ryan, 2014:112; Doran, 2011:40; Brooks, Gupta, 2013:5). In other words, it was social media that brought the narrative of successful social protest across multiple, previously closed, media regimes. When things did not go well, as in the case of Bahrain and Libya, activists in the continuing cascade took note and applied these lessons (Howard, Hussain, 2013:120). Arguably, there were three great effects of this new media environment: i) the free flow of information and the explosion of public discourse and open debate have shattered one of the core pillars of the authoritarian Arab systems that evolved over the 1970s and 1980s: their ability to control the flow of ideas and to enforce public conformity; ii) it has given today’s activists and ordinary citizens new skills, expectations, and abilities. They operate within a radically new information environment, expect different things from their states and societies, and are able to act

¹³ However, this observation should not be overgeneralised as, for instance, in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, countries with some of the highest levels of connectivity, there was hardly any offline mobilisation during the Arab Spring uprisings.

in new ways to demand them. Finally, it has unified the Arab political space, bringing together all regional issues into a common narrative of a shared fate and struggle. This new Arab public sphere is highly critical of most ruling regimes, extremely pan-Arabist in its orientation, and self-consciously celebratory of the power of a long-denied Arab street (Lynch, 2012:36-37).

All the crucial events of the Arab Spring were digitally mediated and the digital infrastructure represented by smartphones, computers, and social media is an integral part of the complex historical narrative of the events. The different outcomes of the protests across the region certainly do not diminish the impact of this digital scaffolding and prove that countries where this is consolidated are significantly more likely to experience successful democratic popular movements.¹⁴

2.2 Al Jazeera coverage. Together with social media, Qatar-based TV station Al Jazeera, established in 1996, was instrumental in covering the Arab Spring protests and in raising awareness about the events both throughout the Middle East and in the Western world.¹⁵ Al Jazeera is an interesting case study in how traditional news media helped create new linkages among civil society actors within and between countries. Unlike many Western news cultures that socialise journalists to maintain a healthy distance from the subjects of their coverage, news cultures in North Africa and the Middle East operate more nimbly and cooperate with citizen journalists (Howard, Hussain, 2014: 90). Al Jazeera has brought a great deal of change and openness to a region where traditional media served as the anodyne mouthpiece of autocratic governments. It challenges authoritarian Arab regimes as well as U.S. policy. Well before the Arab Spring protests, Al Jazeera was instrumental in opening up free debate in the Arab world, fomenting demand for more democratic accountability (Culbertson, 2016:663).

Especially Al Jazeera English (AJE), founded in 2006, has a far greater reach than its Arabic counterpart and plays a significant role as a regional public diplomacy player, shaping the news agenda of the Middle East: by early 2010, it reached more than 100 million households in 100 countries around the world, despite not being

available in major markets such as the US, and it established itself as a credible, objective source of information (Seib, 2014:183).¹⁶ AJE uses YouTube, Livestation and Twitter, as well as its own website (Al Jazeera is probably the most widely read single online news source in the Arab world), to reach viewers (Culbertson, 2016:663). Both AJE and its Arabic counterpart have a large audience among the Arab-speaking diaspora around the world, helping forge a sense of community between Arab viewers overseas and Arab culture.¹⁷ During the Arab Spring, AJE became a functionally independent, transnational news medium generating content even in countries where it was not welcome.

Al-Jazeera played a decisive role in covering the Arab Spring events throughout the region although in unequal measure, linking together disparate national struggles into a coherent narrative of popular Arab protests against both foreign intervention and domestic repression. Its talk shows became an open forum for regionwide discussion and debate about shared issues and concerns, while its news coverage crafted a coherent master frame, making sense of the cascade of events across the entire region. Al Jazeera became the televised face of the revolution both in the Arab world and in the West (Lynch, 2012:179, 216, 286).

Unlike state-run national networks, which censored information about the uprisings and tried to support the failing regimes of Ben Ali, Mubarak, Qaddafi (at least until it became clear the dictators were on the losing side of history), Al Jazeera broadcast live the large-scale popular demonstrations in Tahrir Square, thus contributing to the cascading effect that the Egyptian Arab Spring had across the region; at the height of protests, activists pleaded with Al Jazeera to continue broadcasting, arguing that the live news coverage was protecting the uprising and their own lives (Bosker, 2011; Youmans, 2014:56; Culbertson, 2016:670). As in Tunisia, Al Jazeera provided a focal point for audiences everywhere to share in revolutionary protest. Egyptians now watched themselves changing the world, and the

¹⁴ For data about social media usage in Arabic countries at the time of the Arab Spring, see Jamali, 2015:7-8.

¹⁵ During the Arab uprisings, Al Jazeera became the default go-to source on the matter for many other news organisations, including CNN, BBC, the *New York Times*, Reuters or the *Huffington Post*.

¹⁶ For example, in 2008-2009, AJE provided the only on-site reporting from an English-language channel during the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Unlike state-run media in the Arab world, AJE is dominated neither by geopolitical concerns nor by commercial interests (El-Nawawy, Powers, 2014:193).

¹⁷ AJE has four broadcasting centres (Qatar, UK, Malaysia, the US) and 21 supporting bureaus in Africa, Latin America and Asia.

messages and images that once reached a few thousand Facebook users now reached tens of millions of ordinary citizens (Lynch, 2012:286; Lynch, 2016:128; Patel, Bunce, Wolchick, 2014:67; Rutherford, 2013:41).

In contrast, in Libya and Bahrain, where the station's journalists were present in much smaller numbers, the protests were less successful and considerably more violent. In fact, the station was criticised for its very light coverage of the violent repression of Arab Spring protests in Bahrain, its next-door neighbour, as well as for the fact that it very rarely covers events inside Qatar (Culbertson, 2016:673; Lynch, 2012:67, 450; Lynch, 2014:103). As soon as the protests started in Tunisia, AJE sent in broadcast teams to provide rapid updates and a large amount of news for its live blogs. Unlike other services waiting patiently to verify and double-check information, AJE did both: posting information as it came in onto the live blogs, then doing extended articles and in-focus stories on information that was double-checked and verified. With this combination of rapid reporting and in-depth coverage, a diverse set of viewers' needs was addressed. First, online and offline activists were able to coordinate with a quick understanding of successes, failures, and dangers experienced by others like them in neighbouring countries. Second, the 150 million households in 100 countries could learn about a rapidly escalating and complex cascade through AJE's deep coverage (Howard, Hussain, 2014:100).

During its coverage of the Arab Spring, Al Jazeera had an exceptionally innovative new media team that converted its traditional news product for use on social media sites and made good use of the existing social networks of its online users (Youmans, 2014:63, 65). But a key aspect of its success was its use of digital media to collect information and images from countries where its journalists had been harassed or banned (Howard, Hussain, 2014:31). AJE used social media and user-generated content to supplement its correspondents' coverage. Its live blogs on the website were examples of quintessential networked journalism in action. This kind of online-gained content brought more diversity to the typical breaking news filler routinely populated by experts and other talking heads. Displaying Twitter and Facebook messages, as well as activists and others' videos, made the rolling coverage richer and brought in some diverse views (Youmans, 2014:74; Bebawi, 2014:131).

Although it claims to be apolitical, AJE – especially after Mohammad Morsi's 2013 election

as president of Egypt – found itself subject to increasing criticism for what was perceived to be its biased coverage in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood – something hardly surprising, after all, considering that the Qatari royal family, who sponsor the TV station, are known supporters of the Islamic organisation (Seib, 2014:185; Culbertson, 2016:664, 668; Lynch, 2012:405).¹⁸ The politics of Al Jazeera had actually been evident before, during its initial coverage of the Arab Spring protests: its coverage of Syria, for instance, had a pronounced political bias, clearly opposed to the Assad regime's attempts to retain power. The channel's reports from elsewhere in the region reflected the reality of the tense marriage between journalism and public diplomacy. The government of Qatar, and by extension Al Jazeera, proceeded cautiously as the old order was being upended in Tunisia and Egypt and threatened in Bahrain and elsewhere. The Arab Spring was not just a new political period; it was a new universe in which old rules evaporated and new alignments were cautiously created (Seib, 2014:185).

Throughout the Arab Spring, Al Jazeera was instrumental in constructing a news audience in two ways. First, it covered stories that the national news media in many countries would not, particularly at times when citizens wanted those stories. Second, as an independent organisation it remained active and "live" as a news agency when governments shut down domestic news agencies. Third, Al Jazeera actively cultivated content from citizens, providing fresh, local content that news consumers wanted (Howard, Hussain, 2014:91).

As an event, the Arab Spring had two primary consequences for the political economy of journalism in the Arab world. First, citizens demonstrated, using social media, that they could make news in creative ways using digital tools and their social networks. Second, Al Jazeera's position in the region as a credible, responsible, and responsive news organisation was solidified. News about the Arab Spring came from social media and cell-phone videos uploaded on Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, YouTube, and other

¹⁸ After the military coup that overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood government, Al Jazeera was the only major network giving significant air time to the leaders of the MB, while the new Egyptian regime sent three Al Jazeera journalists to prison on fabricated charges of supporting terrorism and spreading fake news (Culbertson, 2016:672; Lynch, 2016:320). There are voices that argue Al Jazeera is rather an instrument of Qatari foreign policy than an independent Arab media voice (Lynch, 2012:405).

sites, but they were effective because pan-Arab satellite networks such as AJE rebroadcast them with amplifying effects that mobilised and enraged regional and international publics (Howard, Hussain, 2014:102).

3. WHY DID THE SOCIAL MEDIA REVOLUTION FAIL?

As I have argued in the introduction to the present contribution, despite the significant role that social and mass media played in mobilising people, informing them and sharing their grievances, it is improper to label the events of the Arab Spring as a “Facebook revolution”, a “Twitter revolution”, or a “social media revolution”. All the conditions for the outbreak of a revolution existed in the Middle East even in the absence of internet access: oppression, corruption, poverty, unemployment, the rising cost of food, and the half-hearted efforts of a sclerotic regime to solve these problems. All these and more were underlying causes of the revolution and alone had been enough to spark revolutions in other countries at other times (Doran, 2011:39, 44; Bossio, 2014:23). It is often argued that nobody predicted the Arab Spring uprisings, and so their outbreak came as a complete surprise to the world; yet, the crumbling foundations of the Arab order were visible to all who cared to look. Political systems that had opened slightly in the mid-2000s were once again closing down, victim to regime manipulation and repression. Economies failed to produce jobs for an exploding population of young people. As the gap between rich and poor grew, so did corruption and escalating resentment of an out-of-touch and arrogant ruling class (Lynch 2012, 10).

While social media and the Al Jazeera coverage were able to create a clear momentum, especially by helping mobilise people in unprecedented mass protests leading to the overthrow of four dictatorial regimes, the aftermath of the events demonstrated that the social media momentum was not enough to start these countries (with the possible exception of Tunisia) onto the path of genuine democratic reforms: for example, the result of Egypt’s first free elections in its millennia-long history was quickly negated by the authoritarian tendencies of the newly-elected Morsi regime, and soon afterwards, by the forceful intervention of the army which deposed him – something that proves, once more, that free elections are not, by far, sufficient to transform an authoritarian regime into a functional democracy. Just like social media is, by itself, clearly insufficient in bringing about

authentic democratic reforms in the absence of historical tradition, political will and culture, and the institutions to support and implement them.

Moreover, the forceful responses of many of the regimes that the protesters were trying to overthrow also help explain the failure of the social media revolution. Therefore, despite the ample evidence illustrating the role of digital media in the Arab Spring, it would be a mistake to suggest the democratic potential of information technologies without considering the important roles that regimes play in managing or limiting their applications. Perhaps the best evidence that digital media were an important causal factor in the Arab Spring is that dictators treated them as such. The months during which the Arab Spring took place had the most national blackouts, network shutdowns, and tool blockages to date. But just as activists had a longer history of using digital media, authoritarian regimes had a history of responding to the political communication occurring over digital networks (Howard, Hussain, 2014:69). When unexpected political turmoil arose, they developed responses that ranged from jailing and beating bloggers to more sophisticated strategies, such as asking loyalists to identify protesters in photos posted on Facebook, creating domestic surveillance programs forcing citizens to monitor one another’s activities, and more. In these instances, regimes used activists’ spaces against them

The majority of Arab governments responded to the new information technologies in consistent ways: censorship strategies were developed with similar objectives of cultural control, internet service providers were held legally responsible for the content that flows over their networks, and government agencies worked aggressively to support (often “Islamic”) cultural content online (Howard, Hussain, 2014:12). In Tunisia, for example, following the publication of videos showing Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation, the regime initiated a heavy censorship of YouTube, Facebook and other online apps (Marcovitz, 2014:34).¹⁹ Before the advent of the Internet, Bouazizi’s story could not have reached so many households so quickly. Nor could it have had the same explosive impact. His story was able to rouse thousands of people to immediate action because it fit seamlessly into a pre-existing narrative (Doran, 2011:42; Lynch 2016:97). Despite the ban, within a few days SMS networks

¹⁹ There, the regime had a long history of monitoring and targeting individuals engaged in online political activism.

became the organising tool of choice, which helped keep the momentum of the protests going. Less than 20 percent of the overall population actively used social media websites, but almost everyone had access to a mobile phone. Outside the country, the hacker communities of Anonymous and Telecomix helped to cripple government operations with their “Operation Tunisia” denial-of-service attacks, and by building new software to help activists get around state firewalls (Howard, Hussain, 2014:19).

Mubarak’s regime followed the Tunisian example soon after the start of the protests in Tahrir Square, even kidnapping Ghonim once they realised the mobilising potential of his Facebook group. When the Libyan government blocked Facebook, activists took to Muslim dating websites and used the romantic language of courtship and dates to mask their planning for face-to-face meetings and protests. When state officials in Syria started spreading misinformation over Twitter, activists used Google Maps to self-monitor and verify trusted sources (Doran, 2011:43). In the past, authoritarian Arab regimes easily controlled broadcast media in times of political crisis by destroying newsprint supplies, seizing radio and television stations, and blocking phone calls. It is certainly more difficult to control digital media on a regular basis, but there have been occasions when these states have disabled a range of marginal to significant portions of their national information infrastructure (Howard, Hussain, 2014:71). Security services in Bahrain, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria observed how democracy advocates were using social media in Egypt and Tunisia, and they developed counterinsurgency strategies that allowed for surveilling, misleading, and entrapping protesters, despite jeopardising their own capacity to respond to the crisis. Additionally, limiting the internet access of the population inevitably raises the question, “what could have been on the internet to make the regime want to cut access to it?” The limitation imposed increases the eagerness of the public to learn about what is going on in society via the Internet, which leads to the development of political knowledge (Jamali, 2015:34).

Undeniably, information infrastructure *is* politics. And the political culture that we now see online during elections comes not just from political elites but also from citizens: using social media, documenting human rights abuses with their mobile phones, sharing spreadsheets to track state expenditures, and pooling information about official corruption. Perhaps the most lasting impact

of digital media use during crises is that people get accustomed to being able to consume *and* produce political content. One of the things authoritarian regimes did consistently during the Arab Spring was to block citizens from reading international news and activists from reaching international journalists (Howard, Hussain, 2014:87). The Arab Spring did not fail because Arabs were not ready for democracy or because Islamists cunningly exploited the naiveté of hopeful liberals. The Arab uprising failed primarily because the regimes they challenged killed it (Lynch, 2016:27).

An interesting point to consider here is whether the widespread use of social media during the Arab Spring led to any visible increase in critical thinking among the populations of the affected countries. Sadly, the answer is negative: the people used social media as a place to express their government criticism anonymously and as a means to mobilise and communicate (Jamali, 2015:38),²⁰ yet the people’s behaviour in the aftermath of the uprisings does not lead one to believe that there was any significant increase in the levels of media literacy – which could explain why the protests were, ultimately, short-lived and without any major tangible results. Ultimately, digital tools have the most profound effects in states where the public sphere and civil society already check the actions of an undemocratic regime.

4. CONCLUSIONS: WHAT LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE?

Few voices would argue today that the Arab Spring has failed: Tunisia’s ability to sustain a shaky consensus on democratic institutions can hardly compensate for the shattered remains of Egypt’s paradigmatic revolution, the violently collapsed states in Yemen, Libya, and Syria, or the brutally constituted autocracy across much of the

²⁰ In the countries of the Middle East, the wave of social media technology did not come about by incremental improvements, but arrived quite suddenly, so there was no time to develop a technological culture. The great potential of social media for people to express thoughts freely and yet remain hidden behind a changed identity has led to many people living under oppression enjoying only one of the benefits of a social media, while being unable to enjoy all of their applications (Jamali, 2015:78). Additionally, the potential of social media to effect meaningful change may have also been undermined by “slacktivism”, i.e., slacker activism. Armchair militants, the sceptics claim, “like” a political cause on Facebook and then congratulate themselves for having changed the world (Doran, 2011:40).

rest of the region. If democracy was the goal, then it has manifestly not been achieved. But while consolidated democracy would have certainly been the best outcome by far for the popular uprisings in the Arab world, there was always far more to the Arab uprisings (Lynch, 2016:498). The Arab uprisings of 2011 were only one episode in a generational challenge to a failed political order. Protesters won some battles in 2011, and regimes won them in the following years. Many of the conflicts, especially Syria's and Yemen's, have had no winners at all.

The Arab Spring also shattered several important myths that had previously held sway both in the region and outside it. The first of these was that the Arab populations were largely apathetic. The Arab Spring (arguably, along with the birth of the Green Movement in Iran in 2009) demonstrated, across the region, that the people of the Middle East were no longer willing to simply accept their misery. Rather, they were willing to take to the streets and risk their lives to demand change. Indeed, a critical corollary is that the Arab people themselves have had, in many cases, found that when they take action, they could change their own circumstances. The second myth that the Arab Spring shattered is that the Arabs did not understand or want democracy. This claim was always spurious, and there was tremendous evidence to the contrary long before the crowds gathered in Tahrir Square. But it persisted until the people took to the streets and proclaimed their demands for democracy, not just in name but also in practice and in all its particulars (Pollack, 2011:6-7).

Since 2000, technology proliferation has been particularly rapid in the Arab world. This has resulted in improved informational literacy, particularly in large cities. Digital media became a proximate cause of political revolution precisely *because* a significant community of users was already comfortable using digital media before the crisis began. For the residents of Tunis, Cairo, and other capitals, it is the ubiquitous presence of mobile phones that makes technology a proximate cause of revolution (Howard, Hussain, 2014:27; Hudson, Iskandar, 2014:1).

Arguing whether the revolutions would have happened without digital media is, of course, speculative; on the other hand, we also know that the MENA region, despite the relatively large number of democratic activists, has had very few successful protests to date – so one should by no means discount the mobilising and motivational power of social media and the Al Jazeera television coverage. Unlike previous waves of democratisation, however, the

Arab Spring had several unique features. For the amount of political change that has occurred, there has been limited loss of life. In Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, civil society leaders found that state security services were noticeably more reluctant to move in on protesters precisely because most of the protesters had mobile phone cameras. In Bahrain, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, security services did move on peaceful protests, but good documentation of police abuse made its way to the international community (Howard, Hussain, 2014:33).

Social media were instrumental in the outbreak of the protests, first in Tunisia, then in Egypt, and undoubtedly contributed to the cascading effect across the region, but they alone did not cause the political and social disruptions throughout the area. Later on, they served as a useful tool for the amplification of news events, as evidenced by the vast amount of attention to social media content about the uprisings visible outside the Middle East Region (Bossio, 2014:28).

Generally speaking, social media have several kinds of impact on local systems of political communication. First, social media provide new opportunities and new tools for social movements to respond to conditions in their countries. It is clear that the ability to produce and consume political content, independent of social elites, is important because the public sense of shared grievances and potential for change can develop rapidly. Second, social media foster transnational links between individuals and groups. This means that network ties form between international and local democratisation movements, and that compelling stories, told in short text messages or long-form video documentaries, circulate around the region. The inspiration of success in Tunisia was not just a fast-spreading contagion, for civil society leaders in neighbouring countries also learned effective strategies of successful movement organising through social media (Howard, Hussain, 2014:66; Zayani, 2014:24).

In North Africa and the Middle East, relatively new youth movements were themselves surprised by the speed, size, and success of protests they have organised over social networking websites. Over several years, prior to the Arab Spring, they had found their political voice online and held their meetings virtually. Each of the dictators in these countries had long had many political enemies, but they were a fragmented group of opponents. During the uprisings, these opponents did more than use broadcast media to highlight their claims. They used social media to identify goals, build

solidarity, and organise demonstrations. During the Arab Spring, individuals demonstrated their desire for freedom through social media, and social media became a critical part of the tools used to protest for freedom.

The new Arab public sphere, unified by Al Jazeera, Facebook, and Twitter ultimately bound together all the different national struggles into one coherent narrative of the Arab uprisings, for the first time in history: the common language, shared identity, focus and communication across countries helped forge a unique regional configuration. Unfortunately, this proved to be insufficient: despite the diffusion of protests and common grievances, the aftermath of the Arab Spring proved that meaningful political change in the MENA region cannot be brought about by social media mobilisation alone and televised protests. In other words, despite the fact that the revolution was tweeted (to paraphrase Gil Scott-Heron's famous 1970 poem, *The Revolution Will Not Be Televised*), it ultimately failed. It takes a certain level of democratic political culture at grassroots level, as well as the creation of strong institutions and mechanisms such as the rule of law, checks and balances and the separation of powers, to build the foundations of a genuine, stable democratic regime.

So far, sadly, these ingredients have been largely lacking in the Arab world. The Middle East today still presents many of the characteristics that led to the 2010-2011 uprisings, but now there is the added danger of radical, entrenched sectarianism. Therefore, I believe that the future Arab Spring, whenever it may arise, will be a far bloodier affair, if the present is any measure at all.

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EXPLOITING OPEN SOURCES IN THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION AND COUNTERACTING MEDIA MANIPULATION

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Abstract: *The diversity of sources and domains conducive to the collection of useful information in decision making has experienced exponential development with the evolution of the Internet. The focus of the public attention on the online environment in the detriment of the traditional media is mainly determined by the variety of ways of presenting information in the New Media and their ability to propagate them. The online environment has become a battlefield where information helps, inflates, manipulates, being a real challenge for the specialists who validate and exploit these open sources. In the almost endless volume of data, it is a challenge to select the most relevant and useful ones in the policy of national security.*

Keywords: *public information; national security; open source; fake news; New Media*

1. INTRODUCTION

In the last years the preponderance of the information society has become increasingly visible, growing exponentially, and the access of a certain public to information has been facilitated by the development of new communication technologies. The New Media concept has been rapidly embraced by both citizens and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) followers who are looking for data-generating information relevant to national security policies:

The increasing access and real-time access to information is now a fact and at the same time a consequence of what is known as the "OSINT revolution", transforming open sources of information into an extremely important capability for the work of intelligence and policy formulation in the field of national security (SRI, 2020a)

The transformation of data into information that constitutes real resources that underlie the social functionality represents a very interesting aspect. The difference in their usefulness is realized by the diverse way in which the members of the civil society or the specialists refer to it.

Studies reveal that reporting is made according to the degree of knowledge of the field from which the information is generated, but also by other subjective considerations, such as personal or group interests. The perception of the value and usefulness of the information will prove to be equally

subjective. The focus of the public attention on the online environment to the detriment of the traditional media is mainly determined by the variety of ways of presenting information in the New Media and their ability to propagate. The online world has become a battlefield where information helps, inflates, manipulates, representing a real challenge for the specialists who validate and exploit these open sources. In this endless volume of data, it is a real challenge to select the most relevant and useful ones in the national security policy.

Of course, there are two different ways of understanding the information (the people refer to information in another way than specialists). The comments on social media about how to manage, for example, the crisis generated by the emergence of so-called "biological weapons" - coronavirus, a weapon that was thought about 5 years ago in Chinese laboratories, are revealing. Communications of various types in continuous flow on the entire media and new media channels showed, to a large extent, the communicative behavior, in which almost no one took into account the limits of competence and understanding, and messages containing both real and false content, were amplified by the power of spreading of the online environment. The temptation to spread almost all types of content, videos, audio, images, but especially texts containing various methods of countering the "enemy", official and especially unofficial, has increased in a considerable way.

The result in this kind of situations is the direct entry, having no psychological training, into a field of confrontation with an unseen enemy, with largely unknown identification data, which, at least for now, wins “battle” after the battle, “conquering” territory after territory, all over the world. The amplification of misleading information as a result of the spread in the New Media leads to the obstruction of the mission of OSINT specialists. This is a conclusion after doing an analysis of open sources, as we will show below.

Even the representatives of the World Health Organization (WHO) have introduced a new term, saying that we are dealing with a true “Infodemia”. This term represents an abundance of information, both correct and false, which makes it difficult for people to access reliable sources and disorients them. In the Republic of Moldova, for example, in mid-March 2020, the Information and Security Service decided to block over 50 portals during the state of emergency that, in the shadow of anonymity, would have spread manipulative and false news about COVID-19, according to the *Europa liberă* post (Ceapai, 2020).

On the other hand, A. Bârgăoanu, told *Radio Romania Actualități* that,

misinformation is now at the system level, it comes across the information ecosystem, on classic TVs, even on radio, on classic social networks, but also on WhatsApp, as a source of information and conversation. (Bârgăoanu, 2020).

A. Bârgăoanu believes that there are even more dangerous forms of misinformation, such as those packaged in the form of conspiracy theories, in this sense that there is a global trend. Therefore, the communication specialist, A. Bârgăoanu states that we must collect the information from official sources, from the authorities, but for the population to trust the authorities, the communication must be transparent and systematic. She talks about a conspiracy theory that has geopolitical inflections of two types. A conspiracy according to which the virus was created in China and an opposite conspiracy, according to which the virus was created in America. Another conspiracy theory is that which denies the existence of the crisis and the size of the tragedy in Italy. All this leads to people's disorientation to superficiality in addressing national security measures recommended by WHO. Indeed, the World Health Organization was sounding an alarm:

All sections of our society - including businesses and employers - must play an active role if we are to stop the spread of this disease worldwide (WHO, 2020).

On the other hand, Chinese press is again in the spotlight, both in terms of dissemination of official information and analysis, and when it comes to manipulation, fake news or hiding information that if it were published in time the power of this biological enemy would have been limited. At the end of March 2020 Reporters sans frontieres writes that the planet would not have been a pandemic if the Chinese press had been free:

If the Chinese media were free, the coronavirus would not have become a pandemic, according to an analysis published by Reporters sans frontiers (RSF) (Fati, 2020)."

The analysis was based on a research from Southampton University, which revealed the fact that the number of cases of disease with the new virus in China could have been reduced by 86% if measures to combat the epidemic had been taken two weeks earlier than January 20th. The RSF analysis timeline showed on October 18, 2019 that the Chinese press should have talked about the frightening results of a coronavirus pandemic simulation by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, in partnership with the World Economic Forum and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which would have resulted in 65 million deaths in a year and a half.

If the Chinese Internet was not isolated from a system developed by electronic censorship and journalists were not compelled to follow the instructions of the Communist Party, the public and the authorities would undoubtedly have been interested in this information coming from the US and echoing the SARS epidemic, severe acute respiratory syndrome, which caused over 800 deaths and affected 8,000 people, especially in China, in 2003 (RSF, 2020).

Only on the 11th of January 2020, after registering the first death, important information was free to go being helped by researchers, with the imminent risk of closing the laboratory. This is because after January 3, eight doctors were detained by the police for spreading “false rumors”, following a call through the rapid alert system of December 30 that could have been taken over by the media. Forcing the censorship of keywords related to the epidemic of the WeChat social network, used by over 1 billion people in China, on the one hand prevented the press from distributing informative journalistic materials and prophylactic measures, and on the other, the population to have access to this vital information, the RSF study shows.

If the Chinese authorities had played the book of transparency, they would have immediately communicated the sequencing of the coronavirus genome to the scientific press, allowing the international community to gain valuable time in its research to develop a proper vaccine (RSF, 2020)

2. MODELING THE MEANING OF INFORMATION

As we can observe, the control of information and the modeling of their meanings represent a real challenge in the context of the development, in today's society, of the new types of media, the results obtained being a real strategic resource. And this is after the old threats, such as organized crime or espionage, add new ones, related to population health or cyber, but not only.

These are becoming more difficult to manage due to their diffuse and disorganized typology, but with multiple interdependencies.

The holders of interests in the area of communicating information on a large scale sometimes operate on beliefs and behaviors not only at the level of individuals or at the level of market segments, but even at the scale of social macrostructures, creating the possibility of very vulnerabilities to national security. Thus, maintaining the normality between the right and the need to access public information, on the one hand, and the obligation to secrete certain types of information in order not to undermine national security, represents an increasingly complex activity for all social vectors involved in the processes of obtaining and disseminating information (Ghișa & Frunzetti, 2018)

Some administrations resort to security strategies in which specialized services work with government or civilian institutions, while also empowering citizens to get involved individually. Thus, gradually, it has been found that more benefits bring cooperation and open sources along with those of trust, than maintaining the cult of secrecy. The new technology, the development of the media and propaganda have facilitated the loss by the state of the exclusivity of the possession of the information power resources and the generous transfer to the so-called non-state that can use them to the detriment of the security interests, even at the global level. These evolutions, which amplify the uncertainties, also determined the transformation of the intelligence process, conditioning the information structures to resort to changes in tactical management.

Irs now, the online environment has been a real battleground in which information helps, inflates, manipulates, being a real challenge for the

specialists who validate and exploit these open sources, called, in specialized language, Open Source Intelligence. In the almost endless volume of data, it is a real challenge to select the relevant and useful ones in the national security policy.

Abundance of expression tools, from online pages belonging to traditional media (TVs, radios, newspapers), to blogs, websites, social media accounts or forums, the more and more diverse content provided by their members, sometimes in other languages, than those of the host country, there are real challenges for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) users:

As a complex, specialized and distinct process, Open Source Intelligence integrates the human experience with the data obtained from open sources, in order to produce information and informative documents relevant to national security decisions or policies, these open sources gaining increasing significance in managing security risks (SRI, 2020a).

The complexity of the information environment and the speed of information transmission, whether true, false or biased, is, in fact, open-ended, allowing anyone access to data that was previously only available in circles of influence and power. Thus, Open Source Intelligence specialists need to adapt to the increasingly dynamic online environment in order to go through the stages of the OSINT process, which involves collecting, processing, analyzing, disseminating and feedback:

Easy access to information hides another reality: being informed is not enough. The information needs to be validated and processed to become an intelligence product. This process requires technique, means and time, that is the price that must be paid in order to become an informed, intelligence holder (SRI, 2020b).

This is why the training and training of OSINT specialists must be continuous and adapted to the new challenges, in order to make resources more efficient. Continuous and constant training also appears as a necessity for the dynamics of technological transformations that take into account the easier exploitation of the data volume:

Emergence of the new paradigms of intelligence activity, focused on the need to impose the collaborative working model, specifically OSINT, respectively on the principle of adaptability in intelligence work and increasing the capacity of reaction, in real time, in the case of events with potential impact on the state of national security, at the same time, are important steps in the evolution of

information services. There are also significant challenges from the point of view of the training of the personnel (SRI, 2020a).

3. THE MAN AT THE CENTER OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

The analysis of open sources places the man at the center of the intelligence process, whose training and analytical capacity depends on the result obtained, the discovery of the relevant content in the huge and diverse volume of information provided by the new media, but not only.

The management of OSINT, especially those related to the effects of the coronavirus pandemic, has proven to be extremely important both for the authorities of the affected states and for the representatives of the economic environment. From the great magnates of the world to the representatives of smaller companies, all of them have shown their interest in co-opting specialists to collect and control information and have the ability to model their meanings. In the context of the danger of widespread contamination with the new type of virus, for example, an Indian company manager (GDP CHURN (P) Ltd. Loves coding), Manish Srivastava, even launched a call to join an Open-source project for virus outbreaks, supporting open sources of information through funding, showing that this virus was both lethal to people, but also to the economy of the world.

I plan to bring some good developers, universities, research institutes on board, to develop an OSINT (Open Source Intelligent System) for human race health issues. Regardless of your expertise, I think you can contribute. We can develop an OSINT system that can help medical scientists around the world, doctors, governments or even just one person to understand how old and new diseases have spread in different geographical areas, which is the infection rate at different points on the map (Srivastava, 2020).

On the other hand, Fox Business explains that when confronted with coronavirus it is vitally important to have all the official information, but also those that in proportion of almost 90% are known as 'open-source intelligence' (OSINT).

4. CONCLUSIONS

The importance of the specialists in "deciphering" information from open sources and not only concerns the national security. On March 26, 2020, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Romanian Intelligence Service's existence, the

President of the country, Klaus Iohannis, reaffirmed the role of this institution in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, recalling that the classic security challenges and threats new features are added to the state, often unpredictable:

In this context, the more valuable your contribution becomes, the excellent analysis and anticipation capacity of the institution being of real use to the decision-makers involved in a difficult fight to stop the spread of infections with the new coronavirus.

Consistent measures are expected from national security specialists in response to situations of potential risk to security, giving them responsibilities in the most sensitive areas, including cyber-intelligence, cross-border threats, economic security, defense of constitutional rights and values, and protection of the classified information, the head of state said. It has been found that the exploitation of open sources should not be limited to electronic sources alone. Specialists in information management from open sources must build the informational puzzle with the "pieces" collected from social pages, blogs, print and online articles, radio and TV news journals, news agencies, statistics and analysis, reports and balances of companies or institutions in various fields, public reports as a result of CSAT meetings, of government, prefectural meetings, public administrations, special commissions for emergency situations.

The characteristics of this large network, the Internet, designed to facilitate the exchange of data and information in various fields, are on the one hand related to the creation of facilities for users, from the possibility of maintaining relative anonymity to the viral transmission of information, and on the other hand is related to a number of difficulties in the process of identifying and validating sources. However, with the development of the possibilities of interrelation, however, the complexity of the competences regarding the search and processing of information increases significantly, the classical sources with which it operates, now passing mainly in the virtual space, without borders, practically. Thus, the problem of validating both the information and the source appears. Spreading information across multiple platforms and networks at the same time, sometimes without mentioning the author, raises several issues to resolve, such as finding out the initial source and filtering content to eliminate repetitive information. Thus redundancy appears, as prof. A. Lesenciuc showed:

Redundancy, understood as an information surplus in telecommunications, an unnecessary abundance of

expressions in communication, is usually negatively connected not only in the sciences fueled by information theory. Exception is only the case of increasing the stability of the communication channel against the external disruptive actions, in which case the redundancy plays the important role of recovering the altered information, the errors can be corrected and no re-transmission is necessary (Lesenciuc *et al.*, 2011).

It has been found that, in fact, although an increasing amount of information is generated with the development of New Media, the level of relevant information remains almost constant, the form in which they are presented differs depending on the interest of the issuer and the target audience. However, although the amount of relevant information remains almost constant, given the very large volume of information in general, the effort to identify and select those that matter in the national security equation is increasing. Even in these conditions, the unclassified character, the possibilities of cooperation of the workers and the complexity of the resulting products, make OSINT an effective working field in intelligence, for the collection of necessary data in decision-making, relevant and useful in the national security policy

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New Technology,
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A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON EUROPEAN CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIES

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Abstract: *Technology is evolving fast and the associated cyber threats, even more. Their diversity and the attackers' skills set up real challenges in identifying best preventive measures against cyber-attacks. If taken into consideration the classification that defines five main categories of cyber-attacks – cybercrime, cyber war, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage and hacktivism, at least three of them represent a direct threat to national security. This is one of the reasons for which every country needs legislation in addressing these threats. European Union Member States have issued at least, one national cybersecurity strategy. Given the cyberspace evolution, some of these documents already reached third edition. The article represents a comparative analysis on the cybersecurity strategies of EU members. Even if they benefit from the same guidelines, the documents are different, from one state to another, based on preliminary analysis of each national cyber context. This generates diverse approaches related to priorities, scopes, objectives, and also sets of measures and fields of action. The aim of the article is identifying different approaches of the cybersecurity field and how Member States countries complied to EU regulations. One of the key elements of the strategies constitutes ways to integrate cybersecurity in education system, as a measure meant to raise awareness among internet users and also to increase the cybersecurity culture level of the society.*

Keywords: *community; intercultural context; communication*

1. INTRODUCTION

Established as an economic-political organization, European Union started to show interest in cybersecurity in early 2000s. Since then, European Union have issued a lot of regulations, mandatory or not, for its Member States on different aspects of prevention, regarding personal data protection, critical infrastructure protection, safe online transactions, or a common approach on cybersecurity of 5G networks.

The first integrated EU strategy on cybersecurity dates back on 2013 – EU Cybersecurity Strategy: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace that establishes the core values and the main priorities of the Union in this field. In this document, EU reveals the need for legislation in the field, stressing that “there are still gaps across the EU, notably in terms of national capabilities, coordination in cases of incidents spanning across borders, and in terms of private sector involvement and preparedness” (EU Cybersecurity Strategy, 2013). On 2016, European Parliament and European Commission issued the NIS Directive that sets up some measures to be taken in order to achieve

a high common level of security of network and information systems within the Union so as to improve the functioning of the internal market (Directive (EU)2016/1148).

The most recent such document, issued on 2019, is the EU Cybersecurity Act that lays down new objectives and responsibilities for ENISA – EU Agency for Cybersecurity, and also “a framework for establishment of European cybersecurity certification schemes for the purpose of ensuring an adequate level of cybersecurity for ICT products, services and processes in the Union” with “the purpose of avoiding the fragmentation of the internal market” (The Cybersecurity Act, 2019) on the matter of cybersecurity certification.

Thus, there are to analyze three strategic documents on cybersecurity, although different both by type and by object: one resolution containing general provisions and guidelines, one directive focused exclusively on a single component of cybersecurity - network and information systems protection, and a regulation on another two directions: strengthening an important institution in European cybersecurity, on one hand, and establishing a new set of prevention measures, on the other.

As for the Member States, the first national cybersecurity strategies were issued by Germany and Sweden, in 2005. Following the 2007 Estonia's cyberattack, on 2008, Finland and Slovakia issued their first cybersecurity strategies, along with Estonia. The next strategies, issued on 2011, belong to Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Great Britain (at the time, Great Britain was an EU member state). Also, on 2011, Germany revised its 2005 cybersecurity strategy, focusing on critical infrastructures protection (ENISA Study).

At present, every EU Member State has a cybersecurity strategy in force. Some of them are at their third edition, such as those of Germany, Greece, Estonia or Luxembourg.

2. RELEVANT EU PROVISIONS ON CYBERSECURITY

2.1 Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, 2013. The document presents a set of principles for EU cybersecurity policy both within its borders and internationally. These principles refer to: extending the EU core values to cyberspace; protecting fundamental rights, freedom of expression, personal data and privacy; ensuring access to the internet for all; democratic and efficient governance, so that the internet resources, protocols and standards are well managed; and a shared responsibility to ensure security.

The EU Cybersecurity Strategy also sets up five strategic priorities, along with a set of specific actions, addressing different types of actors, including Member States that gets some responsibilities, mainly on raising awareness: "organize a yearly cybersecurity month" and

step up national efforts on NIS education and training, by introducing training NIS in schools (...), training on NIS and secure software development and personal data protection for students and NIS basic training for staff working in public administration.

Another strategic priority that need attention from Member States is "Developing cyberdefence policy and capabilities related to the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)", with some key actions such as: "assess operational EU cyberdefence requirements and promote the development of EU cyberdefence capabilities and technologies", "develop the EU cyberdefence policy framework", "promote dialogue and coordination between civilian and

military actors in the EU" and "ensure dialogue with international partners".

Also, under the priority of "Fostering R&D investments and innovation", Member States should: "develop good practices to use the purchasing power of public administration" and "promote early involvement of industry and academia in developing and coordinating solutions".

The document does not offer a definition for cybersecurity, however it mentions that it "commonly refers to the safeguards and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure", with the purpose of preserving "the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of the information contained therein".

The Strategy was adopted by a resolution of the European Parliament, so the provisions of such document are, in fact, recommendations. For example, at the time, only 13 Member States had adopted national cybersecurity strategies, so that the Parliament "reiterates its call" on the matter. Also, the Member States are called

to take all the action needed to come forward with training programs aimed at promoting and improving awareness, skills and education among European citizens,

or "to set in place adequate framework" for cooperation between private and public sector, or "to establish a network of well-functioning Computer Emergency and Response Teams (CERTs)", or "to take the necessary measures to establish a single market for cybersecurity" etc.

2.2 Directive (EU)2016/1148 concerning Measures for High Common Level of Security of Network and Information Systems across the Union. With a completely different approach, more focused on Member States responsibilities, the NIS Directive establishes a set of measures to be taken with the purpose of securing information networks and systems within the Union.

In fulfilling this scope, Member States have the obligation to adopt national strategies on the security of network and information systems, they should cooperate and exchange information and establish national competent authorities with responsibilities in the security of network and information systems, as well as at least one CSIRT - Computer Security Incident Response Team.

For supporting states to adopt their national NIS security strategies, the Directive offers a set of items that should be addressed, such as: objectives and priorities; a governance framework to achieve the objectives and priorities, roles and responsibilities of the government bodies and other relevant actors; preparedness, response and recovery oriented measures, including cooperation between the public and private sectors; education, awareness raising and training programs; research and development plans; a risk assessment plan; and a list of the relevant actors involved in the implementation of the strategy.

Every Member State has to identify the national operators of essential services, for each sector and subdivisions, and the Directive offers a set of criteria in this way.

The Directive offers a set of definitions to specific terms, without referring to cybersecurity. Instead, there is “security of network and information systems” term that is defined as “the ability of network and information systems to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored or transmitted or processed data or the related services offered by, or accessible via, those network and information systems”.

Unlike the previous EU Cybersecurity Strategy, the NIS Directive has mandatory provisions for Member States, so that, they should have been implemented by 10th of May 2018.

2.3 Regulation (EU)2019/881 on ENISA and on Information and Communication Technology Cybersecurity Certification. Having essentially the same scope as the other two documents mentioned above, “achieve a high level of cybersecurity, cyber resilience and trust within the Union”, and being mandatory to the Member States, The Cybersecurity Act is structured on two main components: strengthening ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) on one hand, and providing support for Member States in addressing cyberthreats, by establishing unitary European cybersecurity certification schemes for ICT products, services and processes, on the other.

According to this document, ENISA is a permanent, independent, scientific and technical center of expertise on cybersecurity that assists the EU institutions and the Member States in developing and implementing the Union policies related to cybersecurity and that promotes the use of European cybersecurity certification.

European cybersecurity certification is a new policy of European Union that consists in “a comprehensive set of rules, technical requirements, standards and procedures that are established at Union level and that apply to the certification or conformity assessment of specific ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes falling the scope of the specific scheme”.

The Regulation also provides, among other terms, a definition for cybersecurity: “the activities necessary to protect network and information systems, the users of such systems and other persons affected by cyber threats”.

3. THE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY STRATEGIES OF EU MEMBER STATES

Generally, the EU law on cybersecurity recommends and sets up a series of tasks and activities for Member States that can be collected in few major objectives: (1) National cooperation; (2) International cooperation; (3) Awareness, education, research and development; (4) Critical infrastructures protection and the resilience of the network and information systems

3.1 National Cooperation in European Cybersecurity Strategies. Most of the documents approach national cooperation as cooperation between public and private sector in cybersecurity.

Malta describes cooperation both at internal and international level “on a European and on a global basis, enabled by EU and international institutions and activities, based on the understanding that cybersecurity has no bounds”.

Another example in this way is Romania’s Strategy that explains cooperation equally internal and international by “all public or private entities collaborate at internal and international level, in order to ensure an adequate response to cyber threats”.

Some strategies, like the Italian one, defines internal cooperation as public-private partnership, having a central role in cybersecurity, and the partners have to: “communicate to the Cybersecurity Unit every significant security and integrity violation of their computer systems”, “adopt the best practices and measures necessary to pursue cybersecurity”, “share information with agencies for intelligence and security and allow access to databases that are relevant to cybersecurity” and “collaborate to the management of a cyber crisis by restoring the functionality of the networks and systems they operate”.

There is a specific concept for internal cooperation, used only in some of the oldest (strategies of Belgium, 2012 and Finland, 2013) and the most recent strategies (strategies of Netherlands, 2018 and Portugal, 2019) - *situational awareness*, defined in Netherlands' Strategy as "a cooperation platform with the goal to offer more information and a swifter perspective for action with relevant organizations within the legal frameworks". Portugal set this platform at CERT-PT level.

3.2 International Cooperation. It is an important concept, especially related to the borderless, global nature of the cyber threats. Most European Cybersecurity Strategies approach international cooperation in terms of projects and exercises, within international organizations, like EU and NATO, or UN and the OSCE.

Ireland refers to cyber international cooperation as a mean to economic development:

continue to engage with international partners and international organizations to ensure that cyber space remains open, secure, unitary and free and able to facilitate economic and social development (National Cyber Security Strategy, 2019).

Another approach on the matter belongs to Finland, that underlines "international operational cooperation and the exchange of information will be continued and intensified with EU and with other countries' corresponding law enforcement officials, such as Europol".

One of the specific objectives in Poland's Strategy is "Building strong international position of Poland in the area of cybersecurity", on two coordinates: at strategic and political level, within the EU and other international organizations, and at the operational and technical level, by CSIRT network.

3.3 Awareness, Education, Research and Development. Different concepts by meaning, they are combined in various ways: awareness and education for all internet users, education in schools from primary grades to specialized university level, education and training for employees in both in cybersecurity and IT fields, both in public and private sector. That's why there are a few strategies that relate education with research and development.

Hungary describes the importance of awareness at political and professional decision making and links education, as a continuous process, to research and development.

Czech Republic defines education by public administration, police and the judiciary staff training on one hand, and by adapting the curricula in schools with the purpose of providing experts in cybersecurity and IT.

Another strategy that underlines the importance of training in public administration is the one of Poland, but as a responsibility of NGOs. Poland also describes the role of cyber education in early stages, and as a continuous process for professional development.

There are countries, like Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Denmark or Spain, that specify cyber education as a mean to rising awareness.

Results of national context analysis can be identified in specific elements in this section. Denmark describes the role of education "for children to navigate in a safe, responsible and ethical manner in using ICT technology and social media" and Sweden relates awareness to "counteracting the effects of disinformation and influence campaigns".

An awareness related concept is the responsibility of all users. It is underlined in Malta's strategy "to ensure a secure and safe cyberspace for all", by applying "at least some form of basic cyber hygiene in using ICT". Lithuania also defines awareness by "society's culture of self-protection and responsible behavior in cyberspace".

A similar approach belongs to Netherlands: "it is important that citizens and businesses also continue to develop their knowledge to protect themselves against digital threats".

Less used in strategies, cybersecurity culture is another concept strongly related to education and awareness. Lithuania defines cybersecurity culture by education, but most of the documents describe it as being achieved by awareness, as the ones of Austria, Romania, Czech Republic and Slovenia. There are others, like Italy and Sweden, that describes this report the other way around – achieving awareness by cybersecurity culture.

Maybe the most comprehensive sense for cybersecurity culture is given by Spain, which defines the term as evolving "from awareness to commitment, in the understanding that citizens have joint responsibility for national cybersecurity".

The third edition of Estonia' strategy contains some evaluation elements such as: "cybersecurity culture helped preventing incidents with extensive consequences", but society's level of awareness is "still insufficient".

Even though state uses these concepts in various ways – objectives, goals, lines of action, measures or even vulnerabilities, Germany does not use any of these terms.

3.4 Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Resilience of the Network and Information Systems. They are another key element in cybersecurity strategies. Although different concepts and systems, the two types of infrastructures are to be analyzed together, because they are strongly related.

On one hand, there is critical infrastructure, regulated by international law, having two major components: international critical infrastructure and national critical infrastructure, that are strongly connected – the international one consists in the national infrastructures network.

A critical infrastructure is defined, as Finland Strategy shows, as “the structures and functions which are indispensable for the vital functions of society”. They are the essential services described by European regulations. Such infrastructures are: transport, energy, financial services, health, water or commerce.

On the other hand, there is the communications and information technology, known as critical information infrastructure. A definition for this concept is to be found also in Finland Cybersecurity Strategy (2013):

the structures and functions behind the information systems of the vital functions of society which electronically transmit, transfer, receive, store or otherwise process information.

Its importance come from the role it has in all the other infrastructures functioning and that’s why one of the key objectives of every cybersecurity strategy is to ensure the resilience of such networks.

In simple words, the resilience term defines a network recovering capacity, after a damaging incident. That’s why Austria underlines that it is “a top priority to improve the resilience of the information systems against threats” and, for most of the countries, it’s a shared responsibility of governments, designated public institutions and structures and also the essential services stakeholders.

4.CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Every EU Member State has adopted a cybersecurity strategy. Today, there are in force 27 such documents issued between 2012 and 2019. It

is clear that some of them need to be revised, firstly because the cybersecurity environment has changed and secondly, from the perspective of EU membership, every state has to comply to the obligations stated in European regulations.

The EU vision of unitary regulations is accomplished by the fact that every country respected the Union guidelines. Nonetheless, the states’ own national cyber context analysis makes great difference. It is only natural that national strategy focuses on national priorities, report to national principles and deal with national risks, as they resulted from analysis. There is a problem concerning different interpretations given to specific concepts and terms and the way they report to each other.

Also, the states’ analysis of the cyber environment caused different general approaches. Therefore, some states *dream big* by assuming the role of important international cybersecurity players; some *play low*, by establishing basic objectives; most of them *play safe*, by including all necessary theories, and there are some that remain *cautious*. In the last group we can include Estonia which is a 90% digitalized country. On 2007, Estonia experienced an important cyber-attack targeting the information systems, affecting every citizen, for 22 days. It was the most important cyber-attack on an EU and NATO member state.

The first measure taken by Estonia, was adopting both a cybersecurity strategy and a cybersecurity law.

Today’s Estonian Cybersecurity Strategy in force is at its third edition. Some of the third edition strategies are more comprehensive, containing even an analysis on previous edition – achieved objectives and implemented measures and plans of action.

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BARRIERS TO SOCIAL MEDIA ADOPTION IN ROMANIAN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

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Abstract: According to the latest Eurostat statistics, Romania ranks the 28th (last position) amongst all EU countries, in terms of using social media: only 9% of the Romanian enterprises are using two or more of the following channels: social networks, enterprise's blog or microblog, multimedia content sharing websites, wiki-based knowledge-sharing tools. Social media is the least used in companies from the constructions industry: 34,7 % of the companies in EU and 22,5% of the Romanian companies. In-depth interviews were conducted with managers at different construction companies to investigate social media adoption. This research addresses how Romanian managers in the construction sector view the rise of the Internet 2.0, what their level of social media understanding is and their perceptions of the benefits or drawbacks for their organization. The outcomes of this research show that reasons for avoiding the use of social media are nuanced and highly varied. A major finding points out that Romanian managers in the construction industry still consider the website as the central tool for communication with customers and the printed brochures for advertising their products and services. The lack of digital skills and the lack of personal use of social media are also indicators often mentioned during the interviews. The sample was limited to only one European country, Romania. Ideally, the study should be followed by new ones including more countries. Understanding why these Romanian companies are not using social media might be a starting point in understanding the similar situation in different European countries.

Keywords: social media; construction; digitalization; digital skills; Romania

1. INTRODUCTION

The spread of globalization and the impact this phenomenon has on the business environment determines companies to pay more attention to their external communication, especially in the online environment. Every big company has already integrated digital advertising elements into their corporate strategy.

Over the past years, the number of SMEs established across the European Union exceeded 25 million, which reinforces the role they play in economic growth, promoting innovation and lowering the unemployment rate through social integration. Therefore, regardless of the size of the business, it is crucial to have in place a digital transformation strategy to gain sustainable competitiveness and growth opportunities.

Most of the previous studies are focusing on how many European enterprises are integrating technology in their activities. However, there is less research focusing on why companies choose to implement digital communication strategies in industries that are known to be more conservative. The purpose of this study was to provide insights

into the reasons why the Romanian companies in the field of constructions are considerably not using social media. Being less involved in the social media environment in both Romania and the European Union, the construction companies might have a relevant viewpoint on what should be changed to make the digitalization process more inclusive.

2. THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

The technological advancement and the use of the digital channels has impacted our lives in many ways. Studies throughout the past decade have proven the important role that digital promotion plays in the development of the company and during the acquisition process of new clients (Neubert, 2018; Brooksbank et al., 2003). Over the past years, there has been an effort in developing platforms and applications to make the Internet more accessible to end users and to adapt it to day-to-day activities. Hence, social media platforms like LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter etc. started to develop. Researchers in this field are referring to

social media as “the king of the Internet” due to the important role it plays in the world (Kumar and Devi, 2014).

The construction sector plays one of the most important roles in human society and it is a major component in today’s economy. According to a document updated in 2019 by the European Construction Sector Observatory, the construction industry has 9% share of EU GDP and employs 18 million workers. This sector was estimated to develop through the digitalization and the use of commercial drones has been projected to create over 100.000 direct jobs by 2025. In Romania, the construction activity “was weak in 2017 and 2018, due to low public and private sector investments in construction projects, weak consumer and investor confidence and a reduction in fixed capital formation” (Globaldata, 2019). According to the same study, the forecasts for Romanian construction sector were positive in terms of infrastructure development and energy and utilities construction market.

As previously demonstrated, the construction industry is conservative, with “a low degree of innovation, and a low productivity” (Gjaltema, Vrijhoef & Laterveer, 2013). Some of the reasons why this happens were explored by researchers and they refer to the use of low-tech solutions and employment of low skilled workers. Similarly, there are researchers who argue that the challenge in bringing innovation in the construction business circles is the conventional way of approaching day-to-day activities (Sidawi, 2012).

Different studies around the world have investigated best practices in construction companies (Plavina & Haase, 2013) and some of them highlighted the impact that social media has in building trust and boosting awareness even when talking about small businesses (Jones, Borgman & Ulusoy, 2015; Gilbert, 2011).

The potential rewards and risks associated with the use of social media in construction industry were researched by Azhar & Abeln (2014) in a quantitative analysis focused on the social media usage logs. They tracked 10 American constructions companies with social media presence and found out that most of the companies in the test group were using social media only as one-way communication tool for disseminating projects and company’s news. The authors developed a second and third phase of the research for a better understanding of the impact of social media on recruitment, company branding, disseminating information and client networking. As the authors noted, the social media is far from

becoming a mainstream communication tool in construction industry. The factors with a great impact are: security issues, privacy issues and the lack of understanding. In response to these finding, different groups started to educate the construction industry for an efficient use of social media platforms (DeVries, 2011).

The situation is similar worldwide, as a study conducted in Australia in 2014 revealed that 36% of the Australian businesses in construction field are not using social media to engage with their market. One interesting finding is that, even though 72% of the companies were aware that implementing a social media strategy is important, they didn’t have the knowledge and expertise to create it and implement it (Trenchless International, 2014).

In the United Kingdom, Pauley (2014) argues that more than 50% of the companies have their website linked with social media channels in order to have a better perspective about their website traffic. However, the construction companies are not taking advantage for example of using WordPress, the easiest and most powerful blogging platform. As studies show, the most popular social media platforms implemented by companies in the construction industry are LinkedIn, Facebook and Twitter (Whiston Solutions, 2015). The key barriers identified by researchers in the UK include the age of the employees, the restricted Internet usage and the additional costs in developing and implementing a social media strategy. Also, their study reveals that some companies consider that social media channels benefit only big companies rather than small and medium-sized ones (Perrera, Victora and Brand, 2015).

3. THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN ROMANIAN COMPANIES

DESI (The Digital Economy and Society Index) is a composite index published yearly by the European Commission, from 2014 until present. It evaluates 5 dimensions (Connectivity, Human Capital, Use of Internet Services, Integration of Digital Technology and Digital Public Services) with different weight reflecting EU’s digital policy priorities. Integration of Digital Technology is the dimension with a relatively high weight, 20%, and it captures the use of ICT (Information and communications technology) by the business sector. It has 2 sub-dimensions: Business digitalization and e-Commerce. The use of social media is an indicator for the first sub-dimension and the one that we are going to present in this chapter.

According to the latest DESI, Romania ranks the 28th (last position) amongst all EU countries, in terms of using social media.

The data published in DESI 2019 was collected between April and July 2019 and it used as a basis for sampling the Business Register updated in January 2019. In order to ensure representativeness, the Neyman allocation was used and the sample within each stratum was drawn without replacement. The sample size was 15.912 enterprises with an overall response rate of 97% .

The latest European reports evaluate the online presence of the companies and the results show that the most widely used categories of social media are: (a) social networks such as Facebook, LinkedIn and others (51%); (b) corporate blogs or microblogs (13%); (c) multimedia content-sharing websites such as YouTube, Instagram, Flickr, SlideShare, and others (21%); and (d) wiki-based knowledge-sharing tools (5%). Amongst the EU enterprises using social networks, Malta ranks the 1st with 83% and Romania the last one with 32%. The use of corporate blogs or microblogs ranged between 33% in Ireland and 4% in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The least popular network explored by the European research is the wiki-based knowledge-sharing tools with the highest percentage in Austria (13%) and lowest in Iceland (1%).

Over time, from 2013 to 2019, the EU businesses using social media increased from 25% to 51%. In Romania, the percentage of companies using social networks almost doubled during this period, from 17% in 2013 to 32% in 2019. But only 9% of the Romanian enterprises are using two or more of the

following channels: social networks, enterprise's blog or microblog, multimedia content sharing websites, wiki-based knowledge-sharing tools. Social media is the least used in companies from the construction industry: 34,7 % of the companies in EU and 22,5% of the Romanian companies.

This data is upheld by local studies that reveal the lack of knowledge and expertise of managers in building the digital business model (Valoria, 2018). As reflected in the study, the food & agriculture and construction industries are the least reached by digitalization in Romania.

4. DESIGN OF RESEARCH

4.1 Research question. As proven in past studies, the use of social media network is low amongst construction companies in Romania and the EU. The research question of this study is therefore: “Why are the companies in the construction sector not using social networks and what are their barriers in implementing digital strategies?”

4.2 Research objectives and hypotheses. The aims of this study are twofold: (1) to better understand the reasons why companies in the construction field are not using social media to engage with their (potential) customers; (2) to reveal the managers’ perspective about the digital presence of their companies. The hypothesis of this study is that Romanian managers from construction companies have low understanding of the social media networks and they fail to identify benefits of using them.




Fig. 1 The use of social media networks in Romania, by Economic sectors, European Commission

4.3 Methodology. In-depth interviews were conducted with managers employed by different construction companies in order to investigate digital and social media adoption. This research addresses how Romanian managers in the construction sector view the rise of the Internet 2.0, what is their level of social media understanding and what are their perceptions of the benefits or drawbacks for their organization. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 9 managers and the answers were explored using qualitative content analysis.

Each interview lasted between 30 and 40 minutes and it was taped with the explicit permission of the participants. All interviews were transcribed and an English translation of the original transcript was made. Before all the documents were exported in Atlas.ti, they were cleaned by repeated words (“yes, yes”), or utterances (“uhm”, “ihm”). After being edited, cleaned and prepared, the text documents were imported in Atlas.ti for coding and analysis.

All 9 managers were recruited from urban companies from construction sector from all major cities in Romania. The inclusion criteria were: middle or top management of a SMEs in construction field. The companies are based in 4 different cities in Romania: Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca, Constanța and Iași. They develop activities in fields such as real estate, civil engineering and infrastructure. From a total of nine participants, one was female and eight were male.

5. RESULTS

5.1 Data analysis. Data were analyzed using the Atlas.ti program. The main coding categories are included in the following themes: a) Current digital strategy of the company; b) Perceived benefits of using social networks in businesses; c) Perceived risks and barrier of using social media in businesses; d) Perceived advantages and disadvantages of using social media in construction industry. The coding families made the process easier by being based on the interview’s questions.

5.2 Results. From all nine companies investigated, only one had a website. Four of them had social media profiles (only Facebook). A number of participants had clear difficulties in identifying or naming the social media channels used by their company: “I remember we had something, but I am not sure if it is still active”, “I think we have a Facebook page, we should have”. Only one of the participants was aware of a social

media or digital advertising strategy in place for the next period.

The analysis of the codes for the second theme revealed perceptions of individuals with low social media usage. In general, the interviewees do not associate social media with higher sales or customer reach. From their personal experience, participants tended to value social media networks only for entertainment or fun after work, but most of them could not identify any role of the digital advertisements in their own spending patterns. A favorable attitude towards implementing digital strategies was captured when talking about receiving any kind of external support: “Yes, if we could get any funds to learn how to do it, maybe we’d try”, “we considered trying to find an intern for marketing activities”.

The third theme analyzed exposed a nuanced and highly varied number of reasons for avoiding the use of social media in the business environment. Some of the Romanian managers in the construction industry still consider the website as the central tool for communication with customers and the printed brochures for advertising products and services in a productive manner. As typical professionals in this field, the participants consider themselves to be conservative and this leads to less drive to implement new technologies: “Our industry is focused on practical activities, not online ones. We don’t find important or critical the use of Internet”, “We don’t look or find projects online.”

Most of the participants lack expertise and knowledge for creating and implementing a digital strategy. They admit not being familiar with digital tools and measurements: “I would try, but I have no time to learn and to do it.”, “No one has time to take care of pictures, texts and is not something very natural for any of us here.” The lack of digital skills and the lack of personal use of social media are the two most often mentioned indicators during the interviews.

The fourth theme evaluated the perception of the advantages and disadvantages of using social media in the construction companies. Most of the interviewees consider that an online presence would be useful in order to promote the company’s services:

The advantage of promoting the whole range of services is the cross-selling. Using multiple messages and channels would provide us a better visibility amongst the potential clients.

Also interesting is that the majority of the respondents consider that in their industry the best advertising strategy is word-of-mouth and

recommendation so it will take more time until when the construction sector will take digital communication into account at a larger scale.

5. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The results of this study are consistent with other findings in this field. The sample analyzed consist of different professionals in SMEs with a large variety of activities in the construction field: civil engineering, infrastructure, real estate management etc. Although some of the participants can understand and support the implementation of a social media strategy, this study reveals the lack of understanding and knowledge in the field of digital communication.

The sample was limited to only one European country, Romania. Ideally, the study should be followed by new ones including more countries. Understanding why these Romanian companies are not using social media might be a starting point in understanding the similar situation in different European countries.

6.1 Limitations. The present study has an explanatory purpose and it only tries to identify several new hypotheses for new studies. With a low number of participants, the results cannot be generalized and still require further investigation. The sample is neither random, nor fully representative for the whole small and medium enterprises in the construction field. The sample was deliberately formed of managers and professionals in the industry from big cities. Also, the sample contains more male than female participants.

6.2 Acknowledgement. This paper was financially supported by the Human Capital Operational Program 2014-2020, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project POCU/380/6/13/124708 no. 37141/23.05.2019, with the title “Researcher-Entrepreneur on Labour Market in the Fields of Intelligent Specialization (CERT-ANTREP)”, coordinated by the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration.

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VARIABLES OF STEM CAREER OF WOMEN IN ROMANIA

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Abstract: Participation in the multicultural conference of TECIS 2019 in Sozopol, Bulgaria, brought to the forefront of the participants' discussions a topic at the same time important and paradoxical for the 21st century: the marginalization of women in the fields of STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics). To discuss the topic, an ad hoc TECIS Inclusion and Diversity Working Group was set up, with 23 researchers from over 10 countries. The details provided by the participants regarding the situation in the country of origin have entrusted the researchers that this phenomenon is a versatile and extremely complex one. And yet, the difficulties encountered by women represented a common denominator; that is why the identification of the causes that led to the perpetuation of such traditionalist conditions in fields of accelerated modernization of society became a priority. In order to achieve the main objective of the Working Group, which is to work on building community and peer support, the first necessary and important step is to understand the current status of STEM in each country. To complete this stage, in this paper, we will perform a secondary analysis of the available statistical data for Romania to identify Romanian cultural specific in the field of participation of women in STEM education and STEM labor force. Further, we will develop a series of hypotheses that will underpin future studies.

Keywords (max.5): STEM, marginalized group, education, labor force, inclusion

1. INTRODUCTION

The need to accurately understand the situation of women involved in STEM in Europe was born in the multicultural environment created within the intercultural conference TECIS 2019. The networking discussions spontaneously and naturally slipped from conference topic (applications of robotics, artificial intelligence, blockchain) to related topics like quality of life of professionals, STEM career or how the gender variable influences these topics, all to illustrate the overwhelming role of the subjective dimension of human beings. An ad-hoc discussion group was enthusiastically established with the purpose of understanding the situation of the involvement of women in STEM fields in Europe (Doyle Kent *et al.*, 2020).

Of course, such an approach is necessary to be based, in a first stage, on analyzing the situation existing in each country, as this is reflected by the statistical data. In this paper, we will try to describe and analyze the Romanian socio-political context from the perspective of the involvement of women in STEM.

2. WOMEN AND DISCRIMINATION IN RECENT HISTORY

The discriminatory treatment of women over the centuries may seem at least astonishing at present. Discrimination against women who represents half of the world's population was justified by the differences between the sexes, in particular by resorting to arguments that supported women inferiority, especially as traditional society was organized having as a fundamental criterion the force, which was expressed in battles or in physical work. Beginning with the Industrial Revolution the physical effort was taken over by machines, creating the premises of changing the criteria of social order. The work automation has shifted the emphasis from the physical force towards intellectual skills, creativity, social abilities and this way today labor market includes more and more jobs in the field of human resources, security and safety, entertainment, supervision of the person, creative activities, environmental protection or other types of activities where women have proven they can achieve excellence.

Over time, researches have shown that there are more similarities than differences between men and women and that differences are sometimes more pronounced within individuals of same sex than between the sexes (Richmond - Abbott, 1992, 35).

A substantial contribution to changing social mindsets was brought by the feminist movement, which accepts that gender is built on socio-biologically determined premises, but draws attention to the need to analyze all the specific variables for a person, not just those determined by sexual differences (Haraway, 1990; Gatens, 1991). Medicine and neuroscience are increasingly clarifying today this long-debated issue, complementing the social sciences in the effort to decipher their springs: gender differences in math aptitude (Emerson, McGoldrick and Mumford, 2012), sensitivity to grades (Rask and Tiefenthaler, 2008; Goldin, 2013; Kugler, Tinsley and Ukhaneva, 2017), competitiveness (Reuben, Wiswall and Zafar, 2017; Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek, 2014; Flory, Leibbrandt and List, 2014), taste for the subject matter (Dyran and Rouse, 1997; Wiswall and Zafar, 2014) and preferences over different job attributes, which are linked to different seniors (Wiswall and Zafar, 2017).

In order to be accepted, STEM women had to become socially visible. By questioning the traditional social order, STEM women trigger a silent conflict with men whose world they claim. However, the existence of an opinion opposed to the majority arouses dissatisfaction and resistance, as it is affirmed and remains unchanged over time, individuals are accustomed to considering it as an alternative solution and treating it as such. The STEM women question the traditional social norm, differing from the majority on the basis of the gender criterion and professional orientation. According to the literature of social psychology regarding the social influence determined by the active minorities, the STEM women do not represent active minorities (Moscovici, 1979) in the true sense of the word, because they do not militate actively to impose their point of view. But this social group can be included in the category of active catalytic minorities (Ciuperca, 2004) because, through their daily professional activity, the society became aware of the need to involve them more actively in social life. Through the style of behavior characterized by consistency and trust (Maass and Clark, 1984), women working in STEM fields can manage to attract the majority's attention to them and produce a division of the social field and its specific balance.

3. THE PARADOXICAL PRESENT-DAY MARGINALIZATION OF WOMEN IN THE FIELDS OF STEM

Although women's access to traditional men's fields has been slow and cumbersome, they have managed to prevail in recent times. Still, STEM fields remain a fortress that women do not always manage to conquer. Although they show enthusiasm and idealism, a strong spirit and living intelligence, an increased ability to take risks and trust their own powers, to involve in traditionally masculine fields can prove to be a major challenge sometimes.

The acronym STEM has been proposed firstly in United States in order to unify in one concept the fields of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics. The usefulness of this concept, subsequently adopted by the whole world, has been proven in the analysis of the programs, practices, policies included in the mentioned fields. The National Science Foundation (NSF) defines STEM as the disciplines of chemistry, computer and information technology science, engineering, geosciences, life sciences, mathematical sciences, physics and astronomy, social sciences (anthropology, economics, psychology, and sociology), and STEM education and learning (Gonzalez & Kuenzi, 2012).

Within this paper, in relation to its objective, we will opt for the more restrictive meaning of this term, namely the math-intensive science fields (geosciences, engineering, economics, math, computer science, and physical science), where statistics indicate an over-representation of men.

In the literature there is a series of research regarding the sociodemographic variables of involvement of women in STEM fields. Xie and Shaumann (2003) found that married women with children rarely succeed in completing STEM studies or pursuing a full-time career in these fields, in promoting or seeking better jobs. Kahn and Ginther (2015) pointed out that the inability to work part-time is the main reason for this migration and it is highly correlated with child-bearing. Cavanaugh (2017), Ginther and Rosenbloom (2015), Orrenius and Zavodny, 2015) highlighted the tendency of women in STEM domains to migrate to nonSTEM domains.

Literature explains the low number of STEM women labor force using two models:

- A. The Leaky Pipeline Model
- B. Vanish Box Model

The first model, The Pipeline Model, focuses on the point women leave STEM (Blickenstaff, 2005)

and describes the linear progression of women through secondary school and higher education to careers in STEM and examines the points of “leakage” (Maltese & Tai, 2011). According to the model, there are three “leakage points” along the pipeline where women leave STEM fields (Blickenstaff, 2005): 1. initial matriculation into a higher education institution; 2. when a student who was originally interested in a STEM field chooses a non-STEM major; 3. a STEM graduate chooses a career in a non-STEM field.

The second model, The Vanish Box Model considers the absence of female scientists employed in academia as a result of their transition to science-related professions. In this approach the perspective is based on the hypothesis that women in STEM are leaving academia because of blockages they do not find in the business sector (Etzkowitz & Ranga, 2011). Obstacles include academic format, gendered labor separation, women in the outer circle, gender bias in funding, fear of being perceived as leaving careers or highly assertive and confrontational (Etzkowitz, & Ranga, 2011). Finally women may leave STEM career but they still use their skills in connected sectors.

On the occasion of the celebration of 203 years from the birth of the world's first programmer Ada Lovelace, the European Commission has launched the *Women in Digital* Report. The results underline some gender gaps for all considered indicators, with minor exceptions depending on the country. For example, in Latvia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Cyprus, women score higher on digital skills than men.

In digital jobs there are 9.3% of people with tertiary studies, of which 14.8% men and 4.1% women, and the gap is widening as in 2011 there were 13.5% of men and 3.4% of women. Also the number of ICT women is reducing with 16,1% in 2015 while there were 22,2% in 2005.

In European Union, women leave STEM more than men. Confirming the previous researches, women tend to leave STEM area when they are in their prime working age, having their first child and/or having to take care of their small children: while around 1.2% of those male digital workers with tertiary education left their profession in 2015 and the number of women leaving carrier number is 8.7% for the same year.

The percent of men working in the digital sector is 3.1 times greater than the share of women and the gender gap is more preminent considering the working population with tertiary studies is considered.

While it is widely considered that an ICT major offers bigger employment chances, this may be true only for men. Probably, stereotypes are more powerful than the skills and certificates women may have.

4. THE CURRENT STATUS OF ROMANIAN STEM WOMEN

In Romania, the evolution of social life was really challenging: the forced industrialization specific to the communist period did not allow a real change of the traditionalist relations between the sexes, while the emancipation of the woman was generally equated with its inclusion on the labor market.

Despite this egalitarian ideology that dominated the Romanian ideological landscape for half a century, the evolution of mentalities has registered in recent history a rather marginal progress in the field of gender equality and statistics continue to highlight a number of gender inequalities and discrimination.

Since 2016, the Istanbul Convention, signed in June 2014, has been applied in Romania, being the first international treaty containing a definition of gender, respectively, recognizing that women and men are not only biologically differentiated, but also socially defined as gender category that gives women and men specific roles and behaviors. The main objectives of this legislative text include the prevention of violence, the protection of victims and the prosecution of offenders.

Still, according to the *Gender Barometer Romania 2018*, gender discrimination has been permanently refined: besides the well-known direct and indirect discrimination, in Romania can be found (i) multiple gender discrimination and (ii) ambivalent, ambiguous forms of sexism, such as subtle sexism or hidden (Benokraitis and Feagin, 1986), ambivalent sexism (Glick and Fiske, 1996, 2011), modern sexism (Swim et al., 1995) or neo-sexism (Tougas et al., 1995).

European Gender Equality Index 2019, ranks Romania 25th in the EU (54.5 out of 100 points) showing that Romania is progressing towards gender equality but at a slower pace than other EU Member States. Romania's scores are lower than the EU's scores in all domains of gender inequalities being the most pronounced in the domain of power (38.8 points), time (50.3 points) and knowledge (51.5 points). Also *Global Gender Gap Report 2020* ranks Romania 55th in the world showing very slow improvements. The report of

the Global Economic Forum of 2016 (WEF, 2016) indicates even a slowdown in the rate of progress of gender equality, being especially highlighted the increase of the gaps in the fields specific to the fourth industrial revolution - science and technology.

On the other hand, the World Bank's Romania Gender Assessment Report (2018) indicates a series of advances related to the presence of women in scientific fields considered male dominated and the creation of a legislative and institutional framework for addressing gender issues. Despite these advances, women are becoming more numerous in the NEET group (people who are no longer in the education system, but are neither employed nor follow any other form of vocational training) and the report is underlying the inequitable distribution of time for domestic activities among women and men.

Although very slow, a series of progress in the field of gender equality results from the Gender Barometer 2018 made in Romania: compared to 2000, more people accept the possibility of a woman as the president of the country, and more people reject the idea that men are better able than women to lead or the one that women are too busy with household and have no time for management positions. Also, the percentage of women who do not trust their strengths decreases and the claim that women are afraid of great responsibilities is largely rejected.

The data collected for the 13 indicators that define 3 main dimensions of the *Women in Digital* Report: internet use, digital skills and employment and professional competences give controversially conclusion for Romania. On the one hand Romania placed on the last places for Internet use: 26th place with 30.9 points (50.2 EU average) and for digital skills: 28th place with 24.5 points (53.1 EU). On the other hand, for the third dimension, the one regarding employment and professional competences, the situation is better, with Romania occupying the 13th place with 44.2 points (43.9 EU).

More paradoxical are statistical data that indicate a large difference between the number of women and men that complete a major in ICT (mathematics, statistics, computing and engineering). In the context, Romania is mentioned as a country with a smaller gender gap difference, despite the fact that the number of men population is almost three times larger. With a rate of only 3% female graduates out of the total number of graduates (as shown in Figure 1), Romania occupy

a paradoxical (because of such a small percentage) and honorable first place.




Fig.1 ICT graduates out of total graduates in 2015 by sex and country (Women in Digital Report, 2018:30).

Although there are a large number of women graduates in STEM areas compared to the other European countries, however, the number of Romanian women who complete doctoral level is really low, as shown in Figure 2, placing Romania in a cluster positioned on the penultimate place, only ahead of North Macedonia.

This situation needs further clarification - it is necessary to investigate the reasons why STEM women graduates in Romania are not oriented towards the deepening of the studies. Our hypothesis considers that the climate of Romanian technical universities may be much to traditionalist male-oriented institutions and not encouraging women to enroll in the next learning cycle.




Fig 2 Women completing doctoral level (Eurostat data)

In addition, the employment opportunities for women in Romania are underwhelming (Figure 4), although there is a large number of graduates in these fields, as figure 3 reveals.




Fig. 3 Educational attainment in Romania (Global Gender Gap Report 2020, 295)

Explanations may be offer in terms of a more traditionalist culture in Romania which prefer men to work in such places, but also it is needed to analyze it as a percentage of the total available

VARIABLES OF STEM CAREER OF WOMEN IN ROMANIA

workplaces as the existing law percent may reflect a poor development of industry




Fig. 4 Persons with tertiary education (ISCED) employed in science/technology (Eurostat data)

An alternative hypothesis would be that many of the women may leave STEM fields to work in other areas. But data give little support to this hypothesis as in Romania, 26.3% of the total number of ICT employees work are women in Romania, compared to the European average - 16.7% (Global Gender Gap Report 2020, 2018:295).

We notice that data collected from different sources gives an incomplete picture of the situation of STEM women in Romania, a mosaic completed at times, but with significant missing parts and with overlapping images. The data are not always mutually confirmed, and their interpretation sometimes seems subjective, bearing the imprint of authors' ideologies.

Gender Barometer. Romania 2018 points out a contradiction between the promoters of gender equality and the target population of these efforts: while 47.3% of women agree that "women often do not get jobs because they are women", yet 50.3% respondents agree that "gender discrimination is no longer a problem in Romania".

5. CONCLUSION

Although self-affirmation, self-realization of the individual must be the ultimate goal for the optimal organization of social coexistence, accommodating with a new state of the society requires considerable efforts. Many women working in STEM fields were exposed either to manifestations of indifference or to insults, ridicule, marginalization and clearly censorship and persecution.

The data presented in this paper gives us an overview of several important principles of social structure based on the criteria of gender. In order to have more in-depth information regarding the real motivations and feelings of women involved in STEM fields, it will be necessary to carry out the

research regarding specific behavior of the female and their contextual contexts, as well as regarding their opinions and experiences. The TECIS group, which is at the origin of this work, intend to engage in the effort to succeed in carrying out such research at European level (Doyle Kent et al., 2020). Depending on the results, proposals can be made to improve serious situations and to generalize good practice for a future inclusive, competitive and performing Europe.

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BRANDING ROMANIA AS A “TECH COUNTRY”. NATION BRANDING IN TIMES OF DIGITAL DISRUPTION

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Abstract: *In the age of “digital disinformation 2.0” (Bârgăoanu, 2018) and “digital deceit” (Ghosh & Scott, 2018), nation branding has become part of a new paradigm of strategic communication between states, trying to seduce various audiences. According to Korjus (2017), the next big industry to face digital disruption will be our nations. For instance, Estonia’s brand image is based on the idea of a digital state, both for domestic and foreign audiences. In Denmark, Casper Klynge has become the first nation state ambassador to Silicon Valley, describing his job as “techplomacy” (Baugh, 2017). The nation-state is responding to the new communications environment by reinventing itself in the current climate of intercultural dialogue for Europe. An interesting case is to be found in contemporary Romania, ranked 46th in the world, in terms of digital competitiveness at global level (World Digital Competitiveness Ranking, 2019). Overall, the aim of our research is to investigate technology as a soft power (Nye, 2004) instrument for Romania and to analyze how journalists and public actors construct the topic of new technology as a competitive advantage. In doing so, our research revolves around 50 news articles, published in the Romanian quality press (Adevărul, Gândul, România Liberă), employing mixed methods such as framing analysis (Entman, 1993) and critical discourse analysis. The results show that journalists have an active role in constructing technology as a public issue in Romania, related to future policy-making and regulation endeavors, as well as the future of public diplomacy.*

Keywords: *nation branding; technology; soft power; media; tech country; digital diplomacy*

1. INTRODUCTION

In the age of “digital disinformation 2.0” (Bârgăoanu, 2018) and “digital deceit” (Ghosh & Scott, 2018), nation branding has become part of a new paradigm of strategic communication between states, trying to seduce various audiences. According to Korjus (2017), the next big industry to face digital disruption will be our nations. For instance, Estonia’s brand image is based on the idea of a digital state, both for domestic and foreign audiences. In Denmark, Casper Klynge has become the first nation state ambassador to Silicon Valley, describing his job as “techplomacy” (Baugh, 2017).

The nation-state is responding to the new communications environment by reinventing itself in the current climate of intercultural dialogue for Europe. Many governments have concerns over digital misinformation campaigns (cyber propaganda) and the emerging relationship between technology and digital security. Nation branding should also be comprehended in the contemporary *fake news* phenomenon and post-

truth era, which puts an emphasis on fabricated content, aiming to generate maximum attention and, therefore, maximum profit. Products of nation branding campaigns are, in fact, *simulation nations*, understood as contradictory compendium of signs, flashing through global media circuits, and trying to seduce various audiences (Kaneva, 2018). The idea of the *simulacra* leads further to a situation of hyper-reality, where the distinction between reality and simulation is blurred. Content generated on the Internet, especially on the digital platforms, shapes public perception, offering a compelling vision of division, an “Us vs. Them” (Bremmer, 2018) rhetoric.

An interesting case is to be found in contemporary Romania, ranked 46th in the world, in terms of digital competitiveness at global level (IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking, 2019). The project “Romania Tech Nation” launched in 2019 aims to boost Romania’s transformation through technology, involving both the Government and the private sector. In the media, Romania is framed as a European

destination for tech investors, an IT outsourcing destination with one of the best Broadband Internet speed, science-savvy workforce and women involved in scientific research. In this context, how does digital disruption change the goals, objectives, and purposes of diplomacy?

Recent worldwide events (i.e. coronavirus outbreak, Brexit etc.) force us to rethink the basis of public diplomacy, and whether this impacts the individual and the society. We live in a post-truth era or in a “truth-decay” era, understood as a set of “increasing disagreement about facts and analytical interpretations of facts and data” (Kavanagh & Rich, 2018), declining trust in formerly respected sources of factual information. In this context, facts are secondary, and we experience the “democratization of truth”, leading further to a semiotic war, with a potential struggle over meaning (Borțun in Olteanu et al., 2018).

Overall, the aim of our research is to investigate technology as a *soft power* (Nye, 2004) instrument for Romania and to analyze how journalists and public actors construct the topic of new technology as a competitive advantage. In doing so, our research revolves around 50 news articles, published in the quality press (*Adevărul, Gândul, România Liberă*) employing mixed methods such as framing analysis (Entman, 1993) and critical discourse analysis. The research questions underlying this study focus on two dimensions – the media representation of technology as a soft power instrument and the relationship between nation branding and technology: (1) How is the nation brand constructed in relation to technology? (2) How do the journalists frame the technological developments of Romania?

Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the current literature on technology and soft power, along with nation branding. Section 3 discusses the methodology, while section 4 presents the main results of the framing analysis. Section 5 is dedicated to conclusions and future implications of nation branding in times of digital disruption.

We will now address the relationship between technology and public diplomacy, in order to understand how are new technologies shaping the communication between nation states.

2. TECHNOLOGY AS A SOFT POWER INSTRUMENT

In the age of “dataism” (Harari, 2018), communication between nation states is affected

by the development of technology. The Internet has changed the context in which international relations play out, while new actors have been empowered by the new information communication technologies as well. The emerging challenge is that “we are grappling with the consequences of code through the many boundary cases of human experience and cultural work that trouble contemporary algorithmic culture” (Finn, 2018:192).

Artificial intelligence is expected to be one of the most disruptive new emerging technologies (Van de Gevel & Noussair, 2013). There is an Artificial Intelligence race between high-tech giants such as Facebook, Google, Amazon, Alibaba and Tencent, and the governments are involved in this. In fact, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has a big potential for governments, in order to analyze large amounts of data and to identify trends and insights. For instance, the American corporate landscape is dominated by five big companies (“The Big Five”): Facebook, Apple, Google, Microsoft and Amazon. According to Bârgăoanu (2018: 110) the Big Five is, in fact, the most powerful instrument through which the USA has projected its soft power. Conversely, in small states soft power is considered a handy tool, especially in the sphere of cultural, political, economic, and social (Peterkova, 2020: 2). The ability to innovate is one of the significant sources of soft power. An asset developed by countries is also the National Strategies on Artificial Intelligence, highlighting policy measures to gain competitive advantage in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI).

The nation-state is responding to the new communications environment by reinventing itself. Smith and Sutterland (2002) use the term “networked diplomacy”, defined as major ICT-related factors that affect the practice of diplomacy. Nowadays we can talk about cyber diplomacy, understood as “the use of diplomatic tools and mindsets in resolving, or at least managing, the problems in cyberspace” (Shaun, 2019). Public diplomacy is important in cyberspace, especially in combating cyber information war and disinformation operations.

Soft power and public diplomacy are linked to international communication. Pamment (2014) proposes four public diplomacy models: output models, related to press clippings, outcome models, related to logic models and impact measurements, perception models, related to surveys, attitudes and favorability, and network models, based on hubs and multipliers, forming alliances and relationship

management. We believe that technology can be integrated under network models because relationships can be measured through linkages, exchanges and patterns of interaction. Technology helps to identify nodes in a network and to identify people that have a leadership position in their respective social sphere.

Public diplomacy refers to transparent ways of communicating to international audiences, in order to promote national interests and achieve foreign policy objectives. In fact, public diplomacy is understood as “government communication with foreign audiences”, referring to *domestic publics* in two ways:

either as the domestic input from citizens for foreign policy formulation (engaging approach), or explaining foreign policy goals and diplomacy to domestic public (explaining approach)” (Szondi, 2008:6).

Citizens have an important role in the debates over foreign policy, while the role of the nation is in perpetual reconfiguration.

The “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991) is now reconfigured to the logics of fabricated content, leading to the hybrid concept of “DIY citizenship” (Hartley, 1999), based on cultural identity and choice, and not on the relationship of people to territory.

Furthermore, the concept of public diplomacy is also connected to the new information technologies, with a special focus on the impact of non-state actors in international affairs. Cyber diplomacy is also connected to cyber-challenges such as cyberwar, cyberterrorism, cyberespionage or cybercrimes. In cyberwar, state and non-state actors penetrate foreign computer systems with the intention of damaging the systems, extracting sensitive information and using it for various purposes. Vickers (2004) believe that all the technological changes give rise to the “new public diplomacy”, so that technology has the potential to shape the governance of soft power. He notices the increasing ability of citizens and non-government organisations (NGOs), from transnational pressure groups to transnational terrorist organisations to access and use these information and communications technologies (Vickers, 2004:183).

The “new public diplomacy” leads further to “data diplomacy”, understood as “the harnessing of diplomatic actions and skills by a diverse range of stakeholders to broker and drive forward access to data, as well as widespread use and understanding of data” (Boyd *et al.*, 2019:3). In terms of data

diplomacy, WikiLeaks has released more classified information that the whole rest of the world’s media combined, compiling a database of more than 10 million documents. The leak consisted of US Army fields reports of the Iraq War from 2004 to 2009, being the biggest leak in the military history of America up to this point (Hehe, 2018). Therefore, new technologies can lead to moral implications (Susskind, 2019).

According to Van Ham (2001), one can talk about *brand states* as political players promoted aggressively by using power and national identity. Put simply, this shift in political paradigms implies a move from the modern world of geopolitics and power to the postmodern world of images and influence (Van Ham, 2001: 4). It is more and more difficult for governments to control, shape, and influence information and its distribution. More recently, nation branding has become part of a new paradigm of strategic communication between states, understood as “a social, cultural and political construct which defines a nation through national identity discourses and with the participation of the public sphere as a debate arena on national issues” (Cheregi, 2018: 97).

In this broad context, the aim of this study is to investigate technology as a *soft power* (Nye, 2004) instrument for Romania and to analyze how journalists and public actors construct the topic of new technology as a competitive advantage. The soft power instruments must be able to use information and knowledge to set the terms of debate on issues, shaping them in ways that are advantageous to it. Even though soft power does not consume as many resources as military power, it requires investments in technology, in order to be in line with the main leaders in cyberspace. The next section highlights the importance of nation branding in times of digital disruption.

2.1. Nation branding and “techplomacy”. In the last few decades, nation branding has become an important yet contested topic in research, attracting an interdisciplinary interest, from areas such as marketing, international public relations, and public diplomacy, but also from schools of thought such as cultural studies and social constructivism.

One of the most important functions promoting the country image overseas is to communicate the idea of a nation. In this regard, Szondi (2007:11) argues that branding has had an important role in generating a discussion about identities, especially because it can help define a certain type of *country identity* that can be communicated to other nations.

Furthermore, the audience must identify itself with the brand, so the citizens should become “brand ambassadors” (Szondi, 2007:19). In fact, nations are “emotionally constructs that shape and construct identity qualitatively differently than other places” (Mordhorst in Berger & Fetzer, 2019:201).

Nation branding is seen as a panacea for small and under-developed countries, as a need to enhance the competitive advantage on the global stage (Anholt, 2003; Dinnie, 2008; Olins, 2002; Papadopoulos & Heslop, 2002). Romania is a post-communist country with a bad image internationally, that is why the nation branding phenomenon has the mission of improving the competitive advantage.

From a public diplomacy perspective (Calabrese, 1996; Jansen, 2008; Gilboa, 2008; Mosco, 1996; Murdock & Golding, 1991; Schiller, 1976; Szondi, 2008; Van Ham, 2001; Zhang, 2006), nation branding is a continuation of public diplomacy and a neoliberal project. Public diplomacy contributes to a nation’s power by generating credibility, fostering values such as the belief in democracy, changing behavior, and increasing goodwill through activities like broadcasting, cultural diplomacy and exchanges (Pamment, 2014:53).

In this globalized world, promoting the nation internationally is an effort driven by global capitalism. Public diplomacy is understood as the Government’s use of *soft power* (Nye, 1990) in order to promote national interests to political actors, NGOs, and corporations. Nation branding is a postmodern mutation of diplomacy and represents an evolution of diplomatic practice (Van Ham, 2001). Globalization is closely linked to the development of nation branding, while commercial neoliberalism privileges market relations in articulations of national identity (Jansen, 2008:121). In this context, globalization has the power to articulate a country’s aspirations for wealth, power and enhanced visibility (Cheregi, 2018:87).

However, there are few studies exploring the link between technology and nation branding. Pawel Surowiec and Magdalena Kania-Lundholm (2018) explore the relationship between social media and nation branding in a study on ‘Logo for Poland’ campaign, run by a coalition of state and corporate actors. The results prove that “the practice of nation branding online is an ideological construct supported by the neoliberal ideology of

the free market, embracing private interests, marketing goals and commercial techniques for self-promotion” (Surowiec & Kania-Lundholm, 2018:173). Recent studies concentrate on analysis of Big Data that relate to countries’ nation branding efforts (Cha *et al*, 2017).

Korjus (2017) believes that the next big industry to face digital disruption will be our nations. For instance, Estonia’s brand image is based on the idea of a digital state, both for domestic and foreign audiences. In Denmark, Casper Klyngé has become the first nation state ambassador to Silicon Valley, describing his job as “techplomacy” (Baugh, 2017). Techplomacy was presented as a foreign policy strategy for 2017-2018 as a priority for Denmark.

In Romania, the situation is a little bit different compared to the above-mentioned countries. According to the Nation Brand Index (Anholt, 2005), Romania was ranked 42 out of 75 countries. Anholt’s Nation Brand Index focuses on studying the nation brand as the sum of citizens’ perceptions about the nations, considering six dimensions of the brand image: tourism, export, diplomacy, investment and immigration, culture and heritage, along with people. In fact, the hexagon is a perception model that lacks the sense of cause and effect (Pamment, 2014: 56), but it also represents a holistic approach to nation branding, measuring the global image, perception and reputation of countries. On the other hand, technology is missing from Anholt’s Nation Brand Index, even though it is an important competitive advantage for countries involved in the “global tech race”.

In terms of digital competitiveness at global level, Romania is ranked 46th in the world (Figure 1). The ranking analyses the extent to which countries adopt and explore digital technologies leading to transformation in government practices, business models and society in general (IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking, 2019). The three main factors defining digital competitiveness are knowledge, technology and future readiness. Firstly, knowledge is understood as the know-how necessary to discover, understand and build new technology. Secondly, technology is related to the overall context that enables the development of digital technologies (for instance Internet bandwidth speed), while future readiness is the level of country preparedness to exploit digital transformation.




Fig. 1 IMD World Digital Competitiveness Rating (2019: 27)

Compared to other research on nation branding, our study moves the angle from nation branding campaigns to technology as a soft power instrument that contributes to the articulation of the nation brand.

The project “Romania Tech Nation” launched in 2019 aims to boost Romania’s transformation through technology, involving both the Government and the private sector. Nations hold a soft power advantage when their culture and values match prevailing global norms when it has greater access to multiple communication channels that can influence how issues are framed in global news media (Nye, 2008: 96).

3. METHODOLOGY

The aim of this study is to investigate technology as a *soft power* (Nye, 2004) instrument for Romania and to analyze how journalists and public actors construct the topic of new technology as a competitive advantage. This aim is guided by the two above mentioned research questions. Our research revolves around 50 news articles, published in the quality press, employing mixed methods such as framing analysis (Entman, 1993) and critical discourse analysis.

Framing works as “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman, 1974), enabling the audience to locate

and perceive occurrences of information. Media frames are patterns of interpretation rooted in culture and articulated by the individual (Entman, 1993; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes & Sasson, 1992: 384; Pan & Kosicki, 2003; Reese, 2007; Van Gorp, 2007). The journalists frame the issues and events in the form of a news story, presenting additional layers of interpretation. This impacts the audience as well, creating “echo-chambers” (Jamieson & Capella, 2008; Nguyen, 2018) that reinforce their beliefs, discrediting other relevant voices. For Couldry (2006), the credibility and the legitimacy of the message producing and the communication environment is important for the ways subjects will relate to those messages.

Research on framing nation branding come from different areas, such as international public relations (Li & Chitty, 2009), public diplomacy (Zhang, 2006) cultural studies (Volcic, 2008, Miazhevich, 2018), or from media and communication studies (Hyejung, 2007; Cheregi, 2017). For instance, Volcic (2008) performs a textual analysis of the official governmental websites of former Yugoslav states in order to see how they frame the nation as a brand. Miazhevich (2018) too uses the cultural studies lens to examine Russia’s international broadcaster RT (formerly Russia Today), in the coverage of the Republic of Crimea in 2016, by drawing on a framing approach

based on Gitlin's (2003) process of ideological hegemony and on Entman's (1993) framing devices. Cheregi (2017) also uses media framing analysis (Entman, 1993) and qualitative content analysis (Schreier, 2012) to analyse 53 news articles on Romania's nation brand and on the national image building problem in four newspapers (*Adevărul*, *Gândul*, *Jurnalul Național*, *Dilema Veche*), published during January 2011 – March 2014. She proves that the Romanian journalistic discourse is built on evaluation strategies, insisting on political responsibility of Romania's nation brand.

Our study focuses on branding Romania as a "tech country", considering the fact that nation branding is a step in the process of discursively constructing the country image as a public issue (Cheregi, 2018). In order to see how journalists and public actors frame both textually and visually the topic of new technology as a competitive instrument in Romania, our research revolves around 50 articles, published in top quality newspapers such as *Adevărul*, *Gândul* and *România liberă* (brat.ro). In so doing, our analysis is based on Entman's (1993) framing model.

For Entman (1993:52), to frame is "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and made them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation." Drawing on Entman's approach on news framing, the research examines the news media's coverage of technology as a competitive advantage for Romania.

4. RESULTS

Overall, Romania is framed as a European destination for tech investors, an IT outsourcing destination with one of the best Broadband Internet speed, science-savvy workforce, women involved in scientific research and a "pole of Artificial Intelligence around the globe" (*Adevărul*, May 2019).

The framing analysis on approximately 50 news articles published in top quality newspapers such as *Adevărul*, *Gândul* and *România liberă*, in the period October 2018 – March 2020, shows that there are four dominant media frames: artificial intelligence, the 5G technology, education and smart city. Firstly, the artificial intelligence frame refers to the adoption of Artificial Intelligence in Romania and to the National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence. The main indicators are digital economy, Romanian women involved in AI

projects and health. The second frame is the 5G technology, related to the effects of the development of 5G in Romania. The main indicators are political actors, national security, Internet of things, and protests (against the implementation of 5G technology in Romania). The third frame is education, related to the digitalization of the educational processes. Here, the main indicators are digital tools used for teaching, research in technology and level of nepotism in Romania. Finally, the fourth frame is smart city, understood as the digitalization of Romanian cities such as Sibiu, Oradea and Alba Iulia. The main indicators are tourism and level of citizen participation in local decision-making.

In *Adevărul* newspaper, the most dominant frame is artificial intelligence, presented in relation to contactless technology – "Romania, on the 5th place in Europe in adopting contactless technology: 2 out of 3 transactions are now contactless" (Dobrescu, September 2018, *Adevărul*), national strategy – "How can Romania become the most efficient center of Artificial Intelligence in the world. A national strategy" (Chirciu, March 2019, *Adevărul*), Romanian women participating at the first AI hackaton – "Alice envisions the future - the first AI hackaton in Romanian destined to girls was a real laboratory for good ideas" (Brîndușescu, October 2019, *Adevărul*) and facial recognition – "The legality of implementing facial recognition technology in Romania was contested (Dumitrescu, October 2019, *Adevărul*).

In *Gândul* newspaper, the most dominant frame is the 5G technology frame. An interesting fact here is that some news articles reveal the threat connected to the radiations produced by the 5G antenna - "What is the real danger of 5G technology? Can radiations produce cancer or not?" (*Gândul*, February 2020) - while others concentrate on 5G as a threat – "The 5G danger is real, nor virtual. Hundreds of people from Craiova have protested against 5G technology (Paraschivu, January 2020, *Gândul*).

As for *România Liberă*, the most dominant frame is also artificial intelligence, presented in relation to investments – "Romania will have annual investments of 50 million Euros in Artificial Intelligence (Diac, February 2020), robotics – "Romania, champion in robotics in South Korea" (Dumitrescu, February 2020, *România Liberă*), and transport – "A factory from Sibiu works at developing the car of the future" (November 2018, *România Liberă*).

The main political actors mentioned in the Romanian press are the Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, the USA President Donald Trump, Alexandru Petrescu, the Minister of Communications and Information Society, the former Prime-Minister Viorica Dăncilă, Gordon Sondland, the ambassador of USA at the European Union, the Authority for the Digitalization of Romania, the European Union and NATO.

5. CONCLUSION

The results show that there are four dominant media frames emerging from the analysis: (1) artificial intelligence, (2) the 5G technology, (3) education and (4) smart city. The Romanian journalists have an active role in constructing technology as a public issue in Romania, related to future policy-making and regulation endeavors, as well as the future of public diplomacy. Furthermore, our article proves that the journalists construct technology as a *soft power* (Nye, 2004) instrument, insisting on technology as a competitive advantage for Romania.

We estimate that this trend towards constructing technology as a soft power instrument and as an instrument for economic development as such will continue, even accelerate in the post-pandemic world, in Romania and elsewhere. It is to be expected that the aftermath of the major disruptions going on right now as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic will be decided by technology, including advances in bio-technology and any other health-related breakthroughs. For Romania as well as for the entire European Union, it is important not to miss this new technology-driven race, which is likely to divide the world in technology-rich and technology-poor nations. Or just in rich and poor nations. For this, the importance of media actors and other institutional actors in raising awareness and articulating this problem as a public issue cannot be emphasized enough.

6. FUNDING

This paper was financially supported by the **Human Capital Operational Program 2014-2020**, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project **POCU/380/6/13/124708 no. 37141/23.05.2019**, with the title **“Researcher-Entrepreneur on Labour Market in the Fields of Intelligent Specialization (CERT-ANTREP)”**, coordinated by the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration.

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COMMUNICATION IN THE TIMES OF GLOBALIZATION. SECURITY IN SMARTPHONE COMMUNICATION AT THE TIMES OF THE WEB 3.0

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Abstract: *On the basis of a critical survey of the scientific literature and a wide range of quantitative and qualitative researches conducted in Europe, of great interest appears to be the study aimed at analyzing digital online environments starting from the daily practices that young people put into act to learn, communicate with the peer group, build their identity or exercise their citizenship rights in a multi-ethnic and globalized society (Fonasari, 2017). The main users of these new media are the so-called 'digital natives' (Prensky, 2001), or that new generation particularly inclined to use new technologies, but this does not mean that they have the appropriate responsibility, the critical sense and the right awareness to make the best use of it to avoid network dangers. In fact, mobile technologies in the past years have known a strong impact and a large diffusion. Within this new context of global explosion of new mobile technologies, an increasing concern is developing towards cybersecurity issues that, now more than ever, become current and perceived, even if not always in an appropriate manner, by users. The article presents an articulated critical reflection on the threats connected to communication via smartphones (the device most used by young people) focusing on the vulnerabilities of: the Android system, applications and connections and highlighting the need to help students build both digital skills (as explained in the context of the eight key European competences) and media education*

Keywords: *security, media; technologies; communication; media education*

1. INTRODUCTION

The *web* today is one of the main places of innovation, driving a rapid social change which easily ends up appearing disturbing or problematic to the eyes of adults. This concern may seem right and wrong at the same time: right because it represents awareness of how much the means of communication (understood as symbolic devices through which is produced and reproduced, on an everyday basis, the culture of a community and as socio-technical devices that redefine the conditions of personal interaction and social relationships) constitute a considerable part of the environment. Wrong because in a historical perspective it does nothing but renovate fears as old as the advent of the first mass media from comics to cinema to television, applying more or less faithfully the same discursive models and the same arguments to the role that internet plays in the experience of young people, forgetting both the groundlessness or partiality of many of those fears and the innovations introduced by digitalization. It happens paradoxically that those who, in an educational

perspective, complained of the substantial passivity of the television medium compared to reading, today express their concern about the excess of network interactivity. This social change has affected how teenagers use the media to keep in touch and communicate with each other and with the whole world. One would say that almost all experiences for this generation, that not surprisingly has been defined *always on* (always connected) or digital, go through the media: from study to free time, to the relationship with friends near and far. The *new media* encourage the development of a particular type of intelligence that Gardner has defined "Relational intelligence" which is configured as an intercultural thought matrix.

This type of intelligence, in fact, opens up to something more significant than tolerance or acceptance; it introduces a flexible, mobile thinking, capable of operating inside of a multi-dimensional, dynamic, procedural culture; in other words to a culture that recognizes in its own birthplace the differences. As Turkle (2013) and De Kerckove (2016) had observed, mass media

have allowed teenagers unprecedented access to the adult world, blurring the boundaries between their respective cognitive experiences.

On the other hand, the contemporary affirmation of youth culture (minors under 18 represent about 20% of the population of developed countries and 50% of developing countries) suggests that teenagers, though wishing to broaden their knowledge, seem more motivated to experiment and put to the test their identity and relationships within the peer group, often inaccessible to the eyes of adults. For Gergen this shift from a vertical relationship (intergenerational) to a horizontal one (the peer group) is quite another thing with respect to the democratization process described by Giddens. It would rather result in an "overall devaluation of the profound dimension of relationships", since adolescents are increasingly absorbed by the effort to maintain a plurality of horizontal relationships with their network reference and less and less willing to develop those rich and intense bonds that characterize relationships with the significant and physically present adult groups around them.

What drives *online* communication on the move is the need for teenagers to stay connected with their peers anytime and anywhere, but does this communication always take place in security? Do young people have sufficient skills for the safe management of these devices and to deal with any network threats?

2. MEDIA AND SECURITY: VULNERABILITIES ON THE ANDROID PLATFORM

Mobile technologies over the past years have experienced a disruptive impact and an enormous propagation. The Internet is now constantly used within public places through free WI-FI connections which, together with a solid 3G and 4G coverage, always better guaranteed by the different telephone operators, has made it possible that smartphones are constantly used to carry out all types of activities. Within this new context of global explosion of mobile technologies, there is an ever growing concern towards cybersecurity issues, which now more than ever, have become relevant and are not perceived adequately by users. In particular, compared to the world of Personal Computers, there are some differences that make mobile devices even more attractive to hackers for the following reasons: smartphones almost always contain a large amount of confidential data. Contacts, text messages, calls and GPS position are

just some of the information available from any mobile device, which can reveal confidential information about the individual using it; smartphones are designed to stay on throughout the day. The availability of an individual will depend on whether the device is active or not and consequently the time window in which a device can suffer an attack widens considerably; smartphones use the same operational systems and consequently the system in which the data is saved and stored is often known to hackers who are able to plan large-scale attacks using the same mechanism. For its nature of free software, but above all for its diffusion, Android has in a short time become the aim of targeted attacks to spread malware and exploit the vulnerabilities of the system. Android's vulnerabilities are essentially inherited from the structure of the operating system and from the applications installed on the device, which expose some components to a series of more or less critical threats (Gunasekera, 2012). In a more summary way we can say that on mobile devices it is possible to identify different types of threats: the communication channel network, applications or the market from which they are downloaded, user settings, improper use of the device but also the operating system itself. There are non-profit organizations such as the OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) created to highlight the sometimes obscure aspects of computer security for web applications. These experts contribute daily to updating information on a field in which it is easy to be out of date and therefore be exposed to greater safety risks. OWASP, in 2016, drew up a ranking that highlights possible critical issues that may occur within the mobile devices: insecure data backup; low implementation of security protocols; insecure management of sessions and cookies; mechanisms of inefficient cryptography; disclosure of confidential personal information. These risks represent the fundamental level on which most of the vulnerabilities currently known for mobile platforms are based.

3. SYSTEM VULNERABILITY

There are some vulnerabilities that allow the user to obtain the so called root privileges inside the device. This operation is called in technical jargon *root or rooting* (understood as "root operation") of the mobile phone. Applications installed on the device cannot obtain this type of privilege and the Android application Sandbox serves to avoid this. In this regard, it wants to

protect the user from a series of threats which could compromise the functioning of the smartphone. At the same time, however, it happens that the users still want to root the devices for several reasons: a) eliminate customizations of the Provider from the phone: the telephone companies often sell smartphones in conjunction with tariff plans and promotional offers. The devices will be personalized in this way by the Carriers in order to allow the user to take advantage of some services which are often perceived by users as troublesome and not very useful. However, the user will not be free to delete the customizations except with the root; b) customization: a long series of operating system software components can be unlocked or customized only by root; c) access to blocked hardware features, such as the processor frequency control; d) to access and modify folders, system files and contents otherwise inaccessible. In order to obtain the root permissions of a device, the only method will be those to exploit a known operating system vulnerability, or flashing of the firmware. Both operations risk compromising the warranty of the device and are therefore largely discouraged for non-experts. Several operating system vulnerabilities have been found and exploited over the recent years. In particular, there are several exploits, almost always easily available on the web both in the form of source code and binary code, which can be used to root the device.

Each of these exploits will have its own target environment and will not work in operating system versions where the security flaw has been corrected. Sometimes it will not be Google Android to be vulnerable but the versions modified by some manufacturers. However, the fact remains that a device on which root privileges have been obtained, even voluntarily by the user, is more exposed to a series of attacks that could undermine its security. Furthermore, it is appropriate to specify how users who root their own device are not necessarily more 'advanced' than the average. In fact, it is quite easy to find a series of tutorials online that describe the correct procedure to be performed for each different phone model. This allows, even novice users, to root their device with all the associated security risks.

4. APPLICATION AND CONNECTION VULNERABILITIES

Applications for mobile devices have experienced a rapid diffusion in recent years, becoming extremely popular and representing the new frontier in the field of communication, like

websites and social networks. App-level vulnerabilities are not always detectable mainly because most of the apps in the official Android store are created by amateur developers not always attentive to the implementation of a secure code (Jeff Six, 2011). Therefore the task of classifying every single error in a series of 'releases' of downloaded or unknown apps would be extremely complex and unproductive. A similar study would only make sense for apps whose traffic in terms of downloads are very high. Furthermore, it should be decided whether to also include in this particular selection the apps present outside the market, which are often perfectly legitimate and authoritative, but banned by Google for policy issues (e.g. applications from betting and gambling agencies).

There are also other authoritative markets, such as that of phone manufacturers or service providers. It often happens that in these markets there are top-apps not present in the Google Play Store, but extremely popular with users. In short, applications should also be filtered by the market in which they are available. In recent years, there has been no shortage of extremely famous application examples, within which, bugs and vulnerabilities have been found (Elenkov, 2014). We cite for example the case of extremely famous software such as Whatsapp, Messenger or Viber suffering from rather obvious security flaws that have been promptly repaired through updates released following the publication of the exploits by researchers, hackers and industry magazines. Application vulnerabilities jeopardize the integrity of users' personal data. A rather fitting example in this sense is represented by the bug that allowed the famous Viber messaging / VoIP application to unlock phones by circumventing the protection provided by the lock screen. However this is the proof that Sandbox and the permit mechanism do not always guarantee the total independence of the applications from system components, even when using certified libraries. In particular Android does not specify whether the type of connection used by the various applications that connect to external servers is safe or not, as happens instead when surfing the browser. It is therefore possible to see how a great number of the bugs present in the applications of the different Markets is attributable to bad code writing and/ or programming; the cause is attributable to inexperienced developers that often copy codes present on the internet without carrying out an accurate debugging or a correct analysis of the possible bugs present in it, but above all without performing any troubleshooting. Insecure connections are typical

vulnerabilities found in most of the Android applications developed by third parties.

The implementation of SSL / TLS protocols is often done improperly and this causes a possible unsafe exposure of data that could, therefore, be intercepted through simple MITM attacks. The fact remains that the security protocols mentioned above, although implemented in a correct way, do not guarantee the total security of the established connection. In 2017 a study conducted by some American experts in the field, detected that out of a sample of 13,500 applications downloaded from Google Play, about 8% of the apps examined contained codes potentially vulnerable to MITM-type attacks. Through simple tools like Wireshark, the data that is exchanged between a client and a server inside any node of the network utilized can be verified. In the development of client-server communications a secure set of connection instructions should always be implemented, especially for transactions involving sensitive data. In this sense, Android provides several APIs that make it possible to build a simple secure connection using the JAVA libraries that make good use of the object SSL Context. Sometimes the problem lies not so much in the implementation by the developers, but in the fact that safety certificates often have a price that cannot be sustained by those who create applications, especially if it concerns single individuals and not companies of a certain importance. Archiving files on the internal or external storage of the device is a fairly common operation for Android applications.

The use of hashing or cryptography protocols therefore represents a very important prerogative for any app that decides to take advantage of the storage media offered by the device. A first measure of security is actually offered by the Android Sandbox, which at least allows to isolate the content of a specific file stored inside the device from the other applications.

5. CONCLUSION

As emerges from this article, the digital skills of the 'generation always on' who often ignore the risks associated with surfing the net, are particularly fragile. If with the term Media Education (Buckingham, 2006) it intends, in fact, the set of educational and didactic activities aimed at informing young people and developing their critical understanding about the nature and use of the media, it is important to emphasize that in the contemporary schools these educational paths are not present. All this appears very serious in a

media society, where young people live a good part of their school and social life online, constantly connected, which is why it is essential to put specific training activities into practice in order to provide all the necessary tools to allow us to live our contemporaneity in a safe, fair and ethical way.

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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE FRAME OF THE NEW AGE VIRTUAL CULTURAL COMMUNITY – EFFECTS ON AFRICAN COUNTRIES

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Abstract: Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a contemporary, important and well-known field of the latest computer science. AI holds vast technological capabilities which are now considered as the future potential of companies, communities, and even countries. Specifically, AI cyber security technologies can assist countries to gain a significant impact in diplomacy and international affairs as well. Specifically, these gains could be highly important as implemented by third-world countries. The purpose of this article is to point out the effects of AI technologies on diplomatic and international affairs of African countries. The article elaborates how AI can provide these countries technologies that can compensate financial and military hegemony of the West. Moreover, AI has the potential to help African countries in becoming a real player in international relations, and to change the depressed discourse of the "other" hegemony. All this, of course, by understanding the meaning of culture for discourse and ultimately for diplomacy, while gaining meaning for the new potential of the West and accepting African culture, towards a possible change for both. The mechanism by which AI could benefit African countries is through flattening of the state network de facto eliminated by the Internet and social networks. Considering a very broad penetration of the cellular technology in these countries, AI could rapidly be distributed and therefore to create a new socio-cultural structure. In this article I will review the potential of AI on the social discourse in African countries as examples of rapid and profound change.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; African countries; Technological Superiority

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the dawn of history, technological development was associated with significant military and diplomatic strategic advantage. In the past decade this pattern exponentially grew involving cutting-edge technologies which create invisible power in the hands of states which hold them. These technologies are based on Artificial Intelligence, meaning intelligence demonstrated by machines which is expressed by many applications such as cloud computing, big data analytics, quantum mechanics, blockchain, and other software and hardware applications. General AI seeks to accomplish this latter task: to empower a machine to learn and solve any number of problems, much as humans can. Most experts appear to agree that the accomplishments of narrow AI, though quite significant, are a long way from the requirements that must be met to replicate human-like reasoning as envisioned by proponents of general AI (Wang & Goertzel, 2012). The proper use and implementation of AI can facilitate

a nation in the achievement of information, economic, and military superiority – all ingredients to maintaining a prominent place on the global stage (Tan, 2019).

It is now becoming clear that AI has become a new focus of international competition. AI is a strategic technology that will lead in the future; the world's major developed countries are taking the development of AI as a major strategy to enhance national competitiveness and protect national security; intensifying the introduction of plans and strategies for this core technology and trying to seize the initiative in the new round of international science and technology competition. However, AI systems could be developed and used not only in super-power states, but also in other countries, even third-world countries.

This paper aims to understand the way AI could enhance strategic diplomatic advantage of African countries by providing them powerful tools to compensate current gaps from industrial countries in many domains. This paper is theoretically relied on theoretical foundations of AI implementations in the

state-level and its influence on diplomacy and international affairs (Wang, & Goertzel, 2012; Cisse, 2018; van den Bosch, & Bronkhorst, 2018). From this theory perspective, states use AI to significantly improve their performance in both internal and external domains, in ways that could attribute a competitive advantage on other states and players in the international level.

2. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) AS A TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY

AI tools are considered of being a “game-changer” technology in shaping diplomatic affairs and international relationships. AI enables to analyze a large volume of data quickly than humans, identifying insights and trends that humans missed, and providing suggestions on how to improve diplomatic decision making (Wilner, 2018). Hence, using AI could assist in political forecasting, mining an increasing array of available data to better understand and predict political, economic, and social trends.

One of the most important aspects of using AI to achieve a diplomatic superiority is by enhancing military capabilities. AI-empowered systems that make it possible to locate, track, and target a variety of enemy weapons systems raises the possibility of striking strategic assets, such as aircraft carriers, mobile missiles, or nuclear weapons. This capability, and perceptions about its existence, could disrupt long held assumptions about deterrence stability, especially if it appeared possible to conduct a disarming counterforce strike against an adversary’s retaliatory forces. Another strategic tool, AI provides to governments is societal surveillance. AI-guided probing, mapping, and hacking of computer networks can provide useful data for machine learning, including discovery of network vulnerabilities, identities, profiles, relationships, and other information that may be valuable for offensive and defence purposes (van den Bosch, & Bronkhorst, 2018; Masuhr, 2019). Therefore, super-powers such as U.S., Russia and China invest significant efforts in developing AI capabilities in the military and diplomatic domains. For example, in 2017, the US Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) commissioned a study which recommended ensuring that the US remains as the world’s leading nation in AI technology. The study also recommended protecting the peaceful use of AI technology for businesses while mitigating any external risks posed by the military applications of AI technology (Allen & Chan, 2017). The US

Department of Defense has allocated in 2017 about 7.4\$ billion to AI, which represented 1.21% of the US military budget (Conger & Cameron, 2018). China also put AI as one of the most important national and international goals. In 2016, China was responsible for 17% of all AI investments worldwide, which was far behind the US, which was responsible for 66% of all AI investments (Columbus, 2017; Larson, 2018). To surpass the US, China plans a strategic investment of \$150 billion in AI technology by 2030 (West & Allen, 2018). Global competition in military AI is already heating up. Considering the rising tide that is advancing AI prospects around the world, temporary advantages are unlikely to yield lasting military predominance (Apiecionek et al., 2015).

Indeed, technological advances in AI reshape the practice of diplomacy. AI technologies in image recognition and information sorting can make diplomatic compounds safer by identifying anomalies for potential vulnerabilities. In addition, language processing algorithms decrease language barriers between countries, allowing them to communicate to foreign governments and publics more easily.

3. USING AI AS STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Western countries enjoyed over the years significant resources which assisted them to gain a technological superiority in many fields. Unlike Western countries, African countries lack these resources, also lack the research and development culture. Hence, they are positioned in very low places in the international map. However, for the first time, using AI technologies could assist these countries to compensate their bad starting point. These technologies enable very fast and efficient data analyses in many domains, and hence, they provide these countries learning abilities which could boost their progress. AI has a large potential to drive economic growth, development, and democratization in these countries, and therefore to improve public services, and bettering the quality of life for many people (Cisse, 2018). AI can empower workers at all skill levels to be more competitive by enhancing human skills similar to industrial countries. There is an increasing awareness of the positive effects which AI has on African countries, in sectors such as security, agriculture, health care, and public and financial services. Recently, we are witnessing initial efforts of implementing AI systems in several countries at Africa in numerous domains.

As for **cyber security** domain, several countries begun using AI in order to enforce tighter supervision on their populations. For example, at March 2018, Zimbabwean government signed a strategic partnership with the Gunagzhou-based startup CloudWalk Technology to begin a large-scale facial recognition program throughout the country. The agreement, backed by the Chinese government's Belt and Road initiative, is intended to see the technology primarily used in security and law enforcement and most likely be expanded to other public programs. This process was driven by Chinese government in order to enhance its capabilities of civil surveillance (Mare, 2019).

In this vein, AI can also aid a variety of border security and homeland security applications. AI-driven perception, processing, and analysis is essential for gathering, sorting, and interpreting data to better inform human decision-making. There are several AI applications that superpowers (U.S. and China) use to increase homeland security, while one of the most important is border security. AI systems, can aid in monitoring borders through advances in automated surveillance and anomaly detection. Systems that monitor human emotional expression and behavior could aid in recognizing humans that appear nervous or are acting oddly, serving as a "sixth sense" at border crossings. AI systems used for game theory/risk assessment also could be valuable in determining where best to apply scarce resources and how to counter adaptive adversaries, such as drug traffickers. Indeed, such systems already are being used to improve security against poachers in Africa (Kumagai, 2018).

In the domain of **agriculture**, AI technologies such as machine learning, remote sensing, and data analytics improve productivity and efficiency at all stages of the value chain. This process enables small-holder farmers to increase their income through higher crop yields and greater price control, identify and precisely treat pests and diseases, monitor soil conditions and target fertilizer applications (Vasisht et al., 2017). For example, Microsoft is applying its Farm beats platform in developing countries by lowering the cost associated with densely deploying sensors, exploiting sparsely distributed sensors and aerial imagery to generate precision maps, and replacing expensive drones with smartphones attached to hand-carried, low-cost, tethered helium balloons (Jain et al., 2019; Kapetanovic et al., 2017).

Another important domain by which African countries could improve their stability and progress, is by using AI to improve **banking and financial**

services. Digitization and innovation are two key factors in financial services providers' ability to grow (Kendall, Schiff, & Smadja, 2013). Financial institutions use AI tools to leverage analytics and data in order to create efficiencies, reduce costs, and improve customer experience. This technology will also enable them to automate their processes seamlessly to achieve improvements in frontline productivity and open new streams of revenue to remain competitive. Specifically, AI help improve financial institutions' risk management, credit allocation, and fraud detection capabilities, as well as increase their share of digital sales and transactions. Likewise, they should partner with FinTech startups for providing financial services (Okello et al., 2018).

There is also initial evidence of using AI to enhance **medical services** in African countries. Specifically, mobile clinical decision support systems could widely improve healthcare provided in rural areas African countries. In a recently published study, Bellemo et al., (2019) used AI deep learning models in a population-based diabetic retinopathy screening programme in Zambia, a lower-middle-income country. Findings showed that AI systems have clinically acceptable performance in detecting referable diabetic retinopathy, vision-threatening diabetic retinopathy, and diabetic macular oedema in an under-resourced African population to reduce the incidence of preventable blindness. Other studies indicate that mobile clinical decision support systems AI-based could improve patient-provider relationships through increased trust and confidence, and that health workers believed the systems could improve their efficiency, competence, and self-confidence in their work (Adepoju et al., 2017; Olajubu et al., 2014).

These examples emphasise the role of AI in providing powerful solutions for developed countries in Africa in various domains. Hence, AI holds a major potential in narrowing large cultural gaps exist between them and industrial countries. The main mechanism that enable the fast penetration and implementation of AI tools in Africa is the deployment of cellular networks in many African countries. Hence, there is an increase in network coverage, also an explosive increase of cell phones user rates all over the world (Piette et al., 2012). Mobile telephony has brought new possibilities to the continent. Across urban-rural and rich-poor divides, mobile phones connect individuals to individuals, information, markets, and services. In the last decade, mobile phones have greatly reduced communication costs thereby

allowing individuals and hereby allowing individuals and firms to send and to obtain information quickly on economic, social, and political topics (Jensen, 2010; Aker, 2010). As a response to increases in mobile phone coverage and adoption in Africa, mobile phone-based development projects have proliferated in a variety of sectors. Policy makers quickly understood the vast potential of the mobile phones among large proportions of the population in Africa. The main goal of each project differs significantly, but the underlying belief is that mobile phones can offer a useful platform for providing information and services. Specifically, the large coverage of mobile phone enable to implement AI tools applications such as civic surveillance to increase the ability of governments in Africa to control (Aker, & Mbiti, 2010).

4. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

AI is one of the most important technological development of the current era, which its potential is yet to be revealed. Using AI by nations has a tremendous and strategic consequences on military and diplomatic relations. Specifically, AI being incorporated into a wide array of security missions and diplomacy provides these nations a very significant tool in analysing data and achieving better decisionmaking processes, in a way that could give them a wide range of beneficial outcomes. As for African countries as third-world countries, AI could be an important opportunity to compensate their lack of resources. This paper reviewed some of the important directions by which African countries begun to use AI to improve social, financial, medical and security processes. These patterns are likely to increase in the coming decade, providing these countries significant resources to achieve some of the international power gained by industrial Western countries.

In order to this course of action to take place, African governments should promote technological development by encouraging innovation and investment. At the same time, as leading countries have shown, government engagement and experimentation with nascent technology can also be a powerful signal of trust and support local companies. According to African stakeholders, low government engagement, particularly at the policy level, has been a hindrance, and a stronger focus will encourage an early adoption of AI. Therefore, African governments should take a proactive approach and implement AI-friendly regulation, policies, and initiatives, specifically in two main domains. First, as for cybersecurity, African

governments should adopt cybersecurity laws which guide for meaningful deterrence, clarify legal responsibilities, and create effective and reasonable enforcement mechanisms. In addition, authorities should assist individuals understand and properly manage the risks inherent in using AI technology. Second, in order to enhance the use in AI applications by users, it is necessary to increase trust in this technology by people. Hence, it is vital to establish a data privacy and security framework that individuals can trust encourages and empowers them to use AI-based solutions that require their data to work. Data privacy and security laws should aim to protect users' data without restricting the ability to move data across borders.

The implementation of these steps is not easy, but in order to unleash the power of AI for African countries, they are very important. Success will depend on the ability of governments to foster collaboration among all stakeholders — state and civil society, academia, industry, and national and international stakeholders. If these groups jointly embrace the challenges and opportunities of AI, Africa will reap the benefits of a vibrant AI ecosystem.

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A REVIEW OF MACHINE LEARNING TECHNIQUES FOR THE CYBERSECURITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

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Abstract: *An essential component of the National security consists of the protection of its critical infrastructures (CIs), whether they are physical or virtual, as any disruption of their services could have a serious impact on economic well-being, public health or safety, or any combination of these. Any shutdown or delay may determine financial losses and major risks to people and the environment. All modern CIs are controlled by Industrial Control Systems (ICS) being dependent on their correct and continuous undisturbed functioning. Modern ICSs are inherently much less secure and exposed to the majority of cyber-attacks that are becoming more advanced and sophisticated. Consequently, efficient tools for the protection of hardware and software components of ICSs are required. One such class consists of intrusion prevention and detection systems (IPDS). Contemporary IPDSs use machine learning algorithms to detect threats manifested as anomalous behavior of a particular system. To provide robust detection systems with sufficient layers of protection, these must be combined with other methods and extensively tested with good datasets and using appropriate testbeds. Recent research suggests that conventional intrusion detection approaches are unable to cope with the complexity and ever-changing nature of industrial intrusion attacks. Moreover, deep learning methods are achieving state-of-the-art results across a range of difficult problem domains. The objective of our paper is to identify and discuss machine learning-based intrusion detection and protection methods and their implementation in industrial control intrusion detection systems, able to contribute to ensuring national security.*

Keywords: *critical infrastructures; industrial control systems; cybersecurity; machine learning*

1. INTRODUCTION

All modern critical infrastructures (CIs) are controlled by Industrial Control Systems (ICS) being dependent on their correct and continuous undisturbed functioning. ICSs are inherently much less secure and exposed to the majority of cyber-attacks that are becoming more advanced and sophisticated. Consequently, efficient tools for protection of hardware and software components of ICSs are required. One such class are intrusion prevention and detection systems (IPDs).

Contemporary IPDSs use machine learning algorithms to detect threats manifested as anomalous behavior of a particular system. To provide robust detection systems with sufficient layers of protection, these must be combined with other methods and extensively tested with good datasets and using appropriate testbeds.

Recent research (Wilson *et al.*, 2018; Yang *et al.*, 2019) suggests that conventional intrusion detection approaches are unable to cope with the complexity and ever-changing nature of industrial intrusion attacks. Moreover, deep learning methods are achieving state-of-the-art results across a range of difficult problem domains. The objective of our paper is to identify and discuss cybersecurity vulnerabilities for ICSs, as well as proposed solutions that mitigate the threats, their inherent limitations that affect implementation in order to support industrial control intrusion detection systems, able to contribute to ensuring the security of CIs. Section 2 highlights the threats to which control systems are exposed today. Considering this landscape, Section 3 addresses the search for defense techniques against APTs, especially intrusion detection systems. Finally, machine learning techniques for

intrusion detection systems, as well as the application of these mechanisms in practice, are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.

2. SPECIFIC VULNERABILITIES OF INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS

A cyber-attack is an attempt to expose, alter, disable, destroy, steal or gain unauthorized access to or make unauthorized use of an information system, infrastructure, computer network, or other computing devices of a system that is executed by means of cyberspace (www.iso.org).

A cybersecurity threat is a potential successful cyber-attack that could lead to gaining unauthorized access, damage, disruption, or steal an information technology asset, computer network, intellectual property or any other form of sensitive data. It also refers to the malicious activity that seeks to damage data, steal data, or disrupt digital life in general (https://www.upguard.com/blog/cyber-threat). The first step to tackling the cybersecurity threats consists in understanding where attacks can come from, how the attacks are enabled, and what damages could produce.

Cybersecurity vulnerabilities have several different, but similar definitions in the literature. For example, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) defines vulnerabilities as “flaws or weaknesses in a system design, implementation, or operation and management that could be exploited in order to violate the system’s security policy” (RFC 4949). Analogously, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the following definition: “Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source” (NIST, 2020). Consequently, a vulnerability can be seen as a specific instance of a weakness and can be found in either software, hardware, a network or inside an organization.




Figure 1. Cybersecurity Concepts Taxonomy (apud Atif et al, 2018)

When talking about malicious code such as viruses or worms, a vector represents the pathway used by that code to propagate itself or infect a computer. In the cybersecurity domain, an attack vector is a path or means by which an attacker can gain unauthorized access to a computer or network.

The threat, risk, asset, and vulnerability are the main concepts of a cybersecurity taxonomy developed by Atif et. al (2018).

According to this taxonomy (fig. 1), vulnerabilities cause the appearance of exploit vectors. Threat actors get a certain level of awareness about those exploit vectors and use them to generate threats.

Threats generate attack vectors that could disrupt the infrastructure assets. Vulnerabilities induce risks to the assets by allowing temporary or permanent functioning disruptions.

Macaulay (2016) distinguishes vulnerabilities and threats based on whether an action has been taken. A threat appears when a person, group or thing is acting, whereas a vulnerability exists as a flaw in a system. While the attack vectors are known, vulnerabilities are dynamic and cyber assets must continuously be monitored and assessed. In order to develop appropriate mitigation actions, it is necessary to understand how the Operational Technologies (OT) environment can be accessed and what impacts can be achieved.

The main challenge present in the modern Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is due to the dual nature of their composing technologies (Amoroso & Ginter, 2018). On one side, Operational Technologies (OT), consisting of hardware and software that detects or causes changes in physical processes through direct monitoring and/or control of industrial equipment. On the other side, conventional ICT components connected with the corporate business information systems and the internet. The two different interface types can be related to different forms of vulnerability: degradation of communications or degradation of I/O control.

In order to ensure the exchange of information with both IT and OT systems, Industrial Control System (ICS) component devices must provide both types of access points and connection capabilities across the ICS network or system interfaces. This is the main pathway of malicious actions on ICS. Firstly, besides classical security threats, conventional IT hacking tools and techniques become able to reach proximity to OT devices. Then, because the OT devices are not protected, an attack on OT control or the device directly could be executed (Amoroso & Ginter, 2018).

Macaulay & Singer (2011) when dealing with ICS vulnerabilities, have classified them from the perspective of security controls. They identified the following categories of security vulnerabilities: management (business), operational, and technical types. Management vulnerabilities are due to human flawed decisions and are basically deficiencies in enterprise risk management in ICS. They include: the lack of ICS security policies, management-level accountabilities and guidance and also bad security investment budgeting.

ICS operational vulnerabilities consist in weaknesses the procedures and policies, like improper separation of duties for administrative accounts and roles, insecure Internet communication channels and wireless system deployments. There are also: improper incident detection, response, and reporting, poor change management, and poor vulnerability and acceptance testing procedures.

Technical vulnerabilities are due to security weaknesses in hardware, software, and networks (Macaulay & Singer, 2011, Calvo et al., 2016) detailed a comprehensive synthesis of these. Accordingly, the following categories can be identified: (1) Platform and applications vulnerabilities, (2) Network vulnerabilities, (3) Vulnerabilities related to Communication Protocols.

Platform and application vulnerabilities are deficiencies and flaws found in hardware, software and malware protection software of the system. They include: usage of outdated equipment and software; usage of default settings in applications; absence of backups of the critical configurations; inappropriate security configuration for remote access; inadequate authentication control at equipment and software level; software components containing errors that produce buffer overflow situations or resource unavailability due to traffic flooding (Denial-of-Service); missing or inadequate malware protection measures; improper configuration of the operating system; flawed designed applications.

The main network vulnerabilities (Calvo et al., 2016) are: ill-designed network architecture without adequate security measures; lack of backup or/and storing network settings; absence or poor authentication mechanisms at the protocol levels; bad management of network passwords; lack of network traffic monitoring; use of nonencrypted protocols (e. g. Telnet, FTP or wireless connections); lack of integrity checking at the hardware device level.

Another major vulnerability in an OT/IT infrastructure is enabled by allowing critical and

non-critical components to communicate across shared mechanisms such as a fieldbus. So, vulnerability paths to remote control are opened and hacks can occur even in the presence of proper network security controls.

3. SPECIFIC THREATS AND CYBERSECURITY TOOLS

As opposed to cyber-attacks against IT systems, usually oriented on data theft or financial loss, cyber-attacks against OT systems additionally focus on the disruption of cyber assets. They focus on operational impact trying to achieve loss, denial, or manipulation of view, control, safety, or sensors and instruments. According to (Ani, He & Tiwari, 2017) threats fall into one of six categories: (1) Denial of view (DoV), (2) Loss of view (LoV), (3) Manipulation of view (MoV), (4) Denial of control (DoC), (5) Loss of control (LoC), and (6) Manipulation of control (MoC).

A DoV is caused by a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, resolved when the interface recovers and becomes available. The reception of status and reporting messages is temporarily blocked. Thus, operator visibility is denied preventing him from noticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. It increases the risks of incorrect or damaging behaviors.

A LoV results from a sustained or permanent interface communication failure and requires local hands-on user intervention. The impact of this threat is similar to DoV, but more severe because of the effort required to bring the system back to the expected functioning state.

MoV is an attempt to manipulate the information reported back to the operator or to controllers. Harmful actions are enabled via information distortion (falsified ICS data) transmitted to the operator or controller. This manipulation may be short term or sustained.

DoC is a threat to temporarily prevent the operator from controlling the processes and (or) devices. The affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. The threat targets control devices, I/O control interface functions and only gets recovered as soon as it is removed.

A LoC condition appears when the operator could be prevented from issuing any commands even if the malicious interference has vanished. The impact of LoC is similar to the impact of the LoV, but recovery can only be achieved via the operator's interventions, such as system rebooting.

MoC, the most critical threat, appears when control system devices are controlled and altered by malicious actors. Manipulation of physical process control within the industrial environment becomes possible, legitimate process instructions, and operator commands can be overridden. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: Man-in-the-middle, spoof command message, changing setpoints.

Starting from mid 2000s, a new type of cyberattack, the advanced persistent threat (APT) has posed an unprecedentedly dangerous threat to CIs. APTs are a category of cyber threats that are malicious, organized, highly sophisticated in their use of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and target IT networks for long-term access, in order to obtain information or sabotage one organization operations. As stated by NIST (Chen et al., 2014), their source is “An adversary that possesses sophisticated levels of expertise and significant resources which allow it to create opportunities to achieve its objectives by using multiple attack vectors (e.g., cyber, physical, and deception)”.

Apart from traditional threats, the distinguishing characteristics of an APT are: it pursues its objectives repeatedly and for a long time, it adapts to defending actions by using stealthy and evasive attack techniques and “it maintains the level of interaction needed to execute its objectives”.

APTs consist of a complex of actions, their life cycle including preparatory, acting and persisting stages. In Chen *et al.* (2014), one of the most detailed description, an APT contains six stages: (1) reconnaissance and weaponization; (2) delivery; (3) initial intrusion; (4) command and control; (5) lateral movement; (6) data exfiltration. First stage is intelligence gathering, mainly relying on the internet, active scan, and social engineering methods. Second and third stages cover the access and invasion into the target network through phishing emails, SQL injection, mobile storage devices and any other methods. In the fourth stage, remote control, by installing back door programs or Trojan programs, attackers control the user infrastructure and keep communication with the control servers via the network communication protocols. Next stage is lateral movement, attackers use vulnerability scanning, listen to network traffic for password, embedded remote control tool (RAT) and other methods, continue to search for important computers which store sensitive information. The final stage is data theft or system damaging by sending back sensitive data to servers or controlling devices.

Besides raising risk awareness to these new categories of threats, an additional effort is needed to mitigate the risks posed by these threats in the ICS domain. This implies using a complex of measures and tools for the effective detection of APTs and other sophisticated threats. These should include combining traditional countermeasures (e.g., intrusion detection systems, firewalls, antivirus) with novel security techniques.

When focusing on the OT domain of the ICS architecture, several specific security tools can be identified. From the perspective of their main functionality, these can be included in one of the following categories (Hurd & McCarty, 2017).

Detection of the Indicator of Compromise (IOC). IOC is a forensic artifact, observable on the network or host, that indicates a computer intrusion with high confidence. IOC examples include: signatures of known malware, traces of malicious network traffic and URLs or domains that are known malware sources. IOCs are directly linked to measurable events. A tool in this category is able to detect all malicious data generated by such events.

Network Traffic Anomaly Detection. Network traffic anomaly detection tools are based on the statistical properties of the network where they are used. These properties refer to IP addresses, ports, frequencies of communication, packet content, etc. Anomaly detection does not necessarily require updates when new threats are detected. An anomaly detected on the network is, by definition, a new threat or a false positive. An anomaly detection tool should be able to be trained on a network for normal traffic, and then to use that model to determine anomalous traffic.

Outlier Analysis. Tools in this category have the ability to analyze anomalous data for future threat intelligence. This data is usually identified by searching for meaningful differences across large datasets spanning many hosts that share common configurations.

Log Review. Log review is the process of analyzing computer generated records of internal events, including a temporal reference. A log review tool does anomaly analysis within the logs in order to identify areas of interest in a log file or correlates different logs into a timeline of event activity. Other functionalities can include the removal of uninteresting data while maintaining the integrity of the log file.

System Artifact Review. A system artifact review tool analyzes system artifacts that are created as a byproduct of execution. These could include registry files, data files, memory resident information, environment variables, or similar.

This tool should be capable of extracting all possibly useful information from the analysis and storing it for future execution.

Reverse Engineering (RE) Analysis. A RE analysis tool extracts information from a given set of data. The data sources include files and/or firmware of a device and also network traffic. The tool is able to decompose software and firmware architectures and to display the information in an easy understandable structure that facilitates the RE process.

The objective of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is to correctly detect attacks against networks with the lowest possible number of false positives. Recently, new anomaly-based detection techniques using machine learning have been used. Even in the research phase, many of them could provide satisfactory results, as regular ICS traffic is related to a limited number of requests and responses, making it clearly different from malicious traffic.

4. MACHINE LEARNING TECHNIQUES FOR INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS

Machine learning techniques are suitable to be applied in various domains where is a need for adaptation to different types of data, as they provide an efficient way to learn a nonlinear system without the need to use a physical model.

Specifically, for ICSs, in order to mitigate the security aspects related to the operation of the CIs, intrusion detection mechanisms need to be employed to protect against malicious attacks. Among the most acute security problems that affect the ICS, one of the most prominent is related to the legacy communication protocols that were not designed with security as a priority, but rather to optimize the performance and provide functionalities. Moreover, insecure deployments are caused by a lack of specific network segregation and access control mechanisms.

In general, an IDS could be conceived as anomaly or signature based. The former is implemented using algorithms that calculate deviations from the normal behavior of the system, while the latter makes use of signature databases or known patterns in order to identify an intrusion.

Another detection approach uses model-based techniques that characterize the acceptable behavior of the system and detect attacks that cause unacceptable behavior. These types of methods are applicable for detecting an intrusion based on the analysis of the network protocol (e.g. Modbus) or the network infrastructure, however

they are of limited use because in practice it is difficult to construct such models. Moreover, as these models are not very accurate (as it is very difficult to capture all possible operating scenarios), this approach could cause many false alarms.

The main task of anomaly detection systems is thus to monitor the network traffic or the parameters of the production installations in order to detect suspicious activity and to alert on possible attacks. The signature-based intrusion detection systems work well to recognize patterns that were already provided to them, however they are not so efficient for novel attacks or patterns that were not seen previously. Instead, an anomaly-based IDS is capable of learning new standard profiles and then to update its model such that new behavior can be learned and classified.

The information about the network traffic and installation operation statistics is provided by management tools that monitor the system hardware and the communication links, such that the traffic can be characterized as normal or anomalous based on specific detection methods like pattern matching which detects anomalies by analyzing deviations from normal behaviors. In this case, the normal traffic of the system is used to build a model for normal behavior. In addition, usage profiles are created for different scenarios, using system parameters such as CPU utilization, network bandwidth, or processes in memory. These profiles are then used to evaluate if a particular data traffic pattern fits a predefined type, which could indicate an anomaly or a possible intrusion.

However, anomaly detection in ICS is a challenging problem and it cannot solely depend on network protocol information. Additional information related to physical processes needs to be examined. This significantly increases the dimensionality and complexity of data samples. In addition, physical process control variables may exhibit noisy behaviors by nature, which is likely to result in high false-positive rates for anomaly detectors and low detection rates of attacks. There are several limitations with most existing solutions, as presented by (Feng et. al., 2017): the majority of the methods rely on predefined models and signatures to detect anomalous behaviors, and this approach requires human effort, which is inconsistent and error prone. These models are not capable of detecting unknown attacks because they use only known signatures, and they are specifically designed for specific use-cases, and lack the flexibility to adapt to new systems.

Nonetheless, machine learning is an essential component of the cybersecurity domain, as it is used in malware detection, events classification, and alerting. It is critical for the identification of infrastructure vulnerabilities and exploits (Fraley & Cannady, 2017).

5. APPLICATIONS OF MACHINE LEARNING IN CYBERSECURITY

Anomaly based intrusion detection techniques are capable of identifying unknown attacks as they follow the normal behavior of the system and observe any deviation from that baseline, and can be customized to different systems and network types (Xin *et al.*, 2018).

Advanced machine learning techniques such as Deep Learning have been widely applied to various application domains such as image processing, natural language processing or speech recognition. In the area of cybersecurity, numerous approaches have been proposed to tackle intrusion and malware detection, as well as phishing or spam detection (Mahdavifar & Ghorbani, 2019).

For example, Bakalos *et al.* (2019) proposed an attack detection framework for critical water infrastructure protection based on multimodal data fusion and adaptive deep learning. Their solution is based on tapped delay line convolutional neural network (TDL-CNN), which contains a deep CNN with autoregressive moving-average attributes, that allows the model to better adapt to dynamic attack characteristics.

A malicious threat detection model for cloud assisted internet of things (CoT) based industrial control system networks using Deep Belief Network (DBN) was proposed by (Huda *et al.*, 2018). This system is based on two different types of deep learning based detection models - a disjoint training and testing data for a DBN and corresponding artificial neural network (ANN), and a DBN which is trained using new unlabeled data that can provide additional knowledge about the changes in the malicious attack patterns.

While many existing solutions rely on human-defined features to develop machine learning based attack detectors against prominent exploits, such features are becoming more expensive and less effective. To supplement more high-quality features for machine learning based threat monitoring, Wilson, Tang, Yan & Lu (2018) proposed a stacked autoencoder (SAE) based deep learning framework to develop machine-learned features against transmission SCADA attacks. Compared with the state-of-the-art machine learning detectors, the

proposed framework leverages the automaticity of unsupervised feature learning to reduce the reliance on system models and human expertise in complex security scenarios.

In He, Mendis & Wei (2017), a real-time detection mechanism based on deep learning techniques was introduced. This system is capable of recognizing the behavior patterns of False Data Injection (FDI) attacks using the historical measurement data. Deep learning techniques are used to capture the higher-order statistical structure of the complex data by arranging the feature detectors in layers. A Deep Belief Network is constructed with a stack of Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBMs) in order to extract high-dimensional temporal features. This DBN architecture is designed to analyze the temporal attack patterns that are presented by the real-time measurement data from the geographically distributed sensors/meters.

Instead of relying on hand-crafted features for individual network packets or flows, Yang, Cheng, & Chuah (2019) employ a convolutional neural network (CNN) to characterize salient temporal patterns of SCADA traffic and identify time windows where network attacks are present. The model uses realistic SCADA traffic data sets and shows that the proposed deep-learning-based approach is well-suited for network intrusion detection in SCADA systems by achieving high detection accuracy and providing the capability to handle newly emerged threats.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The goal of this paper was to provide a better understanding of cybersecurity aspects that are relevant to the Industrial Control Systems on which CIs are dependent. The need to protect against malicious attacks is a paramount concern, as unknown vulnerabilities can be exploited with extremely damaging effects. To mitigate this risk, various intrusion detection techniques are used, and in particular, anomaly-based detection solutions are implemented using machine learning methods. We have presented a suite of examples related to deep learning architectures that are used in the cybersecurity domain, and which are relevant for the protection of Critical Infrastructures.

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APPLYING THE EUROPEAN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY THROUGH UNIVERSITY RESEARCH AT 7TH DEVELOPMENT REGION

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Abstract: *The present paper emphasizes the role that research and innovation plays as part of the efforts that the Romanian society is making in order to achieve the goals of Sustainable Development. At the same time, based on an argument analysis, it is desired to point out some of the causes of the poor cooperation between universities and the business environment at regional level, by suggesting solutions that would bring about major changes at the three levels: social, environmental and economic. The final conclusions reiterate the need of putting into practice the new breakthroughs in science and technology with the help of structures and cooperation network as catalytic factors in economic development and smart specialization at regional and national level.*

Keywords: *Sustainable Development; innovation and innovative enterprise; technological transfer; innovation and research clusters*

1. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL LAW-MAKING

Sustainable Development is a word that holds a world of promises; which conjures up peace, prosperity and being in harmony with nature. Not surprisingly, Europe has a strong desire for Sustainable Development. This European desire became clear in 2001 and increased, reaching a peak in 2007. In January 2007, Jose Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission declared:

Europe needs to lead the world into a new or maybe one should say post-industrial revolution in order to develop a low-carbon emission economy (Gibbs, 2002).

However, one year later, the biggest financial crisis since 1929 hit the world. Consequently, Europe was affected, thus deepening and creating new macroeconomic imbalances. That crisis made it clear that the financial boom of the previous decades had been a durable one. Yet, the way in which most European nations tried to fight against a global financial crisis that would shape the 21st century, lacked completely the Sustainable Development perspective. Romania, as a member of the United Nation (UN), has adopted the 2030

Agenda and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals, approved by the UN at the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit through UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/70/1, on 15 September 2015. Also, as a member of the European Union (EU), Romania has adopted the political document to which the member states have committed themselves, "A Sustainable European Future: The EU Response to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" (SNDDR, 2008).

Thus, in Romania the national framework for implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is set, by implementing the UN and EU resolutions. This strategy promotes the sustainable development of Romania, by concentrating on three dimensions: (1) The economic dimension; (2) The social dimension; (3) The environmental dimension (ADRC, 2016).

This three-dimension-strategy, which was defined as a concept in the Brundtland Report in 1987, may be put into practice by emphasizing this concept of "Exceed boundaries", in the sense that natural resources have been overused and the excessive economic growth has created an environmental imbalance. Table 1 shows the ranking of compound indexes and the main problems that they create within the three dimensions of Sustainable Development (Keiner, 2006).

Table 1 The ranking situation of compound indexes and critical problems

Sustainable development			
	the environmental dimension	the social dimension	the economic dimension
critical problems	biodiversity air quality water quality soil quality energy resource usage climate changes	population health and safety education and knowledge welfare perception institutional capacity	new materials and new energy economic exchange flux income distribution economic growth debt payment
compound indexes	global warming the ozone layers reverse of the earth poles river pollution afforestation ocean fishing	life expectancy loss of earning capacity crime rate institutional participation literacy school drop-out	the Gini coefficient (index of inequality) natural disasters damage natural increase in solid waste quantity
data base	Habitat	population	economic structure

On the one hand, it is clear that the current model of global development poses a number of risky for future generations, ranging from the risk of a nuclear war to risk brought about by the volatility of international financial markets or the risk of flooding of megalopolis on the American or European coast. On the other hand, it is not clear how to reduce these risks, step by step, by starting from the current institutional, social, technological and cultural conditions.

It is clear that the risks mentioned before, can entail seismic waves that will affect all domains of the social and economic life all around the world. Europe cannot solve the problem of Sustainable Development on its own, neither can it give directions to the rest of the world on how this problem can be solved, it can nevertheless help by coming up with appropriate solutions to this global issue. In this context, education and research in support of Sustainable Development are a major opportunity for Europe and thus for Romania, as an EU member to take responsibility, along other states, as an equal partner in these global issues.

2. FACTORS THAT PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AT NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

In this respect, we have considered it would be an opportunity to study the horizontal factors that promote the Sustainable Development, from the point of view of science in service to the public good (Phillis, 2009). If we are to think logically

about the factors that could influence Sustainable Development horizontally, we will discover that we have five structural factors-conditions in order to create a sustainable social economy that can also achieve the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals. These factors are as follows: (1) Education; (2) Science; (3) Technology; (4) Research; (5) Innovation. The five factors have been grouped according to three categories in order to be studied from the point of view of their output, due the determining connections between them, ranging from the level of understanding of the phenomena to their mutual interinfluence. These three categories will be analyzed in detail next (Munier, 2005).

2.1. Education. Easy access and mass participation to quality education are essential in order to be successful in a society that benefits from Sustainable Development, and education as part of the process prior to entering the labor market, has to become a process that will prepare future generations, in line with the challenges of the future, promoting innovation, meritocracy together with constructive thinking, giving way to inquisitives as well as empowerment behavior. This is possible in the next decades, yet being conditioned by all children's access to mass education, to early education that would result in professional skills which are relevant in a changing society, based on Sustainable Development.

As a result of a study carried out by the European Union in 2017, the share of early leavers from education or school dropout stood at 18,1% of the school population. This rate decreased by

1,9% compared to 2006 and it was higher than the rate in the European Union, which stood at 10,6%. Obviously, school dropout represents one of the most serious problems that education has to cope with nowadays being closely linked to the economic and social situation of different groups. The school dropout rate is different in the eight development regions, as presented in figure 1.




Fig. 1 School dropout rate according to development regions in 2017

This difference is caused by a number of factors, one of them being the poor social inclusion and employability in poorly industrialized regions. In predominantly agricultural regions the social failure of families appeared as a result of low income. In addition, monoparental and biparental work migration to other countries in the European Union appeared as a result of the need for a decent salary. As a rule, work migration in poorly industrialized development regions or in predominantly agricultural regions occurs among fit for work adults. Thus, school dropout is encouraged, by replacing parents' duties with children's duties for children's not older than 16.

Sustainable Development is a model to be followed, based on ethics and education for Sustainable Development and its goal is developing skills that help individuals to reflect on their own actions, by taking into account their present and future impacts, their social, cultural impacts and especially the economic, social and environmental impacts (Gibbs, 2008).

Table 2 Percentage of GDP on Education in Romania

Year	% of GDP for Education
2014	3,09
2015	3,24
2016	2,85
2017	2,86
2018	2,98
2019	3,02

According to EUROSTAT data, Romania has the lowest general government expenditure in the EU on education, a figure which is two times lower than the European average. Thus, the education budget accounts for approximately 3% of GDP, as it can be seen in Table 2.

2.2. Science and technology. Science and technology also have an important role among factors that can influence Sustainable Development, as they decisively determine and have a long term effect on economic growth at national and European level, due to the new concepts regarding the usage of "green" technology. Add to this, using Artificial Intelligence, as a drive that turns our present society into an information society or a digital society in which creating, sharing and using the information has significant impact on the economic, political, social and cultural environment. Unfortunately, Europe is only in third place after USA and China when it comes to information technology and to using Artificial Intelligence (AI) in informational technology. Therefore, science and technology need to play a more important role as determining factors of Sustainable Development.

2.3. Research and Innovation. Research and innovation act as catalysts of transition to a society based on Sustainable Development, due to their more significant role in economy and society. They are analysis tools that assess the impact of change and ways for guaranteeing the fact that transition leads to improving our welfare in a society based on the concept of Sustainable Development. Also, these tools, namely research and innovation, allow as to save money due to technological innovations that help to increase the potential of production, due to reducing production costs, thus resulting in a smaller final cost of products. Bigger investment in research and technology will contribute to achieving long term political goals, such as those related to climate and environmental goals, by using "green" technologies or biodegradable raw materials (SN CDI, 2007).

Europe has the intelligence and the necessary skills, as well as a native creativity which, combined with a completely reformed education system can change and bring about future change in world evolution. Due to the large community of researchers and inventors, who are also one of Europe's strong points, Europe has the chance to become a leader in developing and applying radically innovative solutions to support green

growth that helps inclusion in the EU, as well as social and economic worldwide as a social pattern. However, in order to fully take advantage of this potential, it is necessary the EU states should increase research expenditures. EU agreed that 3% of the GDP of EU states should be spent on

research, development and innovation by 2020, but we are still far away from reaching that goal.

In Figure 2 we can see the evolution of the budget allocated to research and innovation in Romania between 2011 and 2017:




Fig. 2 Graph with Romanian budget allocation for research and innovation between 2011-2017

3. RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN ROMANIA-DETERMINING FACTOR THAT SUPPORT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Research and innovation in Romania place our country in the category of modest innovators, occupying for many years one of the final positions in the European ranking, due to the low share of expenditures on research-innovation-development (RID), which has constantly stood below 0,5% of GDP. The duration and the negative effect of these negative developments have had as a result the fact that research community in Romania is currently the largest scientific community in EU, whose activity has attracted attention even overseas (Rus, 2015).

This situation is due to the little interest that the economic environment has shown to the research-development activities in general, and to the ones carried out by their own effort in particular. Given that private investment in financing research development projects is low, in order to support research, measures have been taken to increase the income of research-innovation-development (RDI) personnel, by Emergency Act 751 adopted by the Parliament on October 11, 2017, regarding the maximum level of which salaries are determined, and also by applying tax exemption for the income of research-innovation-development (RDI) personnel.

Also, measures have been taken to stimulate the research-innovation-development (RDI) in companies by means of direct finance tools, using National Founding Programs, research-innovation-development (RDI) Sectorial Operational Programs, loan guarantee instruments or venture capital investment and other tax relief schemes.

Major investments have been made in major infrastructures, included in international scientific

circulation, specific to state-of-the-art technology, emerging in a major European project:

- ELI-NP Extreme Light Infrastructure-Nuclear Physics Project, with a high-power LASER and a high intensity Gamma-ray beams;
- The DANUBIUS Project and the International Centre for Advanced Studies on River-Sea Systems-DANUBIUS RI, a distributed research infrastructure that aims to develop interdisciplinary research on River-Sea Systems;
- The Project of the research-innovation-development (RDI) Institute: High-Tech products for Sustainable Development at Transylvania University of Brasov (ADRC, 2016).

Another goal of European Union is increasing the budget allocated to research by 30% every year, by ensuring a balanced budget distribution, meant to support both the applicative research and innovation, the fundamental and the border research and focusing on Smart Specialization domain that have growth potential (Dobrescu, 2007). Developing Sector programs that finance applicative research is made from the state budget, and also by encouraging private investment and by developing partnerships in this sector. A member of goals has been set for 2030 as follows (Caloghirou *et al.*, 2004):

- Modernizing and developing the quality, durable, strong and reliable infrastructure, including the regional and cross border infrastructure, in order to support the economic development and people's welfare, focusing on mass equal access for all people;
- Improving road safety;
- Redeveloping industries in order to make them sustainable, showing high efficiency in using resources and adopting new technology and clean and environmentally-friendly industrial processes,

as all countries should take proper measures, according to their own capability;

- Stimulating digital economy and industrial investment in particular, that would bring more value, thus capitalizing on the national research-innovation-development (RDI) efforts and that are aimed at stable and developed market;

- Developing scientific research, modernizing technological capabilities of industrial sectors;

- Encouraging innovation and increasing the number of people working in research and development and increasing public and private expenditures on research and development;

- Promoting inclusive and sustainable industrialization and increasing the occupancy rate;

- Increasing the access of small industrial business to financial services, including accessible loans, and integrating them on global markets and value chains.

4. ANALYSING SOLUTIONS PROVIDED BY LOCAL AND REGIONAL UNIVERSITY RESEARCH TO BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT THAT SUPPORT THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

In Romania there are currently over 560 faculties in over 40 universities, but their number has decreased by 100 mainly due to, first of all, the small number of students, and secondly because of the stricter and stricter conditions imposed by ARACIS (The Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education) in order to approve an academic programme. In figure 3 it is shown the number of faculties, which has seen a constant decrease, compared to 2011.




Fig. 3 Graph with decreasing of total number of faculties between 2011-2016

Domestic university research still plays a minor role in economic development, the transfer of results and applying them in economy being a slow and difficult process. Re-establishing a strong connection between research and economy and

increasing innovation are means that ensure a Sustainable Development of the economy in the Central Region thus some recent initiative proving that promoting such a development model is desired.




Fig. 4 Graph with research expenditure in Brasov between 2005-2014-percentage of GDI

In order to become more competitive from an economic point of view, the Central Region has to stimulate research and innovation and the available human resource should be better used, Generic technologies, the new information and communication technologies, the eco-technologies, the creative industries are key-domain that the Central Region has to focus on. Innovation and research should not be restricted only to the economic sector, but they should find practical application in as many areas of society, with positive effects on people's life. In figure 4 it is shown the research expenditure in Brasov, starting with 2005 and until 2014 as a percent of GDI.

It is obvious that there was an increase in the research expenditure before 2009, the year when the research crisis happened. After 2009 [9], there was a drop in the expenditure. The situation improved in 2017 when the GDI also saw a significant rise (SN CDI, 2014).

Active involvement in research of researchers, companies and business support structures, of public authorities and universities represent the key to success of any endeavor that aims at increasing the role of research and development of the economy in the Central Region. In figure 5 we can observe the changes in the financing of research in Central Region compared to Brasov.




Fig. 5 Graph with comparison of financing research in percentage of GDI between Central Region and Brasov

Researchers, research companies and local companies are, at the same time, beneficiaries of this financing and the main innovation agents, but the snowball effect should also be taken into consideration.

In the Central Region, clusters have the highest contribution to supporting research, innovation and technology transfer. A society based on Sustainable Development can only be successful there is a transfer of ideas from the field of research and innovation to organizational or local society in order to help businesses to reinvent themselves by using new discoveries in their field of work. It is a well-known fact that we have to come up with solutions in order to increase the process of technology transfer to local economic businesses.

Firstly, in order to improve technology transfer, a first strategic step has been taken by setting up the Transylvania Cluster Consortium in Seventh Central Region that currently has 21 clusters, the main fields of activity being tourism and health care, food industry and agriculture,

renewable energy, creative industry, wood and furniture industry, textile and clothing industry, space industry, mechatronics, electrical industry and metal industry, which are actually priority areas or successful areas in the Central Region.

The term "innovation" is more and more frequently used in the European Union, due to the setting up of clusters in industry economy or innovative industry. Innovation represents introducing a new product, a new or significant improved process, a new organization method or a new marketing strategy.

Innovation must have new characteristics or new usage intentions that lead to a significant improvement compared to what was used or sold by the industry. However, an innovation can fail or may take time in order to prove its technical and economic efficiency.

Innovative companies are active companies that have launched products (goods or services) that are new or significantly improved, or have introduced new or significantly improved

processes, together with new organization or marketing methods.

Thus, using the only available data provided by the National Institute of Statistics, in figure 6 it can be seen that when it comes to innovative companies, Centre Region hold the third position

in the national ranking of the Development Region. Also, the ranking is the same, regarding the product/process innovation aspect. As far as organization and marketing innovation is concerned, Centre Region is on the seventh position at national level.




Fig. 6 Graph with the percentage of innovative companies according to types of innovations and development regions, between 2010-2012

Secondly, local and regional economic development must be supported by setting up business entities that would offer companies certain business facilities and services, as long as they put into practice the concept of Sustainable Development.

Over the last 15-20 years there have been attempts to set up a new business infrastructure that would meet the specific need of the investors, one that is made up of technological and industrial parks, business centers, etc. Industrial parks have a special place in the business structures, so that in the Central Region there are 11 such industrial parks [12], some of them coming into being on former industrial sites belonging to different business that were had been sold off or artificially bankrupted due to the real estate bubble between 2005-2008.

The most recent example is the first Business Center, technology transfer and business incubator (CATT) in Brasov which was inaugurated on November 11, 2018, built in Bartolomeu Nord neighborhood, near the Institute for Research and Development of Transylvania University and near the future site of Regional Hospital. The Business Center, technology transfer and business incubator (CATT) is a major investment founded by the

Regional Operational Program 2007-2013 Priority 1-” Support for sustainable development of urban growth poles”-key area of intervention 1.1-Integrated plans of urban development, Sub-the poly growth, and by the local budget. Initially the project began in 2014 and the total value of the construction work and commissioning was 64,495,761.87 RON, out of which 8,542,264.36 RON were from grants, the remainder being supported by the local budget. Business Center, technology transfer and business incubator (CATT) aims at becoming one of the key points Brasov and Central Region business map.

Supporting the activity of innovative clusters, business centers, technology transfer centers and business incubators as well as other economic cooperation structures, has to be based on a diversified and modern infrastructure, endowed according to the European standards both at regional and local level. Expanding and supporting the activity of innovative clusters, of business centers, technology transfer center, business incubators and other structures and cooperative networks, as well as economic promotion activities in the Central Region, are also a necessity. Also, it is appropriate to promote as efficiently as possible, all structure and cooperation network, as catalysts

for economic development and smart specialization in Central Region.

5. PROPOSAL FOR SOLUTIONS TO ACCELERATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INNOVATION IN REGIONS THAT EMPLOY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

We, therefore, put forward the following immediate measure in order to accelerate the technology that is necessary for the innovation of business in Central Region: (1) Developing the new technology transfer centers and innovation centers; (2) Supporting research-based business (spin-off, innovative start-up, companies which are active in the field of research).

The following measures are to be put into practice in order to support Sustainable Development:

- Short-term measures:

- Measures that can be put into practice by means of punitive legislation, namely by developing the legal framework, which means to aligning the Romanian legislation with the European Sustainable Development legislation;

- Stimulating legislation, namely harmonization of financing tools to the specificity of the Development Region with a view to increasing the material welfare of the local and regional economic actors.

- Long term measures:

- Stimulating the marketing by advertising products, technologies and equipment that are in support of the environment and the Sustainable Development;

- Environmental education at pre-university and university education level, to support a society aiming at Sustainable Development;

- Involving NGOs in "NGO21" projects, namely getting NGOs involved in Education for Sustainable Development policy. This type of project is an initiative of the "Reper 21" Association (partnership leader) and it is implemented in partnership with the Civilian Society Development Foundation. The project is funded by the Operational Programs "Administrative Capacity" in the period 2014-2020 and its main goal is to improve the participation of the NGOs to working and promoting government policies related to Sustainable Development Education.

At the level of the central Region, other public or private institutions that could benefit from developing or creative RDI infrastructures are in the field of industry, technology, environment,

energy, agriculture, education, social care etc. Thus, in this domain, some immediate measures can be taken in order to increase the number of RDI units within public or private institutions. Therefore, in order to develop RDI activities at regional level, we are putting forward the following proposals: (1) Developing RDI infrastructures by renovating, arranging, expanding, modernizing and equipping them within public entities (universities centers, research institutes); (2) Enabling the creation of partnerships between the research institutions; (3) Efficient integration of research institutions in the Central Region in international network;

The best valorization of the potential of the Central Region researchers must be based on supporting creating and developing high level scientific and technological competencies centers that would meet the economic and society challenges in line with the Sustainable Development tendency.

Also, it is necessity to support the most talented and creative researchers (especially the young one), including those who have earned their PhD and who are actively involved in public and private institutions that do not have as main activity research funded by grants, scholarships etc. More researchers have to be evolved in projects and partnerships between the academic and business environment whose main goal is to contribute to the progress of science and economic growth. Last but not least, supporting the geographical mobility of researchers by giving them access to mentoring and the research infrastructure of the European Union, provides the opportunity of continuous development and correlating the competences of the Romanian researchers to international standards, in order to offer society research products which are similar to those of the European researchers, in line with the European integration and with turning the Romanian society into one based on Sustainable Development.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Within the knowledge Triangle between Research-Education-Innovation, which is the foundation of a society based on Sustainable Development, university have a key role by generating new knowledge, by forming highly qualified human resources, by knowledge transfer and innovation diffusion towards the social and economic environment. Thus, universities have to be evaluated from the point of view of Sustainable

Development, of education, of research-development and innovation, of the impact of the results on the Sustainable Development economy based on knowledge. By completing the Research-Education-Innovation correlation, a high-quality education system means a high level of scientific production based on quality, quantity and easy transfer of know-how at the social level, as well as a significant contribution to the process of turning the society into one that has Sustainable Development as its driving force.

Creativity and the innovation capacity of university have to be restated and we have to get over the apathy moment caused waiting for financial or financing opportunities by overcoming difficulties by expanding the research and the innovation horizons. This can also be done by means of a substantial investment in the human capital and research, namely young researchers. Reaffirming the recent tendency to open innovation and Sustainable Development, new types of cooperation between education institutions, research institutes and business and increase in the knowledge transfer. All these have been possible due to knowledge transfer in society and to direct or indirect cooperation with economic companies contributing to the development of the intellectual capital and to the increase in industrial productivity by setting up new companies in line with a Sustainable environmental society, connected to social realities.

It is therefore important to point out that reaching the European standards related to increasing competitiveness and improving the quality of life, depends mainly on the progress of science and on moving to more and more modern and performant means and technologies. This thing can only be accomplished where there is an institutional dynamic which means harmonization of the legislation that apply to research in the European Union, as well as proper financing of research.

At national and regional level, financing will be possible by using financial resource from the state budget or from private sources. A proper measure would be setting up Regional Innovation Centers that would be interconnected to National Innovation System and that would include connections between all the actors involved in the innovation process. Thus, a National Network of Innovation Regions can be set up in the future, on that is interconnected and founded by the local budget or from the external sources that will be interconnected to the European Innovation Network,

thus benefiting much faster from the latest tendencies in innovation in the European Union.

The interest I took in this research topic motivates me to further my research, namely to attempt a quantitative study on innovation in Central Region.

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