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


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Redefining Community in Intercultural Context



Selection of papers presented within the 7th RCIC Conference, Bucharest, 17-19 May, 2018
Nation Branding, Identity & Security

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Redefining Community in Intercultural Context

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First cover: The statue of Glycon, also spelled Glykon (late 2nd-century A.D., National History and Archaeology Museum, Constanta), an ancient snake-god in Eastern Europe. This statue of the god of wisdom/ intelligence is a metaphor for RCIC’18 Conference. Also, it is representative for the Romanian continuity.

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Plenary
Session

CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY

Bob de GRAAFF

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***Abstract:** In this paper, in which I will consider the relation between national cultures and intelligence cultures as subsets of nations' strategic cultures, I address three topics regarding cultural influences on intelligence activity. First, the 'for whom'-question gets far too little attention in intelligence studies, although it has a major impact on the self-concept of people working in intelligence, the roles they play, the work they do and the way they legitimize their activities. Second, threats are still too often seen as hard-boiled facts in intelligence studies, the only question being whether intelligence organizations detect them early enough. Third, developments in the task environment of intelligence and security organizations will increasingly collide with ideas and opinions from the same organizations' value environments..*

***Keywords:** culture; intelligence; strategy*

1. INTRODUCTION

In the short time allotted to me I would like to address three topics regarding cultural influences on intelligence activity. First, the 'for whom'-question gets far too little attention in intelligence studies, although it has a major impact on the self-concept of people working in intelligence, the roles they play, the work they do and the way they legitimize their activities. Second, threats are still too often seen as hard-boiled facts in intelligence studies, the only question being whether intelligence organizations detect them early enough. However, the way we perceive and discuss threats is very much influenced by our cultural climate and surroundings. Third, developments in the task environment of intelligence and security organizations will increasingly collide with ideas and opinions from the same organizations' value environments. If we want to establish if there are cultural influences on intelligence activity and if so, which ones, we will first have to define culture for our present purposes. I understand culture to be the way of life and in this case especially the beliefs of a particular group of people at a particular time. This particular group is in my case especially the nation. So I will be talking mainly about national cultures and about intelligence cultures as a subset of these nations' strategic cultures.

2. INTELLIGENCE IN ITS ENVIRONMENT(S)

It has always been my understanding that an intelligence organization should be understood not

as an institution in itself, but in its relationship with its environment.(de Graaff, 2014:1-13). However, whereas it is rather easy to establish the boundaries of an organization, it is harder to circumscribe an environment. I would like to discern two types of environment: a task environment and a value environment. The task environment consists of all the actors whose actions may be or will be relevant to an organization, either by influencing it or by being influenced by it. E.g. a radicalizing bunch of youngsters that may turn into a terrorist group or a civil conflict in a nearby part of the world which may have consequences for migration patterns and ensuing tensions in one's own country may have an impact on intelligence activities or at least it should have. The latter is extremely important because an intelligence or security organization may not timely detect an upcoming threat or it may be under political pressure to deny the new phenomenon taking shape. Also, an intelligence organization's counter-radicalization approach may affect many more people than those who are already radicalizing or who potentially will. It may have an effect on the broader social environment of the target group or even on society as a whole (de Graaff, 2010:249-273). This implies that researchers, commentators or observers should not depart their research or observations from an intelligence organization's outlook, but instead formulate an independent personal view on the organization's task environment.

However, even though views on the task environment are in the eye of the beholder, the task

environment can to a certain extent be established empirically. Terrorist attacks do take place or they do not. Wars are fought or not. And so on. And in a globalizing world some threats are common to many, most or all countries, such as Islamist terror, populism or climate change. They can be felt in the United States, Europe, Russia and China. As I will show in a moment, this does not mean that the task environment is free from cultural influences.

However, the tendency of most of us would be to start looking for cultural influences in the value environment. The value environment is that part of the environment that constitutes the cultural and ideological climate in which an organization has to operate. It makes a major difference whether an intelligence or security organization operates as part of a dictatorship or as part of a democracy. Values do impose themselves on intelligence organizations, through politics, through oversight committees, through the judiciary, through the media, through opinion polls or referenda, through leadership that is parachuted on top of the organization from outside and by members of the organizations themselves, who may be confronted with opinions about the workings of their organizations by family members or acquaintances. Nothing seems so influential on an organization member's ideas as a heated discussion with his or her teenage son or daughter the night before about what kind of work (s)he is doing and why.

3. FOR WHOM?

The why and the for whom questions are seldom addressed in intelligence studies, even though here we may find one of the main cultural differences having an impact on the way intelligence is done in a country. When I ask Dutch students who have a career in intelligence for whom they think they ultimately do their intelligence work, some answer 'for the minister', others 'for the government' and still others 'for the state'. When I confront them with the fact that they work for the same or similar state agencies and when I then ask them whether their different answers imply that they do things differently from each other, they are confused. This gives me an opportunity to say that it does make a difference whether one works for the current government or for the more or less immortal state and that substantial political debates have been held in e.g. the United Kingdom or The Netherlands about the question whether the government, the state or an abstract notion such as national security or national welfare should be the ultimate goal of a state agency's intelligence work.

Then I confuse my students further by continuing to ask for whom or what the German security service works, the answer being the constitution, as is implied in its name Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) or Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution. I then have to explain that after 1945 the (West-)German notion of citizenship was based firmly on the constitution, a legal document that does not exist as such in the UK. Subsequently, I use an example from the movie *Clear and Present Danger*, based on the novel by Tom Clancy of the same name, to demonstrate that although the oath officials of the US intelligence community take refers to the constitution their notion of the ultimate objective is 'the American people'. This also explains why it is much more normal in the US to have people from the intelligence community criticizing their president, if they think their national leader does not act in the interests of the American people. My next step is to explain to my students that in Germany for instance the idea that an intelligence or security service would work for the people is abhorred after the experience with both the Nazi system, where people were condemned to death by sentences that began with the words 'In the name of the German people', and the East-German communist era, where people's parties, people's armies and people's police were the strong arms of a repressive regime. And in spite of their professed commitments to the people, the secret services of both the Nazi and the communist regimes acted not so much on behalf of either the people or the state but in the interest of the sole or dominant party. Consequently, I would argue for paying much more attention to this 'for whom'-question in our intelligence teachings and training than the more or less obligatory statement that intelligence is intended to create knowledge that should provide a decision-advantage for policy-makers or other intelligence consumers.

4. CONSTRUCTIVISM IN STEAD OF REALISM

Now let me return to the idea that the task environment is free from cultural influences. It is not. For too long the international relations theory that has been favored most by intelligence studies is that of realism. This could be true as long as, during the Cold War, the main opponents were primarily interested in each other's capacities, taking their intentions for granted. Counting numbers of missiles, their (nuclear) payload and multiply the two amounted to a kind of bean-counting, which allowed intelligence producers to write their reports

and send them off hoping that the intelligence consumers would take note. Intelligence gathering and analysis amounted to the making of puzzles. Questions were directed towards the finding of missing pieces. Today's questions take the shape of mysteries or wicked problems. They start with contradicting definitions of the problem, they ask for changing not so much the facts but the narratives and they demand not only an assessment of the opponent and his intentions but also of the actions of one's intelligence consumers, in other words: they ask for a net assessment.

This type of intelligence-gathering and intelligence fits much better within the domain of the theory of constructivism. A threat is not a threat per se, but it is a threat because it has been construed and prioritized as such. Is terrorism, migration or cyber the biggest threat? This is a man-made decision, not just by the opponent, but also within an intelligence producer's own culture. And more: the intelligence producer takes part in this debate; he helps to create the narrative by communicating threat assessments or publishing annual reports. The task environment nowadays requires that the intelligence producers communicate with the consumers before they produce their final briefs or reports. If they would conclude that Islamic State is a group of religious fanatics, while their consumers have already accepted the idea that they are a bunch of criminals it will be hard to get the intelligence producers' findings accepted by their consumers. So, ideally, they would have to sit together and arrive at a common definition and interpretation of security threats before the intelligence producers start writing their reports.

5. COLLIDING ENVIRONMENTS

However, would citizens accept that intelligence people sit together with their elected

representatives? After all, interpretation is a political act. Is it acceptable that intelligence producers participate in this act? Does not this development, which seems so logical from the perspective of the task environment, constitute a major infringement upon the separation between intelligence-production and policy-making? Will the acceptance of such a deviation from past practices be evenly accepted by the value environment in all cultures, independent from whether people think intelligence is produced for the state, the government, the constitution, the people or the party? Will this not mean that intelligence services will have to communicate much more than ever before to explain the public what role they play in specific dossiers? And will the intelligence community's clients allow them to fulfil that new role, independent from the fact whether the clients are the state, the government, the constitution, the people or the party?

I hope my three questions have given you food for thought and will contribute to an interesting conference.

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DIGITAL REPUTATION MANAGEMENT. RELAPSES OF THE SEMIOTICS IN SOCIAL PERCEPTION

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Abstract: *The management reputation has never been so important not only for a company or a public administration but also for groups of people, minority groups and individuals. The beginning of new technologies, the Internet and social networks as cultural mediation instruments, raise important questions towards the traditional dynamics of reality seen as social construction. The traditional way of socially perceiving others is generated by new media and the on-line and off-line reputation of individuals and groups uses the same methods of the "Brand marketing", so typical of economics. The digital world collapses time and space, the rate of spread of the criticism threatens to cancel any defense, the clumsy response to a crisis can be extremely expensive, not only in economics field but also in sociological field. To have an effective on-line reputation is not enough to know and use technical solutions of SEO, SEM or Social CRM; is required an overall and aware communication strategy, starting from semiotic processes involved in reputation. In this paper, we will deepen the topic of reputation as a permanent strategy, borrowed from marketing, of the relationship between reputation and digital world, and of what skills should own a digital reputation manager in a global world where intercultural competence and digital competence are essential. We will closely examine instruments such as Sentiment Analysis, Data and Opinion Mining, evaluation of Influencers and of processes of Social Intelligence, as well as instruments for the Census of Reputation Risks.*

Keywords: *reputation; new technology; digital; semiotics; economy; social perception*

1. INTRODUCTION

*We are not what we say we are
the credit other give us
Jose Saramago (2012)*

One of the main tests for the process of integration between cultures is the mass media system and the representation (Taguieff, 1994) they give of different ethnic groups: how difficult will the social growth path of an immigrant be in a country where television, web and press always and solely give an image of immigrants linked to misery, marginality and crime? This raises two different categories of problems that other countries had already to deal with for a long time: the need to ensure a representation of immigrants (Allport, 2002) in the traditional and new media that avoids all forms of discrimination; the need to promote the access of ethnic minorities to the media industry (Cipollini 2002). Even in European country studies on mass media representation (Gallini, 1996) of reality are now acquiring the status of valuable tools of collective critical awareness. In fact, this approach has a broad

acknowledgement amongst the most reliable reflections, which are developing at international level, inside one of the most interesting records of the sociology of cultural processes. It is the study of mass media influence on the formation of opinions, perceptions and collective emotions about phenomena, facts and social subjects. The main thing to emphasize concerns the particular influence that media have in shaping collective perceptions of various social actors, and where elderly, women, men and immigrants are "socially drawn" from television shows, newspaper articles, web, social network and advertising. Still, it clearly appears a "disorder" in the communication: the immigrant and a lot of other minority group is predominantly associated with episodes of crime, deviance and anomie, while the everyday dimension of integration processes does not normally appears in communication products. Therefore, what digital reputation do these social categories enjoy? What are the processes that determine the construction and management of digital reputation? Starting from theoretical conditions of socio-anthropological type, the reflections of this article are interwoven with

economic conditions (Sennet, 2006) of the marketing and with those of semiotics of new media. We live in a world that sees us at the same time as actors and spectators, producers and consumers (so-called prosumer), observed and observers, judged and judges. But, above all, we live in space-time different from the past and the visibility of our behaviors acquired gigantic size and timing: the network is a kind of eternal world square and whatever we do, say, publish in Internet can potentially be viewed or heard by billions of people and especially never forgotten: is forever! That is exactly why the reputation today acquires a deeper value and requires from all of us a greater awareness (Peverini, 2014). Today it is no longer enough to tell. The story must be credible as well as the brand. Because we are what the search engines say that we are. Therefore, the definition of one's own strategy of brand reputation becomes a thorough job, not left to chance, and that requires an adequate and rigorous scientific professionalism able to ensure a shift from Risk Assessment to Risk Management (Giorgino, 2015). The Digital Reputation Manager so represents that specific professional figure, which, in a liquid and digital society like the contemporary one, cannot be improvised but must know very clearly the domain of its intervention.

A document to keep always in mind should be the Weputation Manifest that defines in ten points and very clearly, what we should and could expect today about our reputation in the net.

According to the document cited above, socially, we are what others say about us; what people say about us and what we really are not always coincide; what does not coincide, is not what we should socially take care of. What we need to take care of can follow two directions: to look like what we want to be or to look like what the society says or thinks of us (Landowsky, 1991).

The society does not know our being, but only our doing; our do is social projection; the social is an arena where interests, which are not neutral but ideological, meet and clash. The ideology is one of the products of a specific culture: the culture is the place where the individual develops from childhood; the individual left alone in the social clash succumbs.

2. REPUTATION AS A PERMANENT MARKETING STRATEGY

The shift of advertising from the products to the respective brands has attenuated only in part the problem of measuring the Return of

Investment, but did not fix it (Blanchard, 2012). The passage from promoting the product to that of the brand, brought up a new problem: how many times we can change the style of a brand, its story and its values (Lampigano, 2016).

Changing the perception given to a single product does not change the perception of the brand, while changing the perception of the brand means to change the perception of all the products related to it. The hierarchy between the brand and its products is not a matter of communication, but is a specific economic and productive fact. Whether it relates to the product or the brand, eventually this form of direct marketing faces a huge problem: that of creativity. The amount of advertising in the world is just so high that it is unavoidable to fall into the already seen. The time acts as a container of billions of words and images of *headlines* and *body copies* and of all the cultural kit necessary to advertising. Certainly, sometimes emerges something new, but it has a minimum weight compared to the worldwide investment in advertising.

These problems were not so evident until the TV and radio channels multiplied, on one hand and on the other hand, until the advent of Internet. In the first case, the limits of creativity emerged because it cannot be infinite; in the second case the web has changed the basic paradigms of communication. There is no longer an issuer who speaks to thousands of passive recipients, but a new "many-to-many" model, braided, exciting but also dangerous for the brands (European Digital Behaviour Study, 2013).

The "make do" or "make believe" of traditional marketing does not work anymore because technology makes comparisons easy; the abuse of advertising in every segment of life, puts into the recipient a strong feeling of distrust. And the motto into vogue during the 80's and the 90's "as long as they speak of it", today is no longer allowed.

Today it is good "as long as they speak well of it", otherwise it is the disaster of the reputation, triggering a domino effect that can be extremely harmful for brands (see the recent case of the Moncler, a company that produced duvet jackets and clothing with a turnover of 93 million Euros in 2013, which was denounced by an Italian TV program for the fierce and illegal practice of plucking, having serious repercussions on its brand (Repubblica, 2014).

From Floch onward, advertising has tried to engage in the use of semiotics to represent advertising models and consumers' attitudes. In

Semiotics Marketing and Communication Floch represents different forms of advertising communication (Floch,1990) taking as examples the work and recommendation of some leading experts of this field: David MacKenzie, Ogilvy, Jaquès Sèguèla, Jean Feldman, Philippe Michel.

The shift from the product to the brand did not cover only the advertising phenomenon but all corporate organizations of producers, the entire value chain, anyone who came into contact with it. The companies' staff had to behave in a certain way, executives were to appear according to precise directives, messages had to tell the magic worlds of the brand. After NO LOGO (Klein, 2013) everything changes. Successful stories implode under the weight of journalistic investigation that reveals unedifying successes. Some brands must take action to protect themselves, Nike first.

Big headlines and shining concepts, to cover disreputable behaviors. The reputation of big brands is there at the click of a mouse, under the eyes of all. (In 1997, the Nike CEO, Paul Knoght, was received by Stanford's students with these words: "Ehi, Phil, get off the stage. Pay your workers a wage that allows them to live!"). Therefore, it strongly emerges a dichotomy between what advertising conveys and the behavior of the one conveying the message. Just to tell a story is no longer enough: the story must be credible as well as the brand. The marketing should take care of reputation because a progressive mistrust is spreading toward the brand and action must be taken before it becomes complete distrust.

Just think of the Merkel case, in 2015, connected to the auto show in Frankfurt. The German reputation is at the top of its expansion. Whatever is German wins: rules, transparency, efficiency. After a few days, the catastrophe: Volkswagen is in the storm for providing false data about the exhaust gas. The title slumps on the stock exchange (Repubblica, 2015). The new Western audience of consumers is more attentive to messages, to products, to ethical processes of production, to the relationship between companies and the ecology of the planet. A new form of ethical consumer's attention is taking shape in the global market.

3. REPUTATION AND DIGITAL MARKETING

For many years, and for subsequent simplifications, the digital reputation has been

linked to some aspects of the digital marketing. This is an absolutely complex world, whose ramifications are heading toward every corner of the activities of new media.

In the past and with the building of technological fads, it has been taken for granted that SEO, SEM, E-mail, Marketing and Social CRM, constituted the central nervous system of the reputation.

For a long time, in digital marketing, notoriety was confused with reputation; this, based on the cheap communication principle "as long as they speak of it", which sounds like "as long as they find it first". At the origin, there is the power of search engines and their linked acronym: SERP. Technically, it means Search Engine Results Page and represents the list of objects found by a search engine, starting from a sequence of terms for the research itself. Therefore, much of the work is directed to place the web resources in the first few pages, so that they may be the most visited (see SEO e SEM). The census of users with whom entertaining a relationship, is placed in a complex technological environment called Social CRM (Customer Relationship Management). These Digital Marketing paths, are involved with different modalities in the management of the reputation although they are not individually crucial for it (Di Fraia, 2011). Imagine a cultural association that for many years has helped the spread of civilized correct behaviors. It has been working on the web, posting on websites, blogs and social networks. It has reached a strategic visibility on the SERP; has a very high number of visitors and loyal users (lead, reach, engagement). At a certain point, the President of the Association becomes responsible for non-ethical behavior and it turns out that much of the collected resources have been diverted for personal gain in favor of the members of the Association. We clearly understand that the reputation does not depend on reached notoriety (Fumo, 2012).

4. THE SEMIOMATIC OF THE REPUTATION

The semiomatic is born from the encounter between semiotics and information technology for all activities involving computerizes support. To understand its utility simply imagine what it could mean, without a suitable software, to analyze hundreds of thousands of texts obtained from a web search engine; the clash between quantitative and qualitative analysis strategies would be challenging (Cosenza, 2014).

Thus, the semiomatic is at the same time both a proposal for applied research and a set of analytical models that assume the use of technology in quality and especially quantitative investigations. Specifically, semiomatic of the reputation is the set of semiotic-informatics activities that lead to the identification of reputational information, their organization, to drafting models of analysis and identify analytical procedures. To have a synthetic overview of the entire cognitive and operational universe connected to investigations on reputation, it may be useful to outline and describe some macro components such as *storytelling*, *intelligence overview*, *management life cycle*, *social intelligence* and *sentiment analysis*.

There are two reputational regimes: the generic reputation and the specific reputation. The first relates to the lifestyle of a human being, of a company, an institution, a political party, an association. Its evaluation is based on conformity or non-conformity of social behaviors (which vary from culture to culture) considered conventionally correct. The second refers to the social projection of behaviors related to a specific profession, mission, activity, social role (Barthes, 1951). To build the reputation of a subject (individual or collective) means to enhance its reliability and credibility in the public narrative (Centenaro, Sorchiotti, 2013). It organizes the narrative of acting (doing) and being in a consistent and likely way. Consistency focuses on action toward what has been, while verisimilitude focuses on what we are now and the plausibility of the causes that determined this.

We should analyze these characteristic in terms of compatibility with the specific culture of reference (Greinas, 1995) (for example, in some cultures the frequent change of work activities is a positive thing, while others consider it a problem). Each level of perception that we have is the intersection of these two dimensions. In this respect and in view of what explained so far, the process of *Digital Reputation Management* is essential, understood in a top down sense, which we call *reputation intelligence overview* (Collins, 2016). The main process classes are *social intelligence*, *social CRM*, and *Company Admin*. In the first find their place listening and comprehension of digital phenomena; in the second, those relating to structured interaction with users and, the third, outlines some administrative and business processes involved.

Within the social intelligence class, there are processes of listening divided by analysis characteristic: *sentiment*, *opinion mining*, and

passion. For all these processes there should be an alerting function toward the personnel, which may authorize and implement a prompt defense after a public attack (Ceron Curini, Iacus, 2013).

The sentiment analysis clearly shows the polarity of the analyzed text in terms of positivity, neutrality and negativity. The opinion mining, possible with the use of quite expensive platforms, is able to carry out evaluations on the text, highlighting reviews and evaluations. It is widely used in some English-speaking countries by large corporations and political market. Study is under way about passion analysis, and many believe it to be the most effective marketing support.

With this survey methodology, which uses powerful algorithms of learning machines and ample reference textbooks, it is possible to detect the degree of anger or wrath of the users, their empathy, and their frustration. The Social Analytic measures quantities, indicators of access, usage, period, frequency, timing of permanence, places of origin of access and eventual information on the target (Sponder, 2013). This information is important to understand the level of diffusion of resources available on the web. It is thus possible to build an historical archive to analyze the trend of usage, so to be able to prepare analytical reports in support of the return of investment. The Social CRM segment deals with the multidirectional relationship with customers. The social caring is useful to assist consumers, clients, simple observers and followers. It is not just a matter of responding to requests for help, but also of being proactive, that is, to anticipate based on information providing a signal, questions and problems.

4. CONCLUSION

Today, more than ever, we can therefore say how important has been for a company the reputation management: the digital world collapses time and space, the speed of spreading of the criticism threatens to cancel any defense, the clumsy response to a crisis can be extremely expensive. A good public projection produces a competitive, solid and long-lasting advantage. For an effective reputation management, is not enough to know and use technical solutions such as SEO, SEM, or Social CRM; it requires an overall and aware communication strategy. Starting from semiotic processes involved in reputation, only through the *Digital Reputation Management* we can arrange those activities and skills required for the construction and defense of the public perception.

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Romania -
Self-Image and
Hetero-Image

NATIONAL IDENTITY IN A WORLD IN MOVEMENT

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Abstract: *National identity allows one to be typified before others, it is indispensable for simplifying and organizing the large amount of stimulation coming from society overall. The displacement of large numbers of individuals poses questions on the stereotypes relating to national characteristics. The media (TV, newspapers, Internet) play an important role in spreading stereotypes by creating, supporting and bringing information that is often not correct to the attention of public opinion. The media also construct “mythical” social images and categories that often become rooted in individuals’ ways of thinking. This occurs more easily when the people one comes into contact with belong to populations that are not sufficiently known through literature, cinema, tourism, but only through immigration. Stereotypes are thus predominantly negative because they ride the waves of “invasion panic” and “job loss” that strengthen a feeling of belonging in local individuals, and also activate claims leading to a process of making other nationalities inferior. The economic crises of this historical period do not help to meet others with a personal engagement aimed at understanding, but rather at rejection. A point of contact might be found through the recognition of the culture of others, allowing the fears caused by “diversity” to be dispelled.*

Keywords: *national identity; national characteristics; media information; culture of others; how the migrant is known*

1. INTRODUCTION

Human beings do not have an inclination to territorial permanence and they overcame distances that are now unthinkable in order to reach new territories, to improve their life conditions, to enjoy greater freedom and abundance of food. In all cases, they were able to build communities and states, to speak their own language and have their own customs. It is possible to be “citizens of the world” only by being citizens of a State first. In fact, if national identity is not experienced first, one can not then perceive and understand the similarity of belonging to any other nation¹. What is national identity if not an ability to typify and organize the stimulation grasped within society? Immigration and economic and cultural exchange are important because they try to give an answer to the diversities that are highlighted in numerous contexts due to cultural and structural reasons.

In the 16th century the stereotypes by which the various countries are known began to form. The

national roots outline these early typifications that subsequently, with the formation of national states, gave rise to the stereotypes universally used (Elias, 1994). This was the beginning of the use of a stereotype in the presentation of one’s heroes, such as for example the cliché of the English gentleman or that of the Italian Latin lover, represented in a very similar way by American and French, German or Swiss. It is difficult to avoid the clichés according to which Frenchmen are brilliant and Germans tough and aggressive². Even though such generalizations are false, they have an influence on behaviour because men and women relate to one another through generalizations consisting of labels, allowing them to immediately and synthetically define the characteristics, roles and expectations of behaviour (Montanari, 2002:11). In daily life as well, people perceive and are perceived through schemes of typification. Such schemes amount almost to a form of pre-cognition, that is combined with the expectations determining both the aspects linked to the various roles and the ways in which the roles themselves are enacted (Berger and Luckmann, 1969).

¹ The expression “citizens of the world” is frequently used but actually void (utopian?) because a passport, or at least an identity card, is necessary for moving from state to state.

² In a study of minority languages (Tessarolo, 1991) we found the same stereotypes of the speaker reflected in the languages not known by the subjects: sweetness in French, hardness in German etc.

Individual behaviours are therefore rational in reference to a model that becomes a veritable script, helping actors to play the role presented by the exemplary model. Typifications are, in sum, behaviour codes, within the limits of which one may still act with a certain degree of subjectivity. Identity, culture and community are three words that are constantly associated and that imply one another (Balibar, 1991). Belonging to one nation has a logic of its own in which we may identify the classes of the imaginary and the symbolic, to which the class of the paradoxical must be added as well (Milner, 1983:28). The first are based on the attribution of a common feature, and in any case a visible one (white, coloured...). The second are based on a fact that basically can not be represented, that is, the fact that a number of subjects answer to the same name, a name to which they respond when called: "Italian", "French", "Romanian", "Christian" etc. Such a means of identification does not apply to individuals as being similar, but as being united, even if absolutely unique. Nationality is a community word. Identity is never single and its correlation is the fact that an individual is part of an ultimate community, or a finite world, and of a "vision of the world" where all belongings may be hierarchically organized. The "paradoxical" classes serve instead as classes of the real and they should be, in relation to the real, what the aforementioned classes are in relation to the symbolic or the imaginary: paradoxical classes consist of the denial of one or more common features. Such classes manifest a non-belonging in the real: they are forms of exclusive inclusion or inner exclusion.

Stereotypes are important because they do not limit themselves to constructing forms of mental representations, but serve to convey cultural contents and shared knowledge³. They need a language mediation, which may also take place through newspapers, textbooks, television and advertising, to make the interpretation of the world known to the public. Numerous studies of social psychology report that subjects show positive behaviours toward their own group (in-group) and negative behaviours toward the other group (out-group). Stereotypification is based on the fact that different national groups are characterised by a sufficient homogeneity as regards behavioural inclinations, attitudes, orientations, so much as to allow us to speak of a specific "space" and of a

typical "national personality". Very brief descriptions to be derived are examples of stereotypes that are part of a legacy of common sense whose content is known: Germans are rigid and obstinate, they like order and efficiency; Britons are reserved and controlled, formal, comply with rules, are individualistic and competitive; Italians are nice, family-oriented, inconstant, spontaneous; Americans are informal, spontaneous, ingenuous, technically very competent, conformist, competitive etc. (Alessandri, 2016; Destefani, 2016).

2. NATIONAL CHARACTER

Unlike Elias, who studies the European courts, Montanari (2002) explains national character with the example of how the narrative of the police/detective genre is presented by different populations. She observes A. Conan Doyle, and therefore Sherlock Holmes, has a keen spirit of observation, brilliant deductive ability, great control, an attitude of detachment, obstinacy and certainty to succeed. Sherlock Holmes is the basic figure from whom the British Agatha Christie shaped other characters such as Miss Marple and Poirot. The interpreters of German police stories, such as inspectors Derrick and Wolff, show heroism and expose themselves to risks even when they lack adequate equipment to face the situation. This model shows personal value and a willingness to take risks. The French model proposed in films may be represented by Arsène Lupin, the nice gentleman thief, or by Maigret, who is very down-to-earth, intelligent and familiar with the feelings and emotions of everyday life. The Italian inspectors, Montalbano, Coliandro and others, investigate with cunning, creativity and a good amount of irony and intelligence; they identify themselves with the environment in which they operate. Perhaps the stereotype of the Italian man today is slightly different from that offered by Goethe over two centuries ago, either a martyr or an irresponsible person spending most of the time outside and enjoying life, fighting day and night, prey to a happy infantilism from North to South, with the irredeemable spirit of a Latin lover. National ideals are also reflected in educational models: in Italy the great mother, in Germany the warrior image, in Great Britain freedom and independence⁴.

³ What is negative and is generated as a consequence of the stereotype is prejudice, that is, a negative assessment of what was typified.

⁴ Stereotypes have always had great importance in history, as shown by Tacitus, who wrote over 2000 years ago and suggested the stereotype of the undaunted warrior.

National identity is a modern phenomenon of a dynamic, fluid nature, according to which a community sharing a set of features tends to believe that its members are bonded by something ancestral. National identity is formed through stereotypes, which hide a process of categorization with consequences such as the in-group bias and the out-group homogeneity effect: one's own nation is perceived as more diverse in its composition than foreign nations that, in turn, are seen as more stereotyped and therefore more homogeneous. Favouritism toward one's own group leads to nationalism, which legitimizes its dominance.

Among the scholars in this field, Smith (1992) considers the multidimensionality of national identity, constituted by a historical territory or motherland, historical memories in common and myths, which are the "oneiric" work of peoples. A myth is a symbol in the Greek sense of the word, so that it is to be understood as an "enigma" that, with its opacity and consequent wealth of meaning, initiates interpretation.

Culture granted by the system of public education and by mass media also has the task of making known the legal rights and duties in common, presenting them to all the members of a nation and consequently spreading such knowledge to other nations as well. The stereotypes of the various countries are mostly conveyed by daily information through the selection and comments of the news, affecting the formation of public opinion and its orientations. It should be remembered that the media have the power to decide what to tell – and how – of a given country. The process allowing a change in stereotypes, that has its explanation in the hypothesis of a contact, is the one that starts from reciprocal knowledge and could lead to the denial of the stereotypes themselves. This hypothesis does not always work because the encounter of two cultures, instead of letting affinities emerge, facilitates the consolidation of differences in specific conditions of crisis, thus resulting in a strengthening of the stereotype that may even become a prejudice.

The self perception of one's own culture leads those who are immersed in it to judge other cultures as being very different. Stereotypes may therefore be considered genuine habits, leading to the creation of social representations that correspond to a state of disequilibrium highlighting the unpopular but ineradicable domination of one part of society over the other.

According to Moscovici (2005:38), the purpose of all representations is making something unusual or unknown familiar. Everyone wishes to feel at

home, safe, that is, inside a consensual universe. The very dynamic of social relations is a dynamic of familiarization in which objects, individuals and events are perceived in relation to previous experiences. The unfamiliar, nonetheless, attracts and fascinates individuals and communities, and at the same time forces them to make explicit the implicit assumptions that are the basis of agreement. The fear of the outsider is deeply rooted. The act of representation is a means of displacing that which disturbs, which comes from another place but little by little becomes "neighbour". In other words, "near": what is unusual becomes usual.

Social thinking owes to convention of memory much more than it owes to reason: the basic tension between familiar and unfamiliar is always resolved in favour of the first. Before seeing a person and listening to him/her, we have already judged him/her, we have made an image for ourselves that we will then try to confirm progressively. More or less consciously, we transform that which is new going in the direction of what is known to us (Bartlett, 1974). This way to proceed aims to give a familiar aspect to that which is not, and it does so by activating the mechanism of anchoring, which reduces categories to ordinary images and places them in a familiar context, and by classifying, that is, giving things a name. The second mechanism is the objectification of those ideas, the transformation of something abstract into something actual. Objectifying culture leads to constructing reality starting from ideas that are generally meaningful. Anchoring and objectification are ways to manipulate memory: the first keeps it active (by classifying), the second decodes what we need to know through what is already known (Moscovici, 2005:65).

3. LIVING IN A WORLD IN MOVEMENT

In the present world, and not only the Western world, the displacement of populations leads to pluralisation, which refers to a context in which the disorganization of the subjective experience no longer finds a limit in the institutional organization of national societies considered as containers of all human spheres. Instead, it enters into a double disconnection produced by globalization, that questions the bond between individual and organization. We may therefore understand the extent of the change that is under way.

The "society of individuals" may only exist in relation to specific institutional transformations and, particularly, with manipulation of the physical

strength and the growing stability of central bodies of society. Only thanks to monopolies like these does self-regulation reach such a level of automaticity as to become second nature (Elias, 1994:447). The subjective experience of modernity, therefore, is characterized by the fact that the process of individualization of social life takes place within an institutional context, one that is organized. The need for identity is always present and is not a legacy from the past, something that is swiped away or marginalized by the progressive rationalization of social life. Grounding is a relevant and scarcely acknowledged need, besides being one of the most difficult to define. It starts with participation, which may be real, active and natural inside a collectivity that is naturally participating; or it may be automatically imposed by place, birth, profession, surroundings etc. In the second case, it needs to be morally, intellectually and spiritually supported through the environments to which it naturally belongs (Giaccardi, 1996:49). However, these environments become hybrid and the mixing leads to a space that is hybrid as well, where everything is mixed. Cultures are increasingly permeable (Hannerz, 1998), particularly those that have always occupied a marginal position.

3.1 Romanians in Italy. Since the early Nineties, Italy has changed from being a country of transit for Romanians into one of final settlement. In 2009 the incoming flow of migrants exceeded the outgoing flow (Luciotto, 2009). In the list of countries of origin of those who migrate to Italy, Romania ranks first followed by Albania and Morocco. The novel aspect of migration is currently represented by women. A process of feminization is under way in migratory flows, due to the fact that the demand for workers is for jobs that are traditionally feminine, jobs where women are “trapped” as they enter a home environment, a closed one where there are no trade unions in place to protect the work of the carer. In this regard, an experience of so-called “complete migration” is also examined and two Romanian scholars, Scârneci Șandru (2014), relate it to an original life project envisaging a come-back. If we observe the relation between Italy and Romania, this has not always been the case. In the history of Italian migrations we should remember that in the 19th century migrations directed to Romania, from the North-East of Italy, concerned stone workers and wood workers. It was an exportation of labour toward the Transylvania and Dobrugia regions, which were known as the “Romanian California”.

Between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, Romania was the destination of seasonal migrations and the flow of Italian migrants to Romania increased tenfold over three decades, from 830 people in 1871 to over 8,000 in 1901. Between the First and Second World War there were approximately 60,000 Italian workers in Romania.

In Italian school education, a minimal knowledge base of the history Italy shares with other countries should be part of the curriculum. Latins are at the basis of Romanian history and many events brought Romania close to Italy, starting with Trajan, under whose power the Dacian population mixed with Roman colonizers. Decebalus, hero of the Dacian resistance, is depicted on the Trajan Column standing in the centre of Rome⁵. The Latin poet Ovid spent his exile in Constanta, on the Black Sea, where the city university bears his name. Romania’s strong desire to keep its Latin language must be acknowledged, considering the distance between Romanian and Slavic languages or Hungarian, spoken in the surrounding countries. In 1906 the City of Rome presented the City of Bucharest with a statue of the Capitoline Wolf, symbol of the founding of Rome⁶. More statues of she-wolves were given to other Romanian cities during the Mussolini era. In the 19th century there was a big increase in the number of translations from Romance languages in Romania, thanks to a favourable historical context. The book *Cuore (Heart)* by E. De Amicis⁷, translated by an Italian teacher settled in Romania, Clelia Bruzese, was published in 1893 and immediately became a school book – and such it remained till the early 00’s for the patriotic values it conveys. It is currently among the suggested readings for primary schools (Cosma, 2007).

In 2008, the Turin International Book Fair started presenting examples of Romanian

⁵ Few Italians and few Romans perhaps know what tale the images on Trajan’s Column depict. It is important to remember that the monument does not represent the apex, but the difficulties faced by the Roman army in the first and second Dacian wars, and that defeats are depicted as well. The scene of Decebalus’ suicide acquires ethical and political meaning and relates to the honour the hero deserves. Muscardini writes that the feeling expressed here confers humanity on the “Bellum Dacium” (2005:6).

⁶ The date, 1906, tells us that this event bears no relation to the use of the same symbol in the Italian fascist era.

⁷ In Romanian, “Cuore. Inimă de copil. Carte pentru copii”.

literature, translated into Italian and published by the Milan-based publishing house Rediviva. The same company also publishes an open access newsletter on the Internet. The Romanian Institute of Culture and Humanistic Research in Venice publishes a magazine called “Orizonturi culturale italo-romane”⁸. We should finally remember that during the First World War Romania was one of Italy’s allies. In January 2016 1,151,000 Romanians were living in Italy. According to data supplied by the Central Direction of Italian Criminal Police and the Ministry of the Interior, the number of crimes reported between 2004 and 2014 increased by 40.1% for Italians and by 34.3% for foreigners. Romanians are involved in 6.2% of crimes against patrimony and in 5.2% of crimes against persons. The main crime for Romanians is exploitation of prostitution (31%). In 2009, at the culmination of the so-called Romanian crime emergency, 2966 Romanians were jailed in Italy, decreasing to 2791 over the next seven years, in spite of an increase in the number of Romanians living in Italy. The alarm spread by newspapers is unjustified and only causes xenophobic reactions. Media such as newspapers and TV hyper-represent crimes committed by migrants. What we are witnessing is an attitude of closure by European countries, not just Italy, toward foreigners, who are turned into social enemies through a double spiral of panic and exclusion. It is a situation portraying other nationalities and poorer and less developed regions of the world as inferior, to such an extent that fear of the stranger is no longer called “racial hatred”, but becomes a matter of security and of facing an invasion by foreign offenders (Dal Lago, 1999)⁹.

4. CONCLUSIONS

It seems appropriate to consider the experiences of Romanians living in Italy as a case in which a framing process is carried out, a process due to a series of activities and operations whose result is precisely the creation of a frame. From time to time this may correspond to a cognitive or a representational, cultural, methodological or other kind of device (Bruno, 2014:11). It is a specific –

and partly new – way of comprehending, and consequently redefining, the whole public sphere and that of the media, which considers network logics and participation logics. The mechanisms used by the media in trying to influence the way receivers of information organize their personal image of the environment have been known for long. It would be useful for the relation between media and audience to become increasingly more circular and not concern single messages but a flow of representations and meanings that are continuously re-processed, contributing to the construction of reality. Journalistic information should be marked by greater morality and this is a fundamental aspect: this would be the only way to come to a pacification. By suggesting a vision of the world through the lens of single items of news, an atmosphere of fear may be constructed, suggesting a specific key for the interpretation of events. News presented in a certain way resonates with and relates to pre-existing schemas that different audiences may recognize. In their turn, audiences are led by their newspapers to confirm and reinforce what they already think (everyone tends to always read the same newspaper and listen to the same news report). Each vision of the world, in sum, implies a political-symbolical dimension. This may be recognized and identified as being part of the reference culture of individuals considered as members of a group. However, since it is so closely connected to the cultural dimension, its use appears normal and natural, so much so that the processes with which social representations are constructed remain mostly invisible to the eyes of the individual (Bruno, 2014:159). Precisely because these visions of the world appear “natural” and act at an implicit level, they are seldom made explicit. Here we may find their strength and their roots, and this is why the different frames should be discussed in contexts such as school or opinion groups.

Pluralism is a typical aspect of the current period, regardless of our political point of view. If we follow the two types of ethics mentioned by Weber (1997), the ethics of responsibility and that of conviction, even though they are based on different and seemingly juxtaposed motivations, we will not take different positions because they are both driven by an ethics of conviction in as far as they follow a rationalization aimed at confirming. Weber’s so-called “polytheism of values” finds a confirmation in global society, which follows the shift from the ethics of conviction to the ethics of responsibility since it implies the ability to make right choices just where tradition gave way to plural values.

⁸ “Italian-Romanian Cultural Horizons”.

⁹ In this article we do not consider Italian small and medium firms operating in Romania, of which there are approximately 40,000. They represent another way in which similar yet different populations get to know each other. Of course, it would be interesting to investigate what the main stereotypes are for both sides.

One's homeland is not a physical place, but a shifting need; wherever it may be, that homeland is always to be found elsewhere (Sennett, 2014:93). So it is important to recognize others and ourselves as actual, specific human beings rather than as cultural models. Such recognition may also depend on unexpected turns such as the non-destruction of reference systems, but a simple cracking of these. That unexpected turn produced by the uprooting is what allows a stranger to become a citizen of the homeland of birth, even away from it (Sennett writes: becoming Russian away from Russia).

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ROMANIAN ART SOCIETY - A LANDMARK OF THE AUTOCHTHONOUS AESTHETICS IN 1918

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Abstract: *On March 9, 1918, the Romanian Art Society was founded in Bucharest. This was an organization that appeared as a form of protest at the proposal of an authorized artistic force of the time, the Artistic Youth Society, addressed to the artists who were mobilized by the Great General Headquarters of the Romanian Army in Iasi to participate in the great exhibition that they organized in April 1918. Revolted by the academic-romantic-idyllic spirit, reflected in the works of the representatives of the Artistic Youth Society, out at the issues of daily life, artists such as Ștefan Dimitrescu, Camil Ressu, Nicolae Tonitza, I. Ștefănescu, Ion Theodorescu-Sion, Nicolae Dărăscu, Alexis Macedonski, Ionescu Doru, Oscar Han and Traian Cornescu wanted to create an artistic bastion that would provide them with a framework where their aspirations can be revealed and offer them the legitimacy to seek a line of expansion and deepening of the ways of expression specific to Romanian art. During the period 1918 - 1924, the Romanian Art Society became the main attraction of the ideals of the artists who were mobilized on the front of the First World War and who contributed to the realization of works of art, of a high artistic level, grounded in the surrounding reality. Thus, the Romanian art becoming in this period the carrier of a humanist message based on the promotion of national specificity, a real landmark of the aesthetics of the time.*

Keywords: *autochthonous aesthetics, artistic bastion, Romanian art, the Romanian Art Society*

1. INTRODUCTION

Beyond the rumble of social and political life, in the context of the actions of 1918, which will be crowned by the event of the Great Union, de facto concluded on December 1, 1918, the cultural scene in the Romanian space will know, through the specifics of the artistic manifestations, a series of transformations, based on an intensive process of revalorization. In this sense, we witness an artistic avant-garde promoted and supported by important artists of the time, including: Ștefan Dimitrescu, Camil Ressu, Nicolae Tonitza, I. Ștefănescu, Ion Theodorescu-Sion, Nicolae Dărăscu, Alexis Macedonski, Ionescu Doru, Oscar Han and Traian Cornescu. They have outlined a common framework of ideals and professional aspirations, which they have materialized in the creation of an association called *Romanian Art* and through its actions.

The origins of the *Romanian Art Society* are among the actions taken in the second part of the First World War when, in the refuge from Iasi, artists were allowed to practice the craft on the front and moreover they were given the opportunity to create an association in which they

would group and through which to express the avant-garde ideas they promoted and sustained. Thus, in circular order no. 9400 of June 23, 1917, of General Constantin Prezan, head of the General Staff of the Army, was intended to create *the National Military Museum*, which "would include, among other things, images representing "the moments of affliction, as well as the strain through which we hope to fulfill our national ideal" (Brezeanu, 1964:145).

In this context, a number of 35 plastic artists, painters and sculptors, were mobilized by the General Headquarters of the Romanian Army in Iasi, and they were provided with the necessary means to carry out this artistic mission. According to the circular order no. 9400 of June 23, 1917, of General Constantin Prezan, the ensuring of the necessary means to achieve the artistic mission of the 35 plastic artists concerned: "1. These artists will be part of the General Headquarters (Section 3 adjutant). Those who are not mobilized will be assimilated to the rank of lieutenant and will receive the salary and allowances due to this grade, and those mobilized, the rights of degree they have. 2. They will be allowed to go to the front and to the localities where they will be able to take

different sketches asking for the permission of the respective command or services. They will appreciate and decide on the requested permission, given the situation and local military circumstances. 3. For establish the identity of these artists, they will be issued personal permits from the Grand General Headquarters" (Brezeanu, 1964:148). As far as artists are concerned, they committed themselves that all the works of art that they would conceive and execute would be entrusted to the state property, giving up any kind of reward in connection with their realization.

On the back of the page on which the circular was drawn, the names of the sculptors and painters involved in this artistic mission were written: sculptors - Lieutenant Jalea Ion, Medrea Corneliu, O. Han, D. Mățăoanu, Al. Călinescu, Al. Talpoșin (Severin), G. Stănescu and painters - Lieutenant Stoica D., Lieutenant Teodorescu Sion, Lieutenant Cornescu Traian, Lieutenant Crețoiu Alexandru, Second Lieutenant Em. Lăzărescu, Second Lieutenant Brăescu Tache, Second Lieutenant Al. Poitevin, Aurel Băieșiu, C. Petrescu Dragoș, Troteanu Remus P., Aurel Constantinescu, Șt. Dumitrescu, Toma Tomescu, Niculescu Andrei, Negoșanu Grigore, N. Mantu, Camille Ressu, Al. Macedonsky, N Dărăscu, Bulgăraș Petre, Ionescu G. (Doru), Hirlescu, Ion Mateescu, Briese O, Bacalu Constantin, Ignat Bednarik and were written in handwritten the names A. Chiciu and R. Hette (Brezeanu, 1964:148 - 149).

The first result of this initiative was the organization of an exhibition containing 38 paintings and 23 sculptures by 20 painters and 12 sculptors, including the names of artists other than those initially involved in the great artistic mission. It was opened in January 1918 at the School of Belle-arts in Iasi, with the name: "Painting and sculpture exhibition of artists mobilized by M.C.G" (Brezeanu, 1964:145).

2. GROUP ON THE FRONT, ROMANIAN ART AND REPRESENTATION OF THE IDEAL OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION

As a result of the harsh, poor and miserable living conditions that the artists mobilized by the Grand General Headquarters in Iasi faced during the First World War, they outlined a common framework of ideals and professional aspirations, which laid the foundation for what was called the *Romanian Art Society*. At the foundation of this association was the desire of artists to achieve a different kind of art than the one promoted at the time, namely: an art that is anchored in reality and

illustrates the autochthonous specificity: "The spirit of sacrifice and abnegation of our people, who endured the horrors of the war, to which the artists themselves often participated as combatants on the front, inspired most of them the desire to create an art anchored in reality, traversed by humanity and dwelt on an autochthonous specificity" (Oprea, 1969:74). In this respect, in the house of the painter Șt. Dimitrescu from Iasi, part of the mobilized artists, signed the twinning document of the *Romanian Art* group, and on March 9, 1918 in Bucharest, the *Romanian Art Society*, whose president was Ion Theodorescu-Sion, was founded. The founding artists - Ștefan Dimitrescu, Camil Ressu, Nicolae Tonitza, I. Ștefănescu, Ion Theodorescu-Sion, Nicolae Dărăscu, Alexis Macedonski, Ionescu Doru, Oscar Han and Traian Cornescu - expressed their desire to make art through humanity and placed themselves in a position of adversity against the *Artistic Youth Society*, an important forum for launching and affirmation of artists of the time, which, according to the artists involved in the organization of the *Society Romanian Art* had become the bastion of an academic-romantic-idyllic art, which was ruined by the surrounding reality:

In the nineteenth year this is the seventeenth artistic exhibition of the "Youth"; years of war "Youth" is meant to mean in the history of society with two vine leaves... (Șirato, 1967:161)

or

indifference and passivity are in today's situation, sins that need to be removed by awakening the social sense. Nothing more damaging to the phase of a culture than ambiguity, nothing more disturbing than eternal compromises (Cisek, 1967:194-195).

According to its statute, published in *Luceafărul* magazine from 1919, the founders of the *Romanian Art Society* wanted to support and develop the contemporary painting and especially the popularization of the artistic works inspired by the history of the Romanian people. Because of the respect they enjoyed for the cult of national art, the statute set out as a goal:

a) developing, spreading and encouraging beautiful arts; b) organizing annual exhibitions; c) research of the Romanian national sources: painting, sculpture, architecture, iconography, fabrics, bark, wood sculpture, pottery and everything related to national rustic decorative art, bringing them to the general

knowledge through exhibitions, publications, conferences, original works or reproductions of any kind. The exhibitions will take place all over of the country, especially in Transylvania ... to make known our plastic arts and the richness of our national art; d) creating a library and an art gallery; e) protection of all artistic monuments; f) encouragement of any national art work; g) supporting the members who form it and any other comrades even not part of the society (Oprea, 1969:75).

3. THE EXHIBITIONS OF THE ROMANIAN ART SOCIETY AND FORESHADOWING ITS NEW TRENDS

On April 18, 1918, the founding artists of the *Romanian Art Society*, joined by N. N. Tonitza and Dimitrie Paciurea, opened the first exhibition of the newly established society in four halls of a shop located on Lapusneanu street no. 18, from Iasi, where all the exhibitions were organized at that time. They exposed the painters Traian Cornescu, Nicolae Dărăscu, Ștefan Dimitrescu, Ionescu Doru, Alexis Macedonski, Camil Ressu, Ion Theodorescu-Sion, Nicolae Tonitza and the sculptor Oscar Han.

From the beginning there was a concern of artists directly involved in promoting their actions. Thus, on April 13, 1918, in the *Neamul românesc* magazine, appeared the article entitled "Painting and sculpture exhibition of artists mobilized in the Great General District", which brought to light the artists who exhibited and their art works. A similar article appeared in the same magazine on January 30, 1918 as a result of the organization of the first such exhibition (Brezeanu, 1964:150).

The organization of this exhibition takes place in the context in which the *Artistic Youth Society* invites the artists of the new avant-garde in Romania - the group on the front, concerned with the extension and deepening of the artistic expression of Romanian art, to participate in the exhibition organized in April 1918 to Bucharest. It is about an attitude that the new avant-garde take to distance themselves from *Artistic Youth* and to demonstrate divergences of opinions and artistic aspirations, especially in the context in which the representatives of the *Artistic Youth* to mask the refusal received have proposed to organize a retrospective Romanian art exhibition with works by missing or absent artists in the last 10 years, who were in state galleries or in private collections, including the names of artists associated with the front group such as Camil Ressu or Ion Theodorescu-Sion (Oprea, 1969:75).

Thus, although they did not have the time to perform outstanding artistic works, this aspect was less relevant, since the new artists wanted to present their new artistic vision they had proposed and which the context calls for:

... the short period of the previous exhibition of the Grand General Headquarters and, the unfavorable working conditions did not give them the opportunity to perform some special artistic works, but they made known their intentions to present the harsh reality of life " (Oprea, 1969:75-76).

Moreover, the representatives of the *Romanian Art Society* criticized other aspects related to the place that the *Artistic Youth* in the Romanian artistic culture occupies. It was criticized how judging the works that were selected to be part of the time exhibitions, as well as the impartiality of the judges:

You have not left us to live with you as equal, in the profession of our talent; you want us to grow in the shadow of your talents. And then why the quarantine exerted by any jury, in all its forms, towards us, before you came, and its absence from the members of the "Youth"? Not! We do not want it anymore, we're tired, we are not kids that need a nanny, we're just «well-known artists» now (Șirato, 1967:137 - 138).

Also, the representatives of *the front group* criticized the lack of depth and innovation, as well as the poor language of artistic representation promoted through the *Artistic Youth*:

Looking at their artistic manifestations, we find that "Youth" ages: because alas - the artistic is left with only the kind, and its sadness, today, is a bad old age. Some of her members are artistically - if they do not happen to be those who have never been sturdy and healthy - irremediably ankylosed; others, conscious, apply painting in the colors of youth, simulating the effect of the tumult of youthful blood effluvium. However, we admit it to their youth early it was a struggle that ended with a successful - above all - economic one. The "Youth" organization has always presented itself to the public in a tight phalanx and annual, ending by imposing an "artistic taste" on the public. That he did not know how to cultivate this artistic taste [...] is the great guilt of "Youth" and is the reason that the furrow cut by it in the field of Romanian art is much wider than deep (Șirato, 1967:161)

and

No artistic orientation, that is, the rallying at a new or old school, decides the quality of an artistic

genre, but the expression of an extract of potential sensibility (Șirato, 1967:162 - 163).

The mercantilist spirit is another feature associated with the *Artistic Youth Society*, criticized by artists representing the *Romanian Art Society*:

It was the moment when the artists found, pleasantly surprised, that art can be not only a vocation but also a "business" [...] Today we see the result: artistic cohabitation and purely material interests have established, with time, a physiognomy related technique between different members and a fragile artistic conception at the common level (Șirato, 1967:162).

Beyond all the criticisms brought to the *Artistic Youth*, the representatives of the front group bring to attention the necessity of a new artistic current, which is also concerned with the education of the public, a "healthy artistic stream, which removes the taste of the big public from everything that triumphs through triviality and affection" (Șirato, 1967:138). But it must be independent in order to be successful and to impose a new space of art, in which honesty occupies a central role:

... the reason, apart from the intimate anguish of "Youth", is that we believed the time to come to build our home where we would be host and not guests, that this place would be the temple of art in which we will serve the Holy Mystery of Communion, or will it be the shop where we will make art trade? We will be priests or merchants, according to circumstances and talents. And we, the public, bow down with respect for sincerity in any form and ultimately moral, as an effect (Șirato, 1967:139).

In addition, it is considered that the "awakening of the social sense" and the formation of the young people in the spirit of the authentic artistic values are needed:

Romanian art will have to be a block from now on, a rock that will stop the penetration of so many mistakes and horrors in the mentality and in the spiritual image of the younger generations. Enough little things have been exalted to the rank of idol, many ridiculous and lying myths have been propagated by angry ignorant (Cisek, 1967:194).

From 1917 to 1924, we can talk about the most prosperous period of the *Romanian Art* movement. *The Romanian Art Society* organized eight high-level artistic exhibitions and gathered around the most representative Romanian artists. Through the

ideals that has promoted, it has gradually acquired the prestige enjoyed by *Artistic Youth*, the latter becoming for a period of time, after the first world conflagration, a movement that only benefited from the aura of prestige it has achieved with many years ago.

The second exhibition of the *Romanian Art Society* was organized in March 1919 in Bucharest, in the Arta Hall, on Franklin Street. In the minutes of March 10, 1919, concluded at the meeting of the members of the Romanian Art Society, it is specified that the opening of the exhibition will take place on March 22 at 11 a.m. (Brezeanu, 1964:150). Within this exhibition, new founding members co-opted to the group *members on the front*. Among the exhibitors were: Mișu Teișanu, Gabriel Popescu, Ion Theodorescu-Sion, Traian Cornescu, Alexis Macedonski, Nicolae Dărăscu, Camil Ressu, Oscar Han, Ștefan Dimitrescu, Cornel Medrea, S. T. Tomescu, Marius Bunescu, Ion Jalea, Nicolae Tonitza, Ionescu Doru and others.

The exhibition was organized together with the *Artistic Youth* and also in a space close to it (vis-a-vis), in order to create "the possibility of confronting the quality and the two tendencies promoted" (Oprea, 1969:76). The representatives of the *Romanian Art Society* consistently presented the real life of towns and villages and, in addition, showed a special qualitative exigency. From the same minutes concluded on March 10, 1919, we find out that the entrance to the exhibition was paid:

Entering exp. will be paid. On the opening day the entrance will be 10 lei for the people who do not have invitation and in the other days will be 2 lei. Monday will be free (Brezeanu, 1964:151).

and that there is a concern for the presence of one of the members of the society during the whole period of its opening: "It is decided that every day for the exhibition of the society to be present in the exhibition in turn one of the members of the society" (Brezeanu, 1964:151), as well as a concern to promote this action in the press:

The following members are charged with giving advertisements to the newspapers: Tonița, Ștefănescu I., Macedonsky, Ressu, T-scu Sion, Cornescu. Mr. Ștefănescu was charge to conceive the first poster" (Brezeanu, 1964:151).

The 1920s, 1921s and 1922s brought three more exhibitions organized by the *Romanian Art Society*, which managed to surpass all the artistic

manifestations that took place in the capital of Romania at that time. The difference between the artistic quality of the exhibits present at their own events and those present at the *Youth* events was net in favor of *Romanian Art*. Among the members of these exhibitions were: Octav Băncilă, Marius Bunescu, Traian Cornescu, Nicolae Dărăscu, Ștefan Dimitrescu, Ionescu Doru, Iosif Iser, Alexis Macedonski, Theodor Pallady, Camil Ressu, Francisc Șirato, Ion Theodorescu-Sion, S. T. Tomescu, Nicolae Tonitza, Constantin Brâncuși, Oscar Han, Ion Jalea, Cornel Medrea, Dimitrie Paciurea, Nina Arbore, S. Maur, Max Herman Maxy and others. The purpose of these artists was to fit the step "according to the aesthetic rhythm of the time" (Oprea, 1969:76) and to impose "a common artistic creed" (Șirato, 1967:141).

The 1923 and 1924 society exhibitions brought an extra prestige to the organization, which was imposed on the Bucharest market as the main artistic movement in Romania. The movement has co-opted new members, some coming from the movement *Artistic Youth*, such as: Jean Al. Steriadi, Mișu Teișani, Dumitru Ghiață, Petre Iorgulescu-Yor. Correctness, punctiliousness and probity were the essential features of the selection of artworks that were exposed. Thus, in 1923, 168 exhibits were presented, and in 1924 there were presented 88 works of art (Oprea, 1969:77).

4. THE ROMANIAN ART COMPANY FULFILLED ITS PURPOSE!

In 1924, N. Tonitza, Fr. Șirato, Șt. Dimitrescu and O. Han retreat from the *Romanian Art Movement* and will establish at the end of 1925 one of the most prestigious artistic associations formed in the interwar period in Romania, with the name "The Group of Four". This action, however, along with some animosities that had arisen among the members of society as a result of the fact that some of its members had begun to take up positions in the juries of the exhibitions and leadership positions to create their advantages, created a rupture within the *Romanian Art Society*, which led to its collapse. This was also contributed by the action of some members of the association who advocated the re-establishment of the Official Salon, hoping for a democratic opportunity to affirm all artistic talents (Oprea, 1969:77-78).

An ultimate attempt to resuscitate the *Romanian Art Society* was carried out in 1927 by Ion Theodorescu-Sion, who "tried, unsuccessfully, the resurrection of the old group" (Brezeanu, 1964:147). He

takes the initiative of the re-establishment of Romanian Art as, as he writes to Fr. Șirato, on December 8, its appearance is very necessary now that «the growing tide of dilettantism and the derision of public taste create real harm to art and artists in Romania» (Oprea, 1969:78).

Thus, at the beginning of 1928, part of the former members of the society, to which some young artists are added, rebuild the former *Romanian Art Society*. The re-emergence of society is positively welcomed by the press and by some of the art critics.

In the spring of 1928, the new members of the society - Catul Bogdan, Constantin Brâncuși, Leon Biju, Marius Bunescu, Nicolae Dărăscu, Henri Catargi, Ionescu Sion, Anastase Demian, Ion Jalea, Iosif Iser, Cornel Medrea, Aurel Kessler, Mihai Onofrei, Corneliu Mihăilescu, Theodor Pallady, Dimitrie Paciurea, Jean Alexandru Steriadi, Tache Papatriandafil, Tache Soroceanu and Ion Theodorescu-Sion organized an exhibition. However, art critics and the press do not receive enthusiastically many of the exhibits - 55 oils and 10 sculptures are criticized (Oprea, 1969:78).

This situation has reduced interest in the movement that had just been revived, for it was a sign that the ideals that led to the birth of the movement were overwhelmed, and that others had slowly taken their place. Thus, the cultural necessity of asserting the conscience of the Latinity of the Romanian people, a fundamental principle that the artists representing *the front group* had sustained and promoted with great success between 1917 and 1924, had gradually and naturally been replaced by the necessity of creating an arts without concessions, "able to withstand the increasing wave of dilettantism and mediocrity" (Mihăilescu, 1928). The aspirations of the "Battalion of Revolutionaries," as N. N. Tonitza had pencil them and synthesized "Their Ideal: Art. Their weapon: sincerity. Their tradition: nature. Their enemy: the rancid of artificiality" (Brezeanu, 1964: 148) had been replaced and a new way of referring to the creation and forms of artistic representation took its place.

4. CONCLUSION

The Romanian Art Society appeared in a context in which the political and social scene of the Romanian territory had events of great significance that would contribute to one of the most important national historical moments: the

Great Union, which led to the establishment of Great Romania. This was, in fact, the purpose for which Romania entered in the First World War on the Entente side. The role of the artists who formed *the front group* and who were involved in the war either as fighters or as true "war reporters", with the owl of rendering some of the history of the Romanian people in the images, to be testified over centuries, it was an overwhelming one. In this sense, the creation of the *Romanian Art Society* represented a moment of avant-garde manifestation that best responded to the artistic needs and ideals of the time.

The activity of *the Romanian Art Society* enjoyed, for a period of seven years, a great resonance as an artistic movement in Romania. It has become the main initiator of the ideals of artists who have been mobilized on the front of the First World War and has contributed to the realization of works of art, of a high level of plastic and anchored in the surrounding reality. Thus,

Romanian Art was the carrier of a humanist message, mainly supporting the national specificity.

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RECOGNITION OF THE UNION OF BESSARABIA WITH ROMANIA – HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES

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Abstract: *This paper deals with the recognition of Sfatul Țării act of 27 March 1918 - the legal basis of the Bessarabia union with Romania - in international law, by the states who signed the 1920 Peace Treaty of Paris and by the Soviet Russia/Soviet Union. The final agreement of France, United Kingdom and Italy has been made possible because of a very active Romanian diplomacy and of some extreme measures like maintaining military troops in Hungary or abstaining from intervention in Soviet Russia even if the Western Powers insisted on this matter. US and Japan who did not sign and/or ratify the 1920 Peace Treaty of Paris did not refuse explicitly the recognition of the Bessarabia union with Romania. The Soviet Union recognition was de facto accomplished (at least according to the interpretation of the circumstances) after this country signed in 1933, together with Romania and other states, the Convention for definition of aggression. The absence of de jure recognition from the international community cannot lead to the conclusion that Bessarabia union with Romania has not been done according to the international law. As this paper shows, Bessarabia proclaimed its autonomy inside the Russian empire, then its independence and the union with Romania, in full respect of the self-determination principle.*

Keywords: *Bessarabia; peace; recognition; Romania; Russian empire; Soviet Russia; treaty, union*

1. INTRODUCTION

Recognition of the union act of the Bessarabia Union with Romania on March 27, 1918 has met difficulties just from the very first moments. The Ukrainian Rada has protested against the Romanian Government, and the response came on April 20, 1918. The Romanian Government's note proved the Romanian majoritarian character of the territories between Prut and Dniestr, the accusations from the Ukrainian side being rejected. At Kiev, a similar request has been formulated on May 5 and it was rejected again on June 19. The Bolshevik government in Petrograd had the same approach, sending a protest note to the Central Powers. Although on 2 November 1917 Russia's Declaration of Peoples' Rights by which the peoples of the Russian Empire had the right to self-determination was passed, Foreign Affairs Commissioner Gheorghe Cicerin protested to the Central Powers about "Bessarabia's annexation by Romania". Germany announced that objection to the Bucharest government but the position of Romania and Germany was the same, as Alexandru Marghiloman, prime-minister at that time, considered: Russia had already recognized the secession of Bessarabia under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

The Treaty of Peace signed at Buftea with the Central Powers implicitly recognized the union of Bessarabia with Romania. Austro-Hungary, at that time before the beginning of its dissolution, recognized this act in exchange for Romania's "friendly" attitude (the lack of any claims to Transylvania, Bucovina and Banat).

In the context of resuming the offensive on the West Front, Germany was ready to formally recognize the union with Bessarabia. There was no time for discussions on this issue due to the Romania's return to the war operations in November, 1918. In this context, the US Secretary of State at Iași, Charles Vopicka, went to Chișinău on November 3, 1918 to officially declare that his country supports the membership of Bessarabia in the new Romanian unitary state.

After March 27, 1918 Bessarabia was very close or even in some cases inside the theatres of military operations. The Dniester was not yet a recognized border with the USSR. In December 1918 a Bolshevik offensive took place and the Dniester was forced into the Hotin area, the offensive being rejected by the Romanian army. The French Army temporarily occupied Odessa and Chișinău to help the Ukrainian anti-Bolshevik offensive. A junction of French military troops

with Romanian troops was made in Chişinău. After the departure of German troops from the territory of Ukraine, the Ukrainians began their incursions over the Dniester.

In this context, the general opinion was that the union of Bessarabia with Romania will come naturally. As early as December 1918, the French Government created a group of experts to establish the frontiers that would result from the peace plan. On behalf of France, Emmanuel de Martonne was appointed to set the borders of Romania. He attributed Romania the entire territory between Prut and Dniester, the used argument being the percentage of 72% of the Romanian population. Not only the ethnic factor has been taken into account, but also the contribution to the war and the position on Bessarabia. France took note that Romania did not make claims related to Bessarabia during the military conflict, considering that the annexation of this province was the effect of exercising the right to self-determination. The French prime-minister Georges Clemenceau said on the occasion of the opening of the Peace Conference at Paris: “the fact that the issue of Bessarabia was to be regulated in favour of Romania constitute an element that cannot be neglected” (Micu, 2011:112).

We may conclude that since the proclamation of the Union of Bessarabia with Romania on March 27, 1918 to the Peace Conference, the Western powers did not challenge this act, on the contrary they considered it as an effect of the right to self-determination that they encouraged. With the beginning of this Conference, the idea of correlating the recognition of the Union of Bessarabia on the basis of the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime appears: it is believed that a new Russia, liberated from Bolshevism, should be given certain concessions. The evolution of the military situation has made this idea to remain only at the project stage but its existence shows the additional difficulties that have existed with the official opening of the Peace Conference.

2. THE PROCESS OF RECOGNITION

The Peace Conference began on January 18, 1919. The issue of recognizing the Union of the other historical provinces, except Bessarabia, with Romania was somewhat simpler because the successor states of Austria-Hungary were present at the negotiations. Soviet Russia was not represented and thus the issue of the recognition of the union of Bessarabia with Romania has a special

status, and this region had not been part from an enemy-state of Entente, before the war.

Meanwhile, the Bolshevik attacks on the Dniester border have been resumed, the last attack of this kind being rejected by the Romanian troops on February 14, 1919. Soviet Russia closely observed the Paris Peace Conference, the diplomacy of this country being strongly involved in the foreground of the Bessarabia problem. The policy of Soviet Russia was pursued on three levels simultaneously: subversive actions and Bolshevik propaganda; armed attacks on the vulnerable points of the border with Romania; the attempt to influence the opinion of the Western allies regarding the recognition of the Union of Bessarabia with Romania.

The issue of Bessarabia is addressed for the first time on February 8, 1919. The British representatives insisted on the application of the ethnic principle but pointed out that it is important to bear in mind that the possible subsequent reproach of the Soviet Russia according to which it would be deprived of territories belonging to it, taking advantage of the precarious situation of the new Bolshevik State must be avoided. The French representative mentioned that this point of view corresponds to the principle of not taking into account the military occupations but showed that Bessarabia was forcedly annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812. The American, Italian and also British experts expressed doubts about the decision of *Sfatul Ţării* (doubts to be formally expressed by the Soviet Russia), but the Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu rejected these arguments on 28 February 1919. The Report of the Central Territorial Commission would recommend the establishment of the Romania's borders on the Dniester. However, this report would be disputed by the so-called Russian Political Conference in Paris, made up of diplomats of the former Russian Empire, and on March 9, 1919 this institution presented a memorandum against that report. The former high officials of the Russian Empire had other opinions before the opening of the Peace Conference (Micu, 2011:114).

The imminent recognition of the border between Romania and Soviet Russia on the Dniester made the Bolshevik efforts against Romania to intensify. Thus, the Soviet Commissioner Gheorghii Cicerin said: “We have to act, otherwise the Romanian's border on Dniester will be recognized”. A plan of the Red Army's offensive against Romania was adopted in Tiraspol, but the start of General Denikin's

offensive redirected the military forces to counteract it.

The Central Territorial Commission recommended to the Council of Foreign Ministers of Allied Powers the recognition of the union of Bessarabia with Romania. These recommendations were initially rejected by the US Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who stated that there was no competence of the Peace Commission with regard to a territory of a state which was not an enemy of the Allied Powers. In the Lansing's view, no territorial changes could be made to Russia without the consent of that state, expressed by a legitimate government.

But Bessarabia had gone through all the stages that justified the recognition of the union with Romania: the autonomy in relation to Russia, the declaration of independence on January 24, 1918 and later of the union with Romania on March 27, 1918. All these actions, in this succession, correspond to the application of the principle of the peoples' self-determination, stated by the US President Woodrow Wilson.

Since the Bessarabia problem has begun to become more complicated that it seemed at the beginning of the peace talks, the Romanian Government has adopted a new strategy: it has continued talks in Paris but has begun negotiations both with the Soviet Russia and the neighbouring countries. The representatives of France and Great Britain have conditioned the final recognition of the union of Bessarabia for the withdrawal of the Romanian troops from Budapest.

In addition to the US hesitations on the circumstances of the declaration of the union of Bessarabia, the French and British governments have become increasingly reserved as efforts to stop the establishment of communism in Russia proved to be futile. The French Prime-Minister Georges Clemenceau sent a letter to Admiral Kolceak on behalf of the Allies in January 1920 promising to assign Bessarabia in exchange for continuing the struggle against the Soviet power. Interestingly, the French Prime Minister considered at the time that Bessarabia should have been attributed to Ukraine, because it needed a solid Ukraine, a strong state between the USSR and Europe, and a guarantee against the expansion of Bolshevism in Europe. However, Romania had a tremendous advantage in this complicated situation: the presence of its military troops in Budapest. Alexandru Vaida - Voevod reported that during his visit to Paris to boost the works of the Peace Conference, France asked Romania to evacuate its territories beyond the western border

as a price for the recognition of the union. Romania sought to delay this withdrawal as much as possible, invoking "technical" reasons until the recognition of the union.

Romania still faced another great challenge in dealing with the Allies regarding the recognition of its union. France expected a Romanian-Polish alliance to launch an offensive against the Soviet Russia. Romania, however, had a more reserved attitude towards this initiative, as General Denikin was in favour of Bessarabia's reassignment to Russia (Micu, 2011:122).

Romania has initiated parallel diplomatic contacts with the USSR. In the first stage, Soviet Russia accepted the solution of this problem in favour of Romania. The opening was due to the white-guard military offensive and the imminence of an attack by Poland, supported by France. A neutral Romania in this context was extremely important, hence the availability of dialogue. In fact, this was the continuation of the foreign policy started with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty: accepting the loss of any fixed-term territories, to be recovered by ideological pressure or armed force.

In this complex negotiation process, Romania maintained its military presence in Hungary, with the withdrawal being delayed by the transition from the Vaida-Voevod government to the Averescu government. The withdrawal of March 1920 led to progress in the recognition of the Union of Bessarabia, the ambassadors of the Allied states agreeing to accept the legal consequences of the act of 27 March 1918. The US continued to hesitate, even if Romania agreed with France and the United Kingdom to have an official reference to the recognition of minority rights.

Soviet Russia was still preoccupied with stopping any possible outside armed aggression, as the Red Army was very vulnerable. For this reason, Soviet Russia has placed a new condition in the diplomatic negotiations: conditional on the recognition of the Union of Bessarabia with Romania of the obligation of Romania's neutrality in the event of a Soviet Russia conflict with a third state.

These first diplomatic contacts were to be followed by others, much better outlined, in the form of recognizing the inviolability of the borders, after the signing of the treaty recognizing the Union of Bessarabia with Romania on 28 October 1920. Representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan (the ambassador of this country to Paris signed a few days later), as well as those of Romania (Take Ionescu and Dimitrie Ghica) signed this treaty. The US did not sign it. Soviet Russia challenged him right from the

moment of signing, the protest note being addressed to the signatory parties on November 1, 1920. This ended a first period in which many difficulties had been struck since the proclamation of the Union for its partial international recognition. We are talking about the conclusion of a first stage, because the signing of this treaty formed the subjective belief of the political class in Romania that the Bessarabia problem was thus finally settled. The ratification of the treaty and the subsequent negotiations with the USSR were considered to be minor problems in relation to the persuasion effort towards Western powers to recognize the Union of Bessarabia (Micu, 2011:123).

The Treaty was ratified by the United Kingdom in April 1922, by Romania in May 1922 and by France in April 1924. On the occasion of the French Parliament vote, the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs made a protest, considering this ratification as an inadmissible external interference during the Romanian-Soviet negotiations. Italy will ratify this treaty only in May 1927, considering it is important to give Romania and the USSR time to resolve the Bessarabia issue bilaterally. The United Kingdom's intervention, which considered the ratification of this treaty by Italy as very important, was decisive. The USSR aimed to prevent ratification of the treaty by European allies. The failure of this policy will direct the USSR in an entirely unexpected direction: initiating talks with Japan. This country signed in January 1925 a convention with the USSR on the settlement of the problem of the north of Sahalin, occupied in 1918 (Nouzille, 2005:120). The signing of this convention will eventually lead to Japan's implicit commitment not to ratify the Union of Bessarabia's Treaty of Recognition that it had signed in 1920. Soviet Foreign Commissioner Gheorghii Cicerin gave clear instructions on channelling efforts to hinder the ratification of the treaty by Japan.

The first contacts between the two countries took place in connection with the signing of the Convention on Principles of Cooperation between the USSR and Japan of January 20, 1925, when an exchange of notes took place between their representatives. Soviet Ambassador Karakhan said on this occasion that "on October 28, 1920, five states, including Japan, signed an agreement in Paris that acknowledged the annexation of Romania to the territory of Bessarabia belonging to the USSR". Considering good relations between the USSR and Japan, the Soviet government says it hopes Japan will not ratify this treaty. In his note,

Japanese Ambassador Ioshizava said that as long as the treaty is not ratified by all signatory European powers, the Government of Japan does not intend to ratify it.

After the ratification of the treaty by Italy, the situation of Japan has become more complicated and the Soviet insistence has been resumed with greater intensity. Karakhan considered "the occupation of Bessarabia" depended on Japan, and ratification would mean that Japan join the struggle the United Kingdom is taking against the USSR. At a meeting with Soviet representative Dovgalevski, Japanese Foreign Minister Dabuty said the issue of ratification had not been officially announced and told that a Romanian minister Aurel Ion Vassiliu was accredited in Tokyo to meet with Prime Minister Tanaka, in order to know the Japanese position on the issue of Bessarabia. Dabuty opposed ratification but showed that there was a strong pressure on the Japanese government by the British, French and Italian diplomatic corps. In this context, the meeting between Dovgalevski and Tanaka took place on May 24, 1927, when the issue of Bessarabia was discussed. The Soviet diplomat said the USSR hoped the Japanese government would not want to worsen relations with Moscow and not ratify the Treaty of Paris. The Prime Minister of Japan has shown he is aware that ratification would be an unfair act against the USSR, but the refusal to ratify it would have been interpreted by signatory states as an unfair act to them after Japan signed it. Tanaka said his government is in a difficult situation, but promised to resolve this issue, given Japan's friendly policy towards the USSR. Japan eventually preferred a non-aggression treaty with the USSR rather than ratification of a treaty that would have attracted its hostility (Țăcu, 2016).

The accreditation of an ambassador to Tokyo from Romania in 1927 was late. From governments after 1918, it was a great negligence not to put a close relationship with Japan. During the Paris Conference and later, during the ratification of the Peace Treaty, Romania did not have adequate diplomatic representation in Japan. During the visit to Russia on 6 May 1917 Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu contacted the Japanese ambassador to this country and sent him the desire to establish diplomatic relations. Japan was the only country in the Entente camp with which Romania did not yet have diplomatic relations. Brătianu has realized that Japan will be able to help Romania in achieving the objectives that warranted the entry into the war (Scumpieru, 2017:25). Nicolae Xenopol was appointed

Ambassador in September 1917, presented his letters of accreditation to the Emperor of Japan in Tokyo, but died on December 18, 1917. The consequence was the failure to sign the Agreement for Establishing Diplomatic Relations between Romania and Japan. It is considered that the lack of signing of this Agreement does not mean that there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the signing would have been strictly formal (Scumpieru, 2017:28). The Romanian Legation in Tokyo continued to function *de facto* through the work of Alexandru Bianu, the former private secretary of Nicolae Xenopol, until August 1918. At the request of the Romanian Government, the Netherlands Legation took over the representation of Romania's interests in Japan. Between June and July 1920, Crown Prince Carol paid a visit to Japan, but the Romanian authorities did not take advantage of this moment to resume diplomatic relations at the level of representation through the ambassador.

It is interesting to note that in a report on December 4, 1929, to the minister of foreign affairs, the Romanian diplomat George Stoicescu, who was staying for a period in Tokyo, mentioned after a meeting with the same Yoshizawa:

I did not have the impression that Japan would have made any written commitment to the ratification of the treaty. However, I am convinced that Japan does not want to raise the issue of ratification, before resolving the main pending economic and political issues that it still has to deal with Russia.

At that time, the Romanian diplomacy considered it was still possible to ratify the Peace Treaty in Paris by Japan, the same Romanian diplomat said:

if from an unexpected cause there would be some coldness between these relationships, only in that context we could take advantage of the new situation and get the right moment to get ratification (Rădulescu, 2018).

The same thinking prevailed in 1938, when Alexandru Crețianu formulated a report arguing the possibility of ratification of the Treaty of Paris by Japan, in the context in which the Japanese ambassador to the USSR had evoked this possibility to some Romanian diplomats (Ciupercă, 1996:38).

Romania tried to achieve the recognition of the Union of Bessarabia by the Soviet Russia / USSR both before and immediately after the signing of the 1920 treaty. A first attempt to reach a

compromise, subsequent to the signing of that treaty was the Warsaw negotiations in 1921 between the envoys of the two states (Filality and Karakhan respectively). These discussions will be influenced by Lenin's position of August 21, 1921, which puts the issue of Bessarabia in a totally unfavourable sense of recognition of the union of this province with Romania. Soviet diplomats insisted in these negotiations on the link between recognition and the payment of sums that would have accounted for the share of Bessarabia in the public debt of the Russian Empire, equivalent to the value of the public property of Bessarabia taken over by Romania (Micu, 2011:155). After 1922, the USSR regained its international stance and was taken into account by the great European powers. As a result, Romania's position in the bilateral negotiations is greatly weakened.

The delegates of Romania and the USSR met in Vienna in March 1924, the issue of the Union of Bessarabia being put forward with substantive arguments. The position of Soviet diplomats was that the *Sfatul Țării* had no right to decide on such an important issue. In the Soviet vision, the *Sfatul Țării* were organized with the sole purpose of temporarily managing Bessarabia until the convening of the Bessarabia Constituent Assembly. The meeting of 27 March 1918 was seen as one that occurred in the face of non-compliance with its own rules. At the meeting of 27 November 1918, when the decision on the incorporation of Bessarabia into Romania was made, 46 out of 162 members of the council were present and this issue was not put to the vote. The decisions of *Sfatul Țării* were considered by the Soviet side to be taken under the pressure from the Romanian military occupation. The USSR has advocated in these negotiations that the Council's decisions cannot be recognized and that a referendum is necessary in Bessarabia. The treaty signed in 1920 was for the first time officially considered by the USSR to have no legal value (Geblescu, 2013:121).

The Romanian delegation responded through an official memo to these considerations. The presentation of the contents of this memorandum is fundamental for the qualification of the act of 27 March 1918 as the legitimate expression of the Union of Bessarabia with Romania.

First, it is shown that the Romanian army entered Bessarabia only on January 18, 1918, after the establishment of the local bodies of self-determination, and the coming was in response to the invitation of the *Sfatul Țării* of December 24, 1917. After the moment of the Romanian troops'

entry, all the power institutions have been maintained intact, with the initiative of constituting the *Sfatul Țării*. The Union's proposal was put on the agenda on 25 March 1918 and was subsequently discussed for three consecutive days. There were only 30 abstentions and only 3 votes against, and 87 council members voted for. The Romanian troops were not in the assembly. The Council of the Country was, in the view of Romania's diplomats, a body set up on the same basis as the Diets that formed in Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, where under the same conditions autonomous and then independent states have been recognized by the Soviet governments and all governments of Europe. The *Sfatul Țării* had the right to dispose of the fate of the province it represented. In the view of Romanian diplomacy, if the Soviet government resorts to the hint of the necessity of a Constituent, it should oppose its attitude to the Constituent of its own country (after the coming of power to the Bolsheviks, the constitutional elections as a result of the February 1918 revolution, have not occurred; see Figes, 2016 and Courtois, 2017). The November 27, 1918 vote of the *Sfatul Țării* was already considered an internal problem of Romania, since the Union Act of 27 March 1918 was already recognized. Romania also used the argument of the 1918 parliamentary elections: the elected representatives of Bessarabia in the Romanian Parliament on the occasion of the 1919, 1920, 1922 elections did not question the Union's act of March 27, 1918. The Council's decision is the manifestation of the clear will of the Bessarabia population to unite with Romania. The conclusion was that "only by a definitely qualified act of self-determination and by its incontestable right, Bessarabia returned freely to Romania."

Regarding the issue invoked by the USSR concerning the absence of a referendum, the Romanian side argued in the following way. The lack of a referendum was systematically invoked by the USSR, but the Soviet Union governments did not use the referendum as a means of resolving political difficulties. Not by the referendum the power of the Soviets was established, and not by the referendum, "the Soviet government imposed the fate of the populations of the old Russian Empire and those who were later embedded in the Union." Moreover, the representatives of Romania, even Trotsky, argued in his work *The fundamental problems of the revolution of 1923* argued about Georgia:

The proposal to remove Soviet armies from Georgia and to hold a referendum, under the control of

mixed commissions composed of socialists and communists, is an inferior imperialist trap under the democratic flag and national self-determination.

The Romanian delegation stated that it is legitimate to ask the Soviet part to hold a referendum on the self-determination of ethnic Romanians who live "east of the Dniester" but will not do so. The organization of a referendum in Bessarabia at that time (1924) was considered to generate a flagrant contradiction between Romania and its allies, since a Peace Treaty that recognized the Union of Bessarabia was signed. Negotiations ended with the Soviet government declaring not to recognize the 1920 Paris Peace Treaty.

The Romanian-Soviet negotiations were resumed in Riga in January 1932 with a view to concluding a non-aggression pact, but the Soviet delegation refused to sign such a pact in which the Bessarabia dispute was not mentioned and refused to give a precise definition of the territory over which aggression could take place.

The issue of recognizing the Union of Bessarabia with Romania by the USSR was to be solved in part by signing by the two states of the Convention on the Definitions of Aggression on July 4, 1933, to which also being part Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and then Finland. It is specified that the territory over which the aggression of a state cannot take place is the territory in which the signatory states signed the Convention. Thus, the USSR did not formally recognize the union of Bessarabia with Romania but acknowledged that it had renounced Bessarabia, both on the road of force (by renouncing aggression) and peacefully. The proof of this last part of the conclusion is the statement of Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Nicolae Titulescu:

I know that in principle signing this Convention we gave you Bessarabia. If I cannot recognize this officially, it is because of the difficulties I would have with my public opinion ... But when I commit myself never to make an aggression on Bessarabia and that I cannot ask for the revision, not only because the USSR is not a member of the League of Nations, but because in principle we are against the revision, because it means war, how could I get Bessarabia back? (Geblescu, 2013:276)

The signing of the 1933 Convention between Romania and the USSR determined the United States that had not signed the Paris Peace Treaty to change its attitude. State Secretary Cordell Hull set

out in a memorandum addressed to President Roosevelt how to reach the recognition of the Union of Bessarabia with Romania and proposed that from 1 July 1933 immigration quotas should refer only to Romania and avoid registering the name of Bessarabia for the Romanian citizens coming from this region. On the basis of the approval of this Memorandum, it can be said that the United States made a *de facto* recognition of the Union of Bessarabia with Romania.

4. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, even if from March 27, 1918 until the beginning of the Peace Conference in Paris, the Union of Bessarabia with Romania was not questioned, being even given as an example of the application of the principle of self-determination, this act was not finally recognized by all parties that participated in the negotiation of the Paris Peace Treaty. The agreement of France, Great Britain and Italy was possible due to a highly active diplomacy of Romania that did not hesitate to resort to extreme measures to recognize the Union of Bessarabia (keeping troops in Hungarian territory, abstaining from actions against Soviet Russia despite pressures even from the signers of the Peace Treaty).

It is important to underline that none of the states that have ratified, signed or ratified the Paris Treaty - Japan or the United States - did not explicitly refuse to recognize the Union of Bessarabia with Romania. This act was thus finally recognized by all states that participated in the Paris Peace Conference. The reservations expressed for signature / ratification were generated by the general positioning of these states towards the USSR. Recognition by the USSR was also *de facto*, following the signing of the 1933 Convention, or rather by interpreting the circumstances of this episode.

In any case, the absence of a fully valid *de jure* recognition by the international community cannot lead to the conclusion that the Union of Bessarabia with Romania did not comply with international law. As we have seen, Bessarabia has gone through

all the steps necessary for the decision of the *Sfatul Țării* of 27 March 1918 to be fully legitimate and to be considered the indisputable basis for the recognition of the Union of Bessarabia with Romania: Bessarabia proclaimed its autonomy to the Russian Empire - declared independence on January 24, 1918, and later decided without any external constraints on joining Romania. The principle of the self-determination of peoples, as expressed by the US President Woodrow Wilson, has been fully respected, like all the other principles of international law that were recognized at that time and are still functioning today.

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ROMANIA AS AN ONGOING VAMPIRE STORY: COUNT DRACULA AND THE POP-CULTURAL DÉTENTE

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Abstract: *The present article analyses two recent fictional reiterations of Count Dracula's topos – namely, Alucard in Kouta Hirano's Hellsing manga series (1997-2008) and Fifi/FAD (Florin Anghelescu Dragolea) in Alexandru Mușina's novel Dracula's Nephew (2012) – as two rather authoritative contemporary references modifying the vampiric epitome originally outlined by Bram Stoker (and others). The focus is set on the evolution of 'nation branding' related elements reflected inside the common fictional paradigm. More specifically, this imagological investigation revolves around the ethical-symbolic dimension of the two selected contemporary works, in its particular relation to the controversial tendency of 'branding' Romania (or Transylvania) as the 'actual' homeland of the vicious vampire count. The ethical response both works imply is distinctive as well as significant, in the sense that it illustrates a current tendency towards what will be referred to in the present study as a 'pop-cultural détente'.*

Keywords: *nation branding; popular culture; manga; vampire; Dracula.*

1. THEORETICAL GUIDELINES

It is common knowledge that the original definition of the concept of 'branding' is closely related to marketing. Much in the same line of thought, 'nation branding' is typically defined as "the application of corporate marketing concepts and techniques to countries, in the interests of enhancing their reputation in international relations" (Kerr, Wiseman, 2013:354). Nevertheless, even in this traditional (i.e. 'functional', 'materially-oriented') definition, certain fiction-related elements are still inherent to the concept, since 'branding' is still seen as "a marketing tool associated with perception, image, mental associations in the minds of target groups" (Vuiginier, 2016:5). This means that imaginative creation, narrative patterns (especially popular ones), stereotypes, mythopoetic production – in a word, fiction (in the broadest sense of the word) and fictional *topoi* are a part of any process of brand-generation.

Now, while the meaning of the concept of 'topos' – a fictional motif, theme or reoccurring, structured discursive convention – is quite clear in comparative literature and cultural studies, things are a little less axiomatic when it comes to the idea of 'pop/popular culture'. Taking many forms according to various competing or successive

theoretical definitions, this rather controversial notion will be used within the framework of the present approach in a (mildly) Gramscian connotation. As such, 'popular culture' will be understood as a terrain of artistic production where significant cultural negotiation between the masses and institutionally-produced discourses occurs. Unrestricted, in our view, to strictly consumerist productions, the concept extends in such a way as to encompass elements issued by different 'alternative culture(s)' or 'subculture(s)', in those cases where the cultural product reaches massive acclaim or exerts significant influence. The concept will hence broadly oppose the notion of artistic 'canon', i.e. those productions issued or validated (so far) as 'high culture' by a certain cultural establishment. In this line, we approach John Storey's definition of 'popular culture as *Other*' (Storey, 2001:14-15).

Coming back, at this point, to the notion of 'nation branding', most of the recently-issued theoretical syntheses similarly concur towards the conclusion that there is more than one plausible understanding of the term. In a rather influential study on the concept, Nadia Kaneva identifies three basic possible viewpoints on 'nation branding': a technical / economic perspective, a political perspective and a cultural / critical perspective, respectively (Kaneva, 2011). Of course, this clear-

cut, three-fold distinction is merely heuristic, but as it is rather intuitive, it serves our immediate purpose of delineating the range of meaning we are interested in. Concretely, the present study thus falls into the category/range of cultural approaches, since it basically envisages “a critique of nation branding’s discourses and practices as they relate to national identity, culture, and governance” (Kaneva, 2011:127)¹.

Another initial remark worth making here would be that the perspective on Dracula’s myth as a nation branding phenomenon that I am proposing is (again, in Kaneva’s terms) constructivist², in the sense that the spotlight is rather set on the evolution of the allogenic stereotype as an identity-related issue³. In other words, the main pursuit of this study is basically imagological in nature, as it analyses and interprets some recent (and perhaps, significant) changes in the features of an image still automatically (and traditionally) associated with Romania and its identity.

2. DRACULA AS A HETEROGENIC NATIONAL BRAND

“I’ve asked a few British what they knew about Romania. You would be surprised to hear that number one on the list was Dracula / Transilvania.

¹ This is why, for any references and discussions related to Dracula as an economic asset or to governmental policies related to reputation management or exploitation, see, for instance, A. Sepi’s (2013), *Nation Branding: The Case of Romania* (E/IR&CD), www.culturaldiplomacy.org. Available:

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² For a more detailed description of the ‘constructivist’ approach on nation branding as opposed to ‘essentialism’, see Kaneva, *ed. cit.*, 129-130.

³ This is why the present analysis will also refrain from expressly contrasting the stereotype/brand against historical, social or cultural realities, figures or places in Romania. For such approaches, see, for instance, Monica Hârşan, *Bram Stoker et la genèse d'un stéréotype géoculturel : « la Transylvanie hantée »*, in L. Dupuy, J.-Y. Puyo. *L’imaginaire géographique. Entre géographie, langue et littérature*. Pau: Presses de l’Université de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour, col. Spatialités. 209-222.

Some of them were uncertain if that was in Romania”, said PR specialist Trevor Morris, cited by nation-branding.info in 2008. And he is but one in a long list of specialists still ranking Dracula first of all Romanian national brands when it comes to international popularity⁴. Of course, the economic aboriginal exploitation of this hetero-image has generated its own complementary fictions and *topoi* (such as, for instance, Bran Castle’s fictional assignment as ‘Dracula’s Castle’). Also, the popularity of the fictional vampire count and his (far-fetched) association with one of the most notorious Romanian historical figures – Vlad the Impaler – has generated critical reaction among Romanian scholars, who strived to clarify (and over-clarify) the scientific incongruences – and the deficiencies with respect to political correctness – of this imaginary fusion. But between such scholars who, offended by the Count’s bloody countenance, attempt to dismiss Dracula and his authority as an identity brand and those conversely militating in favour of a cleverer commercial exploitation / governmental policy in the matter, not many locals pause to consider the actual image and its fictional potential as a discourse⁵ in itself. That is to say, the force of purely fictional productions (literary works or graphic novels, cinematic productions etc.), understood as a potential ‘brand-producing’ mechanism, should perhaps be reconsidered, as they still seem to be unparalleled in terms of influence by both scholarly work and the bare media/PR strategies employed so far by Romanian governance. But let us first briefly overview the actual fictions, their inner structures – and the nation-branding connotations behind this famous literary topos.

3. THE FICTIONAL TOPOI: A VAMPIRIC ARCHETYPE AND ITS AVATARS

3.1 A few remarks on a classic: Count Dracula. Since there is a lot of scholarly literature analysing this (nowadays, archetypal) stereotype, I will just briefly review some less-known aspects and their implications for Romanian identity.

To begin with, it is significant to note that Stoker’s Count Dracula is not singular or unique as a representation, but rather the last (and most prominent) element in a string of popular Western European 19th century Gothic fictional depictions of

⁴ For further details, see Preliceanu, C.-M. (2015:157).

⁵ In a mild Foucauldian definition of the term, i.e. a social system’s produced knowledge and meaning as a position of power.

vampires and/or vampiric figures. Little is said on the fact that Bram Stoker's interest in a vampiric Transylvania was, for instance, preceded by Jules Verne's nearly-supernatural Transylvania in *The Carpathian Castle* (1892). It is also almost unknown that Dracula's emergence follows a series of writings featuring a similar (and rather successful) character: Lord Ruthven, a vampire of non-specified national appurtenance, first starring in Dr. John William Polidori in the short story *The Vampyre* in 1816. This first notable representation of an aristocratic, sensual, but ruthless vampire generated a whole series of literary reiterations, among which one by none other than the famous Alexandre Dumas père (*The Vampire*, 1865, drama)⁶.

There are striking similarities in the narrative scheme as well. The vampire (or vampiric figure) dangerously charms his way into the civilised world by manipulating a young, inexperienced European nobleman. But if Lord Ruthven was originally a-national and a-geographical, with Dumas' rendition, the topos of his fictional (ancient, aboriginal, excessively rocky and richly forested) country visibly evokes Dracula's. Moreover, the vampire's homeland is placed in Circassia, on the north-eastern shore of the Black Sea. Later, with Jules Verne's baron Rodolphe de Gortz, the image of a dark (obscurantist / occult) Transylvania emerges and gets to be associated with the already shaped stereotype of the aristocratic vampire.

Bram Stoker's *Dracula* (1897) is thus the successor of a rather prosperous 19th century popular literary tradition in which the vampiric figure of another (or an 'other', heterotopic⁷) Europe comes into shape and is gradually associated with Transylvania, a region which was just struggling to place itself on the map of Europe at the time, but was still widely unknown to the majority of the public. Attached to Romanian identity on-the-go, as a sort of a dark-romantic, gothic-horror topos basically opposing the positivist-rationalist spirit of the 'civilised world', and bringing a half-horrifying, half-alluring mystical primitiveness into the public eye, the image of the obscurantist, delayed Other might have generated both an unsettling sensation and a certain melancholic revival of Europe's (already) lost mystical / magical past – a

combination which most likely converged into the tremendous success of the initial Gothic topos.⁸ Its echo in Western consciousness was, as we know, amazingly powerful, spawning an extensive vampire subculture in the 20th century. Still, let us maintain that, as a representation of otherness, it remains in many ways a less-than-flattering and ill-documented depiction.

3.2 Alucard, the vampire hunter (1997-2008; 2001-2006; 2001-2002; 2006-2012)⁹. Of course, the famous vampire is also a presence in various vampire comic series and graphic novels, usually making secondary-character majestic appearances as the unsurpassed ancestor of all vampires. In contrast, Kouta Hirano's Alucard plays the role of the protagonist in the Japanese *Hellsing* series – initially a *manga* (graphic novel) series, further developed following its popularity into two *anime* (animation) series and doubled over by a prequel *manga* (*Hellsing: The Dawn*, by the same author).

Obviously, the character's name reads 'Dracula' in reverse, pointing out to the old blood's conversion into a vampire hunter, an enemy of his own kin (so, a supposedly positive character), as he joins Hellsing, a British secret organisation designed to fight emerging supernatural menaces brought about by the Undead. The reasons for which he does so are (and remain) inexplicit: even if he apparently swore an oath of faith to his old archenemy, Abraham Van Hellsing (whose descendant, Sir Integra Hellsing is the current head of the organisation), he still seems to act as if out of sheer boredom. More than that, he is in a permanent search for a truly challenging, perhaps deadly opponent.

The character is mysterious and intimidating in many ways. His brutality and lust for blood, his fierce, unpredictable, untameable nature and appearance, his rather beastly sadomasochistic and uncommunicative attitude and his formidable vampiric powers bring sheer charisma into the character and give it the stature of an elemental force. However, there is a second dimension to this

⁶ Namely: *Lord Ruthven or the Vampires*, 1820, novel by Cyprien Bérardand; *The Vampire*, 1820, novel by Charles Nodier, adapted for the London stage by James Robinson Planché and re-played at least four times within the same year.

⁷ Both terms are used in their Foucauldian sense, as defined in *Of Other spaces* [Espaces autres]. (1967).

⁸ I have extensively developed this thesis in a scientific (see Hărșan, 2014).

⁹ The mentioned periods of time correspond to the successive continuations and video transpositions of the series, as follows: 1997-2008 – *Hellsing*, the original 10-volume issue of the *manga* (published in *Young King OURS* magazine, Tokyo: Shōnen Gahōsha); 2001-2006 – *Hellsing – The Dawn*, a *manga* 10-volume prequel (id., see above); 2001-2002 – the 13-episode *Hellsing* TV Series' original run; 2006-2012 – the 10-episode OVA series *Hellsing Ultimate* (release date).

protagonist which actually provides him with unparalleled charm: he is also awash in dark humour. Utterly charismatic, but rather monstrous as a physical presence, he tends to look pretty hilarious in his frill shirt adorned with a red cravat, white gloves and generally, in the oldish-gentlemanly 19th-century-like, scarlet attire making out his uniform, as his dandyish clothes never quite seem to properly suit his unnaturally tall and bony appearance and messy hairdo. Also, the weapons he carries are unusual (to say the least): two preposterously-dimensioned, large-calibre handguns (named Jackal and Casull), charged with consecrated bullets purposefully issued by the Protestant Church are meant to put his ordinary opponents to (eternal) rest. And last, but not least, he has a hilariously hideous, toothy grin.

In what concerns his true identity, he gloriously reveals it as the plot of the initial series reaches its peak – more specifically, as he manages to impale his ultimate foe and shows colossal, ungovernable force: he is both Dracula, the supreme vampire, and Vlad the Impaler, hereby presented as a Christian warlord having long fought the Ottomans and ultimately turned his back on God as he was eventually defeated and executed by them. The anime rendition of the scene in the TV series is monumental, as the protagonist's face – normally well shaved and framed by an unruly short haircut, usually hidden beyond his rounded specs and a large, floppy hat – intentionally gives away, by means of a mere shadow play, its stunning resemblance to the most famous portrait of Vlad Țepeș. This wordless avowal is followed in the later-issued OVA by further reassertion, as he appears in some sequences cloaked in a dark cape, wearing long, dark hair and a moustache, much in the manner of the Impaler.

Thus, Alucard seems to correspond, in general, to the wider stereotype of the ultimate vampire; still, there are some notable particularities which are worth mentioning. First, the character's half ridiculous appearance – stemming from the organisation's absurd efforts to civilise him is also doubled by the fierce dark humour of his rarely articulate commentaries. For instance, he would laugh at a disabled opponent's desperate attempt to launch a last attack, and ask if he should really fear dying by being 'chewed to death' by his broken, armless adversary.

Then, there is a visibly hyperbolic lust for violence attached to this character: just killing an enemy is never enough for this mentally deranged vampire. Sadistic chopping, blood baths and even masochism (as he frequently invites his enemies to

slay him and provides them with occasions to do so) result in intentionally-exaggerated, Tarantino-like displays of physical violence. Touching the absurd, and thus turning most battle scenes into parodic, farcical parades, Alucard's own moped tone and sickly-ironic comments, as well as the willed repetitiveness of the scenario add up to generate a striking of their nonsensical character. The nonsense hence hints to an implied meta-discourse on the repetitiveness of the explicit violence typical for the *manga/anime* Shōnen/Seinen culture¹⁰ (which are sometimes directly hinted at via hidden references), but not exclusively (as references go as far as including bloody Victorian plays such as Shakespeare's tragedies, for instance). Also, there is a legibly critical take on the very topos of the bloodthirsty, morally ambiguous superhero often presented and/or perceived as a positive character, as well as on the topos of the hero's (all-justifying) over-professionalism specific to so many contemporary action-movies (and narratives in general) – as Alucard is ostentatiously over-efficient and ultra-professional, as well as obsessive in his work. Third, there is also a subtle innuendo that the anti-hero's emotional immunity/numbness to bloodshed resonates with the public's unconscious emotional immunisation to (and saturation with) obsolete, gratuitous and unreasonable adrenalin-filled story patterns.

As far as the discrepancies in relation to the original stereotype Alucard brings along (beyond its ironic hyperbolising), two aspects are also worth noting. First, the fact that the personal history of the *manga* hero shows an increased awareness (and perhaps more thorough documentation) in what concerns the historical figure of Vlad Țepeș, who is this time correctly associated with Christianity and the wars against the Ottomans – even if the cruelty of his demeanour is fictionally motivated by his satanic turn. Second, the fact that Țepeș/Dracula is, in this case, the protagonist of the story and, in spite of all his moral/mental issues, he is definitely not all bad. In fact, Alucard joins the cause of the Good, and despises the undead. More than that, it is suggested in the *Ultimate* OVA that he is actually incessantly seeking for his own death both out of a need for redemption and because of his low self-esteem, which, combined to the never-ending boredom of his infinite existence, progressively turns into sheer depression. Now, both these

¹⁰ Types of manga/anime whose main target audience is made out of a male public (adolescent and older, respectively), and which is notoriously dense in fighting scenes.

features show a deeper concern for political correctness, a pursuit Stoker (or Verne, for that matter) obviously ignored. Additionally (and accidentally, to all appearances), low self-esteem is more often than not mentioned as one of the traits plaguing Romania's public image (see, for instance, Prelipceanu, 2015:158).

To sum up, in all his apparent barbarity, Hirano's Alucard makes up a more aware, self-conscious, documented and updated rendition of the initial stereotype's national implications, as the character's cultural appurtenance and affiliation become altogether secondary to its showy biological otherness and psychological alienation – or, in a word, to its individual difference, which puts its problematic singularity first and makes its metafictional traits move to the centre of attention. Consequently, Hirano's take on the paradigmatic vampire moves away from nation-branding elements (or from the temptation to produce cultural labels), by displacing the emphasis laid on Transylvania as an emblematically Gothic-horror territory and shifting the public focus towards the narrative, i.e. the weirdly dramatic individual difference of the protagonist and the (meta)fictional potential of ingenious intertexts.

3.3 Dracula's nephew, the faint-hearted professor (2012)¹¹. Yet another parodic reprise of Count Dracula's topos is the sarcastic fictional construction of an alternative self-image articulated in Alexandru Mușina's seemingly pop-fictional enterprise in the satiric campus-novel *Dracula's nephew*, published in Romania in 2012. However, quite opposite to Hirano's rendition (which is a neo-allogenic perspective, i.e. both foreign and secondary, as it retells an allogenic original story), the Romanian author's novel is an autochthonous response to the first-hand outlandish perception of Dracula as a nation-branding element. That is to say, Mușina overtly addresses the issues related to the political (in)correctness of the association and its rather laughable superficiality.

As an eminent university professor in literature and folklore, a nationally-acclaimed literary scholar, theorist and poet, the Romanian writer naturally has both the proper theoretical and the practical insight on the matter, as well as the creativity to set up a deeply critical discourse under the form of light, relaxed narrative. In fact, he chooses to confront the issue of negative 'nation branding' in such an extensive way that it implicitly comes to constitute

the major theme of the novel. In other words, as I have stated elsewhere, "[t]he playful, *opera buffa*-like surface of the story shouldn't misguide interpretation: real and thorough culturally critical observation is constructed by means of the (apparently) humorous decontextualisation of stereotypes. As they are ironically approached and hilariously recontextualised, their meaning gets "deflected", i.e., it changes its course, it gets "reprogrammed" so as to serve a different purpose and create new significance" (Hărșan, 2016:550).

The entire fictional setting of the novel is, for instance, playfully based on Mușina's real life experience as a university professor at "Transilvania" University of Brașov (placed some 30 kilometres away from Bran) – a circumstance which he cleverly intends to enable as a possible novel-related cultural/tourist attraction. According to the author's own sarcastic claims¹², he intended for the novel to be translated at least in English and Chinese, in order for it to generate a new and 'more credible' popular tourism brand than Stoker's. In any case, the alternative Transylvanian setup was directly inspired by the (apparently, ridiculous) fact (commonly known among faculty members at "Transilvania" University) that the first thing to come up in connection to the institution's name in any conversation with foreign peers or students was, of course, Dracula's name (or alternatively, Dracula jokes). Ironically, Mușina overtly and outspokenly uses one of his younger colleagues' profile as a basis for the figure of Dracula's nephew in the book¹³.

The profile of the vampire is also utterly dissimilar to both Stoker's paragon and Hirano's version of the anti-paragon: "The most blatant (counter-) stereotypical representation in the novel is the theme of the vampire and his Romanian ancestry. [...] Since any respectable vampire must descend from Vlad Țepeș, alias Dracula [...], so does Florin Anghelescu Dragolea, actual nephew of Athanasie Drăculea, Țepeș's last known descendant. However, apart from this 'stereotypical imperative', nothing else is, 'vampirically' speaking, *comme-il-faut* in what concerns this civilised (and thus, degenerate), postmodern anti-vampire" (Hărșan, 2016:550). Mockingly surname "professor FAD" (meaning "dull" or "insipid" in Romanian) or "Fifi",

¹¹ Alexandru Mușina. (2012, first and so far sole edition). *Nepotul lui Dracula*. Brașov: Aula.

¹² During book launches, conferences or various scientific events, and in particular discussions (I have worked closely to Alexandru Mușina between 2010 and 2013 as a PhD candidate at "Transilvania" University).

¹³ The name of the real person isn't displayed here because of the personal nature of such information.

“the poor benign grand-grandson of the noble Athanasie is, in fact, a modest, depressive, shy, scrupulous, scruffy and tedious middle-aged Junior Lecturer in French literature at ‘Transilvania’ University of Braşov [...]. Personally, Fifi is a three-time divorced recovering alcoholic, living (and depending, emotionally) on his (over)affectionate mother. His social status is less than dignified [...], his self-esteem and psychological composure are free-falling as he is constantly stressing about his own worth and the opinions of others [...]. Thus, our vampire’s disposition is (understandably) morose, introverted and... uptight, as he constantly manages to hinder and ridicule himself.” (Hărşan, 2016:550).

Thus, as I have stated in my above cited study, “Fifi’s ensanguine, anaemic, starved figure, contrasting with his (much-too) gentle behaviour is a visible (tragi-) comical parody of the gloriously menacing, mysteriously fascinating romantic image of the vampire” (Hărşan, 2016:550), even if the story is actually a bildungsroman in which the fading vampire is brought back to himself and the “old ways”, becoming a “civilised (noble, even!), a legitimate, respectful and extremely polite consumer of (Romani) blood” (Hărşan, 2016:550). That is, of perfectly bottled (for export) and thoroughly verified (for hygiene-related issues), premium-quality (Romani) bio-blood. The narrative is provided with a happy-end, as Fifi is brought to himself by his loving would-have-been victim-slaves and Lulu, a rich student who falls in love with him. In the end, he comes to establish a “good marks for (donated) blood” trade with his students (Hărşan, 2016:551) and ends up dreaming of being installed king.

Of course, this is both a reversed and satiric reaction to the ‘negative’ hetero-images produced offshore as it is a criticism of Romanian post-communism, global consumerism and the policies economic domination which relies, in Muşina’s case, on deep cultural observation. In sum, Muşina’s ‘over-civilised’, faint-hearted and vulnerable avatar of the vampire is definitely ‘brand-oriented’ and functions, just like Hirano’s rendition, on a meta-discursive level. The difference consists, however, of the implied metadiscursive reference: *Dracula’s Nephew* doesn’t refer as much to (popular) fictional patterns and their inconsistencies – even if popular fiction per se and its instructive potential has been one of Muşina’s constant ethical preoccupations over the years; in spite the novel’s ‘pop’ surface, it is, in fact, a sort of a “fictio-critical” approach to stereotypes (Hărşan, 2016:549) I have previously described in terms of a “deflective” strategy

(Hărşan, 2016), i.e. a strategy setting up a delicate, fictional and intellectually relaxed refusal of such uncomplimentary nation-branding associations.

4. SOME GENERALISATIONS: ON POP-CULTURAL DÉTENTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL FICTIONAL IMAGERY OF NATION-BRANDING

As a conclusion to this brief analysis, let us first note that Dracula’s current secondary, if paradigmatic role in vampire culture remains, for now, the typical one. But such generalised withdrawal of the original topos towards the margins of contemporary narratives and into archetypal appearances is perhaps less a sign of its exhaustion, as one of transformation. It is conspicuous that the two fictions examined here come to ‘tell a different tale’: that of a possible fictional re-signification of the master-narrative¹⁴ and its probable success (as both stories have reached, in their own terms, considerable notoriety and were given a warm reception by their target audience).

Some common features of the two contemporary representations of Count Dracula’s theme in what concerns their relationship to the nation-branding features of the topos also become evident. The fact that the sombre, menacing Gothic-horror atmosphere is transfigured and relativized into parodic, present-day or even futuristic set-ups (i.e., gender transshipping), that the figure of the vampire essentially becomes less ominous, even attaching – at least to some extent – as human anxieties and predicaments come to trouble the vampires’ inner lives (i.e., the resemantisation of the narrative content and themes), the raised degree of awareness and concern for political correctness in the fictional rendition of identity-related cultural detail, and the fact that both stories are, one way or the other, metafictional (i.e., they are stories, but also function as self-conscious discourses on narrative techniques and conventional representations) – all these attributes concur towards the idea that the stereotype, the paradigm itself is (slowly, but steadily) undergoing significant change under the pressure of globalised dialogue and shared experience, even as it remains at the core – or the

¹⁴ In the sense assigned to the term by Jean François Lyotard in *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge [La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir]*: that of an all-encompassing, global cultural narrative pattern organizing and explaining knowledge and experience. 1979, Paris: Minuit.

basis – of such narrative constructions. Reiterated, it survives, but it is also bound to adjust to the gradually changing perceptions of Romania as an Other, of Romania as a potential identity under (a self-)construction (in progress). If with the classical stereotype, which is a classic example of a (rather ‘negative’) hetero-image, the Other (in this case, Transylvania / Romania) was the ‘stranger’, both exotic / fascinating / mysterious / vitalistic and possibly dangerous / brutal / primitive / risky, at the dawn of the new paradigm, otherness itself, in terms of a hetero-genetic definition of Romania either becomes less important as a trait (as with Hirano) or is addressed head-on, finding its own untamed, ‘uncivilised’ voice (through Mușina’s self-image generation). Tables are turned, and the Other apparently tends to reach global integration, as the newer definitions refuse to focus on difference (or exoticism) as much as the old did.

A certain relaxation in the general tone consequently ensues in what concerns Romania’s reflected image, a sort of ‘a pop-cultural(ly generated) détente’: fiction is either relegated back into fiction, as public awareness becomes more and more able to distinguish between real-life and imaginary stories; or it becomes a proper vehicle of cultural dialogue and negotiation when used in such a way by both parties, and does so in the terms of a more open and less hurtful or belligerent rhetoric.

This last observation could also open the way to a more general conclusion on the importance of fiction (and especially of popular narratives) in today’s globalised world. As archetypal patterns are simultaneously perpetually recycled and perpetually re-assigned new meanings, we could probably talk about the establishment of an ‘international fictional imagery of nation branding’ (as one among numerous other such globalised patrimonies of essential images). It is mainly on what the abstract reality ‘fiction tourism’ or ‘place branding’ draw on, for instance; there is also a massive amount of stories (cult or simply folkloric), popular sayings or stereotypical narrations defining and redefining national or regional identities; and it is, in sum, a global patrimony of tremendous representational force that should neither be used lightly, nor ignored

as unpractical or unrelated to a community’s material existence. On the contrary: as archetypes and fictions never stop merging, emerging and re-emerging in a perpetual, unstoppable loop – and that, with or without our consent, advertently or not – to seriously consider a mythopoetic effort in the sense of attempting to ‘tame’ them, to knowingly contribute to their configuration, generation and perpetuation when it comes to nation branding related issues would probably be a profitable strategy in itself.

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NATIONAL IDENTITY IN ROMANIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES

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Abstract: *The national identity and the psychological specificity of the Romanian people have been approaches of interest from the beginning of psychology as science in Romania. Constantin Rădulescu-Motru imposed it as a distinct theme in the 1930s, since then it constantly returned to attention. In the context of celebrating the centenary, the approach to describing national characteristics in terms of psychological features has become both current and desirable. The paper presents succinct approaches of some authors from the 20th century (Dumitru Draghicescu, Constantin Radulescu-Motru, Mihai Ralea), as well as a cognitive-experimental approach (Daniel David, 2015). In addition, they outline an approach that goes beyond the boundaries of psychology, thus contributing to the theme of national identity in Romanian cultural space.*

Keywords: *identity; traits*

1. INTRODUCTION

The psychological approach to national characteristics is closely linked to the beginnings of psychology as a science. Wilhelm Wundt, founder of experimental psychology, published between 1900 and 1920 a complex work entitled *Völkerpsychologie. Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetz von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte*.

Wundt compares the relationship between *Völkerpsychologie* and experimental psychology with the one of psychology and physiology: each approach offers an alternative perspective to each other and each one completes one another in different ways. At its beginnings, *Völkerpsychologie* was a field of theoretical study, defined as such by the founder of psychology as experimental science. Later, it was used in connection with Nazi ideology, which made it gradually lose its momentum. Also, its foundation on the theory of substantiation / essentialization of a nation's ethos has not proved its validity.

The implicit psychological approach to the characteristics of the Romanian people can be noticed first in philosophical works, starting with those of Dimitrie Cantemir, which is also mentioned in Ion Manzat's psychology history treaty (2007: 979). The theme was consecrated with the work of *Psychology of the Romanian People* (1937/2012) by Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, who obtained the Ph.D. title (with a theme of philosophy) under the guidance of W. Wundt.

2. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMANIAN NATIONALITY IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Remarkably, the main contributions in the field of psychology to the characteristics of the Romanian people were made in the past by personalities with a true encyclopaedic vocation. That is why the works that address the psychological characteristics specific to the Romanian people can not be considered as belonging only to psychology, they have since the appearance and until now notable effects on the Romanian cultural space.

In the 20th century there were several authors who approached this topic. In this article, only the contributions of Dumitru Draghicescu (1875-1945), Constantin Rădulescu-Motru (1868-1941) and Mihai Ralea (1896-1964) are presented succinctly.

Dumitru Draghicescu was a philosopher, sociologist and Romanian diplomat (a quality that he worked closely with Nicolae Titulescu for the establishment of the League of Nations, in 1920). He remained in the history of Romanian psychology by introducing the first course of social psychology in the academic year 1905-1906 (Mânzat, 2007: 992) and especially through the work *Din psihologia poporului român* (en: *From the psychology of the Romanian people*) (1907/1995), which is the first monograph of this theme. Drăghicescu's volume is structured in 12

chapters, each of which can also be taken as an independent study. Although he was criticized for describing predominantly the negative psychological characteristics to the detriment of the positive ones (in a manner similar to Dimitrie Cantemir), Draghicescu expresses "confidence in the characteristics of the great future of the soul, which << hide or are reduced in the contexts of certain vicissitudes of our history >> ... << The riches of our mentality have been stopped instead of their development, they have waited and waiting for good circumstances to come to light >>”(Mânzat, 2007: 991).

Although it has been more than a century since its publication, Drăghicescu's work contains passages of surprising timeliness, such as those on the "subdued character," seen as a "protective reflex" stemming from the lack of confidence of the Romanian peasant face of everything meaning "official administration", being associated (at the time when the book was written) with the "disinterest" and "non-involvement". Both in the preface and in the introduction to his work, Dumitru Draghicescu emphasizes that this is a "first volume" and stresses the difficulties of the proposed approach: "we hope that the object of the research will not go too far the limits of our powers "(Draghicescu, 1937:19), in the conditions in which the work was written in a "transitional period". In fact, the work appears in 1907, the year of the great peasant riots, a historical phenomenon in which there was sufficient involvement and interest in social change. As such, Draghicescu's claims regarding the limits of his approach had an immediate confirmation.

Constantin Rădulescu-Motru held the first experimental psychology course at the University of Bucharest, being the author of *the Psychology Problems* (1898), which founded psychology as an autonomous science in the Romanian cultural context. He is recognized as the founder of the psychological school in Bucharest (focusing on experiment and psychometry), establishing the first experimental psychology laboratory in this university center (1906). In *Psychology of the Romanian People* (1937/2012), Rădulescu-Motru describes and explains the soul traits of the Romanian people by conjugating three factors: the hereditary biological fund; geographic environment and institutional features acquired with historical progress. Just like Drăghicescu, he warns of the difficulty of his approach: "In peoples with a newer culture and not so original, the difficulties remain high. Nearly unobserved. This

is the case of the social psychology of the Romanian people "(1937/2012: 15).

A major thesis of the paper is that of the specificity of Romanian individualism, considered to be of a distinct type from the occidental meaning of the term: "does not involve the spirit of initiative in the economic life and too little spirit of independence in the political and social life, the two attributes which characterizes the individualism of the Western cultures" (1937/2012: 18), but it is "a mere subjective reaction, an egocentrism, under the influence of the biological, hereditary factor" (1937/2012: 20). This feature is associated with a lack of perseverance, although there are remarkable exceptions, according to Rădulescu-Motru: agricultural work and professional occupations transmitted from one generation to the next.

The apparent contradiction is explained by

A mismatch between the hereditary factor and the institutional factor. The Romanian is, by its hereditary nature, persevering in work, as it is patient, conservative, traditional, but this hereditary nature has been perverted by a mistaken institutional life imitated by strangers. He is unproductive because the state institutions have forced him to improvisations (Rădulescu-Motru, 1937/2012: 26-27).

Regarding the psychological characteristics of the Romanian people, Rădulescu-Motru describes both some unfavorable (disorderly work - done in leaps, the lack of commercial spirit, the poor use of time) and more favorable ones: welcoming, tolerant, religious-loving. The enumeration is not sufficient for the pursued approach, the characterization of "the function these qualities and defects have in the Romanian people's soul unity", in the context in which the big problem is the "Romanian spiritual purpose." In this context, the final phrase of the work keeps its topicality:

Shame is not for the people who are very well known it's different to the glorious and powerful peoples, but it is ashamed for the people who have no courage to know their fate and destiny (1937 / 2012: 53).

Mihai Ralea was a psychologist, sociologist, esthetician, philosopher, essayist and Romanian political scientist with a Ph.D. in economic and political science and another one in letters. In the *"Romanian Phenomenon"* anthology (1997), his main writings on national specificity are reunited. As far as the psychological characteristics are

concerned, Ralea describes the two poles, Western-type individualism, and passive resignation, typical of the Oriental, among which there is a "intermediate structure" of soul structure: adaptability. Starting from adaptability, Ralea describes the transactional spirit and manner in which the Romanian people survived throughout history. The power of adaptation comes from the conjugation of the following factors: the spirit of observation; the exact understanding of the situation; feeling rather than passion; unconditional will; resourceful spirit, sometimes through the use of unorthodox means.

Adaptability is proven, says Ralea, by the ease with which Romanians learn foreign languages and adapt to another culture. The demographic evolution of the last decades, in which millions of Romanians have gone abroad definitively (adapting to adoption language and culture), only supports this statement.

3. PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Daniel David published in 2015 a book titled *Psychology of the Romanian People*, a title chosen in consonance with the mention that

the work is a tribute to academician Constantin Rădulescu-Motru and his mentor, the founder of experimental psychology, Wilkelm Wundt (2015:6).

The subtitle's explanation also describes the specificity of his approach: "We have included a sub-title - *The Romanian Psychological Profile in a Cognitive-Experimental Monography* - to show that I will not just summarize a simple psychological / psychological analysis, but that these psychological aspects will be included in a comprehensive psychological profile that can then have various uses "(David, 2015: 15). The book includes research carried out over a decade (2005-2015), having three declared objectives (David, 2015: 18):

- 1) achieving a modern synthesis of the Romanian psychological attributes;
- 2) providing a self-knowledge opportunity for Romanians, based on scientific knowledge, and
- 3) developing a scientific monograph on the psychological attributes of Romanians, contributing to Romanian culture.

The conclusions of his book relate to three perspectives (David, 2015: 322-323):

1. How can we (relative to the US and the Western world, in general):

We have a high potential for intelligence, creativity and learning. The personality structure allows both positive and negative expressions, depending on us that we are shaping through the social institutions we create;

2. How we are (compared to the US and the Western world): the high potential described above is not capitalized, while

the personality structure, often defensive, sometimes supports too many negative aspects (for example, skepticism / cynicism). Instead, we have a great need to prove our value (potential), which makes us competitive in work, but competitiveness, unsustainable cooperation for success and perseverance through discipline often does not lead to efficiency;

3. How do we think we are. The Romanians consider themselves to be

alternating between individualism (more selfish) and collectivism, and between perseverance (especially from interest and / or stubbornness) and the unpredictability.

A "surprising result of the work" is that no major differences were found between the old Romanian provinces, a matter that Daniel David explained as "probably as a result of common education / socialization and globalization over the past 100 years" (David, 2015:323).

This relative psychological homogeneity of the psychological traits of the Romanians can be capitalized in the double sense: by using the work for the purpose of self-knowledge and for the foundation of public policies based on the psychological premises of the Romanians, because "with some well-thought public policies, the potential psychologically can be transformed into reality "(David, 2015: 330).

4. CONCLUSIONS

The approach of the identity and the psychological characteristics of the Romanian people has been a topic of interest in Romanian psychology since the beginning of the 20th century. Authors such as Dumitru Draghicescu, Constantin Radulescu-Motru and Mihai Ralea have had remarkable contributions that have surpassed the boundaries of psychology, influencing the Romanian cultural field.

100 years after the Great Union, psychology can continue to contribute in the same way by providing information that facilitates (self) knowledge of the psychological traits specific to the Romanian people and formulating public policies in line with them. For this to be feasible, a continuity of the approach is necessary:

If we consider that a generation is about 20 years old, probably because it understands how the psychological profile of the Romanians changes according to the generational evolution, it would be worth publishing such a work every 20 years. If we want to better capture the changes in the surface profile ... perhaps the analysis would be worth every 10 years (David, 2015: 18).

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National Identity
in Intercultural
Context

FAREWELL DIFFERENCE. A FEW COMMENTS ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF GLOBALIZATION

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Abstract: *More than twenty-five years ago I published a book: Farewell to the differences, translated into Romanian. In this book there was a chapter devoted to a commentary on Husserl's 1935 text on the Crisis of European consciousness. I think that since the factors of standardization, in particular economics, militaries, scientific and cultural have strengthened, and today offering the spectacle of a planet where the differences become more and more microscopic, which does not mean that conflicts are less acute. As the German historian Nolte wrote about the Second World War, it was the largest Weltbürgerkrieg (World Civil War) we may think that we are currently faced with the same phenomenon extended to all the peoples of the planets*

Keywords: *globalization; postmodernity; difference; standardization*

1. COLONIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION

At the end of his famous book, *A World on the Wane* (Tristes tropiques) published in 1955 (Plon, France), Lévi-Strauss spoke of "the rainbow of human cultures". This very poetic expression suggested to us a world, our world composed of many different human cultures juxtaposed which certainly communicated between them only on restricted spaces, even if, as we have learned from a number of ethnological descriptions, in these small spaces some inhabitants could be polyglots.

That is why it should be recalled that before the generalization of the few languages belonging to the great colonial powers, the functional communication between peoples speaking very contrasted languages, supposed this superficial multilingualism for trade, various exchanges. But when it was the great narratives of origins, myths, and religions there was only one language, the mother tongue of every primitive people that it usually was called "the language of humans".

To understand this cultural state of mind, there is little need, even not to appeal to primitive peoples, but to the one which has provided one of the foundations of our learned culture, I like to say to Greeks of classical antiquity. Everyone knows that the word "barbaros" means not really a savage, but simply a human being who does not speak Greek and therefore who can't communicate with the gods, and not only with the gods, but can't exchange with this unique mode of self-reflexive

and rational consciousness, philosophy. Indeed, the great inaugural moment of philosophy as creation of metaphysics is formulated by Socrates-Plato dialogues at the very beginning unfolded in one language. Those who did not practice were excluded from this way of building the world, of giving meaning to the world.

Thus, many peoples of classical antiquity, although very civilized, did not communicate between them in the strongest sense of the term. It was during the expansion of the Roman Empire that a language (lingua franca) would become the instrument of communication between different peoples. *Civis romanum sunt* says St. Paul to escape the prison whose mother tongue was to be Aramaic or Syriac, and Greek as language of culture. With the Roman empire begins something which, when Christianity becomes official religion of the Empire with its philosophical argument from Greek metaphysics, will be presented as a sort of proto-globalization. Certainly, it was stopped first by the fall of the Western Roman Empire, then by the rise of Islam which later destroy the Eastern Roman Empire. But anyway, the Empire was a model. Certainly, the Holy Roman Germanic did not have this vocation in a limited to parts of Europe, but among elites, the universal language was Latin. But the world was still divided in vast regions that did not know each other.

We had to wait for an event, – Hannah Arendt speaks of "a step forward" – for the idea of world empire to regain strength. This step forward is

known, its name is the conquest of America that opened the Christian Europe (Catholics and a little later Protestants) to the domination of the world. This conquest has a name in the realm of politics, that is colonialism, and in the realm of economics when it became extended capitalist, imperialism.

This genealogy must be resumed as I have recalled from the colonization of America. Not that exotic societies of Africa and Asia were unknown to Europeans, they are known since the empire of Alexander and the Roman Empire, but the conquest for the most part left the local elites in charge of power with allegiance to the central power. The colonization that begins with the "step forward to America" had a very different nature from the previous incursions of the West out of itself. The American conquest and all conquests that followed resulted in the enslaved use of the natives, the Indians, and after their massive refusal to work as slaves their systematic extermination, followed by the importation of black Africans source of a very profitable capitalist trade, "the triangular trade", and origin of the most the great fortunes of the New World.

This colonization has been not only the greatest genocide of humanity in modern history, but also the first step toward a standardization of the world. Three European languages share America, English and French in the north, Spanish and Portuguese in the south; three religions occupy the continent, in the south Latin Catholics, in the North various Protestantism, Catholicism, and in Latin America various syncretic religions, mixing Africans goods with Indian goods and some elements of Christianity: Candomble in northeastern Brazil, Voodoo in Haiti, Santeria in Cuba.

That was the first elements of standardization. Then come a second moment with the decline of the Spanish, Dutch, then French imperial power. During this time, on the one hand, the extension of Christianity on the one hand, extension of slavery and after wage labor on the other, all that unified the objective conditions of non-European peoples. This uniformisation also had directly a political origin, linked to the previous ones, but with extremely powerful effects on the ideological forms of these colonial societies. I want to talk about the struggles for national liberation or decolonization. Led by modern ideological representations, generally derived from the British and French Enlightenment and the ideals of French Revolution. These conflicts between an indigenous vanguard intellectuals able to gather people, finally wielded the most modern social classes (workers, small local employees, petty civil servants). And

these people fighting with the colonial power, often allied to the half-breed's people, fed not only discourses, but also identical practices and hopes among peoples that some centuries before did not even know each other. So much so that colonization nurtured social formations with identical or almost identical speeches.

2. FROM GEMEINSCHÄFT INTO GESELLSCHAFT

Why is there in postmodernity a generalized communication between human being from different civilization origins?

However, we must nuance the question and say through the majority of men because some still remain or a kind of archaeological residue out of generalized communication or in a mixed culture which is summarized with the concept of syncretism. Nevertheless, globalization or mundialization is on the verge to be generalized.

Among these many and diverse intercommunications, which will perhaps surprise you in Bucharest, I will choose to give one example, the one of West Papua-New Guinea's struggle for independence. Anyone who is somewhat familiar with ethnology and anthropology, and interested in politics of the South Pacific, as well as in geopolitics of the area brought about by the transformations of decolonization and recolonization, know that an island as large as New Guinea, where in northern-west part there are about sixty tribes from the coast to the most remote mountain valleys (and some still unexplored), know the big problem of communication among that dozens of different languages were spoken and sometimes as different as Romanian from German or Estonian. The fact that indigenous struggles for independence from Indonesia are currently heard around the world is due to the fact that opinion leaders have chosen to communicate not with Indonesian language, but with English in general (French for an island like New Caledonia).

This generalization of a lingua franca in the South Pacific is not an original social and political fact, simply here is more spectacular because of the multiplication of the local languages. So that lingua franca lets natives able to communicate with the world and in particular with their former and new colonizers. Nevertheless, it was not only the use of a common European language which is at stake, but deeper the fact that adopting a language you still adopt modes of thought of your colonizers. We know well that beyond language as

a sum of words organized by a grammar (formal rules) there is a semantics that carries an historical, social, cultural and spiritual experience. At the end, to communicate with colonizers is not simply to exchange at the lowest level words necessary for simple everyday life or commandments, in that new exchange there is also concepts, axioms, theorems, visions and conceptions of the world, *Weltanschauungen*. It was from the moment when colonized peoples grasped Western conceptualizations, both political and technical that they began to fight efficiently against Europeans for their own independency. Wars against Westerners required understanding of their tactics and strategies in order to oppose its owns. War became slowly a war articulate on the same metaphysical foundations This is the difference between American Indians or Australian Aborigines and Asiatic peoples when confronted with Europeans colonizers. The first did not understand the western way of thinking and practicing wars and treaties, and therefore they were unable, beyond even a battle win to see the global issue of fight, the real transitivity of treaties. The case of Australians Aborigines is worst, because they were very peaceful people, even unable to understand the process they were involved in, the total conquest and their extermination. While the Asian peoples have never been totally submissive to Europeans conquerors. Their cultures had already known States power and administrative centralized management, they know the relativity of all treaties, and they developed a literature of military strategy and diplomatic tactics. Thus, it was not easy to colonize totally a people like Chinese who gave a Sun-Tse or Vietnamese who constantly fight against the French. It was not easy to colonize a country like Algeria where elites have read medieval Muslim political thought. In short, modernity is precisely characterized by the end of the strongest, most powerful, most original cultural differences that prevented men from communicating with each other.

From the conquest of Mexico to the last unknown lands of Melanesia and Paouasia, the modern technical and capitalist Western world has indeed destroyed the traditional communities, as it has done simultaneously in the European countryside. Gradually each tribe, each clan lost its transcendental references replaced by those brought to them by the White people: religions, slavery then wage labor, revolts turned into struggles for national independence (independence of Latin America in the early nineteenth century), revolts transformed into class struggles (case of

Latin America) or the mixture of these two aspects in the constitution of a modern state as is the case in the Middle East Arab-Muslim and Arab-Christian societies and in the Far East. I could even add that wars between Europeans in which colonized peoples participated as colonial troops (Indians, Nepalese Gurkhas, Blacks of East Africa among the British; Vietnamese, Blacks of West Africa and Arabs of the North Africa for the French), have developed in these peoples references to modern politics. All these tragically existential experiences drove them toward modernity. Don't forget that national political theories of modern States or the one of Marxism-Leninism are modern thoughts coming from European philosophy that exotic people learned from us. Of course, we witnessed some adaptation to local culture, but in a general way it is not a mere coincidence if many of the first revolutionaries of the colonial World, from Indonesia and India to Ghana, from Vietnam and China to South Africa from the leaders of the Vietminh or those of Algerian NLF (National liberation front) or Kenya Mau-Mau had all either studied in France or in England or had participated as non-commissioned officers in special in the Second World War.

No one can deny today that the process of globalization set up by the West since the conquest of America has gradually succeeded in transforming the world into new forms of socialization. The main trend of this process was to evolve towards the form of Nation-state, even if it was a micro-State as we meet among islands of the South Pacific or the Caribbean. This transformation of the form of communities (tribes, clans, fractions of clan), so *Gemeinschaft* into *Gesellschaft* according to the classical terminology of German sociology, has obviously changed the modes of communication at all levels: economic, political, technical, educational, interpersonal. This mutation, which can be defined as anthropological or civilizational, organized at least by the elites and a part of the people, is currently leading to another, at least now in Europe which witnesses the decomposition of the Nation-state and its foreseeable end, in spite of strong resistance as shown by Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary today.

If it is possible to say that contemporary communication is global because most people speak the same language, not so much an English of airport or super market, but a language where notions, axioms and concepts are the same. This universal language is both that of political economy, that of Technics in general and military

technology in particular, because in modernity there is no political and economic power that do not go hand in hand with technology power.

3. TOWARDS A GLOBAL CIVIL WAR

At the moment of the fall of communist regimes in Europe and the Soviet Union, an American analyst (having read Hegel too quickly) asserted that the cold war was over and won by the United States, so we had reached the end of history that is to say the fulfillment of the American model of world power and the democracy (but more likely an oligarchic and plutocratic democracy), as the achievement of the absolute Spirit (*Leistung des absoluten Geistes*). It seems that his prophetic words are not only meaningless words, but above all it seems that his head is emptied of lucid thoughts. He proposed a world of political relations motionless, not a dialectical Hegelian model of history, but a kind of Kantianism revisited at the end of the 20th century by a new "project for a Perpetual Peace". There is a serious blindness in the mind of Mister Fukuyama who believes in the eternity of the moment, a new kind of *Philosophia perennis* of the relations of power (which implied as such a passivity among peoples). It seems that our Hegelian did not understand that the unification of the world under the force of an economy globalized to the extreme, puts face to face countries with are charring identical concepts of politics and power, so that power relations cold or hot have become the origin of a world-wide civil war, as the First World War had already offered a premonitory beginning. It is what Carl Schmitt had brought under the concept of *Weltbürgerkrieg*. There is no and cannot be an end of history unless we are, as Voltaire told Rousseau formerly about natural life, cows grazing in the meadows, or more present, if a nuclear catastrophe

would abolish our lives. There cannot be any end of history because of the essence of human nature, both its essential violence (I am on Hobbes' ground here), and its ability to think about its actions, interests, future in short, its ability of self-reflection which has given birth to philosophy and all the social sciences which derive from it.

We speak the same language of the political and we fight with the same modern weapons which like all technical objects carries not only a functionality, but also concepts giving our world the sense of that founding relation, the one between object and subject....

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ETHNIC IDENTITIES AND NATIONALISM. BELGIAN CASE STUDY

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Abstract: *Starting with the XIXth century the academia saw an increase interest in the field of knowledge related to the issues of ethnicities, minorities studies, nation building. What started as a purely academic project soon became of out most relevance especially after the end of World War II and the beginning of the decolonisation process which saw the emergence of a series of new nations. This process of nation building and of redefinition of the states didn't spare the European continent, often with tragic results (see the interwar period or the conflicts after the fall of communism in 1989). Added to this already complex situation we need also to take into consideration the emergence of a new political actor – the European Union as a supranational organization. This is important given the fact that the current analysis, starts with a literature review of the theories on ethnicity, nationalism etc. in order to focus as a case study on Belgium, a multi-ethnic state, with a specific local situation where he have a strong presence of the European Union institutions.*

Keywords: *ethnicity; nationalism; Belgium; linguistic division*

1. INTRODUCTION

The XXIst century is being characterized by numerous manifestations of the cultural diversity and the heterogeneity of the society. Speaking about ethnical identity we will have to make a recourse to memory and remember that Europe has a long history of multi-ethnic living together. This generated a series of Europe wide models of multi-ethnic organisation, one of which would be latter one examined here.

2. ETHICAL IDENTITY AND ITS DIMENSIONS

The social and cultural differences between the citizens of different ethnicities represent serious challenges for the persons from political sphere, their solving leading to the proclamation of multiculturalism and multilingualism,

ideologies that are raised to the rank of state policies and which are based upon an essential premise: all citizens are equal, therefore each has the right to preserve its own identity, practice and identify with its own culture, be proud of its cultural heritage, be different of others (Vlăsceanu, 2011:112).

The majority of definitions for the concept of 'ethnicity' refer more to cultural elements than the biological ones.

Max Weber sees the ethnic group was a group of individuals reunited by their faith in belonging to a common ascendance and a specific psychology (Weber, 1978). On the other side, other researchers have considered the ethnicity as the results of a way of life, based on a own language, psychology and culture, cumulated with the spatial determination that creates cohesion (Poutignat *et al.*, 1995: 35).

Richard Molard appreciates that an ethnic group is characterised by a community of beliefs, values, language, and juxtaposed to the spatial criteria (Vulcănescu, 1979:104). In exchange, the South African anthropologist Meyer Fortes, beliefs that the ethnicity represents a spatial determined group, inside of which exists very strong bonds (*Encyclopedia Universalis*, 971:972).

The ethnic identity is based upon the basis of differences and conditions the connection between the members of the community through the conscience of having common origins and is practically, a way of life based on an own language, a psychology and culture, cumulated with the spatial determination that creates solidarity, cohesion. The sociologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen, believes a similar thing as he stipulates that the ethnic groups are social and cultural groups, and not biological ones (Stavenhagen, 1992:135-151). The terms 'ethnicity', 'ethnic group' or 'ethnic minority' are

immanent related to the cultural traits of the individuals taken into consideration, thereof on their cultural identity and of the group they form. The cultural organisation has a precedence over the ethnic considerations and is not necessary a confirmation of the realisation of a distinct ethnic component (Koubi, 269).

The ethnical identity represents a pluridimensional construction characterised by the existence of feelings of belonging to an ethnicity, pride, a positive attitude toward the own ethnical group. The feeling of self is defined in ethnical terms which presuppose common origins and sends a series of elements in close connection with the language, culture or origins. The ethnical identity changes as the time goes by, the age being the result of some personal experiences and explorations which have a dynamic character (Phinney, 1992:156-176).

We can speak about a series of common components of the ethnic identity such as *ethnical self-identification*, *affective components*, *cognitive components* and *values*. These change as we have said above, as the time goes by. Speaking about *ethnical self-identification*, we think about the self-labelling of the individual as a component of the ethnic group. The *affective components* encompass all the feelings related to the cohesion of the ethnic group and the manifestations related to ethnicity. In accordance with the *social identity theory* previously described, there is a connection between the belonging to the ethnic group of the individual and the self-perception. The defining elements for the ethnic identity, such as positive perceptions toward the ethnic group, the pride of belonging to that group, and also the use of a common language, offer to the individual a feeling of unicity. *The cognitive components* are information about the ethnic group – such as traditions and history, combined with the understanding of the term of ethnicity, and also of all the obligations that derive from them for each individual. All the ethnic classes coexist when all the individual composing them have in common the same attributes, but without a high cohesion. The individuals are aware of their belonging to the ethnic group when, alongside the social or cultural traits, they find also a series of peculiar signs such as: nationality or ethnic origins, without granting any importance to profession or gender.

3. THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM

The concept of ‘*nation*’ is constantly changing. From the point of view of historians or

sociologists, the nation has managed to maintain a multitude of meanings. One refers to unchanged and primary approaches that highlight the fact that nations represent ethno-cultural groups that have existed in the past. On the other hand, ethno-symbolists claim that the nation represents those ethnic groups with a common history and culture that occupy a well-determined space, united by feelings of brotherhood, cohesion, similarity, and unification in conscious groups did not take place until the modern age. Another approach is the modernist one in which some sociologists believe that the nation is an imaginary, subjective construction (Anderson, 2000). Others believe that the nation is a multi-ethnic or ethnic social group that wants to establish a state, priority having the political dimension, the civic consciousness, but also the ethnic component. Other opinions suggest that the nation has emerged on the basis of ideologies, such as nationalism, and a process of human evolution. As a result, the nation would be a voluntary construction, an imagined and edified entity.

Nationalism has contributed to forming a perception of the state as the political unity of an ethnic group with the role of defending and promoting language, traditions and identity. Significant contributions to the scientific structuring of the phenomenon of nationalism have brought researchers Raoul Girardet and Ernest Gellner. The first researcher, of French origin, in his book ‘Nationalism and the Nation’, notes that

no word reveals to a greater extent the equivocal and ambiguity. Moral considerations, the meanings of polemics, the preoccupation to justify or to condemn appear to stubbornly change the meaning of its usefulness (Girardet, 2003:13).

Equally,

although it is recognized by all as a phenomenon of history and as a decisive factor in the general evolution of the societies of our time, nationalism continues, nevertheless, to emerge as an extremely mobile reality. The ubiquitous, but inexpressible, having many forms, it is most often elevated in glory, but not defined, analysed, described, inventoried (Girardet, 2003:13).

In trying to interpret the multiple manifestations of nationalism, the author identifies four types of nationalism: nationalism of liberal and democratic inspiration, authoritarian nationalism, plebiscite nationalism, or Marxist or fascist nationalism.

On the other hand, the philosopher and anthropologist Ernest Gellner has a vision of a historical-philosophical trend originating from the deepening of modern history. His conception of contemporary nationalism is based on two basic premises: *culture* and *organization*, which for the author represents the *source* of nationalism. Culture, as the predominant attribute of individuals, is a pattern of ethical conduct and unity of the ethnic group, with genetic origins, innate inclinations, and also the characteristic of the result of social cohesion inherited from father to son. In conclusion, anthropologist Gellner considers culture to be radically different from one ethnic group to another and may undergo substantial changes over time. The similarity of culture is the basic link of the political principle with nationalism.

Starting from the premise that organization and culture are the source of nationalism, Gellner promotes a series of theses to characterize the phenomenon:

- Nationalism is a fundamental political element that supports the idea that cultural resemblance is the primordial social bond.

Whatever the basic elements of power among individuals, to be legitimate, they are closely related to the fact that individuals of the same ethnic group have the same culture (Gellner, 1994:11).

- The relationship between state-nationalism and culture-organization systems is straightforward.

Culture and organization generate nationalism and the nation-state, the former being stable and long-lasting, and the other being the products of the above-mentioned basic ideas on a scale of the development of society in the present times (Belli, 2005:8).

- Nationalism is neither universal nor stable in the ethnic groups, and not all individuals are rationalizing and acting nationalistically. Gellner points out that nationalism is not universal and essential, and not essential and Western, being

the necessary consequence or the correlation of certain social conditions, and they happen to be the conditions of our age, widespread, profound and all-encompassing (Gellner, 1994:17).

Gellner concludes on the one hand that the problem of nationalism emerges in a civilization in which states have been recognized and accepted as indispensable, and in another order, if the state has

not acquired a universal character, neither nationalism can be characterized alike (Gellner, 1994:13).

For some researchers, nationalism facilitates the possibility of reaching a unitary culture, respectively, of a communication community, the theory of communication being defined as a theory of modernism that proves the functionality of nationalism. The nation is promoted through a functional communication scheme for conventions, and its modernism can be quantified through the efficiency of conventions concluded, since modernization is closely linked to effective communication. The nation thus turns into a multitude of individualities closely linked to the group and place of origin through social-emotional communication ways. At the same time, nationalism revolves between politics and social transformation, being conceived by leaders and implemented from top to bottom. Through it, quality culture is formed in societies where previously the culture was below average, modernization being closely linked to the education process. Ernest Gellner said that

nations heading towards nationalism are characterized by an average education of society, a term based on a multitude of academic systems, coding the rules for a systematized bureaucracy and technological communication.

According to Ernest Gellner's first theory, nations and nationalism

are logically contingent but sociologically necessary in modern industrial societies (Gellner, 1987:21),

are based on a study of the transformation of agrarian societies into modern societies. He identified three significant historical periods: pre-agrarian, agrarian and industrial. In the first stage, the emergence of nations and nationalism was not possible due to the lack of some form of state organization, in the second period there was the possibility of the two terms, because the social structures took the form of layered layers horizontally isolated, the specific being that both the ruling class, and its substrates rather emphasize cultural differentiation than homogeneity, and in the third period the state influence emerged, with nationalism becoming a universal goal.

4. CASE STUDY: THE BELGIAN MODEL

The European Union has its share of multilingual states and one of the most famous as

well as studied examples is Belgium, a country characterized by the proximity of people with different ethnic backgrounds with strong linguistic ties that tend to promote their specificities actively. With three major linguistic communities of Flemish-speaking, French-speaking and German-speaking Belgian, the country has long been a model, either for good or for worse as regards the way various ethnic groups coexist in the same territory.

What characterise the Belgian model is the *creation of ethnic identity in opposition with the dominant group*, meaning the French speaking Belgian. If starting with its creation in early XIXth century the French speaking population was a predominant one the Flemish minority started to create and promote its own identity in stark contrast with the French. We have then the ingroup whose composing individuals are defining themselves in opposition with the outgroup. The characteristics of the ethnic group that define the individual as belonging to it even from birth are given by the objective dimension and have as a purpose to establish individual links with the ethnical group. These characteristics are represented by language, religion, belonging to a define territory, culture, common mentality, specific institutional system, characteristic way of life, physical differences (Rotariu, Iluț, 1996:416).

The language represents for the ethnic identity a significant point of reference as seen in the Belgian case. A nation is built on the basis of language, and the efforts to maintain the characteristic language for each ethnic group are major, being protected by legal provisions in various documents. For instance in the Belgian case the Constitution in the Article 4 divides the country into linguistic areas, which form the basis of the federal structure:

Belgium has four linguistic areas: The French-speaking area, the Dutch-speaking area, the bilingual area of Brussels Capital and the German-speaking area. (The Belgian Constitution, 2009 translation).

The diversity of language of a nation represents a cultural richness and is protected by a series of laws and norms. The Flemish have created a distinct survival strategy by forcing the creation in Flanders of a unilingual Flemish speaking area and thus offering them access to administrative positions (Van der Wee, 2018). In the Belgian case we are dealing with what Ernst Gellner defined as a nationalism seen as a

fundamental political element that supports the idea that cultural resemblance is the primordial social bond:

Whatever the basic elements of power among individuals, to be legitimate, they are closely related to the fact that individuals of the same ethnic group have the same culture (Gellner, 1994:11).

4.1 Why Belgium matters? First of all in European terms it a relatively “new” state that was ‘engineered’ in the XIXth century almost from scratch.

Even though the Belgian elite tried to construct a Belgian identity by creating different national symbols such as a flag, a constitution and a national hymn, these symbols were not as successful because they were novel and created for the purpose of nation-building (Aggarwal, 2016).

We are dealing here with what the scientist Anthony D. Smith called *lateral ethno-symbolism* where “in lateral (aristocratic) ethnies, national identity is dispersed by the elites from the top-down” (Aggarwal, 2016). Another reason is that the Flemish group has *transformed itself from a language to an identity*. However this a risky system as it affects the chances of understanding between various ethnic communities:

[...] there is a concept of *Language Communities* in the Belgian governmental systems. By formalizing linguistic divide in the government and creating official segregation for different language groups, the Belgian political system essentially encourages regional and linguistic conflict (Aggarwal, 2016).

We are dealing here, in my opinion, with a clear application of the social identity theory, as mentioned above in the paper. The *social identity theory*, emphasises some behaviour aspects of the individual, member of the *ingroup*, that sacrifices himself in order to protect the *ingroup* toward the *outgroup* in case of some menaces and to maintain the differences between them. Also, the theory predicts certain intergroup behaviours on the basis of the differences of group status perceived, the perceived legitimacy and the stability of these differences, and also the perceived stability of the individual to pass from a group to another, based on Henry Tajfel theory from 1979 (Hajfel, 1979/2018). Also, some of the theorists have shown that motivated to emphasise the homogeneity of the *ingroup* more than the *outgroup* members or of the majority group, are the members of the ethnic minorities, on the

consideration of a continuous danger facing the minority.

This is more that obvious if we take into consideration the above mentioned linguistic issue.

The issue of political identity based on language has become so entrenched in Belgian politics that it threatens the break-up of the state. Linguistic communalism is the principal, though not the exclusive, cleavage in contemporary Belgian politics. The critical problem is how to accommodate two language communities, each dominant in its own region, to the shared endeavour of a nation state (O'Neill, 2000:114-134).

The question arose more prominent after the end of the World War II and generated in 1962 the cultural autonomy and the unilingual status of Flanders in 1962, while Brussels kept a bilingual status. This in exchange, fuelled by economic growth lead in the 1970's to an increase of tensions:

Centrifugal tensions are apparent on all sides, but the more insistent threat to a Belgium state comes from Flanders where cultural identity has been transformed into a politicised ethnicity bolstered in recent years by economic well-being and demographic supremacy. Important differences of historical conditioning and sociological experience account for the relative absence in Wallonia of an ethnic as opposed to a merely an abiding sense of cultural identity (O'Neill, 2000:114-134).

The Flemish nationalism, although based on the idea of a common mother tongue, a theory explained in the paper, hasn't become strong until the economic. Slow economic development and the will to overcome this lender have occurred development of the region. We are dealing with an economic evolution of nationalism internally orientated where the effort of the Flemish to overcome a number of economic underdevelopment give nationalism a particular character sufficient to be in opposition to other more developed French speaking community. Yet there is hope! Keeping Belgium as a single state, even though not a unitary one is a sign that national identities, even though on the rise can find the resources to unite around a common political project, albeit on a federal basis. Also it reinforces the *role of political elites as the central figures in keeping a single state project* on the people's list while also they are a guarantee of the ongoing intercultural bargaining. Moreover *the role of the Parliament is increased as the main arena of dispute settlement.*

What also is of out most importance is the emergence of a new political actor that transcends these cleavages – meaning *the role of the European Union*. If in the particular case of Belgium being the host of the main EU institutions puts an extra-pressure on the peaceful solution of divergences there is also valid at the EU level the idea of subsidiarity as a way to calm ethnic disputes:

The very logic of EU governance—the encouragement of subsidiarity, but not at the expense of administrative coherence and efficiency—is another positive influence binding the communal parties to mutual endeavour, here as elsewhere on a shrinking continent (O'Neill, 2000:133).

Belgium continues thus to be at the EU level a model of cultural diversity and a policy approach based on 'intercultural' topics. Living together while being different continues to function in Belgium as the linguistic communities continue to have a common stance on the larger issues as well on, what may be the most important, on day to day administrative issues that impact the good governance of local communities.

4.2 Similar developments in the European Union Member States. The Catalan case. The Belgian model that be extrapolated also to other situations in the European Union more precisely the Catalan case. We are having here a region with its own language who has known in the last decades a tremendous economic development due to outside investments. This instead fuelled an increase sense of self that lead to the recent independentist movements.

However, we are dealing with a different scenario here as Spain, unlike Belgium, is not a federal state. This made the push toward independence to be a drastic one, without having exhausted all the methods of internal negotiations and change. This also led to an increase pressure on behalf of the European structure who do not recognize separatist movements.

The Catalans where therefore forced to take a step back as their demands were deemed not reasonable by all the parties involved.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The nation is above all a social construct, an ingenious creation, a cultural construct combined with the traditions found on the territory National historical continuity is closely related to the

relationship between ethnicity and nationalism. The terms 'ethnic' and 'national' are interchangeable, not clearly identifying the ethnic groups of the nations. Ethnicity is a phenomenon of division within the nation, such as regionalism. Some theorists assimilate the 'ethnic' adjective with the 'national' adjective when it comes to border issues or is used interchangeably with the term 'culture'. The lack of precision or attention in terms of ethnic phenomena is consistent with the ambivalent debate of the relationship between nationalism and the past.

The existence of the nations is closely linked to the worldwide affirmation of nationalism, which has proved to be of great importance in the crystallization of a problem of individual consciousness, namely the ethnic identity that gave it political legitimacy and social audience.

However, the rise of nationalism in various states gives birth to different results due to the local specificities. Nationalism and the linguistic issued prove to be a powerful tool for change yet they cannot guarantee by themselves the future of a nation. The economic factor is also of outmost importance and their combination must be used wisely. Moreover we are dealing with the rise of a supranational identity, in slow motion, that of a European one, whose impact is not sufficiently studied on the question of national movements inside the European Union.

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NATIONAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL POSITION OF THE ROMA IN SERBIA

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Abstract: *Despite the growing number, as well as a relative share of the Roma in total population of the Republic of Serbia, their socio-economic position doesn't show signs of visible improvement. First Decade of Roma Inclusion, from 2005 to 2015, which Serbia presided over during 2009, makes exclusion of the Roma population from Serbian social life socially visible and more comprehensible for the wider community. Some research conducted during that period shows certain progress in the priority areas of the Decade: education, employment, housing and health. During the last ten years, many laws, which have direct or indirect influence of the improvement of status of Roma population in Serbia, have been passed, especially having in mind enabling the establishment of national councils of the national minorities, as well as National council or the Roma national minority. However, Roma community, compared to other national minorities in Serbia, is in more unfavorable social position. The causes of such a position are partly due to the insufficiently built national identity and the complex problems that the Roma themselves face in the process of developing their cultural identity. In this paper there are analyzed socio-economic characteristics of the Roma population according to the last census of population of the Republic of Serbia and their correlation with national identity of the Roma population.*

Keywords: *Roma; social position; national identity*

1. INTRODUCTION

Like a majority of countries of the modern world, Serbia also faces challenges of multiculturalism within its social community. However, social dynamics of relationships between members of different national minorities, and when their group or national interests are in question, as well as when fulfillment of their individual civil rights is in question, is dictated by specificity of its socially-political and economic situation. The consequences of turbulent political past during the last decade of the twentieth century: breakdown of mother country, long-term isolation and sanctions of international community, massive ethnic migrations of population, then bombing, are still visible both on economic and political plane, as well as through evident crisis of the value system.

Serbian society hasn't passed through economic and political transition quite luckily.

Socio-economic recovery is very slow, and democratization and cultural development blocked" (Komatina, 2018:56).

In that context, unfavourable social and economic position of Roma in Serbia is being maintained. During the Decade of Roma, by which Serbia presided in 2009, certain moves were made in the spheres marked as priority (education, employment, health care and housing), but the data about the progress were not summed up systematically.

Difficulties in improvement socio-economic position of Roma population partly come out of incapability of Roma community itself to use possibilities which are available to it at the institutional level. Still, a part of the responsibility has the state itself, which doesn't form adequate mechanisms for connecting of the legislative framework with real possibilities for it to be conducted in practice, it is often powerless and indifferent when the discrimination of Roma population is in question, and it also has unequal treatment of Roma to major population and other minorities, especially if it about violation of human and children's rights.

Analytical-descriptive method is applied in the work – the sources of data were analyzed at

the highest level of reliability as well as relevant literature so that specifics of social, economic, political and cultural position of Roma in the Republic of Serbia; basic problems of Roma national identity and their connection with socio-economic features of Roma population in Serbia are identified and guidelines are set for overcoming of obstacles in intercultural communication and empowering of Roma national identity.

2. ETHNIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC OF ROMA NATIONAL MINORITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Roma are one of more than twenty national minorities which, apart from major Serbian population, have been followed by regular censuses since 1948¹. After the Hungarians (3.5%), Roma is the second biggest national minority in the Republic of Serbia with the total of 147.600 people, that is, 2.1%, according to the last census from 2011.

However, the data about moving of the number of Roma minority from census after census show illogical trends which cannot be explained by demographic reasons, that is, by natural and mechanical movement of population².

¹ The oldest census of Roma on our soil dates from 1491, from the time of the Osman empire (Djordjevic, 1984). Tatomir Vukadinovic (1983: 22) states that the first Roma in Byzantium, i.e. in the Balkans, appeared in the middle of the sixth century when they, running in front of the Seljuks, left Armenia and moved toward Anadolia, and then also toward Greece and further north.

² Based on ethno-statistical data atypical variations in the number of Roma can be seen from census to census, which cannot be explained by demographic factors (birth and migrations), because constant changes in statements about the belonging to an ethnic group had the crucial influence on their migrations. In demographic literature, it is explained as a result of ethnic mimicry because of ever present, hidden or open discrimination toward Roma people, because of what they declare themselves as members of the other national corpus, losing or covering their own ethnic identity. It is well known that at census Roma most frequently declare themselves as the members of the major nationality in the region where they live, because of what their number is underestimated at all the postwar censuses" (Raduski and Komatina, 2013: 93)

Table 1 The number of Roma and their relative share in the overall population of Serbia, according to all the postwar censuses

Year	1948	1953	1961	1971	1981	1991	2002	2011
Number	52,200	58,800	9,800	49,900	111,000	90,900	108,200	147,600
%	0.8	0.8	0.1	0.6	1.2	1.2	1.4	2.1

Source: Table made according to: Raduski, 2013³

These illogicalities are attributed to the way of enumeration which enables the respondent to declare himself according to his own free will (Raduski, 2013: 15), but also according to the ethnical mimicry of Roma population which emerges as a result of its unfavourable status, discrimination and stigma which follows them (Mitrovic, 2000: 71).

We can accept the last census data with the higher percent of reliability, considering the census was being prepared under the influence of the Decade of the Roma, so, among other things, apart from numerous consultations, it was preceded by a trial census at which members of Roma population participated, too⁴.

Out of ethnic characteristics, apart from the structure of *national belonging*, two more features are census monitored by Serbia: *mother tongue* and *religion*. As it can be seen in tables that follow (Tables 2 and 3), Roma population in Serbia isn't homogenous according to either of the two features. The largest number of Roma, 67% of them, claimed Roma their mother tongue, but it's not negligible that 30% of Roma that claimed their mother tongue is Serbian. The similar situation is with the religion, too. Almost 2/3 of Roma (63%) are Christians (56% orthodox, 3% Catholics, 2% protestants), and 25% of them claimed they are Muslims.

Therefore, census data about ethnic characteristics of Roma population in our country can implicate certain problems, which Roma face in the experience of their national identity, but they can also face troubles in achievement of their

³ Census datum from 1991 is here reduced to methodology of the 2002 census.

⁴ "Trial census of population, households and flats – Education of Roma" was conducted within the period from November 1st to November 5th 2009, at which Roma enumerators participated and during which they were educated, and they later took part in 2011 census. Mapping of 533 Roma settlements preceded this census (Roma settlements which had at least 15 households), and it was conducted in cooperation with National council of Roma national minority and Roma activists (Vukmirovic, Djordjevic i Lakcevic, 2010).

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national interests, considering it's about different education, informing in their mother tongue and practical needs in achievement of the right to worshipping.

Table 2 Roma according to mother tongue and sex

Mother tongue	Total	Male	Female	Total %	Male %	Female %
Total	147,604	75,042	72,562	100	100	100
Serbian	43,926	22,385	21,541	29.76	29.83	29.69
Albanian	1,393	724	669	0.94	0.96	0.92
Bulgarian	98	48	50	0.07	0.06	0.07
Vlach	332	170	162	0.22	0.23	0.22
Hungarian	912	466	446	0.62	0.62	0.61
Macedonian	109	58	51	0.07	0.08	0.07
Roma	98,872	50,187	48,685	66.98	66.88	67.09
Romanian	1,308	672	636	0.89	0.90	0.88
Other languages	225	115	110	0.15	0.15	0.15
Undeclared	180	94	86	0.12	0.13	0.12
Unknown	249	123	126	0.17	0.16	0.17

Source: Special processing of data of the Census of population, households and flats, 2011, RZS

Table 3 Roma according to religion and sex

Religion	Total	Male	Female	Total %	Male %	Female%
Total	147,604	75,042	72,562	100.00	100.00	100.00
Christian total	92,610	47,034	45,576	62.74	62.68	62.81
Orthodox	82,454	41,888	40,566	55.86	55.82	55.91
Catholic	4,865	2,518	2,347	3.30	3.36	3.23
Protestant	2,966	1,484	1,482	2.01	1.98	2.04
The other Christian religions	690	325	365	0.47	0.43	0.50
Christian – not known which one	1,635	819	816	1.11	1.09	1.12
Muslim	36,591	18,550	18,041	24.79	24.72	24.86
Eastern religions	13	11	2	0.01	0.01	0.00
Other religions	19	10	9	0.01	0.01	0.01
Agnostics	7	3	4	0.00	0.00	0.01
Undeclared	12,553	6,468	6,085	8.50	8.62	8.39
Atheists	1,094	598	496	0.74	0.80	0.68
Unknown	4,717	2,368	2,349	3.20	3.16	3.24

Source: Special data processing of Census of population, households and flats, 2011, RZS

On the other hand, if we observe *level of education, economic activity and profession* as determinants of socio-economic position of Roma population in Serbia, then we face with the fact this population is much more homogenous according to mentioned socio-economic characteristics, then

according to ethnic characteristics, which confirms status of Roma population as ethno class.

According to the last population census data, Roma population has a low level of economic activity: 28% of population is economically active, while 72% of population is economically inactive. Profession related census data tell us that

2,304,628 citizens of Republic of Serbia did some job in 2011, and that 16,887 of them (0.73%) were Roma. If we observe this number in the context of overall Roma population, then we come to the conclusion that just 11.4% of Roma in Serbia does some kind of job! These devastating data are under the influence of a very unfavourable educational structure of Roma population in Serbia (though it's much better, both with literacy and the level of education in relation to the previous census). Namely, 19.5% of Roma hasn't graduated from any school, and 34.2% of them haven't graduated from elementary school – which means that 53.7% doesn't have any level of education. One third graduates from the elementary school (33%), which also isn't qualification enough for getting a job, and 11.5% graduated from secondary school. All the versions of high education which are monitored by the census are below one percent (Komatina, 2017: 41-47).

These facts actually not just negatively affect the future economic and social emancipation of Roma population, but also homogenization and cohesiveness of Roma ethnic identity.

3. INSTITUTIONAL ASSUMPTIONS OF IMPROVEMENT OF THE POSITION OF ROMA MINORITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Since the beginning of transition of socio-economic and political systems in Serbia and introduction of democratic changes, as well as under the influence of stimuli that come from European Union, Serbia has been reforming its legal system for the two decades, it modernizes it and harmonizes it with the principles and guidelines of the union of European countries which it wants to join. Many of passed laws relate to overall population and improving of its civil rights, and some of them deal with special rights of national minorities. Because of lack of space, we shall focus only on those who are the most important and have the biggest influence on the improvement of the position and rights of national minorities.

Above all, we should mention the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia from 2006 which systematically and comprehensively arranges the rights of minorities stressing that the “country guarantees special protection to minorities for complete equality and preserving of their identity” (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 2006, article 14, paragraph 2).

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the part of which Serbia was until 2003, passed the Law on protection of rights and freedom of national minorities (in power in the Republic of Serbia), which leans on the documents of the Council of Europe, Framework convention for protection of rights of national minorities (1995) and European Charter on Regional and Minority languages (1992). The Law sets very high standards of protection of minorities. Some domestic authors think that they are higher than those that are adopted in international documents (Basic, 2005, Stanovcic, 2008).

Beside the series of other laws which directly or indirectly refer to the issues of national minorities⁵, the Law on National Councils of National Minorities from 2009 should especially be pointed out. “It could be said that previously mentioned Law on National Councils of National Minorities represents the beginning of more active institutional organizing of minorities, as well as Roma community, aiming to protect their national interests. Firstly, it offers the members of minorities the possibility to choose their national councils as a form of self-organizing and institutionalizing their participation in decision making on all the issues related to their cultural autonomy, and then it regulates jurisdictions of national councils in the sphere of official use of language, education, culture and informing” (Komatina, 2017:32).

The right to education is a basic human right, but it is also specially protected collective right when national minorities are in question. Current legislature enables minorities to educate themselves in their mother tongues, but for the conducting of that practice, when Roma are in question, there are no real conditions. Above all, our educational system isn't capable of maintaining lessons in Roma language, for one thing because of drastic lack of stuff at all levels of education, and because of large dispersiveness of Roma population in the whole territory of Serbia, by which it differs from the other minorities which are concentrated on certain territories. (Komatina, 2018: 90).

There is the optional subject *Roma language with elements of national culture* in our educational system since the end of the twentieth century in certain towns in Vojvodina, but just from the school year 2015/2016 it starts to be

⁵ The Law on official use of language and alphabet (1991), The Law on local self-government (2007), The Law on the basics of education and upbringing (2009), The Law on prohibition of discrimination (2009), etc.

taught on the territory of the whole of Serbia, at the level of elementary schools. Just one university institution introduced lecturing in Roma language (High school of professional studies for educators 'Mihailo Palov from Vrsac), and modern Roma language is being studied at the Faculty of Philology in Belgrade since 2015/2016 as an optional subject.

Nevertheless, numerous researches (Komatina, 2016) showed that many parents, members of Roma minority, don't want their children to learn Roma language at school even at the level of an optional subject. Some make comments that standardized Roma language (introduced in 2013) isn't the language they speak, and some point out that children should learn Serbian at school, because that's the only way to graduate from school and get a job.

It seems that Roma population hasn't equally managed to use all the benefits given to them by the legislative framework and that it is still way behind other minorities. Part of the reasons originates from the widespreadness of Roma national identity and incompatibility of the interests of different groups of Roma, and part of the reasons refers to especially unfavourable socio-economic position of Roma population which is a direct consequence of a very low average educational level. Lack of information and ignorance are the major barriers which stand in the way of emancipation of Roma population.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Characteristics of socio-economic position of Roma population in Serbia have an unfavourable impact on preserving and cherishing their national identity. It is clear that economic emancipation and improving of the educational status make indispensable preconditions on the road to their national emancipation and preservation and cherishing of their own cultural features.

When Roma national identity is in question, perhaps it's more correct to talk in plural, about Roma identities, because according to significant characteristics by which nations and minorities are characterized, and by which they differ from the others, and among them there are language and religion, but also customs which make everyday life, Roma people in Serbia are significantly different. That's why, within the wide possibilities enabled to them by the legal regulations, each group should find its own path and way to achieve its own interests.

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NATION BEYOND NATION

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Abstract: *During the last years, due to constant wars and civil strife in many countries, a large number of people have left their nations. They have moved towards and settled down in other nations of Europe or U.S.A. According to UN's International Migration Report 2017, international migration reached about 258 million people, out of which 60 percent reside in Asia (80 million), Europe (78 million) and Northern America (58 million). As per the report of PEW Forum, about 27 percent Muslims (60 million) migrated from their home to live in other countries. The migration of such a large number of people and their settlement in other countries raise many questions related to the culture of the migrated people and culture of the host nations. Would the migrated people abandon their culture and adopt the culture of the host nation or would they form a zone of their own culture in the host nation? The present paper has studied the migration of the Muslims in Europe and U.S.A. and discusses it in the context of this question. The present paper is important in order to understand the pros and cons of the migration process of Muslims in Europe and U.S.A. This would help in unfolding a complex relation between Europe, U.S.A. and the Muslim world on the other hand, which could help in promoting world peace and protecting human rights*

Keywords: *culture; multiculturalism; migration; nation; human rights*

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the important phenomena of the global world is migration. Migration is defined in simple words as the movement of those who are leaving their countries for another country out of some particular reasons. As per the definition of The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, migration can be called "the crossing of the boundary of a political or administrative unit for a certain minimum period of time. It includes the movement of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people as well as economic migrants." (*Migrant/Migration*) In the context of this paper only the migration of Muslims in Europe and America has been studied.

The process of globalization has brought the nations of the world very close to each other, thus to the overcoming of time and distance. The technological development speeded up and facilitated the migration of people at national and international levels while the expanding of the global economy at a faster rate has made possible the movement of the work force from one part of the world to another. The constant war in few regions of the world has forced people to migrate from their regions of strife to regions of peace. The qualitative higher education has also made people

move from one part of the world to more attractive ones. A large number of students who migrated from their own countries for higher education reasons also prefer to stay in the host countries or settle down in some another countries. Against the background of these factors, the number of migrants has increased at both national and international levels. As per an estimate of International migration report, "The International Migration Report 2017" the number of total migrant around the world is 3.4 percent (258 million) of the total resident population of the world. (*The International Migration Report 2017*)

The present paper has studied the migration of Muslims in Europe and the United States of America, the rationale behind the selection of these two regions being that there has been created a significant load of fear against the Muslim migrants, these being considered a threat to the culture of these regions.

The study is important due to the emergence of fear of clashes between the world of Islam and the West represented by Europe and USA. The thesis of the clash of the civilizations by Huntington draws the attention of scholars worldwide, particularly of the scholars of multiculturalism, to study the civilizational conflicts rationally rather than hypothetically. The present study has in view the

concern of the cultural clashes which are identified in the increasing number of migrants in Europe and USA. Is the number of migrants so huge that can it pose any threat to the culture of the host nations and pave the way for the creation of an exclusive cultural zone in Europe and USA? Can the exclusive cultural zone create a separate identity from the mainstream and produce the spirit of separatism resulted in the demand of a separate nation? Can the exclusive cultural zone be an expansion and strengthening of the multicultural zone or the end of the spirit of multiculturalism? Is it possible to create a cultural zone in the host country from migrated cultural zone?

This paper has studied these questions in the context of the number of Muslim migrants in Europe and USA. Migrants from other cultural backgrounds have not been included in the study as many European nations represent the same cultural values for which Europe stands. An important point to be noted while studying Europe and U.S.A. is the supremacy of race and culture over the religion. In this paper the notion of culture of the immigrants has been analyzed in the context of religion, races and ethnicity. The whole paradigm is to see the

religion of immigrants in the context of the culture of the host nation, which is more racial than religious.

2. MUSLIM MIGRATION TO EUROPE

In 1990 the total population of Muslims in Europe was 4.1 percent which increased to 6 percent of total population nowadays. The number of total population of Muslims in Europe has increased from 29.6 million in 1990 to 37 million in 2000 and 44.1 million in 2010. In 2016, the total percentage of Muslims was 4.9 of all European population. The projected rise in the population of Muslims in Europe till 2030 is 58.2 million which would be 8 percent of the total population of Europe and less than 3 percent of the total global population of Muslims. (*Europe's Growing Muslim Population*)

As per another set of data on national basis in Europe, Muslim population also does not show that they constitute more than 10 percent of the population of any nation of Europe in 2010 and till 2030 except only in two nations (Belgium-10.2 & France-10.3 percent). (*Europe's Growing Muslim Population*) Table -1 shows the number of the Muslims in some selected countries of Europe.

Table1 Number of Muslims in some selected Countries of Europe

Countries	Estimated Muslim Population in 2010	Estimated % of Muslims Among total population of the country in 2010	Estimated Muslim Population in 2016	Estimated % of Muslims among total population of the country in 2016
France	4,704,000	7.5	5,720,000	8.8
Germany	4,119,000	5.0	4,950,000	6.1
United Kingdom	2,869,000	4.6	4,130,000	6.3
Italy	1,583,000	2.6	2,870,000	4.8
Netherlands	914,000	5.5	1,210,000	7.1
Spain	1,021,000	2.3	1,180,000	2.6
Austria	475,000	5.7		6.9
Belgium	638,000	6.0		7.6
Denmark	226,000	4.1		5.4
Greece	527,000	4.7		5.7
Norway	144,000	3.0		5.7
Sweden	451,000	4.9		8.1
Switzerland	433,000	5.7		6.1

Source: PEW Research Center

Table-1 shows the rise of the Muslim population in the given countries. There is moderate rise in the population in each country from 2010 to 2016. No country shows the high growth rate of more than 5 percent. None of the countries of Europe has more than 10 percent of total population in 2010 and 2016. Migration is an important factor in the increase of the Muslim

population in Europe. Most of the Muslim migrants are from South Asia, North Africa and Turkey. There is internal migration within the boundary of Europe and external migration from outside of the European nations.

As per the PEW Research Center, migration of Muslims is an important phenomenon of the growth of the Muslims population in Europe.

According to available data, 3.7 million Muslims migrated to Europe between mid-2010 to mid-2016. Visualizing Muslim population under three conditions, the Muslim population is not going to exceed 14 percent of the total population of Europe in 2050. In the first condition when net migration is assumed to zero, the increase in the population of Muslims would be from 4.9 percent to 7.4 percent in 2050. In the second condition, when net migration is assumed moderate, the population of Muslims would be 11.2 percent in 2050 and in the third condition, when there is assumed high level of migration, still the population of Muslims in Europe would not exceed 14 percent in 2050 of the total European population. In each case, the population of Muslims in Europe is going to increase depending upon the condition of migration but not at an alarming pace. Their population would be doubled in high migration but not going to be more than 15 percent of total European population over a period of time. (*Europe's Growing Muslim Population*)

With count estimated of Muslims population in 2010, 2016 and projected for 2050, in three condition of migration, the population of Muslims is: 2010(19.5 million), 2016(25.8 million), 2050(35.8 million - with Zero migration), 2050 (57.9 million - with medium migration) and 2050 (75.6 million - with high migration). (*Europe's Growing Muslim Population*)

Among the 3.7 million Muslim migrants, countries from where these migrants originated are Syria (710,000 and 91 percent (650,000) are Muslims), India (480,000 and 15 percent (72000) are Muslims), Morocco (370,000 and 100 percent Muslims 370,000), Pakistan (280,000 and 96 percent (270,000) are Muslims), Bangladesh (250,000 and 95 percent (230,000) are Muslims), United States (240,000 and 1 percent (2400) are Muslims), China (240,000 and 2 percent (4800) are Muslims, Iran (220,000 and 97 percent (213,000) are Muslims), Nigeria (190,000 and 23 percent (43,700) are Muslims), Sri Lanka (190,000 and 10 percent (190000 are Muslims), Afghanistan (180,000 Muslims), Libya (180,000 Muslims), Jordan (150,000 Muslims), Iraq (140,000 Muslims) and Algeria (140,0000 Muslims) (*Europe's Growing Muslim Population*)

And where are these migrants heading for when they come to Europe? As per the PEW Research Center, the countries of Europe which received a significant number of migrants from 2010 to 2016 are: UK (1,600,000 in which 43 percent (690,000) are Muslims), Germany (1350,000 in which 63 percent (850,000) are

Muslims), France (790,000 in which 67 percent (530,000) are Muslims), Italy (720,000 in which 56 percent (400,000) are Muslims), Sweden (450,000 in which 67 percent (300,000) Muslims), Netherlands (310,000 in which 57 percent (170,000) are Muslims), Switzerland (280,000 in which 33 percent (90,000) are Muslims), Austria (240,000 in which 46 percent (110,000) are Muslims), Belgium (230,000 in which 57 percent (130,000) are Muslims) and Spain (210,000 in which 39 percent (81000) are Muslims). (*Europe's Growing Muslim Population*)

The important points related to the population of Muslims that need to be remembered are that the increase in the Muslim population is due to the high rate of fertility (period-2015 to 2050 Muslims 2.6 to 2.4 and Non-Muslims in same period from 1.6 to 1.7) (*Europe's Growing Muslim Population*) and the net migration which has been mentioned above.

3. MUSLIM MIGRATION TO U.S.A.

The United States of America is one of the leading powers of the global world and one of the economic centers of the world economy, being one of the best examples of unity in diversity.

As per an estimate the population of America in 2017 was 325.72 million. (Resident population of the United States from 1980 to 2017) In another estimate by United States Census Bureau, April 25, 2018, the population of America is 327,600,50511 As per the estimate of PEW Research the population of Muslims in USA in 2007 was 2.35 million which rose to 2.59 million in 2010 and to 3.45 million in 2017. There was an increase from 0.8 percent to 1.1 percent of the total population of the United States of America from 2010 to 2017. (*Muslims in America: Immigrants and those born in U.S. see life differently in many ways.*)

The migration of Muslims in America started to rise after 1990. Only in few years of post 9/11 there was a decrease, otherwise the increase continues. In 1990 the number of migrants who got permanent residence was 50,000, which rose to 66,000 in 2000, 115,000 in 2010 and 109,000 (projected) in 2020. Due to the policy of the present administration there may be a decline of the migration of the Muslims in America. (*The Future of the Global Muslim Population. Region: Europe*)

As per the PEW Research Center's Survey 2017, the Muslims in America show no racial or ethnic majority. All of them show racial and ethnic diversity. The origin of American Muslims is from 75 countries. The PEW Research Survey finds "No

single racial or ethnic group accounts for a majority among Muslim immigrants, with 45% identifying as white and a similar share (41%) identifying as Asian.” (*Muslims in America: Immigrants and those born in U.S. see life differently in many ways*)

As far as their view towards religious practices is concerned, what constitutes in fact the essential culture of Muslims, 65 percent immigrants say that religion is very important for them while 44 percent pray five times; 80 percent observe fasting during Ramadhan; 45 percent attend a religious service once in a week; 47 percent considered Halal food (the permitted foods in religion with permitted method of preparation) essential for Muslims and among women 40 percent prefer head covering most of the time or all times. (*Muslims in America: Immigrants and those born in U.S. see life differently in many ways*) These data show that the Muslim population of America is not so fundamentalist nor does it follow its religion strictly.

4. MIGRATION AND CULTURE

As the theme of the paper is to see the relationship between migration and culture in a host nation, the study of the Muslim migrants in Europe and America shows that there is no such threat of exclusive cultural zone of Muslim migrants in Europe and America. Neither the migrant population is too big in Europe (with high migration the population of Muslims in Europe in 2050 would be no more than 14 percent) nor is it in America (the number of Muslim in America would be 2.1 percent only) (Mohamed, January 3, 2018) How such a small population can put a threat to a population five times bigger is indeed a matter of study. The study of the behavior of the migrants in terms of their origin country cannot be accepted in the study of the behavior of the migrants in the host countries.

On the other hand the population of Muslim migrants is not homogeneous and hegemonic so that it could threaten the culture of the majority of any nation. As per the survey of PEW Research Center, the Muslim migrants of America come from 75 countries while in Europe the origins of Muslim migrants are from as many as more than 50 countries. (*Muslims in America: Immigrants and those born in U.S. see life differently in many ways*) The Muslim migrants are divided on the racial, ethnic and cultural line, only religion being that that binds them all. In such a case how can the Muslim migrants pose a major threat to the major culture of Europe and USA?

The point that should be considered while studying the culture of the Muslim migrants in Europe and USA is that they are not seen in terms of racial and ethnic groups but in terms of religion. In terms of racial and ethnic groups, Muslims migrants are more diverse in their culture than the people of their host nations. They are similar to other racial and ethnic groups residing in the continent of Europe and America. In case of racial or ethnic groups the Muslim population in USA is divided into white (42 percent), Black (20 percent), Asian (28 percent) Hispanic (8 percent) and others/mixed (3 percent). (*Muslims in America: Immigrants and those born in U.S. see life differently in many ways*)

Similarly, the ethnic and racial division of the Muslims in Europe is Asian, African, Eastern European (Bosnian, Macedonian, Russian etc.), Turkish, Arab etc. In the same way, in terms of religion, the whole of Europe is an example of the hegemony of Christianity. And if religion is taken as the basis of a culture, then Europe presents a hegemonic cultural zone of Christianity which has no match and threat from the Muslim migrants which are in very small numbers.

In the case of the racial and ethnic basis of culture, Europe is a multicultural continent and in that case too Europe should not fear any cultural threat from the migrant Muslims whose number is small and divided into numerous races and ethnic groups. In the case of USA too there is no cultural threat from the Muslim migrants as they are divided on racial and ethnic lines and are very small in number, just 1.1 percent in present and about 2 percent in 2050. In case of a culture based on religion, there is no match of the culture of USA with Migrant Muslims both in terms of numbers and sects (Shia, Sunni, Qadyani etc.).

Perceiving the culture of the Muslim migrants and the host nations in term of religion is nothing but to create enmity through misunderstanding between the world of Islam and the world of Christianity, although both these religions have many common grounds to share and help each other. In case of Muslim migrants religion cannot be accepted as a tool to study the culture. If it is accepted as a tool it will create misunderstanding, which would be threat to the world peace and development.

In the same way the survey of the PEW Research center shows that the American Muslims do not strictly adhere to the basic principles of Islam. It means that a considerable number between 20 to 50 percent are either assimilated or integrated with the culture of the host nations as the response

on various aspects of the culture by Muslim population shows. In another example 93 percent considered themselves as proud Americans while 95 percent considered themselves to be proud Muslim, which makes us observe that here is no line of division between religion and nationality. (*Muslims in America: Immigrants and those born in U.S. see life differently in many ways*)

Therefore, in the light of the present study there is no chance for the creation of an exclusive cultural zone or hegemony of the culture of Muslim migrants in the continent of Europe or in U.S.A. till 2050. Whatever could be the possible threat to the culture of the host nations has been eliminated with the policy of multiculturalism, assimilation and migration policy. The real threat can be seen in the reversal of the multicultural policy by many European nations and emergence of many political right wings opposing the immigrants in Europe and in America.

The hypothetical fear that has been created around the increasing number of the Muslim migrants in Europe and America is not true and misleading in the light of the number, racial, ethnic and cultural background of the Muslim migrants and the host nations.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The present paper has studied the migration of the Muslims in Europe and in USA from various points of views of culture and reached the conclusion that, with the present ratio of migration of Muslims in Europe and America, it is not a threat to the culture of Europe and America. Even on the basis of projection of the population, there is no chance of the creation of an exclusive or cultural zone of migrated Muslims and cultural hegemony of any sort till 2050. The fear for separatism on the basis of increasing number of the Muslim migrants is hypothetical, which has no basis taking into account the available data presented by various organizations. There is no chance till 2050 of the creation of nation (culture) beyond nation (culture of origin). There may be possible the emergence of few small pockets of cultural zone in many parts of Europe but they would be not so powerful to threaten the hegemonic culture of Europe based on diversity and unity (European Union).

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EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND SECURITY IN POST-BREXIT AGE: A POSSIBLE MODEL NEOPOSTNAPOLEONIC?

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Abstract: *In this paper we propose to assess the possible anticipatory European identity and security context in the post-Brexit age. In this context, based on the concept of theory neomedievalist of English School, we tried to support the hypothesis that UK out of the EU club could lead to resize identity and security European architecture, in a similar manner as the type congress / European concert, established after the defeat of France in the Napoleonic Wars. The research objective is to identify similarities / differences between the two factual historical and security contexts on the continent, which are able to support the previous hypothesis. Quadrilateral power (Russia, Prussia, Austria, England) in Europe established after the Congress of the Holy Alliance, could be replicated in a similar quadrangle after a new E.U. treaty that would reshape E.U. after Brexit, quadrilateral composed of European powers that were favorable to the project said two-speed Europe (Germany, France, Italy, Spain). Therefore, a set of conditions similar postnapoleonic context could create prerequisites of identity construction and security type neopostnapoleonic, but supplemented by functional integration problems.*

Keywords: *European identity; security; Europe post-Brexit; concert/ congress neopostnapoleonic.*

JEL Classification: *F52; F53; F55*

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the last two centuries, the balance of the international system has constantly depended on the condition of security on the European continent, and the finding of the most appropriate continental security formula has proved to be one of the most difficult enterprises both in terms of political and diplomatic practice and on the level of intellectual-epistemic theorization. Whereas constructivists recognize the identity factor as being a significant component of European security, the rationalists of the English School assert the role of normative arrangements (agreements, treaties) in calibrating the continental security framework. In Europe, more than in any other regions of the World, the architecture of national identities and security framework has undergone evolutionary metamorphoses in line with the dynamics of political and historical transformations validated by political, economic or security arrangements. Thus, the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the Congress of the Holy Alliance (1815), the Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Treaty of Paris (1947), the Treaties of the European Communities (1957) are examples of

arrangements that have brought about new political, economic and security formats across the continent. Many of them have capitalized on a number of institutions and systems used by previous arrangements.

Pursuing this line of reasoning, we will argue that Britain's exit from the European Union could generate a new security framework on the continent, similar to that established after France's defeat in the Napoleonic wars, even if the United Kingdom's exit is a voluntary gesture as opposed to France's, the latter being a consequence of the humiliating defeat.

Over this background, we find many similarities between certain systemic elements of the post-Napoleonian context and those of the current European framework under Brexit conditions. The comparative examination allows us to analyze from a neo-medievalist perspective the European dynamics determined by the UK's separatist option. The liberalization of Continental Europe from a series of restrictions associated with former British claims¹ could lead to a re-

¹ Optout clause; not including the Schengen space; differences in fiscal policy, defense and common security policy etc.

/consolidation of the EU's basic treaties, in order to strengthen the convergence of common policies and thereby increase the degree of Community integration in the new circumstances.

The need for such a reconsolidation is illustrated by the positions already adopted by European officials regarding the re-/design of the EU at different speeds. In fact, Brexit seems to be an excuse that allows for the opportunity of implementing the organizational and security reconfiguration desired by the powers of "old Europe", given the current volatile security climate (migration, terrorism) and the poor economic and social convergence of the so-called "new Europe" spaces which joined after 2004. Obviously, the EU's political and security rearrangements, once institutionalized, will be accompanied by the adjoining identity and community corolla (Bărbulescu, 2015: 547) responsible, in their turn, for perceptual and behavioral readjustments in post-Brexit Europe. Europe's new structure, following a new gravitational model, will be facilitated by the prospective institutional segregation of actors with different "weights" in the process of political, security and identity re-establishment of European society. This phenomenon creates the premises of a state of fact similar to the one institutionalized by the 1815 Congress of the Holy Alliance.

For the purpose of comparative contextual assessment, we have identified and extracted the premises in question by comparing the provisions of the political and security arrangements established by the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, the current provisions of the consolidated European Treaties, and the declarations of intent of European leaders.

The aim of this paper is to identify and evaluate the similarities and differences between the post-Napoleonic political and security context and the current one, under the Brexit / post-Brexit conditions.

The research hypothesis states that by leaving the EU, the UK generates the contextual framework necessary to undertake a remodeling of the European Community architecture in line with the political, economic and security interests of the main post-Brexit actors (Germany, France, Italy, Spain); the model gives a mimetic projection of the situation managed by the European powers (Prussia, Austria, Russia, England) after the Congress of Vienna.

The paper is structured according to the following sections: introduction, literature review and epistemic framing, methodological approaches, results, conclusions and bibliographic references.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The basic treaty provisions of the EU with regard to community governance, have brought to the limelight of the academic debate of the last decades the assertion of neo-medievalism, a model promoted by the representatives of the English School. Neo-medievalism argues that national sovereigns have a strong devolution to both supranational and sub-national levels of governance (Bull, [1977], 2012:245). In a manner similar to the neo-medievalist thesis put forward by Bull, we can argue that the current European conjuncture related to Brexit brings to attention the emergence of elements associated with the context generated by the provisions of the Final Act of the 1815 Congress of the Holy Alliance.

Most academic approaches assess comparatively the framework of European security institutions. The European power concert is analyzed through the lens of how similar the balance of power established at the Congress of Vienna (1815) is, compared to the less known subsystem power balance of the current environment, which is largely concealed by the institutional framework of the European Union (Miroiu, Soare, 2006:207-208).

According to Jervis, the *status quo* established after the Napoleonic Wars can be seen as a security regime (Jervis, 1982:364), and at present the European context can be interpreted to the limit as operating under the security regime offered by OSCE (Ungureanu, 2006:241), an aspect which has been conserved after Brexit. However, the current data allow us to give a view alternative to Jervis's and to accept the current and immediate situation as a predictable exception to the accepted rule for building a power concert, according to which "a concert of power can be established only after a conflagration against a potential hegemon" (Jervis, 1985:60). However, there are also a number of differences which are noted in the literature such as the security community based on identities and shared values (Adler, Barnett, 1998:31) operable in the EU (most likely after Brexit as well), which did not exist in post-Napoleonic Europe.

Taking Buzan and Wæver's considerations as a starting point, we can state that the composition of European security in the post-Brexit era could circumscribe some security coordinates similar to those of the post-Napoleonic concert, namely a series of institutional arrangements that vary from the perspective of the themes and the approaches

covered (Buzan *et al.*, 2011:266) and with obvious differences. Thus, from a neo-realistic perspective, the post-Brexit stage could re-/bring the exercise of a balance of power within the EU, but in an exclusively economic and non-military matrix (Ungureanu, 2010:81).

The saving epistemic solution that might offer an explanation for the similarities between the post-Napoleonic European concert and the probable post-Brexit one comes, rather, from a neoliberal perspective on the subject. The interdependencies between the European powers after 1815, those of today, and those in the immediate future, seem to be taking place within a network of rules, norms and procedures (Keohane, Nye, 2009:64), determined by the reciprocity of interests between these powers, the expectations regarding the others' behavior as well as their number (Axelrod, Keohane, 1993:87-98).

According to constructivist assessments, the normative framework, along with the interactions and the conveyance of ideas, regulate the relationships among states and influence their behaviors and identities, albeit in different ways across the eras (Legro, 2009).

Thus, some fixed constructs of identity could add to the socio-economic and security reconfiguration of the continent in an era of future post-sovereignty (Greenhill, 2008:365), in a manner similar to the catalytic role that nationalisms had for the consolidation of sovereignty in the post-Napoleonic stage (Armstrong, 1982:96). It is therefore desirable that a remapping of the power concert in Europe be accompanied by a gradual rethinking of European identities (Morin, 1987:47), in accordance with the sympathies associated with the new arrangements (Ross, 2006:198) and with the ongoing metamorphosis of the national phenomenon's facets in Europe (Rumford, Buhari, 2014:121; Adamson, Demetriou, 2007:490). Understanding these changes is essential for a rational management of predictable remodeling in continental architecture and assumes the end goal of safe cohabitation in a common European home, governed by balance and security.

3. METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS

For the purpose of identifying the similarities and differences between the European context established in the aftermath of the Vienna Congress and the current post-Brexit situation, we used a questionnaire comprising essential issues

that characterize the two eras. The items of the questionnaire cover three categories of referential elements, namely the elements of the political framework - 5 items, elements of the economic framework - 4 items and elements of the security framework - 5 items (Table 1). The answers to these items were formulated by extracting the corresponding information from the content of the normative acts and their derivatives, acts which established the organizational and functional configuration of the European system at the two relevant historical moments: the Final Act of the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the Consolidated Basic Treaties of the European Union, decisions, recommendations and opinions of the EU institutions and their decision-makers on Brexit issues.

With regards to *the political framework*, we focused on identifying the main processes underlying the political and security arrangements of the two eras, the emerging ideologies, the distribution of power centers in the international system, and the way in which power was exercised across the continent. Three of the five points used in the questionnaire outline current Brexit related processes in a converging grid, with similar processes that appeared following the Congress of the Holy Alliance.

Thus, the main continental event in the post-Napoleonic era was the political and territorial unification of central Europe (in the German space), while in the post-Brexit era a reconceptualization of European integration is anticipated, with the same Germany being considered as the catalyst. This phenomenon will undoubtedly have to be validated by a new post-Brexit treaty, as the European reality after the defeat of France was enforced by the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna. The reconceptualization of both epochs was / is accompanied by the emergence of new deviant ideas: while the 19th century has seen the emergence of revolutionary, Marxist, socialist ideologies, the current era seems to witness the explosion of populist, Eurosceptic and anti-system ideas. There are only two referential items of the European political domain which do not present comparative convergence: the way power is distributed in the current international system is no longer a Eurocentric, but a polycentric one, and the exercise of power at European level is largely based on a qualified majority vote of the EU Council, and not on a restoration of Europe's principles as established by the Holy Alliance.

Table 1. The comparative framework of European context postnapoleonic and post-Brexit context

Referential elements	Enquiry	Europe in the postnapoleonic age	Europe in the post-Brexit age
Political features	Main process	Political and territorial unification/ centralization in Central Europe (German area)	Reconsidering E.U. integration (around Germany)
	Basic rule/ act/ arrangement	The European arrangement architecture by the Agreements of the Congress of Holy Alliance	The arrangement of new E.U. architecture by a new treaty to strengthen the E.U.'s basic treaties
	New ideas/ Schismatic ideas	The development of alternative ideologies (revolutionary/ socialist / marxist ideologies)	The development of alternative ideologies (populist/ eurosceptic/ iliberal/ countersystem ideologies)
	The distribution of centers of power in international system	Eurocentric international system	Polycentric international system
	The exercise of power	The restoration of the Princes' Europe	Community decisions by qualified majority voting
Economic features	Economic processes founder	Developing capitalist economy after the industrial revolution	Digital and innovative world economy development after the IT revolution
	Evolutionary economic processes	Transition from premonopoly capitalism to the monopoly capitalism	Strengthening newfunctionalist economic integration: preparing the transition to fiscal union
	Type of market	Free economy in monopoly conditions	Internal Market based on the four freedoms
	Monetary system	Gold monetary standard	Single currency; Euro wide area
Security features	Type of institutional system	European concert/ congress of security	Security concert into the Euro-Atlantic Community of security
	Type of European framework	An architecture with two categories of actors: 4 hegemon powers (Russia, Prussia, Austria, England) + outskirts of Europe	An architecture designed for a two-speed Europe: 4 main actors (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) + outskirts of Europe
	Type of insecurity	Turbulences generated by the empowerment of indigenous nationalities	Turbulences associated with the diasporic communities outside Europe deterritorialized
	Security status of Europe	Security independence of Europe	Euro-Atlantic political-military Alliance
	Existence/ Non-existence of ex-European threats	No ex-European threats	Ex-European threats
Legend: - similarities - differences			

Source: Authors' proceedings

The elements of *the economic framework* have taken into account the transformation processes of the European economy, the existing market type and monetary system. Two of the four points used in the questionnaire highlight the convergence of current post-Brexit processes with some processes following the Congress of Vienna. Thus, in both eras, Europe had/has recently re-established itself in the matrix of new types of economies: the development of the capitalist economy following the industrial revolution, and the development of

the digital and innovative economy following the IT revolution (Kobrin, 1998:382). Likewise, both periods have experienced beneficial transition processes: the transition from pre-monopoly capitalism to monopoly capitalism in the 19th century, and the preparation of the transition to the fiscal union, that will have to be sanctioned by the next post-Brexit consolidation treaty. The two items related to the economic domain reflect divergences between the reference moments, due to the processual dynamics of the European

economy: monopoly capitalism versus integrated economy based on the freedom of movement of capital, goods, people and services, namely monetary system based on the gold standard versus European single currency and, most likely, on the rethinking of the Eurozone after Brexit, based on the European model with two (or more) speeds.

Continental security parameters derive exclusively from the projected security arrangements anticipated (Mitzen, 2006:342): adopted models of security architecture, types of internal turbulence, Europe's security status in the international system, the nature of the new emergent threats. Three of the five security items used in the questionnaire reveal shades of similarities between the 1815 post-Vienna security patterns in Europe and post-Brexit Europe. Both security contexts state the power concert as the institution admitted to the continent, with the amendment that, perhaps, after the UK's exit, the community's power concert will be further circumscribed, from a security point of view, to the Euro-Atlantic Security Community, compared to its post-Napoleonic independence.

At the same time, for both periods, the European power architecture is structured according to the two-speed Europe model: the dominant core and the peripheries; the difference is only given by the composition of the hard core: Russia, Prussia, Austria and England, as laid down in the Final Act of the Holy Alliance, and Germany, France, Italy and Spain, according to their position in support of the statements made by the President of the European Commission with regard to a post-two-speed Brexit. The internal unrests of 19th century Europe, as a result of the emancipation of nationalities, are replaced by new phenomena - such as radicalization, alienation and social exclusion, identity crises - generated by the presence of extra-European diasporas (Chiru, Barna, 2006). The contextual differences between the periods under scrutiny refer to the origin of the threats (excluding the 19th century intra-European ones, predominantly extra-European at present) as well as Europe's degree of security autonomy (19th century security independence as opposed to the current dependence on NATO's Atlantic Alliance).

4. RESULTS

The previous evaluation allows for a European Post-Brexit model, based on the coordinates of a European power concert similar to that established by the Congress of the Holy Alliance, although not completely identical.

Indeed, the post-Brexit community order aims at fulfilling similar goals to the post-Napoleonic concert, but in the matrix of the new main actors: preserving the European equilibrium, preserving intergovernmentalism (based on the sovereignty of states, albeit with wider predictions), maintaining security and stability in accordance with both the Community norms and the security commitments that the EU Member States are part of. The paradigm of preserving the European balance, most strongly supported by England and Austria in 1815, now has Spain and Italy as fervent supporters because of their security interests in the secessionist tendencies they feel threatened by (Catalonia, the Basque Country, South Tyrol). The Germany-France pair seems to be replacing, in a rather mimetic way, the Russia-Prussia pair at the Vienna Congress. Russia's 1815 desire to establish a European federation under the leadership of Tsar Alexander I (metamorphosed in the "European Common House" skillfully reinvented by Mikhail Gorbachev between 1987 and 1989) is now replaced by Germany's hegemonic tendency in what seems to be an unbalanced European Union after the leave of the United Kingdom. Therefore, through a counterfactual exercise in imagination, we can visualize the virtual translation of the Tsarist Europe of 1815, to the more plausible Europe of the Kaiser (Ferguson, 2013:149); in fact, we are dealing with only a relative increase in Germany's potential in the new European concert, attributable to a "smaller" West on a global scale (Boia, 2013). By converging to the line of Germany, France finds itself in a position very similar to that of Prussia at the time of the Holy Alliance. Even Britain, as an EU outsider, can be given the posture of France in the post-congress power concert. Though defeated, France managed to be accepted in the power concert after 1818, thanks to the capability of its Foreign Minister, Charles Talleyrand. Similarly, the United Kingdom, which had firmly refused to join the European Community in 1957, was accepted as a member in 1973. In such a context, we have all the arguments to state that a possible wish on London's behalf to rejoin the community club (in another format), would not be refused.

From the perspective of such an emerging evolution and the silent acceptance of a wider multiple speed European project, it is possible to outline the post-Brexit landscape. If the model is to be validated by a new treaty, Europe's first speed could include the four main actors (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) along with some other developed "old Europe" members for the

reconfigured euro zone. In this context, the Eurozone concert could give up on some of the current members (such as Greece and Cyprus) in a similar way that the actors of the Congress of Vienna decided to exclude Spain from the post-Napoleonic concert (Wight, 2002:53). Europe's first speed could also include some non-Euro members, which prove not only good economic compatibility, but also an identitarian and socio-cultural one with most of the other members of this elitist group (such as Denmark and Sweden).

A second-speed Europe would include the current non-Euro states, to which Greece and Cyprus would be added, all of which are perceived as having not only economic difficulties, but also serious socio-cultural differences with their first-rate competitors.

Another emerging dimension that supports the hypothesis of a post-Brexit Europe very similar to the post-Napoleon Europe is the nature of alternative ideas. Just as the 19th century was marked by the emergence of Marxist revolutionary ideologies, so is the present age increasingly disturbed by Eurosceptic or anti-system ideologies.

Neo-post-Napoleonian emergence is also ensured by the upgrading of some economic "rites of passage". The current development, which derives from the technological revolution, resembles that of the 19th century, which was generated by the effects of the industrial revolution, and the transition to a tax integration of the community body (catalyzed by Britain's leave). Therefore, the transition to liberal capitalism is repeated in a ritualistic fashion.

At the same time, today's Europe and that of the near future, will have to find the most appropriate instruments for managing the social instabilities (Ciupercă, 2018) related to the existence of allochthonous diaspora minorities, just as between 1815-1918 the European powers had to cope with the waves associated with the emancipation of indigenous nationalities.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The assessment of the current post-Brexit European dynamics compared to that of the 1815 Congress of the Holy Alliance, reveals the possibility of offering an epistemic definition to the context, in the form of a neo-post-Napoleonian paradigm, seen as an intellectual mutation of the neo-medievalist theory, the latter being largely accepted in the field of international relations and security studies. The emergence of our paradigm

encompasses political, economic and security dimensions.

From a political point of view, the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union could be used as an opportunity, similar to France's departure from the 1815 European Concert, for the reconfiguration of the European scene. The projection of a new European concert would allow the institutionalization of a two-speed gravity model of Europe, enforced according to the political, economic and security interests of four main European actors (Germany, France, Italy and Spain); this idea resembles that of the post-Napoleonic hard-core which was made up of Russia, Prussia, Austria and England.

The economic realities circumscribe the register of beneficial consequences (the current IT revolution versus the industrial revolution) and the expected transitions (transition to the fiscal union versus the transition to the liberal economy during the years following the industrial revolution). In terms of security, the new realities address the turbulences associated with extra-European diaspora communities, which have replaced the turmoil caused by the emancipation of indigenous nationalities in the 19th century.

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NATIONALISM AND CIVIC LIFE: FROM INCONSISTENCY TO INEQUALITY

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Abstract: *There is a strong bond between the individual, the state and the society. Failing to properly address the relationship between individuals inside a community and culture will bring democracy into contempt. Although it should promote values and target important questions regarding the civic life, the state is now more than ever concerned of its well-being in terms of pursuing new markets and promoting empty social discourse. In a sense, it is not democracy which dwindles but its leaders and political representatives. Their inconsistency and lack of discourse brings us today in front of a new challenge: the rise of populist nationalism, a byproduct of immoral markets, widen inequality and a new social contract. My thesis aims at connecting the dots between the decline of civic life due to increased inequality and the rise of populist nationalism, in a soft-despotic context, which settles the terms for a new social contract. Having to do with a Tocquevillean approach on democracy and despotism, my paper will endure the illusion of self-determination, postulating nonetheless the idea of contractualism and civic duty.*

Keywords: *civic life; nationalism; democracy; despotism; inequality*

1. INTRODUCTION - FROM THE PERPETUAL PEACE TO THE END OF HISTORY

When Kant proposed the following idea which stated: "the greatest problem for the human species to which nature compels it to seek a solution is the achievement of a civil society which administers right universally" (Kant, 2006:8), he also considered "a perfectly just civil constitution" as being the highest goal for mankind (Kant, 2006:8). I believe Kant was somehow ahead of our time when issuing the above, as we can see nowadays that there is something peculiar happening inside our societies, as they grow more and more apart from a sense of communality and morality, both being aspects of which social and civic life are strictly dependable.

If Hobbes referred to institutions, as means to ensure authority inside the community (Hobbes, 1651), Rousseau built his idea of a society postulating the supremacy of law and order (Rousseau, 2002). They both met Kant's view that each individual has an intrinsic duty whenever he steps inside the society, a duty of shaping itself in order to maintain a common bond with the other citizens with whom he or she interacts, building the society as a whole, its institutions, and with

that, its laws. In Kant's perception, the social contract derives out of necessity, and imposes the actual society, which is meant to protect the individuals (Kant, 2006). For that safety, the state has to provide and guarantee two of the most important principles of life, which is liberty and equality. Hobbes's tyranny has no place inside Kant's theory, as it leads to a violation of any individual's right for self-determination.

Although Kant isn't perceived as an actual social contract theoretician, his contribution in this regard is undoubtable. For Kant, the social contract represents an idea, one of great fortune and also a test for human reason (Kant, 2006). Furthermore, Kant's perpetual peace depends on democracy's success, a lottery at which most states, haven't yet bought any tickets.

As we can see, we haven't yet reached the final form of human government as Fukuyama considered (Fukuyama, 1992), nor we can currently conclude the victory of democracy, as it may have come to a point where it should be improved and frequently adapted to an increasingly dynamic international context. The globalisation and marketisation of every aspect of our lives inflicts many changes upon the democratic establishment and "proposes" many challenges, some of which are still to come.

In the present paper I shall focus on briefly presenting a new form of social contract, which was pointed out early on by Tocqueville, while having an approach on a new form of despotism that pushes the society from having a smooth democracy into accompanying a fierce form of populist nationalism, built upon social inequality and its proceedings. While admitting the current limits of my essay, I strongly consider pointing out, now and in future writings, that there is a strong bond between our civic behaviour and the world we are shaping for the next generations. Of course such endeavours need a broad approach, that's why I shall adjust the present content, accordingly.

2. DEMOCRACY AND DESPOTISM IN ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE

While being a key figure inside the study of democracy, Tocqueville isn't recognised among the social contract theoreticians that made an impact on the concept. For him, the notions of civil society and democracy were in connection, as the first witnesses the second's evolution. Tocqueville believed that the society included ideas, traditions, institutions and a firm feel of democracy as a state of mind. In order to support progress and political representation, people encounter one another in the public life, issuing public discourse and cooperation between individuals that hold the liberty of free speech and self-determination.

Tocqueville's assertion of what democracy is and could be, still remains topical. While he considered social interaction as being a part of a mechanism that drives democracy on a path of continuous evolution, there are a few negative implications regarding the rule of the majority. As the public debate and discourse narrows, a gap between the individuals and the political establishment unravels. For Tocqueville, the close distance between the citizens and their political representatives stands as a vital aspect of democracy. The centralisation of the political system raises many questions regarding the concept of civil liberty and acts as a tool for any despotic tendency. In other words, the Frenchmen's idea of despotism is quite different from the ones which were used before him. The standard notion of despotism had a violent approach, clear statements, untainted beliefs and so-called ideological targets. On the other hand, Tocqueville's new form of despotism is rather unusual, as it is soft and misperceived. Montesquieu was the first to consider the term *soft-*

despotism in the middle of the eighteenth century, in connection with England's rulers, although it was the Frenchmen who gave it a context and elaborated on its sense (Scott, 2009: 70). Tocqueville's *soft-despotism* follows the rise of a despotic ruler, that seizes every individual's mind and self-determination without them even noticing. It is silent, misperceived and very efficient. It also allows its citizens to follow what they think they want or need, while the state assures that they get it in a limited sense, gradually turning them in people who are dependable of their ruler, although their actions are in fact limited and controlled. *Soft-despotism* is in some ways an invisible form of controlling the society and its members, up to a point where the ones that rule are so powerful that nothing can move them away from their authority. This is frightening because it is subtle and it derives from a new form of social contract, one that puts everything in the hand of the state.

3. THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE ILLUSION OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Soft-despotism creates the illusion of self-determination not only by allowing people to democratically elect their political leaders but by charging them with the ideas of which they are autonomous, although that isn't entirely true. It also operates by the rules and laws that are rightfully established and by which, they exercise control over the society, limiting any individual growth beyond their reach. Additionally, it guides the society by its own will, restraining any reactionary temptation.

A *soft-despotic* establishment doesn't use force or any other violent behaviour. It is quiet and peaceful, but most important, it doesn't show its real face. By controlling the citizens and guiding them accordingly, the tyranny is senseless. The power of the people remains strictly on paper, while the tyrant makes sure its authority is legitimate and the popular demands are obsolete. In some ways, things haven't changed much since Tocqueville's notes were made. What is indeed different from then, is the fact that the economy is now above the political dominion, it being in control of policy making and the political interests' spectrum.

Nowadays markets control every aspect of our lives and there is literally nothing that money can't buy. This particularly assures that people of different social status live separate lives and don't encounter one another inside the society, as they share different road lanes, tickets lines, stores, while allowing those that are wealthy enough, to

benefit from the marketisation of everything (Sandel, 2012:7). This social discrepancy leads to inequality, lack of solidarity and tolerance, the absence of social debate and most important — a disunited society.

Children go to different schools based on their social status, get a limited amount of respect and opportunity, and don't live up to the expectations of a so-called democratic society. Furthermore, a market society being one in which a child is paid to read a book a day, or a convicted criminal can optionally choose to upgrade his cell if he pays the right price, raises questions about the way we wish to spend our lives and the future we create for our next generations (Sandel, 2012).

In my opinion, the so-called *soft-despotic* upheaval is being determined by a change of social contract, due to increased inequality that has formed in connection with the lack of social debate and inappropriate leaders/models. The new social contract that I am referring to, is oblivious for those who sign it. In other words, the citizens approve of it tacitly. It can be compared to Hobbes's social contract, it being the result of yielding responsibility to a leader (in our case elected) that is suitable to lead the society. Although in both cases the authority is accepted, what differs from Hobbes's notion of social contract is the fact that in its newest form the authority doesn't act in plain sight, whereas its actions are invisible and they target the individual's faith, being also absolute, though with a softer approach.

Inside a society which is governed by the new form of the social contract, people tend to be persuaded by the apparent equality and liberty. They live with the illusion of self-determination and don't even consider the leaders as being tyrants but merely tutors (Tocqueville, 2005:333). Their thought is being darkened and seized by the authority in the virtue of the new social contract. The saddest part is that the citizens are involuntarily choosing to enter this contract as they are unaware of its implications and of the *soft-despotic* engagement that it assumes.

Currently, the new social contract installs upon unstable societies, that face a period of growing inequality, due to the lack of public debate and the globalisation of markets which are expanding beyond imagination and moral standards. The marketisation of everything shares a fair bond with inequality and contributes to the lack of social interaction and public discourse. People don't find debates attractive anymore and that concerns the way we conduct our civic life, being a part of a society meaning we need

to take a proactive position inside it, sharing views and opinions that might enact a coherent social discourse for the community and the political establishment to consider. Of course, being torn apart by inequality, people live totally separate lives, not being close to each other in order to socially interact and to develop common grounds. This brings us in front of an anxiousness behaviour by our counterparts inside the society, constantly showing that we are on a path to separation and intolerance towards one another.

The civic life suffers under the pressure of raising inequality and the results of an unbalanced social discourse tend to go on the extreme. Such results determine the way we cast our votes, share our public thoughts, and react to the political behaviour. Furthermore, the inconclusive political discourse and the inefficiency of the political establishment has made the voters edgy and unsettled for compromise. This is why liberal democracy is held responsible by so many nowadays, for the lack of accuracy in policy making, and also why populist nationalism is gaining more and more success among the European societies.

4. THE DECLINE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE RISE OF POPULIST NATIONALISM

There are three aspects that we should consider whenever we are labelling a form of government as being populist (Fukuyama, 2018). From Fukuyama's point of view, the first aspect is that it "supports policies that are going to be good on the short run but bad on the long run". The second characteristic is that of "addressing only to a certain part of the society" (an ethnic or racial group), while emphasising a kind of national identity that excludes any other "outsiders". And for the third characteristic, Fukuyama points us in the direction of a much more identifiable aspect, that of the "cult of personality" which is relevant for the style of the populist leadership (Fukuyama, 2018). All three of these aspects being put together are consistent to the label of populism. As we can easily see nowadays, in some states, all three of the characteristics mentioned by Fukuyama are being marked.

The inconsistency of assuring a constant public discourse served as a standpoint for the political class to indulge in a kind of empty political discourse. The latter were convinced that the more they pursue economic benefits for the society as a whole, the more the citizens would prosper and

tend to support them for another mandate. In this regard, they have failed to consider addressing bigger questions, for which the population had interest in, such as those related to education, values, inequality or day-to-day problems that affect every part of the society. Unfortunately, false made promises and unbalanced strategies regarding markets and development, created the perfect context for liberal democracies to fall into contempt.

Many people of whom were fed up with the current establishment, casted their votes in order to support change and a new vision. What they failed to consider themselves was the replacement of a liberal form of democracy with one of which its tendency is to promote a populist approach and a sort of extreme nationalism, that isn't accustomed with respect for every individual and tolerance towards different minorities.

Due to the lack of public debate, and of course increasing inequality, people don't consider all the aspects before using their ballots. This leaves behind any moral and opportunity-related discussions, and pursues only what is the fruit of what Kahneman consider it to be the first system of thinking, which is the fast, intuitive one, that doesn't accommodate analytical assessments and reason-based approaches (Kahneman, 2013: 22). In other words, the flaws of not-entering into a debate regarding aspects of our lives, might end up as being an important reason for the society's current and future evolution. As we are more and more acquainted with the appearance and intensification of the extremist discourse, of the parties which promote a nationalistic approach throughout their populist leaders, we should be worried about the evolution of democracy on the long run.

It could take years for it to be downgraded to the point of inefficiency, but the process has started to move on rapidly and to collect more and more adherents which believe the latter establishment was to blame for everything that didn't work in the past and still doesn't work in the present. Thus, the only solution is a radical change, as always. While reinforcing the constant need for a coherent public discourse and constant debate regarding important aspects and big contemporary problems, the solution for the current nationalism is caught somewhere between the alternatives for a democratic revival of both policies and leaders/models.

5. CONCLUSIONS

In order to engage with the tough questions that we face nowadays, we must consider as part of

our civic life, the importance of the public discourse and the role that it plays inside a democratic society. In spite of Sandel's opinion regarding "the declining of the civic spirit" contemporary issues related to democracy have a broad spectrum of challenges, that can't always be put on the shoulders of the citizens, as inactive individuals. The representatives are also responsible for the failure of the political class, which constantly diminishes in trust, coherence and is unable to sustainably address the important aspects of our lives (Sandel, 1996). Covering a gap of faith, left behind by the mainstream parties, the far right spectrum succeeded in discourse and approach, by filling the holes of those fed up with the two or three decades of unfair politics, that failed to address major parts of the societies, closing up for elites and leaving the ordinary people in sorrow and disdain.

From the point in which liberal democracy embraced the globalised economy and market mechanisms associated, there were a few decades in the making. As some believed for many years now, democracy is not intact, on the contrary, it dwindles as time goes by. Therefore a more robust civic live won't be the solely answer for the democratic questions raised by various changes inside societies as a whole. Notwithstanding, the strong bond between the individual and the state thickens every day, that is why it is up to the citizens to inflict change inside their societies, in order to correct the wrongful path of the current democracy's drift. Formed on grounds of inequality and immoral markets, the new social contract that enacts a soft-despotic engagement of the society by those who lead, has changed the way we live our lives and enabled us to give up everything for almost nothing. Linking the way we conduct our civic duties, to the deterioration of democracy, is surely a questionable act in many views.

My thesis has tried to figure out what are the motives behind the upheaval of populist nationalism, pointing towards the fact that there are many variables which contribute actively on disrupting the bond between the state and the individual, forcing democracy into crisis. The unquestionable importance of participation in the civic life, as being a virtue among individuals represents one of the reasons for which democracy should harness the public discourse and debate. In order to conclude, I wish to reiterate the importance of civic life, not solely as a mechanism to ensure inclusion and social dialogue but also in a sense of underlining the fact that there couldn't be a democracy without its people.

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Security and
Intercultural
Communication

COMMUNICATING INTELLIGENCE WITH THE CITIZENRY: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE NETHERLANDS REFERENDUM ON THE ACT ON INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICE

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Abstract: *In The Netherlands on March 21st, 2018 a non-binding referendum was held on the new act on the intelligence and security services. In many respects this was a unique moment in the (Dutch) history of intelligence. The Netherlands has no long lasting history of referenda and probably never will. In 2016 it held a referendum on the EU association agreement. It led to a clear no-vote and although the referendum was not binding, it was a shock to the government, which had to bend over backwards to explain to its European partners how it had gotten itself into this position and to legitimize to the voters that it still signed the agreement. As far as the government was concerned this was a -once-and-never-again experience. However, just before it managed to close down the possibility of national referenda, enough signatures were collected to have a non-binding vote on the Dutch act on the intelligence and security services. The outcome of the referendum surprised friend and foe: 49.5 percent of the voters rejected the act against 46.5 yes-voters. This paper discusses the issues that were involved and the way the government treated the referendum. The government tried to follow two objectives simultaneously when it drafted the act. First, it wanted a law that would be independent from technological developments, precisely because a former one had restricted the services' room for manoeuvre especially due to technological considerations. Second, it wanted to make a law that would be ECRM-proof. This led to a balancing act and a very complicated bill. Opponents stated that past practices and the vague wordings of the bill were reasons for distrust. Champions of the bill said that it combined the enhancement of the services' powers with a broadening of the oversight mechanisms. They blamed the opponents because of factual misunderstanding. What they did not take into account enough was that it was not so much a matter of good intentions or practice but an issue of images. In a belated effort to save the act unscathed representatives of the services appeared more often in the media in the three months before the referendum than in the preceding half century. This contributed to the beginning of a serious intelligence debate in The Netherlands. The changes the government promised after the referendum were not inserted into the law itself and were considered to be only cosmetic by opponents. The law entered into force on May 1st, 2018 as scheduled. At the time of writing both summary and substantive proceedings against the law, initiated by both humanitarian and privacy organizations and professional associations of lawyers and journalists, are pending.*

Keywords: *intelligence; security; referendum; public opinion; law*

1. INTRODUCTION

In 2002 a law on the intelligence and security services became effective which was much more elaborate than the previous one, the first such law in The Netherlands, which dated from 1987. The 2002 law had become necessary for several reasons. First, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had judged that the powers of the services should be better circumscribed in the law, that an independent oversight committee was lacking and that there was no individual right to complain against actions of the services. The second reason was more institutional. In 1994 the Dutch government had abolished its Foreign

Intelligence Service, expecting that it was no longer needed. However, in the following years it became clear that The Netherlands could not do without a civilian foreign intelligence capacity.

The 2002 law remedied all this. It provided for two intelligence services: the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD, Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD, Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst). It also established an independent Committee for Oversight (CTIVD, Commissie van Toezicht op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten). And citizens got the possibility to complain about actions of the services to both the CTIVD and the National Ombudsman.

The law had hardly become effective when it showed a major flaw from the perspective of the AIVD and the MIVD. The law allowed for both bulk interception of wireless transmissions and targeted interception of communication that went through cables, but not for cable-bound bulk interception. Soon after the law had become effective a technological change occurred after which most of the current communications took place through the cable. Consecutive governments lent a willing ear to the services' complaints that thus they were becoming deaf while hearing and blind while seeing, as the saying went. It was understood, however, that a new law expanding the powers of the services would be a hard sell. Therefore in 2013 the government set up a commission-Dessens (named after its chairman), which concluded that a widening of the powers of the services should have to be counter-balanced by an increase in oversight.

This led to a bill that had to serve two purposes. It should be both technology-independent and ECHR-proof. The bill introduced the possibility of bulk interception via the cable and made it possible to exchange this bulk material with befriended foreign services. It made special provisions for tapping phones of lawyers and journalists, because in judicial processes the government had been condemned for not having done so. In the end the bill also provided for an independent committee of two judges and an IT-expert, who should give ex ante permission for the use of special powers by the services.

2. OPPOSING VOICES

Those who had hoped for a bill that would end all controversy around the intelligence and security services, engendered for instance by the so-called revelations of Edward Snowden, were disappointed. The act was an unfortunate mismatch between two ambitions: in order to be technology-independent the law had to use general terms, in order to be ECHR-proof it had to be as specific as possible. Those who had hoped that the intention to make the act technology-independent would open a grand vista could not detect a vision about the future of technology. Words like 'the internet of things' or 'brain-computer-interfaces' were lacking from the bill's explanatory memorandum. However, it did make explicit the services' powers to hack into electronic systems and made cooperation of service providers mandatory. It also opened the possibility of hacking through third parties.

Furthermore, the ECHR-proof intention did not take into account the case law that could be expected in the years to come from the European Court of Human Rights. It just tried to withstand current ECHR case law. In this sense the law was rather meant to mend the broken pieces of the past than to make a future-oriented document.

The first draft of the act was published in July 2015. It was open for public internet consultation and an amazing number of 1100 reactions were received from organizations and individual citizens criticizing the bill for allowing too many and too large infringements in people's privacy. Among them were not only defenders of privacy and human rights but also telecom providers and the largest organization of employers in The Netherlands. Also the Council of State, which has to counsel the government on every bill, and the Oversight Committee CTIVD voiced substantial criticism.

However, the Dutch government in 2015-2016, Rutte-II, did not heed all criticism. It had made an estimate of its chances in Parliament and decided to push the bill into a law. A great number of amendments in the Lower House were killed. The then minister of the Interior Ronald Plasterk treated opponents of the law as if they were endangering national security, which led even one Member of Parliament, the spokesman for the Socialist Party, Ronald van Raak, to leave the parliamentary debate prematurely.

In the Senate the government did concede a few points. However, these did not change the law and although these concessions do have some legal status, they do not have the same legal force as a provision in the law. In the end the law got clear majorities in both the Lower House and the Senate, respectively 114 against 35 and 50 against 25.

3. A REFERENDUM

Several human rights and privacy activists announced that they would appeal to the European Court of Human Rights as soon as the law would become effective. A bigger surprise though was the announcement in August 2017 by five students of the University of Amsterdam that they wanted to have a referendum about the law. They focused mainly on Article 48 of the Act, which allows for 'the tapping, receiving, recording and listening of any form of telecommunication or data transfer by means of an automated work, irrespective of where this takes place'.

The Netherlands has no long lasting history of referenda and maybe never will. In 2016 it held its

first national referendum, a referendum on the EU association agreement with Ukraine. That one led to a clear no-vote and although the extant Dutch referenda are not binding, it was a shock to the government, which had to bend over backwards to explain to its European partners how it had gotten itself into this position and to legitimize to the voters that it still signed the agreement. As far as the government was concerned this had been a once-and-never-again experience. In 2017 a new government under Prime Minister Mark Rutte, Rutte-III, took shape and during the preceding coalition discussions it was decided to abolish the possibility of referenda, even though until then this instrument had been used only once. Then the announcement of another referendum was made.

In order to make a referendum possible in The Netherlands 300,000 signatures are needed. For a long time reaching this goal seemed unlikely as the discussions about the bill had been foremost an affair for well-informed insiders. When, however at a late stage, a Dutch satirical newscommentator, Arjen Lubach, promoted the demand for a referendum the required number of signatures was soon reached. It was decided that the referendum would take place on March 21, 2018, simultaneously with the elections for the municipality councils, which would guarantee that the quorum of thirty percent of the electorate casting their vote would be achieved. Intriguing detail: the referendum would take place just before the government intended to close down the possibility of referenda.

4. AN ABSENT GOVERNMENT

Still, the government felt it had little to worry about and remained almost absent from the debate. The result was that the opponents of the law had a free playing field and coined the law the ‘dragnet law’, a word even serious media began to use, together with the words ‘eavesdropping’ or ‘tapping law’. The law had provided for three stages of bulk-processing: collection, pre-processing and processing. In the final stage, government sources said, about two per cent of the original bulk would be retained and therefore, Dutch citizens had little to worry about, as real surveillance would start only at that final stage. Some citizens on the other hand maintained that surveillance would already start as soon as bulk information was collected. However, this fundamental difference of opinion was hardly addressed in the debate. It led satirist Arjen Lubach to ask his audience: would you allow the

AIVD to hang a few cameras in your bedroom if the service promises never to use them?

Nevertheless, all polls in the months before the referendum showed that about fifty percent of the voters would vote in favor of the law, thirty or less percent were against and about twenty percent remained undecided. As the undecided vote normally splits proportionally along the yes-no vote, it seemed the Dutch government still had little to worry about.

The new government, Rutte III, came into power on October 26, 2017. It consisted of Rutte’s conservative liberals (VVD), the Christian democrats (CDA), the progressive democrats (D66) and the small Christian party Christian Union. Of those the progressive democrats were in the most difficult position. They had voted against the law and one of their principles had always been the possibility for the Dutch citizenry to express themselves through referenda. In order to become part of the coalition they had to embrace the law and go along with the abolition of the referendum in The Netherlands. Furthermore, the minister primarily responsible for both the law on the intelligence and security services and the abolition of the referendum was the minister of the Interior, Kajsa Ollongren, who happened to belong to D66, the progressive democrats. In order to appease the progressive democrats it was promised that two years after the coming into effect of the law it would be evaluated and, if necessary, changed.

For ‘campaign technical reasons’ the members of the Cabinet stayed aloof from the debates leading up to the referendum. Instead they sent the heads of the AIVD and MIVD into the field, who in the final months before the referendum were seen more often in public debates and on television than in the preceding fifty years. It put them into an awkward position. It was hard for them to answer their audiences’ frequent questions about the technical ins and outs of the powers they would be able to use under the new law, as they are obliged to keep their methods and sources secret. Neither could they discuss recent intelligence successes, because this would mean that the extant law was not so bad after all. This was for instance one of the reactions when several weeks before the referendum news was leaked to the media about a successful hacking operation by the AIVD in 2014 against the Russian hacking group Cozy Bear. And neither could the intelligence chiefs point out explicit failures due to the ineptness of the law, because by doing so they would give directions to people with malicious intent. It was also hard for them to indicate whether the new powers would

indeed lead to greater success, e.g. in the fight against terrorism.

They could only state that based upon their secret inside knowledge they just knew that the law would be an improvement and that many of the objections raised against the law were based upon misunderstandings about the actual workings and real intentions of the services. Thus they ended up in an ‘I am right and you are mistaken’-debate, whereas the public formed its opinions not so much upon facts as well upon images. And facts do not necessarily change images. The government and the services overlooked the fact that in Dutch society authority is no longer accepted naturally. Politicians, judges, policemen, teachers and professors have all experienced this. Not only is their authority no longer accepted as such, their claim to authority makes them suspicious in the eyes of a mistrustful audience keen on detecting semblances of inequality. Authority that is shrouded in secrecy is doubly suspicious and a government that is suspected to surveil its citizens should be prepared for the counter-question by its citizens: and how transparent are you, government, yourself?

5. AN INTELLIGENCE DEBATE

Several of the opposition leaders were also notoriously absent from the debate, such as the leaders of the two populist parties, Geert Wilders (PVV) and Thierry Baudet (Forum for Democracy), who preferred to focus on their campaigns for the municipal council elections. In spite of or maybe thanks to the depoliticized character of the referendum discussions for the first time in history an actual intelligence debate took place in The Netherlands. On the op-ed pages of newspapers, in explanatory articles and broadcasts, and in meeting rooms people debated the law. Most of the questions that arose from these debates concerned technical aspects of the law, such as how the bulk interception was done and how the different oversight mechanisms would interact.

The criticism focused mainly on the idea that collecting bulk information would infringe upon people’s privacy, the exchange of bulk un-analysed information with foreign services, the retention of some bulk information for up to three years, hacking via third parties, the notion that journalists would not get enough safeguards and the idea that medical data could be seen by the intelligence and security services.

Other aspects of the law were surprisingly hardly discussed at all, such as the algorithms that would be used to select particular information from the bulk, the fact that the law allowed the services to establish a DNA-database of their own, and the possibility of impairment of physical integrity in case people would have electronic systems inserted into their bodies. Another aspect which drew not enough attention was the fact that the AIVD and MIVD are both intelligence and security services. Powers given to the services by law are often intended to be used abroad, especially in order to protect and further the missions of military troops. However, in the discussion it was often thought that these powers would be used against Dutch citizens. Also, the government and the services often stated that in order to enhance security the citizens would have to offer some of their privacy. The fact that privacy enhancing software is available that serves both values was hardly discussed. And also overlooked was the fact that hacking by the services becomes more and more important in relation to interception.

There were other interesting developments in the run-up to the referendum, all part of a public relations offensive by the government and the services. First, the public appearances of the chiefs and other (former) personnel of the intelligence and security services. The head of the MIVD even called populism a danger to the democratic order, an issue that had been shunned by sister organization AIVD for years. Second, after years of refusal the government finally revealed the numbers for telephone and internet taps by the intelligence services over the past years. Third, the annual report of the AIVD appeared more than a month earlier than usual. In it for the first time the cyberthreat was pictured as a more prominent threat than terrorism. Fourth, the minister of the Interior did not inform Parliament about a report written by the oversight committee CTIVD on faults in the intelligence exchange with other countries until a few days after the referendum. She stated publication had had to wait because not all permissions from foreign governments had been received before the referendum.

6. THE OUTCOME OF THE REFERENDUM

When the votes in the referendum were counted it turned out that to the surprise of friend and foe approximately 49.5 per cent had voted against the law and about 46.5 per cent in favor. It is hard to explain why the actual vote differed so much from the polls in the months before. It seems

at least three reasons are likely. The first is that some of the no-voters actually wanted to express their desire to leave the instrument of the referendum intact. Their no-vote against the law on the intelligence and security services was wholly or partially a pro-referendum vote.

The second probable cause was the news about the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal, which broke just a few days before the referendum. It touched a nervous string with people worried about their privacy, the more so because the head of The AIVD had repeatedly told his audiences that the Dutch intelligence and security services did not have the same powers as Facebook, Google, Twitter and Tinder. This clumsy comparison between a government agency and citizens on the one hand and a private firm and clients on the other might unintentionally have primed the voters, when they were confronted with the Facebook-scandal, and consequently have influenced them to vote against the law.

And the third possible explanation would be the high-handed manner in which government politicians treated the case in the days before the referendum. Prime Minister Rutte compared the referendum with lace-making and other hobbies. It was a blow in the face of all people who in preparation of the referendum had earnestly tried to understand the intricacies of the law and had often for the first time immersed themselves in a study of intelligence and security services. On the eve of the referendum, following the final election debate on television, a televised debate about the law took place between Prime Minister Rutte, the leader of the Christian-democrats Sybrand Buma, part of the government coalition, and two members of the opposition, the leader of the Green Left (GroenLinks) Jesse Klaver and the Socialist Party Lilian Marijnissen. The government politicians just stonewalled the opposition leaders' doubts and arguments. Buma even repeated that as far as he was concerned nothing would be changed in the law even if a majority would vote against it.

As said the Dutch referendum is not binding, but in case of a no-vote the government has to reconsider the debated law. So, the question now was what position the government would take regarding the law after the referendum. Would it modify certain parts of the act and if so, which ones? And would the government's action be the end of the intelligence debate or would it rekindle it? Whereas it had taken Prime Minister Rutte many months to formulate the Cabinet reaction after the Ukraine referendum, his new government decided to clear the air this time as soon as

possible. Within a few weeks it came with what they called some concessions that did not need to be enacted, but should be accepted as elucidation. Opponents called them merely cosmetic. E.g one of the concessions was that intercepted bulk material could no longer be retained for three years, as the law allowed, but only for one year. However, this one-year limit could be postponed twice with another year. Another concession was that bulk interception would have to be as goal-oriented as possible, but this had already been included in one of the few Lower House amendments which had been accepted.

The reason the government was in such a hurry was also the fact that the law would become effective on May 1st, 2018. Although the government said to have made some concessions these did not change the law itself, as both the opponents and the Committee for Oversight had wanted. Bits of Freedom, Privacy First, Free Press Unlimited, The Dutch Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, the Dutch Association of Criminal Lawyers and several other organizations objected that the law would enter into force without Parliament having had an ability to debate the government's concessions. Therefore they asked the government to refrain from such action, otherwise they would institute summary proceedings to postpone the entry into force of the law. The ultimatum ended on April 27. The day before the government published the changes, indicating that it would not insert them in the law. This means that the summary proceedings will take place, although at the moment of writing (April 28, 2018) it is not clear when. However, they will be held after the law has become effective on May 1, 2018. Meanwhile the Netherland Association of Journalists has begun substantive proceedings to have the act reviewed in the light of European law.

7. CONCLUSION

The way the governments-Rutte II and so far also Rutte-III have pushed the law disregarding broad and often well-funded criticism. By doing so they have turned national security and the intelligence and security agencies into a question of the current government instead of a case of the state. This is a situation that should have been avoided and it will take quite some effort if the government would like to redress this situation. Both this situation and the execution of the law itself ask for continuous communication, explanation and elucidation. It has been a benign experience to finally see the heads of the AIVD

and MIVD appear in broad daylight to discuss the work of the services with the public, but the government should take their responsibility as well and not stay absent from the scene. The intelligence debate that has started in The Netherlands over the past few months should be prolonged, but then the government should understand that it takes two to tango.

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THE SYMBOLIC POWER: NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE REFLECTED IN PRIMARY AND PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION

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Abstract: *The current paper approaches the potential of symbolic power reflected by the security culture, from a socio-anthropological perspective. In this regard, the deductive endeavors have been doubled by the transductive ones. The security culture, in its operationalized meaning used by the Guide of the National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019, is perceived as an activating factor in the extended national security functionality. The case study focuses on the rapport between the core of the security system and the education system, more precisely, on the manner in which the forming and development of security culture is or should be reflected by formal education, especially through curricula specific to primary or pre-primary levels. The methodological design encompasses the content analysis of documents related to security and curricula, aiming at identifying competence clusters or formative contents devised for this purpose.*

Keywords: *symbolic power; culture; security culture; security education; primary and pre-primary school curriculum.*

1. INTRODUCTION. THE SYMBOLIC POWER

The symbolic power, perceived as an expression of "dominance" (*Herrschaft*) in Max Weber's theory in the first part of his monumental work *Economy and Society* (1956/1978), functional in case of evident determination and influence of the dominator in relation with an influenced behavior of the dominated, has found its plenary manifestation in Pierre Bourdieu's studies (1991). Basically, in the French sociologist's acceptance, the symbolic power is a countermeasure to the material manifestation of power and it implies justifications, convictions, and types of classification and legitimization of power. This symbolic meaning of power with Bourdieu is in reference to the legitimating dimension of any impositions of power, be it political, economic, military or of any other nature, which creates, even in its latent state, a symbolic capital and a form of related violence, a struggle inside the symbolic space used for imposing meanings, labels, categories and other various types of legitimating a present or potential behavior. In other words, the symbolic power consists of everything that has been left behind after the reduction of power relations to communication

relations, irrespective of their institutional form or type of approach:

In criticizing all forms of the 'interactionist' error which consists in reducing relations of power to relations of communication, it is not enough to note that relations of communication are always, inseparably, power relations which, in form and content, depend on the material or symbolic power accumulated by the agents (or institutions) involved in these relations and which, like the gift or the potlatch, can enable symbolic power to accumulate. It is as structured and structuring instruments of communication and knowledge that 'symbolic systems' fulfill their political function, as instruments which help to ensure that one class dominates another (symbolic violence) by bringing their own distinctive power to bear on the relations of power which underlie them and thus by contributing, in Weber's terms, to the 'domestication of the dominated' (Bourdieu, 1991:167)

Pierre Bourdieu's symbolic power is to be found encompassed in the British sociologist Michael Mann's¹ phrases *ideological power* and

¹ In the first volume of his work entitled *The Sources of Social Power*, the British sociologist structures the rapports between diverse types of societies, in accordance with quaternary typology of powers:

diffuse power. However, the phrase itself, irrespective of the shape it takes, is (and remains) vague, incomplete, insufficiently developed. A redefinition (in analytical terms) of the power matrix in the social field, achieved by John B. Thompson in 1996, better clarifies the phrase: *symbolic power* „stems from the activity of producing, transmitting and receiving meaningful symbolic forms”. Thompson’s perception is by far more explicit, yet, also more different from the projection released by Bourdieu, who would place a symbolic potential behind any form of power manifesting in social areas, just like a shadow impossible to be detached. The shadow of symbolic power is projected as a legitimation necessity, once the light of knowledge overlaps with the power forms in rapport with the relating angle (ideological, in Michael Mann’s perspective). According to Thompson, symbolic power does not represent the remains of the power relations’ reduction to communication relations; on the contrary, it is intrinsic to any forms of communication, it goes hand in hand with information, through the symbolic content it implies. It is these very symbolic remains, apparently harmless, hard to control, that become the holder of unimaginable energies and it gives birth to latent symbolic powers. We can as well perceive the symbolic power as a shadow of the justifications to any possible other forms of power manifestation, still, we can identify it instant communication, within social networks, in everything else that interactionism could not explain in a satisfying manner for Bourdieu’s demands. Symbolic power does not stand for a holder of latent social energy, because social energy can be stocked in groups of individuals belonging to various species². Symbolic intelligence differentiates humans from the representatives of the other species, and the expansion of symbolic potential from individual level to the level of the small group or even of culture calls for bringing up manipulation of the huge energy potential of a culture, named symbolic power.

ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP), v. Mann (1986/2003:2). John B. Thompson (1996:18) completes Michael Mann’s projection with Pierre Bourdieu’s and proposes a matrix of powers manifesting within the social area: economic, political, coercive, and symbolic.

² ”Should people’s symbolic intelligence seem unequalled by other species on Earth, social capacities are to be found with other species as well”, according to Hofstede *et al* (2012:444).

2. CULTURES PERCEIVED AS DEPOSITARIES OF SYMBOLIC POWER

Culture, understood as *mental software* or as a set of thinking, feeling and potential action typologies, “consists of unwritten rules of the social game” (Hofstede *et al.*, 2012:17). Mental programs differ from one another, in relation with the levels of culture, from national, regional, ethnic, religious and linguistic, of the generation or social class, up to the level of organization. The common aspects, whatever links cultures, not what separates them, is made up of a set of elements deposited in a pre-established order, following norms, patterns, charts, systems of values. These elements are the ones that compose the DNA of societies. It is not accidental that the Dutch researcher Geert Hofstede, in his great work, written together with his son, Gert Jan Hofstede and with the Bulgarian Michael Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations. Software of the Mind*, transductively approaches the cultural issue, inducing the idea of a “cultural genome” pre-existence and of a cultural continuity, based on it:

During a person’s life, new body cells continually replace old ones. The twenty-year-old does not retain a single cell of the newborn. In a restricted physical sense, therefore, one could say we exist only as a sequence of cell assemblies. Yet we exist as ourselves. This is because all these cells share the same genes.

At the level of societies, an analogous phenomenon occurs. Our societies have a remarkable capacity for conserving their distinctive culture through generations of successive members and despite varied and numerous forces of change. While change sweeps the surface, the deeper layers remain stable, and the culture rises from its ashes like a phoenix (Hofstede *et al.*, 2012:36).

“Cultural genome” is not a mere presupposition. A system of values, symbols, centripetal forces that takes action within nations maintains cultures to be able to transmit genetically their need for integration and joint reaction to threats. Geert Hofstede (2012:31) includes language, mass-media, education, national armed forces, political system, national representation in events with symbolic echo in the set of these cohesive forces. In other words, he places in the foreground those institutions that establish the symbolic power (let us remember, for example, the role played by the institution named language, in Pierre Bourdieu’s study, *Language*

and *Symbolic Power*), also suggesting other forms of power: military (coercive), political, economic, each of which has its attached symbolic shadow. Thus, cultures are not only depositaries of symbolic power; symbolic forms prefigure culture, they are “multipliers” within the cultural evolution process. Symbolic power models these forms that highlight the features of the whole (culture) and not of the parts (various particular forms of manifestation of culture). Ralph Linton, who perceived culture as the “total way of life of any society, not simply to those parts of this way which the society regards as higher or more desirable” (Linton, 1968:61), had prefigured the cultural continuum half a century ahead of Hofstede – the “genome”, metaphorically suggested by the Dutch scholar as being the reference element of the cultural “sharing”, to the detriment of the very culture, at a given moment. As a result, this cultural “genome”, prefigured and transmitted through the symbolic power, aims at a sharing by means of education/training or by explicit (the main agent of cultural transmission) or implicit imitation³. The “sharing”, in Linton’s anthropological projection, constitutes the activating element, the one that transforms the symbolic potential of a culture in explicit symbolic power.

3. SECURITY CULTURE

Should Mann’s phrase *ideological power* be inadequate, then the phrase *diffuse power* is indistinct, whereas Bourdieu’s term *symbolic power* is decentered; the farthest term ever from any possible operational form used to be, until recently, that of security culture. First, just like in case of language, the cohesive institution of a nation’s symbolic power, culture cannot function as *ergon* (explicit product), either. The complex rapport (of interconditioning) between the two terms was described by Eugeniu Coșeriu: language is, on the one side, the foundation of culture, on the other side, it is one of its forms⁴. Language and

culture produce effects in the field of products (linguistic, cultural); nevertheless, it cannot be shaped as such, into concrete products. Both institutions are autogenerative. Yet, speaking of a genus proximum (culture) impossible to project at the products’ tangible level of any other forms of power, or speaking of the impossibility to quantify explicitly this form of power, directly associated with (symbolic power), becomes unproductive in rapport with the specific difference (of security), apparently explicitly formulated, describing explicit products related to security. Placing together the two terms in the phrase *security culture* raised serious questions in the attempt of operationalizing the concept. First, the concept itself is the outcome of some recent institutional approach (of security structures), necessary to be debated to answer adequately a series of challenges at the level of *soft* powers (in the light of the American researcher Joseph Nye Jr.’s perspective, “Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others”, 2007:391), of the “attraction and seduction”, as well as at the level of *hard* power, illustrated through asymmetric actions of terrorist nature. Thus, the security culture constitutes in itself a diffuse term, considered to be a recent institutional approach that operates with a broad range of sensitive aspects of security, starting with emergencies and ending with the set of skills the people need, as citizens of one state (which means, from the perspective of their contracts with the state), in relation with the values, interests and immediate necessities of the state. However, due to the fact that in case of insufficiently explicit terms, before any possibility of operationalization, there is need for a transductive approach to be applied to the more explicit dimension, we are going to utilize a metaphor, belonging to the same class of organic metaphors, in order to be able to describe the security system.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS, 2015) is the first projective document that operates a clear distinction between core and extended forms of national security:

The Strategy reflects the need to promote an extensive **national security concept** – grounded on constitutional democracy and mutual respect between state and citizens – regarding interests related to ensuring national security in the following fields: defense (perceived in a double normative stance of national defense and collective defense),

³ It is the very contact with explicit culture of the society and the experience derived from this contact that recreates, in each individual, the share psychic moods which constitute the implicit culture.

⁴ “Language is, on the one side, the foundation of culture, of culture as a whole, and, on the other side, it is one of culture’s forms. This means that only language has this possibility of being language and reality at the same time and of speaking of itself. Music cannot speak about music, and neither can sculpture speak about sculpture. In conclusion, language has this feature of

being both the foundation of culture and one of culture’s forms” (Coșeriu, în Saramandu, 1996:102-103).

public order, intelligence, counterintelligence and security activity, education, healthcare, the economic field, the financial sector, environment and critical infrastructure (NDS, 2015:5).

It is not this distinction between the extended national security concept and the core security (implicit to this term) that matters but the distinction between corresponding security systems. Related to the core security, we can mention structures with explicit security tasks (defense, public order, intelligence), whereas the extended system comprises, apart from the already mentioned tasks, other systems with various tasks and, above of them, they are responsible for security (education, healthcare, environment and critical infrastructures). The analogy with the human body is close. For example, the skin is not only a sensory receptor of the human body; it represents the largest organ with a defending duty for the body. The skin's defending role consists mainly of preventing pathogenic agents from entering the body. In other words, we speak of an organ that has mainly a defending role, belonging to the category of core security organs and systems. The human body also has apparatuses, systems and organs with other key roles. For example, the liver, an organ that secretes bile, a substance with a fundamental role in digestion, plays, among other roles, the part of a defender against toxins, disinfects the intestines and protects against some digestive diseases. This organ belongs to the category of extended security organs and systems. Bearing a similar meaning, the symbolic power of a nation may be assimilated with the human body's metabolism, while the totality of defending and replicating processes of the "cultural genome" are easy to understand by analogy with the anabolic and catabolic processes of the human body.

The *security culture*, in this metaphorical approach to knowledge, has the role to foresee any possible form of perturbing a nation's metabolism, to protect it against any metabolic threats. Naturally, when speaking of the set of prevention measures taken to annihilate the dysfunctions at the level of explicit meaning, the *security culture* has still remained a diffuse, suggesting term and it has been perceived as an individual's set of information, convictions, attitudes and values (on which one can take action through the *symbolic power*) in relation with the state or with the state's systems, which generates various forms of power (political, economic, coercive) and implies citizens' education for the protection of national values. The specialized literature in Romania refers to the concept of *security culture*, in most of the cases, as a set of knowledge and information, not as a functional, metabolic, autopoietic and implicitly non-additive structure⁵.

The concept of *security culture* explicitly signals a break from the previous paradigms with regard to security, traditional approach to intelligence, which used to involve the understanding of security as military power (Sebe, 2013:48-49) and of the military art as "philosophy of warfare", a break from the Clausewitzian paradigm in the field of military sciences, from the action strategy to the detriment of deterrence strategies, from the prevalence of *hard* power in relation with *soft* powers. The concept was understood in the context of previous strategic visions (see the role of security culture in democratic context, in accordance with *The Strategic Vision 2011-2015*), Ciupercă, 2011:94). However, it was also developed within the normative or projective framework of administrative structures of the Romanian state, being given an operational definition starting with the year of 2015, through the *National Defense Strategy Guide for 2015-2019*⁶, whereas the




Fig.1 The extended national security system and security culture. Role of education

⁵ See the example given in the online publication *Intelligence in your service*: "The security culture may be defined as a set of knowledge and information in reference to the national security values and necessities, whose acquisition leads to the development and promotion of some conducts needed for self-defense or national defense against internal or external threats" (Calangea, 2017).

⁶ The Guide was drawn to promote the double meaning of security within the bipolar state-citizen, contributing to the consolidation of not only the term *security culture*, but also of its content: "From this perspective, the document is intended to be a first stage in developing this security culture, promoting the idea of

fundamental aspect of this projection is represented by the direct connection with the main vehicle used to transmit/promote culture – education:

Security culture: totality of values, norms, attitudes or actions that lead to the understanding and assimilation of the security concept and its connected forms (national security, international security, collective security, insecurity, security policy etc.) at society level. Security education is a preponderantly educational dimension, through the development of a preventing attitude at society level for self-, group and state defense and protection against risks, threats, vulnerabilities, real and potential aggressions (National Defence Strategy Guide for 2015-2019, 2015:7).

4. FROM THE DESIGN OF SECURITY EDUCATION TO THE NATIONAL EDUCATION SYSTEM. CASE STUDY: THE ROMANIAN PRIMARY AND PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION

4.1 Method. State institutions play a fundamental role in designing the security education. The state can take the role of symbolic power depository and it can prefigure the set of probable and explicable reactions by means of various legitimation instruments of the forms of power that derive from its relation with the citizen. The state can appeal to ceremonies, heroes, symbols and myths to develop its security culture – its development, “also achieved through continuous education, able to promote values, norms, attitudes or actions that enhance the acquisition of the national security concept” (National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019, 2015:21) is one of action directions to challenges that Romania faces, in accordance with the national strategy - , but it also dispose of forming institutions. The only aspect that is worth mentioning is the one related to the projective optimum, in rapport with the age from which the learning of “security insurance” should start, at individual level, respectively, with the projective coherence in national curricular instruments. In this respect, we used a contents analysis, the research method consisting of a qualitative

establishing a civic partnership for the setting of high standards of collective and individual security – objective established through the National Defense Strategy.”, according to its display on the President’s official internet page, URL: <http://www.presidency.ro/ro/presa/securitate-nationala-si-aparare/ghidul-strategiei-nationale-de-aparare-a-tarii-pentru-perioada-2015-2019>

organization of national curricular contents specific for primary and pre-primary education, for the identification of certain relations with the projected variables by means of national strategic documents, or for the identification of some formative patterns. The research consisted of two stages: (1) identification of the role of educational dimension in the national defense strategy and the national defense strategy guide; (2) identification of competences/objectives clusters or formative content projected within curricular documents deriving from the strategy and its norms of implementation.

4.2 Results. Strategic documents include, on the one hand, a set of three directions of action in the field of education, including “shaping an ample national education project that can assure the mechanisms programs, projects and performance planning” (NDS, 2015:21), enhancing scientific research in correlation with the education system and the development of security culture through education or separately from it, on the other hand, ways of fostering the security culture, among which we should mention:

stimulation of institutions and people’s interest in security culture/ education, through mass-media and other ways of promotion; integration of security education within educational institutions, both destined to children and adolescents, and to adults, by organizing lectures, conferences, symposiums and workshops, meetings, talks, round tables and other leisure-educational activities (NDSG, 2015:14).

Moreover, the same National Defense Strategy Guide mentions the “the design of a real project of national reform in education”, respectively, specific actions/ steps/ methods/ ways of achieving at least two of the national strategic objectives (NSOs): NSO 18 “Deterrence of radical or extremist reactions and tendencies, by respect shown for pluralism in society and spread of tolerance at the level of civil society” (NDSG, 2015:34), respectively, NSO 19 “Promotion of national identity, also by preservation and employment of cultural and natural heritage, together with a responsible encouragement of areas of excellence”. If, in the first example, we detect the direction projected in the strategy transposed, with regard to the development of security culture by means of continuous education, two other aspects are worth mentioning, as they refer to the two objectives: “modeling the education system by including the concept of pluralism in it” (within

NSO 18), respectively, “developing educational instruments in the formal, non-formal and informal education, to promote spiritual identity in a climate of tolerance and multiculturalism” (within NSO 19).

National curricular documents for primary and pre-primary education, which can be referred in connection with those aspects projected within the national defense strategy, are, first of all, preceding the current strategy. For the pre-primary segment, the document in use is *Curriculum for the early education of children from birth through age 6/7* of 2008, while for the primary education segment, the document referring to the topic under debate include *School curriculum for the subject matter Personal Development. Preparatory grade, grade I and grade II*, of 2013, and *School curriculum for the subject matter Civic Education. Grades III and IV*, of 2014. The pre-primary segment has a curricular document initiated in 2017, which is to be piloted for the school year of 2018-2019 and applied later on (if the case is), entitled *Curriculum for Early Education (age 0-6)*, but its effects cannot be considered yet. Nevertheless, the contents of this curriculum and the accuracy of the formative dimension reflection in the field of national security can be analyzed.

The *Curriculum for Early Education* of 2008 is inadequate for the current national curricular requirements; its content is somehow anachronic in relation with the unprecedented development of high technologies and their outcomes in education, including early education, yet, it is based on a set of values and principles consistent with the general design of the national security system and with the use of instruments meant to activate the symbolic power: “non-discrimination and exclusion of social, cultural, economic and gender inequity”, together with avoidance of discriminatory phrases/prejudices and celebration of diversity (CEE, 2008:5). Structured on areas of development and containing a set of general/specific objectives for each area, the curriculum sends to the general frame of the strategic design: “the educational environment has to allow the harmonious development of a child and to highlight the intercultural dimension, together with the social inclusion”, prefiguring the action directions in reference to NSOs 18 and 19 of the Strategy’s Guide. With regard to contents, the area of socio-emotional development related to ages 3-6(7) includes, in its psycho-social development trait, General Objective 3 – “Development of the ability to recognize, appreciate and respect similarities and differences between people”, out of which

there derives, among others, Specific Objective 3.2 - “(The child) is able to formulate questions about others’ family, ethnicity, language, culture, physical traits” (CEE, 2008:48) and Specific Objective 4 – “Development of (a child’s) capacity to follow rules and understand their effects” (CEE, 2008:48). As far as the document of 2017 is regarded, it aims at the multilateral development of a child⁷, but it proposes only some changes in the nuance of contents, it changes the sequence of the development areas and replaces objectives with competences. Thus, related to the socio-emotional development, General Competence 2 was designed – “Development of pro-social conduct for accepting and respecting diversity”, with its Specific Competences 2.1 – “Recognition, appreciation and respect of similarities and differences between people” (with an example of conduct specific to ages 3-6: “Formulates questions about others’ family, ethnicity, language, culture, physical traits”, CEE, 2017:28, and 2.2 – “Understands and follows rules, understands the effects of rules”, CEE, 2017:29).

With regard to curricular documents specific to the primary education segment, even if they are adequate for the curricular requirements – drawn in accordance with the model for curricular design, centered on competences – aspects of security culture development framework are much vaguer that in case of pre-primary education. The school curriculum for the subject matter *Personal Development*, for the preparatory grade, grade I and grade II (2013) does not continue the development of previously projected competences, through the curriculum for pre-primary education, but it develops specific interaction competences, see General Competence 2 – “Adequate expression of feelings and interaction with unknown children and adults”, thus annihilating the previous achievements, whereas Specific Competence 2.3, for the preparatory grade: “exploration of characteristics of favorite beings and objects and of simple interaction with them”, for grade I: “exploration of necessary traits for becoming a good friend”, and for grade II: “exploration of abilities of interacting with the others” (SCPD, 2013:6). In conclusion, this curricular document does not achieve the passage from acquired competences throughout the pre-primary education to the ones necessary for the consolidation of

⁷ For a better preparation of a child, for school and life, during his/her early childhood, the attention given to all aspect of the child’s development is extremely important (CEE, 2017:5).

values, norms, attitudes and actions consonant with the state’s interests, which is, it does not facilitate the passage from group norms to national norms or to the implications of a civic contract.

The school curriculum for the subject matter *Civic Education*, for grades III and IV, aims explicitly at the “moral-civic accommodation of children” (SCCE, 2014:2) and their initiation in “adopting a moral-civic conduct in a democratic society – an active, free, responsible, tolerant, open, communicative, reflexive and self-assessing conduct” (PSEC, 2014:3). Illustrative for our study is the scrutiny of specific competences deriving from general competences 1 and 2, related to norms of conduct and moral-civic conduct:

Table1. General competences 1 and 2 of the School curriculum for the subject matter *Civic Education*, grades III and IV, *apud* SCCE (2014:5;7)

grade III	grade IV
GC 1 Application of conduct norms in everyday life	
SC 1.1 exploration of the status of person that every individual possesses	SC 1.1 recognition of belonging to a place (local, national, European) where the person is integrated
SC 1.2 identification of defining moral traits of a person	SC 1.2 identification of some relevant elements for belonging to various communities (local, national, European)
SC 1.3 exploration of small groups and of the rules of the group	SC 1.3 exploration of some moral norms that regulate relationships with other people
GC 2 Manifestation of some moral-civic conduct traits in life-contexts in a familiar environment	
- irrelevant, competences regarding the physical background	SC 2.1 exploration of some moral values that constitute the basis of relationships with other people
	SC 2.2 recognition of some moral-civic conducts in everyday life
	SC 2.3 distinction between pro-social conducts and antisocial conducts

The curriculum under debate proves that for the Romanian education system the design of a security culture framework starts only at the level of grade IV (ages 10-11), although the fundamentals of values, norms or attitudes or proactive actions forming related to national security are set starting with the pre-primary education.

4.3 Discussion. The most important observation in rapport with the correlation between the two types of projective documents in the field of national security and national education is that there are no competence/objectives clusters or designed formative contents in the curricular documents directly derived from strategy. The alignment of the two projective documents is rather random, their convergence resulting from remaining of formative contents in accordance with an acceptable minimum level of security culture. In the circumstances of the passage from collective values toward the individual ones, the Romanian state needs to compensate this reality through formative measures directly derived from the national defense strategy. Practically, the only document which could have been aligned with the strategy in use will only be enforced after the expiry of the strategy and it will include, in the pre-primary formative system, requirements of the security education derived from main goals of a conservatory education system, reflecting the previous directions and the drawbacks of the education system and not the explicit requirements for adequate development, imposed by the national defense strategy.

The formal alignment to the current curricular requirements does not benefit from an intercultural openness such as the case of the national curriculum should be, nor from an anticipative design of the formative system. For example, the connection with the mass-media (including the new media as well), brought about through means of facilitating the security culture development, continues to consolidate a parallel space from the education system. Although the technological determinism met consistent criticism and the technological dominance was debated by some of the most relevant contemporary anthropologists, the Romanian education still looks at technology and culture as if they were strictly subordinated to it: “This domination of technology on culture is yet an illusion. The software in cars might be globalized, but the software of the minds that use them cannot be” (Hofstede *et al.*, 2012:374). From this perspective, the answer of the education system (which is preserved) to the challenges of the state: the necessity to develop a security culture in a formal manner (but exceeding it), for the first time explicitly formulated in 2015, is doubled by the delayed answer of the state with regard to the education system: “In cultures where education is important, new technologies will be used for its benefit” (Hofstede *et al.*, 2012:451). Not even at

formal level was the security system able to impose its projective line. None of the actions/steps/ methods/ specific means of achievement of action directions related to the national defense strategy is to be found explicitly in a set of specific competences for primary and pre-primary education.

Logically, the state institutions should collaborate. The best example with regard to the symbolic power, in the history of the past century, is Israel, settled in 1948. Yet, this example is not random. Israeli citizens benefit from generous efforts of their state to accumulate a set of minimum knowledge, attitudes and values related to the concept of security culture. Even particular forms of the security culture, chronologically speaking, dating older than it, such as strategic culture⁸, find a proper climate of development within the formal, nonformal and informal education of Israel: national security subordinates national objectives and citizens' objectives due to its education system (Giles, 2009:99). But this model of good practice does not produce effects at the applicative level of the bipolar relation citizen-state when it comes about the security culture in Romania.

5. SECURITY CULTURE

The development of security culture asks for symbolic power awareness, both on behalf of the state and of its citizens. This latent symbolic power cannot be activated through formative plans inadequate to the current society's organization forms, current global openness or technological development. The Romanian state has inherited a special relation with its citizens since the years of communism. At that time, the maximum logical extension of the *internal group*, the generalized "we" used to include the nation, at its best. The state was considered a different structure, the first step toward the meaning of *external group*. The state was referred as "they". The thinking pattern

⁸ Gregory F. Giles (2009:97) utilizes the following definition of strategic culture: „Shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives”. The first definition of the concept to the system of symbols that establish the minimum level of understanding the relations between states and implicitly, of the military forces associated with these states, and it is attributed to Alastair Johnson (1995:32-64).

was inherited and partially, it was culturally transmitted. Under these circumstances, namely those of the transition from collective organization toward the individual one, highlighted by numerous sociologists, the security culture needs a natural development, through a "natural" learning, first in a formal environment, and then, by extension, in the non-formal and informal environment of education, of manners of activating the symbolic power. The first step was made through the National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019. The second step, of the alignment of curricular documents with the strategic design and the development of the dimension named "security education" needs to be achieved. The invoked common effort does not produce effects in the state-citizens relationships. It is fundamental for the strategy to be followed by ways of imposing a development of security culture, through the common part of national curriculum, starting from the primary and pre-primary education, which is, starting from the age segment at which values, norms and attitudes are formed. In essence, this alignment does only represent the natural agreement between two types of cultures, the national one and the organizational one (of the core security and of education); out of whose convergence the *soft power* may emerge. In time, many specialists focused on this alignment. Suffice to remind Garrett Jones' (2009) *It's a cultural thing*, to bring up the possibility of activating the soft power through the organizational culture, as a future possible development of the current study.

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TRANSACTIONAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS OF SECURITY DEFINING HIERARCHIES

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***Abstract:** Analyzing a set of punctual cases from the world modern history we highlight that states behave differently according to their international status on a certain security relationship. We also noticed a gap in the theory of security studies: the lack of a proper definition of security status of states. Therefore this article aims to ring a bell for the need to clarify a few overused but theoretically neglected concepts of the security studies. From here we aim to emphasize the importance of a clearer definition of concepts such as security producer and security consumer trying to identify theoretical criteria that allow a proper conceptual delimitation.*

***Keywords:** security producer, security consumer, international division of labor*

1. INTRODUCTION

As international relations become more transactional (Aceves, 1996, Menotti, 2017, Chong, 2017, Kurlantzick, 2018), the rhetoric of value is replaced by material cash-value interests. Alliances are redefined and allies are searched according to the concrete yield they may have on short term. At the same time economic metaphors pervaded the common parlance of security studies and diplomacy bearing the peril that the initial denotation of certain notion is twisted. Paradoxically, the study of international relations grew apart from the other social sciences to the extent it developed a rather autistic setting concentrating on its own tradition while neglecting much else (Kennedy, 2000, 476-479). The result would not be a new synthetic language bridging business, governance and military fields, but a flashy cacophony full of buzzwords with little use. In this article we shall direct our attention towards two notion in need of better clarification, namely <security producer> and <security consumer>. Easily employed across a wide range of analysis, from MA dissertations and press open editorials to much more serious academic studies, surprisingly, both of them lack a proper definition, being somehow taken for granted. More so, those who used them do not seem to ponder the possibility that a state might be at the same time producer, facilitator and consumer of different security items. To mend such shortcoming we endeavor to work

and define several notions pursuing in the background a more intimate dialogue between international relations theory and classical sociology. The design of our research is rather policy orientated and unfolds from several case-studies out of each a new taxonomy is laid down to come to terms with the reality of the XXI century geopolitics.

2. INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF WORK IN SECURITY AFFAIRS

Kenneth Waltz's highly influential Theory of International Politics describes states as equivalent on the map, all of them heaving the same function: to shepherd and defend the needs of their population. Even though he uses Durkheim to uphold his arguments, Waltz did not use the division of labor concept to its fullest potential. Against such classical view, this article believes that states specialize themselves on the international scene just like regular individuals in the field of economics.

Given such premises this chapter will follow several dyadic relationships in order to demonstrate how defense or security tasks are distributed among political actors.

2.1 India-USA: a difficult eco-system between world's biggest and world's greatest democracy. After a tenuous relationship for almost the entire period of the Cold War, India and the United States

found a common ground after 1991 and grew more intimate ever since. Without being a frictionous entanglement, both Washington and New Delhi managed to appeal to their similarities in order to be mutually useful by articulating a balance of power for the XXI century. Even though from a strictly military angle both capitals aim to set limits to Chinese hegemonic ambitions, their dialogue entails many topics.

Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta described India as a “linchpin” of U.S. policy in Asia, whereas former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel dubbed India a security provider “from the Indian Ocean to the greater Pacific” (Weitz, 2017, xiii, 2). So, is India really a security provider given the fact that it has been the largest arms importer in the world while its domestic defense industry still lags in appropriate capabilities and the internal apparatus gasps when confronting various terrorist groups? Not to mention Southasian chronic problem with a bloated corrupt bureaucracy, a perverse outgrowth of British high civil service. If we are to speak of conventional weaponry, US arms exports towards India lags on second place (15%), far behind Russia (62%), both of them followed by Israel (11%) (Pandit, 2018). However, American martial hardware going to India has increased by 550% between 2013-2017 compared to the previous five years (SIPRI, 2018).

What is really at stake in the strategic partnerships between world’s biggest democracies is the nuclear factor; New Delhi covets it so as to deterrence against Pakistan and China and also to become one of the pillars of a multipolar international system. Washington is needed to help legitimize and vouch for Indian desire. At the same time, White house and Pentagon hope that by signing the 2008 Civil nuclear deal, it will shape India’s rise to the peak and also gain an ally against Extreme Orient’s changing dynamic in the decade to follow.

There is another side to matter where India is the producer while US stand as client: highly qualified workforce. From a meager group of immigrants among many others, today’s Indian Americans compound a 2 million strong community of “younger, richer and more likely to be married and supremely well educated” as compared to other groups, says The Economist (Chakravorty, Kapur and Singh, 2016). A quarter million work in IT industry and make the backbone of Silicon Valley while another significant quotient own motels (Chakravorty, Kapur and Singh, 2016). In 2003 Indian origin researchers made up

2,5% of US research workforce, whereas in 2013 their percent rose to 3,3% (Koshy, 2016).

2.2 US-Japan: recycling enemies to become your creditors. A good example would be the relationship between Japan and the United States after 1945, when Washington was the one who secured the safety of Japan from a military point of view, while the former imperialist nation had been banned from investing in defense; still from a financial point of view, Japan helped the first Gulf War through its banks. Therefore, the US played the role of security supplier on military dimension, while Japan became a security supplier for the US on the economic dimension.

Tokyo also assumed the role of one of the most substantial international donors, with Japan contributing \$5 billion to the reconstruction of Iraq by 2013. This is how Japan consistently practiced the status of an economic security supplier. The contrast between the huge Japanese financial and technological potential and its war capabilities were condensed in the expression 'Japan, a military dwarf and an economic giant', but this phrase is about to become history. In the last few years have been discussed and written about the remilitarization of the country of the rising sun. The Prime Minister Shinzo Abe directs the country to a military status able to discourage what it is perceived as the interference of China and North Korea. We are the witness of a process of transforming the north-east Asian monarchy from an economic security supplier into a potential military security producer – one more reason to assume that the wealth of a country is a predictor of its security capabilities.

In addition, it remains to be discussed to what extent the dyad Washington-Tokyo still embodies a win-win relationship since lately street protests have asked the dismantling of US military bases, starting with the one of Okinawa.

2.3 US-Saudi relationship: when oil greases the incompatibility of values. Security producer - security consumer relationship. Another interesting example brings together the United States and Saudi Arabia. From an energetic point of view, the Saudi nation is an energy security producer at planetary level, with the ability to influence the oil market, as it did, in the early 1970s. From a military point of view, Riyadh manifests a special interest in acquiring American weapons, having a status of semi-peripheral consumer or even the broker of security in case of American interventions in the area (operations against

Saddam Hussein (1990, 2003) started from Saudi territory). Lately, the monarchic state is trying to move to a new stage, that of a military security producer. In May 2017, the country's Public investment fund announced the creation of a government-owned armament company with an initial capital of 14 billion riyals (3.7 billion \$) which will provide 40,000 jobs by 2030. The new company will be called Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) and it is hoped that it will create around it a constellation of new dependent firms. As part of its vision Saudi Arabia 2030, the prince and also defense Minister Mohammed Bin Salman announce an additional 6 billion riyals that will be invested in research and development of new technologies.

2.4. Security Suppliers. In the field of military security, the F-16 fighter aircraft, produced by the United States, was bought by Romania, but not directly from the strategic partner – i.e. the Americans, but from the Portuguese who had already used those planes. Therefore, Lisbon played the role of a supplier between Washington and Bucharest.

2.5 Brokering security: cases of Norway or Romania as mediators. At international level there are very difficult files such as civil wars. Although local, they end up in the attention of the public opinion. Of particular importance in solving these dossiers are certain types of countries that can play the role of brokers, honest states easily accepted as referees? Brokers can be big power or poor states. One example is that of the Nordic countries, which are models of prosperity and respect for human rights that have taken seriously the posture of good Samaritans, to cite the title of a book by Alyson Brysk. Norway involved in the Sri Lanka Civil: opposing the Sinhalese majority to the Tamil minority, the inter-ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka (1983-2009) lasted an entire generation. The mediator's involvement led to a ceasefire agreement (February 2002) and the Oslo communiqué (December 2002) that explored the idea of a federal division of the island. The failure of Norwegian mediation can be interpreted according to our criteria as an example when a political player does not necessarily have the resources to stop a conflict, but it possesses the will to change a crisis. To be an honest, but unarmed intermediary, can be sometime an advantage.

Another notable example involves Romania behavior after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in

August 1968, when Nicolae Ceausescu thought to take advantage of international events to depart from Moscow and seek new allies. Observing the Sino-Soviet rift and the American attempts to have good offices with Beijing, Ceausescu and Bucharest diplomacy have offered to intermediate between the two poles of power. Beyond the external prestige, Bucharest was considering two goals: a) the friendship of the United States and b) obtaining nuclear technology.

The analyzed dyad meets all the criteria: communist Romania was a developing state and became a mediator on the security issues between two geopolitical giants. Compared to the conflict situation in Vietnam, Bucharest has helped to reach a peace agreement between the US and North Vietnam. At the same time, it hoped to obtain as a reward the status of security consumer status of American nuclear technology, initially for civilian purposes and then defensively. If he had managed to fabricate the nuclear weapon, then Romania would have increased its status inside the Warsaw Pact and the region, becoming perhaps a security producer for the smaller countries that would want to break away from Moscow.

A brief glance at the literature reflects a surprising reality. The security producer and the security consumer have, from a semantic point of view, an axiomatic status. International relations specialists have lent the meaning of the economic field without reflecting on the appropriateness of the loan and without questioning themselves: Have readers a common key to understand such concepts in the absence of an appropriate definition?

Up until now, the given examples talk about the relationship between United States, world's hegemonic actor and different other great powers. However, the stake to measure one's status within the international society accurately is most important for those middle nations, caught in between giants and dwarfs.

In this regard we suggest a dialogue between Kenneth Waltz and Immanuel Wallerstein so as to fulfill the promise of bringing together IR theory and classical sociology. On the one hand, Kenneth Waltz is one of the most preminent authors whose pioneering work describes states similar to firms-rational agents always calculating profit and lost in their quest for survival. Such a Hobbesian desire for survival makes them fear one another preventing a better cooperation:

Although states are functional similar units, they differ to a large extent on their capabilities. From such differences arises something like division of

labor (...) The Division of labor between nations is, however, meaningless, compared to the extremely articulate process of division of labor within them. (...) Although it is often discussed about the integration of nations, it rarely happens. Nations could enrich each other, dividing further not only the work that the production of goods involves, but also some of their other tasks, such as political leadership or military defense. Why couldn't be produce their integration? The structure of the international political system imposes limits on member cooperation... (Waltz, 2006, 150).

On the other hand, Immanuel Wallerstein, also a Durkheimian, describes inter-state interaction laid down on a hierarchy made up of three layers: center, semi-periphery and periphery. His version of the World System Theory analyses modern geopolitical dynamics as an international division of labor and power. Apart from Waltz, he considers nations do specialize and acquire certain skills.

In our perspective, a dialogue between Waltz and Wallerstein should emphasise that nation-states are both rational, largely self-aware but at the same time prone to work in collective groups, even if they have a minor, discriminatory position. Our explanatory framework is largely aimed towards what Wallerstein calls semi-peripheral states, namely those middle powers from common parlance. More is, we endeavor to apply it to the security producer-supplier-consumer scheme.

The concept of semi-peripheral state has been refashioned by other authors, especially after 1990-2000, when the importance of superpowers has left room for analyses related to regional powers, geostrategic pivots, emerging nations and their alliances. A generational fellow of Wallerstein, the Italian Giovanni Arrighi (1937-2009) defines semiperipheral states according to their contribution to world capital, in particular to transnational corporations (CTN). Arrighi concludes that the central areas are notable for hosting the management structures of CTN, while the peripheral areas contain mainly executive mechanisms while the semi-periphery may contain intermediate elements of a corporation (as regional directors). We consider that GDP can be a very good indicator of the degree of development of a nation. Without being a perfect analytical tool, it can provide information about other indicators such as: income equality, social stratification, child mortality and life expectancy, corruption or innovation (Bai, Jayachandran, Malesky and Olken, 2014).

In this point, it is important to formulate a definition of security which can satisfy both the philosophy of the world system as well as Waltzian

structural realism. In this key, we propose defining security so as to emphasize both the political institution and the socio-professional classes:

Security is the state of safety that the individual lives as a result of the relative harmony between social classes and internal and international division of labor."

Corollary: "Inter-state security represents that state of safety that arises between several states as a result of a mutually satisfactory division in the defense issue.

This formula satisfies the criterion of legitimacy that Wallerstein spoke of. In other words, as long as collective inequality (either on domestic or on the international scene) is bearable and implies certain satisfaction of the basic needs, then the dominated classes will not revolt, but will be integrated within the division of labor. On the second level, a win-win alliance is likely if the national interests of the actors involved are synchronized. Determining the conceptual sphere of the notions security producer vs. security consumer is only possible by reporting them to the economic area from which they originate. That is why we believe that only by addressing security in close interdependence with the economic sphere, we will be able to build valid conclusions for the formulated questions. Having in mind that the notions listed below are relational (having value only in interaction with someone else), we develop the following taxonomy based on three criteria:

1. the resources states allocate for security,
2. the will of the state,
3. the need of state for security.

Therefore we obtained a new taxonomy:

Security Producer: a state that has the necessary resources¹ and the will to increase the degree of security of another state or of other states without having cardinal security needs that it can not satisfy by itself.

Security Supplier: a state with security needs that primarily has the will and possibility to mediate the relationship between a security producer and an environment in need of security.

Security Mediators: a subtype of the vendor and is considering an honest broker who does not actually provide any security resources but brings together the producers and consumers, thanks to the prestige they have in international community.

¹ Through the "necessary resources" we understand a set of institutional, financial, technological, demographic, geographic factors necessary to attain the national interest.

Security Consumer: a state that needs the help of others to resolve threats to its own security.

Marginal state: those states of the world that do not fit into any of the above categories. Here we can include the political actors of Lilliputian territory who do not take part in the existing tensions, the balance of power, humanitarian interventions or arms transfers. Their status should not be seen as immutable, as it can change.

It is important to underline that the status of a security producer does not mean the political actor is invulnerable (i.e. the terrorist attacks on September 11 in the US or those in the Russian Federation, France and the United Kingdom). Our phrase <cardinal security needs> should be read in terms that the country cannot be kneeled by another state or by a non-state actor without the attacker suffering massive retaliation. This is primarily the case for the five permanent United Nation Security Council members holding nuclear arsenals (and, eventually, Israel and India).

3. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, we can say that the concept of security is currently being addressed in a generous manner, offering a wider conceptual umbrella than defense, which allows specialists from several sciences to contribute to shaping and conceptualizing the domain. Unfortunately, with the widening of the sphere of significance, the new term is also even vaguer, exposing unclear or contradictory formulations from a logical point of view. The diagnosis must not induce pessimism, but on the contrary, the impetus to link once again the concern for <international> with sociology and the great family of social sciences (Rosenberg, 1994, Albert and Buzan, 2013, Besnik and Stivachtis, 2017).

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ROMANIANS FROM UKRAINE – REALPOLITIK AND IDENTITY

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Abstract: *The actions of the Russian Federation resulting in the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula marked a historical moment that made the Ukrainian authorities watch more carefully the Moscow's strategy on Russian ethnics. This moment has marked the beginning of a new stage of using nationality as a soft-power instrument. In this respect, we must consider that the Russian ethnic origin, as assumed by the majority of the Crimean Peninsula's residents, was the factor that allowed the annexation of that region, after a referendum where the residents declared themselves Russian citizens and asked the Russian Federation to protect their rights. Fighting back, in the battle for Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian authorities have been taking some steps to restrain the Russian Federation's influence in the region. One of those measures consisted in the limitation of the ethnic minorities' languages use in the schools across Ukraine. Such political decision affected not only the Russian minority, but also the other ethnic minorities belonging to the neighbouring countries, including the Romanian minority. Based on these considerations, this paper aims to assess how the ban on Romanian language's use in schools would affect the preservation and affirmation of the ethnic identity of the Romanians from Ukraine.*

Keywords: *identity; nationality; multiculturalism; dialogue; Romanian minority*

1. INTRODUCTION

The assumption of Russian identity by the vast majority of the Crimea's citizens was one of the most important factors that allowed the annexation of this territory by Russia, such event occurring after a referendum where a great majority of the region's inhabitants declared they were actually Russian ethnics and asked the Russian Federation to protect them. In this context, the Ukrainian authorities enacted several measures that leave the impression of a denationalization policy in respect of all minorities.

The aim of this paper is to assess whether the actions of the Ukrainian state affected or not the preservation of the ethnic minorities from Ukraine, and particularly in respect of the preservation of ethnic identity of the Romanian minority living in the neighbouring country.

2. CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN PRESERVING NATIONAL IDENTITY

Ethnic nationalism and isolationism has been more and more present in Europe during the past years, after a short calm period that followed the extensive identity movements and even the armed conflicts on ethnic grounds which occurred after

the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Federal Yugoslavia. In this respect, we learn from history not to deal with the nowadays nationalism and ethnic isolationism emergence in a unitary manner. If the "mass democratic nationalisms" based on the linguistic and cultural differences from the early 19th century had mapped Europe after the Treaty of Versailles, imposing "a world of nations aware of their ethnicity and willing to speak it out", „the nationalism combined with racism" resulted in the fascism, racism and antisemitism emergence (Smith, 2002:16).

The analysis of these historic realities is tightly bound to the vexed question of the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism, some authors considering "ethnicity as a splitting process" of a nation. Also, according to Anthony Smith, "ethnicity is highly important for a proper understanding of nationalism" (Smith, 2001:57). Most of ethnic minorities' leaders are supporting the pluralism model in the disputes with the majority population, in the attempt of obtaining a "peculiar, yet equal status" for their communities, although such option still seems far away, as we can notice analysing what is currently happening in Europe.

Authors like Anthony Giddens consider that "ethnic minorities are still being perceived as a threat by many people", such fear deriving from the fact that minorities have been constantly used

as a scapegoat for any failures of the society (if we consider the Western Europe) (Giddens, 2001:260). More often the “threat” of ethnic minorities cannot be overlooked, as attributes like language, ancient history (whether real or not), religion, clothing or decorations” are very actual in the everyday life. According to Giddens, out of these identity attributes, language is the most important as “none of us invents the language we are learning in the childhood and we all are bound to the standing rules of using the linguistic method”. Language is being learned throughout the life and within the group we belong to. Self-awareness cannot be shaped without the language understanding and thereof “is required for raising awareness on our individual distinctive characteristics” (Giddens, 2001:52) - this being one of the most important steps in undertaking our own **identity**.

Eric Hobsbawm shares this opinion, considering that there were numerous attempts of setting impartial criteria for nationality or of explaining why certain groups did become nations and others did not, the criteria that grounded such claim being mainly the language, but also the territory, traditions and other criteria, whenever that was possible (Hobsbawm, 1997:8).

3. THE ROLE OF IDENTITY DIMENSION IN MOSCOW’S GEOPOLITICAL PLAY IN UKRAINE

Vladimir Putin regards „Russians and Ukrainians as the same people” such assertion highlighting the Kremlin’s policy in terms of protecting the Russian ethnics from Ukraine. In respect of Crimea, Vladimir Putin declared that the importance of this Black Sea peninsula is not defined just by geopolitics for the Russian Federation, as “the destiny of millions of Russians, millions of compatriots that needed our help and support” is at stake (Putin, 2015). Such affirmations are confirmed by the Russian National Security Strategy, a document stating that Russia has demonstrated the ability to protect the rights of compatriots abroad, reciting the existence of a Russian world and civilisation which Kremlin must defend, notwithstanding whether by such actions it harms or not the sovereignty, independence and indivisibility of other states, as it happened in Ukraine.

History of Ukraine, or Little Russia as seen by the Russians, is tightly bound to the history of the Russian Empire and of the Soviet Union, which is why the Russian public opinion rejected the existence of an independent Ukrainian state, the

Ukrainian linguistic and cultural particularities being considered a threat for the unity of the Russian Federation. While Ukraine gained independence in 1991, after the fall of Soviet Union, based on a rebirth of Ukrainian nationalism, later on Ukraine’s political class considered that “any highlight on ethnicity might be a divisive factor in the state building process” (Resler, 1997).

The truth contained hereinabove is also attested by the fact that, after the anti-Yanukovych protests in November 2013, which climaxed in the flee thereof, the Ukrainian Parliament repealed, in February 2014, the law on “*the principles of State language policy*”, such decision resulting in an escalation of inter-ethnic tensions both in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine (Matcovschi, 2014). The above-mentioned law, which had been passed in 2012, granted to other languages than Ukrainian the status of a “regional language” in the areas where the members of ethnic communities represented more than 10% of the population, Russian thus becoming a regional language in 13 out of 27 regions of Ukraine. Consequently, invoking the risk of losing the Russian identity for the Crimean population, the members of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea voted the scheduling of a referendum on the region’s statute and its secession from Ukraine, on March 2014, followed by the annexation to the Russian Federation (Matcovschi, 2014). In respect of the newly occurred position, also given the evolution of the ethnic conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian authorities considered further actions to limit the Russian influence, one of which being the ban on the use of the language of ethnic minorities in Ukrainian schools.

4. USE OF ROMANIAN LANGUAGE BY THE ROMANIAN MINORITY IN UKRAINE – FIGHTING FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY?

Romania’s position, at the confluence of the geopolitical interests of the Eastern and Western Europe, corroborated with the Russian neighbouring in its Eastern part, caused compact groups of Romanians to remain outside the national territory, Ukraine being the country with the largest historical community of Romanian ethnics. An incursion to the history of Romanian schools and communities from Ukraine (geographically located in Transcarpathia – historical Maramureș, Bucovina, Southern Basarabia, Odessa region, the area between Dniester and Bug) reveals that the national identity

preserving process was an extremely stiff one for them, despite all bilateral treaties and agreements.

Following the Trianon Treaty, Czechoslovakia received several communes in Transcarpathia area, located on the right bank of Tisa, inhabited almost exclusively by Romanians: Apșa de Jos (Nizni Apșa), Apșa de Mijloc (Stredni Apșa), Biserica Albă (Bila Cirkev) and Slatina (Selo Slatina). Therefore, the total number of Romanians from Czechoslovakia was around 15,000 persons, the official Czechoslovakian statistic reporting, in 1920, that there were 10,810 Romanians who kept alive their national consciousness, language, apparel and customs. The Czechoslovakian state agreed to the establishment and maintenance of 4 primary schools with 20 teachers for the Romanian population, the entire teaching being carried out in Romanian (Blenche, 1935:79-80).

In Bucovina, the national consciousness had developed, as the Austrian Empire observed the nations' right to ethnic identity. An important Romanian cultural centre grew at Cernăuți and the population in this area participated actively to the actions meant to raise awareness on national consciousness (Nistor, 1938:21-22). Southern Basarabia came back inside the borders of Moldova Princedom in 1856, after the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Crimean War, the inhabitants thereof participating to the process of Romanian identity creation, as the region was an integrant part of the United princedoms since 1859, and subsequently belonged to Romanian Kingdom, according to the Constitution published on the 1st of July 1866.

Unfortunately, the conquest of Romanian independence towards the Ottoman Empire resulted again in the loss of the territory between Danube and Dniester in favour of the Russian Empire, Russia aiming to regain geopolitical influence in the region. Later on, the presence of a numerous Romanian communities on the Ukrainian area represented the grounds for the establishment of the Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, in October 1924, at the Eastern border of Romania. After the annexation of Basarabia to USSR, the Romanian schools remained functional both in Moldavian soviet republic and in Ukraine, writing in Cyrillic, until the 90's when the Soviet Union broke up (Heitmann, 2014:74).

After 1944, in Ukraine were active 114 schools teaching in Romanian, located in Transcarpathia, North Bucovina, North Basarabia and South Basarabia, (Cubreacov, 2015). After the Ukraine's declaration of independence, there were 86

Romanian schools in 1999, decreasing to 77 in 2010 (Broască, 2018).

In 2012, Ukraine had adopted the law "on the principles of State language policy" which recognized the status of Romanian as a regional language in the areas where Romanians represented more than 10% of the population. This situation was changed by the article 7 of the Ukraine's Education Act, promulgated in September 2017, which affects the Romanian minority from Ukraine, particularly that from Cernăuți region, where Romanian had a "regional language" statute as well, and the "Moldavian" language from Odessa region (Southern Basarabia). Practically, this law transforms Romanian schools into bilingual schools, provides that the persons belonging to the national minorities in Ukraine may study the minority's language at the pre-school, primary and secondary school only together with the state's official language (Matcovschi, 2014).

The first stage of this reform wanted that, starting on 1 September 2018, the Romanian teaching should be made only for the primary school (1st – 4th grades). Such restriction of the minorities' right to learn in their own language in Ukraine resulted in a postponement of the visit of the Romanian President in Ukraine, scheduled for October 2017. Also, the Parliament from Bucharest has adopted, on September 2017, the „Declaration on the amendment of the Ukraine's Education Act”, establishing at the same time a delegation to visit Ukraine in order to discuss with the Kiev authorities such occurred situation.

Other actions on this issue was the visits of the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Romania and Hungary and, respectively, of the Romanian Minister of Education in Ukraine in October 2017, followed by the talks on the education law in Ukraine from the Parliamentary Meeting of the European Council, on December 2017. Moreover, the representatives of ethnic minorities from Ukraine sent a notification to the Venice Commission, on November 2017, emphasizing the negative impact that the enforcement of the above-mentioned act would have on the preservation of ethnic minorities' identity in the neighbouring country. Following the decision of the Venice Commission from December 2017, which states that such provisions of the Ukrainian Education Act does not observe the minorities' rights, The Ministry of Education and Science from Ukraine extended until 2023 the transition period for the implementation of the "language article" from the new Ukrainian Education Act (Brândușă, 2018).

The new Ukrainian Education Act provides a step-by-step implementation of the new system and, at the same time the replacement of the courses taught in Romanian with disciplines to be taught in Ukrainian. Also, it is worth mentioning that, in March 2018, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the law “on the principles of State language policy” adopted in 2012, which recognized the status of Romanian as a regional language in the areas where Romanians represented more than 10% of the population.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The nationalist and identity-based policies of the Ukrainian state aiming to safeguard and save its own identity against Russia’s aggressions, from the Ukrainian identity preservation perspective, affected indirectly the Romanian community living in the neighboring state. The actions of the Ukrainian state following the enforcement of the Education Act affect the right of Romanian ethnics to study in their mother-tongue in the schools from Ukraine, which violates the international conventions on human rights and the bilateral treaties between Romania and Ukraine.

From the analysis of the Ukrainian state’s policies on the Romanian community, in terms of the role of language and culture factors, we can see that it affects the affirmation of the ethnic identity as a value of multiculturalism, which is largely promoted within the European Union.

The necessity of providing security in terms of safeguarding the rights of the Romanians from the neighbouring areas entails an inter-disciplinary approach of this issue and setting new priorities of the state’s demarches by the connection of bilateral relationships with the states where Romanian communities exist from in terms of reciprocity and by enforcing European and international laws.

Notwithstanding those communities or the period they emerged, the safeguarding of cultural and ethnic identity is a moral duty towards the past and an obligation for the future, each of these communities being actively involved, either directly or indirectly, in the promotion of national values and of the state where they are located, facilitating the relations between the host state and the origin state.

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GUIDELINES ON IMPROVING *CIMIC* CAPABILITIES IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

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Abstract: *The concept of public sphere, introduced by Jürgen Habermas, also called the leader of critical thinking, is seen as a way of coexistence and social integration. Starting from the idea that public events reflect social order, civil-military relations had and still have evolutions and manifestations varying according to the country in which they have exercised their capabilities. Moreover, civil-military cooperation has suffered in time, changes in approach and perception. The different perceptions related to the public sphere of organizations like NATO, the EU, the US and not only, are brought into discussion in this paper, alongside current concepts such as strategic communication and fake news. The public communication process involves military and civilian institutions, governmental and non-governmental organizations that contribute to areas such as public affairs, public diplomacy, military intelligence operations and civil-military cooperation. Therefore, international cooperation, the multinational and intercultural context sometimes complicate the understanding and the communication between involved parties implicitly, due to certain existing barriers that must be overcome and always improved by the militaries within CIMIC structure.*

Keywords: *CIMIC StratCom; fake news; public sphere*

1. INTRODUCTION

The concept of a public sphere was introduced by Jürgen Habermas, also called the leader of critical thinking, who sees it as a way of coexistence and social integration. Going further on, he studies the bourgeois public sphere, with its transformations, from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the eighteenth century, in countries such as England, France and Germany. The author considers that the subject of this sphere is an audience of priests, professors, doctors, journalists and officers. They represented a social class within the middle class, which in the meantime emancipated, thus changing their views and approaches in relation to the opinions expressed in the public sphere (Habermas, 2005:83). Thus, language becomes the essential means of communication, and "using language to manipulate, forcing acceptance is a <parasite> use, that takes us away from the true meaning of language" (Dobrescu, 2007:224).

Starting from the phrase that public events reflect social order, civil-military relations had, and still have, evolutions and manifestations varying according to the country in which they have exercised their capabilities. Therefore, we can

speak of several typologies, determined by certain factors (both internal and external): 1.the military institution, including its capability, the socio-political context as well as the level of professionalism of its members; 2.the effect of the internal, social, economic and political environment; 3. the roles of international factors; 4.the past and present role of the military institution in the evolution of civil-military relations in a particular state (Soliman, 2015:68).

2. *CIMIC* AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Authors and recognized scholars / researchers have written about civil-military relations and their reflection in the public sphere. Among these, Huntington's, Luckham's and Janowitz's perspectives are relevant. So, Huntington bases his typology on the political objectives of the action taken by officers. The author groups them in three categories: the palace coup, the coup d'état and the revolutionary coup. Janowitz divides civil-military relations in the Western context, into three categories: aristocratic, democratic and totalitarian. In the context of peripheral states, the latter identifies five categories: authoritarian-personal, authoritarian-mass, democratic-competitive, civil-

military coalition and military oligarchy. The third, Luckham, offers a much wider model based on three factors: 1. the power or weakness of civilian institutions, 2. the power or weakness of the military institution and 3. the nature of the links between the military institution and its sociopolitical environment (Soliman, 2015:67).

Additionally, Rebecca Schiff has come up with an interesting approach to a theory of concordance between three groups: the military group, the political elite and citizens. In her article entitled *Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance*, she takes into account both the institutional and social factors and the cultural history of the concordance or disagreement between civilians and the military in the design relations between the two parties in different contexts/states. In her paper *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, the author develops this theory from both perspectives (institutional and cultural). Furthermore, unlike Huntington (who focuses on the separation of military institutions from the civilian ones), Rebecca Schiff's theory of concordance does not involve splitting civilians from military, she goes further on with the assumption that the balance between civilians and military within a society is based on the agreement between the military, political elites and citizens (Schiff, 2009:69).

In Turkey, for example, studies related to civil-military relations are addressed both politically and culturally. Lately, the military implications in politics are particularly significant, but the process of demilitarization of the political sphere does not always lead to a complete demilitarization process in the public sphere. Therefore, there are certain meanings and codes of the military symbols used in the Turkish public sphere. These include public events, national festivals and military parades, patriotic commemorations, formal education that have all strengthened the presence of military codes in the public sphere. The latter is a source of continuation of a particular culture. Certain norms, values and messages are passed through education. It is a means of socialization that is also an easy method of indoctrination and manipulation. However, there is an attempt to separate the civilian from the military side to support the military influence in the civilian political decision-making sphere.

After the 90s, *CIMIC* capability perception was quite different. Peacekeeping missions were the ones that initiated cooperation between military and civilians. In the first instance, the military

involvement in supporting civilians was hardly seen as an integral part of security operations. This tendency to minimize the military role originally manifested itself within NATO, where *CIMIC* capabilities were not perceived by the organization leaders at their fair value, especially in the initial stages of the interventions, where civilian and military missions overlapped.

Then, a first document was issued that regulated the policy of *CIMIC* principles describing the purpose of the structure, namely the military commander's co-operation with civil authorities, organizations and the local population. In 1997, civil-military cooperation was defined as the relationship between NATO commanders and civilian agencies / authorities in the operation area. In 2001, *CIMIC* was complemented and redefined as coordination and cooperation in support of the mission between the NATO commander and the local civilian population and authorities as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies. This definition was more focused on military capabilities and commanders' responsibility, but did not change yet the perception in the public sphere of increased involvement of the military personnel in peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. *CIMIC* has been associated since 1990 with the reconstruction of the war-affected nations, with humanitarian assistance, with the construction of hospitals and schools, which diverted attention from the main purpose of involving the armed forces, namely, protecting the local population against violence. Moreover, while the focus was not on public security according to *CIMIC* policy and doctrine, the key element in civil-military cooperation in most peacekeeping missions was cooperation between military and local policemen or international forces. This cooperation has brought *CIMIC* to light. Along with the deployment of NATO troops in Bosnia, *NATO CIMIC* foundations were also set up. Thus, the period between 1995-1999 represented an incentive of the cooperation between military structures and civilian structures, in the context of peacekeeping missions. Those who did not completely follow the NATO perspective on civil-military cooperation were the British who did not agree with NATO's focus on the reserve units designed to operate within a *CIMIC* working group subordinated to a command center, as in case of Bosnia. In this respect, the British did not consider it necessary to develop civilian relations or the *CIMIC* structure, since they were recognized for the success of the missions in Somalia and Cambodia (Zaalberg, 2005:424-426).

The comparison between the civilian-military operations of the 1990s and the civil affairs during the Second World War in Europe represent another argument for the differences in the *CIMIC* approach of Americans and the British. While the British preferred the integrated model of civil affairs, Americans tended to create a separate organization for the management of the conquered territory. However, the British model prevailed for pragmatic reasons; Britain's experience of counterinsurgency operations being significant. With a reduced number of forces but with a high degree of tactical flexibility, through cooperation with civilians and military, focusing on the gathering and dissemination of information, they have been successful in fighting insurgents. But, only a part of the insurgency campaigns can be considered lessons learned and applied in the case of peacekeeping missions (Zaalberg, 2005:428, *trad.*). Later, around the year 2000, the definition of peacekeeping missions was diluted. Also, after 2000, the Netherlands participated in two stability missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The main purpose of the military presence was to support the civilian power with the help of the military force, and thus, under the legend of the peacekeeping mission, the intention was to weaken civil power and to take it over by the military.

It is certain that the military must think about their profession and its link with public beliefs. As Huntington states, like Sparta in Babylon, a distinction must be made between the military and the political sphere due to differences in ideology. Beliefs and obligations of success in a sphere are not found in the other one. Therefore, according to Huntington, good cooperation between civilians and military could only be accomplished taking into account these differences. If the military do not have expressed ideological archetypes, then the question arises whether their beliefs in the public sphere contribute in any way to improving relations with civilians. Moreover, it is the question of what common normative beliefs/foundations lead to group cohesion/ thinking, when participating in different types of missions. The pluralism of the modern, diverse state makes this consensus impossible. Yet, in case of Americans, there is a common area in which the military personnel adhere, not only to the state, but also to its democratic character(Nielsen, 2009:187).

3. *CIMIC* AND STRATCOM

The framework of strategic communication emerged as a necessity of adapting messages to the

specifics of the recipients, as well as integrating all communication activities, as well as synchronizing them, with the actions of the military operations, in order to fulfill the political and military objectives. Communication becomes strategic when it serves political-military purposes and when it is applied uniformly to achieve the strategic objectives pursued.

From the point of view of the means used and the manner in which it is carried out, the Deputy Head of the Department of Information and Public Relations of the Ministry of National Defense states:

communication becomes strategic by assuming the role of integrator of all activities that can exert an impact on the informational environment and audiences, generating the effects pursued by the political-military leadership. Strategic communication therefore implies the synchronized and complementary application of several types of activities - public diplomacy, information and public relations (...), psychological operations and information operations, including high-resonance events, large-scale military exercises (Vasile, 2017:56).

The author goes further on saying:

the materialization of strategic communication can not be the prestige of a single institution requiring, at national level as well as at allied level, the inter-institutional coordination of all the activities carried out by the components under the umbrella of the strategic communication in support of the fulfillment of national and allied political and military objectives (Vasile, 2017:57).

Therefore, the framework of strategic communication requires a very broad approach, involving many civilian and military institutions. In this context, the circumstances, the purpose and the objectives whose achievement must not go beyond the specific legal framework of both military and civilian institutions in order to achieve a common strategic goal must be taken into account. Strategic communication harbors more valences and a comprehensive and complete view of the operations underway in the US, Britain, NATO and the EU. Thus, after the March 2017 edition of the *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, edited by the US Department of Defense, strategic communication is defined as:

The United States Government's concentrated efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or maintain favorable conditions to promote US Government interests, policies and objectives by using coordinated programs, plans,

themes, messages and products in a synchronized way actions of all instruments of national power (2017:223).

So the Strategic Communication Framework (*NATO StratCom Framework AJP-01*) is seen as a cumulation of individual contributions that are synchronized and coordinated. This process involves military and civilian institutions, governmental and non-governmental organizations that contribute to areas such as public affairs, public diplomacy, military intelligence operations, civil-military cooperation, and beyond.

Regardless of the type of mission, the level at which it is carried out and the nations involved, intercultural communication is achieved both between members of a military structure and between them and representatives of the host culture or local institutions. This communication is vital from the projection of objectives perspective. Cooperation cannot be achieved without communication, and for the efficiency of communication, not only linguistic but also non-verbal aspects, plus a whole range of cultural values and norms should be taken into account. In addition, strategic communication (*StratCom*) and media communication come to complete the effective communication framework in the theater of operations, necessary for *CIMIC* militaries participating in multinational missions.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Communication within *CIMIC* structures, between military and locals or local authorities, is accomplished differently, by specific methods and means, so that the mission in a conflict area or in a multinational framework is successfully accomplished. Militaries are part of international missions, being deployed in all regions of the world, which vary substantially from linguistic, cultural and ethnic point of view.

In theaters of operations, the ever-dynamic ratio between resources and requirements makes it necessary to cooperate with the institutions or citizens of the host nation. Therefore, the necessity of legitimacy makes even the most powerful countries cooperate with the armed forces of other nations but, in particular, with the structures of the state on whose territory the military operations take place. In the first case, this cooperation may be *joint* or *combined*, in an international context and with a multinational character. In the case of dialogue with host structures, the *CIMIC* mission is fundamental, aimed at negotiating with the

belligerents of the parties involved in a conflict, while the military is forced to remain neutral and be able to defend itself against possible aggressions. They cooperate with international actors in theaters of operations, including representatives of various NGOs.

International cooperation, multinational and intercultural contexts sometimes complicate understanding, and, therefore, communication between parties is characterized by the imposition of certain barriers that need to be overcome by militaries of *CIMIC* structures through their experience of intercultural dialogue. Equally, this communication leads to outstanding results, with intercultural differences often being a plus in the attempt to initiate dialogue. The fundamental requirement for *CIMIC* military personnel is to preserve national/ local values, to respect local attitudes and the culture of a particular area.

In the case of peacekeeping missions, the multinational character leads to the achieving of multiple relations with a high degree of international cooperation, especially at tactical and operative level. The effectiveness of coordination and cooperation at strategic, interstate or state level, organizations and alliances is also a determining factor in the success of a mission.

In the case of missions in theaters of operations or in conflict zones, the *CIMIC* military have a very difficult mission. Communication between them and local or local structures must be thoroughly prepared. Any known information, on cultural, linguistic, religious, political, social or caste organization is a plus in the successful cooperation. In this respect, a key role is played in this context by interpreters who are the main mediators and who have to know not only the linguistic norms, but also the cultural ones as a whole, specific to the host country. Sometimes, through this cultural, sociological and anthropological knowledge, interpreters are the only ones who can smooth away a conflict situation or one in which *CIMIC* officers fail to make themselves understood.

Starting from the common projection framework of communication between civilians and military, and from the understanding of the *CIMIC* concept in the projection of the two main organizations that are of interest, as an EU member state and NATO, we have brought into discussion the possibility of understanding the issues on the upper level. It leads to the promotion of political objectives, being an instrument used to develop national interests, to promote them at the communicative level, so as to influence the

attitudes and behaviors of the citizens of the host state, and of its political, social, military and cultural organizations. The fundamental role of CIMIC is the dialogue with the structures of the host country and its citizens. But, in order to avoid any possible syncope or barriers, it is necessary to focus on interpreters, who fill the gaps in training or the inability of trans-cultural dialogue.

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THE METAMORPHOSIS OF COMMUNICATION IN MILITARY ALLIANCES

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Abstract: *The article is analysing understanding the functioning mechanisms in communication and in interrelationship in military multicultural environment generating the necessity of understanding, adaptation and the creation of efficient mechanisms to adjust these relationships. Xeno-cultural images are resistant to change and seem to be cultural values, being part of the cultural nucleus of a nation that remain stable, with the changes coming gradually and the attitudes influenced by organizational policies. Language, the impact of national composition, cultural distances, the level of technological knowledge and stereotypes are only some elements that are affecting communication in multinational military coalitions. The efficiency of the mission is proportional with the understanding linguistic and cultural knowledge, the harmonization of cultural differences and the cultivation of cultural aspects of military sub-cultures.*

Keywords: *xeno-cultural image; theater of operation; communication.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Moving from the brief approach of the biblical origin of communication to the effects of communication differences and finalizing with their own vision of the effects that technological evolution has on communication, this article expresses the personal and synthesized vision of communication metamorphosis. The emphasis is mainly on communication in the military environment, especially in multinational and multicultural military missions.

There are multiple testimonies of the manifestation of co-dependence, in the ancient world, between humans and gods. Sacrifices and construction are some ways people try to appease them to get the protection and welfare. Numerous archaeological evidence led to the general hypothesis that civilizations existing before the Biblical Flood were technologically advanced. After the Flood, according to Biblical writings, the survivors spoke a unique language and lived in a united community, which seems to have worked very well if it is to consider archaeological vestiges.

Referring to biblical texts and starting with Genesis, chapter 3, we find that after people have lost access to the spiritual space represented by the Garden of Eden, they have tried to regain it by

offering sacrifices and constructions. Then in chapter 11 of Genesis says that God was angry with people and "confused" languages. The fact that the construction of the Tower of Babel meant "not to build a name for God but one for them" seems to have been the reason for the "confusion" of languages, so that people could not understand each other, the construction project failing (Walton, 2014).

Going further, in scientific evidence, the Anatolian common language, derived from Proto-Indo-European language, has undergone important changes throughout the eight thousand years of evolution (Jones, 2015). Elements of the evolution of communication can be found in the evolution of humanity in all its forms of social manifestation.

Of course communication is done in multiple forms, language being the fundamental, organized and systematic way of interaction.

2. XENO-CULTURAL IMAGES OF THE THEATERS OF OPERATIONS

Moving from assumptions, suppositions and legends to the reality of the modern world, all aspects of political, economic, social, and cultural life in this modern and globalized world interfere with varying degrees of influence on decisions, courses of action and implicitly communication

and inter-human relationship. What specially interests us in this article is the understanding of the mechanisms of functioning of communication and interrelation in the multinational and multicultural military environments and the effects these mechanisms generate.

With Romania joining different military alliances, the knowledge of the cultural and communication aspects that intervene during the process of interaction in the multinational environment has become an acute concern for the different categories of staff, specialists or just enthusiasts about the subject. This multicultural military co-operation has generated effects on various interactional plans, which implicitly generated the need to understand, adapt and create effective mechanisms to regulate these interrelationships.

The experience of multinational military co-operation is not a recent one. What has happened in the meantime is the accelerated technological evolution that implicitly implied an acceleration of communication, decisions and execution. Deficiencies in the communication process and its consequences can be dramatic in all stages of combat action. In my opinion the aspects of the communication process are very important in the military cooperation within multinational, multicultural coalitions.

Since 1995, Palin has noted that cultural factors play an active role in achieving this interoperability, in addition to the difficulties involved in political decisions and the interoperability of military equipment. Steward, Bonner and Verrall (2001), Leung and Bond (2004), William Hardy (2016) and other reputable researchers from the Research Task Group 120, studied the issue of cultural interoperability and how it affects the effectiveness of multinational military missions.

Of course, common courses and exercises create the conditions for acquiring and practicing NATO procedures, but the experience of operating theaters has proven that time is needed for the process of communication between military personnel of different armies to work effectively.

‘Cultural Interoperability - Ten Years of Research in the First German-Dutch Joint Corps’ (vom Hagen *et al.*, 2006:15-51) is a relevant research work because it is the only research conducted in the modern era with the participation of two NATO countries over a period of 10 years, 1995-2005.

René Moelker, Joseph Soeters and Ulrich vom Hagen wanted to determine whether cultural

interoperability is feasible, what conditions would favor it, and in what direction it will develop. They focused on two well-known hypotheses of intercultural theory, arguing that the frequency of contacts, as well as mutual trust, are likely to favor sympathy between different cultures. It is a collaborative case study of peace, communication between the participants in the study being conducted in English and the procedures used were NATO.

The fact that military personnel from different NATO member states, apart from the German and Dutch states, was part of the 1st Corps Command in 2003, facilitated the creation of an international atmosphere where the model of integration through cultural interaction (instead of assimilation or separation) had more chances of success.

The conclusions of this study are many but we will only mention those that we consider very important from the perspective of influencing the cultural communication process: xeno-cultural images are very resistant to change and seem to be cultural constants, values and images that are part of the cultural nucleus of a nation remain stable, changes occur gradually, attitudes towards other cultures are prone to change and are influenced by organizational policies.

Although there was not much space for emotional identity among members of the various military cultures involved in this bi-national collaboration process, there is a common ground when talking about profession, goals and professional standards. In order for these standards to merge, it is necessary to increase the share of time spent together and, in particular, the one allocated to collective exercises and skills through permanent training.

Surveys conducted in theaters of operations have been difficult due to restrictions imposed by staff policies in making and publishing any type of work while military or civilian personnel work for the mission.

3. STUDY CASES

The first case study was conducted on the Warehouse, Kabul base. The observations made on the staff of the German - Dutch Corps have mostly contradicted the conclusions reached at peace on the same Joint Corps. In 2003, the Corps headquarters took over the command of the Kabul mission for a period of six months. German-Dutch collaboration proved to be less successful in the theater of operations, although the opposite was foreseen in the light of previous positive

developments. Operational stress has accentuated logistical and personnel issues in the operational unit.

Generally, the Dutch criticized how the Germans led the mission and the tasks they had ordered to be fulfilled. In addition, the Dutch did not understand why Germans had better accommodation facilities and financial allocations different from their own. This situation did not improve even after the first turn of the Dutch units. The problems at Camp Warehouse resonated in Münster (Corps Command) and the ISAF Command in Kabul. After the return of military personnel to Münster (Moelker & Soeters, 2006:97-129), the Dutch and German commanders of the Corps felt the need to pay considerable attention to improving the relations between the personnel involved in the Kabul mission (von der Dunk, 2005). German-Dutch operational cooperation at Camp Warehouse ended in autumn 2003. In view of all these processes and results, we consider this case as an example of friction between nations in terms of military co-operation and joint pre-mission preparation, even if it is long enough to prove to be an important but not always sufficient element.

The second case study was also carried out in Kabul, the KAIA air base. Here we observe a very interesting aspect of communication, namely the effect that the standardization of technological communication has on inter-relationship in a multicultural and multinational military structure. The success of KAIA operations can be attributed to norms based on technology and professional isomorphism. It is an air base where the staff has extensive expertise in air communications and the procedures are internationally agreed. General personnel policies are the same as on all other bases, but national staff policies, national regulations and restrictions are added. Stereotypes related to national cultures are another factor influencing communication and interactions.

All these overlapping rules and policies sometimes create frictions in the communication process that takes place outside of the interaction in the work processes. KAIA soldiers are generally pleased with the mission and consider their work in Afghanistan to be "just another job." We consider this case as a good example of international military cooperation.

The third case study was carried out in 2010 by Joseph Soeters and Tibor Szvircsev Tresch (2010:272-287) on a multinational contingent of Canadian, Belgian, Norwegian and Hungarian military personnel who carried out their military

mission Camp Julien. Fighting missions that have taken place only with national participation have gone very well, without friction, the operative groups being very effective in a critical number of incidents. On the other hand, the contacts between the soldiers inside the base were the ones that generated communication deficits and the efficiency of the Coalition's functioning decreased. The communication of Norwegian and Hungarian soldiers with Belgian and Canadian military did not create friction. Problems on this basis were only between the Belgian and Canadian military. The poll conducted by Joseph Soeters and Tibor Szvircsev Tresch among Belgian soldiers showed that more than half of them indicated that their relations with Canadian soldiers were "*very bad*" and that they were treated "*condescendingly*".

All these divergences and misunderstandings have been based on an acute difference in "customs and military rules." Canadian soldiers display a professional attitude alongside a high degree of discipline and guidance to strict adherence to regulations, which is based on substantial physical fines and penalties. In fact, Canadians often apply collective punishments, even if only one person or a very small number of people in a unit committed the offenses. The Belgians considered this behavior to be rude. In contrast to these Canadian practices, Belgians appear to be somewhat more relaxed and superiors react to deviations in a much less aggressive way. This is an example of how communication and differences between military cultures and subcultures affect inter-relationship in multinational coalitions.

The three studied cases offer three different facets of international military co-operation. None of them provide the picture of perfect co-operation. Even the second case, which seems to illustrate the most effective way of interaction, nevertheless shows the misunderstandings generated by isolation and the frictions due to the stereotypes generated by the interaction of different weapons and armies. The level of linguistic competence, the impact of national composition, cultural distances, stereotypes, technological knowledge and belonging to superspecialized units are just some of the elements that have affected the process of communication in the multinational military coalition.

Between 2012 and 2017, we conducted a comprehensive study at the Kabul Theater, Afghanistan, in the Headquarters Headquarters. The subject of the research paper is "Effects of cultural differences on the military mission in the

Afghanistan theater". A diverse bibliography has been studied in the research: from the perspective of organizational factors, operational issues, command and control, interaction in multinational military teams, communication, interaction between culture and technology, world values and common values military subculture.

At Headquarters level, the command structure is a multinational one with an ABCA majority. It was understandable that although this was the original intention, a multinational organization could not be set up to function with maximum efficiency because there are differences in training, doctrines, capabilities, linguistic level, procedures and logistics. These differences can generate frustration in the interaction between the quotas. One way to solve these frictions in practice was to allocate geographic areas and assign assignments to different contingents under a single command and a multinational general district. The only possible method of research, considering the restrictions imposed by the mission leadership, was the participatory and non-participatory observation, supporting the results of the study of the documents and the reproduction of the research results through the analysis of the items identified as important, plus the narrative rendering method of the case study analysis results.

Several countless conclusions have emerged from the research that I consider to be very relevant to the subject of this article as follows:

- By using the standardized language of communication, human interaction is reduced, emotional frictions, stereotypes, common history, English language deficiencies, differences in personnel policies, cultural differences, etc. are avoided. (KAIA case);

- The level of expertise and professional competence plus the level of linguistic competence vary among nations, which creates discrepancies in communication. The research results of Resolute Support Mission Command led to the conclusion that there is a significant difference between nations native speakers of English and other non-native nations in terms of understanding the intentions of the commander's actions carried out under stress;

- The common history and the feeling of belonging to powerful nations instigates a certain attitude among the militaries belonging to different nations. This attitude undergoes changes during the mission. At first, the military interact in an open, friendly, diplomatic manner. The stress level being low, the masking capacity is high. Time, along with confidence (or lack thereof) and respect (or

lack of) of the skills of coalition partners shape group behavior. If there are gaps in communication, then the phenomenon of separation occurs. If, against the linguistic level, training and operational experience, cultural knowledge, respect and trust combine, the phenomenon of group integration occurs with positive effects on both the psyche of the military and the efficiency of the group;

- There is a high probability that, in stressful situations, any cause (including historical conflicts between nations) could be used as a bailout, but in the Afghanistan theater of operations there were no exaggerated reactions of "historical baggage" which the military of the various nations came to the theater;

- Preparing pre-mission, operating in multinational structures, division by area of responsibilities, informal meetings are just a few of the equilibrium elements in this aspect of collaboration;

- Affiliation to different political, social and military systems generated differences in procedures, technique, very different values of the "distance to power" dimension, differences that reduce interoperability. The consequence of the formation of personnel of different nationalities in totalitarian systems (especially the East European bloc) or in the long-term war zones (Afghanistan) has led to the development of a certain type of behavior that we have called "adaptive / survival behavior". The consequences of this behavior are: lack of trust in partners, respect only for persons with special military skills (strong leaders), caution in assertions, functioning in the already known and "verified" groups, the desire to fulfill the job requirements only as much as needed without initiatives and without making any effort to stand out. This attitude generates frustration at the coalition partners' waiting for active and active participation;

- Knowledge gained from the grouping of nations participating in multinational missions by category, based on Hofstede's cultural values and dimensions, indeed facilitates easier interaction between contingents and can avoid friction and increase the efficiency of missions but is not a sufficient condition;

- The factors that dramatically affect the effectiveness of co-operation in the coalition are the following: the level of linguistic knowledge, military training and international experience, cultural identity and value differences, housing and feeding conditions, codes of conduct, differences between management systems and forms

discipline, differences in political beliefs, salary differences and other benefits, the nature of the relationship between officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, how women are viewed in different cultures, values of national cultural dimensions, etc. ;

– Education in terms of equality of conditions and risks speaks its word in the process of communication in theaters of operations. The military participating in the mission expects logistical support to be equal for all staff.

The overall conclusion was as follows: "In multinational military operations, the effectiveness of the mission increases proportionally to the level of linguistic knowledge, the level of cultural knowledge, the harmonization of cultural differences and the cultivation / strengthening of common cultural aspects of military subculture.

4. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS. TOWARDS A LANGUAGE OF CYBERSPACE?

Current conflicts are at a different level and national armies will undergo major changes: the number of troops will decrease, the role of sophisticated technologies, the influence of the media and coalition armies will increase. The creation of a European, professional army is, in my opinion, how the defense can be effectively carried out in the post-modern era.

Technologically developed countries have understood the breadth of this technology in all areas of social life. Computer literacy has become the ultimate way of communicating intentions but, at the same time, the weapon of today's struggles. The future does not mean so much fighting with human forces but economic warfare, financial chaos and destabilization of state institutions. Cyber communication is the modern form of inter-human communication.

In classical wars, the opponent, the territory, the capabilities are (almost) known. The post-modern era brought about changes in the rules of the war through the cyber-revolution. In 2007, for example, even in the most technologically advanced countries, cyber war was not part of the list of possible sources of aggression, a threat to state security. In 2009, it appeared as a possible danger, but was somewhere at the end of the list as priorities. Now the cyber threat is at the forefront of lists with potential dangers to national security of developed countries. There have been identified three major categories in which cyber attack affects humanity, namely: theft of intellectual property, attacks that produce massive lifestyle

consequences, cyber attacks that can affect the capability of defending national territory, by cybernetic damage to the functionality of the defense. The most powerful states in terms of technology are also the most vulnerable to cyber attacks. When it comes to the defense capability of a country, the limited ability of national governments to dictate how private companies operate (electricity, water, financial services, communications) must also be taken into account.

Another aspect of cyberwar is represented by the huge space in which it acts and, more often than not, the victims even do not know that this is their position until after a certain period when the losses are already huge. For example, in 2008, it was fraudulently introduced into the military communications system of a highly developed state, a program that produced scandal over a period of 14 months until it was detected. This has led to the notification of cyber-protection services. Compared to classical wars in cyber war there is no time to alert the attack, and the response to it is often long, and attack attribution is most often the biggest problem.

A profound international impact has been the creation and use of the "STUXNET" virus in 2009. We believe that this was the time when the war changed its rules. It was the first time a cybernetic program, a virus, overcame informational barriers and manifested itself in the physical environment. As a weapon, it was considered a "brilliant and elegant" one that fulfilled its goal of halting Iran's nuclear program. As a precedent, it is a very dangerous one because it represented an attack on a national infrastructure, in peacetime, which can be considered as a declaration of war. Cyber weapons have become so sophisticated that it is difficult to detect in the initial phase. The fact that it was decided to approve the use of the cyber weapon only with the President's approval (we refer to the US) underlines the value of equality with the nuclear weapon.

Cyberwar does not just cause personal information to be at high risk but leads to insecurity of life in general. Cyberwar puts humanity under existential risk.

The leadership of the Ministry of National Defense has understood the need to create a specialized structure in the cyber war. The importance and financial support that has been given to this structure is a subject that is not well known to us.

The valency of the cyber war requires changes in national doctrines and policies, which, in my opinion, would need to be coordinated and agreed

upon internationally. As there are rules of classical war, it is necessary to set the rules of cyberwar internationally.

And, to close the circle of the evolution of communication and its effects on human relationships, we return to biblical writings that say *when all men speak the same language*, it will be the end. To be referred to the language of cyberspace?

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CULTURAL VARIABLES RELATED TO RISK AND DISASTER. TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF CULTURALLY INFORMED COMMUNICATION

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Abstract: *This paper provides a multi-disciplinary overview of existing knowledge on cultural factors that shape and influence citizens' risk perceptions, emotions, and risk behavior in the context of man-made, natural and technical disasters. The aim of the study is to explore to what extent the effect of culturally-informed risk perceptions are known and taken up by disaster managers in their risk communication, and how – in turn – their own cultures (i.e. cultural aspects within disaster management units) influence the effectiveness of disaster preparedness, response and recovery. Additionally, given the fact that cultural factors can not only inhibit successful risk communication in disaster situations but may also be beneficial to disaster preparation, response and recovery – taking into account the considerable strength of cultural ties and values – the paper also explores cultural dimensions and cultural variables that are, or can be, used for capacity building, defining, and enhancing the specific cultural ties between disaster managers and disaster victims.*

Keywords: *risk perception; cultural variable; natural disaster; disaster management*

1. INTRODUCTION. WHAT IS CULTURE? AN APPLIED PERSPECTIVE

For the purpose of the current study in which the main objective is that of identifying the most relevant cultural variables impacting communication in risk and disaster management, we shall undertake an understanding of culture as specific to the discipline of anthropology, which understands culture via examining different lifestyles and the way they interact or fail to interact successfully. Therefore, eliminating from the start the concept of *high culture*, namely culture defined as the sum of artistic products and works of art a society produces through its most talented members, we shall focus on an understanding of culture as a set of core values, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors that are shared, understood and valued by a community and that informs their lifestyle, their patterns of understanding and their decision making. In a recent handbook of applied anthropological studies, Andreatta and Ferraro, for instance, observe that

the anthropologist does not distinguish between cultured people (those who have the finer things) and uncultured people. All people have culture

according to the anthropological definition (Andreatta and Ferraro, 2013:33)

For Andreatta and Ferraro (2013:34), culture can be defined as *everything that people have, think and do as members of a society*. Such an approach to culture comes in a long anthropological tradition established in the 19th century by anthropologists such as Edward Tylor, Raymond Williams, Malinowski and Radcliff Brown, for whom culture was understood as a way of life rather than a sophisticated means toward civilization, moral perfection and social good (as by contrast Mathew Arnold, or F.R. Leavis used to define culture).

In another comprehensive attempt to define culture as nowadays understood by both specialists and lay people, Chris Barker observes:

The multitudinous ways that culture has been talked about within cultural studies include culture as a whole way of life; as like a language; as constituted by representation; as a tool; as practices; as artefacts; as spatial arrangements; as power; as high or low; as mass and as popular only to conclude that the concept of culture is thus political and contingent and (refers to) a shared social meaning (*The SAGE Dictionary of Cultural Studies*, 2004:44).

In this sense, culture is not only a socially transmitted set of shared behaviors and meanings, but also a shared community construct that displays the following characteristics:

Cultures can be (1) **transitory** (i.e., situational even for a few minutes) or (2) **enduring** (e.g., ethnocultural life styles), and in all instances are (3) **dynamic** (i.e., constantly subject to change and modification). Cultures are represented (4) **internally** (i.e., values, beliefs, attitudes, axioms, orientations, epistemologies, consciousness levels, perceptions, expectations, personhood) and (5) **externally** (i.e., artifacts, roles, institutions, social structures). Cultures (6) **shape and construct our realities** (i.e., they contribute to our world views, perceptions, orientations) with ideas, morals, and preferences (Marsella, 2008:5).

At a closer look, all definitions of culture cited above point to an understanding of culture as a complex system of meanings that is disseminated, shared, embraced and propagated by its individuals through the production and dissemination of material goods, ethical values and symbolic relations.




Fig. 5 Culture as complex system of meanings

Culture, risk and disaster. What do they have in common? In order to better understand the cultural variables that have an impact in modeling understanding, attitudes, behaviors and the overall reception of messages that make up risk and disaster communication we must first take a look at what a risk, disaster or crisis signify in the collective memory of the community. Regardless of individual, particular traits of one community or another, it must be stated that in *any* given culture, a disaster and/or a crisis represent a traumatic disruption of the normal routine of society. As such, they have a traumatic connotation that starts to loom over the horizon of the community once the risk has been made aware and imprinted in the conscience of the individual and the community. Therefore, the experience of conveying

significance and rendering the crisis/disaster into the routinized patterns of thinking is mediated through cultural variables made available via collective shared values, ethical code and last but not least, collective memory of similar events. It has been noted that:

Both the immediate chaotic experience of the catastrophic event and the calm and composed retrospective comprehension thereof draw on our collective reservoir of cultural forms and patterns of understanding. It is in this way that one can talk about catastrophes and crises having a cultural life (Meiner and Veel, 2012:4)

If regarded through specific cultural lenses, it must be noted that any crisis or disaster has an exceptional character which evades routinized patterns of understanding. Therefore, such events often are first grasped as incomprehensible, a fissure in the reality of the individual and the community. Cultural patterns therefore act as a mediating filter, an aid in framing ‘the incomprehensible’ into the known or at least comprehensible reality.

In this, we can only agree with Isak Winkel Holm that:

every new catastrophe or crisis also depends on and is culturally constituted by the experiences and cultural processing of previous events in that it rearticulates the ideas, forms and fantasies related to catastrophic and critical situations which reverberate in our cultural imagination (Holm, 2012).

Therefore, we believe, cultural imagination and the overall cultural package that make up the collective set of memories and values of a community should be carefully considered if we are to understand the impact culture can have in the integration of a successful risk, crisis situation or disaster management strategy.

Furthermore, if considering the impact of technology on communication patterns and the circulation of information at global level, we understand that now more than ever the local and global cultural values and practices combine to create cultural packages with unprecedented forms of evolution and hybridization. Let’s take for instance the agenda promoted by local NOG’s whose main objective is the protection of the environment. A local e.g. anti-fracking movement in the USA, or anti-cyanide mining in the Amazon gets to have significant echo in e.g. Romania, Canada or Peru, where information, protest

practices and civic movements are replicating a pattern developed continents apart and further hybridizing both the message and the practice of environmental protection. Not to mention here the cultural impact of online connectivity between movements, individuals and messages that achieve a global shared conscience of a common agenda and why not power of action.

Another illustrative example, closer to risk management is the highly mediatized New Orleans disaster in the aftermath of the Katrina Hurricane. Citizen outrage, empowered by the media account of the destruction of New Orleans led to a publicly embraced narrative in which the ineffectual authorities and the epic dimensions of the outrage held the stage for weeks to come (US Congress, 2006). Elsewhere in Europe, every time a terrorist attack occurs, such as the Bataclan or Nice murders, or the Bruxelles terrorist attacks in March 2016, both classic and social media seem to focus discussions on the human component, the error, the inability of the authorities to control and contain the danger. Most frequently invoked reasons range from “institutional failures, short staffing and communication struggles” (A., 2016); “insufficient resources, missed signals, failure to pass on information, complacency” (Heath, Sheftalocvich, & Spillane, 2016); failure to carry out investigations extensively (Dalton, 2015).

This particular trend which makes an underlying characteristic of the current glocal (global and local) society, has to be understood in the overall framework of the changing nature of risk in the 21st century, a change prophesized by Ulrich Beck in his concept of ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992).

2. RISK SOCIETY AND ITS CULTURAL VARIABLES

Quoting UN statistics, Cristof Mauch observed that:

every year approximately two hundred million people are directly affected by natural disasters—seven times the number of people who are affected by war. In just the past few years, earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, and floods have wrought tremendous devastation around the world. Hurricane Katrina, which in late August 2005 submerged large parts of New Orleans, was by far the costliest natural disaster of American history after accounting for inflation. The South Asian tsunami on December 26, 2004, known in the scientific community as the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake, was one of the most terrible natural

disasters of this type in recent history; more than one hundred eighty thousand people died as a result (Mauch, 2009:3).

If put in a historical perspective, these figures may not seem too impressive in comparison to past disasters. What has however changed dramatically is people’s exposure to their representations. If a century ago a disaster would have impacted the collective imagination and the cultural framework of a region or perhaps a country, today, with televisual representations, digital images and comments from the scene being instantly shared by both mainstream and social media, the impact on the anthropological structure of our collective imagination is far larger. Communities are exposed to images of disasters almost every day. As a result, human frailty, vulnerability, as well as the need to contain and control vast forces of nature combined with man made errors and/or ill-intent and violence have become a recurrent pattern in a larger narrative about survival and endurance of the human species and planet Earth. Therefore, post 9/11, post Hurricane Katrina, post the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake, post London, Madrid and Paris terrorist attacks and well into a late modernity framework, we are witnessing and experiencing at the same time a world in which the many faces of risk are changing and transforming at an unprecedented rate. *Every advance from gene technology to nanotechnology opens a “Pandora’s box” that could be used as a terrorist’s toolki* (Beck, 2002). Social networks, connectivity and collective commons can in their turn affect the way we live our lives both for the good and the bad. They can foster liberty of thinking and individual agency, but they can also facilitate the emergence of enhanced surveillance and regressive, over securitized, over regulated states. In order to determine how all these factors affect the way communities of citizens perceive risks today, and how they understand to mitigate and manage them, we need to understand what are the driving forces of change and which are the level of expectations and the framework of understanding that are being shaped with the advent and embracing of new technologies, of connectivity, of globalized communities and of social activism. Therefore one feature that needs to be underlined right from the beginning is the increasing lack of credibility and legitimacy of centralized authorities.

The globalized, urban, digital natives that make up the world’s youth population have been increasingly changing patterns of thinking on authority. The authorities and institutions are

questioned in terms of efficacy and expertise by both media and common citizens. This shows a profound change in the patterns citizens process information and address authority. The 'skeptical public' (Bennet 2000) or the 'reflexive public' (Beck, 2009) expresses an increasing need to demystify old certainties and figures of authority – be it church, doctors, or police officers. Increasingly, the public tends to favor and give voice to anti-establishment figures, alternative voices and countercultures.

According to Bennet (2012) and Beck (2009) *In late modernity established loci of authority and power – science, the State – are challenged and, in the case of the forces of law and order, undermined.* Furthermore, as Beck observes:

strategies that lend the appearance of control and security instead of guaranteeing them and exacerbate the general feeling of insecurity and endangerment (...) it is not the terrorist act that destroys the West, but the reaction to its anticipation. It ignites the felt war in the minds and centers of the West (Beck, cited in Bennet, 2009:28).

The unprecedented challenge to established authority is most likely caused by the high levels of connectivity, intermedia communication and transnational cultural patterns emerging with the advent of globalization, internet and the overall impact of the social networks on the way citizens across the globe relate to theirs and others feelings, values, expressions of shared humanity and fighting against shared challenges and dangers, be it incurable diseases, migration, terrorism, scarcity of resources, famine, severe income disparity or climate change. Eduardo Neiva once noted that today,

without great cultural chasms around them, like the waters where schools of fish swim, societies will not tighten themselves with organic solidarity, forging the impression of stability and permanence so enchanting to anthropological monographs. Whether we like it or not, singular cultural systems are presently preyed on with information and messages that sprout and leap suddenly not from the rims but from their core. There are no parochial limits to the international media networks, much less to the computerized communication exchanges happening on the Internet. The tendency is to have communication rings that are hopelessly without boundaries (Neiva, 2001:49).

Referred to as 'the global village' by Marshall McLuhan or 'the global ecumene' by Ulf Hannerz (2001:58), the highly irregular and interconnected

phenomenon that lies at the center of the formation and circulation of shared value(s) across the divides of the nation states has come to be regarded as the starting point of a distinct, influential and unusual grassroots cultural construct that informs attitudes, beliefs and perceptions on life of citizens across the world – and with them perceptions of risk and crisis situations as well.

In an interesting study on the cultural analysis of disaster, a rather new field of study, speaking of community perceptions in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Isak Winkel Holm underlines *the two most important themes in contemporary disaster research, both of which were dramatically underscored by Hurricane Katrina* were the fits of anger directed against the man-made character of the calamity that doubled the biophysical phenomenon, and against

"the media-borne character of a calamity caused to a large degree by the severe misrepresentations and misunderstandings of the city of New Orleans by federal and international media, behaving less like sober eye-witnesses and more like vultures preying on death and suffering (Holm, 2012:17)

These two keen observations highlight a characteristic of the global village or the global ecumene – the acute distrust in both state and media establishments of at least some categories of target audiences. The 2016 Edelman Trust Barometer for instance, shows a 3 point increase in trust inequality during 2012-2016, between informed public and mass population with regard to their trust in the four institutions of government, business, media and NGO's (Edelman's Trust Barometer, Trust Inequality), accelerated disparity and decreasing trust of mass population in the media outlets being highlighted in most parts of the world, including France, UK, US, Spain, Singapore, Malaysia, India, China, Brazil, Germany, Australia, Ireland, Russia, Poland etc. Low levels of trust have also been linked in the Edelman's Trust Barometer to the low levels of income, with respondents in bottom quartile of income in each country ranked significantly lower in the level of trust in mentioned authorities.

As the following case-studies will show, similar perceptions and attitudes can be detected in the public perception across the globe with regard to any of the more recent events, be they the series of terrorist attacks in France, the floods across Europe, the fire in the Colectiv club in Romania, to name just of few of the case studies and incidents mentioned in the current project.

Therefore, admitting that crisis and disasters have come to be perceived across the globe according to and/or in reaction to media generated archetypes and cultural representations of disaster, we can only conclude that vulnerability, incapacity and a certain malignant passivity have come to populate collective imaginary of disaster and disaster management - a trend all the more relevant and dangerous as it signals an undercurrent of pessimistic reluctance to act upon and generate solutions. Therefore, we agree with Holm that

The recent decade (...) has seen a growing recognition of the importance of the way we frame disaster culturally. According to this “cultural turn” in sociological disaster research (Webb), not only the physical and institutional but also the cultural infrastructure of a society play a major role in shaping disaster by determining how it is interpreted by human beings (Holm, 2012:17).

The cultural infrastructure of the - recurrent Hollywoodesque interpretations of disaster, media reports on terrorism, the “no comment” zone of online media promoting the so called unfiltered reports from conflict zones or the social media unpredictable circulations of narratives – generates models of understanding and coping with risk and disaster. We thus understand the fundamental role that the cultural infrastructure of a community (combining elements of the global *ecumene*, the local community and the collective imaginary of its living members) plays in generating cognitive patterns that frame both the perception of crisis and disaster and the response to it. Being able to contextualize communication and action within these cognitive patterns would then be the stakes that any risk and disaster management communicator should have on the radar.

2.1 The repertoire of cultural variables in the risk society. Trying to search for cultural variables that nowadays populate the glocal imaginary is in many ways the same as watching the patterns and movements of a kaleidoscope. One can only follow a limited number of bits at a time, guess their movement and *imagine* a pattern according to the limited experience of its formation. This is the reason why, in this particular section, and before we move on to the particular and grassroots makings of risk, crisis and disaster communication management, we feel the need to take a closer look on several cultural traits that seem to emerge as global rather than local imaginings of the cultural infrastructure of disaster.

Taking into account human emotions, routine experiences and the way they are modelled by the mediated digital communication nowadays can be another key factor to explore for a better understanding of the way people, especially in urban areas, respond to risk and crisis situations. Let us not forget that emotions stirred by cultural symbolism can and will play a dominant role in the way perceptions are shaped and mitigated with, especially when dealing with fear, anxiety and panic. This is the reason why, today more than ever, we need to integrate a deep understanding of cultural stereotypes and cultural taboos into the way we transform risk perceptions for better crisis mitigation. According to Lull,

“The global availability of ever more diverse and mobile symbolic forms emanating from the culture and information industries, when combined with increased access by individuals to micro-communication technologies, uniquely empowers many people (Lull, 2001:3).

The lack of trust in established authority. The lack of trust in the established loci of authority is a pervasive characteristic of the global *ecumene* and the risk society that seems to be directly connected to the advent of technology and the instant circulation of digital information. Growing numbers of citizens nowadays demand to occupy public space, have access to information and claim transparency of the public affairs. In this larger framework and due to the instant access to information, it has become more and more frequent a practice to address, whenever necessary, the ‘poor quality’ of government response in crisis and disaster situations. Individual interrogations quickly turn into public outrage, citizen journalism combines with professional journalistic investigations, people demand the right to know on social media and the mainstream media channels often have no choice but to follow popular leads. All these have become frequent elements in the repertoire of public reactions. This specific trend must be addressed by crisis and disaster management communicators in rapid, informed, specific and transparent manner that can thus help in the building of a solid capital of trust, able to remain resilient in the advent of a crisis situation.

The self-help, open source, globally networked local community The fast paced technology development and the almost instant circulation of digital information have also had enduring effects on communication patterns embraced by citizens across the world. Today, we are witnesses to increasing bidirectional

communication between established authorities and citizens, between citizens and communities themselves as well as between communities situated continents apart. Grassroots initiatives get propagated with increasing speed while the creative commons generate open-source initiatives that everyone who wishes can contribute to. And though not yet a general trend of initiative, movements of self-help combined with open source initiative and citizen alert systems created ad-hoc via e.g. social media in the advent of e.g. a major earthquake or a terrorist attack, must be taken into consideration when designing communication strategies for risk, crisis and disaster management.

The constitutive pleasurable forms of violence and disaster in the risk society. Community and individual understanding of risk, crisis and disaster is often embedded in those forms of violence that have become constitutive to our shared identity. The plethora of disaster imaginings of epic proportions that populate Hollywood movies, videogames, science-fiction literature circulate across the world and contribute to the creation of behavioral models and cultural practices. Such mental models, in their turn, are used by individuals later on in order to decode real events, expect meaning and generate attitudes and reactions towards ways of managing crisis situations. In the beginning of a study on natural disasters and their cultural responses across the centuries, Christof Mauch observes:

Lately it seems that every Borders bookshop and Blockbuster videostore is filled with titles such as *Nature on the Rampage*, *Killer Flood*, *Devil Winds*, *Tidal Wave: No Escape*, *Dante's Peak*, *Aftershock: Earthquake in New York*, and *Storm of the Century*. Hollywood provides a steady stream of disaster movies featuring erupting volcanoes, earthquakes, tornadoes, and even menacing asteroids. In 2004, *The Day After Tomorrow*—a rollercoaster drama about a superstorm that devastates New York City at the start of a new Ice Age—was among the top grossing movies worldwide (Mauch, 2009:1).

While not entirely new, this fascination with natural and man-made disaster and crisis situations that populates popular culture and the collective imagination globally speaks of violence and suffering in pleasurable forms that invite the human being to assess the way in which suffering tests human dignity, courage and the ability to address forces that are beyond his/her power to shape. At the same time, it speaks of a more disturbing entertaining nature of death, of violence

as a constitutive possibility. Now a famous study, Slavoj Žižek's *On Violence* chapter on the 9/11 terrorist attack analyses exactly the way in which the cultural schemata populating the Hollywood movies has channeled the public towards expecting the unexpected and rendering to the real the surreal character of an alternative, virtual reality (Žižek, 2008). More than a decade before, a famous study signed this time by Jean Baudrillard attracted attention to the televisual character that the first Gulf War had in the collective imaginary. Framed by television renderings of a clean and game-like warzone, it created expectations of a war in which violence remained abstract and almost pleasurable, entertaining. It voided disaster of its fleshy character and created expectations of abstract realms where terror was manageable and remote (Baudrillard, 1995).

More into our times, there have been speculations that suggested the 11/13 attacks in Paris were plotted while using the Sony's PS4 game platform for communication, either through audio messages or by using the network of the gaming facility. (Rawal, 2015) (Titcomb, 2015) Furthermore, the similarity of actionable patterns between war video games and the actual terrorist acts create concerns as to how the virtual reality gets to emulate into real life situations whenever motivation occurs. Research so far proved inconclusive results, some studies arguing for, other against an existing connection between players of violent video games and heightened levels of aggression in young adults (Amini, 2013).

Nevertheless, all of the examples above illustrate the way in which cultural frames encourage a fictional presence of crisis and disaster into our everyday lives and facilitate the transfer of meaning between the virtual towards the real and not the other way round as we have generally been used to in cultural receptions of the 20th century. Furthermore, we can argue that this cultural fascination for doom like scenarios has had its role in creating negative expectations and readings of violence and disaster, both natural and manmade, as a constitutive part of our collective imaginary. Should this be considered a threat to how the public models the unexpected and the incomprehensible of a disaster situation? Contradictory results recorded by researchers in this field prevent us from reaching a direct and unequivocal conclusion. However, one cannot refrain from wondering whether the pleasurable, narcissistic quality of violence and the entertaining nature of disaster, combined with all the more frequent dramatic climactic changes and upsurge

of terrorism in real life won't affect the collective imaginary we share so much so as to create passive expectations of suchlike events. Recent propaganda materials put forward, for instance, by the terrorist organization DAESH seem to suggest a clear attempt to exploit what it must be sensed by the terrorist propaganda disseminators as a very fluid interaction between the real and the virtual models of reality. As the George Washington University's School of Media and Public Affairs scholar Javier Lesaca concludes after analyzing some 845 videos put forward by the terrorist organization, propaganda "nods and sometimes directly copies—memes, characters, and scenes contained in Hollywood movies, video games, and music videos." (Khan, 2015)

All of the above in mind, we believe communicators should be advised to create strategies to share information especially with youth by integrating game-like, interactive features of a 'learn how to help yourself and others' culture, simply as a way to disseminate information and know-how according to patterns.

2.2 Cultures of disaster, cultures of resilience. There are frequent examples in the literature on disaster and disaster management that show cultures which are often exposed to extreme phenomena to create coping mechanisms so as to include the abnormal character of disaster into a routine, and, therefore, into the normalcy of everyday life. According to Bankoff, for instance,

For Filipinos, hazard and disaster are simply accepted aspects of daily life, what can be termed a frequent life experience.(...) It is so ordinary that Filipino cultures are partly the product of adaptation by communities to these phenomena through processes that permit the incorporation of threat into daily life, or what can be called the "normalization of threats (Bankoff, 2009, p. 265).

As Bankoff discovered, normalization of threat by the, for example, Filipino, implied the creation of distinctive patterns of activity as well as behavior, and that, despite the dissimilarities between various ethnic communities. From materials used in architecture to agricultural patterns or seasonal migration patterns, cultural norms and every day practices seem to have been regulated so as to avoid and contain the effects of seismic and meteorological disasters that frequently affect the country. Material culture practice may or may not be of relevance to other countries in other climates. They belong to the local and maintain across the centuries local value

as long as they are still integrated by modern communities. Psychological and emotional adaptation strategies integrated into cultural norms may, on the other hand, bear greater relevance and importance for cultures across the world as they can always be trained and exercised through education, preparation and training. Cognitive and behavioral responses designed to reduce psychological distress, passed on from one generation to the next with the help of collective memory represent one of the cultural mechanisms that must be correctly assessed and benefitted from. In the Philippines, *migration and relocation can be regarded as preventative coping practices, as they attempt to prevent the same set of circumstances from recurring* (Bankoff, 2009:265).

In the same way, a sociological survey shows that the refusal of part of the Afro-American population in New Orleans before Hurricane Katrina to leave home and incapacitated family members behind can also be said to represent a cultural model constructed though past experiences of Hurricanes that as often as they appeared, never created destructions of such magnitude and threat to human lives and therefore did not recommend extreme measures and especially the symbolic destructuring of the family nucleus (Eisenman, Cordasco, Asch, Golden and Glik, 2007). Thus we see how opposite behaviors in the face of danger both are apparently motivated by the same recourse to the collective memory of similar events and the way they have remained imprinted in the imaginary of the community. Therefore, one has to emphasize the fundamental importance of determining expectations and collective representations of specific types of disaster within the community where policy is being drafted. Without a correct assessment, a policy maker may not have the measure of what needs to be corrected in the pattern of behavior so as to create successful adaptation strategies and integrate them into recommended cultural norms.

In the case of the Philippines, Bankoff illustrates, the feeling that life is essentially a game of change (*bahala na*), that one is indelibly united with the other and community good is also the good of the individual (*pakikipagkapwa*) and the particular sense of humor which allows Filipinos laugh in the face of any adversity (Bankoff, 2009: 269-270), represent cultural variables that allow and foster the creation of strong social support networks and self – generated community actions. Bankoff (2009) identifies as efficient coping strategies developed within the Filipino cultural

framework the storytelling practice and the swapping jokes with friends:

Reports of the aftermath of the Mayon eruption of June 23, 1897, describe how survivors were heard to tell jokes while collecting the grotesquely disfigured bodies of the dead, comparing the separation of body and soul to a “slow” husband being left by his “fast” wife, or the remains of a dead coconut farmer to the oil he used to make: “They told all sorts of jokes and so instead of being sad while gathering the dead, they were all laughing. The pain in their hearts was great but the jokes were comparable to the water that extinguishes a fire. The jokes were made to defend one from getting weak, and so to be able to go on gathering the dead without shedding too many tears (Bankoff, 2009:270).

Finally, Bankoff’s research shows that constant exposure to hazards has created in the case of the Filipinos

hazard as a frequent life experience manifests itself in a history of formal and informal associations committed to individual and community welfare that stretches as far back in time as the earliest written record (Bankoff, 2009:270).

His conclusions are mirrored by research carried out by anthropologists elsewhere in regions that are also highly exposed to disaster and crisis situations due to natural disasters.

The cases discussed show that one of the particularities of the less developed countries in coping with natural disasters is not so much the appeal to technology (as is the case with the highly developed urban societies in the West) as the appeal to cultural values that can help both individual and the community build resilience in the face of adverse situations. In all the studies quoted above, perhaps the most important trait identified was the recourse to self-generated help within communities, to *enlisting people’s participation as an essential element in disaster management through the formation or support of grassroots organizations* (Bankoff, 2009:279).

2.3 From glocal to local. Grassroots movements and the empowering of the citizen. Some studies in disaster mitigation and relief, especially those dealing with the psychological effects of crisis and disaster situations and their aftermath, have insisted on the importance of acknowledging, understanding and integration into the intervention strategy of structured knowledge of ethnic, gender, local community and/or

professional cultures. Ethnic community especially has repeatedly been invoked as one key factor for the successful mitigation of crisis and disaster situations as well as its containment and limitation. In an interesting study dedicated to Ethno-Cultural Perspectives on Disaster and Trauma, editors Anthony J. Marsella, Jeannette L. Johnson, Patricia Watson and Jan Gryczynski insist on the importance of adapting the universals of Western science to the specificities of the local communities, if experts and intervention teams are to have a positive effect in the disaster preparation and mitigation:

Local communities have specific methods and tools for healing such as rituals, ceremonies, and practices of remembrance. Since they are grounded in the beliefs, values, and traditions of the local culture, they are both culturally appropriate and more sustainable than methods brought in from the outside (Wessells, 1999:274-275).

They also state that the dynamics of response to a crisis or disaster situation is often generated in the interaction of the following types of cultures:




Fig. 6 Types of cultures interacting in crisis and disaster situations. Adapted after (Anthony J. Marsella, 2008:XI), Cultural Encounters of Disasters

As a result, when adopting the socio-cultural perspective on crisis and disaster mitigation, one cannot overlook the importance of a productive dialogue and interaction between the cultures of the victims and those of the responders. The major topics invoked by Marsella et al, and which can be found more or less comprehensive in similar studies (by e.g. Andreatta & Ferraro, 2013;

Bankoff, 2009; Bennet, 2012; Meiner & Veel, 2012), include:




Fig. 7 Topics used to define and explain cultural variables.

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ENDEMIC REPRESENTATIONS OF SECURITY CULTURE IN THE ROMANIAN PUBLIC SPHERE

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Abstract: *In Romania - and not only - security studies and its related disciplines are going through a significant crisis. They tend to be dominated by certain discrepancies between conceptual and theoretical advancements on one hand, and empirical research on the other one. The act of measuring security and security culture has usually generated academic debate much more than actual empirically-tested models. Notwithstanding, security culture must be analysed beyond its normative regulatory value. Theoretically, experts already know how the Romanians' security culture should look like, but have little information on how it actually is. Unfortunately, both the scholars and the security professionals have little substantial sociological studies regarding security culture, security perception and other adjacent themes. Our presentation refers to a sociological description of security culture, starting with a general horizon and continuing with formulating a proposal regarding scientifically sustainable public typologies. The research was conducted in February 2018 by a consortium between LARICS - Romanian Academy, the University of Bucharest and INSCOP Research.*

Keywords: *security studies; public security culture; public opinion; methodology; survey analysis*

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper features results from the Romanian Security Culture Barometer, a nationally representative sociological survey issued in April 2018 by LARICS-Romanian Academy. Field data was collected in February 2018 by Inscop Research. Data analysis (statistical and theoretical) was performed by a joint team from LARICS, Inscop and the University of Bucharest. The two co-authors of this material took part in all the stages of the research, from the project to the public presentation of the results. Our paper refers to a descriptive approach of the seven dimensions of the security culture and also outlines a typology that tries to identify two opposite forms of security culture: security culture vs. insecurity culture. Our present work is based on two previous materials published on Larics' web platform within the efforts to communicate the Barometer's various results (Cristea, 2018a), (Cristea, 2018b). A list of works that helped the team substantiate the security culture research model can be found in the *Bibliography* section.

2. DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY CULTURE

Our project proposes not only a theoretical and strategic discussion on the idea of *security culture*,

but an operational structure based on the first empirical study on the Romanian security culture. A simple Google search is sufficient to show that the „security culture” concept is an extremely popular one, in areas such as security studies, international relations and public policy. Unfortunately, these certified academic interests have yet to produce anything beyond theoretical debates, although the above mentioned concept has an increasing popularity and many practical applications. As *security culture* transforms into a sociologically measurable concept, its empirical aspects and understandings can bring obvious advantages to understanding how the public perceives the idea of security.

The model we propose describes security culture parameters in the Romanian context. We wanted to understand if what we have is a majority-type security culture, or, instead, we have several specific security cultures, each dependent or not on sociodemographic, geographic, political or any other kind of relevant variables.

Methodologically, our instrument is functionally designed as an intermediary approach between an opinion survey and a scale; this was decided in order to avoid starting from a hypothetical typology - whose substantiation is more often than not a problem -, and also because

this area has not been studied (empirically) enough for us to weight items into a possible Romanian security culture index.

As such, we describe security culture by using seven compact dimensions, each theoretically substantiated and linked with the Romanian context. Each dimension has five indicators, formulated as questions. The 35-item questionnaire was applied on a *nationally representative sample* of 1000 individuals. The seven dimensions were defined as seven graphic polarities:

- Trust – Distrust (D1)*
- Localism – Globalism (D2)*
- Realism – Liberalism (D3)*
- Optimism – Pessimism (D4)*
- Security – Rights (D5)*
- Implication – Apathy (D6)*
- Conspiracy – Reason (D7)*

Each dimension is presented within five-question sets that channel the public towards the most relevant and current situations regarding attitudes the dimension refers to. Each question has two possible responses, each referring to one of the elements dichotomized in the dimension label.

To exemplify: the five questions describing the Trust – Distrust dimension each propose two possible answers, one showcasing *trust*, and the other one, *distrust*. We computed the scores obtained by each dimension polarity from the percentage means of answers given by respondents to the five questions describing each dimension, consequently securing a quantitative description of security culture – seen through seven different perspectives. A description of indicators formulating the seven dimensions and scores obtained by each of them following the application of the questioner can be found below:




Fig. 1 Trust - Distrust (D1)




Fig. 2 Localism-Globalism (D2)




Fig. 3 Realism-Liberalism (D3)




Fig. 4 Optimism-Pessimism (D4)




Fig.5 Security-Rights (D5)



Fig.6 Implication-Apathy (D6)




Fig.7 Conspiracy-Reason (D7)

Trust – Distrust: (1) disbelief in state institutions, (2) evaluation of the degree of professionalism of state institutions, (3) evaluation of the activity of public order institutions in connection to legislation directing their activity, (4) evaluation of stipends received by public order system employees in connection to their activity, (5) trust in Romanian

politicians, compared to politicians connected to European institutions.

Localism – Globalism: (1) Romanian identity vs. European identity, (2) goodwill of Romanian political institutions vs. that of European institutions, (3) the European Union as federal state vs. union of national states, (4) chances for self-sufficiency and good quality of living in Romania vs. elsewhere, (5) trust in NATO.

Realism – Liberalism: (1) importance of military power vs. importance of economic power, (2) ONU efficiency, (3) reconciliation of all national interests, (4) growth of budget for defence vs. growth of budget for social areas, (5) defending Romanian interests by appealing to international support vs. by using national resources.

Optimism – Pessimism: (1) chances for Romania to be able to self-defend in the case of a security threat, (2) chances for a military conflict in the area, (3) the amplitude of the terrorist threat in Europe, (4) EU and NATO integration impact on neighbouring tensions/conflicts, (5) malice preposse of neighbouring countries.

Security – Rights: (1) restricting certain rights in order to increase security, (2) the importance of respecting individual privacy, (3) verifying the manner in which intercepted information is used, (4) collection of personal information by commercial entities – banks, corporations, hypermarkets, (5) evaluation of the idea that criminals have too many rights.

Implication – Apathy: (1) personal availability when it comes to responding to a call from the army or other such state institutions in case of emergency, (2) need of more implication in the political and social national life vs. leaving the country in order to have a better life, (3) level of knowledge regarding international politics, (4) need for activities on a voluntary basis in order to solve some social issues, (5) facilitation of taxes payment by introducing new payment methods.

Conspiracy – Reason: (1) way of selecting information/news, (2) evaluation of mass-media-based information credibility, (3) press tendency to manipulate vs. objective representation of information, (4) existence of a hidden global government, (5) the chance for smaller states to be taken seriously and affirm their interests on a global scale.

A base-level way to analyse these data is a general description of Romanian security culture. Which are the general characteristics of this particular type of security, in the context of chosen dimensions? Let's see.

- Disbelief, rather than belief, in institutions;

- Localist, rather than globalist orientation – here, as in the case above, statistical differences between the two are not significant enough to suggest an irreconcilable attitude towards institutions or globalization;

- Pessimism, rather than optimism;
- Liberalism, rather than realism – in regard to ideological and paradigmatic classifications relating to the field of international relations (this is not to be mistaken with usual political doctrines);

- A certain balance between focus of rights and focus on security – this could also reflect an ideological misapprehension of the Romanian public;

- At a theoretical-ideological level, Romanians tend to showcase values associated to implication, rather than apathy;

Romanians tend to show a penchant for conspiracy theories on politics, mass-media and international relations – let us remember that both possible answers in the questionnaire were defined by exaggerated indicators, as to better display the corresponding attitudinal disposition.

3. SECURITY CULTURE VS. INSECURITY CULTURE

Beyond a general description of Romanians security culture, the study *Security Culture Barometer* can also lead to other approaches. One of these refers to segmenting security perceptions so as to identify, if needed, the existence of a larger number of *security cultures* – in other words, if beneath the general description of security culture, Romanians actually configure a larger number of structured references to the problematic of security.

We have various ways to formulate these typologies – focusing on index totals, dimension indexes, most statistically compelling dimensions from the seven proposed initially, focusing on the technique to weight non-responses, etc. We will now advance one of these methods, a particular characteristic this approach being the attempt to both identify and estimate the attitudinal extremes present. However, our interest here is *to map the population segment dominated by an “insecurity culture” vs. the segment dominated by a “security culture”*.

The first variant is that where we take dimension scores as reference point, as presented in the first part of this paper. As such, we define *security culture* as being characterized by trust, globalism, liberalism, optimism, rights, implication, rationalism, and the *insecurity culture*

by distrust, localism, realism, apathy and conspiracy-tendencies. We continue by computing the average between variant scores for each of the seven dimensions. This will lead to the following statistic: security culture score 40%, insecurity culture score 46%, 14% non-responses.

This typology systematizes dimension scores (which themselves are averages resulted from the answers given to the questions in the questionnaire) and helps produce a panorama of what we have defined as “security culture”, in contrast with the “insecurity culture”. We must stress that such operations, based on work with averages, lead to a particular drawback: the placement of those dominated by insecurity, security and those who gravitate along the average together (the former, as resulting from our research, being the biggest percentage).




Fig.8 Security culture vs. insecurity culture

In order to try identify the population sector strongly dominated by insecurity, that dominated by security attitudes and separate the two from the rest of the public, we will ascribe the score 0 to each answer variant expressing insecurity (disbelief, pessimism, etc.), 1 for indecision, non-response, lack of interest and 2 for variants referring to the idea of security (trust, optimism, etc.). As each dimension has five indicators, each respondent can receive 1-to-10 scores for each dimension and 0-to-70 scores for the complete index.

We now isolate those with the weakest scores, as well as those with the biggest ones, as to see how big the vulnerable, dominated by insecurity, segment is, compared with the one clearly characterized by an attitude of trust, security, etc. (see Fig.9).

From left to right, we have scores of 0 and 1, 2 and 3, 4 and 5 and so on, each segment showing bars representing the seven dimensions, from the “Trust – Distrust” one (first dimension-bar on the left) to the “Conspiracy – Reason” one (last dimension bar on the right). The first two segments, 0-1 and 2-3, illustrate the certain

insecurity culture, while the last two, 7-8, 9-10, present the firm *security culture*. As we can see, the insecurity culture describes a much more significant population segment than that of the security culture, is fundamentally distrustful and presents statistically significant scores on most dimensions – this is fairly striking, as the most powerful scores identified for security culture are within the “Implication – Apathy” dimension, showing a high “implication” that could speak to a desiderate of values as much – or rather than – true implication.




Fig.9 From insecurity culture to security culture

Below, a table showing population percentages inside each score category, on dimensions. We can see how 47,5% of the public has a 0 to 3 score on the “Trust – Distrust” (D1) dimension, 32,5% have an 0 to 3 on “Globalism – Localism” (D2), 31,4% in “Optimism – Pessimism” (D4) and 36,3% in “Conspiracy – Reason” (D7). We can thus conclude that distrust, localism, pessimism and conspiracy tendencies are the most present characteristics of the population segment dominated by an *insecurity culture*.

%	Scores				
	0-1	2-3	4-6	7-8	9-10
D1	20.9	26.6	35.7	11.0	5.8
D2	7.4	25.1	53.0	11.5	3.0
D3	1.3	11.3	64.3	18.9	4.2
D4	8.1	23.3	55.3	11.8	1.5
D5	3.2	13.8	59.5	19.2	4.3
D6	3.6	13.7	44.1	23.2	15.4
D7	10.4	25.9	52.9	10.0	0.8

23,1% of the population shows a 7 to 10 score on “Realism – Liberalism” (D3), 23,5% a 7 to 10 on “Security – Rights” (D5) and 38,6% in “Implication – Apathy” (D6). Therefore, the most present characteristics in the segment dominated

by a firm *culture of security* are liberalism, focus on rights and, even if only in theory, implication.

In the Romanian context, the insecurity culture is more solidly grounded than the security culture.

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JUSTICE, POLITICS AND INTELLIGENCE. QUANTUM SYNERGIES COMPUTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK CONTRACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) MEMBERSHIP

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Abstract: *“The manner in which conflicts are to be settled by political means can have no influence on the manner in which conflicts may be settled by judicial means” (Opinion Advocate General Van Gerven on Case C-70/88). What appears as a quantum fallacy, represents one of the multiple dimensions settled within the realities of the European Union (EU) membership’s conundrum. The point on which the intelligence factor - the affluent induced towards both political and judicial capital decision making processes - transmutes itself from binary into the quantum vortex generated by the EU interests shall be defined and safeguarded accordingly. Researchers have claimed already that the theoretical benefits of quantum environments would go beyond the proven theory of ordinary mechanics and would imply non-standard interpretations, such as multiple worlds and negative probabilities. Large-scale quantum techniques would theoretically be able to solve efficiently and more quickly certain problems that are not practically feasible when using classical binary methods. The synergies connecting political strategies and judicial solutions within the EU would offer an inclusive platform for Member States individual’s identities.*

Keywords: *quantum; justice; politics; intelligence; security*

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 From a myth – to the present days. The story has it that once upon a time there was a beautiful Phoenician princess called Europa, which was abducted by the ancient god Zeus, who had disguised himself as a bull. They say that Europa had been gathering flowers alongside other friends, near the seaside, when she came across with the bull (Zeus) - which looked to her surprisingly temperate. Full of trust, Europa mounted on its back; but the bull then suddenly went off into the sea and carried off Europa up to the shores of the island of Crete, where she was made the queen of the island. The myth of Europa has survived the times in different modes. On the one hand it has been transmitted through generations as a story of virtue, innocence and romance; on the other hand it remained in the collective memory as a caveat note addressed against the spread of violence and segregation. Nowadays, the myth itself is perceived largely as a grid reference for identifying a well-known continental territory whose epicenter lies somewhere in central Europe.

At present, Europe’s different modes exist with respect to its modern institutions, law and legal

systems. Europe is more and more associated to the geopolitical frame delineating the area of European Union (EU), which strives as an example of ultimate compliance with the rule of law.

The European Union’s law is frequently perceived as illustrating new ideals granting the pave-way towards the ultimate standards of democracy. The law of the European Union has been, however, equally portrayed as being invasive, interfering, divisive or even inflated and exorbitantly overpriced. Such critics have been addressed both internally, from within its own Member States as a counter justification of their own unorthodox shift in policies, as well from external counterparts expressing their reluctance towards EU criteria and ideals.

How can it be that the a legal concept may be able to induce into practice a large plethora of opposite and diverging opinions? There is a quantum political environment which supersedes the EU law in order to create its own operating dimension engaged into the path of serving the EU interests. However, it is yet to be clearly delineated the full extend to which the control of the EU institutions can keep the quantum political dimensions into the logic of reasoning and accountability.

Security and intelligence elements are the affluent induced towards the decision making process in EU politics – and also for judicial proceedings. The quantum theory might be used as metaphor for the framework predicting the interaction and the momentary state of such elements.

1.2 Vision statement of EU quantum politics and justice elements

The manner in which conflicts are to be settled by political means can have no influence on the manner in which conflicts may be settled by judicial means (Opinion of Mr Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 30 November 1989 on Case C-70/88, 3rd paragraph, last sentence)

What appears as a quantum fallacy represents one of the multiple dimensions settled within the realities of the European Union (EU) membership's conundrum. There is a quantum leap in the European integration efforts to safeguard the Union's irreversible nature. It is the political advancements that constitute the common denominator formula for the EU quantum principles.

1.3 Definitions. For the purpose of this document, the following definitions shall apply:

“Intelligence”: the information processed with the scope of assisting the decision making process of a certain function / institution to whom it has been addressed; (n.b.: the information is transformed in intelligence by the actionable perspectives adopted from the receiver's point of view);

“Justice”: the quality of being fair and reasonable; the administration of the law or authority in maintaining things; (www.oxforddictionaries.com);

“Quantum theory”: refers to the theory of matter and energy based on the concept of quanta, especially quantum mechanics; n.b. : “Quantum”: means a discrete quantity of energy proportional in magnitude to the frequency of the radiation it represents; “Quanta”: plural form of quantum (www.oxforddictionaries.com);

“Politics”: the activities associated with the governance of a country or area, especially the debate between parties having power (www.oxforddictionaries.com);

“Security”: the condition of being protected against hazards, threats, vulnerabilities, risks, or loss (www.asisonline.org).

2. EUROPEAN UNION CASE LAW

2.1 What if? What if it would be now up to the nowadays laws of our European Union to mitigate the quarrel around the myth of Europe – should one adopt the point of view that the action, as described in the myth odyssey, had actually happened.

Would it be then a court judgment on law principles, given on a case where romance started with a disagreement? Would it be about the heart-breaking story of loosing the “*Europe-an*” innocence? Would it be maybe an obvious case involving disproportionate use of violence in a kidnapping story? Would it ultimately a case related to the illegal migration or the smuggling of a Phoenician princess? Should this incident become the foundation of an international inquiry? What systemic approach would favor and serve the interests of the European Union from the perspectives of these points of view? Lets start with exercising the common sense of our imagination; this might be the factor that can help overtake the limitations posed by the regular approach of the “binary” determinism in politics and legal determinism.

2.2 The legal system. European Union represents, between other things, a legal system implemented in order to deal an array of contemporary problems and accomplish a range of opportunities that nation states felt not able to manage them individually. However, should one pursue the endeavors to understand the EU law, one has to recognize that at its centrum there is a constant interplay between two elements: the development of the European ideals, and the government of problems spinning over the contemporary Europe. Both elements are have been infiltrated as a result in the European Union case law. In some areas there is a tension and apparent one-sidedness between the two of them. In other areas, each of those strings (European ideals vs. European governance) is being revised in the light of the other. Nevertheless, the balance is never static, whereas it has been constantly shifting, as political principles would have made the shift as well. The stated scope is the pursuit of a roadmap where the institutional settlements of the European Union are evolving while the challenges of the outside world would alter.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has been set up as an institution and invested to ensure that the EU legislation is interpreted and applied in the same way in each Member State. In

other words, the Court of Justice shall ensure that the law is always identical for all the parties and in all similar circumstances.

2.2 The direct effect of the European Union's law. The principle of direct effect enables individuals to immediately invoke a European provision before a national court of the EU Member States or in front the European Court itself. The direct effect of European law is, along with the principle of precedence, a fundamental principle of European law.

It was enshrined by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It enables individuals to immediately invoke European law before courts, independent of whether a national law exists to that extend. The direct effect principle therefore ensures the application and effectiveness of European law in EU countries (<https://eur-lex.europa.eu>). In short: the EU law exists, is effective, has as well a direct application, it prevails in front of any contradicting piece of legislation of a Members State, and can be invoked by individuals in front of other courts within the EU states.

3. "QUANTUM MECHANICS": A PRIMER FOR THE PARTICLES OF JUSTICE, SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

3.1 The primer: quantum mechanics. The field of quantum mechanics was coined by the German physicist Max Planck who had made an attempt to describe the spectrum of light emitted by hot bodies. Specifically, in 1900, he was wondering what was the exact reason that can be accounted for the shift in color from red to yellow to blue as the temperature of a candle flame was increased. Planck made the following assumption: energy was made of individual units, or quanta. Planck invented thereafter the equation explaining his observations based on the assumption that the very same matter can behave itself in certain differentiated ways.

His research kicked off the start into a new field and more than 30 years of scientific inquiry that produced the theories and discoveries which are forming the basis of today's understanding into this field of quantum physics.

Albert Einstein introduced one of the quantum mechanics' most famous and astonishing concepts about five years after Planck had invented his equation. Einstein extended Planck's assumption by asserting that a quantum of light, or a photon,

behaves as both a wave and a particle. This duality became the seabed foundation into the field of quantum mechanics.

Today, scientists still debate how to interpret quantum mechanics. One of most largely accepted approach is called the Copenhagen interpretation, which considers that every quantum particle, known metaphorically as a "cat," exists in all of its possible states at once until it is measured; only when it is observed does the particle exist in one state. In simple words, a "cat" could be form a quantum perspective both dead and alive at the same time. In a binary transposition, the number zero could be as well coexist with the number one, as equivalent value states at a given moment. This concept has become known as the principle of superposition. A second interpretation of quantum theory is the many-worlds theory, which holds that as soon as a possibility exists for any object to be in any state, the universe of that object transmutes into a series of parallel universes equal to the number of possible states in which that the object can exist, whereas each universe contains a single and unique possible state of that object (www.whatis.techtarget.com).

Einstein described space-time as a smooth fabric distorted by objects in the universe. For him, the separation between past, present and future was merely a obsessive persistent illusion. Building on Einstein's ideas, another physicist Nobel Laureate, Richard Feynman, focused on how a particle can travel in waves from point A to point B along a number of potential paths, each with certain probability amplitude. According to Feynman's theory, the sum of all the amplitudes of the different paths would give you the "sum over histories" — the path that the particle actually follows in the end (www.stratfor.com).

3.2 The EU case law) within a quantum theory

The manner in which conflicts are to be settled by political means can have no influence on the manner in which conflicts may be settled by judicial means [emphasis added].

In simple words, it is settled case already the fact that the political factor can reserve unilaterally the option to settle down a conflict in a different manner, whose accepted results can be different if one would compare tem to the manner in which the same conflict would be (or have been) processed by a European Court. The respective political manner, in itself, refers to the processes, the filters,

the checks and balances and, most important, the outcome of a political resolution.

But where is the logic? Isn't that the rule of law is still reigning? How exactly the gods of the mundane political life have inherited the power and the means to overthrow the almighty reign and sense of justice? Or, can it be as well, that the nymph of Justice can drive the bull by its horns and, at her turn, she can ensure safe passage of return for herself back to the EU mainland from where the political deceives had departed her?

In a quantum metamorphosis, the "political means" and the "judicial means" would represent the quantum of light, or the photon that can behave with a dual entity – as described by Planck and Einstein. Thus, a specific dual behavior can appear over the quarrel of the very same matter, which can be distorted either as a "waive" or as a "particle" depending on the given circumstance. The verses of this "quantum metaphor" constructed around the senses of the European justice is found in the "lyrics" of multiple rulings of the EU Court:

For example:

In a political process, it is for the participants alone to decide which countries should or should not be included (n.b. on list of countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the EU Member States). The Court cannot make any assessment on the largely political arguments (...) and cannot decide (...)" (Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Case C-392/95, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu>).

It implies directly that it is not up to the Court to question the validity of a political argument – being that even in relation to its ascension or its admission into a certain functional area of EU politics. For example, as the case-law implies now, one cannot question the Court the political refusal of including a country in the European Schengen area just by simply upholding that this non-admission would follow rather the pure political ascent, but not the logic of the pre-established score card and the agreed technical criteria that have been achieved meanwhile.

In another piece of case law, the European Court of Justice has ruled the following: < It may be regrettable that competition operates between the Member States in this field [n.b. taxation of company profits] without restriction. That is, however, a political matter.

It should be noted, in that respect, that the ... (Ecofin' Council) adopted a code of conduct for business taxation (...) [Towards an Internal Market

without tax obstacles (COM (2001) 582 final & Commission Staff Working Paper 'Company Taxation in the Internal Market' (SEC (2001) 1681 final)].

According to its preamble, the code of conduct is a political commitment and does not affect the Member States' rights and obligations or the respective spheres of competence of the Member States and the Community resulting from the Treaty (Opinion of Advocate General Léger, in Case C-196/04, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu>). The important part of this opinion is that it demonstrates the fact that a Code of Conduct represents more of a guidance, rather than a binding document. Should one go further on with conducting a summary research on how a Code of Conduct would serve for to the functioning of the EU Institutions (for example), one would easily find the title of such documents as part of the oath taken by the officials when entering the service of the EU institutions. For example, let's take the European Code of Administrative Good Behaviour (available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en), which serves as well as the main administrative tool for the European Ombudsman in handling the complaints addressed at its level. It is somehow disappointing to reach the conclusion that this Code of Conduct is rather a guiding internal document, but not the bible and the binding rule that shall be invoked for institutional administrative compliance. To implement it from the outside of the institution, it would be rather required to have reached a consensus on both sides: (i) from the Ombudsman (administering a complaint based on the European Code of Administrative Good Behaviour); (ii) as well as the sympathetic political confirmation coming from the side of the EU Institutions management levels.

Last, but not least, there are some good news after all: the political elements of the EU are still accountable to a certain extend. Namely the political factors shall put in place all the due diligence and foresee accordingly that the action taken was not manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective pursued:

'Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to admit the legal character of a question which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial task (...)' (Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, paragraph 41; <https://eur-lex.europa.eu>).

It can be seen that the Court has wished to adapt its case-law to a wide variety of circumstances, as the reality is always more complex than was imagined by the legislators, rejecting an excessively formalistic or rigid approach. In any event, in a political field such as the conclusion of international agreements, judicial review of the wide discretion conferred on the legislature should be limited to verifying that the action taken was not manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective pursued. According to settled case law,

(...) [The Court] concluded from this that the legality of a measure adopted in those fields can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue' (Case C-440/14 P, EU:C:2016:128, paragraph 77; <https://eur-lex.europa.eu>).

To this end, another relevant piece of case-law shall be retained:

It is settled case-law that, although the Union legislature enjoys broad political discretion when it weighs different general interests in the adoption of a legislative or regulatory act, it is always bound by the obligation to take into account all the relevant 'basic facts' and available 'facts'. In this context the Court must determine that the discretion has actually been exercised and that the measure adopted is not manifestly inappropriate [emphasis added] (Opinion Advocate General Wathelet on Case C-104/16 P; <https://eur-lex.europa.eu>).

What appears as a quantum fallacy represents one of the multiple dimensions settled within the realities of the European Union (EU) membership's conundrum. There is a quantum leap in the European integration efforts to safeguard the Union's irreversible nature. It is the political advancements that constitute the common denominator formula of this quantum conundrum.

3.3 The behavior of EU security and intelligence elements in a quantum politics environment. The sounding of this subtitle could represent either the nightmare or, by the contrary, a wishful thinking for the professional into the security industry. It only depends on where you are. "And where you stand depends on where you sit" (Mile's law: www.britannica.com). One shall remember that there are others out there just as passionate (and probably just as right) as you are. Where you stand indeed depends on where you sit and realizing that might make things go a little

smoother – considering the quantum of security and intelligence particles interaction. There is more than one single element of each kind, and they all follow a quantum theory behavior in which they shift their "color" depending on the "temperature" of a particular political "environment" and, as a result, have a tendency to behave in a dual contextual nature: both as waves and particles. Security and intelligence are the affluent induced towards the decision making process in politics – but also for judicial proceedings.

On the one hand there is also a political reality set within the platform of the Union of European Member States. There are, obviously, criteria to be achieved but, more importantly, the interests propelled by the states *political* matrix prevails in front of the pure technocratic arguments and institutional constraints. There are gods, and there are myths. There remains also a human part into our Europe, which can turn the bull on its horns. But it is all about the context and the environment of geopolitics into which security and intelligence elements shall be able to interact based on a the structural behavior presets, as well as on timely calculated political shifts that would challenge the validity of an existing paradigm.

Researchers have claimed already that the theoretical benefits of quantum environments would go beyond the proven theory of ordinary mechanics and would imply non-standard interpretations, such as multiple worlds and negative probabilities. It takes great responsibility and due diligence to maneuver such institutional gears for to purpose of unifying the synergies resulted from the domains in which its Members States are cooperating for a greater scope of the European Union.

4. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

4.1 Conclusions. Too often, we foresee the future as we have seen the past: through the distorted lens of the present. This is a flaw in our human nature that we shall try to overcome. Constraints will continue to be present and to apply. We must simultaneously exist in the past, present and the future to prepare for a world that we have yet to know and discover. New probabilities will be assigned, by the binary flaws of the present times, into the quantum environment of our common future.

The point on which the intelligence factor - the affluent induced towards both political and judicial capital decision making processes - transmutes itself from binary into the quantum vortex

generated by the EU interests shall be defined and safeguarded accordingly. Large-scale quantum techniques would theoretically be able to solve efficiently and more quickly certain problems that are not practically feasible when using classical binary methods. Outside of the military and intelligence spheres, quantum machines would greatly expand data processing and permit the simulation of almost every natural phenomenon. Would politics and justice be able to create further mechanisms to that extend? The synergies connecting political strategies and judicial solutions within the EU would offer an inclusive platform for Member States individual's identities.

4.2. Acknowledgement. The author takes full responsibility for the contents and scientific correctness of the paper.

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MODERN METHODS TO INCREASE RESILIENCE IN SECURITY

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Abstract: Some new world-wide events of the last few years demonstrated us that the ability to anticipate and to respond to security changes is a compulsory asset for a state. The Syrian problem, the Brexit, the Crimean problem, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) negotiations – are only few examples of applied lack of anticipation in the field of security. Clearly, the so-called "security resilience nexus" became a milestone in achieving maturity in security planning. The frailty of the systems and the impact of the unpredictable emergence of security certified the importance one should pay to "resilience awareness". Cultivating awareness appears to be a tailored solution for some common positions in defence. Therefore, increasing applied resilience in security with the help of future studies represents a real alternative for the security planners when keeping in mind the nowadays state of art. In the array of the anticipative methods – scenario planning, future wheel method and the cross-impact analysis achieve notable results. Those methods flourish, in our opinion, on the foundation of the "wild cards" detection and of the "weak signs" discovery. Hence, the article builds up a nexus between security planning, resilience and future studies. One concludes that resilience awareness plays a key role for a state in preparing and responding to sudden disrupts and changes.

Keywords: security; resilience awareness; cross impact analysis; scenario planning; future studies

1. INTRODUCTION

Ever since Kahn's projections on Cold War nuclear issues, security foresight continuously flourished (Kahn, 1960). Even though the foresight methodology achieved nowadays a certain self-reliance, some authors agree that there is no perfect model of predicting security (Glenn, 2014). Authors like K. Fierke or M. Kaldor and J. Solana argue that in the new geopolitical arena, the state must build security into a complicated network of reciprocal influences (Fierke, 2007). This fact conducted to widely debates regarding the man response to crises and change. Particularly, the state of art shows a keen interest of the researchers for better shaping the moments of change and development of the security providers in relation with risks and threats, as Caveltly claims (Caveltly *et al.*, 2015).

Among these debates, the concept of resilience is counted as a practical path for preparing to the unknown future. According to Caveltly, resilience is a story that achieved success in the late 10 years. Originally, resilience was first mentioned by C.S. Holling in his researches regarding the ecology, as related to the development of the systems (Holling, 1973). Over decades, in the early 2000, this topic gain momentum in *Critical Security Studies* and

spread itself among *Web of Science* citations (Caveltly *et al.*, 2015). As S. Flynn outlines, one of the challenges of cultivating resilience is related to its multiple definitions and approaches (Flynn, 2011). The author identifies three main approaches of the concept: (a) in ecosystems as "the capacity of a system to withstand disruptive risks without failing"; (b) in management, as "the ability to quickly return to a set of prior conditions"; (c) in general thinking as "the ability to transition from one equilibrium state to another". Resilience means accepting somehow that security environment is unpredictable and marked by disequilibrium. Compared to classical approaches of risks, resilience follows a new direction: rather than pointing prevention, it mixes the present with the future to restore or to adapt the system to a certain phase. Therefore, practitioners must shape a global understanding of the concept for dealing with the unknown and security risks. M.D. Caveltly claims that in practice there are two types of resilience in security. The first type – *the bouncing back* one – is cultivated in United Kingdom and in Singapore (Caveltly, *Resilience in security policy*, 2013). This type is based on making decisions about risk management at the lowest appropriate level. It helps the system to return to a certified state from the past. The second type – *the adaptive*

one – is cultivated in USA. This type is based on shared responsibility and tries to bounce back the system in parallel with adapting it to the new set of rules. Resilience overrun the organizational life such dramatically that in the United Kingdom a standard was approved: the BS 65000. According to *BS 65000 - Guidance for Organizational Resilience* (2014 ed.) resilience is “the ability of an organization to anticipate, prepare for, and respond and adapt to incremental change and sudden disruptions in order to survive and prosper” (BS 65000, 2014). This definition proves that cultivating resilience has a positive impact over that system as it strengthens it. Therefore, security practitioners started to offer a key role to resilience awareness. The concept is a new element that tries to shape the importance of perceiving the need for highly-performant tools for dealing with a risk-evolving environment.

While considering the BS 65000 definition, it might be concluded that a suitable solution for building resilience awareness in security could refer to using future studies methodologies in order to anticipate, respond, prepare and adapt. It is agreed that now, the process of security planning must be preceded by foresight to act decisions based on projections of the possible futures (Taleb, *Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder*, 2014). G. Gioacchino and J. Sumberg plead to a similar position related to the development studies (Gioacchino & Sumberg, 2016). Even though the lack of foresight accuracy is the main cause of resilience cultivation, the anticipation is also a solution for better preparing for the future. As seen from this point of view, the researchers argue that the value of futures studies is less in forecasting accuracy and more in planning and opening minds as G. Glenn (2014) and R. Popper (2008) claim. It means that foresight could be used for creating practical paths for preparing and responding to security risks and finally, rise resilience awareness. Therefore, this article suggests in the following paragraphs that foresight is a key player in security awareness. Therefore, future studies are useful to identify and classify the suitable methods for cultivating resilience.

2. SHAPING THE TAXONOMY

Facing the numerous foresight methods and techniques, some researchers met the need for synthesizing and refining them, as Bertolucci (2004) shows. Among those efforts, we count Jerome Glenn’s *Future Studies Methodology* (2014), Rafael Popper’s *Foresight Diamond* (2008)

and Sam Tangredi’s taxonomy of the *Foresight Products* (2000). Nevertheless, few efforts were made in synthesizing the suitable foresight methods for increasing resilience awareness. One of the most appropriate solution for synthesizing future studies methods and techniques relates to **time framing and temporalities**. According to M.D. Cavelti, temporalities are strong issues that determine the man interest related to resilience (Cavelti, Mareile, & Kristian Soby, 2015, 3: 14). Therefore, this article proposes a time framing approach of the foresight methods to shape resilience. A possible time framing approach applicable to resilience awareness has, in our view, three main components, as Sam Tangredi (2000) militates: (a) *the estimates* (2-5 years), (b) *the predictions* (5-10 years) and (c) *the scenarios* (10-25 years). All the actions related to anticipating, preparing, responding and adapting must arise in those frames. The state of art reveals two main directions related to *foresight practices* that fit security awareness. The first direction states that as the time horizon progressively grows, the qualitative methods should be used – especially for predictions and scenarios (Glenn, 2014). The second direction reveals that no single method should be used; the prospective studies’ methodology makes sense combining different types of methods, as Popper (2008) deducts. Being giving those two hypotheses, a taxonomy based on three frames was delivered, as shown in figure one.

The first frame is expressed through the estimates. The frame presents the current fields of security analysis. Those products strongly affect the resilience awareness, as their outcomes are tangible and noticeable in short time. In addition, their temporality is based on a more articulate class of known data. This means that the processes of *looking into the future* and turning back are easier to complete and more scalable. In the field of security, numerous estimates are provided by the intelligence agencies (like the *National Intelligence Estimates* in USA that are provided by Central Intelligence Agency).

Their purpose is to sum up some important assessments for the political leadership concerning security. The estimates usually combine and merge a variety of components (including technology achievements, economic projections or industrial production) in a decision-making comprehensive way. Estimates usually evaluate the outcome of the near-term policies or the impact of the climate hazards. To increase resilience awareness by developing estimates, one must use mathematical modelling (including decision Modelling or

Statistical Modelling). However, if a researcher wants to cope with complex issues that refer to how future events may change extrapolations, a possible solution is the *Trend Impact Analysis* (TIA). John Stover (1975) and Joseph Coates (1992) make some extensive description of the method and provide samples of applications. In this case, the creation of a database containing potential key events, their probabilities and their impact is necessary. This database will facilitate the process of forward looking and bouncing back.

Least but not last, if a practitioner is interested in the intensity of change in international relations, he must use an index like *the State of the Future Index* (SOFI). SOFI represents a quantitative time series that could indicate the changing points of the future and could show us the probability of getting better or getting worse. The method was refined in *2001-2003 Millennium Project's State of the Future*. A full description of the method is now provided by T. Gordon (2012).




Fig.1 The taxonomy of suitable methods for resilience awareness cultivation

The SOFI could be extended to a 10-year outlook of the future. To be accurate, this extrapolation must simulate historical data for the last 20 years. The SOFI could be used not only for estimates, but also for predictions. The index permits a smoothly transition from past to present, from present to future and vice-versa that makes it reliable to both resilience types.

The second frame is expressed through the predictions. The frame sketches some longer-range assessments. Their relationship with security awareness is rather based on opening mind intention, than on tangible assets. The peculiarity of predictions is related to using trends. This fact inserts the possible futures approach, meaning that there is no certified direction for the evolution of security. In this way, security awareness becomes vital in coping with risks and threats. The predictions argue how trends may combine in international relations to shape significant influences over the system. If the political leadership has the aim of evaluating the validity of any new resilience policy, he must determine the possible directions through predictions. If a practitioner wants to increase resilience awareness by developing predictions, he has many options.

Predictions are situated on the intersection of quantitative and qualitative methods, between estimates and scenarios. The extrapolation of estimates through their specific methods (as TIA and SOFI) outlines the movement of the subsystem towards some new possible peaks. Therefore, the process of forward looking opens some directives for planning and turning back. Nevertheless, one of the most useful tool for resilience awareness is represented by the impact matrices. Impact matrices calculate the influence of factors over the development of the future. The results of impact matrices are not very tangible being influenced by the “wild card identification” (also called black swans or discrete events). This process assumes that the final product of future reality will be different from the results of the prescience patterns and of estimates. This will be true, whether unpredictable events will make their presence felt; the finite product of reality will also subsume elements from all estimates, also according to the advent of “black swans” (Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, 2010). Therefore, an analysis of “unpredictable events” will lead to measures and plans with the purpose of avoiding those events. Once “wild cards” and “weak signs” were

identified, the interrelationship called *Cross Impact Analysis (CIA)* can be applied (Glenn, 2014). Seen from resilience awareness perspective, “wild cards” detection and the “weak signs” discovery opens the possibility of cultivating the *adaptive resilience*. However, if the relation between subsystems should be described, to point the system’s evolution, structural analysis can be applied. *Godet’s Impact Matrix Cross-Reference Multiplication Applied to a Classification (MICMAC)* represents one the most flourishing structural analysis. It is a simulation tool that allows shaping the evolution of the system. The method has three phases in Julius Kane’s opinion: listing the variables, describing the relationship between variables and identifying the key variables (Glenn, 2014). However, if planning for medium term resilience is involved, it is recommended to use the actors’ strategies analysis. (e.g. Teniere-Buchot’s *Chart of Powers*, Battelle’s *Explore-Sim*, or Enzer’s *Interactive Model for Studying Future Business Environments*).

The third frame is expressed through scenarios. The frame represents the most complex and well-balanced construction from the field of future studies with long term impact over resilience awareness. Being governed by qualitative methods, scenarios purpose is to help decision-makers to view all the possible futures. As P. Schwartz (2012) argues, “the result of the scenario is not a frame of tomorrow, but a tool which could give better decisions for the future.” Scenarios mean thinking big for resilience awareness. Those tools represent the most suitable time framing for adaptive resilience. Resilience cultivated through scenarios is synonym with shared responsibility based on “wild cards” detection and on the “weak signs” discovery. In this context, *scenario modelling*, *future wheel* and *Delphi* represent vivid techniques that help security planners to clearly see the problems, the risks and the opportunities of the security environment.

The scenario modelling has as result a possible description of what might occur. It represents the classical method for long-term policy building. *Future wheel* means organizing thinking and questioning about the future. In this regard, future wheel implies a sort of structured brainstorming that collects possible impacts related to multiple concepts. For using future wheel, the group first must identify the drivers of change. Then, must determine each consequence of change in a circle and connect it to the central circle with an arrow, as J. Glenn (2014) militates. As the process continues with second-order

consequences and third-order consequences, the researcher obtains a map of the implications of the event, possible influencing the system and building resilience.

RAND originated the Delphi technique in the 1950s, to anticipate the impact of technology on warfare. Ever since, this method had notorious results in day to day future sketching. The method is suitable for obtaining consensus to apply measures that finally grow resilience. C. Hsu and B. Sandford argue that “the Delphi technique is used for achieving convergence of opinion concerning real-world knowledge” (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). If practitioners want to cultivate *adaptive resilience*, the solution is this time framing. They must describe events and trends by considering the “wild cards” and then, they must use scenario modelling, interactive scenarios and participatory methods as *Delphi Methods*.

3. CONCLUSIONS

As stated in the introduction of this paper, the newly worldwide events from the last few years validated the importance of anticipating and responding to security changes. Constrained by the impossibility of maximum accuracy regarding the future studies, man response to risks and threats became a *light motive* of the state of art. In addition, the European practice of security highlighted some important issues regarding integration and exit. The need to better shaping the moments of change allowed resilience to achieve success in the last decade. This article shows a keen interest on how resilience could be better cultivated through future studies’ methodology. To offer practical paths for resilience awareness, a taxonomy of the suitable methods was designed on the base of time framing, having in mind the estimates, the prediction and the scenarios. The taxonomy proved the interdependency between the length of the period and the wild cards: the bigger the time frame is, the better are the odds of wild cards to appear and the system to be strengthen. Therefore, a primary conclusion arises related to wild card identification: the system will be more resilient if planners study patterns and wild cards related to a longer period. In addition, wild card and weak signals identification must become the “mantra” that will influence the foresight process. A second conclusion is driven from the taxonomy: The key of long-term development of security is the *adaptive resilience*. In respect to this, the adaptive resilience enables practical paths for planning security. However, when making

estimates, only bouncing back resilience is possible. Nevertheless, in the new geopolitical arena widely aforementioned, adaptive resilience is a more suitable solution. Therefore, scenario building, future wheel and Delphi are necessary for an “A+” security planning system.

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PERCEPTIONS ON SECURITY CULTURE

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Abstract: *Security culture encompasses the socially-transmitted traditions, mindsets, action modes which are specific to a certain community found in a certain geographical area. Security culture serves a vital function in its capacity of social cohesion mechanism as it provides the necessary framework for a social representation of security and it fosters the development of certain behavioral models, patterns and attitudes with respect to security. These, in turn, ensure the state of security that a society needs in order to be stable and well-defined. The present article presents the perceptions that the informed Romanian public has on security culture, its meaning, components, development, promotion, etc. The analysis is based on the results of a questionnaire administered in November-December 2017 to a group of 152 respondents and places the answers in the more global context of the trends in security culture.*

Keywords: *security culture; promotion; vulnerabilities; risks; threats*

1. INTRODUCTION

The interest in security is increasingly developed in contemporary society. It concerns broader categories of public and various professional groups. These pursuits and interests have generated practices and approaches that are more or less similar, but which definitely foster adjustment and adaptation mechanisms for the social and public realities regarding security. A certain structuring and interconnectedness can be noticed in their respect which point to the fact that a specific security culture is present and manifest.

The aim of the present article is to provide a clearer understanding of what security culture is at present by taking a brief look at its evolution. Once the theoretical basis has been established, it is important to understand the means through which security culture can be promoted and what functions these different types of communication can achieve. The third part of the research focuses on the results of a questionnaire regarding security culture promotion.

2. SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE SECURITY CULTURE

Security culture is the result of social interactions that take place among groups, organizations and communities concerned with

aspects of social security, of certain learning and knowledge development processes which mirror the human needs for protection, safety and shelter. Security culture is adaptive, it develops in relation to societal evolution and is transmitted from one generation to the next through various means of communication, either written or oral, as well as through support practices for security values.

2.1 Academic perspectives on security culture. A precursor to the concept of security culture was the term 'strategic culture', first developed by J.Snyder (1977) with respect to the Soviet approach to strategic thinking and defined as

the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired with regard to [nuclear strategy] (Snyder, 1977:8).

During the Cold War, strategic culture reflected the confrontational situation and the positioning of the two military and political blocks: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, separated by the Iron Curtain. In fact, each military block was closed onto itself, looking with hostility, fear and mistrust over that 'curtain'. At the same time, neither side wanted a direct confrontation. Confrontation avoidance was most likely due to the nuclear arsenal each side had at its disposal.

Continental missiles allowed them to hit targets in the adversary's strategic locations, without any direct confrontation. Strategic culture came as a response to this situation and it offered doctrines, principles and coping mechanisms for military and political approaches to the situation created. If the First World War had been one in which belligerents had got stuck in trenches dug close together, during the Cold War, the opposing forces took cover behind the strategic blockade they had created and their general beliefs, attitudes and behaviors reflected these strategic positions which dictated their interactions with one another, the way they positioned themselves with respect to whom they perceived as the enemy. Since these positions remained fixed for nearly half a century, they became engrained in the culture of the respective states and surpassed the transitory status of policies. However, at that time, strategic culture focused mainly outwardly, towards enemies and allies as borders and delimitations were distinct, and roles had been clearly assigned and were distinctive. Strategic culture was at that time derivative of and dictated ways of interaction in the international arena which focused little on attitudes towards security at home.

C.S. Gray takes the concept one step further. Strategic culture is

the master narrative, is the disarmingly elementary, even commonsensical, idea, that a security community is likely to think and behave in ways that are influenced by what it has taught itself about itself and its relevant contexts. And that education, to repeat, rests primarily upon the interpretation of history and history's geography (or should it be geography's history?) (Gray, 2006:7).

Gray focuses not only on international strategies but also on what strategic culture means for the society that upholds it. He stresses the importance of what a particular security community thinks of itself, what it is taught about itself, what contexts it operates in, and what its geography and history can be interpreted as.

We can notice a shift from the limited perspective of strategic culture, to the more encompassing security culture of today. This shift is due to increasingly complex geopolitical and geostrategic interactions, to the more amorphous, ambiguous and unpredictable nature of security challenges, to demographic changes etc. Gray maintains the term strategic culture but refines its meaning to include three concepts: (1) public culture; (2) strategic culture; and (3) military (organizational) culture (Gray, 2006:10). He also

emphasizes the strong bond of mutual determination that binds culture and identity,

We must insist that culture in its several identities – public, strategic, military-organizational – should consist of assumptions and ideas that are strongly held (Gray, 2006:11).

Culture is the lens through which people perceive the world, the software that we are programmed into without being aware, by being members of a certain society.

[Culture] enables us to make sense of our world. Culture provides us with the assumptions, largely unspoken and unwritten, that are the foundation for, though not the sole determinants of, our judgments. Culture yields us the truths, small and large, that we know should guide our decisions and actions (Gray, 2006:12).

We cannot make conscious choices with respect to the culture we belong to, as Gray explains, 'societies, security communities, do not choose their strategic cultures. Rather do their strategic cultures choose them' (Gray, 2006:17) and this dictates that ways in which we respond to the events we are confronted with, the ways we interpret them, the ways in which we react, predict, fall prey to security challenges.

Although not entirely impervious to change, security culture modifies only when there are strong enough reasons to do so, when adjustments are called for, when society itself is altered fundamentally. We have noticed such changes in recent years and they have impacted security culture as it will be reflected in the result of our survey. To name just a few of these changes: an open border policy entails migration of workforce and not only; IT developments lead to vulnerability from cyberattacks, ideological conflicts cause terrorist attacks; low intensity conflicts can escalate and lead to large scale migrations, etc.

Our survey and resulting analysis uncovered what elements of security culture are seen as most prominent, what risks, threats and vulnerabilities are strongly felt by the public and what the public perceives as being the most important aspects that security culture promotion should focus on so as to become an intrinsic part of a well-functioning society that can meet contemporary challenges.

2.2 Institutional approach to security culture. In the *National Defense Strategy 2015-2019: A Strong Romania within Europe and the World*, in the chapter 'The educational, healthcare,

social and demographic dimension', one of the lines of action mentioned is 'the fostering of the security culture, including through continuous education, aimed at promoting values, norms, attitudes or actions allowing for the assimilation of the national security concept'.

To complete this provision, *The Guide to the National Defense Strategy*, drafted by the Presidential Administration and approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence decision no.128 on 10th December 2015, defines security culture as

the sum total of values, norms, attitudes or actions which determine the understanding and assimilation at a societal level of the concept of security and its derivatives (national security, international security, collective security, insecurity, security policy etc.).

The above-mentioned definitions highlight several angles from which security culture can be presented and analyzed and various approaches to this concept become evident: the cognitive approach related to the knowledge obtained directly or acquired as part of the educational process in the field of security, interpretations of the concept of security; the emotional approach referring to perceptions, affective availabilities, feelings that determine individual and group attitudes; the evaluative approach pertaining to assessments with respect to the level and quality of security; the historical approach focused on experience, processes, evolutions, traditions, customs, practices; the operational approach related to actional patterns, favorite modes of action, stipulated procedures.

In society, security culture has several important functions. Firstly, it defines group, community, society identity and ensures a foundation for social solidarity, a rallying point made up of common objectives that inspire devotion, loyalty, cohesion, belonging and patriotism. Moreover, security culture ensures the reference points needed for the projection of the social structure of security and for the development of specific capabilities, it defines the patterns, behaviors and attitudes in the field of security.

By including security culture under the larger umbrella term of culture, one might also make reference to the cultural patrimony, defined as 'a testament and expression of the values, beliefs and traditions that have resulted in time from the interaction of human and natural factors;', according to the Ministry of Culture and National Identity. Thus, by way of analogy, we could speak

of the security culture patrimony which includes the immovable material patrimony (special strategic and operational infrastructures, critical infrastructures, administrative infrastructures) and movable material patrimony (artistic treasury, technical treasury, craftsmanship treasury, etc.) and the immaterial patrimony (beliefs, values, norms, rituals, symbols, attitudes, practices, forms of verbal expression, etc.).

3. PROMOTING SECURITY CULTURE

The promotion of security culture includes an array of public and strategic communication activities, influence communication and various exhibitions and promotional events whose purpose is to inform, stimulate interest, educate, as well as change target groups' (be they individuals or institutions) attitudes and behaviors with respect to security issues.

Public and strategic communication presupposes the existence of an information (message) exchange between public actors by means of specific channels and processes. In the promotion of security culture, the actors can be individual or collective entities with responsibilities in this field, who plan, initiate and support formal communication processes (which function hierarchically, legally, etc.) or entities with concerns in this field which participate and support formal actors through informal actions and activities, establishing autonomous social support networks. Strategic communication can focus, among others, on existing security issues and on the identification of alternative responses, on the creation of a positive image for the institutions with responsibilities in the field of security, and on trust building to support these institutions' actions. Raising public awareness can be achieved, for example, by transmitting information and knowledge regarding the enforcement of specific norms, rules or procedures which contribute to security culture development. Security culture messages have specific, distinct, concrete objectives, designed to ensure the success of promotion, to be well structured with a view to transmitting ideas which can draw the target audience's attention.

Influence communication presupposes the transmission of intentional informative content, meant to alter, transform target audiences' opinions, attitudes and behaviors. The process of influence targeted in the promotion of security culture is educational and is achieved by awareness raising activities, conferences, seminars and

debates by editing special publications, creating and broadcasting media products, etc. All these are meant to facilitate the transmission and consolidation of knowledge and attitudes among social actors (institutions and organizations in the field of security), media institutions and the general public. By broadcasting objective, timely and correct information, influence communication contributes to the development of resilience by countering and neutralizing the consequences of negative information, including by creating a desirable image for security culture and the institutions that promote it.

Structures responsible for this type of communication are found at the central level of the Ministry of National Defence - the Information and Public Relations Directorate, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - the Information and Public Relations Directorate, as well as at the level of structures that make up these ministries: the information and Public Relations Offices of the General Staffs of the Armed Forces branches; the Romanian Police - The Information and Public Relations Center, the Romanian Gendarmerie - the Information and Public Relations Service, the Romanian General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations - the Information and Public Relations Service.

Promotional events, as a form of unidirectional communication, can contribute to informing and raising public awareness regarding security issues. Even if this type of activities target a relatively small audience, by broadcasting them through means of mass communication, the number of receptors can become larger than initially estimated. Promotion activities focus on new concepts, visions, strategic publications and establishing institutional or personal contacts in the security field by participating in exhibitions, international conferences, fairs, etc.

4. MEASURING PERCEPTIONS ON SECURITY CULTURE AND ITS PROMOTION

This research presents the perceptions on security culture and its promotion that are held by an informed audience, with a view to identifying the main interests, representations, concerns and possible avenues for improvement that the participants in the survey believe to be relevant with respect to security culture. Security culture and its promotion are analyzed from several perspectives. Thus, the ways, methods, means of support and development for security culture of stimulating the public interest in this field as well

as alternative means of dissemination of specific ideas, notions, knowledge.

To offer a comprehensive view of the analyzed issue, the objective and available data provided by institutions which operate in the field of security have been supplemented by a subjective dimension regarding people's perceptions, attitudes and experiences with respect to security culture.

4.1 Data collection. The analysis is based on the results of a survey that was carried out in November-December 2017 meant to identify the perceptions regarding the promotion of security culture. The survey was based on a 23-item questionnaire, with multiple choice and open-ended answers. The questionnaire was accessible as a google form, it was transmitted via e-mail and distributed in printed form. The respondents had the possibility to add their personal answers for each question. The respondents are people interested in the field of security and security culture, who are students, researchers, employees or previously employed in this field.

The total number of persons who responded was 152, the vast majority of whom are young and very young: 81.5% under the age of 35. There were 8.6% respondents aged 45-60 and 1.3% over 60. 64.5% of the participants in the questionnaire were students (undergraduate, graduate, PhD or post-doctoral) and 22.3% were employed either in private or state institutions. As far as place of residence is concerned, the vast majority live in urban settings, over half of the respondents in Bucharest. Synthesizing the above-mentioned data, the profile of the respondents emerges: young and very young persons, under the age of 35, mostly students who live in the urban environment and have an interest in the security field.

4.2 Analysis of survey results. Two types of indicators have been used to perform the analysis presented in this research:

- objective indicators - observable, quantifiable by a third party, based on periodic reports and public data published by various institutions. These indicators have been used in data interpretation in order to verify and support the interpretations of the data resulted from the collection of questionnaire results and to integrate these interpretations in the larger context of the dynamics of the security environment and perceptions of security culture at a national and international level.

- perception indicators - which focus on the public's perceptions, attitudes and experiences,

quantifiable only by means of questionnaires. In order to verify the data resulted from the ProSCOP questionnaire, results obtained from surveys conducted by both Romanian and foreign specialized institutions have been employed.

4.3 Security culture outline. When asked what they consider to be the defining elements of security culture, more than half of the respondents define security culture by means of the cognitive approach (specialized knowledge needed for the understanding and internalizing the concept of security - 52%) and by means of the large scale operational approach (standard operating procedures for threats, risks and vulnerabilities). A significant percentage of participants (50%) add the historical approach with its immaterial patrimony component (a coherent set of ideas, values, ideals and symbols related to security) followed closely (47.7%) by the small scale operational approach (norms, regulations, specific rules pertaining to security issues). Less emphasis is placed on individual, group or societal lifestyles adapted to security conditions (22.4%) and on individual and societal behaviors with respect to security (28.9%), which indicates that respondents do not perceive security culture as the product of individual choices or of collective individual decisions, but rather as something that either transcends the individual or is the responsibility of the state. Moreover, the historical approach gathered the fewest responses as only 9.2% believed that security culture is the repository of experiences, beliefs, conceptions, attitudes, and customs regarding security. This type of shortsightedness could impact the cultural aspect of security, as a shared history is an important element of security culture and strongly determines societal attitudes towards security.

To synthesize, the respondents understand that security culture is a complex mechanism based not solely on knowledge regarding possible threats, risks and vulnerabilities but also on certain modes of action to tackle these challenges and that all these are rooted (as Gray explained) in a shared culture which comprises values, ideas, beliefs regarding what security is for that community. More precisely, security culture is being able to react efficiently when confronted with risks, threats, vulnerabilities based on and resorting to the core elements that bind the community together.

4.4 Objectives of security culture promotion. When asked what they believed should be the main objectives of security culture promotion, more than

two thirds of the respondents (69.7%) indicate citizens' awareness regarding security risks, threats and vulnerabilities as the main objective of security culture promotion. This is followed closely by objectives focused on ensuring minimum knowledge about security for as large an audience as possible (62.5%) and developing citizens' ability to understand risks, challenges and threats to security (58.6%). These answers closely reflect the answers to the previous question regarding the most defining elements of security culture.

Approximately one third of respondents consider that security culture promotion should lead to citizens' compliance with security norms, regulations, standard operating procedures (35.5%) or to adapt individual, group or societal behaviors to security-specific conditions (30.9%). This last choice further confirms the assessment formulated in 4.3, namely that security and security culture are not seen as the responsibility of the individual.

4.5 Promoting security domains. When asked which vertical component of security they would believe should be promoted above all, human security was the answer of the vast majority of respondents (81.6%), followed by national security (73.7%). At the opposite end of the spectrum, a low or moderate interest is manifested with respect to subregional security (13.2%), regional security (17.8%), euro-atlantic security (22.4%) and global security (44.1%). The paramount importance assigned to human security is a direct consequence of the fact that individualism is gaining ground as the dominant ideology of the 21st century. More precisely, individual interests are foregrounded, sometimes to the detriment of collective ones. According to *Future State 2030: The global megatrends shaping governments*, 'Advances in global education and technology have helped empower individuals like never before, leading to increased demands for transparency and participation in government and public decision-making.' In the case of Romania, the focus on human security can be correlated with limited trust in the government (24%) and in the Parliament (20%), according to a CURS survey.

The focus on national security can be associated with the trust that the Romanian public exhibits for the institutions that operate in the field of security and defence, more precisely in the Armed Forces, 71%, surpassed solely by the level of trust associated with firefighters 83%, according to the same CURS survey.

Moreover, disinformation campaigns combined with the lack of information campaigns have led to

a decrease in trust in the structures that manage security at a European and euro-atlantic level. According to a survey conducted by Gallup in south-eastern Europe in 2016, only 50% of Romanians associate NATO with country protection, while 8% consider NATO a threat to Romania's security and 25% have no opinion. With respect to EU membership, another Gallup survey from 2016 reveals the fact that 58% of Romanians believe that this status is beneficial for Romania, 17% that it is a disservice and the rest did not respond. These results are confirmed by a survey carried out by IRES in 2017 *Account of the political year 2017. Perspectives for 2018* according to which, the question 'How much do you trust the European Union?' received the following answers: 13% of the participants - very much, 38% - much, 31% - somewhat, 17% - little or not at all. In all cases, Romanians' attitude with respect to superstatal organizations with implications at the level of national security and responsibilities for subregional, regional and global security is divided.

4.6 Security threats to consider. Threats to national security represent 'actions, deeds of states, capacities, strategies, intentions or plans that can affect the security-related values, interests and national objectives and/or are able to endanger directly or indirectly national security, by affecting the normal functioning of state institutions, the citizens' lives and physical integrity and the organization of human communities', according to *The Guide to the National Defense Strategy*. Threats can be direct, objective, quantifiable, open or can be seen as such against a backdrop of uncertainty and lack of confidence. When asked which threats they consider a priority for security culture promotion two thirds of the respondents' answers focus on cyberattacks launched by hostile state and non-state entities (69.1%) and terrorism respectively (67.8%), while 32.3% feel threatened by hostile information actions.

Disinformation can be achieved by means of cyberattacks materialized in attempts to take over systems control of communications management, of financial management, of institutions, of stock market transactions, etc.

Terrorism is a major concern for the Romanian public because 142 failed, countered or finalized terrorist attacks were registered in Europe in 2016 and 1002 people were arrested for terrorism-related crimes. According to *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017* drafted by Europol, in Romania only one person was arrested

in 2016 for terrorist activities connected to jihadism, therefore, concrete threats against Romania are not as substantial as in the case of other European nations. Even under these circumstances, terrorism remains a threat that worries respondents mainly because of the unpredictability and uncontrollability of the phenomenon.

42.1% of respondents are concerned by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and trafficking of double-use products, 28.9% regard as threats the destabilizing actions on the Eastern border and 24.3% the continuation of frozen conflicts in the Black Sea Region and the instability in the West Balkans. So, it could be said that a quarter of the respondents consider that threats from the neighborhood need to be explained clearly to the public and addressed in order to foster the development of a string security culture. Only 23% view as threats the distortions on energy markets and competing project of state and non-state actors.

4.7 Security risks to look at. The risk to security represents 'the likelihood that any event, situation, condition with uncertain manifestations could occur and its occurrence could affect in any way the normal functioning of state institutions, the organization and functioning of human communities, as well as the citizens' lives and physical integrity in a given circumstance or determined context,' according to *The Guide to the National Defense Strategy*.

When asked which risks they consider a priority for security culture promotion, the respondents' answers focus on social risks (demographic decline, emigration of active population, environmental degradation, deficiencies in national healthcare, education and welfare systems, as well as distortions on the labor market) together with cross-border organized crime (drug, person, weapon and goods trafficking, illegal migration and economic and financial crimes) which concern respondents' to the greatest extent (63.1% and 61.8% respectively). In their opinion, these should be the focus of security culture promotion. Once more, the focus on national security which impacts human security can be noticed, since these responses can be correlated to the ones regarding the vertical components of security. Social risks take precedence because their effects are commonly felt by the population.

These concerns take precedence over the risks associated with Romania's development failures

(24.3%), regional instability (30.3%), illegal trafficking of conventional weapons (30.9%), as well as high impact low probability risks: low intensity conflicts which persist in time, migratory fluxes generated by natural disasters, pandemics, ecologic disasters (34.2%) and the radicalization of extremist entities (39.5%). The latter's percentage can be correlated with the answers to the previous question regarding threats, more precisely the high percentage of people who perceive terrorism as a threat. The radicalization of extremist entities is considered one of the causes of terrorism. According to *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017*, 'The largest number of attacks in which the terrorist affiliation could be identified were carried out by ethno-nationalist and separatist extremists (99). Attacks carried out by left-wing violent extremists have been on the rise since 2014; they reached a total of 27 in 2016, of which most (16) were reported by Italy. The number of jihadist terrorist attacks decreased from 17 in 2015 to 13 in 2016, of which 6 were linked to the so-called Islamic State (IS).

4.8 Security vulnerabilities to observe. A security vulnerability is represented by 'that functional/systemic/structural deficiency that can be exploited or can contribute to the materialization of a threat or risk, determining the weakening of the state's ability to diminish the impact of event with potentially grave consequences for the normal functioning of state institutions, the citizens' lives and physical integrity and the organization of human communities, as well as the capacity to protect, defend and promote values, interests and national security objectives,' according to *The Guide to the National Defense Strategy*.

When asked what vulnerabilities they consider a priority for security culture promotion, the only one indicated by a majority of respondents is corruption (61.8%). This answer confirms the results of an IRES survey carried out in November 2017, according to which 81% of respondents believe that in Romania corruption is unbearable and only 18% disagree.

Scarcity of resources and the incongruence in managing various types of risks that affect interinstitutional reactions in crises situations are indicated by 43.4% of respondents as another vulnerability. The same percentage indicates that workforce migration is a vulnerability that security culture promotion should tackle. 36.8% believe that healthcare is a vulnerability and an almost similar percentage, 36.2%, indicate that the ability

of the central and local administration to implement national and European public policies needs to be addressed. Almost one third of respondents (30.9%) identify poverty as a vulnerability as well as critical infrastructures (28.9%) and energy security (27%). The other vulnerabilities were considered less important as the focus of security culture promotion and only gathered around 20% of respondents' answers: public spending-22.4%, the fragility of civic solidarity-22.4%, economic disparities between regions and counties, demographic decline, social exclusion and polarity-20.4%, and European funds absorption-22.4%.

4.9 Actions to promote security cultures. The actions that need to be undertaken in order to better promote security culture focus not only on changing the behavior of social actors with responsibilities in this field (governmental organizations) but also of those who participate voluntarily (non-governmental organizations) regarding the level of involvement but also the improvement of specific policies and strategies.

When asked which of the following actions they believed could contribute to a more effective security culture promotion, 70.4% of respondents indicated the need to perfect the communication methods and techniques so they ensure that everyone clearly understands security problems. Setting goals and actions to follow for a more efficient promotion of security culture should lead, according to almost two thirds of the respondents (60.5%), to the writing of a national strategy to promote security culture. A better understanding of security issues could be fostered, according to 59.2%, by developing security policies accessible to the general audience. With respect to active participation, it would be more desirable that governmental institutions in the field of security get more involved (42,1%) than non-governmental ones (25,7%). Only 27.6% of respondents believe that a coherent and consistent discourse regarding security coming from qualified institutions and persons could help promote security culture.

These answers confirm the need for strategic communication at the level of the state in order to promote security culture. Strategic communication can reunite all the actions that respondents consider important because strategic communication presupposes clearly-defined objectives, adapted to the target audiences' levels of knowledge and competence so that the objectives of the respective campaigns are met.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Security culture is a complex and dynamic concept and the goal of the present research has been to identify some key components and to estimate and analyze the ways in which security culture is and should be promoted in the Romanian society. Given the fact that the survey results our analysis is based on pertain to a large extent to the under 35 year-old category, we could say that we have a clearer vision of what young people believe security culture is and what aspects of it should be promoted. Security culture is mainly defined by its cognitive and operational approach, and human security is considered to be the most relevant. The risks identified as most prominent pertain to the social domain, the threats refer to cyberattacks and terrorism and the vulnerabilities focus once more on human security aspects. Our conclusion is that strategic communication needs to be employed in order to promote security culture efficiently and extensively and to create an aware and informed audience that can perceive security not solely as a personal or national matter but as an international and collaborative project.

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JIHADIST GROUPS ON THE TURKISH - SYRIAN FRONT

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Abstract: *The instability in Syria that started in 2011 when the anti-regime uprisings turned into a civil war has initially spread into the region, and then has become a global problem due to the Salafist militant extremists. The terrorist organization known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria declared a global jihad and urged "true" Muslims all over the world for an exodus towards the newly founded Islamic state. Turkey, as a neighbour to the conflict zone, has been facing an increasing risk and threats to its security at many levels. The reason for the risk is essentially caused not only by the geographical proximity to the conflict zone but also by its border neighbours, which include such non-state actors as DAESH, the Kurdish Democratic. Turkey is preparing to launch the main effort of its Operation Olive Branch assault against the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in the Afrin area in northern Syria. Turkish forces and Turkish-backed Syrian opposition groups have set military conditions for a Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) ground operation in the coming days. In this paper we will present the Jihadist groups that act for Turkey's interests as well as for Syria's interests. Knowing these groups will help us understand that terrorism is financed from the outside to create destabilization of the area.*

Keywords: *Jihadist; Turkey; Syria; "Olive-Branch"; Kurdish*

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the last seven years, 2011-2018, the conflict in Syria has seen changes at all levels, including the name and loyalty of the Syrian opposition armies. Some have retained their name and infrastructure, while others have repeatedly changed their name and loyalty. Currently, only a few small groups in northern Syria are called the "Free Army" after the United States and the Gulf countries have stopped providing them with money and weapons. It is noteworthy in this respect that military groups such as Al-Nosra, Ahrar Al-Sham and other small active groups fighting under the Liberian Army's flag in control and leadership to play the role very well and receive in return the necessary weapons be antitank missiles etc. After the cessation of external support for these groups in northern Syria, Turkey remains the only source of financial and military support, while the Kurdish ambition of Syria is Turkey's top priority if it is not the only item on the agenda. Despite the announcement by the Syrian Interim Government in Turkey to establish what he called the "Syrian National Army" by the end of last year, however, the factions recruited by Turkey to fight with her in Operation Olive Branch, which intends to invade the Afrin area, fought their names and not under the "Syrian National Army" flag, despite the

support of the interim government and the Syrian opposition to this process. Said Yasser Abdel Rahim, one of the leaders of the military factions that entered the battle of Afrin, said that 25,000 Syrian fighters were involved in the operation with the Turkish army, but this figure is questionable. Many of this military group fought each other in the context of the struggle for financial and commercial resources, the last battles between the Al-Shamie Front, Jabhat Al-Shamie and Sultan Murad brigade, Liwa Sultan Murad from the Bab Al-salamah border crossing in Turkey, near Izaz. So I will present jihadist groups who fought alongside the Turkish army on the front of the Afrin influencing otherwise the state of the conflict between Turkey and Kurds will lead to the fact that these groups had both a common strategy and common objectives. Before I start mentioning the warring parties in the town of Afrin, it is necessary to mention some of the fighting parties in the Syrian city of Aleppo. Here is what is called the battle of Aleppo, the butcher of Greater Aleppo. It was one of the most violent battles because it brought together all parties with the sole aim of liberating and defending the historic city of Aleppo and confronting the army of Bashar al-Assad, which is composed of religious Shia Islam such as Hezbollah and others, in addition to the Russian air strikes. The Butcher of Greater Aleppo: This is the

armed factions that participated in the decisive battle, this war has lasted for six months in 2016: Ajnad AL-Sham, Levant Front, Jabhat Al-Shamia', Turkistan Islamic Party In Syria, 13th Division (Syrian Free Army), Northern Division (Syrian Free Army), Central Division (Syrian Free Army), Ansar Al-Din Front, Front Of The Levant, Jabhat Fatah Al- Sham', Jaysh Al- Islam, Jaysh Al- Tahrir (Syrian Free Army), Jaysh Al- Sunna, Army Of Mujahideen, Jaysh Al-Nasar (Syrian Free Army), Haraket Ahrar Al- Sham, Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki Movement, Fastaqim Union, Sultan Murad Division, (Syrian Free Army) Legion, Al-Safwa Brigades, Kataeb Thuwar Al- Sham (Syrian Free Army), Liwa Al -Haqq, Mountain Hawks Brigade (Syrian Free Army)

2. GROUPS AND FRACTIONS OF THE ISLAMIST INVOLVED IN THE INVASION OF AFRIN

2.1 Movement Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki. It is one of the most important groups supported by Turkey in rural Aleppo, formed at the end of 2011 by sheikh Tawfiq Shihab al-Din in the village of Sheikh Suleiman, northwest Aleppo, and in July 2016 an online video clip of a group of members of this Movement and sacrificed a child 15-year-old. The movement was allied with the Sham Liberation Organization before the outbreak of military conflicts between them and ended with their separation. Named after Nouredine Al-Zenji,, Atabek,, of Aleppo, Prince of Damascus and Aleppo in the twelfth century. The largest gathering of fighters in the city of Aleppo are in its northwestern suburbs. Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki participated in the first battles that began in the Battle of Aleppo in July 2012 and took control of Salah al-Din district, although he soon withdrew to its heart in the countryside. Who is Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki? It is known as a Sunni Islamic rebel movement that participates in the Syrian civil war. Between 2014 and 2015, they began as part of the Syrian Revolutionary Command Council and always fired the BGM-71 TOW, known as anti-tank missiles. In 2014, it was reported to be one of the most influential factions in Aleppo. On February 18, 2018, Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki's movement merged with Ahrar Al-Sham to form a single front, the liberation of Syria. This group also has gone through many affiliations since its establishment. Was initially a branch of the Fajr movement, then went to join the Tawheed Brigades during the attack on Aleppo, before the withdrawal and allied with the Saudi-backed

originality and development front. In January 2014, Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki was one of the founding factions of the Jamaat-ul- Mujahideen, an anti-Daesh organization. In May 2014, it withdrew from the coalition and later received increased financial support from Saudi Arabia, which was reluctant to support the Mujahideen Army because of its ties to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. In December 2014, Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki joined the Mashreq Front, a broad coalition of Islamist insurgent groups operating in Aleppo. On May 6, 2015, she joined 13 other groups of Aleppo in the Aleppo Joint Operations Room. On October 6, 2015, the positions of Nour Al-Din al-Zenki's movement in the city of Aleppo were attacked by the Al-Nasra Front of al-Qaeda. On 19 October 2015, the SLA military commander was reportedly killed in fighting with government forces near Aleppo. on November 2015, Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki's movement has absorbed several Turkoman groups supported by Turkey. On 11 November, a number of 35 Turkish fighters in the group split into the Nasra Front and, on 15 November, one of its commanders was replaced by a Turkmen commander. During the Vienna peace talks in November 2015 for Syria, Jordan was commissioned to draft the list of terrorist groups; it was reported that group Nour Al-Din had been placed on the list. On January 28, 2016, the movement of Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki withdrew from its positions in Aleppo, which was captured by the Nasra Front. In the same month, the group's headquarters included banners from prominent Salafist jihadist quotations and figures, including Abdullah Azzam. On September 24, 2016, Zenki joined the army Al Fatah. On 15 October 2016, four "battalions" of the Mashreq Front (also former members of the Tawhid Brigade) left and joined the group. In October 2016, a group of fighters from the Mashreq Front who were former members of the Tawhid Brigades left the Mashreq Front and joined the Nour al-Din al-Zenki movement. On November 02.2016, during the attack on Aleppo, Fastakim fighters captured a military commander of the Zenki movement. In response, the Zenki fighters attacked the headquarters of the Fastakim Union in the Salah al-Din area and Ansari area in Aleppo. At least one rebel was killed and more than 25 wounded on both sides in the raid. The next day, the Mashreq Front and the Abu Amara Brigades began patrolling the streets to arrest any rebels taking part in the clashes. At least 18 rebels were killed in the internal fighting. Eventually, the Zenki movement and Abu Amara brigades took over all the

positions of the Fastakim Union in eastern Aleppo. Scores of rebels surrendered from the last group and were captured or some of them joined Ahrar al-Sham or were abandoned. On November 15, 2016, the Syrian Free Brigade and the Shahba Brigade declared that they had pledged allegiance and joined Nour al-Din Al-Zenki's movement. Also during November, the Northern Army joined. In December, the Aleppo branch of the Siyof al-Sham Brigade joined the group, while its branch in Azaz joined the Mashreq front. On January 27, 2017 the Northern Army left Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki's movement and joined the Mashreq Front. The next day, the group's Idlib branch joined the Liberation of Sham, while its northern branch split into the Levant. The branch then formed the Revolutionary Cavalry Brigade at the end of February. It later became involved in fighting against other TFS factions in northern Aleppo. For more information, the Free Syrian Army is supported by Turkey. Internal disputes between armed forces factions On July 20, 2017, the movement of Nour al-Din Al-Zenki led by Sheikh Tawfiq Shihabuddin announced its withdrawal from the Liberation of Sham in the midst of a large-scale conflict between HTS and Ahrar Al-Sham and became an independent group. In November 2017, violent clashes erupted between the movement of Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki and the Liberation of the Sham in the north of Idlib and western Aleppo, especially in the region between Atma and Khan Al-Asal.

2.2 AL-Sham Army Legion. It is also known as the Homs Army. The group was formed in March 2014 as a federation of 19 Islamist factions close to the Syrian Muslim brothers in the cities of Alep, Idlib, Homs and Hama. "The AL Sham" joined a group of factions on 2015, and set up the "Open Aleppo" Military Operations headed by Yasser Abdel Rahim. The Sham Legion was formed on 10 March 2014 in Syrian territory. These groups operated between the governorates of Aleppo and Damascus, but were concentrated in the governorates of Idlib, Hama and Homs. The aim of this formation was to "unify" non-Al-Qaeda Islamist insurgents in Syria. After its formation, the group participated in the Battle of Morak and Khan Cheikhon in 2014. On April 26, 2015, along with five other major rebel groups in Aleppo: the Ahrar Cham, the Army of Islam, the Mashreq Front, the Syrian Revolutionary Guards, and the Fajr of the Caliphate Battalion, the Sham Army established the joint Fatah-Aleppo "Open Aleppo" operations. Major Yasser Abdul Rahim, Field

Commander of the Sham Army, was appointed commander of Fatah, a site he maintained until the government forces were fully restored from Aleppo in December 2016. Between 2014 and 2016, Sham Legion was at some point a rebel group supported by the United States and received BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missiles. However, in January 2016, the Northern Brigade was formed as part of the Sham Legion in Aleppo. This group participated in Operation Euphrates Shield, which began in the war of 24 August 2016 in Grappulos with the aim of expelling the Syrian democratic forces and the Islamic state from the northern province of Aleppo. After this campaign, Sham Legion was involved in a conflict between the different factions of the Turkish Free Army TFSA. On May 30, 2017, after increased conflict between the rebels in northern Aleppo, the Syrian Legion expelled the northern battalion from its ranks and rejected its commander Mustafa Rami Al-Kujah. The Sham Legion, together with six other groups of TFSA, formed the Victory Block in June 2017, while the Free North Brigade, which was formerly part of the Unification Brigade, joined the Sham Legion on 16 June 2017.

2.3 Hamzah's Band. It is a group trained by the Turks, and it was announced that it was foundation in April 2016, joining a Turkmen group called "Samarkand Brigade" concerning the city of Samarkand in Uzbekistan. This group was one of the first Turkish groups to enter the Syrian city of Grapples in 2017 from the Qarqamish gate joined the Turkish army and took control of the city. The history of this group dates back to the Syrian Free Army, trained and equipped to fight by the United States and Turkey as part of the Syrian training program to fight the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria, in northwestern Syria. On April 23, 2016, five units of the Free Syrian Army were merged into the town of Mar'i in the northern province of Aleppo, the Hamzah Brigades, the Dhi Qar Brigades, the Raad Al-Shamal Brigades, the FAR Brigades, "And the fight against terrorism "such as the dissenter Syrian from the government. Under the command of Syrian army commander dissident Saif Abu Bakr and the factions receive military support from the international coalition against Daesh. They are also called the descendants of Salah al-Din Al-Ayubi. In June 2016, the Northern Thunder Brigade received BGM-71TOW missiles from the coalition, and a Turkish Turkmen group called Samarkand Brigade, named after the city in Uzbekistan, joined the Hamza section. During the Turkish military intervention in the Syrian civil

war, the Hamzah division was one of the first groups of the Syrian Free Army to enter Jarabulus from Karkamış and took over the city. Saif Abu Bakr was one of those who followed Turkish tanks and troops and entered Grapples in the morning, during the first day of the operation, and arrived in the city center in the afternoon. Later he gave a speech to civilians there. On 18 October 2016, the Northern Thunder Brigade issued a final warning to the, People's Protection, and Revolutionary Army units,, warning them to leave Tel Rifaat within 48 hours after the attack on the city.

2.4 Brigade Sultan Murad, Sultan Murad Division. It is a group formed by the Turkish state, offering all sorts of support from military funding to logistical assistance and even training it. The group was formed as a result of the integration of brigade groups "Sultan Mohammed Al-Fateh" in the rural area of Aleppo, the brigade of the "Martyr Zaki Turkmani" and the brigade of "cubes of faith" with the forces of Sultan Murad. This fraction represents the majority of Turkish-military armed groups in the northern Aleppo region. This doctrine was taken from the roots and previous ideas. So this movement was named after the former Ottoman Sultan Murad II, 1421-1451. The flag was borrowed from Sultan Salah Murad, who symbolizes the martyrs to express his political commitment to Islam, while the red color symbolizes Turkish nationalism. Among the leaders of this group is the so-called Ahmed Osman, Fahim Issa and Ali Seih Saleh, it is Among the Syrian rebel groups and participation in the Turkish military intervention in Syria, this division receives the largest support from the Turkish armed forces. It has at least 8 tankers and FNSS ACV-15 armored vehicles that were used during this military operation. This group also has bombers and grenades Milkor MGL. Heavy weapons are composed of armed technical vehicles with heavy machine guns and autocannons. The BGM-71 anti-tank missiles have also been manufactured in the United States.

3. LIST OVERVIEW ISLAMIC GROUPS WORKING FOR SYRIA AND TURKEY

1. Martyrs of Islam Brigade 'Liwa Shuhada Al-Islam, Active for operate military in 2012 until now, it was led by Saeed Enker, known Abou Jamal.
2. Yarmouk Army 'Liwa Shuhada Al-Yarmouk, Was founded in 2012 until present, was led by Muhammad Al-Baridi.

3. Lions of Sunnah Division, Forqat Usoud Al-Sunnah was formed in August 2014 until now, leader General commander: Tlass Al-Salama, know Abu Faisal.
4. The 18th March Division 'Forqat 18 Azar' operate military 11 April 2013 to present, the leader Col. Mohammed Khaled Al - Duhni.
5. 13th Division 'Forqat 13' Active June 2013 to the present, leader Lt. Col. Ahmad Al-Saud
6. 101st Division Infantry 'Forqat 101 Moushat, call 21st Combined Force, Free Army, June 2013 by Col. Hassan Hamada.
7. Northern Division, Firqat Al-Shamalia' was formed on 25 February 2012 by leader Lt. Col. Mohammed Khaled Fares Al- Bayoush.
8. Mountain Hawks Brigade, Liwa Suqour Al-Jabal' September 2012 to the present by leader Capt. Hassan Haj Ali.
9. Army of Victory, Jaysh Al-Nasr' Founded in August 2015 to the present formed by leader Major Muhammad Mansour.
10. 1st Coastal Division, Brigade of the Chargers' Active 2014 until now, formed by Muhammad Haj Ali.
11. 2nd Coastal Division, known on the Turukman mountain, Active from 2015 until now, formed by Riad Qura Bajaq, has been killed in clashes with the Syrian army in Latakia province.
12. Army of Glory, Jaysh Al-Izza 'formed 2013 until present by Maj. Jamil Al-Saleh
13. Central Division, Al-Forqat Al-Wosta' Septembre 2015 until present, now the leader Capt. Mamoun Sweid from Septembre 2017.
14. Army of Liberation, Jaysh Al-Tahrir' 24 February 2016 until present formed by Mohammed Al-Ghabi.
15. Sultan Murad Brigade, Liwa Sultan Murad' 23 March 2013 until present the leader is Col. Ahmed Osman.
16. 16th Division Infantry, Liwa 16 Moushat' now is the 23rd Division Active 19 September 2013 until present formed by Colonel Hassan Rajoub.
17. Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki Movement, Harakat Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki, formed 2011 until present the leader is Sheikh Tawfiq Shahabuddin.
18. Mujahideen Army/Army of Holy Warriors, Jaysh Al-Mujahideen, 2 January 2014, the leader Lt. Col. Muhammad Abdel Qader Bakr.
19. Revolutionaries of al-Sham Brigades, Kataeb Thuwar Al-Sham' 03 May 2015 tell present, the leader now is Colonel Naji Moustafa.

20. Fastaqem Union, Fastaqem Kama Umirta' December 2012 till now, the leader is Mustafa Berro know Sakkar Abu Kutaiba.
21. Islamic Safwa Brigades, Kataeb Safwah Al-Islamiyah' 2015 to present, Martyr Abdul Rahman Mansour
22. The Sham Legion, Faylaq Al-Sham' 10 March 2014 to present, leader, Col. Mohammad Bakkar
23. 1st Regiment, Al-Fauj Al-Awwal' 05 mars 2015, it was formed by Hassem Kenjo
24. Northern Thunder Brigade, Liwa Rad Al-Shamal' Hamza Division 2013- 2017-present, leader Abdullah Halawa.
25. Ahmed Al-Abdo Martyrs' Force, Quwwat Al-Shaheed Ahmad Al-Abdo' August 2013 until now, leader is Colonel Bakur Al-Salim.
26. 2nd Infantry Division, Forqat Al-Thani' 21st Combined Force, June 2013 to present leader is Lt. Col Dayoub.
27. 1st Brigade, Liwa Al-Awal' Free Syrian Army-29 July 2011 to present leader imam Mohamed Al jawad.
28. Al-Rahman Legion, Faylaq Al-Rahman' November 2013 to present, was formed by Capt. Abdul Nasr Shamir.
29. Southern Tawhid Brigade, Liwa Tawhid Al-Junoub' 18 July 2012 formed by Abdul Qader Saleh.
30. Division Al -Hamza, Forqat Al-Hamza' formed 23 April 2016 to present by Seif Abu Bakar.
31. 1st Artillery Regiment, Al-Fauj Al-Awwal' 5 mars 2015 by Col. Saber Safar.
32. Syria Revolutionaries Front, Southern Sector, Jabhat Thuwar Souriya' December 2013 by Jamal Maarouf.
33. The First Corps, Faylaq Al-Awal' Formed in August, 2014, by General Leader: Ziyad Al Hariri
34. Salah al-Din Division,, Forqat Salah Al-Din,, Active 2015-July, formed by Mahmoud Khallo knows Abu Hamza.
35. Omari Brigades, Alwiyat Al-Omari' 2014, by Capt. Al Qatahneh.
36. Unity Battalions of Horan Brigade, Liwa Tawhid Kataeb Horan' April 2013 Muhammad al-Turkmani.
37. Youth of Sunnah Force, Quwaa Shabab Al-Sunnah' 2014, Capt. Ziad Abbas.
38. Moataz Billah Brigade, Liwa Moataz Billah' formed 2014, Col. Khalid Nabulsi.
39. Sword of Al-Sham Brigades, Alwiyat Saif Al-Sham' 2012. By Abou Salah Al-Shami.
40. Dawn of Islam Division, Forqat Fajr Al-Islam' February 2013, Lt. Col. Mohammed Hassan Salama.
41. Emigrants and Supporters Brigade, Liwa Muhajireen Wal Ansar' 2012 formed by Captain Iyad Qaddour and Captain Khalid Fathallah.
42. Military Council in Quneitra and the Golan- 2014 by Abdul-Ilah Al-Bashir
43. Division of Decisiveness, Forqat Al-Hasim' 19 April 2016 by Col. Qassem Al-Hariri.
44. Partisans of Islam Front, Jabhat Ansar Al-Islam' 2014 until present by Abu Muhammad Al-Jolani.
45. Al-Furqan Brigades, Alwiyat Al-Furqan' 2014 to present by Muhammad Majid Al-Khatib.

4. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Erdogan was successful with the entry of his military army into the city of Afrin would not have been so easy without the help of the parties involved in the Syrian war, such as the Free Army and other Islamic groups. This is the greatest piece of proof that these Islamist groups, called armed groups, or terrorist groups are against the regime of Bashar AL Assad. The rebels have only worked for their own interests without any principle, yet this time it has been Turkey's interest in these groups that succeeded. Example the external support In May 2014, Zenki received increased financial support from Saudi Arabia after he withdrew from the Mujahideen Army. The group also received financial assistance from the United States in a program run by the CIA to support rebel groups approved by the United States, reportedly through the MOC. However, by October 2015, the group claimed that it was no longer provided by MOC - "because of regular reports of violations." On May 9, 2016, a plan was proposed by the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to make Nour Al-Din Al-Zenki's movement a "northern army" to bring more than 3,000 fighters into the process. ,, Behind the Sudden Death of a \$1 Billion Secret C.I.A. War in Syria, in august 02 .2017, by The New York Times paper, The next stage will be the transfer of fighters from Idlib to northern Aleppo through the Bab Al-Hawa border crossing and the Azzaz border crossing. This is said to have started on May 13. However, the plan was delayed because of doubts by US officials about the capabilities of Syrian rebel forces recruited by Turkey to fight with its army, opposition to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the rift between Turkey and Russia. It was only repaired in

early August 2016. The Turkish army, with the help of the Syrian free army, took control of Afrin Al-Shaikh Hadid Center in the West. This announcement was later published on Facebook on March 4, 2018 by Turkish President Erdogan.

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THE MEDIA AS A SECURITIZING AGENT? THE FRAMING OF CORRUPTION IN ROMANIA

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Abstract: *The article analyzes the extent to which Romanian media outlets employ the securitization framework to represent discourses on corruption. Securitization theory was initially devised by theorists of the Copenhagen school and it quickly spread among academic security studies researchers. Media scholars aimed to compare securitization with framing theories, arguing that while ontologically different, framing something as an issue of security has the effect of reinforcing feelings of fear and aggression towards that object. The article analyzes around 2000 media articles from the Romanian press and concludes that corruption is treated as a security problem only in official discourse, while the media prefers a moral framing of the phenomenon.*

Keywords: *corruption; securitization; framing; Romania*

1. INTRODUCTION

The international struggle against corruption has gained significant momentum and taken on new shapes in the past decade. Corruption was not seen as an impediment to geopolitics during the Cold War. This allowed international donors to pour aid unto friendly but highly corrupt regimes. However, the collapse of the Soviet bloc sharpened the focus on good governance and made it a conditionality for international aid.

Over the past five years, Romania has been cited as an example of how a successful anti-corruption campaign can be waged. Yet policies need to be “sold” to the people as, otherwise, they can soon find themselves in a quagmire. The representation of corruption in media, especially during a period of intense anti-corruption efforts is crucial to this effort. The emergence of large-scale street protests, both in the wake of the Colectiv disastrous club fire which killed 64 people in the autumn of 2015 in Bucharest and against prison pardons in early 2017 shows that a large number of Romanians perceive anti-corruption as a legitimate endeavor. Media representation of corruption cases helped spread the message and created an image of a wide-spread phenomenon. Alternatively, in order to de-legitimize it, the anti-corruption offensive was framed as being the work of sinister forces.

The paper looks into whether the media acts as an agent for transmitting securitizing speech. It initially presents the concepts of framing and

securitization and discusses the role of the media in the securitization process. Then, through an empirical analysis of 2400 news items, the article argues that while political decision-makers employ the frame of security to describe corruption, this is not taken up by the general media.

The securitization framework has slowly gained momentum in international security studies, benefitting from the advance of constructivism and critical theory. A concept popularized by the Copenhagen School, securitization has been applied to analyze a series of discursive actions by political elites, who attempt and many times succeed to take a problem out of the space of normal politics and to treat it as an exceptional issue.

In its empirical analysis, the article tests the hypothesis that the media takes up securitizing speech uttered by political decision-makers. It relies on two sets of articles collected from the Romanian media during the summer and the autumn of 2015. The data was gathered within the space of a research project carried out by the National Intelligence Studies Institute on the perception of risk to national security. While in the first set of articles (summer of 2015), the keywords according to which the search was done were “risk”, “threat” and “national security”, the collection of the second dataset involved a search according to the term “corruption”. The article finds that the association of corruption with risk and threat is only done by the media when politicians take the lead, while otherwise

corruption is framed as a moral problem or as an administrative deficiency.

2. FRAMING - THE CASE OF ROMANIAN CORRUPTION

D.H. Waever (2007) selects, in a review article, several definitions of the concept of framing. Firstly, he quotes Tankard *et al.* (1991, *apud* Waever, 2007), who argue that a frame is a

central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration (Entman 1993, *apud* D.H. Waever, 2007:52),

who claims that

to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described McCombs (1997, *apud* D.H. Waever, 2007:37)

and for whom

framing is the selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda when a particular object is discussed (Waever, 2007:142).

Moreover, according to others who have contributed to the topic, frames can be defined as “abstractions that work to organize or structure message meaning” (*Mass Communication Theory*, n.d.) while in Lecheler and de Vreese’s view (2012, *apud* Waever, 2007:144), they have a selective function since they “stress certain aspects of reality and push others into the background—it has a selective function” as well as suggest some “atributes, judgments, and decisions”.

Shanto Iyengar’s distinction between thematic and episodic framing is useful to understand how corruption is being addressed in international and Romanian media. According to Iyengar,

the episodic frame depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances of specific events- a homeless person, an unemployed worker

while

the thematic news frame, in contrast, places public issues in some general or abstract context. Reports on reductions in government welfare expenditure,

changes in the nature of employment opportunities, the social grievances of groups [...] are examples of thematic coverage (Iyengar, 1993:369).

Further, the author distinguishes between causal and treatment attributions of responsibilities:

causal responsibility focuses on the origin of the issue or problem, whereas treatment responsibility focuses on who or what has the power to alleviate or to forestall the alleviation of the issue (Iyengar, 1993:369).

Relying on this work, Starke *et al.* (forthcoming) show how episodic and thematic framing affect the attribution of causal and treatment responsibility regarding blame assignation for corruption.

Framing research has been applied to the issue of corruption by Roxana Bratu and Iveta Kazoka (2016), who have identified several “narratives of evil”. In their work, conducted for the FP7- funded ANTICORRP project, they argue that corruption is associated with the idea of a dark and damp place such as a swamp, a sea, an ocean or the den of an animal. Moreover, sometimes, corruption is seen as a maleficent creature such as “viruses, flourishing plants” and multi-headed hydra, “worms, lurking animals, beings with tentacles”, who sits in “nests”. Corruption can also be framed as a disease, sometimes leprosy or even cancer, a gangrene or an infection. According to research done on Romanian media, tabloid and quality newspapers framed corruption differently. While general daily newspapers (whose reporting also tends to be highly politicized), showed in great detail the political ramifications of a case, tabloids only focused on the spectacular features such as arrests and politicians being carried away in handcuffs. Moreover, the daily newspapers avoided small-time corruption cases, as they could not be connected to any political actor (Dimulescu and Milewski, 2016).

Within the framework of the same project, Ioana Avădani (2016) argues that the Romanian media landscape is, according to Halin and Mancini’s categorization, a polarized pluralistic (alternatively known as Mediteranean) one. It is characterized by high political parallelism (media outlets are associated with politicians and put forward the views of their employers) and a low level of enforcement and internalization of professional standards. According to Avădani, the political polarization of the media became apparent during the troubled two terms in office of President

Traian Băsescu and this led to the decrease of public trust in the profession. Corruption thus became a battle ground between political factions, each media outlet employing it to accuse the other rather than condemn the phenomenon. Furthermore, according to her analysis

in terms of weight, the news piece surpassed other journalistic types of reporting. [...] as a general feature, corruption is represented by the media as a series of separate cases and less as a mechanism involving the collusion of several actors (Avădani, 2016).

3. SECURITIZATION - A CONTESTED CONCEPT

The concept of securitization emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s in academic debates on the meaning of security. Starting with the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, the idea that security is not an objective state has come to gain ground in academic political science and security studies. Alongside with the advance of constructivism and the decline of realism in international relations, security studies have moved from understanding threats as something objective and external to the referent object to defining security as intersubjectively constructed through a speech or other performative acts.

The initial emergence of the concept of securitization can be traced to Ole Waever's 1995 chapter in which he articulates his definition of securitization. According to Waever (1995:50) security is a "speech act" through which the state defines something as belonging to a separate realm, the realm of security and grants itself the right to use exceptional means to solve that problem.

Waever's definitions can be characterized by two important limitations which have been later subject to significant criticism in the literature. Firstly, it is elitist in the sense that it grants power to act only to elites entrusted with real power and symbolic capital – that is, people who occupy crucial positions in the state and are seen the representatives of official authority. Secondly, it sees security only as a speech act and excludes other forms of performative practices. Finally, it does not inquire into whether the speech act has been received or accepted by the target audience, allowing any speech act by an elite to be termed securitization.

A further development of the securitization framework was carried out through the publication of the volume *Security: A new framework for*

analysis, where Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (2011[1998]) discussed the idea of a speech act as a "securitizing move", rather than as securitization itself. This definition comes to accept the possibility that it is not only the definition of the problem of security that matters, but the acceptance of it as such by the target audience (Stritzel, 2007). In their later work, the three authors argue that a successful securitization depends to a great extent on the facilitating conditions of the act: whether it is done according to the proper grammar, whether it is done by the right person and whether real events are occurring which can provide a basis for the construction of threat (Buzan *et al.*, 2011:56).

The central idea of securitization theory is that a certain speech act takes a problem outside the sphere of what can be defined as normal politics and permits the use of exceptional means for its solution. These involve the repressive apparatus of the state, including militarized police, extensive involvement of several law enforcement agencies, surveillance by intelligence service or even non-state security providers such as vigilante groups. Moreover, once a problem is successfully „securitized”, the normal guarantees of liberal democratic politics can be reduced, suspended or even eliminated. Thus, after the 9/11 attacks, international terrorism was seen as such a serious threat, that "war" had to be declared on it, leading to the uncritical acceptance of wide-scale military action by the political opposition or by the press (Gadarian, 2010:470). Even before the Arab Spring, the immigration issue had become heavily securitized in many Western nations, as it was discussed in the terms of a need to defend identity or jobs or even physical security from criminal immigrants.

4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

The article analyzes how corruption is framed in the Romanian media by employing two datasets of articles collected in 2015 through two research projects carried out by National Intelligence Studies Institute/ "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy of Romania was part of. Relying on the theoretical framework presented above, two opposite models of the media can be conceived. Firstly, it can be an agent in the process of securitization, taking up and further disseminating securitizing moves (speech acts) uttered by political decision-makers. Alternatively, it can represent a watchdog which focuses on

political power holders as subjects of investigation and condemns their behavior. In the first situation, one can expect that corruption is framed in a thematic way, as a general phenomenon and that treatment responsibility is assigned to national security institutions. Alternatively, the media-as-watchdog model expects considerably more episodic framing of corruption and the assignment of causal and treatment responsibility to personal morality. We test the media-as-securitizing agent model by formulating two hypotheses: H1: *Media outlets in Romania frame corruption thematically (focus on process, causes and policies to combat it)*. H2: *Media outlets in Romania assign treatment responsibility for corruption to state institutions*.

Data was collected from Romanian online media outlets within the course of two research projects carried out by the National Intelligence Institute. Data collection involved automated programs and the search for keywords among collected articles. Websites dedicated to news, as well as the websites of print-based journals and websites of TV stations with a presence on air, or citizen-journalism websites (Romaniacurata.ro) were used. The first set of articles was collected based on keywords such as “risks/threats” to national security while the second relied on “corruption” as a keyword. A total of 454 articles including the term national security risk/threat were included in the first dataset. Out of these, only about 35 referred in any way to corruption. Conversely, all articles in the second batch featured the word corruption, as this was the key selector. Two thousand media items were collected through automated machine-collection in early September 2015.

In order to analyze the data, a coding scheme was designed and applied. This included the following categories: whether the article contained the reporting of a case, an event or a policy (this scheme was inspired by Iyengar’s distinction between thematic and episodic framing) or was an editorial (to be able to trace the paper’s own voice); whether it involved a politician or another professional category such as police officer, doctor, judge, lawyer or civil servant; whether it mentioned a particular high-profile politician and whether it contained a particular narrative.

5. RESULTS

Less than 10% of the articles included in the first dataset featured the term corruption, and the vast majority of them referred to the release of the 2015 Strategy for National Defense and its

associated guide. A few of them covered corruption cases leading to arrests or house searches. One analysis by Vladimir Socor linked corruption with Russia and argued that Romania must stop being vulnerable to Russian expansionism by combatting corruption.

The first dataset included news that covered three particular events, which led the press to make an association between corruption and security. Firstly, the adoption of the National Security Strategy (Strategy for National Defense – 2015-2019 - SNAP 2015) in the summer of 2015 generated a higher number of articles linking corruption to security. The document distinguishes three possible ways in which Romania’s national security can be imperiled. Threats are “possible external forces or plans that can affect national security”, while risks are “probabilities for the occurrence of events that can affect national security”. Finally, vulnerabilities are “systemic deficiencies” which can be exploited and lead to the manifestation of events that impact national security (SNAP 2015). The Strategy for national defense labels corruption as a vulnerability, which is also taken up by the press reporting on the event.

Further, the strategy was expanded through a guide, which establishes how national security institutions will act in order to reach the desired objectives. The guide sees corruption as a threat to the implementation of values such as the rule of law, good governance, a strong economy, sustainable development and the promotion of Romania’s policies in the European Union and NATO (SNAP Guide). Press coverage of the event takes up the language of the Guide and addressed corruption as a vulnerability.

Finally, several public appearances by the Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, Eduard Hellvig, led to other associations between corruption and national security. In one of them, he argued for a clearer legal framework on the retention of communication data, showing that the Service is highly involved in combating threats such as corruption, organized crime or tax evasion, as well as cyberwarfare. Another featured a visit to Bucharest by then-FBI director James Comey, and a common press statement made by Hellvig and Comey. It mentioned the threat of corruption as one which the two institutions are combatting together. Further, yet another public connection between corruption and security was made in the press when the Romanian Intelligence Service launched its 2015-2020 intelligence strategy, which also featured corruption as a threat. Finally, the involvement of the Romanian Intelligence

Service in the anti-corruption struggle, as well as remarks made by one of its generals prompted the National Union of Judges to require a parliamentary investigation on the way the security service is involved in combating corruption among magistrates.

Inspired by Iyengar’s distinction, the first analysis performed on the second dataset dissociated between cases, policies and editorials. Case-focused articles are individual-level occurrences such as reports of persons being arrested or indicted or politicians being summoned for questioning. Alternatively, articles referring to policies were those announcing a new strategy or speech on policy development. Finally, editorials were opinion pieces (written in the journalists’ own voice) which described, explained or attempted to propose solutions for the problem of corruption. Out of the 2000 articles, only 1600 were coded, due to the repetition of some items.

Table 1: Type of events featured in articles about corruption

Type	Number	% of total
Case	1604	87.51
Policy	148	8.07
Editorial	81	4.42

The set of articles that mentioned a corruption case were disaggregated according to the professional category of the person mentioned in the article. This provided a useful indicator to show what type of corruption the media focuses upon. It also allowed to see whether corruption is seen as a threat to security or, alternatively, a threat to governance by those involved in the process of governing.

Table 2: Professional categories of those mentioned in relation to corruption cases

Professional category	Number of articles	% of total
Politician	942	58.88
Civil servant	104	6.50
Foreign	127	7.94
Officer	132	8.25
Police officer	91	5.69
Prosecutor and civil servant (mentioned together)	37	2.31

Private	36	2.25
Many (more than two people with an identifiable profession – no specific focus on any person)	38	2.38
Judge	47	2.94
Lawyer	15	0.94
Detainee	3	0.19
Professor	21	1.31
Sport	2	0.13
Business	3	0.19
Private/Civil Servant	1	0.06
Trade Union	1	0.06
Total coded	1600	

The results above allow for the rejection of hypothesis 1. The vast majority of the coverage concerned cases of corrupt officials summoned for questioning, being put under investigation or indicted for corruption charges. In most of those cases, only the fact that the person was summoned for questioning or arrested was reported. These officials were primordially politicians, but some of them were also civil servants, prosecutors, professors, judges or lawyers. Some cases reflected corruption among police officers or other state institutions relating to law enforcement (the taxation authority). Other articles chronicled anti-corruption protests in neighboring Moldova, which, in autumn 2015, led to the resignation of the government.

Three cases of prominent politicians were covered in great detail by the press during the period of reference. Firstly, then prime-minister Victor Ponta was the focus of the press twice, on the occasion of his first appearance before anti-corruption prosecutors and of the indictment which eventually led to his removal from office, in the wake of the post-Colectiv protests. The second most covered case was the arrest of the mayor of Bucharest, Sorin Oprescu, who was also eventually removed from office. The third case covered by the press was that of former anti-organized crime head prosecutor, Alina Bica, who was indicted for fraud in the case of property restitution. Coverage was also given to the case of former education minister, Ecaterina Andronescu, accused of mismanagement

of the acquisition of Microsoft software licenses and to former Constitutional Court judge Toni Grebla. Concerning international news, the FIFA corruption case and the Moldovan protests were also given some coverage. Finally, the appointment of a new US ambassador (Hans Klemm) and his statements in support of the rule of law were duly reflected in the press.

The data also leads to the rejection of the second hypothesis. Very few articles involve and appeal to public institutions and these referred mostly to the National Anti-Corruption Directorate, without mentioning other state institutions. Some of the articles collected engaged in an analysis of the roots of corruption or in the condemnation of the phenomenon. Two major trends in opinion-oriented articles could be discerned: some articles condemned the corrupt while others criticized the anti-corruption fight in terms of being a foreign imposition. Thus, “anti-corruption” articles focus on demanding the expansion of investigations to find out who exactly gives bribes (Tolo.ro, 8.09.2015) or on supporting civic activism (Româniacurată.ro, 13.09.2015) or on condemning the low morality of those who engage in acts of corruption. In this narrative, corruption was associated to a moral evil and its practitioners to “fallen” individuals who behave contrary to the duties of their office or to regular decency (Gazetadenavodari.ro, 9.9.2015). NAD prosecutors were presented as positive actors, a form of moral individuals helping “sanitize” corrupt places, especially county-level institutions.

Articles critical of the current Romanian offensive against corruption tended to present it as an outcome of the work of sinister forces and to move the focus away from actual events to other aspects of the political debate. Thus, according to journalist Ion Cristoiu (a virulent critic of the anti-corruption effort), it took the arrest of Sorin Oprescu to determine President Klaus Iohannis to “work in the weekend”. The main topic of articles against anti-corruption is a supposed well-designed plot by the National Anti-Corruption Directorate to eliminate from politics some “inconvenient politicians”, while entertaining the population. According to one article, the NAD has already prepared the autumn session of the “circus” while in another, the NAD is compared to Stalinist prosecutors who have already decided who will win the 2016 mayoral elections. Moreover, the anti-corruption offensive is sometimes presented as orchestrated by “sinister powers”, especially the American Embassy or European Commission.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The article rejects the model of the media as an agent of securitization by showing that significant differences in the framing of corruption can be observed according to the person or institution issuing the message. The largest part of the media coverage of corruption focuses on cases and individuals being questioned or charged by prosecutors. This reflects not only the media’s choice of to simply reporting, but also, probably, the public’s appetite for seeing particular high-ranking individuals being charged. The vast majority of these are powerful people, who are permanently in the news and hold important position either in politics or in the judicial system. Other reports focused on simply relaying press communiques issued by the National Anti-Corruption Directorate about leaders of local authorities or simple citizens being placed under investigation.

The media chose to treat corruption as more of a moral evil, concentrating on the breach of public and moral duty which corrupt people commit. Journalists penning editorials chose to question themselves rather “how come there are so many corrupt people?” rather than “what causes corruption?”. Alternatively, those opposing the anti-corruption struggle treated it as a form of conspiracy of sinister forces, which aim to discredit particular politicians through the weakening of procedural guarantees (granting importance to those who report cases of corruption). Prosecutors are presented as “master-puppeteers” who plan who to eliminate some politicians while leaving docile ones in place. Foreign influence on the anti-corruption struggle is also reported by the press, in some cases positively, while in others it is associated with a form of colonialism. This rhetorical move is aimed at bringing up narratives of foreign domination and exploitation, either by the Ottoman Empire or by Soviet Russia and to compare the European Union’s anti-corruption mechanisms with these. Securitizing frames were employed only by institutions associated with national security. The Supreme Council of National Defense “securitized” corruption through the issuance of the National Strategy for Defense and the director of the Romanian Intelligence Service claimed that corruption must be combatted due to its effects on security. Moreover, a reputed analyst linked corruption with the resurgent Russian threat. Media outlets did not make any critical commentary on the way national security officials

framed corruption, but did not adopt their discourse either. Rather they focused on the simple reporting of facts or events, or on government decisions undertaking some policy.

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THE POWER DISTANCE (DP) AND LEADERSHIP IN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS FROM AFGHANISTAN

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Abstract: *Social aspects are affected by norms related to the distribution of power, being a reflection of inequality manifested in different areas: gender differences and the age, the rules inside the organization, the access to the health systems and education, etc. There are no absolute standards for measuring this dimension. In societies in which this dimension has a high value, social inequality is considered normality, being tolerated until it reaches an unacceptable level. In antithesis the societies in which this dimension has reduced values, social inequality is perceived as something wrong and tends to be revised gradually. Not understanding the relationship in between leadership and different cultural dimensions is a barrier, but not as dangerous as not having enough military skills and competencies. Military should adapt only to cultural phenomenon that are affecting military operations leaving the others the exploitation of cultural elements.*

Keywords: *power distance; leadership; theatre of operations*

1. INTRODUCTION

The directions which I develop on this topic are the following: A brief reminding of the signification of terms “Power Distance” (DP) and “Leadership” (L); Multicultural specificity of the multinational military missions into the theatre of operations; Multicultural military collaboration in peacetime; The effects of the differences in perception and the application of the two notions (DP & L) in theatre of operations; DP and L in „Resolute Support Mission HQs”; Pre-mission cultural training of all the military and of specific leaders.

2. POWER DISTANCE

A brief reminding of the signification of these terms “Power Distance” (DP) and “Leadership” (L) will facilitate a better understanding of the topic of this article. The term “Power Distance” (DP) it was used first time in 1960 by Mark Builder, being taken later and adapted in 1970, by Gerth Hofstede in order to describe one of the socio-cultural dimensions. The term was used with an identical signification also in GLOBE Study. The definition offered by Hofstede for this term is: “The degree in which the majority of the members of the Society, organizations, and institutions are

waiting and accepting that the power can be distributed unequally”.

This dimension is present in all manifestation forms of the social life, starting with the family, kindergarten, and the school, where the parents are inducing the children the social model and continues in all the forms of social organization. These social aspects are affected by social norms of the distribution of power, representing the reflection of inequality and are finding the place of manifestation in different areas: gender differences and the age, the rules inside the organization, the access to the health systems and education, etc.

There are no absolute standards for measuring this dimension. In the societies in which this dimension has a high value, social inequality is considered that representing normality, being tolerated until it reaches an unacceptable level. In antithesis the societies in which this dimension has reduced values, here social inequality is perceived as something wrong and tends to be revised gradually.

The socio-cultural dimension expressed with the help of the “Power Distance” indicator (IDP), has values in between 1 and 100. Hofstede’s research over this dimension comprised 76 countries. A high IDP was registered in Slovakia, Russia, Romania, Serbia, China, India, France, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Poland and Belgium.

A medium level is having Japan, Italy, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Germany and a reduced level in USA, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom,

Nederland, Norway, Denmark and Austria (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2012). IDP is validating social phenomenon and is correlated with:

Table 1 Power Distance indicator (IDP)

A high IDP	A reduced IDP
Individuals situated in high positions are perceived as being superior; The power is a fact and its legitimacy is irrelevant.	Individuals situated in high positions are supervising the social rules in order to function properly but the social roles in between the members of the society can be easily changed.
The one that is in power decides the behavioral line and decides what is good and what is wrong.	The use of power must be legitimate, with the limits in between right or wrong clearly defined.
The respect is cultivated through education.	The independence is cultivated through education.
Centralization of power	De-centralization
The relationship in between the leader and his subordinates: the subordinates are assuming the execution role, they are fulfilling the assigned tasks by those who are in power and have not been able to influence because all the power is in the hands of those who are on the top of the social pyramid.	The relationship in between the leader and his subordinates: when the problem is related to their work the subordinates are expected to be consulted.
A high degree of inequality in the distribution of income.	The income in a society is equals, depending of the role fulfilled inside the society.
Medium population is thick.	Majority of the population is situated at a medium level.
Oligarchic Society, dictatorship.	The power inside a State are separated and the use of power must be legitimate.
There is an Autocrat Government and can be replaced only through a revolution.	There are pluralistic governments elected through a majority vote and changed in a peaceful way.
The parents are teaching their children the unconditional listening.	The parents are treating their children as their equals.
Old persons are respected and listened.	Old persons are not respected or feared especially.
The education is centered on the teacher.	The education is centered on students.
Hierarchy means only existential inequality.	Hierarchy means an inequality of roles, convenient one.
Corruption is frequent and the scandals are covered.	Corruption is rare; the scandals determine the end of the political carrier.
The priests created their own hierarchy.	Religions are promoting the equality of choice of the Christians.

There is a direct relationship in between “Power Distance” dimension and communication. Individuals that are coming from a culture with a high IDP tend to use a formal hierarchic way in communication, in which the inferior ones on the hierarchic chain are considering as an inappropriate way to ask questions or to argue with the decision taken by the superior. Individuals that are coming from a culture with a reduced IDP tend to use an informal communication, they are thinking individually and are feeling comfortably to contest superior’s decision concerning the fight or their rights. The values of IDP are changing in time, being influenced by social evolution of their

own nation or by the neighboring ones. Comparing the evolution of this indicator over two generations, the conclusion that there are small changes of the value of this indicator but, in total the position of a country in respect to another is still the same, differences in between the values of this indicator is evolving in a parallel way over the time.

3. LEADERSHIP

Leadership is representing the behavior and the attitude of the leader. “People are asking what is the difference in between a leader and a boss. The

leader is giving the tone and the boss is assuming the success. The leader is leading and the boss is giving the orders” used to say Theodore Roosevelt.

The level of personal leadership is rising with the increase in self knowledge, with the management of your own believes, emotions, attitudes, behavior, traditions, abilities and capacities that are helping in achieving personal results. When the behavior and the attitude of the leader are acting over some people belonging to an organization, this is called organizational leadership.

The organizational leadership is the way in which individuals are guided, led and influenced in an organization. The organizational leadership level in multinational organizations is increasing with the social intelligence, cultural knowledge and the way exercising power is accepted. A valuable content, related to the influence of the cultural differences over the leadership is offered by two comparative studies in between Northern and Eastern European countries (Smith; Zander). In the first study there are investigated the cultural differences related to “the style of management”, analyzing 17 Nordic and Eastern European countries (Smith, 1997). Leaders from the Nord-European countries proved to be willing to favor a greater implication of the subordinates (higher scores in equality and participation) while the South-European countries preferred the dependence on the surveillance authorities (higher in hierarchy). In the study done by Smith (1997) it was analyzed also “the hierarchy and the loyal implication in the organization activity”. The countries from the North-European group Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway tend to register higher scores of the dimension “Equality and the utilitarian participation”. The central and Eastern European countries such as France, Belgium, Spain, Italy and Portugal, those from the vicinity of the Eastern European countries, Greece, Turkey and Austria tend to have a higher score related to “Hierarchy and loyal implication in the organization activity”.

In the second study done by Zanderin the year 1997 was evaluated the preference of the personnel towards the leadership style. In North-European countries United Kingdom, Nederland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, the participatory leader is proffered in comparison with the directive one specific to the South-European countries like Spain, France Belgium or the Germanic ones like Germany, Switzerland or Austria. The results of these studies are providing precious information

related to the leadership style in the European countries.

Knowing the leadership style and of the differences in between the countries is a useful way for analysis in multinational operations and a possible way for anticipation of the potential cultural problems.

GLOBE is the most comprehensive study of empiric data, which is showing the relationship in between culture and leaders’ behavior in different societies and organizations, using qualitative and quantitative methods (Hoppe, 2007).

The results of the study showed that the effectiveness of the leader is contextual, *depending on the societal and organizational norms, on the personal values and believes of the individuals that are led*. In order to have a starting point in researching the relationship in between leadership and different variables, GLOBE extended the number of cultural variables to nine and had achieved the grouping of the countries in terms of similarities, difference in norms, believes, values and practices. There were then 10 cultural groups of those 60 countries that have been studied.




Fig.1. Graphical representation of cultural grouping- GLOBE

Then, they analyzed the replies of over 17,300 managers from the countries belonging to the 10 cultural groups. The conclusion of the study is that an exceptional leader is a person from the organization having “motivational influencing and favoring skills of those members of the group and to contribute to the success of the organization” (House *et al.*, 2004). There have been identified 21 major attributes that can characterize a leader. They have been statistically and conceptual

reduced to six categories of leaders. Then the determined for the predominant leadership.

categories in different societal cultures are

Table no.1 The societal groups and the leadership style

Leadership Orientated towards the performance High	Leadership Orientated towards the team High	ParticipativeLeadership High	Human Leadership High	AutonomousLeadership High	Auto Leadership /Protective Group High
Anglo Germanic Nordic Asia SE L. European L. American Confucian African E. European	Asia SE Confucian. American E. European African L. European Nordic Anglo Germanic Middle East	Germanic Anglo Nordic L. European L. American African E. European Asia SE Confucian Middle East	Asia SE Anglo African Confucian Germanic Middle East L.American E. European L. European Nordic	Germanic E. European Confucian Nordic Asia SE Anglo African Middle East L. European L.American	Middle East Confucian Asia SE LatinAmerican E. European African L. European Anglo Germanic Nordic
LOW	LOW	LOW	LOW	LOW	LOW

GLOBE Study has an important influence because it offers a scientific framework to understand the way leadership is performed in those 61 studied states, analysis is generating finally six styles of leadership. And these are: Leadership style oriented towards performance, named “charismatic, based on values”, that is having the following characteristics: high standards, determination, innovation, supports and inspires the team that is leading; Leadership style oriented towards the team: is cultivating proud, loyalty and the collaboration in between the members of the team, based on cohesion and on the aim of achieving the objectives; The participative style: encourages the others opinion for the decision implementation, being comfortable with the delegation of responsibilities and with the concept of equality; The human style: the leadership is achieved with generosity and compassion, patience, support, preoccupation for the wellbeing of the team; Autonomous, independent, individualistic and centered on interest; Auto-protective style (or for the protection of the group): procedures, rules and position are important, no authentic behavior for saving the appearances, concentrated on the safety and the individual protection of a person or a group.

Moving forward with the research, the study determined 22 universal characteristics of an exceptional leader, 8 incompatible with the role of a leader and 35 important skills whose variation is signifying a variation in amplitude and perception from one culture to another.

4. DP AND LEADERSHIP IN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

The societies with a high IDP pay a greater attention to the formal respect towards the status and the title of a leader, with the socialization in between the leaders and the subordinates being limited and where the subordinates are respecting the leader’s decision.

At important meetings in between individuals belonging to groups with different IDP there is produced a phenomenon of hard inter-relationship. The equal creative participation is not a notion specific to all societies. Those belonging to cultures with an IDP reduced have the tendency to be vocals and are perceived by the rest of the group as being very interested and involved, while those belonging to groups with a high IDP are considering that participation has to be according to the responsibilities they have inside the structure to which they belong. In multicultural structures they are in disadvantage because inside the same system the acceptance is generated by individual initiatives and creative solutions.

In organizations with a high IDP there is an expected phenomenon that the elites, commanders to function keeping a significant distance in between the normal members of the society. If this fact will not happen, the members of this kind of society will lose respect for the leader. In multinational teams, the team members coming from societies of this

type have the tendency to have their own opinion and to have difficulties to express themselves in the presence of the leader, the effectiveness of the information or the creative feed-back being restricted, the social position, limiting the area of communicating with those persons, and the information being offered in a formal way. The superior cannot be criticized even the individuals know that he is wrong; the decision will remain the attribute of the leader. In multicultural relations, in the interaction of a leader belonging to a culture with a high IDP with individuals belonging to a culture with a reduced IDP, criticism or direct talk of those or sharing their own opinions and ideas will be perceived as being very bad, without respect and with arrogance. In cultures with a reduced IDP individuals are opened to criticism, they do not perceive as a personal issue and they are seeking a way to progress, innovative solutions in resolving the problems a communicating the information is achieved mainly through informal ways. Knowing that is diminishing the frictions generated by the cultural interaction in between societies with extreme values of the IDP.

Zelman *et al.* (1993:369) had characterized the essential elements of the military culture as being “conservative, routed in history and traditions, based on group loyalty and orientated towards conformity and listening the superiors”. Is understanding of the cultural dimension more important than understanding military carrier, operational art or military strategy? Misunderstanding of the cultural context is a barrier, but not as dangerous than of not having enough military competencies. When it is analyzed cultural factors we need to have in our attention the fact that the military are experts in using legitimate violence. In the opinion of the specialists, military should adapt only to the cultural phenomenon that are affecting military operations and to leave for the others the exploitation of the cultural elements. I am not having the same opinion. The modern type of war has changed; the individual actions are having serious repercussions over the international public opinion attitude towards the fighting actions. Not knowing the culture can generate regrettable consequences.

Is the multinational common training important for the increase of the efficiency of the multicultural military missions? The analysis of the 10 years of German-Nederland collaboration led to surprisingly conclusions. Common training is important, but its duration is not a guarantee that inter-relationship will be efficient during common missions in high and extended stress conditions.

Moelker *et al.* wanted to determine if cultural interoperability is feasible, what conditions will favor cultural interoperability and in what direction will be developing. They elaborated a study of the collaboration in peacetime, the only research document produced in the modern Era with the participation of two NATO countries over a 10 years period, in between 1995-2005. 90% of the questioned personnel agreed that “German and Dutch National Cultures are pretty similar”. In general, reciprocal images of the Dutch and the Germans were positive (Soeters; Winslow).

The most astonishing difference is related to the *formal dimension versus informal one over the behavior codes* (the Dutch being informal and liberals with respect to rigidity, sociability and independence). This difference can bring different styles of interaction and frictions in between Dutch and German soldiers. The styles of leadership in Nederland and Germany are different (Dechesne *et al.*, 2005). The authoritarian style is more frequent in German Army, while the participative one is specific for the Dutch. The majority of the German soldiers showed the preference for the Dutch leadership style, but in military environment the style of leadership is generating the attitude of the majority of the participants. The peacetime cooperation was positive, with all the signs of an excellent functioning in the theatre of operation because of some common elements: a common culture, common leadership elements, knowing the military procedures, all achieved during the 10 years military cooperation.

The multinational experience into the theatre of operations had generated, in my opinion conclusions that were not a surprise. Into my PHD thesis “The effects of the cultural differences over the military mission in the theatre of operations from Afghanistan” I presented both conclusions on three case studies performed by other authors in the theatre of operations (“Camp Warehouse”, “Camp Julien” and Military Airport-KAIA) and the results of two case studies conducted by me during the mission.

In the first three cases, conducted by the authors, different operational tasks were shared in between the national participating units. Each national unit in case study no. 1 (German-Dutch cooperation, in “Camp Warehouse”) and no. 3 (Belgian-German cooperation in „Camp Julien”) had their own area of responsibility, having the task to control the situation, to protect the area from hostilities and to develop projects in cooperation with civilians. Despite these national contingents had not the same living conditions and

also some of the nations had a surveillance role in their national operations being supervised by another nation (Case study No.1: Germany; Case study No.3: Canada). At KAIA Airport (Case study No.2), for each national unit there was a specific functional task. Such a kind of structure is based on cumulative interdependence (Thomson, 1967:54-55) that means that each unit is bringing its own direct contribution, complementary to the whole mission. The ways in which those processes are administrated are different in every case study. The administration is supposing reciprocal interdependency and adjusting. Only in the case of KAIA Airport this thing has been reciprocally adjusted at the personnel level, in a true international environment, creating a collective spirit (Weik, 2001:266-268). In each of the two operational camps “Camp Warehouse” and “Camp Julien”), only a single country had the command that meant an administration of the problems according to its national spirit. Differences in the terms of perception and the administration of power, to which were added different styles of leadership, had generated frictions of different intensity in all the three case studies analyzed.

The experts are describing the organizational culture of a NATO HQs as “a mixture of different national military cultures and services that NATO member states are represented inside *Resolute Support Mission HQs*”. In the graphical representation of the cultural grouping, done by GLOBE, we found 24 from the participating nations in Afghanistan. A simple glance over this representation will help us understanding the initial image of the cultural difference and of the possible frictions generated during the interaction. Countries being into an opposite cultural posture are risking a decrease of the mission efficiency.

The structure of the General headquarters of „Resolute Support Mission” is specific for multinational military operations. The leadership of the mission is mainly ABCA (USA, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia) on which Italy, and Germany are contributing. This top dominance of some similar multinational sub-cultures is determining an interaction and behavior line that is promoting participation and stimulating personal opinion in the operational planning process. The leadership dominant forms within Resolute Support Mission HQs are „participative leadership” and „leadership oriented towards performance”. These are generated by the characteristics of military sub-cultures of the mission’s leadership and have a direct link to the

IDP value of the societies from where the leaders are coming from.

For a better understanding of the idea I will make a brief analysis of the interaction in which the leaders belong to a culture with a value of the IDP below average (USA) and subordinates belonging to a high value of IDP such as Romania. In USA the general relation in between the leader and his subordinates is one in which the subordinates are waiting to be consulted if the problem is one related to their job. In Romania subordinates are assuming that they are executing the task given by those who are in command and they do not the power to influence the means use by those who are in lead. The effects of those approach differences of inter-relationship, from the position perspective towards the power, can have effects on the efficiency of the mission.

Leaders are expecting participation and the subordinates are waiting for orders and directions, communication is limited, the participation in making creative decisions is minimum and the subordinates are intimidated by the person in lead. Current practice proved that in a participative leadership participation personnel’s capacity and the wish for adaptation is accelerated if this is belonging to cultures with an increased IDP.

The majority of the modern armies have cultural knowledge software used in the military and civilian training programs for the international missions. For example, in 2004 it was created „GS Commander”, a computer program for general multinational headquarters for cultural knowledge, that has been validated during the exercises „Allied Warrior 2004 (AW04)” and „Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF)”. This program comprises 10 modules each using 5 steps.

- Step 1, comprises a short series of questions that are helping to produce the personal profile for certain cultural dimensions;
- Step 2, comprises a scenario that illustrates an unproductive interaction based on the cultural differences. It contains a narrative part, a discussion part and an exercise;
- Step 3, makes an animated presentation of the country’s profile and helps in comparing the two or more country profiles;
- Step 4, is providing recommendations in the interaction with different behavior styles, developing integration suggestions according to the team effort;
- Step 5, offers the opportunity for the users of this program to develop action plans with the soldiers from other nations with who they are in contact.

5. CONCLUSIONS

I consider that this type of training program is useful for all personnel categories, in all the stages of the professional formation, mainly during pre-mission training. The exercises, common international training, cultural harmonization and the knowledge, leader's training for multinational positions are representing only some elements that can increase the efficiency of multinational missions.

"The linear model for the harmonization of the cultural interaction and knowledge" (Palaghia, 2018) is, in my opinion a complex instrument to know the different cultural aspects, for the specialized personnel in cultural training at all levels for the military personnel of all ranks. In all the armies, both for officers and NCOs there are leadership courses starting from the beginning of the carrier. Those courses are carried out at national level, but also in NATO common training centers (Rome, Oberammergau, Stavanger, Lucerne, Bucharest, etc.).

The leadership style can be taught but can be influenced by the culture of the society from where the individual coming from, by the specific training, his/her personality and international experience. Not understanding the relationship in between leadership and different cultural dimensions is a barrier, but not as dangerous as not

having enough military competencies. In the specialist opinion military should adapt only to cultural phenomenon that are affecting military operations and to leave the others the exploitation of cultural elements.

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SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS GENERATED BY THE CONCEPT OF ADMINISTRATIVE INTELLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES

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Abstract: *Administrative Intelligence as a novel hybrid notion featured by Government Intelligence and Business Intelligence adds to the classical intelligence cycle elements of innovation defined by cloud-computing evolution towards cognitive computing using computational techniques and artificial intelligence for analysis of Big Data structures. Today, the partial automation of existing processes at the level of the Central and Local Public Administration in Romania involves the modeling, validation, simulation and optimization of the common and specific workflows of each type of administration with the ultimate goal of eliminating human errors, subjectivism or inappropriate intentions in exercising the public administration functions. In this paper we shall evaluate the social perceptions of the fact that people will have to boost their creative skills and to give up repetitive activities that will be taken over by such automated systems. The prior understanding of such social future development is of a great value for the community cohesiveness and design of the future development objectives.*

Keywords: *administrative intelligence; cognitive computing*

1. INTRODUCTION

The need for introduction and study of the concept of *Administrative Intelligence* (AI) is given by the criticism of the NPM (New Public Management) paradigm – the new management philosophy designed to modernize the public administration. This is based on the following elements: performance competition, privatization, standards, measurement and monitoring, focus on results, focus on customer, social control. The fact that this model is not flawless is proved by Boston *et al.* (1996) by highlighting that the missing elements such as overarching legal frameworks, vested public interest, the market and sovereignty (notably, Rosenbloom, 1993) create the divide between the public and private sectors. They trigger non-compliance with ethical standards in public life and, as a matter of consequence, greed, favoritism and conflict of interests are enshrined (Larbi, 1999). The shift to the NPM in Public Administration has also led to power differentials, understood as a concentration of power and knowledge within governments and in the exclusion of other stakeholders from the policy making process (Yuen, 2007). In Asian countries where a bureaucratic model is not in place, privatization (featuring NPM)

has become a popular source of income in relation to the distribution of corruption and patronage (Samaratunge *et al.*, 2008), the same phenomenon taking place in the East European countries.

The concept of *Administrative Intelligence* is not totally embedded to Government Intelligence (protecting the democratic values, citizens' safety, economic security and state classified information; preventing and combating spying, terrorism and organized cross-border crime which, by their nature and scale, affect national security, promoting the security interests of Romania and its allies in a fluid geostrategic context of states, corporations and asymmetric threats.), nor in Business Intelligence (which comprises the strategies and technologies used by companies for the data analysis of business information (Dedić & Stanier, 2016).

Examining Organizational Intelligence (OI), we see that the concept of AI overlaps OI but applied to Public Administration. The concept of AI will bridge the existing gap between the development of Organizational Intelligence using Business Intelligence tools and techniques and the missing elements identified above. These give rise to the following symptoms in Public Administrations, according to Veryard (2013):

- *Choke*: inability to capitalize on expertise.
- *Denial*: refusal to accept the reality that we are already facing.
- *Guesswork*: intuition-driven action rather than focused readiness.
- *Meddle*: attempt to change a state of affairs that is not under our control or responsibility.
- *Muddle*: confusion due to many overlapping and conflicting situations.
- *Panic*: unreasonable thoughts or behaviour.
- *Policy-based evidence*: decision-making is based on a selection of data while removing any contradictory data.
- *Repetition / Oscillation*: no lessons of the past are learnt so as to avoid making the same mistakes.
- *Short-Sighted / Tunnel Vision*: strategic long-term orientation is not developed.

2. FRAMING ADMINISTRATIVE INTELLIGENCE

2.1 The Importance of Knowledge Management for Public Administration.

Knowledge has always been considered a valuable resource for public and private organizations, a prerequisite for achieving goals, and a timely response to changes in the political, social and economic environment. It was recognized as an intangible asset during the last two decades of the 20th century and widely acknowledged as the top ranking factor of production in the era of the “New economy”, tools and methodologies becoming available and shared for development purposes.

The concept of Knowledge Management is a later addition, still controversial and lacking a unitary definition or application (Despres & Chauvel, 1999). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) envisage Knowledge Management as the capability of an organization to create, disseminate and integrate it its products, services and systems. In the same climate of opinion, Skyrme & Amidon (1997) define knowledge management by focusing on its explicit and systematic nature and on the cycle of its “creation, gathering, organizing, diffusion, use and exploitation” for the accomplishment of collective goals. Wiig (1997) demonstrates convergent thinking with the above mentioned authors, and associates renewal with Knowledge Management as a complex strategy of optimization, value creation and return on investment. OECD (2003) provides an all-inclusive definition of knowledge management:

a broad collection of organizational practices related to generating, capturing, and disseminating know-how and promoting knowledge sharing within an organization, and with the outside world.

Sutton (2007) also claims that scholars and practitioners alike have not yet been able to define the phenomenon of Knowledge Management in a sustainable way so as to clearly identify its multilayered meaning and components. Jennex (2009) advocates that Knowledge Management boils down to leveraging, by the optimal exploitation of knowledge assets and connecting all the stakeholders: knowledge generators, holders, and (end) users, thus securing the flow of knowledge internally. Bali et al. (2009) also dwell on effectiveness and efficiency in shaping Knowledge Management, and share their concern with authenticity and relevance of data supporting superior decision-making and sustainable competitive advantage. McElroy (2010) expands Knowledge Management to innovation management and organizational learning. Despres (2011) raises the question of no definitive theory of Knowledge Management, considering it an open system. In our attempt to harmonize all these views, we can conclude that Knowledge Management is an evolving multilayered concept covering the creation, collection, systematization, sharing, dissemination and storage of knowledge for problem solving and decision making along with the evolution of the governance.

2.2 From Organizational Intelligence to Administrative Intelligence. The first approach to the concept Organizational Intelligence is attributed to McMaster (1998) who endorses that OI is the capacity to think and act at the organizational level, while allowing for flexibility, creativity and accommodation strategies. Similarly, Tarapanoff (2002) sees OI as resulting from the need of the organization to continuously and quickly adapt to environmental changes, accurately dealing with opportunities and threats, and showing the ability to innovate. Therefore, OI refers to a process of converting data into knowledge and knowledge into action so as to secure corporate gain (Cronquist, 2010). We favour the broad definition of OI put forward by De Angelis (2013) as the ability of an organization to adapt, learn and change in response to environmental conditions via the exploitation of relevant knowledge.

The first definitions of the *Administrative Intelligence* (AI) pertain to Choo (1998) and

Tsoukas (2005), being equated to the intelligence of public organizations in the form of a distributed knowledge system or sense-making community. This theoretical view holds that the knowledge resources which a public-sector institution deploys are neither given nor discovered, but created in the process of making sense of the knowledge. This comes very close to what Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) describe as a process during which tacit knowledge is converted into explicit knowledge within the structures of a given organization. As knowledge becomes an asset in terms of organizational competitiveness, mechanisms of learning, unlearning and competence building become incalculably valuable features.

Virtanen and Stenvall (2014), for instance, argue that the AI encompasses two dimensions – knowledge-based decision-making (including the constructionist way to build performance systems, management and metrics) and customer-centered thinking emphasizing the role of service-dominant logic in organizing public-service delivery. This perspective underpins that an intelligent public organization – and public policy-making as well – develops consolidated knowledge-management systems which take the whole planning process into account – from strategy to implementation and from implementation to the evaluation of effects of public interventions.

We would like to emphasize that public-service delivery has developed qualitatively during the last 10 – 15 years or so – and now there is an urgent need to identify new directions of performance management and evaluation. More exactly, the new planning ideology has been built upon the New Public Administration (NPM) principles; management conveys the idea that society, public policies and organizations cannot be governed without the capacity of managing networks and co-operation (e.g., Greve, 2015). These networks exist at all levels of governance – that is, at the local, regional, national and global levels. Consequently, the time-frame logic of planning has also changed radically. Planning cycles are now shorter, and this calls for a new kind of reflexivity, in terms of both the agility of the public organizations and their performance systems.

2.3. AI as a dimension of Knowledge Management. The concept of AI is interconnected with the concept of Knowledge Management as indicated by Mooghali & Azizi (2008) and Yaghoubi et al. (2011) who claim that 59.2% of the changes of AI are determined by the strategic processes of Knowledge Management. Zarbakhsh

et al. (2011) counterargue that although research and diagnostic works have been using Albrecht organizational intelligence tests, no adequate measures have been taken to standardize them. Liebowitz (2001) insists that the active management of knowledge is of paramount importance in problem solving, decision-making enhancing performance in the case of public organisations.

Cruz and Dominguez (2007) strongly believe that AI is enabled by Knowledge Management as serving to gather external and internal information, and facilitating perception, knowledge creation and decision-making. Lefter et al. (2008) state that intelligent organizations use knowledge management as an adaptive coping tool within a continuously changing environment – hence, early identification of opportunities and risk avoidance are possible. It is obvious that Knowledge Management provides the toolkit for the identification, collection, storage, dissemination, and creation of knowledge, whereas AI interprets and integrates and these inputs to enable decision making. However, Choo (2009) warns us against the fact that too much information can impinge on AI processes. The idea of developing and implementing appropriate copying strategies in the private sector in terms of Knowledge Management/Organizational Intelligence is assimilated to adopting a proactive stance, but it presents several pitfalls as suggested by Boston *et al.* (1996).

2.4. From GOV2.0 to GOV3.0 through cultural changes. The move on from WEB 1.0 to WEB 2.0 and WEB 3.0 has meant passing from Hierarchically oriented governance (WEB 1.0) to Market-oriented governance (WEB 2.0) and currently to Network-oriented governance (WEB 3.0). As a matter of fact, we have witnessed the shift from a “Gov-to-You” to a “Gov-with-You” framework to incentivize the co-creation of knowledge as enabling AI, while highlighting the following:

1. building up and promotion of a sharing culture of the public administration;
2. facilitating a concise expression of citizens through public platforms and portals;
3. engaging technology and specialists to turn Knowledge Management into AI.

The public value will be provided not by the government alone, but mainly by collaboration because the scarcity of resources, in-house skills, and intelligence to meet the needs of citizens in a dynamic environment and the Network-oriented governance This 21-th AI will be based on sharing

power, opening up the policy- and decision-making process, shaping new relationships, and partnering on service delivery.

As the world becomes more unpredictable and more complex, the model of AI is based mainly on changing cultural patterns in the Public Administration field, i.e., from the interaction “people to documents” to “person to person approach” fully exploiting social and communication skills.

This important cultural change is the main element of the AI model acting as a driving force, as pointed out by Riege and Lindsay (2006) with reference to corporate communication and culture. The biggest challenge faced by the public administration, employing permanent staff, with a strict organization chart and having to comply with directives come from numerous management bodies, is to be able to do away with the “Knowledge is power” mindset in favour of “Knowledge sharing is power.”

Culture change is an ongoing process, underlying (notably, De Angelis, 2013):

1. willingness to cooperate;
2. understanding of how AI improve the public processes in conjunction with e-Gov implementation;
3. implementation of a network of CIO;
4. performance indicators for AI and for public services delivery;
5. the extent to which public policies impact on AI implementation;
6. introducing local and regional collaboration networks between public and private organizations;
7. meritocracy policy in the assessment of civil servants;
8. development of intercultural competence along with specific competences in lifelong learning;
9. creative thinking, fair-mindedness, broad-mindedness, and open-mindedness;
10. addressing integrative problems from workflows to cognitive computing;
11. understanding the passing from social media to public engagement;
12. turning transactional leaders into transformational leaders.

3. A PROPOSAL MODEL FOR AI

3.1. AI model based on New Cognitive Technologies. The OI model based on Falletta’s Organizational Intelligence Model (2008) was created using Traditional Approach based on

structured data, analytical functions and logical architecture with respect to “Circle of Trust” where data stays closer to warehouse and analytics.

The 2013 model of De Angelis is based on Halal model (1998) in which “Stakeholders relationship” is replaced by “Learning with environment”. The criticism we bring to the De Angelis model is related to the lack of dual interaction between the IT Component and the Strategy-Planning component, between the IT component and the Organizational Structure component. Also, the link between the IT Component and the policy and best practices component is not achieved directly. It is obvious that all these links must have a systemic direct link with the feedback measurement. Also, filtering the policy component and best practices through the learning component completely eliminates the feedback on the application of both policies and good practices on other levels than those of learning.

We propose a model based on creativity, holistic thinking and intuition where all data is unstructured, intimate, coming from social networks, mobile, GPS, web, photos, audios, video, email, logs. We integrate these new data sources with Governmental Enterprise Architecture to enhance the outcomes (Fig. 1).




Fig.1 AI Cognitive Model

In order to maintain the AI cycle, in the Big Data environment, the excess of information can befuddle the AI processes, but the data collectors are exponentially increasing. To solve this gap, new technologies were developed. Main directions of data analysis consist of passing from Machine Learning to Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Computing. Machine Learning defines the technology by which a computational system has the ability to modify subroutines from the learning

algorithm through the learning process from the available data to create predictions about the evolution of these data (Fig. 2).




Fig.2 Cognitive Computing Model

Artificial Intelligence defines the technology by which a computerized system or automated system takes one or more decisions based on data, algorithms and machine learning available. This technology can make a decision based on an alert and estimate at a critical time or provide a set of decisions for a given problem, each of which can have a certain score relative to a particular measurement indicator system. State of the Art in Artificial Intelligence is Intelligent Agent, specific to the new WEB 4.0. Wooldridge and Jennings (1995, pp. 203-218) consider intelligent agents can perceive environmental conditions and respond quickly to changes in order to meet the goals for which it was built, are able to show objective behavior and have the ability to take initiatives to meet their design goals. Through their social capacity - to interact with other agents and possibly people in order to meet the goals for which they were designed - intelligent agents shape social behavior by creating a data collection system and learning machines based on ETLs on quantifying human social perceptions and creating associated measurement metrics applicable to the internal and external social network environment in public administration.

The natural pursuit is Cognitive Computing technology based on intelligent intelligence systems, learning machines, data mining, extracting, transforming, collecting and developing tools in two directions: computer-based data exploitation, visual recognition and natural language processing and on the direction of cognitive sciences by developing tools for measuring and shaping human behavior at a biological and social level.

The challenge for a new model of AI for the Public Administration, is to change the paradigm,

meaning to deliver public, electronic services with an increased usability and accessibility for the citizen, together with the facilitation of social perceptions at the level of public servants that will facilitate the identification, documentation, decomposition and compliance of these public services both with the public policies generated by GOV 3.0 and with the new technologies (Fig. 3).




Fig.3 Cognitive Capabilities of AI Model

This is why, together with the understanding of the new technology itself, it is necessary to change the social behaviour within the social networks created inside and outside the Public Administration, and the change of the social behaviour is the result of the social perceptions that both public servants and citizens have through their interactions with both the final interfaces of the new technologies as well as within the above-mentioned social networks.

3.2. Social perceptions associated with the new model AI. Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2003) show how social perception automatically leads to adequate social behaviour, perceptual representations automatically activating behavioral representations. We shall not analyze here the case of observables (gestures, body position, body movements), focusing instead on the prediction of the features (intelligence, honour, professionalism) based on the social perceptions within the social networks. This prediction is not based on metrics (tests, IQ, references) but on direct perceptions within social networks.

Social perceptions equally activate social stereotypes, which are not always objective. For instance, the image of a Roma escaping from a car

will be associated with the person's belonging to the social group of individuals breaking the law.

The role of social perception in building a viable AI model is that of a catalyst for cultural change, seen as the main element of the AI model. This evolution is needed because the transition to GOV 3.0 involves moving from the "citizen-document" interaction to the "citizen-civil servant" interaction, where the competencies of the latter are decisive. Following the evolution from Gov 2.0 - open government, social media and open data - to Gov 3.0 Collaborative Innovation, Public Engagement and e-Services in Cognitive Computing, we shall become aware of the need to upgrade the notion of "civil servant" with virtual assistant for simple and repetitive actions. This perception should not lead to the rejection of these forms of Artificial Intelligence, motivated by the fear of losing the job, but by the need to further the skills of the civil servant towards meeting the demands of organizational culture changes as presented by De Angelis (2013): creative thinking, fair-mindedness, broad-mindedness, and open-mindedness (Figure 4).



Fig.4 Cognitive competencies of public servants

As far as technology is concerned, we should "guide" the social perceptions (we favour relativistic and pluralistic perspectives) so that the required new competences will allow for the deep understanding of granularity, of the need for sub-activities, triggering changes of the planning capacity, monitoring strategies and building of a culture of quality for each public authority involved. Moreover, all these should reverberate at the individual level in order to secure the intended reconfiguration of the workplace relationships, i.e. the achievement of an institutional structure in full

compliance with the imported technology in each field of activity.

Hence, efficient and effective communication is a pre-requisite, and the success measure consists in the answers to the following questions: "Are we ready to socialise?" and "Have we developed the required social skills?" Most likely, the answers are positive in the case of groups that are culturally homogenous. Nevertheless, we think that the answers should also be positive in the case of the specific activities pertaining to the workflow, and the ingrained habits, routinised ways and related skills shaping cultural unity should be exploited to achieve unity of action.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Social perceptions influence both citizens and public servants, leading to behavioural modifications both at the societal level and within the Public Administration system. The abrupt shift to new WEB 3.0 specific technologies, and WEB 4.0 technologies for the next years, leads to a change of approach in what regards organizational and cognitive-computing approach. The new AI models will take into account the capabilities of the cognitive systems (UNDERSTAND, REASON, LEARN, INTERACT)

There is a necessity for reconstructing the institutional architecture of the Public Administration, based on the new Cognitive Computing concepts and the adjustment of public servants' competences to the capabilities of cognitive systems based on social perception of Cognitive Systems.

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IMMIGRATION, COMMUNICATION BARRIER AND TERRORISM

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Abstract: *The article attempts to capture in a unique and original conception elements of the communication barrier that arise between immigrants and the autochthon population. When I refer to communication barriers, I do not refer to verbal communication, but to applied methods and procedures that go into antagonism and could result in the collision between the autochthon cultures and those belonging to the origins of immigrants, generating in this way various negative phenomena such as fundamentalism and extremism. All this confrontation between new habits, which must be assimilated or accepted, and the ancestral customs of immigrants must be directed in such way as to find a generally accepted algorithm that would result in an unconditional symbiosis of the two elements. Also, the communication barrier must be looked into also from the perspective of fundamentalist and extremist manifestations and the desire to integrate into groups that have nothing to do in common with the respect of human rights. The question of the possibility to creating a Caliphate in Europe is also put in the context of analysing the communication barrier as only a person with a rudimentary and limited culture, for whom life is not seen as a desideratum, can admit the return of human society to the conditions of the Early Middle Ages or in times when the tribal leaders were guiding human society.*

Keywords: *immigration; communication barrier; digital age generation; terrorism; fundamentalism and extremism*

1. IMMIGRATION. WHAT STANDS BEHIND THE NEED TO IMMIGRATE?

Starting with the last century, the first-born immigrant who had fled from armed conflicts or wanted to integrate himself within the sovereign state of the colonial country from which he had come, managed to adapt to the hypostases imposed by the capitalist society and accepted the new living conditions, culture and education offered by the state on whose territory he/she became refugee.

Nowadays it is very difficult to differentiate between a request made by an immigrant seeking to obtain a form of international protection, who actually wants to escape armed conflicts and to integrate into a democratic society, and the immigrant seeking this stratagem only to implement a diabolical plan and act as a terrorist.

Above all these, one must consider the desire of second- or third-generation young people born from immigrants established in some of the European Union's Member States to highlight themselves, by joining terrorist groups or by participating directly in terrorist actions as "*foreign fighters*" or "*lonely wolves*". The above mentioned actions occur due to various reasons like deception or suffering from psychic image complexes,

following Islamist radicalization or the rejection by the society in which they were born and raised based on subjective reasons related to their religion and culture, education or other social orientations. Other young people are just attracted by the mirage of promises made by the recruiters or by the hope of an emerging opportunity.

Analysing the risks generated by immigration among young people we can identify: risks arising from mental disorders due to the separation from the world they know and understand; risks resulting from traumas based on the difficulties encountered during their immigration journey through various states or even the loss of a family member; risks of socio-professional marginalization; risks of unconditional devotion relationship built between an immigrant and various mentally unstable individuals or members of organized crime groups or terrorist organizations.

In Europe, we can identify three main types of immigration: (a) One can be considered beneficial to the European Union Member States as the immigrant is an educated person with a good professional background who integrates easily into the new society. (b) The second type of immigration is the source of the creation, appearance and manifestation of conflicts and it is

based on feelings of antipathy that arise due to objective or most of the time subjective reasons, because the immigrant is a person trapped in the customs of the past and does not accept the transformation of the human society. (c) The third type of immigration is the one generated by citizens of the Member States of the European Union who migrate from one state to another and usually come from eastern European countries to Europe's western states with the aim of finding more robust places of work than the ones available in the state of origin.

2. THE PARADIGM OF THE COMMUNICATION BARRIER

In order to eliminate this communication disability between two totally different cultures, which resemble in terms of acceptance of compromises, in order for science to try to explain what divinity has set and which is the progress of human society, studies must be undertaken to understand the context of the occurrence and the struggle between these cultures. Starting from the emergence of a culture, everything is limited to understanding the growth and decay of that culture within a society that either accepts or it is conquered by a certain religion. If freedom of speech is restricted, then democracy will be restricted and religious dogma will overcome and conquer the political and private life of that society, condemning everything that is outside the religious dogma and that is not possible to be explained in favour of the one who holds the power.

Basically, there will be nothing beyond the will of that "entity" that holds the power, who will distort in their own way any manifestation of the social life, and will misinterpret and falsify the history of the religions at its own good, but with the aim of highlighting the violence that should be applied. This being the main characteristic of the preached religion and if the religion is attacking

the achievements of previous civilizations, along with those of the civilizations that followed, there will remain only three fundamental things within society: the holy book (the Bible or the Qur'an) the law created by this holy book and the prophets, and the doctrine of that society will be represented only by occult thought (Said, 2015:39).

We say it is an occult thought because the prophet who is believed to be the embodiment of the supreme God perceives

the deviation from the theological text of the holy book as an unbelief that must undoubtedly and severely be punished and not as a mere error that can be directed by consensus (Said, 2015:40-41).

At this point, art and science must oppose this pathological tumor that will destroy human society in its entirety and that will be tolerated primarily by extremist and terrorist groups because the representatives of these entities do not want to find an answer to the problems that arise within society, and violence, regardless of its form (physical or psychic, individual or collective), will be directed against any element of a democratic system. This approach is reportedly a target that will be accepted by the members of the retrograde organizations.

If science has to seek and provide precise answers that can be explained to anyone regardless of their educational background, art must help the individual discover his place in society and make him understand the universe where he lives. Art will give him an answer about creation in general, and that he, a simple person, actually participates in the creation, knowledge and development of the world and not in its destruction. Therefore, religion should not be the instrument of destroying what is beautiful in society, it must contribute to

opening up new horizons for research so that humanity can express creativity in all fields at the universal level (Said, 2015:132).

The paradigm of the barrier of communication that manifests itself will find its origins in the false perception of religion as an indestructible unity that should not be analysed and completed in parallel with the development and diversification of the culture of society. Therefore, if necessary, the religion will overlap and replace socio-political instruments such as

the noble blood of the monarchical regimes, the Arian blood or pure of nationalist policies, etc. (Codreanu, 2011:19-20),

and will become the object of religious manipulation that will control the distribution of values within human society.

Finally, as a brief conclusion, if science, art and religion are not in a symbiosis relationship and will not be completed, then there will be an antithesis between religion, art, and cognitive disciplines that will permanently generate a barrier of communication.

3. BARRIER OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN NATIVE CITIZENS AND NEW IMMIGRANTS

The barrier of communication is an element that combined with other elements born on the background of xenophobia, arisen from faith or education, leads to the inappropriate adaptation of the immigrant to the new environmental conditions that shake his inner self and disturbs his convictions and conscience. This barrier of communication generally appears in the case of the second type of immigration described above. In fact, Touraine's question, "Can we live together?" (Green, *et al.*, 2006:2) becomes very important and valid, and the answer must be a symbiosis between assuring national and international security and respecting human rights.

The communication barrier can be artificially maintained through a retrograde manifestation of resistance to culture by rejecting any form of acceptance and integration into a new social group that has different customs. Marginalization is imminent. Thus, any attitude of the immigrant, any opposition to the biotic elements present in the democratic society must be seen in the context under which the event is understood by the immigrant and the way in which he perceives and interprets national security and ensuring public order and safety, as an outward appearance of his feelings against a society in which the organization of state institutions respects the social and cultural values as understood by the immigrant or a society without organization.

If we think at it and accept that the way in which today's young people see and interpret phenomena in the world as a whole and the technology development is different from that of their parents and teachers (Voinea, 2017:64), then we will understand the extraordinary difference that exists in understanding the same phenomena by the younger generation which grows, develops and gets educated in totally different conditions, in an environment of chaos and terror. The antagonism of the vision on life also arises from the perception that for the European Union "digital age generation", that has inherited a culture developed in centuries, and have training and education resulting from the application of democratic processes, in the end everything is summed up to two figures, 1 and 0. For the young people raised under the spectrum of ignorance and violence, the two digits 1 and 0 are limited, first to something we can understand and especially accept and the second, to nothing. Thus, there is a barrier

of communication and expression in conception and education between democracy and terror, generated by fundamentalist and extremist manifestations. This is being only a part of a complex ensemble that encompasses political, economic, educational, cultural, religious and ideological factors that have to be studied, analysed and interpreted in the context of the religion and the cultural heritage of the society from which the immigrant originates. In addition, it should be compared also with the predominant religion and the cultural heritage of the indigenous people from the region where the immigrant wishes to settle.

Fundamentalism and extremism can mean rejection of acceptance, a part of multicultural democracy, or new cultural elements the immigrant finds in the new society. Therefore, it is often attempted to forcefully insert the cultural elements inherited into the new society, thus trying to eliminate a part of the existing cultural heritage within a human society and even return to the tribal condition. There are many examples in this respect, but I will only stop over one: the binding regulation of the ban on Islamic headscarf in schools or in public, adopted by several European countries. In this regard, even the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has rejected several complaints made by Muslims against the authorities of some EU states, regarding the ban on wearing Islamic veils in schools. The conclusion was that the ban on wearing does not violate religious freedom but represents a violation of already established freedoms, in this case the freedom of secular expression.

4. HOW DOES THE EU NATIVE POPULATION PERCEIVE THE PHENOMENON OF IMMIGRATION?

Our jobs are being stolen, even if those jobs are not attractive to the native population. The truth is somewhere in the middle because everything is based on manipulation. Immigrants are seen as a cheap labour source and they are attracted by those firms offering them working conditions and wages, which are often much better than in their third countries of origin. Despite the payments are in general reaching the minimum legally accepted ceilings in the EU countries of interest for the immigrant, which are unattractive for the native population, the leitmotif remains. Another leitmotif generally met is "If they do not like us they should leave", which is an increasingly common concept, especially as a result of the attacks and sexual

assaults committed by young Muslims. These population fears, which often originate in the ignorance of the international socio-political situation, in some cases overlap also the policies adopted at national level by some of the European Union Member States, third countries or some speeches by government representatives or even presidents of those states. It is wrong to try to promote by force our point of view. Examples in this regard can be numerous: from the destruction of religious objectives (like the statues of Buddha in Bamiyan, Afghanistan dynamited and destroyed by the Taliban in 2001) or bringing insults to the religion or nationality, to the creation of a state of chaos is only a small step.

The subject must not be neglected and we do not refer here to violent actions used to impose a point of view or to receive an answer. Why some events are considered harmful by a category of people, and others are allowed and encouraged by the same people? Why is it acceptable that under the title "Migrants", alongside two men who run after two women, the symbolic image of the three-year-old Syrian child who was found dead on a beach in Turkey should be seen next to the question: "What would have Alan become when he would have become an adult?" and the inciting reply: "Sexual aggressor in Germany", referring to the sexual assaults committed by immigrants from North Africa and the Middle and Middle East (Charlie Hebdo, 2016). Why it cannot be considered instigation towards "hate on racial, religious, nationality grounds" (see article 40 of the Law no. 504/2002), and it is just a satirical caricature that appeared in Charlie Hebdo Magazine in 2016 one year and a few days from a terrorist attack.

If the same measure is not used to respond to the chaos and challenges, we will be permanently exposed to violence. When we learn to respect and understand the true meaning of freedom of expression, then we will become more humane, and then we will have the right to judge the actions of others. No part, indigenous or immigrant, should change its religion, or abandon the ancestral culture of the place from where he/she originates and which he/she represents. Everyone has to respect the decision of cohabiting partners, not to hinder their religious and cultural manifestations, as long as these actions do not promote a policy of terror and chaos, acting against the states' national security to the detriment of maintaining the balance within the social, professional and religious life which contributes to the development of art, education, society as a whole.

5. IS IT POSSIBLE TO CREATE AN ISLAMIC CALIPHATE IN EUROPE?

The Caliphate is a state led by a caliph, and if we analyse the ethnic and religious composition of the states in Europe, the answer is a positive one. At present, states such as Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Kosovo province with a majority of Muslim population who, according to the authorities of these regions, actively participated in ISIS activities, pose a threat to the security of the European Union that should not be disconsidered. Looking towards Turkey and Russia, but also towards the former states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, we find that Europe is still under the pressure and influence of a strong Islamic current. Many citizens of these states, but also others who are originary from France, Belgium, etc. have participated as "foreign fighters", alongside members of the ISIS terrorist group, in the battles in Iraq and Syria, and some of them have recently returned to their states of residence.

According to the data published in studies of some European institutions and organizations, only between 2014 and 2015 more than 30,000 "foreign fighters" from over 100 states were ISIS combatants (Boutin *et al.*, 2016:9). In a SOUFAN Centre report issued in 2017, the number of "foreign fighters" amounted to over 40,000 people in 2014, coming from more than 110 states. Out of these, over 3,400 came from Russia, about 3,200 were from Saudi Arabia, 3,000 from Jordan, and over 1,900 from France (Barrett, 2017:7-10). According to the data provided by the authorities of the European countries, between 2011 and 2015, approximately 4,300 people from European Union member States joined the ISIS terrorist group, out of which more than 580 people were killed in the armed conflicts in Iraq and Syria (Boutin *et al.*, 2016:49). Below, there are some examples from some European Union states: Belgium - over 500 citizens; France - about 2,000 citizens; Germany - over 720 people; Great Britain - about 700 people (Boutin *et al.*, 2016:25; 31; 33; 40). Also, the influence that may be exercised by the Muslim population from other European states must not be underestimated. As a result, the emergence of new conquerors (foreign fighters) that would settle themselves and receive help from indigenous people in certain regions of Europe cannot be overlooked.

Therefore the possibility of establishing a geographical region, if not even the creation of an

Islamic Caliphate in Europe that affects and negatively influences the social and political life of the states in this area, must not be indifferently looked into, nor underestimated.

6. WHAT TO DO IN THIS CASE?

It's a natural question. I believe that first of all education programs should be adopted to address both immigrants and locals. These programs should be developed on the basis and in the context of the immigrants' culture and customs, but in symbiosis with explanations of the native culture and the role of the society in which immigrants want to integrate. Programs must provide the necessary elements and tools to prevent disillusionment when the immigrant realizes that his "new country" does not offer more than his home country, and locals must not perceive immigration as an invasion of an infectious disease to be eradicated. By creating and implementing public policy documents, "the accumulation of knowledge is not important and it matters more how the principles are organised and implemented at the same time because only so we can get meaningful notions" (Tessarolo, 2017:209).

Therefore, we must accept the immigrant as an interlocutor and find a common language to understand each other. Thus reforming the paradigm whereby the beginning of a discussion for a true understanding of the interlocutor is superior to a simple acquirement and dominance of several notions, which are used independently without making connections, even though "diversity will obviously be greater among different social groups" (Tessarolo, 2017:209).

7. CONCLUSIONS

Nowadays, when Europe is practically suffocated by large and sometimes overwhelming flows of immigrants, the barrier of communication is a factor that manifests itself actively and virulently when the immigrant is left to choose the way of integration into the capitalist society that has, admits and offers other perceptions of applying customs on cultural habits belonging to different populations or ethnic groups.

In order to overcome the communication barrier, a perspective that unites the elements of the two cultures must be found, so that, at least in the first phase of the process of assimilation and integration into society, various obsessions, hostility, past experiences, hidden interests,

different values and beliefs that have psychically affected the person, must be understood and explained in order for a person to be able to move into a higher phase of integration into society.

Another condition that must be taken into account when considering public policy documents, is the appliance of ad-hoc programs in which specialists need to first understand themselves the culture and habits of immigrants, in order to overcome the communication barrier.

Based on the studies and analyses carried out, it must be understood and accepted that the daily reality, under which the world is in a continuous movement, is highlighted, and that different segments are identified in regards to the possibility for the immigrants to find working places or to complete/finalise their education by following general or professional training courses at different levels.

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CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGES IN THE STUDY PROGRAM TO THE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE OF AEROSPACE MILITARY STUDENTS

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Abstract: Educational programs of the Faculty of Military Technology at the University of Defence in Brno are continuously upgraded in accredited study programs. Changes have been brought about by the transformation of the defence sector as well as by the more frequent involvement of aeronautical services in foreign missions, particularly in the Baltic states and in Sinai. New study programs should reflect the requirements of aeronautical units in the training of military pilots, air traffic, air and missile technology and aerospace systems. In this context, the increasing dependence on the use of information systems and the implementation of new versions within the ICT Army of the Czech Republic is described as a response to changes in military and a new paradigm of logistics support for aeronautical services. The results of the analyses of knowledge of aeronautical module graduates and the use of acquired knowledge in practice, apart from those already mentioned, have been expanded with the expertise of radio engineering, air traffic control, engineering and aeronautical services, aeronautical technical and operational security, and airport security needs to be adapted to current military practice requirements. The multifactor leadership questionnaire for graduates from 2010 has been used to investigate the level of aeronautical module graduates' knowledge.

Keywords: air base; air force; multifactor leadership; flight simulator

1. INTRODUCTION

Knowledge organizations, as it is the case of universities, are found in the new position – enquiry requirements are changing quickly and they require reaction (Korecki, Z., Draghici, C. 2012). The experience of the aeronautical training process was analyzed for the 2015 - 2017 period, where accreditation for new Master's studies was gradually updated. The education process was significantly influenced by the requirements of the European Credit Transfer System and the specified requirements of the Czech Republic's Defense Department, in particular the Air Force Command. e analysis focused on graduates of aeronautical military expertise (military pilot, air traffic, aerospace, rocket technology and aerospace systems for academic years 2015/2016 to 2016/2017).

The Faculty of Military Technology was educated in 2015-2017 students in four training modules - Military Pilot, Flight Traffic, Aircraft and Rocket Technology and Air Electrical Systems. An important part of training pilots and their practical skills is training on an airplane simulator, where they acquire basic skills and can routinely repeat activities (Bořil & Čičmanec, 2016).




Fig. 1 Number of graduates in training modules - military pilot, flight operations, aircraft and rocket technology and aviation electrical systems.

1.1 Analysis of the new program study. The problem of harmony of student knowledge, performed function, needed knowledge and realization of foreign missions, was solved with the method of sources allocation (Korecki, Pomazalová, 2010). Education requirements in contemporary conditions are based on complex knowledge and focus on the logic of the thinking of the implementer of activities, which are influenced by the short reaction time and possible fatal consequences (Čičmanec & Nevrlý, 2012).

The training of military professionals is based not only on professional knowledge but also on the ability to communicate in a foreign language. For this reason, attention is paid to the University of Defense in Brno on the language skills and, above all, the professional terminology (Lopourová, Korecki, 2009). Current teaching of military expertise 21-29 (21 pilots, 22 - air force expertise 23 - Air Traffic Control, 26 - Radio Technical Assurance, 27 - Engineering - Air Service, 28 - Airport Technical and Operational Security, and 29 - Airport Security) take place in a continuous five-year Master's degree program. In the following text I will deal with the training of Military Pilot Expertise and Air Traffic Control.

The total study load of the study plan - Military pilot is 6252 teaching hours, which is 301 ECTS and Air Traffic Control is 6213 teaching hours, which is 301 ECTS.




Fig.2 Number of teaching hours of the study plan - Military pilot

Subjects of basic theoretical profiling for pilots are a study load of 624 hours, which is converted to 30 ECTS. Subjects included here are Air Traffic Technologies, Aviation Technology and Technology, Airborne Operational Use and Applied Air Traffic Technology.




Fig.3: Basic theoretical profiling for pilots

The most important area of training for military pilots is specialized training. The area

consists of air training and practical training of military pilots. Flight training is planned for 1,050 teaching hours with a subsidy of 56 ECTS. Practical preparation has 180 teaching hours and 6 ECTS. Subjects of basic theoretical profiling for air traffic controllers are Air Traffic Engineering, Aircraft Techniques and Technology, Air Navigation and Radionavigation, and Airborne Operations.




Fig.4 Basic theoretical profiling for air traffic controllers.

2. THE COURSE AND RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH

Main objective of the article is to find an immediate answer to the question whether the contents of study programs develops those qualities and abilities of the graduates, which are necessary to hold functions not only at the air bases of the Czech Air Force. The results obtained will make it possible to use the results obtained in order to change the routing of the study modules. The authors will use the lessons learned to alter the curriculum structure that will reflect not only the demand of the Air Force, but also reflect changes in the implementation of logistical support processes due to structural changes in the defense sector, including the development of information systems. Based on testing and assessing of students who participated in internships abroad an innovation was proposed, with regards to the capability and preparedness of students to work in international environment, was made (Korecki & Cabicarová, 2015).

3. FINDING RESULTS

The results achieved by the author during the first period under review stated that the flight and aeronautics flight program graduates achieved a

point rating ranging from 34,75 to 94,42 for the subject of Airport Technical Technology, a score of 38,45 to 92,15 in the subject of Airport Technology technical security, the range of points from 35,45 to 93,25 in the subject of the Organization of Logistic Support and Airport Technical Assurance for Air Traffic, and language skills showed a point rating ranging from 37,12 to 100,00 points. The results obtained in the graph represented the values $y = 14,133+6,461x$ and $R^2 = 0,3951$.




Fig.5 Knowledge of Masters Students - Growth (level) of knowledge in defined time periods for the period 2015-2017

Knowledge assessment milestones were defined for the period after the first short-term internship, then the second postgraduate period in the fifth year and especially after the practice of practicing flying in Pardubice. The first field training on the territory of the Vyškov Military Academy is realized in the first year and develops practical habits for students.

Knowledge level measurement periods were defined as follows: (1) completion of the first short-term placement - aviation specialization in Brno; (2) flight training in CLV Pardubice in second academic year; (3) flight training in CLV Pardubice in third academic year; (4) flight training in CLV Pardubice in fourth academic year; (5) flight training in CLV Pardubice in fifth academic year

The linear trend line represents the regular growth of professionally knowledge from the the third year of academic education until the fifth year.




Fig.6 Level of Knowledge Growth Bachelor Students Study - Growth (Level) of Knowledge in 1st, 2nd and 5th Period

The polynomial trend curve represents an increase in military logistics knowledge. The Air Force of the Czech Republic Army for the training of its pilots is using the Air Training Center (CLV) at the Pardubice Military Air Force. Part of the center is also the unique Tactical Simulation Center (TSC), where not only pilots are trained but also air guides and guiding combat guides. Training is conducted in four areas as follows: theoretical retraining, purpose training, basic pilot training and flight test training. The evaluation of the students in CLV Pardubice is shown in fig. 2.




Fig.7 Evaluation of training at the Pardubice Center for Air Training

3.1 Multifactor leadership questionnaire.

Transformational Leadership in analyzed study groups demonstrated that students are able to work and vest their subordinates without major deficiencies and demonstrate a growing level of knowledge based on practical examples. Air task order (ATO), AirSpaceControl Order, Airspace Coordination Order and Air Operations Directive were analyzed. The groups worked on Standard Operating Procedures and demonstrated the ability to work independently. The level of knowledge of pilots and air traffic controllers was very similar and testifies to good theoretical knowledge that was subsequently used in case studies. Passive Management would only result in a time lag.




Fig.8 Changes in Transformational Leadership, Transactional Management and Passive / Avoidant by the number of case studies solved in Command and Control in the Air Force

The subject of Command and Control in the Air Force is based on knowledges in different areas, such as command and control, combat documents and be familiar with STANAG 2014, ED 9. Students have proven good knowledge and orientation in documents and have been able to use all available means to achieve the goal.




Fig.8 Changes the number of errors

4. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The investigations carried out by aeronautical graduates and the analysis of exit levels and their reasons have led to several conclusions that will be gradually implemented in the preparation of students. Students of aeronautical expertise are very well prepared for the first systemised places after graduation. Graduates have a realistic overview of the current military engineering of aviation bases, with a significant share of this fact in practical internships in troops. In general, graduates of aeronautical military expertise have been prepared and, above all, motivated to work on their own.

A good level of knowledge of information systems, knowledge of laws, regulations and other internal regulations needed to hold functions was established. It is clear that feedback from departments and facilities should result in better cooperation between the University of Defense in Brno and aeronautical bases, for example by passing on real life experience at the department or missions to students.

An important change could also be to start redistributing students in the third semester, thus avoiding loss of motivation. The University of Defense in Brno accredited a new continuous five-year program in 2015. The new accreditation is

made up of two blocks, the first three years of which are based on a common foundation and the students are then divided into modules. The practice of field training as well as the number of flight days at the base in Pardubice was greatly increased. It was confirmed that the change in accreditation had positive impacts and reflected a higher level of knowledge.

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CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND INCREASING KNOWLEDGE IN SECURITY AND RESILIENCE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ELEMENTS IN THE NEW STUDY PROGRAM FOR STUDENTS OF THE FACULTY OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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Abstract: *The aim of the article is to analyze the experience of the supply chain management security and knowledge in crisis management of the Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies and their reflection in the design of the new study program. Processing of the new study program of the faculty International Territorial Studies for Accreditation was based on the experience of the previous accredited study program and foreign internships, where the students analyzed the ability of students to respond to examples of crisis situations, to examine their decision-making process and to respond to changes in the situation. Students in the years 2011-2017 attended the Crisis Management courses, which represents the study load of the subject in the semester, is 140 hours and in the years 2016 - 2017 Transport Management and Distribution and Regional Development and Transport Management, Marketing and Logistics with a allocated limit of 143 lessons. Overall, 143 students took part in the courses in Crisis Management, and the subject of Transport Management, Marketing and Logistics was 45. Realization of case studies has shown positive changes in all aspects of research - transformational leadership, transactional leadership and passive / avoidant behavior. The use of the Multifactor Leadership presented by Bernard M. Bass and Bruce J. Avolio has enabled the study of changes in leadership and, using the results obtained, to propose changes and complements to a new study program. The data analyzed not only allowed the adoption of proposals to increase students' professional knowledge, but also highlighted the need for increased training in human resources and intercultural communication skills.*

Keywords: *supply chain management; leadership; communication skills*

1. INTRODUCTION

The crisis is a term for a period caused by a negative event, where the results or even the existence of an organization are significantly affected or jeopardized. As a result of the crisis, there may be a significant deterioration and change in the functioning of the organization, its existence, the lives of its employees, or property and other values may be jeopardized (Robertson, 2000). The crisis caused by a disaster or other threat is the form of a wide-spread risk that needs to be addressed ex post, depending on the specific situation. Crisis is usually preceded by Failure; there may be various crises, such as: the economic crisis, the financial crisis, the personnel crisis, the personal crisis, the corporate crisis and the manufacturing crisis (Coombs, 2007).

According to Parsons (1996), the causes of the crisis in terms of organization can be: (1) internal

causes of the crisis caused when crisis can be prevented, (2) external causes of the crisis when external causes cannot be directly affected, but their impacts can be reduced by organizational readiness. The crisis may be due, for example, to production constraints, falling employment and wages, liquidation of the enterprise. A crisis situation is always a loss for the business, and it's inappropriate or no solution can lead to the company's disappearance (Sapriel, 2003).

Knowledge of crisis response and the resulting solution requires, among other things, the principles and the operation of logistics and transport. A virtually proven capability to use programmatic management methods and analytical techniques in the field of transport and logistics enables students to manage the transport and storage activities of an organization. All these processes assume the knowledge in the areas of logistics planning which includes managing

material, information and financial flows to meet customer requirements (Cooper, Lambert, Pagh, 1997). In this context, it is possible to state that the objective of logistics is to ensure that the right customer receives at the right time and in the right place the right goods or service of the right quality and quantity.

The support of technical education is the efforts of the faculty to link together activities that will enable it to be profiled as a faculty with a knowledge-based economy.

In recent years, the question arises as to how to educate students capable of responding adequately to the crisis situation and to solve the issues of logistics processes that are an important part of the lead management. The topic is widely discussed not only between educational institutions, experts at the international level, but also professional public. The current world is characterized by an increasing number of military and non-military incidents, which in turn pose risks for national states and supranational entities. The knowledge of distribution logistics in the crisis management process is a conditional factor for success in eliminating the impact of crises (Školník, M., Belan, L., 2015). Significantly proves that the analysis of the transport networks region is a necessary prerequisite for a crisis operation and therefore the need to increase knowledge through innovation of study programs and the inclusion of multidisciplinary subjects. There has still been a lower level of knowledge of project management in a real environment. The experience of the analyzed period and subjects has led to the extension of the taught areas on the problem of sub-jet resistance (Ivančík *et al.*, 2014).

Graduates of the faculty will take part in crisis situations in the near future, where they will hold leading positions in international staff and it is therefore desirable to increase their knowledge not only in the areas of crisis management and sustainability, but also in effective human resources management. The distribution of humanitarian and development assistance as a result of extraordinary events implies an innovative approach in teaching and leading the student to work independently in a planned response to an extraordinary event. The article deals with graduates of two subjects in the framework of accredited teaching of interdisciplinary territorial studies in 2012-2017¹.

¹ Based on an internal quality management survey at the University of the Defence in Brno, led by Zbyšek Korecki, Ph.D. and Hana Kalisova in 2017.

Selected subjects prepare students for the competencies needed to develop leadership, not only in crisis situations.

Table 1 Total figures of students in academic year

	2012/ 2013	2013/ 2014	2014/ 2015	2015/ 2016	2016/ 2017	2017/ 2018
Crisis Management	21	21	30	25	27	19
Transport management, Marketing and Logistics					27	18
Total	21	21	30	25	54	37

The objective of Crisis Management is to explain the basics of crisis management terminology and to reach the ability of students to respond to current crisis situations.




Fig. 1: Evaluation results in semesters

The national composition of students is determined by the number of contracts with educational institutions and is variable.

Table 1 National composition of students

	Summer semester					
	12/13	13/14	14/15	15/16	16/17	17/18
Ghana	3	1	8	9	16	3
Azerbaijan	1				1	
Slovakia	1	2	6	3		
Czech Republic	16	18	15	7	6	3
Ukraine			1			

Sweden						1
England						1
Brazil						1
Turkey						1
Gambia						1
Tanzania						1
Cyprus						1
Mexico						4
Nigeria						1
Cameroon						1
Greece						1
Zimbabwe		1				2
Spain						1
Kazakhstan						1
Nepal				1		
Russian Federation				1		
Georgia					1	
Total	21	21	30	25	27	19

Student instruction was conducted in order to build students' capacities in: analysis and identification of weaknesses in crisis management activities of the developing world; states and intervening entities; utilization of qualitative and quantitative methods of solving decisional problems characteristic of solving selected crisis scenarios; ability to analyse areas of crisis management depending on the type of emergency; ability to apply crisis management tools in the context of the emergency response phase; ability to synthesize knowledge and experience from major historical crisis events, gain knowledge of the principles and patterns of behavior and behavior of individuals and groups in crisis situations.

Subject Traffic Management, Marketing and Logistics were taught only in the last two workshops and the overall results are shown in Table 3.




Figure 2: Evaluation results in semesters

The aim of the course is to acquire basic theoretical knowledge in the field of operational research, informatics, and logistics in transport,

transport means and infrastructure. The deepening of the acquired knowledge is complemented by theoretical basics of economic disciplines in transport, management and marketing and their use in solving problems of transport processes.

The national composition of students is determined by the number of contracts with educational institutions and is variable.

Table 3 National composition of students

	Summer semester 16/17	Summer semester 17/18
Ghana	17	4
Azerbaijan	1	
Czech Republic	5	5
Cyprus		1
Nigeria		1
Cameroon		1
Zimbabwe	1	2
Spain		1
Kazakhstan		1
Nepal	1	
Russian federation	1	
Vietnam		1
Jordan		1
Georgia	1	
Total		

2. RELATION TO EXISTING THEORIES AND WORK

The general objectives of the learning process are defined in the areas of managerial skills development based on the process of leadership and management of a peer group of peers from a number of countries. The output was followed by changes in the accreditation documentation of the analyzed subjects.

The educational theory of Jean Piaget (1970, 1977, 2005, 2015) has been used, a multidimensional analysis that has been adapted to the needs of subjects that are specific in that outputs, particularly in logistics, are precisely measurable. The issue of the projection of knowledge and processes was explored when I was looking at the answer to the question: How does knowledge of processes grow and how behavior is manifested when students are entrusted with team leader. It has turned out that if students solve case studies based on standard operating processes, they are able to carry out the tasks of case studies. A visible increase was recorded in an active approach. Using a passive approach based on the activity of all members of the group took 12-18

minutes before proactive approaches to the case study were clearly visible.

Based on the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire Comparison were analyzed the development of approaches the development of the reactive approach to the active approach, which was based on the brain tree during the individual briefing. The expected development is shown in Table 4.

Table 3 Comparison of reactive and active approach

Reactive approach	Proaktivní přístup
Focus on emergencies	Focusing on vulnerability and disaster risk
Scenario of one event	Scenarios dealing with many risks in a dynamic design
Command and operational control	Strategic and tactical management
Hierarchical links	Variable relationships
Device focus (hardware)	Focus on skills (software)
Specialized expertise	Specialized expertise respecting broad contexts and public views
Urgency, short-term timeframe	Comparison, longer timeframe
Rapidly changing information usage	Differentially of views, information management
Vertical flow of information	Scattered, wide flow of information

3. RESEARCH APPROACH

Each group in the semester was evaluated in Transformational Leadership Management and Passive-Avoidant Leadership Behavior. During the training process, a total of three case studies were created for each subject. The first study was solved by the lecturer and the procedures and processes were defined, the form of division of activities into the group, the form of documenting the partial results and the presentation of the overall conclusions.

Transformation leadership is the process of influencing subordinates when leaders define goals and work around the environment to try to get the working team to see opportunities and challenges in resolving crisis management issues in a new way. Transformational leaders are proactive and seek to exploit their synergies of individual efforts in favor of the group (Butler, Cantrell, Flick 1999). The leader works with the goal of developing the organization and innovation of existing processes. Its goal is not only to achieve "expectation-based"

performance, but to leverage the potential of the team by implementing moral and ethical standards.

In accordance with the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire Feedback Report presented by Bernard M. Bass and Bruce J. Avolio (1997), it has been pointed the following factors which are crucial for the process of shaping the Transformation leadership: Idealized Behavior, Idealized Behavior, Inspirational Motivation, Intellectual Stimulation, Individual Consideration Transaction Leaders and Transaction Leadership define expectations and support performance to achieve these levels. The supervisor supports performance and monitors the achievement of those levels that have been defined in the process of preparing leaders at the strategic level. Another form that was examined was passive management, when the members of the group were given a task in the form of a simple assignment and all other activity was left on a personal approach. Therefore, the manager did not actively enter the process of making variants, did not systematically address the problems solved and only controlled the outputs.

In the area of Transactional Leadership - Management, the author has explored Constructive - Contingent Reward and Corrective - Management - by - Exception: Active. The last track was Passive-Avoidant Leadership Behavior, where the Passive -Management-by-Exception: Passive and Avoidant - Laissez faire has been studied.

Comparison of leadership capabilities was rated as a percentage of 0-100, the results of the calculations were rated 0-100 according to the accuracy of the delivered results and their comparison with the sample examples, and finally the last parameter was the time to complete the task.

4. FINDINGS

Transformational Leadership level of change has shown that groups are able to work in an international environment and perform tasks. A detailed explanation of the operational processes is required, after which the students are able to perform the tasks independently. It was found that the key differences of group management were visible and even though the groups worked according to the same scenario.

The difference was based on the level of knowledge of subjects and the personal courage to divide work in a group where there was no visible profit. It can also be appreciated that the reaction time was dependent on the way the task was explained. Different times were recorded only at the beginning of the works. The processing itself

was already solved according to the standard operating procedures

In general, it can be confirmed that Passive Management is definitely a time lag, but above all it has a negative impact on the desired results. Even though the level of knowledge was the same for both case studies, missing leadership resulted in an increase numbers of an errors. The authors take full responsibility for the contents and scientific correctness of the paper. The selection of the texts to include depend on the result of the peer review process announced.




Fig. 3 Changes in Transformational Leadership, Transactional Management and Passive / Avoidant by the number of case studies solved in Crisis Management

It can be stated that the reaction and working time for the delivery of the results was also dependent on the way of management, but in general the approximation of the times according to the number of case studies solved.




Fig. 4 Delivering results in the Crisis Management course

The control of the level of results in the subject of crisis management is based on procedural control and it is not possible to evaluate the documented results empirically.

The subject of Transport Management, Marketing and Logistics is based not only on the

human resource management capabilities, but it is significantly dependent on the level of knowledge of the calculation of transport, storage and handling costs. Here depends on the choice of individual processors. They are supposed to work independently for individual areas and will only consult changes in assignments, or changes in commodities and traffic times.




Figure 5: Changes in Transformational Leadership, Transactional Management and Passive / Avoidant by the number of case studies solved in Transport Management, Marketing and Logistics

The commencement of the activity in the subject was significantly influenced by the knowledge of the computational knowledge and the orientation in the map for calculation of transport costs. It was clear that everyone was able to engage in all activities, which allowed confirming the way in which the calculation of logistic variables was done.




Fig. 6. Delivering results in the Transport Management, Marketing and Logistics

The subject requires the use of good practices for the calculation of logistics costs, and it was clear that students from the African Union were unwilling to cooperate when dealing with the first case study, and only after a strong alert from the head of the group began to deliver corresponding

results. It is obvious; therefore, that the absence of control was visible when calculating logistics costs.




Fig.7 Accuracy of delivered results in the Transport Management, Marketing and Logistics

5. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The transport sector is one of the important areas of the national economy that has an impact on all areas of public and private life and the business sphere. The sector's cost is obvious, but on the other hand it should be noted that the transport sector is a major contributor to public budgets. The development of the transport sector has a direct impact on increasing the competitiveness of the Czech Republic. Achieving the objectives of transport policy presupposes harmonization of conditions in the transport market, permanent modernization, development of rail and water transport, while improving the quality of road transport. Transport policy also aims to reduce the environmental and public health impacts of transport, which are a prerequisite for a synergy for the development of society.

The Czech Republic's anchoring in the European Union also sets requirements for increasing the level of operational and technical interoperability of the European rail system and envisages the development of the trans-European transport network. Transport infrastructure and its facilities belong to factors that affect the competitiveness of not only individual regions, but also the Czech Republic as a whole. The impact of transport on regional development needs to be seen in the context of other infrastructure, high quality and educated workforce and the use of modern technology. Telematics is a system engineering that deals with the creation and efficient use of the information environment for homeostatic processes (compensation of interference for maintaining robust processes according to defined criteria, f.

ex. comfort, economy, etc.) of territorial units to global network industries.

The public sector is responsible for the development of transport infrastructure because it is a "public good". The financial difficulty of the transport infrastructure, which represents the realization of the construction, operation and maintenance of the transport infrastructure, assumes the use of European co-financing. Although the density of the transport network in the Czech Republic is above average in terms of ensuring competition is not enough. The attractiveness of the territory for investors in terms of transport accessibility is due to the relative availability, by comparing the availability of individual states and regions.

High-quality transport infrastructure that allows for regular deliveries in the transport of goods is important for reducing logistics chain costs. Logistics based on regular deliveries make it possible to reduce stockpiles and speed up the turnover of goods. As a result, there is a reduction in production costs for companies operating in the regions. The use of modern logistics technologies must also ensure the sustainability of processes. Logistics chains must be able to take advantage of all modes of transport by applying the principle of co-modality. Further development of the area and its security requires a progressive innovation environment that enables effective and rapid acquisition of theoretical and practical knowledge and processes in modern technologies.

The aim is therefore to focus on security issues, which are of a highly interdisciplinary nature. Interdisciplinary approach allows greater interconnection of research programs into teaching and practical implementation of theory into real life. The development of educational competencies should now be directed to the following areas: minimizing risks and addressing emergency situations affecting the population, personnel management in crisis situations and crisis management, analysis, identification and control of risks in the corporate sphere, environmental management in the context of sustainable economic development, geo-informatics and geoecology as a contextual component of integrated economic studies.

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TRANSFERENCE OF MEANING FROM ANALYST TO POLICY MAKER IN INTELLIGENCE

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Abstract: *This paper focuses on the significance of negotiating the meaning in the communication between analyst and decision maker. In other words, although the analyst and the decision maker use the same language, we need to make sure that the output of the communication process actually returns to the input provided, by mediating the effective conveyance of meaning. Whereas words and conventions are universal, in the sense that they are shared by the members of the same linguistic community, meaning is a product of individual neuro-psychophysiology. The meaning of the message we convey is reflected by the answer we get, which reveals the interlocutor's understanding of our words, and that may have everything or nothing to do with our intentions. If we do not negotiate the meaning of the input we supply, we cannot control the output thereof, and therefore the message could be valid for the disclosing party alone. In order to communicate efficiently, we need to adhere to a set of concepts and values governing our interlocutor's outlook, and to be able to adapt the substance of our message by reference to the output we expect. In intelligence analysis, information is directly related to the recipient and his representations. The recipient's singularity entails the unique and contextual nature of the information.*

Keywords: *meaning; communication process; explicit feedback; intelligence analysis; decision making*

1. MEANING AND FUNCTION IN EFFICIENT COMMUNICATION

Intelligence analysis, at the same time the most fascinating and the most misconstrued component of the intelligence cycle, has generated disputed and polemics about its place and role in governmental intelligence but also in competitive intelligence. This study seeks to launch a debate on the concept of meaning, starting from the relevance of feedback in the relationship between analyst and beneficiary. According to the dictionary definition, meaning splits into three lines of use: the first, the intrinsic one, is the semantic content of a word, i.e. the sense; the second is the extrinsic one, rendered by the signs' function of representing something that is independent from them, as a denotation of the things that they are describing; last but not least, the third one is the metadiscourse, i.e. either the symbolic value, the significance, or the importance or value of a fact or of an object.

Feedback, as an essential component of self-adjustment mechanisms, was used for the first time by Norbert Wiener in "Cybernetics, or control and communication in the animal and the machine". Subsequently, the concept was also taken over by communication sciences as "all verbal and non-

verbal messages that a person transmits consciously or unconsciously in reply to the message of another", and it is "necessary to determine the extent to which the message was understood, believed and accepted".

American researcher Melvin DeFleur proposes an analysis of communication from the perspective of a correspondence between the significance given to the message by interlocutors. For said author, human communication entails "determining significance from other persons". Thus, convention lies at the foundation of communication, within the meaning of a social contract connecting "a certain word to subjective internal experiences, that the members of the linguistic community agreed to be appropriate for such word". The merit of the DeFleur model is that of outlining the impossibility of establishing the perfect match between meanings. In this context, dialogue, the main condition of which is isomorphism, becomes virtually impossible. In exchange, what can be created is a dynamic connection through feedback mechanisms, in order to adjust the meanings of the message rendered from one interlocutor to the other.

DeFleur's model, by the role awarded to convention in communication, captures the

essential connection between significance, as a subjective internal representation, and feedback, however without going deeper than that. The need for the reverse connection is based on the need for a consensus between interlocutors, as regards meaning, because “words do not have meanings, but functions”, and, as Ludwig Wittgenstein said, we need not look for the “sense of a word, but for its manner of use”.

This perspective, captured by the interdisciplinary model of neuro-linguistics, points out that while words and conventions are universal, in the sense that they are shared by the members of a linguistic community, significance is a construct of individual psycho-neuro-physiology.

Basically, words, as symbolic elements of human communication, are nothing else than mere conventions, with limited function and relevance. They do not preserve, in themselves, universal realities, whereas they are indicators of phenomenological classes. When we hear a word, we develop on the inside what psycho-linguists call a transderivational search.

The purpose of this internalization is to find the most pertinent referential index to guide us, clearly and without a doubt, the understanding of the concept. It is self-explanatory that these referential indices are *sui generis* synthetic products, shaped by individual experience. Thus, the significance of a term is totally subjective, bearing the imprint of a strictly personal history. This is precisely why, in communication, in our capacity as transmitting party, we are unaware of what we are communicating until our interlocutor, in his capacity as receiving party, closes the loop of the reverse connection whereby he communicates the meaning bestowed upon the message. In other words, the meaning of what we are communicating lies in the answer that we get, which points to what our interlocutor understood, irrespective of our intentions. In absence of feedback, the message is meaningful and valid for the transmitting party alone.

2. TAILORING ANALYTICAL PRODUCTS TO CUSTOMER NEEDS

2.1 Intelligence cycle as a self-adjustment system. To communicate efficiently means, first of all, to align oneself from a psycho-neuro-linguistic perspective to the paradigm governing the interlocutor's understanding, and secondly to be open to change the content of what we are communicating, until we get the desired result.

Thus construed, communication is a self-adjustment system, where there are no failures, just

feedback. In other words, the resistance to the communicated message points to the lack of alignment and flexibility in the approach. Our interlocutor never says “NO”, but “NOT LIKE THIS”, constantly telling us, by his reaction, the path to follow in order to reach our goal.

The pragmatic relevance of this theoretical development in the field of intelligence analysis resides in that information is not written randomly, but by direct reference to the beneficiary, to his manner of (re)presenting reality. The unique nature of the beneficiary's personality claims the unique nature of the information, particularly in intelligence analysis, where feedback is more likely indirect and inferred.

Moreover, just as in interpersonal communication we do not presume that we were understood strictly based on the conventions of our mother tongue, when communicating and intelligence product we cannot afford to infer the meaning that it triggers at the beneficiary's level. The meaning is, in fact, a negotiation, and the feedback is the foundation of the negotiation. Without feedback, we cannot talk of communication, but merely of monologues, whereby interlocutors, based on the limited semantic overlaps, successively state, in all their honesty, “But I told you so” – “But that's not how I understood it”.

In this context, we cannot speak of the intelligence cycle as a self-adjustment system, as long as we rely on inferred feedback. Moreover, the purpose of intelligence activity should not be simply to use analytical products by transmitting them to the beneficiary, but we are subject to the obligation, as a *sine qua non* prerequisite of our efficiency, to go from implicit to explicit feedback.

2.2 From uncertainty to persuasion in decision making. Intelligence analysis takes into account the community's need to present a product that is useful to its various beneficiaries; in North-American specialized literature, this is defined as a product “tailored” to answer the specific needs of the clients. The relationship to the policy makers is active, not passive, and the accent placed on analysis, presentation and persuasion distinguishes “intelligence” from information sources which provide data, such as radar images for immediate operational use, or real time warnings for missile launches.

Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz (in Indonesia, in 1986 - 1989), former undersecretary of defense, believes that the main challenge for policy makers is to make decisions in terms of uncertainty. One

of the requirements for success is that the policy maker becomes the main analyst in the focal points of his agenda. Responsible policy makers are, in the ambassador's opinion, those who do not delegate the evaluation of information, because they are the final analyst in the interpretation chain where the end beneficiary is the president. As a work method, he must adopt the analytical procedure whereby he is ready to fight, based on incomplete information and conflicting premises.

Analytical materials disfavouring explanations to the benefit of forecasts and promoting the analyst's opinions to the disadvantage of evidence are of little use to policy makers. This does not mean that the deliberative process resulting in the field of uncertainty must be kept silent, because otherwise the policy maker could deduce that the degree of uncertainty of the analyst is minor. In the position of the policy maker, Wolfowitz is of the opinion that only a tight cooperation between the political level and intelligence officers can ensure the management of uncertainty and challenges in making efficient decisions. While the analyst and the intelligence collector must know the working agenda of the policy makers and must become aware of the fact that the processes in reliance upon they make decisions are mostly intricate and informal, the decision maker must establish such relationships to the intelligence community so as to be able to guide same in the professional cooperation of the two groups. Their bear negative effects not only on policy and information, but even worse, on state interest.

In stating that "great harm is done if differences in professional values cause the two groups to avoid close contact", Ambassador Wolfowitz suggests that good cooperation is possible where "intelligence production should be driven by the policy process" (Davis, 1996:37). To this effect, the Ambassador adds, inspired by his own practices, that the formal intelligence reports have a lesser impact than interpersonal exchanges of ideas, further to which the decision maker can draw his own conclusions based on the debates between intelligence experts.

"Formalized lists of intelligence requirements, prepared a year or more in advance, cannot substitute for a more active policymaker involvement" (Davis, 1996:38), says the Ambassador. Therefore, the intelligence community must present its own working procedures to the decision makers in a more transparent manner. If they better understand the collection and production process of intelligence, they can direct more efficiently the resources

particular to intelligence work so as to reduce uncertainty and to determine the objective and clear examination of the issues causing confusion.

In order to build or render the relationship between analyst and beneficiary more efficient, it is not sufficient that just one of the poles is made responsible. So far, the analytical level was the main focus, pointing out the limits and errors of the mental layouts and processes that analysts operate with in drafting their materials. The decision maker's responsibility in the decision making process is rarely mentioned. As regards the actual study of the processual aspect of decision making, this is an exception. The rules or principles guiding same could be useful for analysts but also to decision makers. The first could use them in drafting the materials that would have the critical degree of persuasion so as to convince the authorities to act, and the latter could use them to construe the decisions that the opponents' actions could be based upon. On an institutional level, decisions are agreed upon in meetings, they are not made by individuals. Decisions are collective, not personal; the system depends upon reaching consensus and it does not promote individual stands; decisions must arise from debate and reasoning, not intuition or conviction. This article questions these current rules and re-circulates them in a larger holistic context.

The state of facts resulting from previous and current research – the small number of studies on the beneficiary's role in intelligence work and the way in which decisions are made – points to the frailty of the relationship, if any, or to the lack thereof. "Very few guidelines appear to have been devised to assist the analyst or the policymaker to follow some logical process in reconstructing the adversary's decisionmaking process. In the pressures of a crisis situation, and lacking any body of experience or agreed "rules" that might be of assistance, there has been some tendency in the Intelligence Community to ignore this problem" (Cynthia Grabo, 2002:103).

2.3 The need for a code of good practices in the relationship between the analyst and the beneficiary Specialized literature is filled with classifications and explanations for the pathology of intelligence analysis and, in a smaller extent, errors in interpreting the results of analysis work by its beneficiaries. Still, it is necessary to determine a code of good practices in the relationship between the analyst and the beneficiary, since the history of success owed to good communication between intelligence services

and decision makers was not examined enough. It is perhaps not surprising that the focus on failures eludes the series of success in fighting threats against national and international security and, moreover, it decreases the chances to learn from the experience of others for all apprentices of intelligence work. Underlining what did not work perpetuates the unsuccessful practices, whereas innovating proposals sometimes only deepen the imbalances already existing between the relationship among intelligence producers and their clients. On the contrary, the careful examination of what went well in view of finding a successful method in reaching the goals of intelligence work could be the start of a new era for the professionals working in this field. In other words, the saying that we learn from our mistakes proves to be obsolete, since intelligence work is not only about learning, but especially about development to reach excellence and top performances. And this is the solution proposed by neuro-linguistic programming as a coherent strategy in the process of learning excellence.

The basic principles of an efficient communication are distinct from the matter of said communication, since they pertain to its structure. Thus, the main pillars are awareness, honesty, responsibility, acceptance and assertiveness. These characteristics can be regarded as necessary but insufficient premises of the relationship between the analyst and the beneficiary. Some authors point to eluding these premises: "Experience has shown that a large number of individuals – and often including those whose judgments or statements will carry the most weight – are rendering opinions in critical situations either in ignorance of important facts or without recognizing the relevance or significance of certain information which they may know" (Grabo, 2002:10). Being aware that any type of information, either a regular one, a warning or a forecast, cannot be given with absolute certainty, being a constant assessment of probabilities, is the duty of the decision maker. Awareness without assertiveness is just another type of ignorance or lack of awareness. The beneficiary must undertake and acknowledge by clear assertions that he does not know decisive elements of the state of facts or that he chose to ignore both the importance and the meaning of others, often without being able to identify the psychological mechanism of his actions. To integrate failure and transform it into development towards excellence of intelligence work, we must clearly state that what was done unknowingly and what could have been done

knowing everything that was available when the decision was made.

Furthermore, the beneficiary must understand that, in some cases – and usually, although rare, they are the most important and stressful, he will have to admit less firm lines of reasoning or those that are based on less material evidence that they would like. At this point, awareness must be doubled by the responsibility to encourage such assessments, although the predetermining reaction would be to repudiate them. On the other hand, intelligence analysts must bear in their minds the acute lack of time of high-level decision makers. Therefore, the analyst must assume the fact that reports with no clear or explicit warnings on the probable actions of the opponents they will fail in communicating their clues to the author. The responsibility in case the beneficiary does not receive the warning message lies with the analyst who failed to formulate it clearly. Finally, the efficient communication between the analyst and the beneficiary pertains to the purpose of intelligence work: supporting the beneficiary's making the best decision in light of the facts and lines of reasoning communicated to him, and if need be, taking action.

If the decision maker is not convinced or for various reasons, cannot take the necessary measures, the intelligence effort was useless. The responsibility lies with both parties, not only one of the poles. Moreover, the demonization of one or the other, analyst or beneficiary, is useless, if the events could have been influenced towards a beneficial direction.

Regardless of how intelligence and policy function in relation to one another, or how dependent or independent the policy level may be, the important thing in the end is that appropriate action is taken, when needed, to protect the interests of national security and the security of our allies. Without this, the warning function of intelligence will have failed no matter how brilliant the collection and analytical effort may have been (Grabo, 2002:16).

Due to the lack of trust in the impersonal intelligence machine, the beneficiary can choose to produce his own intelligence. The fact that the product of intelligence work lacks subjectivity in order to attain an unrealistic goal of objectivity determines the decision maker to extract himself from the relationship with the intelligence community and to follow his intellectual curiosity, recurring directly to open sources in order to form an opinion in reliance upon which to make a decision.

It does appear that actions have been taken at the policy level to which intelligence contributed little directly, or that policymakers have run ahead of the formal processes of intelligence in taking action to forestall possible threatened actions of adversary or potentially hostile states (Grabo, 2002:16).

The ideal of objectivity is unrealistic if silenced, because one cannot elude the fact that intelligence professionals make judgments all the time, they act upon them or they present them in various publications or information sessions. Ever since the data collection phase, the intelligence officer makes a judgment call in choosing to forward a certain piece of information or not to the central office. Afterwards, the analyst deciding to draft or not a report on a certain piece of information makes another judgment call. The manner in which he drafts the report, the focus on a certain aspect or another of the information entails another judgment call. The elements that the immediate superior selects to include in an information report to the department management are the results of another judgment call. In a nutshell, the intelligence system could not work and would be entirely useless to the beneficiary if the judgment were not an integral part of the work process.

The huge quantity of data collected makes it impossible to operate in any other manner, but it also places greater responsibility to formulate intelligent and pertinent lines of reasoning on the obscure mass of members in the lower ranks of the system, and last but not least on the raw data collectors in the field.

If facts do not speak for themselves to policy officials, neither do they necessarily do so to intelligence analysts and their supervisors. Or, if they seem to be doing so, it will often be found on further analysis that not all are hearing the same oracle, not by any means (Garbo, 2002:134).

Interpretation variations, sometimes polar opposites, that a group of people ends up with starting from the same set of facts, even when the facts are relatively simple and uncontroversial, are astounding for the people who are not part of the working group. Generally speaking, interpretation discrepancies are higher the more one advances in processing clues, from the raw data collection phase towards the stage of final assessment of the opponent's actions. For instance, it will be easier to reach consensus in the data collection phase, where data are clues or potential clues, than in regard to their meaning. It will be all the more difficult to

gain unanimity on that the facts or clues mean that the opponent is ready to start hostile or threatening actions against state interests.

2.4 Decision maker's responsibility in shaping up the intelligence product. The conservatism displayed by analysts in receiving and processing new types of data, specific to the contemporary world, is caused by a fundamental principle of rigorous research: postponing to make a judgment call until sufficient clear data is available to decide on the meaning of new information. Thus, the impact of the nature of information is not reflected only on the investigation and analysis of the atypical data, but also on the relationship with the beneficiary. Not undertaking the risk of analyzing controversial issues and of producing reports comprising "bad news" is particular to bureaucratic intelligence organizations. One of the most difficult tests of maturity in intelligence work is preparing and submitting reports that the decision maker does not want to hear, particularly when they are contradictory or they question the legitimacy of a policy already in place.

The analyst's reticence is doubled by the beneficiary's need for consistency, since he wants to hear something that confirms his own interpretation. The relationship between them is built on their deficiencies. The absence of a method of approaching atypical data and problems, as well as the lack of personnel especially appointed to process and analyze them leads to postponing the examination thereof, or even to disregarding them. However, the incoherence or absurdity of the opponent's actions are carrying the meaning in decrypting his intentions. Despite the reticence which is understandable of submitting evidence or clues that entail a difficult or dangerous decision on the authorities' part, especially as long as there are doubts as regards the need to make such a decision, the honesty of the expert analyst will be decided and improved in such contexts. As regards the beneficiary, the openness and courage of his thinking will be tested in accepting that which seems unbelievable.

The path towards understanding the opponent's objectives, specificity and decision making processes is risky. The analyst, the decision maker or the military strategist must make a conscious effort of imagination to put themselves in the other's position and see the matter from his perspective. Serious errors in judgment and one of the most detrimental estimates of the opponent's intentions were blamed on such failure in

perception or understanding. The ability to understand or at least to grasp what happens in the mind of the other is the mark of a multi-disciplinary expert. This ability is hard to gain and it seems difficult to implement it in practice, even when the opponent makes no special effort to hide his opinions on a certain matter, or even more, he expresses them clearly.

Coming back to the interest bestowed by specialized literature to intelligence analysis and drafting reports in reply to the beneficiary's requirements, we can see the imbalance caused by the lack of attention towards the responsibility of the decision maker.

Knowledge is power— sometimes. At other times it proves erroneous, irrelevant, or impotent. The power of knowledge depends on who has it, how accurate it is, and how it can be used. Knowledge does not speak for itself. Useful knowledge can be buried or sidetracked or distorted within the complexity of modern government and the hectic pace of work at high levels. To produce power, knowledge must be not only correct but integrated and communicated effectively to the policymakers and implementers in a position to use it productively—the intelligence “consumers.” Then those consumers who are in a position to turn the knowledge into power must be sure not to misunderstand or misuse it. Because knowledge is a combination of facts and beliefs intermingled in the minds of decision makers and implementers, ideology and intelligence often prove hard to disentangle (Betts, 2007:14-15).

It is equally important, or even more so, that the beneficiary understands what can be supplied or not by the intelligence community, and that they must have a constant path of communication, i.e. dialogue. Leaders, both in the intelligence community and in the political one, must maintain a constant and consistent exchange with the working group of the intelligence community to avoid corruption of information and communication gaps. In order to secure the full and appropriate support of the intelligence community, the decision maker is subject to the following obligations:

- a) to ask that he be presented with the minority and dissonant opinions, and the facts substantiating same;
- b) to offer certain explanations, insofar as possible, as regards the reasons for which he asks for certain information and for which purpose they are to serve;
- c) to make sure that the data from the information and operational reports are not

uselessly divided for the sake of compartmentalization or that they are not kept secret from the intelligence staff;

- d) to ask the correct questions, because the attitude and requests of decision makers shape up the facts reported by the intelligence community and the manner in which they report same.

One of the most difficult things for analysts to find out is what people higher in the chain of command actually know in the way of facts and how they have interpreted them. As intelligence has evolved from the rather small, informal shops which prevailed after World War II to a large and highly organized bureaucracy, these problems have been compounded. It is safe to say that most analysts never get to talk with anyone at the policy level, and that their understanding of what these officials know, and need to know, is likely to be extremely limited. One result of the failure of intelligence to provide the policymaker with judgments therefore is likely to be that the official will make his own judgments, but will make them on the basis of inadequate information – or at least without benefit of interpretation which might have assisted him. These difficulties of course are compounded in warning situations when the volume of information is both much greater than normal and its interpretation more complex (Grabo, 2002:136).

3. WISE INTELLIGENCE

If the central pillars of efficient communication are awareness, honesty, acceptance and assertiveness, wisdom or altruism are its keystone. The intelligence activity takes place between two opposite poles: decision makers and analysts, both consumed by the same disease, of individualism and individualism. In her own words, “policymakers are highly individualistic” (Grabo, 2002:137), and “intelligence is self-serving and seeks to justify its usefulness and importance by stirring up unnecessary flaps” (Grabo, 2002:166). As long as communication between them is blocked under the weight of individualism and selfishness, the chances to reach excellence are minimal and those who gain it represent the exception. The rule of the king of the jungle applies, in this case of the decision makers, whose guidelines and directives as regards what is useful and necessary are transient and subject to chance.

Policy officials generally, in this view, distrust intelligence in some measure, not because it is incompetent or lacks imagination, but because it is self-serving and seeks to justify its usefulness and importance by stirring up unnecessary flaps. Insofar

as this opinion prevails among policy officials, it is gravely in error and a potential cause of much misunderstanding. In my considerable experience with this type of problem, it has been evident that the Intelligence Community tends to be extremely cautious in reaching alarming conclusions and to pick its words with great care so as not to appear to be nervous or unprofessional. The generally prevailing view is that the sophisticated intelligence analyst should never get excited, never lose his cool, and never use colourful adjectives or other strong phrases to convey his meaning. Rather, he should play down the situation, appear calm and detached. The greatest sin of all is to be alarmist, or to rock the boat (Grabo, 2002:167).

The unpredictability of individuals and of their manner of work, how much they want to know and in what way, will cause that the requirements set forth for the intelligence community differ from one month to the next, or even from one day to the next. A beginner would conclude that changes arise from the fact that the dynamics of the international situation or the arbitrariness of the events, when, in fact, most of them are determined by the decision makers' will. Wisdom – a source of excellence – requires that one sets aside his own small interests and opens up towards the other (the analyst towards the beneficiary and vice versa) in light of the etymological meaning of the word “communication”, in Latin, *communis,-e*, “belonging to several, or to everybody), i.e. that of communion and sharing (communion, Eucharist). According to Charles Morris, communication means bringing together, sharing and transmitting properties between a number of aspects. In intelligence work, sharing between the analyst and the beneficiary is merely the seed of ensuring and imparting with the rest the safety and security without which none could follow the deeper call of the humanity within, transgressing the petty interests of the individual.

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REDUCING THE SIDE EFFECTS OF ENERGY SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH INCREASING FOOD SECURITY - CASE STUDY HUSNICIOARA - MEHEDIŢI COUNTY

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Abstract: *Ensuring the desired level of security for a country involves a mix of components to be achieved, each with a certain weight. While different activities have both a financial and social component, the costs of reaching the desired level for each of these components are generated by the specific activities carried out and by the social phenomena associated with social perceptions of those activities. The paper describes new technologies to reduce the side effects generated by the energy system, in convergence with a bunch of measures designed to increase food security through regeneration of the sterile surfaces produced by the activity of the thermal power plants and their conversion into agricultural lands. Using the case study of Mehedinţi County of ensuring energy security can be overcome through agricultural technology and how a lot of associated social phenomena can be avoided, with great benefits for the national security system.*

Keywords: *security; (inter)cultural sensitivity; social phenomena*

1. INTRODUCTION

The issue of *security* can be addressed from a multisided perspective within interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary settings. More often than not, mainstream literature in different fields (social sciences, political sciences, communication sciences, intercultural studies, agricultural sciences, environmental sciences, etc.) favours the associative engineering of *security* with *nation*, *identity* and *ethics* in an attempt to raise further awareness and build security-oriented priorities. From sociolinguistic and intercultural points of view, *security* occurs in contexts triggering widespread concern rather than empowerment. In this climate of opinion, we propose an ecology of security, more specifically in relation to energy security and food security, as reverberating socially and culturally. We plead for a holistic definition of *security* and for the positive effects it can generate: celebration of core human values, global vision of social development, solidarity, concerted actions, increased agency and accountability, and, last but not least, well-being.

Another mention concerns the fact that we envisage security as *praxis* rather than a theoretical construct, grounded in reflective and action-oriented approaches, furnishing attitudes about what is appropriate, beneficial, feasible and

sustainable, and useful not only for evaluating but also for guiding socio-cultural, economic and (norm-regulated) political behaviour. Attitudes to security should be linked to identity from a relativistic and pluralistic perspective - in this respect, Domenici and Littlejohn (2006) endorse an identity continuum consisting of *personal identity*, *relational identity* and *community identity* (a kind of meta-ethnicity with no specification of the community size - ethnic group, nation, etc). Accordingly, the ethics of difference and context sensitivity may be restated in terms of “for whom”, “for what”, “for when”, “for where” and “from whose point of view” (Lee, 2007), further raising the questions of the authorisation (authority of beliefs, tradition, custom, policy making or law) and rationalisation (main goals and uses of institutionalised knowledge and action - notably, van Leeuwen, 2007) of security.

2. FOOD SECURITY AS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SECURITY

2.1 The missing link. To our best knowledge, studies integrating energy security, food security and socio-cultural concerns are scarce or not widely disseminated. Furthermore, our study is intended to give more prominence to the Romanian research within the European context, as well as to

highlight the degree to which localisation (requiring higher specialisation due to adaptation work) and globalisation strategies (as integration of economies, industries, markets, cultures and policy making across countries) apply.

Dorin *et al.* (2014) embed the Romanian policy of energy security to the larger context of EU vision considering coal deposits as a top ranking source of sustainable renewable energy and drawing attention to long-term planning of coal energy production, use and economy in order to reduce the vulnerability of Europe against the energy crisis. In line with Cochechi (2016), we add that interconnectedness between economic efficiency, social cohesion and environmental balance lie at the heart of the EU policy.

Godfray *et al.* (2010) dwell on the wide variation in crop productivity across regions even in similar climates, explaining the differences in terms of the “yield gap” as the optimal exploitation of the current genetic material and available technologies. We agree, but, on the other hand, this site-specific productivity powered by agricultural policies should be complemented by the examination of economic and socio-cultural variables, especially because of the multilayered nature of *food security*: availability of food; access to food and to healthy food (underlying volatility of prices, too); basic component of social, economic and national security of a country. To put it in a nutshell, food security is closely linked to economic growth and social progress, as well as to political stability and peace.

Most scholars and practitioners agree that the threats to food security are numerous, mainly including: global warming, desertification and land degradation; inappropriate exploitation of an area or country agricultural potential at the expense of excessive imports; inadequate national food security strategy or lack of coherent policies in this regard; the global economic crisis; disparities regarding the development of different regions and countries; lack of immediate action; lack of control and traceability of the food chain; lack of control and practical action at global level; lack of independence of food security - metaphorically speaking, we witness the snowball effect.

2.2 A hands-on approach. Case study. In 70% of the cases, the exploitation of coal for the purpose of energy production takes place through surface or “daily” quarries, a technological process which is extremely pollutant and which affects the natural balance, mainly on account of waste dumps. They result in the replacement of fertile

soils on large surface areas - it is also the case of many agricultural areas in the Mehedinți County, which have been turned into genuine “lunar landscapes”, where vegetation will grow after a long period of time.

Recent research shows that the reactivation of the land and the transformation of these dumps into crops is far more expensive than the value of the extracted coal; the recovery speed of the natural balance on the degraded lands is slower than the speed of their productivity decrease. Under the circumstances, the recultivation of waste dumps seems to be a must, and it implies urgent measures so as to bring the “industrial wasteland” back to the previous state, to create a new landscape, optimally organised, i.e. there is need for an ecological reconstruction of these degraded lands (Mocanu *et al.* 2004). The experiment was carried out on an uncovered dump in the Husnincioara quarry, Mehedinți County, the main aim of biological recultivation being to increase the content of organic matter and nutrients, which can sustain crops, to be achieved by using organic and chemical fertilizers.

Thus, within a three-year rotation of maize, sunflower and chickpeas, organic fertilizers such as compost and minerals (nitrogen and phosphorus) were selected. The experiment was based on the method of plots, subdivided into 3 repetitions for statistical calculation, and fitting into the existing surface area, the size of the rectangular plots being of 2.1 m width and 8 m length, which correspond to the ratio of 1:5. The maize crops were fertilized with cattle compost prepared at the Research and Development Unit of Caracal (SCDA Caracal) (made up of solid waste, liquids, bedding, feed, straw and special cultures of bacteria undergoing fermentation at the right temperature and humidity), in doses of 10, 20 and 30 t/ha at a time interval of 1, 2 and 3 years. Having in mind the chemical composition of wet compost in relation to the established doses, the following amounts of nutrients were introduced into the waste dumps as follows: 10t compost/ha annually: 105.4 kg N, 44.7 kg P₂O₅, 9.5 kg K₂O, 18.6 kg CaO, 5.1 kg Mg; 20t compost/ha annually: 210.8 kg N, 89.4 kg P₂O₅, 19.0 kg K₂O, 36.2 kg CaO, 10.2 kg Mg; 30 t compost/ha annually: 316.2 kg N, 134.1 kg P₂O₅, 28.5 kg K₂O, 55.8 kg CaO, 15.3 kg Mg. For the mineral fertilisation ammonium nitrate of 33.5% N was used, in doses of 60 and 120 kg N/ha, keeping a constant amount of 60 kg P₂O₅/ha. The sowing took place in the second half of April at a distance between lines of 70 cm, acdepth of 6-7 cm and a density of 40,000 plants/ha. The harvesting took

place in late September. The application of the fertiliser was done for compost and phosphorus in autumn under base furrow and for divided nitrate, for sowing 1/2 of the required area, and the rest for the second manual hoeing. The number of hoeings applied was larger than normally for the control of herbage because herbicides were not used, not knowing their effects on such lands. During the experiment, the following parameters were analyzed and interpreted: the height of the plants (cm), the production (kg/ha) for the humidity of 15.5%, the volume of 1,000 grains and the hectolitre mass, statistically calculated through the method of variation analysis and interpreted according to the degrees of freedom with a margin of 5%, 1% and 0.1%.

1. The height of the maize plants under the influence of the organic fertiliser was bigger compared to the unfertilised variant, with different doses of compost in all these 3 years of experimenting (Table 1). On an annual basis, the growing of the plant height for the same doses was due to the lasting effect of the compost applied to the previous crops. The average values during the targeted period of time were similar. The increase of compost variation compared to control is different and highly significant. The application of compost for different periods of time led to differences in the maize height (Table 2). The annual use of compost led to bigger size, as compared to the other variants with the application every 2 or 3 years. The negative value differences with regard to control were highly significant in the first year, significant and highly significant in the second year and significant in the third year. For the variants fertilised every 2 and 3 year, compared to the negative control, the average values of the maize plant height ranged, statistically, within the limit of 1%. The mineral fertilization with different doses of nitrogen on a constant basis of P_{60} positively influenced the growing of the plants (Table 3). The unfertilized variant recorded a slight increase of the plant size in the second year as a result of the accumulation and decomposition of the vegetal waste from the previous culture. Through the continuous application of nitrogen doses, the height of the plants grew steadily, but the differences were sharp, the highest one being at the maximum dose of N_{120} . The calculation of the average for these 3 years indicated differences between the variants fertilised with nitrogen and control, which were highly significant. The maize was the crop that reacted positively to the factors included in the experiment involving the plant size.

2. The maize yield was directly influenced by the application of compost and mineral fertilisers, the results being proportional with the dose and the period of time in which they were used. The production yielded by using organic fertiliser increased from the control variant to the one with the maximum dose of 30 t/ha compost during the 3 years of experimentation (Table 1). The differences of production between the unfertilised variant and the ones which received different quantities of compost, including the average values, were of 2, 3 and 4 times higher than for the control variant, all of them being highly significant. Analyzing the influence of the period of time of the application of the biological fertiliser, we can see that the annual use led to high and constant amounts of maize (Table 2). The every 2 or 3 year application led to a progressive diminishing of the waste dump in time, the values of production being extremely high and very significant. The value of average yields showed the same tendency with some differences between variants, statistically ranging between 5 - 1%, the low significance being determined by the high variation of production for the variants fertilised for 2 and 3 years during experimentation. Mineral fertilization, also, positively influenced the increased production of maize (Table 3). For the unfertilised variant, the maize yield was influenced by the fertilised variants with which it was combined, the increase being higher every year as a result of the effect of the previous crop. Both for the 3 years and average values, the differences between the control variant and those minerally fertilised were significant, the last being statistically highly significant. The maize yields in the experimental field of Husnicioara for the experimental variants were equal or even higher than those of the plots of land cultivated by the local farmers.

3. The volume of 1,000 maize grains was influenced by fertilisation. When compost was applied to the control variant (with no organic matter) the lowest value of this parametre was recorded, the production increasing simultaneously with the increase of the doses of organic fertiliser from 10t/ha to 30t/ha (Table 1). During the 3 years of the experiment, the unfertilised variant displayed a constant value of the MMB (202.6 – 203.3 g), while the other variants recorded increased values, similar to the average of the compost doses, the differences regarding the control variant being highly significant. Examining the influence of the period of application of the biological fertiliser, the positive effect of its annual

use is obvious for the whole period of application, and the differences in value were higher in the third 3 year (Table 2). The average values calculated for the period of experimentation were the highest in the case of the annual application and decreased with the duration of use for the other two timelines. Through the use of different doses of chemical fertilisers, the volume of 1,000 grains showed close values for the whole period of the cultivation of maize for the chemically unfertilised control variant, recording an easy tendency to increase on account of the contribution of the previous crop. For the other variants for which we doses of N₆₀ and N₁₂₀ were applied against a constant background of P₆₀, the MMB increased, especially for the maximum dose (Table 3). The value differences per year are highly significant for the maximum dose and average ones, the same being true for the variant with the fertilisation N₆₀P₆₀.

4. The hectolitre mass of maize, based on the recorded values, highlighted the influence of fertilisers applied to seeds. The application of different doses of compost triggered the progressive increase of the hectolitre mass of the unfertilised variant compared to those for which the amounts of organic matter became higher (Table 1). The situation remained the same in the next years as a result of the long lasting effects. The increase of values in relation to the hectolitre mass of the unfertilised variant ranged between 5 - 0.1%, highly significant being the values obtained through composting amounts of 30t/ha. The average values of the 3 years showed differences between the control variant and the other variants within the limit of 0.1%. The period of application of the biological fertiliser also determined differences in the hectolitre mass of maize (Table 2). Negative differences between the control variant and the other variants for which the period of time was longer than 1 year went up to highly significant, being the same as in the case of the average of the 3 years. The last factor, the effect of mineral fertilisation on the value of the hectolitre mass was constant for the unfertilised variant in the 3 years and increased for those to which different doses of nitrogen were applied (Table 3). The average values presented highly significant differences between the variants.

Table 1 The influence of compost fertilisation on the analysed parameters

Compost fertilisation	Height (cm)	Production (kg)	MMB (g)	MH (kg)
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Unfertilised	114.6	914	203.0	70.4
10 t/ha	123.7	2,600	211.8	71.4
20 t/ha	128	3,325	234.6	72.6
30 t/ha	132	3,793	242.9	73.9

Table 2 The influence of the application interval of the compost on the analysed parameters

Composting interval	Height (cm)	Production (kg)	MMB (g)	MH (kg)
Annual	132.4	4,696	247.5	73.9
Every 2 years	123.0	2,297	230.0	71.8
Every 3 years	118.6	1,499	218.8	71.6

Table 3 The influence of mineral fertilisation on the analysed parameters

Mineral fertilisation	Height (cm)	Production (kg)	MMB (g)	MH (kg)
N ₀ P ₀	123.0	1062	201.3	70.3
N ₆₀ P ₆₀	124.8	2445	217.4	72.1
N ₁₂₀ P ₆₀	126.2	2949	236.4	72.9

The research findings (quantitative data interpretation) can be best summarised as follows:

1. the positive influence of the compost on the height of plants, the average values for the 3 years constantly increasing for the unfertilised variant compared to those having received organic matter.

2. the annual application resulted in the biggest size and progressive diminishing with the increased period. Also, the application of mineral fertilisers led to the increase of the biometric size of the control variant.

3. in terms of crop yield, the organic fertilisation led to larger quantities compared to the control variant were no grains were obtained (the quantity was, in fact, due to the effect of the chemical fertilisers, in combination with this factor).

4. the annual composting of the waste dump of Husnicioara contributed to high and constant yields and their decrease with the increase of the duration of the application of organic matter.

5. the chemical fertilisers applied resulted in the production increase (for the unfertilised variant there was no yield at all), but quantitatively it was smaller than in the case of using the compost.

6. the volume of 1,000 grains was constantly influenced by the amount of the applied organic

matter and the period of use and, to a smaller extent, also by the mineral fertilisers used.

7. the hectolitre mass showed increasing average values for the uncomposted variant compared to those which having received different doses, constant in the case of annual fertilisation, and decreasing values in the case of application every 2 and 3 years. The use of mineral fertilisers determined, evidently, values that became higher with every dose applied.

8. waste dumps are poor in organic matter and nutritive elements, but good results are secured through the provision of nutritive substances under the form of compost, a biological fertiliser specially prepared, annually administered, or, in the worst case, every 2 years and with the mineral fertilisers annually applied. The effect of the compost is immediate, due to the fact that the nitrogen from the organic compounds, as well as the other elements, become readily available, the process of mineralisation retracing much faster than in the case of manure annually applied, and the quantities retained in durable humic substances are smaller.

Therefore, through the use of compost, the stimulation of the biological activity of the crop fields takes place, and when mineral fertilisers are applied, they amplify the effect more than manure, in reduced doses (considered as maximum in case of maize N₁₂₀). The effect was long-lasting, and, in conjunction with the one from the previous crop, it became even stronger in the conditions of the Enticantrosol of Husnicioara.

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The specific solutions must be fast, cheap and must enhance, as far as possible, the potential of the targeted area. We hope that the case study of Husnicioara - Mehedinți County, focusing on the accurate identification of energy and food security-related problems in the area, will provide solutions which may be adjusted or re-contextualised beyond cultural barriers or territorial borders. It might be

considered a showcase, even if a small-scale one, able to be replicated in order to create economic and socio-cultural impact and value.

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Linguistics.
Discourse
Analysis

WOMEN, PROVERBS AND CULTURE DIVERSITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KOREAN AND ROMANIAN PROVERBS

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Abstract: *The paper aims at examining some traditional values related to the women living in two geographically and culturally distant cultures (Korean and Romanian) the way they emerge from proverbs that reflect the many roles women have had in society (daughters, mothers, wives, mother-in-laws), as well as their positive and negative characteristics. The premise I have started out from is that despite the huge differences between Korea and Romania there are many similarities in the women-related proverbs. My main interest is in unraveling the inequalities between men and women, in finding out men's attitudes towards their female peers, and in identifying whether the Korean women have enjoyed a better treatment than their Romanian sisters. I am convinced that by scrutinizing the lessons of life transmitted through their languages, we can obtain a wealth of data about these cultures and a better understanding of them.*

Keywords: *culture diversity; proverbs; female roles; women*

1. INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, intercultural encounters seem, more than ever, to be on the crest of the wave and the need to comprehend the values, traditions, and heroes of foreign cultures has become more pressing. By analyzing proverbs, one can get an understanding of the culture that produced them. This understanding is even deeper if proverbs from one foreign culture reflect the same values as those in our own. Proverbs, as folklore statements, may be considered a mirror that reflect elements of life which people belonging to various cultures have in common; at the same time, they also reveal unique cultural features. They are an excellent starting point for a better mutual understanding and form “an excellent way to build bridges between cultures” (Schipper, 2006:14).

Proverbs came into being a long time ago and the reason why nowadays they are still considered an important living genre is that they embody the wisdom of the cultures that have created them. They are well-tested truths of condensed knowledge that can be employed at present, just as they were used hundreds of years ago, to observe and to instruct. Over centuries, they were passed from one generation to the next first orally, by word of mouth and then in a written form. This process occurred initially at a local level, having reached an international spread at present. The premise of this paper is that we can learn

a lot about the Korean and Romanian cultures by scrutinizing the ‘lessons of life’ or ‘words of wisdom’ transmitted through their languages.

2. PROVERBS: DEFINITION AND FEATURES

Pratt and Rutt, define proverbs as

pithy sayings using stock epithets, similes, and metaphors to express commonplace experience or advice. (...) Their wisdom is often trite and is virtually the same in all languages (1999:362).

As most paremiologists (Mieder 2004, Schipper 2006) agree, they are characterized by a number of features, among which we can mention (a) their colourful and vivid language; (b) the short, fixed form; (c) their unknown origins; (d) their status as ‘rules of conduct’; and (e) they express common concerns. All these lead to the conclusion that proverbs can be considered “compact treaties on the values of culture” (Steidensticker, 1987, quoted in Rou, 2016:32).

As the approach I made recourse to is a comparative one, comparable data was required. Thus, for Romanian I employed the 19th century paremiologist Iordache Golescu's collection of proverbs, reprinted in an abbreviated form in 1973, under the title *Proverbe comentate* (Commented Proverbs), Anton Pann's (2007) reprinted version of *Povestea vorbii* (The Story of Words), as well as

Botezatu and Hîncu's (2001) *Dicționar de proverbe și zicători românești* (Dictionary of Romanian Proverbs and Sayings) from which I have extracted all the examples referring to women. The search words were: *femeie*, *muiere* (woman), *mamă* (mother), *soacră* (mother-in-law), *fiică* (daughter), *noră* (daughter-in-law). For the Korean counterparts, I received help from two of my former students at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Lee Kyeong-lim (Clara) and Lee Jeong-Min (Celina)¹, who searched various Korean sites for proverbs unified by the theme of women. They also provided me with the English translation of these phraseologic units.

Despite the fact that the Korean and Romanian cultures are quite different, I found many similarities in the proverbs related to women. Thus, the questions I sought to answer in this paper are the following: a) What accounts for the similarities between the Korean and the Romanian proverbs, considering that the two countries had different historical backgrounds and were influenced by different religions? b) In what way(s) do women-related Korean proverbs differ from the Romanian ones? c) What cultural features emerge from the proverbs in these two languages?

With these questions in mind, let us proceed with the analysis of the two small corpora of proverbs.

3. WOMEN-RELATED KOREAN AND ROMANIAN PROVERBS: THE ANALYSIS

As the focus of the analysis are the proverbs concerning women, I will venture into the world of (mainly village) women, entering their households, and identifying the social roles assigned to them by men for the benefit of men.

3.1. Similarities

3.1.1. General characteristics of women. The features attributed to women fall in two categories: *good* and *bad*, but in male-dominated cultures, like the Korean and the Romanian ones, it is the bag/negative ones that prevail in proverbs. Thus, both in the Korean and the Romanian folklore statements², women are perceived to be evil, being often **associated with the Devil/Satan**:

¹ I take this opportunity to thank Clara and Celina, my former students from HUFSS, for the help they offered me in carrying out this small-scale research into Romanian and Korean proverbs related to women.

² For the Romanian proverbs, the source employed will be rendered by the capital letters of the names of the authors of the collections of proverbs

(1) *Femeia e sora dracului/Femeia'i dracul.* (AP)
'The woman is the Devil's sister./The woman is the Devil himself.'

(2) *Chiar și cea mai bună femeie are în ea o coastă a Dracului.*
'Even the best of women still has a Devil's rib in her.'

(3) *yeojaneun saheulboda iljjig taeonassda*³.
'The woman was born three days earlier than the Devil.'

Another negative characteristic attributed by men to women is their **changing their mood**, which is frequently rendered by weather metaphors in both languages:

(4) *yeojawa gyeoul nalssineun mid-eul suga eobsda.*
'The woman and the winter weather are doubtful.'

(5) *Așa's fetele, când senin, când ploile.* (AP).
'This is how girls are: one moment like bright blue sky, the next like rain.'

Many of the proverbs stress that women are verbally gifted, to compensate in a way for their weak constitution. Their talkativeness is presented under various forms, such as *cackling*, *twittering* or *nagging*, while their tongues are perceived as some kind of weapons they use to fight against men. Thus, men feel entitled to reduce women to silence, many times using violence (as illustrated in subsection 3.1.3).

(6) *Dacă limba femeii ar fi mai scurtă, zilele bărbatului ar fi mai lungi* (B&H).
'If the woman's tongue were shorter, man's life would be longer.'

(7) *Femeile, când se adună, parcă's gîscele la pîreu.* (AP).
'When women come together, they sound like geese on the river.'

(8) *yeojaga jansoliga manh-eumyeon jib-an-i manghanda.*
'If a woman nags a lot, her family will be in ruin.'

(9) *amtalg-i ulmyeon jib-an-i manghanda.*
'When the hen cries, the house falls.'

Wickedness is another feature attributed by men to women, and it can take various forms: being morally wicked, naughty, or behaving badly. When women are compared to men, this negative characteristic is even more obvious, as reflected by the following Romanian proverb:

³ In keeping with the Korean writing style, no capital letters will be employed at the beginning of the Korean sentences rendered in Romanized style.

(10) *Doi bărbați la un loc tot pot locui, dar două femei într-o casă nici cum nu pot trăi* (AP).

'Two men can live together, but two women cannot share the same house'.

(11) *yeojaga ses-imyeon namu jeobsiga deulnonda*.

'If three women get together, dishes are broken'.

Example (10) capitalizes on women's wickedness and maybe also on their jealousy, which prevent them from staying united/together, especially if they are mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. The Korean proverb, on the other hand, underlines that fact that when more women come together, as a result of the fact that they may not agree on various topics, they would start quarreling so loudly, that the noise produced is able to break the dishes in the kitchen.

From among the positive characteristics, the following emerged from the investigated proverbs: being hard-working (12), having the power to persuade (13), being able to keep all her thoughts to herself (14), outwitting men (15), and being chaste (16) and (17):

(12) *Casa e casă când ai gospodină în casă*. (B&H)

'The house is properly kept when you have a hard-working woman in it'.

(13) *Vrei să intre toți în danș? Pune o muiere să tragă danșul*. (IG)

'Do you want everyone to dance? Then ask a woman to start the dance'.

(14) *cheon gil mul sog-eun al-ado han gil gyejib sog ma-eum-eun moleunda*.

'You can know 1,000 fathoms deep, but you can't know the mind of a woman'.

(15) *Femeia vede unde bărbatul abia zărește*. (AP)

'The woman understands what the man barely sees'.

(16) *Mai bine fată moartă/ Decît necinste să poartă* (IG).

'Better a dead daughter than a deflowered one'.

(17) *gat-eun gabs-imyeon dahongchima [cheonyeo]*.

'If the price is the same, choose the red skirt [virgin]'.

3.1.2. Women's roles

A. Wife/Mother. In both cultures under investigation, the position of *wife* is the one most approved. Despite the fact that very often women are associated with Satan and are seen as potential troublemakers (as shown above), an obedient, skilled, active and fruitful wife is considered an undisputed prerequisite for men's wellbeing and advancement in the world. Those men who found an industrious woman to oversee their household considered themselves blessed. This is illustrated by the examples below:

(18) *jinjeonghan anaeneun nampyeon-ui ma-eum-ui bomul-ibnida*.

'A true wife is her husband's heart's treasure'.

(19) *Muirea înțeleaptă, coroana bărbatului*. (B&H)

'A wise woman is the man's crown'.

(20) *Femeia înțeleaptă își zidește casa*. (B&H)

'The wise woman builds her home'.

Many of the proverbs in Korean and Romanian stress the fact that women need a husband and men need a wife. In both cultures, the reasons for men to get married are almost the same. First, they needed to have a spouse to look after them, so that they could focus on their manly duties. Second, they needed to have legitimate sons who should perpetuate the family name, "glorify the family through official appointment" (Chul, 2013: 24), inherit the family house, look after the elderly parents, burry them according to tradition and perform the ancestral rites for their departure parents.

The girl's dowry was an essential element in the marriage: the bigger the dowry, the higher chances for young women to get married. In many cases, when the time came to settle down and take a wife, men would choose a less worthy woman as their bride whom they would marry only for the sake of money.

(21) *Bogăția șede-n ladă și toanta șede pe vatră*. (B&H)

'Wealth fills the chest, and the stupid woman lies on the oven'.

(22) *Miile și sutele mărită și slutele*. (AP)

'The thousands and hundreds help the ugly ones get married'.

A counter-example to men's general tendency in the 18th and 19th century Romania to marry for the sake of the dowry is provided below.

(23) *Decât să mănânc mămăligă cu unt și să mă uit în pământ./ Mai bine pâine cu sare și să mă uit la ea ca la soare*. (AP)

'Rather than eating polenta with butter and looking down, it's better to eat bread with salt and look at her [my wife] as if she were the sun'.

What emerges from this phraseological unit is that some men preferred to live in poverty and share their joys and sorrows with a beautiful and kind woman, rather than marrying someone who was so ugly-looking, lazy or stupid that the sight of her made them avert their gaze, while the opinion of the

fellow villagers made these men feel ashamed with their choice.

As for the woman, once she become a wife and then eventually a mother, she was no longer a suspect vehicle of bad luck, curse or perversity, but she became productive in her household, as she had been taught by her mother. "The socially constructed goal of marriage for a woman is not some sort of 'romantic' fulfillment, but rather a context in which her fertility and economic assets are channelled 'honorably'" (Fontaine, 2002: 24). The idea that mothers should be a role model for their daughters is captured by the following Romanian phraseological unit, which capitalizes on the education that daughters receive from their mothers in everything concerning housework, prior to their marriage, in order to become good wives:

(24) *Mama, cînd m-o dat, tot m-a învățat.* (B&H)
'When mother gave me in marriage, she had taught me everything'.

The mother figure frequently emerges in both Korean and Romanian proverbs, where she is presented as a model for her daughters:

(25) *Uită-te la mamă-sa și cunoaște pe fie-sa.* (B&H)
'Look at the mother and you will know the daughter'.

(26) *jasig-eul bogi jeon-e eomeonileul bolaessda.*
'Before seeing the kids, we have to see the mother'.

B. Daughter. Despite the message of the Romanian proverb *Copiii sînt o bogăție la casa omului* 'Many children are the riches of the Romanians', it was only the birth of a son that was a reason for immense joy in the family, while the arrival of a daughter brought sorrow to the parents, because in order to marry her, they needed to gather some wealth, to offer as dowry. More daughters in a family meant poverty. This attitude seems to be shared by the Korean parents, too:

(27) *Cînd se naște băiatul, rîd pereții, cînd se naște fata, plîng pereții.* (B&H)
'When the boy is born, the walls laugh, when the girl is born, the walls cry'.

(28) *myeong-ui ttal-iiss-eul ttae, dangsin-eun mun-eul yeolgo jam-eul jagedoebnida.*
'When you have three daughters, you sleep with the door open'.

(29) *Cine are fete multe, însoară mulți măgari.* (AP)
'The one who has many daughters marries many mules'.

The examples under (28) and (29) show that in desperate situations, families with too many

daughters would give them away in marriage to anyone, be that person a thief or a good-for-nothing, only to get rid of such 'burdens'.

Moreover, in the Korean society, "in extreme cases, girls are ignored to such a degree that a father would leave them out of his calculations when asked about the number of children in the family" (Chul, 2013:24). At the same time, when Korean girls married, they had to submit to all men in their husband's family. But in both cultures, men had the right to divorce their wives and send them back to their families if they were unable to fulfill one of their main duties, namely to conceive (in Romania) or to bear a son (in Korea). In those cases when daughters were born in a family (both in Korea and Romania), mothers tried to console themselves by making their daughters helpful to them and by teaching them everything that was necessary for them as future wives, namely moral conduct, womanly tasks, and proper appearance.

C. Mother-in-law/daughter-in-law. The dissensions between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law are well known throughout the world, Romania and Korea making no exception in this respect, as illustrated below:

(30) *Nici nora fată, nici soacra mamă.* (IG)
'Neither is the daughter-in-law a daughter, nor is the mother-in-law a mother'.

(31) *Cîte pite rele, toate ale nurorii mele.* (IG)
'All the bad loaves of bread are my daughter-in-law's'.

(32) *myeoneuliga miumyeon baldwichug-i dalgyal gatdago namulanda.*
'If there is no chest, your daughter-in-law's legs are white'.

(33) *Soacră, soacră/Poamă acră.*
'Mother-in-law/ Sour fruit'.

The Romanian proverb under (30) shows that no matter how hard they try to keep up the appearance of a friendly relationship, there is mutual hatred between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law. This could be attributed to the fact that blood relations take precedence over in-law relations. "As opposed to blood relatives, all in-laws are usually valued negatively" (Schipper, 2006: 141). The other two proverbs highlight the mother-in-law's tendency to find fault with everything a daughter-in-law does, while the last one (33) argues that there cannot be any sweetness in a mother-in-law.

In many cases, the tensions between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law escalate to the extent that the latter feels like kicking the former, but in

order not to spoil the harmony in the house or to show disrespect, she prefers to let the rage fall on a poor animal:

- (32) *sieomi miwoseo gae yeopguli chanda.*
'A daughter-in-law kicks a dog because she hates her mother-in-law.'

3.1.3. Men's attitudes towards women. In the past, just like in the present (in certain societies), men always ignored and neglected women and demanded obedience from them. Many proverbs, both in Korean and Romanian, reflect this consciousness of women's subjection. The following examples clearly reveal that women were regarded as having a lower social status than men:

- (34) *Femeia nebătuță, e ca moara neferecată.* (IG)
'A woman who is not beaten is like a mill that is out-of-order'.
(35) *yeojaneun saheul an ttaelimyeon yeouga doenda.*
'If you don't beat your woman for three days, she becomes a fox'.
(36) *jeongbueseo ttae lida. jib-e waseo yeojaleul ttaelyeo.*
'Get slapped at the government office; come home and hit your woman'.

These proverbs indicate that beating was part of women's lives, but we are not quite sure what the meaning of beating was: to show women that men did not ignore them and that this might be a sign of affection, to teach women a lesson in being faithful to their husbands or to turn them into beings that lacked features such as arrogant, quarrelsome or opinionated, in other words into obedient and dutiful wives, whose voices are entirely muted?

Male chauvinism also emerges from the two examples below, which highlight the fact that men considered women stupid (or that they didn't want women to be clever, so as to be able to 'shine' over them) and that they thought of them as being less reliable than an animal:

- (37) *Femeile au fuste lungi și minte scurtă.* (AP)
'Women have long skirts and short minds'.
(38) *so-deoreo han mal-eun an na-do cheo-doreo han mal-eun nanda.*
'Words spoken to a cow don't spread, but words spoken to a wife do'.

On the other hand, in the new collection of Romanian proverbs (Botezatu and Hînduc, 2001), a change of attitude of the Romanian men towards

women can be noticed. Thus, the following example contradicts the message of the proverb in (34):

- (39) *Femeia cine-și lovește, norocul își oprește.* (B&H)
'The one who hits his wife will hinder his good luck'.
(40) *Nevasta nu e o cârpă să o descoși și să o lepezi.* (B&H).
'The wife is not a piece of cloth to tear apart and dispose of'.

Unfortunately, in the Korean society, where Confucianism reduced women to an inferior status, a great change in attitude and perception is needed until the two genders should come to treat one another ethically. In this country, which has progressed to such an extent that it is one of the most developed in the world, the mentality concerning women is still very 'old-fashioned'. The idea that homemaking is exclusively the responsibility of women is still pervasive throughout the Korean society. Even if women hold university degrees and have a career, once they get married and have children they give up their jobs and turn into housewives. Their status is so belittled that they are not called by their names, but "are addressed by reference to their children's names, even by their close friends" (Yoon, 2016).

3.2. Differences. Though there are many similarities between the Korean and the Romanian women, proverbs also reflect a much bolder character of the latter. Despite the general claim that they should be submissive and faithful to their husbands, they are more rebellious than their Korean sisters and do not fully comply with the social demands. Thus, even if they get married, not all of them consider that the social rules need to be strictly obeyed, in that they see themselves entitled to enjoy life just like men do. This is reflected in the following examples:

- (41) *Dacă m-am căsătorit, nu m-am și călugărit.* (AP)
'If I got married this does not mean that I also became a nun'.
(42) *Lelea joacă pînă-n noapte, iar bărbatu-i e pe moarte* (B&H).
'The woman is dancing until late at night, while her husband is on his death bed'.
(43) *Cîți văd cu nădragi, toți îmi sînt dragi.* (AP).
'I like all those wearing trousers'.
(44) *Țara piere de tătari și ea bea cu lăutari.* (AP)
'The country is conquered by the Tartars, while she is drinking with the fiddlers'.
(45) *De m-ai bate cît vei vrea, tot nu voi tăcea.*
'Even if you beat me hard, I will not keep silent'.

The message of the proverb in (41) is that marriage should not deprive women of all human rights: just like men, women feel entitled to enjoy life. The next proverb (42) shows how much a woman loves her husband. She is so fond of enjoying herself that she does not care for the fact that her husband might pass away soon. Though chastity is mentioned as a virtue in many Romanian proverbs, there are also lots of such folklore structures that highlight some women's tendency to perceive themselves as equal to men in terms of sex (43). The proverb under (44) emphasizes the idea that even under dangerous or important circumstances, women would not renounce their little joys (like drinking or tarding up). In the last example (45), the envisaged outcome of beating is questioned, in that instead of the anticipated muted wife, beating produces an outraged wife, unwilling to submit to her husband.

Despite the frequent association of women with the Devil/Satan in both cultures, it seems that the Romanian women, unlike their Korean sisters, are capable of outwitting it, as illustrated by the following examples:

(46) *Femeiei nici dracu' nu'i vine de hac.* (AP)
'Not even the Devil can defeat the woman'.

(47) *Femeea judecă pe dracu și'l scoate dator.* (AP)
'The woman judges the Devil and finds him indebted'.

(48) *Femeea a îmbătrînit și pe dracul.* (IG)
'The woman has made even the Devil age'.

(49) *Femeea hotărâșce și Satana împlinesce.* (AP)
'The woman decides (on something) and Satan will carry it out'.

These examples hint at women's cunningness and manipulating skills. If a woman sets her mind on doing something, she will invariably find the means to achieve it. As Schipper (2004: 245) puts it, "women's power is presented as so dangerously spectacular that the Devil himself is overruled and has to accept being a woman's subordinate".

Another important difference that emerges is a much stronger emphasis on the personal sacrifice of the Korean women and especially mothers, who perceive self-sacrifice to be part of their lives.

(50) *hyungnyeon-e eomineun gulm-eo juggo aineun baeteojoyeo jugneund.*
'During the famine, the mother starves to death and the child dies from eating too much'.

(51) *hananimkkeseo yeoleo gos-e hankkeobeon-e gyesil su eobsge eomeonileul changjohasyeossda.*
'God created mother because God cannot be in every place at the same time'.

(52) *yeojaneun yaghaedo eomeonineun ganghada.*
'Mother is strong even if the woman is weak'.

The proverb under (50) points out that in times of "great economic hardships due to climatic conditions, the scarcity of natural resources, and the lack of productive capacity" (Lee, 2006: 77), Korean mothers would save every grain of rice for their children, to help them survive, even if this meant leaving their children orphans. The second example (51) very nicely captures the idea that mothers watch permanently and everywhere over their children, being a substitute of God, while the proverb under (52) shows that even if a woman's body is weak, she has a very strong power to raise a child, being able of any sacrifice required.

Though the Romanian proverbs are written from the perspective of men, and consequently one expects to come across only male names in them, I have also encountered examples of words of wisdom containing female names, which is not the case in the Korean proverbs. This might represent additional evidence for the Romanian women enjoying a more favourable position in society than their Korean sisters:

(53) *Tir mi-e baba Rada, tir mi-e Rada baba.* (IG)
'Whether it's Rada, the old woman or the old woman Rada, it's of no importance'.

(54) *Aceași Mărie cu altă pălărie.*
'The same Mary with a different hat'.

Another difference I noticed in comparing the Korean to the Romanian women-related proverbs was the fact that in the latter the mentions of women's professional skills are far more numerous. Thus, Romanian women were cooks, midwives, tailors, wool-spinners, and weavers, while the Korean women made good doctors, especially for their own children:

(55) *Cu două bucătăreșe iese ciorba prea sărată/nesărată.* (B&H)
'When there are two female cooks, the soup is too salty/not salty at all'.

(56) *Copilul cu două moașe rămîne cu buricul netăiat.* (B&H)
'The child delivered by two midwives remains with the navel uncut'.

(57) *Cămașă bărbatului, cinștea femeii./ Cămașă copilului arată ce mamă are.* (B&H)
'The man's shirt, the woman's credit./ The child's shirt shows what kind of mother he has'.

(58) *Femeia harnică ține casa cu fusul.*
'The industrious woman keeps house with the spindle'.

(59) *eolin ai byeong-en eomimanhan uisaga eobsda.*
 'There is no credible doctor but mom, when the kid is sick'.

The message of the proverbs in (55) and (56) is that if a woman is trying to do her job, no interference on behalf of another equally qualified person is needed, as this may result in failure. But while the quality of the soup is not so very relevant, the safe delivery of a baby, especially of a male one was of crucial importance. Proverb (58) shows that women were also very skilled in producing both the fabric for the clothes, as well as the clothes themselves. Moreover, in many cases clothes were nicely embroidered with patterns specific of the geographical areas of the country. This example also presents spinning as the gendered task from the very beginning of the world.

While in exceptional situations Romanian men would take (and even appreciate) women's advice, for the Koreans this would have meant a loss of face:

(60) *Bine e să ascuți și de sfatul femeilor.* (B&H)
 'It's good to follow women's advice, too'.

(61) *yeoja mal-eul jal deul-eodo paegahago an deul-eodo mangsin-ida.*
 'If you listen to woman's advice, the house comes to ruin; if you don't listen, the house comes to shame'.

One last difference between the Korean and Romanian proverbs related to women concerns the use of vulgar terms. Both languages employ exactly the same dirty lexical item, namely *fart/farting*, but even if at first sight one may be tempted to say that it depicts the naivety of girls (virgins), Golescu's explanation of the Romanian proverb sheds light on its meaning, showing that there is no similarity between the Korean and the Romanian examples below:

(62) *cheonyeodeul-eun mal bang-gwiman kkwieodo usneunda.*
 'The virgin laughs even when the horse farts'.

(63) *Fata mare/beșe tare.* (IG)
 'The big girl/virgin farts loudly'.

Example (60) shows the inexperienced young women'/girls' tendency to laugh at everything that is new or unexpected. The use of the term 'fart' should not come as a surprise for someone who is familiar with the Korean customs of spitting, burping and farting openly. Its emergence in a Romanian proverb was quite surprising to me. The Romanian example is ambiguous in that *fată mare* could be interpreted either as a 'virgin' or as a 'corpulent'/'big' girl. The proverb makes reference to the latter meaning of the

syntagm, its message being that the higher your social status, the bigger mistakes you can make, and the louder these will be heard from afar.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The comparative analysis of the Korean and Romanian proverbs has brought to light many similarities, but also some differences, the latter being determined to a large extent by the strong impact of Confucianism on the Korean society, on the roles assigned by this doctrine/philosophy to girls and married women. In both cultures, from an early age, girls were raised to be good women, with the ultimate goal of being married and becoming good wives. This reinforced the idea that women were entirely dependent on men in society. They were taught (sometimes by violent means) to sacrifice their personalities, feelings, emotions, and achievements for men.

Both in Korea and in Romania, a certain kind of behaviour was expected on behalf of women: they needed to be hard-working and skilled in many activities, but had to be quiet, faithful to their husbands, and disciplined; they were not expected to express any personal opinion, but to completely obey their male family members' orders; next, women were not expected to be beautiful, but well-groomed, and if they happened to be blessed with beauty, this was perceived to endanger the domestic peace and happiness, as a beautiful woman would be desired by all men in the community. Finally, it was expected of women to properly perform womanly tasks such as cooking, weaving and looking after the children. Additionally, it was demanded of the Korean women to be also self-sacrificing daughters-in-law. If women did not comply with these norms imposed by male-centered societies, they were shamed and punished, sometimes even beaten. An expected outcome of this attitude towards women was their complete submissiveness to men.

But while the Korean women stoically accepted their fate, among their Romanian sisters a more rebellious attitude could be noticed. Thus, they had the courage to confront their husbands, to retort when they were beaten, to reconsider the norms related to chastity, at the same time expecting some sort of gender equality, by getting involved in activities like drinking and dancing, which were prerequisites of men. Moreover, the determination of Romanian women was so strong, that very often they were portrayed as outwitting or overpowering Satan himself. So, the notion of personal sacrifice was not as deeply rooted in the conscience of the

Romanian women as it was in the case of the Koreans, who

believed that they were committing self-sacrifice for their families. (...) Korean women were driven by fear and anxiety stemming from this. This was the direct result of the patriarchal Korean society (Chul, 2013: 28).

As far as the cultural issues are concerned, I expected to discover more lexical items denominating tools employed by women in their everyday activities or names of specific Romanian or Korean dishes. The only one I came across was the term *fus* (spindle), employed by Romanian women to spin wool. But this dearth of information was compensated by the discovery of some aspects that made me empathize with the Korean women and feel fortunate that I was born in a culture where women had the right of being addressed by their own names. In the Korean society, even nowadays, people prefer to address one another not by their names, but rather by using titles, which they consider a sign of politeness. When somebody has to address a woman they don't know, they would use titles based on the appearance of her age. Thus, a middle-aged woman who may be married would be called *ajumma* (a term carrying negative connotations) or *samonim* (teacher's wife), if she looked like a wealthy married woman. These two terms highlight the Korean women's dependence on their husbands. But even if they are educated and have a career, they would not be called by their names accompanied by their titles (like doctor X or professor Y); they will still be addressed on the basis of their sex and relative age: *eonni* (older sister), *ajumma* (aunt). In such a situation, one may wonder why Korean mothers try to give their daughters such beautiful names as *da-won* (more than beautiful woman) or *ga-yeong* (beautiful flower).

4. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

No matter how impartial and objective I have tried to be in carrying out the comparison between the Korean and the Romanian women-related proverbs, I have the feeling that in some cases I was biased in my evaluation of the cultural aspects and that I sided with my compatriot ancestors, which I hope will be pardoned by the possible Korean readers of the paper. At the same time, I am well aware of the fact that my lack of knowledge of Korean prevented me from grasping the real, deep meaning of the proverbs, which gets lost or altered

in the process of translation into English. Proofreading by a Korean-English bilingual would have been necessary.

Finally, I would have liked to have access to a much larger database of Korean proverbs, which would have given me a better perspective on the topic and would have prevented me from making just guesses. Despite these shortcomings, I am hopeful that the image of women as revealed by the Korean and Romanian proverbs comes close to reality.

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POLITICAL SEMIOTICS: LEXICAL INNOVATIONS IN MASS-MEDIA DISCOURSE

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Abstract: *The article is devoted to the analysis of English political neologisms in mass-media discourse. Language functions in the society which develops and evolves as a system. The society constantly needs support in the language and the reflections in the changes which stimulates linguistic processes. The significant peculiarity of vocabulary is its inherent direction to the phenomena of reality, that's why it is the vocabulary that reflects all the changes happening in the public life, which inevitably leads to the formation of new nominations. New vocabulary in mass-media is of peculiar interest to scholars as a word in this sphere of life should possess expressiveness, draw the attention of the audience. So lexical units capable of fulfilling a certain communicative task are formed. And it is the mass-media that spreads these new words and is the means of their popularization. It is noted that by means of verbal evaluations the reflection of a language personality in a lexico-semantic system takes place. The most frequent ways of creating evaluation are proper names, precedent names and a derogatory component of connotation of the words relating to politics. The article underlines that the analysis of English political new words contributes to the understanding of typical and specific peculiarities of a people by a language personality, and as a result of a description of cultural interpretation of a basis of the analysed units conceptual values of the people based on their mentality, typical traits of an ethnos can be singled out.*

Keywords: *political semiotics; lexical innovations; mass-media discourse; structure; semantics*

1. INTRODUCTION

Vocabulary is often called the mirror of time in which it lives: words reflect the state and development of public life. Modern life cannot be perceived without the qualitative and quantitative growth of discoveries in the most diverse spheres of human activity and there are many opportunities to replenish lexical systems of languages. This gives a powerful impetus for describing and systematizing a large stream of neologisms, idioms, phrases and meanings that cause the emergence of an independent sphere of research in lexicology.

We live in a society that constantly develops. New objects in different spheres arise and they need to be named. That is why no science can exist without neologisms, new words. Though the neologisms dominate in the field of knowledge, other people, not only scholars, can also feel the necessity to express and interpret reality by new ways and create new words that would reflect it.

David Crystal defines neologisms as

the creation of new lexical items as a response to change circumstances in the external world, which achieves some currency within a speech community

at a particular time. ... New words in the language are constantly entering the lexicon to describe new concepts and technologies and what they mean to us" (Crystal, 1992:264).

Some scholars (see the works of S. S. Guseva (2017), V.V. Katermina (2016), M.V. Moskaleva (2008), L.V. Ratsiburskaya (2007), M. E. Rut (1992), etc.) emphasize that the process of the emergence of a lexical innovation begins with practices and usage since the historically formed, socially conditioned, political, economic and cultural conditions of the language community affect the lexico-nominative speech activity. Given that a large number of nominative structures supply economic, social, scientific, technical, political and cultural discursive areas, at the present stage of the development of linguistics the understanding of the need for a comprehensive study of linguistic and sociocultural processes in their functional-semantic interaction becomes increasingly clear (Golets, 2015).

The aim of the study is to analyze English political neologisms in the discourse of mass-media in the interconnection of language, person and culture.

Language functions in the society which develops and evolves as a system, so it constantly needs support in the language and the reflections in the changes which in its turn stimulates linguistic processes.

The significant peculiarity of vocabulary is its inherent direction to the phenomena of reality, that's why it is the vocabulary that reflects all the changes happening in the public life, which inevitably leads to the formation of new nominations (Katermina, 2017:618).

2. LEXICAL INNOVATIONS IN MASS-MEDIA DISCOURSE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Neology as no other area of linguistic knowledge is most intertwined with the world outlook and culture of a person. The tendency to changeability and renewal is a global property of the language system. Without this understanding it is impossible to truly understand the dynamics of the language picture of the world from the point of view of cognitive-discursive conditions and factors of neologization. Renewal of the language is influenced by two incentives: one of them is related to the cognitive and communicative needs of society, the other is to the peculiarities of the internal structure of the language. Therefore, an important task of modern neology is the creation of a cognitive-discursive theory of a new word. The formation of new words, the emergence of new meanings happens because of the creative work of human consciousness, the endless cognitive process determined by the practical and intellectual activity of a person. L. Kasyanova states that the

emergence of new nominations is a kind of response to the social demand, the result of cognitive-discursive mastery and interpretation of reality (Kasyanova, 2009:4).

The goal of any speaker is to construct a meaningful statement as a complete communicative unit. Acts of nomination play an important role in the process of generation of this communicative unit. In the implementation of these acts any language uses either existing nominative units or creates new ones. Word meaning (internal form of the word) recognized by the speaker is considered to be one of the main characteristic features of the nomination. To form a lexical unit one uses various ways and, therefore, the originally internal form of the word is the basis of any individual re-creation (Antyufeeva, 2004).

Each thing, every phenomenon gets its name. The designation of objects and phenomena in their universality or in a generalized form encompasses their essential characteristics as if their inner universality is nothing but the nomination of objects and events in the corresponding linguistic units. Language captures conceptual world of a person. It is believed that all the nominative activity of a person is based on ready-made signs which are known from the previous experience. Nevertheless, the features of human nature are manifested in the so-called selective interest, that is, the isolation of certain objects (or some properties, attributes, qualities, objects) in comparison with others.

In processes of name formation there are three heterogeneous entities. One of them is the world of reality including the mental activity of a person (the sphere of denotation). The second is the image (in the epistemological sense) of the component of reality – its conceptual reflection in which human consciousness is able to combine a qualitatively-evaluative vision of the world. This image is embodied in the linguistic naming in the conceptual-linguistic form of the reflection of the reality (the sphere of signification). The third entity is the name that is the linguistic means of expressing the significative content assigned to the name in order to identify what is being indicated. The naming relation correlates it with the designated reality (Kolshanskij, 1977).

Lexical innovations in the media are of particular interest to researchers, since it is in this sphere that the word should have expressiveness, draw the attention of the audience. At the same time it is the media that is the distributor of these innovations, the means of their popularization.

The purpose of the mass media is to “convey to the audience the reflection of the real world” (Dubskikh, 2014:133). Various forms of presentation of information motivate the selection of the following functions implemented by the discourse of the media: 1) informative; 2) regulative, including the ideological function and functions of social control and manipulation of public consciousness; 3) educational; 4) entertaining (Dubskikh, 2014).

On the one hand, mass media responds to the public's request; on the other hand, it forms these requests as well as the attitude of society to various spheres of life which can be indirectly judged by the correlation of various topics presented in the press, the selection of a specific material as well as the language tools used to represent it. It can be rightly argued that the discourse of the media is a condition of the linguistic and cultural situation of

the society because by its nature it reflects both the linguistic and cultural status quo of the society.

3. LEXICAL INNOVATIONS IN MASS-MEDIA DISCOURSE AS UNITS OF POLITICAL CULTURE

A word is not the only means but it is the most available and effective one used by politicians. How and what politicians speak is of great interest of scientific and social character.

3.1 Politicians and supporters. The first group of the analyzed units covers new units denoting people belonging to a party or being adherent to some political views as well as naming the leading figures of the USA.

It is easy to note the current tendency to name this ideology in honor of its political representatives usually by adding suffix *-ism*, ex.: *Blairism* – the political ideology of the former leader of the Labor Party and Prime Minister Tony Blair. It reflects the commitment of someone to its centrist politics. In our opinion, this neologism does not have any constant connotation which means the presence of the archiseme ‘adherence to certain political views’ as well as the differential seme ‘commitment to Tony Blair’s policy’. Another example is the neologism *trumpism* – the views and cultural and political statements of Donald Trump. A neologism *bushism* formed the same way means however funny or absurd words, phrases, pronunciations, and semantic or linguistic errors that occur in the public speaking of former President of the United States. We have noticed that because of the president’s repeated absurd statements, he became the subject of jokes both of the residents of his country and beyond. Besides, *bushism* produces a significant comic (ironic, and often sarcastic) effect. Among the most used bushisms are as follows:

“I know the human being and fish can coexist peacefully.”

“Make no mistake about it, I understand how tough it is, sir. I talk to families who die.”

“I think that the vice president is a person reflecting a half-glass-full mentality.”

“You’re working hard to put food on your family.”

“They underestimated ...”.

“There’s an old saying in Tennessee – I know it’s in Texas, probably in Tennessee – that says: fool me once, shame on ... (long pause) shame on you? (long pause) Fool me – you can’t get fooled again”.

“You teach a child to read, and he or her will be able to pass a literacy test.” (Bushism, n.d., para. 4).

It should be mentioned that among the neologisms with the name of American President Barack Obama – *Obamaphoria*, *Obamanation*, *Obamarama*, *Obamanos*, *Obamatopia*, *Obamalujah*, *Obamatrons*, *Obamascope*, *Obamanator*, *Obamalicious*, *Obamaloha*, *Obabama*, *Bamelot*, *Obamerika*, *Barackstar* – there is not a single lexical innovation reflecting adherence to certain political views put forward by a politician or political party. Recent American elections have led to the creation of neologisms among which we can single out the following: *trumpalist* – a person supporting Donald Trump as candidate to President of the USA; *trumper* – a person who is a supporter of politician Donald Trump; *trumpertantrum* – angry early-morning tweeting laced with innuendo and falsehood; *trumpflation* – the expected increase in inflation as a result of economic policies of Trump.

Shortened words being one of the main ways of word-formation in English also influenced the process of creating political new words. Based on analogy of the already existing *POTUS* – President of the United States of America and *Flotus* – First lady of the United States such new words like *PEOTUS* – President Elect of the United States and *Slotus* – second lady of the United States – the wife of the vice-president appeared in English.

And now, the PEOTUS (President-Elect of the United States), even before officially taking charge, reiterated his promise of bringing jobs back to the States by slamming General Motors over the production of Cruze sedan in Mexico via his official Twitter account (PEOTUS Donald Trump Warns General Motors Over Mexican Imports (January 4, 2017), para. 1).

3.2 Types of government. Another group of political neologisms names types of government. Among them are: *narcissocracy* – government by the excessively self-centered; *ineptocracy* – a system of government whose main characteristic is incompetence in all areas; *idiocracy* – rule, government or control exercised by foolish people; *kludgeocracy* – government that is over-complex and ineffective. Observations indicate that all the units of a given group are formed by blending. Scholars believe that in the modern English language, the word-formation method called blending is gaining more and more strength:

with the help of this method, the formation of new lexical units occurs with impressive dynamism, but corresponding changes are introduced into

dictionaries with delay and caution (Murzakov, 2013:1-2).

Negative evaluation of the meaning of these new words should also be taken into consideration: *narcissism* – an extreme interest in your own life and problems that prevents you from caring about other people; *kludge* – a clumsy or inelegant solution to a problem; *ineptness* – the quality of having the wrong properties for a specific purpose; *idiocy* – very stupid ideas or behavior.

The study of the concept of linguistic evaluation makes it possible to assume that the cognitive-classifying activity of a person is reflected in linguistic units; the evaluation component acts as an obligatory semantic component of the lexical meaning. In the first case (*narcissocracy*), a negative evaluation is achieved by using a precedent name *Narcissus* – via Latin from Greek Early 19th century: via Latin from the Greek name *Narkissos* (*narkissos*, perhaps from *narkē* ‘numbness’, with reference to its narcotic effects). In the next three units (*kludgeocracy*, *ineptocracy*, *idiocracy*) the evaluation component is achieved by the following words containing in their meaning an emotional-evaluative component: *clumsy* – expressed without enough skill or thought, and often in a way that is likely to upset people, inelegant – not attractive, graceful, or polite, wrong – not accurate or correct, stupid – not intelligent, or not able to consider or judge things carefully. Steven M. Teles starts his article “Kludgeocracy in America” with the following words:

In recent decades, American politics has been dominated, at least rhetorically, by a battle over the size of government. But that is not what the next few decades of our politics will be about. With the frontiers of the state roughly fixed, the issues that will define our major debates will concern the complexity of government, rather than its sheer scope (Teles, 2018).

He uses such evaluative expressions like the size of government, complexity of government to draw the readers’ attention to the problems in American government. He is concerned that kludgeocracy poses a significant threat to the quality of American democracy.

The evaluation component, in our opinion, is the main one in the connotative meaning of the lexical unit due to its sociolinguistic nature. The subjective-valued element of meaning can be explained by the differentiated response of people to positive and negative phenomena and it acts as

an integral one in the semantic structure of the nomination.

3.3 Political events. The next group includes neologisms devoted to political processes. It is necessary to take into consideration a lexeme *Article 50* – article of the Lisbon Treaty that sets out the process by which member states can withdraw from the European Union being the so-called prophecy of the process itself. Jennifer Rankin, Julian Borger and Mark Rice-Oxley reveal in their article in an expressive way the importance of this neologism:

Rarely have 250 words been so important – five short, obscure paragraphs in a European treaty that have suddenly become valuable political currency in the aftermath of Britain’s decision to leave the EU (Rankin, Borger, Rice-Oxley, 2016).

Being formed on analogy with the already existing neologism *grexit* – the (as yet hypothetical) Greek exit from the Eurozone, some new words began to appear among which we should point out the following: *Brexit* – the British exit from the Eurozone:

SIX months ago the chances of “Brexit”— Britain departing from the European Union—seemed remote. Today, largely because of Europe’s migration crisis and the interminable euro mess, the polls have narrowed. Some recent surveys even find a majority of Britons wanting to leave (A background guide to ‘Brexit’ from the European Union (February, 2016), para. 1).

Calexit – an exit by the state if California from the United States of America:

Californians would need to pass an amendment to the US Constitution, which requires the blessings of the other 49 states. The measure would also survey voters on whether a “Calexit” is something that interests them (Robinson 2016).

Clexit – an exit by the country from international climate treaties.

First there was Brexit [...]. Now a movement is building that would further stun the supranationalists: an exit from the United Nations climate change protocol, dubbed “Clexit.” Brexit happened, and Clexit could be next. (As Earth swelters, global warming target in danger of being missed (August, 13, 2016), para. 1).

Due to these words a new suffix was brought into existence: -exit (*suffix*) – added to the first letters of the name of a country or state to indicate that it may leave a union or federation. Any political process has its own supporters and opponents. The following neologisms are the confirmation of that: *regrexit* – someone who regrets the vote to leave the EU; *bremoaner* – someone who complains about Britain's exit from the European Union; *brexiter/brexit* – one who favours Brexit. It is interesting to note that in the first case the structure “a complex word + suffix” contains in its composition the seme “regret” while the lexeme naming the supporters of this process is formed by the direct addition of suffixes -er or -eer, in connection with which the assumption can be made that this word, being the base, indicates a more positive perception of this process by the British. We should single out a lexical innovation *brexistence* – the fact or state of living or continued survival of Britain (UK) or the British after the BREXIT event. One should also note such new lexical units like *bremorse*, *breturn*, *breversal*:

First Brexit, then Bremorse... is Breturn possible? (First Brexit, then Bremorse... is Breturn possible? (July 2, 2016), para. 1).

Breversal: there may be a way to reverse the decision to leave the European Union. (Nsubuga, 2016).

The consequences of Brexit can be shown in the lexical innovation *vassal state* – a term used by some Brexiters to refer to the UK if it stays in the customs union or single market during a transition period following departure from the EU. Since the appearance of this neologism there have been many articles devoted to this topic. The titles of the articles emotionally express their attitude to this issue:

David Davis rejects ‘vassal state’ claim over Brexit transition (Stewart, Mason, 2018).

Boris Johnson: Brexit mustn't leave us a ‘vassal state’ (Shipman, 2017).

May Signed UK Up to Be ‘Vassal State for Next 2 Years’ – MEP on PM's Brexit Plan (May Signed UK Up to Be ‘Vassal State for Next 2 Years’ – MEP on PM's Brexit Plan (April 1, 2018), para. 1).

The UK is a ‘vassal state’ – Rees-Mogg and David Davis go to war over Brexit (The UK is a ‘vassal state’ – Rees-Mogg and David Davis go to war over Brexit (January 25, 2018), para. 1).

4. CONCLUSION

Political sphere is very active in the formation of neologisms, and, due to its constant development and actual nature, its productivity will grow. Through mass communication, people structure and substantiate their own beliefs and experiences. Mass media is predetermined not only by information awareness but also by everyday life and the picture of the world. Mass communication can be considered the space where people create and share life experience, values and knowledge.

The analysis of the material allows us to consider the changes of the information paradigm in the XXIst century: the addressee is no longer a passive participant in communication, on the contrary, they introduce their interpretation of the event by enriching knowledge of the world. Being nationally specific, neologisms through their space realize those categories that are thought by representatives of a particular people, and the boundaries into which they are put to perceive and analyze the world around them.

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MEANING AND INTENTION IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE ABOUT BREXIT

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Abstract: *Political discourse concerns strategies, attitudes, arguments, words and phrases used by people who have the political power or who wish to gain it. So normally, it implies attitudes, linguistic and sometimes philosophic knowledge. Whether it is a Prime minister talking, a president of a country or a member of a parliament speaking, we may be sure that we will be confronted with a speech characterized by cohesion and coherence, having a precise and defined message to transmit and a clear cut mission to convince his audience. Obviously, political discourse differ from other types of discourse in point of topic and, consequently, in point of effect. So, political discourse should be analyzed from various points of view and linguistic theories, such as discourse analysis, pragmatics, theory of argumentation or semantic theories such as prototype theory and frame semantics theory. All these various approaches can give us a thorough image and a complete meaning of political discourse.*

Keywords: *political discourse; argumentative discourse; meaning; prototype theory; frame semantics*

1. INTRODUCTION

Political discourse is the most common and widespread variety of discourse. Discourse is a linguistic category defined as a "sequence of sentences in use or a sequence of enunciations" (A. Reboul and J. Moeschler, 1998:41) characterized by cohesion and coherence. Among his most important characteristics we must emphasize that it consists of a message transmitted by a speaker to an audience. As far as political discourse is concerned, the speaker is a politician and the message is about a political issue. Political discourse has consequences, so it implies a lot of responsibility on behalf of the speaker. Let us remember Charles de Gaulles's discourse on the occasion of the events that took part in France in May, 1968. In the middle of a social crisis, being asked to step down from office, the president declares boldly: "No, I will not step down, no, I will not retire. I have a mandate given by my people and I intend to carry it out". In those circumstances, his firm attitude and his firm words led to solve the social crisis; it also ensured peace and calm in the country. Many other ministers, presidents of states made outstanding speeches on historic moments. Political discourse is focused on matters and concepts such as democracy, property, rule of law, equality, citizenship, justice, civil rights, liberty or sovereignty. The message needs

to convince the auditorium, so it must be built up according to the circumstances and it also must take into account the needs and interests of those to whom it is addressed. In the paper, we will deal with an analysis of various approaches to political discourse and with construction of meaning in such a discourse, with reference to the particular case of Great Britain's decision to leave the European Union. As the Prime Minister Theresa May pointed out, it was the British people who voted, as she put it, "for change" and her speech, or rather speeches, are meant to give the British citizens an image of the "brighter future" that awaits them.

2. POLITICAL DISCOURSE. LINGUISTIC APPROACHES

French linguistics is known to have given new approaches on discourse. Michel Foucault (1999:27-61) initiates a project to describe discursive events in order to search and analyze the units which are being formed in this particular context. He states from the beginning that this analysis will not be about language analysis. Michel Foucault describes his investigation field as a finite and limited assembly made up of existing linguistic sequences. He is the one who first spoke about "formations discursives" which, in his opinion, are enunciations which are produced by various enunciators but which are related to the

same topic, such as science, morals or politics. He illustrates it by discourses about evolutionism given during a period of time, starting with Buffon and ending with Darwin. He even identifies some constructing rules for these “formations discursives”, such as: indication of object of interest, of enunciation modalities, indication of concepts and themes.

Patrick Charaudeau, another specialist of discourse and in its different manifestations, such as media discourse (1997), which he compares to a “social mirror” or in political discourse, considers that discourse is about information and about communication, two notions that refer to social phenomena. In one of his many studies (<http://www.youscribe.com>), the linguist Patrick Charaudeau pays special attention to aspects concerning language, since political discourse is very often considered from the point of view of political language. He reminds Claude Lefort’s contribution to the study of political phenomena, in the way that he indicated that political phenomenon of a combination of the following facts: political facts, social facts, legal facts and moral facts. Patrick Charaudeau reviews some of the most well-known analyses with regard to the connection between language and action in political discourse, among which Max Weber’s analysis, who bluntly stated that political power is directly connected with domination and violence. Another point of view mentioned by Charaudeau is that of Hanna Arendt who considers that political power is the result of a unanimous consent of a group of human beings willing to be and to live together. The third point of view is that of Jürgen Habermans who makes a distinction between a communicational power and an administrative power. Their cooperation may lead to discussion, which enables citizens to fight for their own point of view in some form of expression called public opinion.

Other French linguists, such as Jean-Jacques Courtine (1981) paid more attention to the study of discourse analyses from the point of view of social and political conditions in which political discourse is produced. He gathered a body of research and he dealt especially with the study of the linguistic aspect of this body of research. He paid special attention to enunciation system, syntactic structure of sentences and clauses, as well as to discursive effects of political discourse.

For her part, Corrine Gobin (2011) notes that from a certain period of time, she sees significant changes in political discourse which became more focused on a technocratic orientation. The new political discourse has become a discourse about

competence, about morality, but in fact this discourse is based on the use of a wooden language. Much more than that, this type of political discourse is tending to be generalized in the Member States of the European Union. The lexicon of this wooden language is primarily made up of terms which may appear to be expert and scholar termini, used by competent and educated persons, while the same discourse appears to be in use with many other international socio-economic or political instance. For the linguist, a question arises: is there a hard-core manufacturing this strange wooden language, made up of a lexicon, a syntax and an argumentative model which is to become universal? The French linguist Corrine Corbin notices that, starting with a unique pattern in political discourse, humanity may find itself in a great danger, that of a unique thinking which will dangerously lead to globalization.

As far as Anglo-Saxon linguistics is concerned, the most outstanding approach concerning political discourse is that of Teun van Dijk (<http://discourses.org>). In the respective article he expresses his intention to find the most adequate way of doing political discourse analysis. He does not deny that political discourse analysis is both about political discourse and about critical discourse analysis: “PDA is both about political discourse, and it is also a critical enterprise. In the spirit of contemporary approaches in CDA this would mean that critical-political discourse analysis deals especially with the reproduction of political *power*, *power abuse* or *domination* through political discourse, including the various forms of resistance or counter-power against such forms of discursive dominance. In particular such an analysis deals with the discursive conditions and consequences of social and political *inequality* that results from such domination.” We find in this theory some important landmarks, as linguists call them: political discourse is identified by its actors or authors, more exactly the politicians. Political discourse is about “text and talk of professional politicians or political institutions, it is about political communication.” It may also imply that many other actors are involved and many fields of human activities are concerned. In his opinion, a broad definition of politics is about all the participants in the political process, being “a deep study of the nature or the activities or practices accomplished by political text and talk”. Van Dijk considers that politics field should be limited to some major concepts denoting official and unofficial political actors, events, encounters, settings, political systems (like democracy and

communism), political ideologies (like 'perestroika'), political ideologies (like liberalism) and political (group) relations (such as power, inequality, hegemony and oppression).

The linguist considers that some relevant properties of the political context could be used as a set of criteria to distinguish political discourse from any other form of discourse. Such properties can be considered relevant categories leading to the definition of political text and context. Here is a comprehensive list: Societal domain and field (Education, Health, Law, business or Art); Political systems (communism, dictatorship, democracy, fascism); Political values (freedom, solidarity, equality, harmony, Submission, Sympathy); Political ideologies (communism, democracy); Political institutions (State, Government, Parliament, Congress); Political organizations (political parties, political clubs, NGOs); Political groups (opponents, dissidents, demonstrators, coalition, crowd); Political actors (politicians, demonstrators, lobbyists, strikers); Political relations (power, power abuse, hegemony, oppression, equality, inequality); Political process (governing, legislation, opposition, agenda-setting, solidarity); Political actions (a session of parliament, a meeting of a group of dissidents); Political discourse (propaganda, political advertising, political speeches, media interviews, party programmes, ballots); Political cognition (shared social knowledge, specific knowledge, models, concrete political events). If all these categories are taken into consideration, we will have a complex analysis of any political discourse which will emphasize refined characteristics of an epoch and of a social system.

Another approach of political discourse that is to be noted is that of Isabela and Norman Fairclough (2012), in which they suggest a new approach of the domain or rather a new direction of the same principal field, that of political discourse. Their contribution to political discourse analysis consists in suggesting a new frame of political discourse analysis, within the limits of critical political discourse. They consider that political discourse is an argumentative discourse, an argumentation, more exactly „a practical argumentation for or against particular ways of action". It is, mainly, about deciding what to do, about deliberating „over several possibilities" (2012:9). They also insist on the relevance of argumentation theory

for understanding two concepts which originate outside critical discourse analysis but have been

significant within this version of critical discourse analysis, imaginaries and political legitimacy, and the concept of power, which is fundamental for critical discourse analysis. (Fairclough, 2012:103).

Most of the political discourse analysis approaches follow the lines and directions of politeness theory, as it is the case with Sandra Harris's article (2001) who extends this theory beyond informal situations, dealing with adversarial political discourse. The linguist studies manifestations of face threatening acts, preserving each other's face, ways of minimizing the risk of confrontation in discourse using parliamentary debates in the House of Commons.

3. CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE. THERESA MAY'S DISCOURSE ABOUT BREXIT

If we take into account Isabela and Norman Fairclough's theory (2012), political discourse is an argumentative one, so it must have a meaning, relevant and powerful enough to convince the auditorium. From a linguistic point of view, meaning concerns words in their complex relationship they establish with other words in a context (J. Lyons, 1995). According to other contributions to define meaning (F. Rastier, 1989), this is a contextual phenomenon and a component of the meaning of an element can be described as a reference to that element. We can also speak about meaning from a conceptual point of view, and, as such, meaning would consist of the notion or rather the mental image of an object or situation in extra linguistic reality. Meaning is something to be constructed in a specific situation of communication, which implies a speaker and an interlocutor. It is very important that both participants, the speaker and the interlocutor(s), should have the same mental image or representation of the extra linguistic element about which they communicate.

When the extra linguistic element is Brexit, things are more complicated. A Prime-minister, in our case, Theresa May, the Prime-minister of Great Britain, is trying to communicate with the British people on the sensitive topic of Brexit. Theresa May had given quite a number of speeches on Brexit, but we are going to refer to those given on the 17th and the 20th of January, 2017. She uses quite a large amount of arguments, she even presents a well-shaped plan to describe the future United Kingdom after Brexit. She expresses her intentions on how to make things work in the intended direction and she

delivers a very well-constructed argumentative discourse with a view to persuade the general public that everything is under control. Everything is already well-thought of: “Let me be clear”, “I want to be clear”, “we will establish certainty and clarity”, “I am confident”. We cannot help noticing that she uses the first person singular and plural, “I”, “we”, since she never forgets to emphasize that she speaks on behalf of British citizens who voted in favour of Brexit, as she says, “with their eyes open” and, of course, on behalf of the government. These speeches are characterized by an argumentative intention, which, in a nutshell, consists in portraying the future United Kingdom out of the European Union. Her plan is structured in twelve objectives and it is not very clear why she chose that specific order in enumerating them.

Speaking about its argumentative intention, we also notice that the interlocutor of this speaker is the British people for which she constructs a future image of United Kingdom out of the European Union. At the same time, the speeches seem to equally address audiences abroad, since she uses very considerate words when speaking about European Union: she refers to them as “our friends and neighbours”, “our European allies”. The arguments include promises for further collaboration as well as warnings: “United Kingdom will not accept”, “we shall not tolerate” and even a more or less clear threat: “No deal is better than a bad deal for Britain.”

The speeches Theresa May had given in January 2017 on Brexit may also be considered from another linguistic point of view, that of cognitive semantics. An approach from cognitive semantics’ point of view is about constructing meaning, putting it into words and succeeding in sharing it with a larger community. Theresa May constructs an image of Great Britain after Brexit and, in our opinion, this image is the one of the best representative of a category: the best representative of a state when delivered from constraints and ties emerging from belonging to a union of states. Since the Prime Minister mentioned twelve objectives, we can conclude that the achievement of the twelve objectives may lead to the materialization of such a prototype.

So, considering the objectives envisaged, after Brexit, the twenty-seven remaining countries will be confronted with a new partner, with mixed new and old convictions, still able to have his say in relation to his former partners from the European Union. What will this new partner look like? We remind that this is a portrayed partner, having some

attributes which enable it to be different from the former partner of the European Union.

The new state will be one that:

- Will seek for new regulations concerning new customs agreement within Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and getting the greatest possible access to the single market embodied by EU members;

- Provides means to finance farm payments

- Provides clarity on university payments;

- A state in which there will not be new barriers in living and in doing business within doing business within our own union, nevertheless maintaining the necessary common standards;

- A state which will empower the UK as a trading nation;

- A state which will ensure a secure border with the EU as regards with the border of the Republic of Ireland;

- A state which will ensure openness to international talent, but controlled immigration; control of the number of people coming from Europe to Britain, with respect of the rights of foreign people living and working (and paying taxes) in UK as well as the rights of nationals living in other European Union states;

- A state which will mean a truly global Britain, opened to free trade with our close friends and neighbours in Europe but also with new friends and allies from outside Europe (meaning the former Commonwealth).

Such a state would be the embodiment of a prototype of a modern, free and open state in which anyone would like to live. This kind of prototype was described in linguistics as opposed to the classic theory developed by Eleanor Rosch. According to Eleanor Rosch, a prototype is the best representative of a category (1978). In E. Rosch’s conception a prototype can be established within the boundaries of a category and it is based on people’s judgment of how good an example or clear case members are of a category. A prototype appears to be just that member of a category that most reflect the redundancy structure of a category as a whole. Coleman and Kay (1981) contributed to the development of the prototype theory. According to them, prototype is a mental object, scheme, cognitive image associated to a word which brings about categorization. A French linguist specialized in cognitive semantics, Danielle Dubois (1991), considers that it is quite possible that a prototype, as a mental construction, could not have a real representation. A prototype may be made up by a combination of values, never materialized, even if the respective values are frequently met with. It may

be an abstract representation, constructed on the bases of typical characteristics.

So, in the Prime minister's view, the Global Britain she presents to British citizens is, for the time being, a prototype, a non-existent country but a country for which the British citizens long for. They want to get out from that single-market agreements, so as to extend their relationship with old friends and new allies from outside Europe (meaning that they hope to reinstate relationship within Commonwealth); they want to be able to control immigration, meaning that Brexit must mean control of the number of people who come to work and live in United Kingdom from Britain; they want that the Northern Ireland border keeps being that common travel one, so no hard border between the two countries. In the end, we wonder whether this prototype of a country presented by the Prime Minister Theresa May can ever materialize.

In order to convince the British citizens, especially those who voted against Brexit, the Prime Minister chooses to use words that would touch the general public, being part of their everyday life. In her speeches about Brexit, Theresa May speaks repeatedly about the disadvantages of the membership of a *single market*; she insists on the importance of *leaving the customs union*; her point of view on immigration implies a strong will to *take control over the number of people coming to work and live in the UK from the European Union*; she intends to engage in negotiations for a Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement; she expresses her satisfaction with regards to the *budget question*, saying that UK will not pay huge sums of money to the European Union on a regular basis; she very frequently mentions Great Britain's intentions to extend their relationship with *old and new partners and allies*, referring to the members of the Commonwealth; the ultimate goal of the British government will be to construct a *global Britain*.

Using these words and phrases, the Prime Minister intends to build a future image of a bright Great Britain after Brexit, which will be what British citizens want for their children and their grandchildren. Many of these words and phrases are chosen on purpose, as they have a certain echo in the general public's mind. We shall try to explain how the general public would be able to understand the dimensions of the changes that Brexit will bring through a semantic theory which concerns construction of meaning. This semantic theory belongs to Charles Fillmore (1982:111) and he named it "frame semantics" thinking of the term

"frame" which, according to him, denotes "any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits". In his conception, the term "frame" would be more appropriate and more comprehensive as compared to other terms which have been used to describe natural language understanding. He thinks that the term "frame" can be considered as a hyperonym for many other terms such as "script", "scenario" "schema" or "cognitive model".

In Charles Fillmore's opinion, "frame semantics offers a particular way of looking at word meanings" (Ch. Fillmore, 1982:111). He starts from the idea that "words represent a categorization of experience, and each of these categories is underlain by a motivating situation occurring against a background of knowledge and experience". This means that language and thinking are completely different things, but they are related and work together to form human knowledge and human vocabulary. Human beings have some mental representations about the extra linguistic reality which they have to put into words. In order to simplify the theory, Fillmore finds an analogy between the tools offered by frame semantics theory about word meaning and a set of tools, such as a hammer, a knife or a clock. We are supposed to know about those tools if we know what they look like and how they are used or even what kind of people use them. We are supposed to know what is the shape and the make or model of a knife, we are supposed to know who uses it, why and in what circumstances. In the same way, we may consider a linguistic text as some kind of record of tools used to construct meaning, tools belonging to phonology or morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics.

The origin of frame semantics theory dates back to the period when Charles Fillmore was interested in lexical structure and lexical semantics, exploring co-occurrences of words, specific contexts in which verbs tend to appear accompanied by certain arguments, so it was the beginning of the frame semantic theory when Fillmore identified the importance of the concept of frame which led "to the discovery of important functioning word classes or grammatical categories" (Ch. Fillmore, 1982:112). Using his studies concerning the use of English verbs according to the surface-syntactic frames in which they appeared but also according to their grammatical behaviour, acquiring great knowledge about deep structure syntactic frames which were hospitable to it, he developed first his theory about semantic roles. He considers that verbs

have “two kinds of features relevant to their distribution in sentences: a deep – structure valence description expressed in case frames and a set of rule features”. So, it became normal to say about a verb that it occurs in a linguistic context involving a number of nominals, among which an Agent, performing the action, the Patient, the one that who undergoes the action performed by the Agent and perhaps an Instrument, or an Object or a Force. Such a syntactic-semantic valence description of verbs lead to the creation of some kind of a small abstract scene or situation for each case frame, “so that to understand the semantic structure of the verb it was necessary to understand the properties of such schematized scenes”. His first attempt to describe a cognitive structure was in the case of verbs like *blame*, *accuse*, and *criticize*, for which he imagined some characteristic scene schematization. He also imagined a scene schematization for the verbs *buy* and *sell*, describing the categories speakers bring into play when describing other situations than the actual speech situation. Our understanding of the meaning of a word is based on cognitive frames and interactional frames. Under the influence of cognitive semantics, he proposed a description of word meanings that made use of the notions of categories and prototype. He noticed that, very often, the frame against which the meaning of a word is defined and understood is based on the notion of prototype, able to provide with the most frequent mental image of the reality described by the word. He offers as examples the notions of orphan and breakfast, describing the most usual situations in which the words are used and taking into account the most usual phrases in which the word occurs, the most frequent word associations containing orphan or breakfast. To conclude, this theory is essential in constructing and understanding meaning through a word, since “a word can give us a category that can be used in many different contexts which are determined by the multiple aspects of his prototypic use”. Human mind should be capable of putting together all the information given by the different contexts in which a word is used and it should be capable of making choices whenever a specific use is indicated.

According to Charles Fillmore’s frame theory, Theresa May’s choice of words in her political speeches about Brexit was not a random one. Some of the words or phrases she uses have a certain echo in the British citizens’ minds, they have a certain meaning.

One such word is security, used four times by the Prime minister. Of course, it is not exceedingly used, it is not misused, but it is cleverly used.

Here are the contexts:

- (1) There is growing concern about European *security*.
- (2) With the threats to our common security becoming more serious, our response is [...] to work together more.
- (3) I am proud of the role Britain has played [...] in promoting Europe’s security.
- (4) After Brexit, Britain wants to be a good friend and neighbour in every way, and that includes defending the safety and security of all our citizens.

From the first sentence, we may construct the following scenario in order to understand the meaning of security: there is an unidentified place in the world where somebody, also unidentified, is very much afraid that Europe can be attacked by enemies. It means that the respective country is not free from danger, fear or anxiety of being attacked. The rest of the meaning is to be constructed if we know for sure what are the limits for that part of the world called Europe; then we should define who are the enemies; will the territory named as Europe be under attack of: mosquitoes, a hostile neighbour, a single person, such a terrorist or a deranged person, or an army.

The next examples reinforce our conviction that Theresa May presents an image of Europe under attack or at least threatened to be attacked. And we tend to conclude the meaning of those sentences is that every time European security was in danger, United Kingdom was not concerned as it was capable of offering support and acting like a friend in need. Of course, when addressing British citizens, it is very flattering to portray United Kingdom like a protector, mounting guard at the gates of Europe. From the point of view of other European citizens, the situation is far from being correctly depicted. What would the Greeks, the Italians, the Spaniard or even the German say? Do not protect the frontiers of that part of the world called Europe?

Another word or rather phrase we intend to analyze is “a global Britain”. It is the logo she chose for Great Britain after Brexit. The logo is printed on the background of her tribune and it is also mentioned in her speech.

(1) We seek a new and equal partnership between an independent, self-governing global Britain and our friends and allies in the EU.

(2) We will take this opportunity to make Britain stronger, to make Britain fairer, and to build a more global Britain, too.

(3) The great prize for this country is to use this moment to build a truly global Britain.

(4) A Global Britain must be free to strike trade agreements with countries from outside the European Union too.

What is the meaning one can construct about the adjective “global”? What can be global? Global warming, global fame, a global life insurance, the we have globalization, a phenomenon very much spoken about and much disliked in some parts of the world. So, the meaning of global Britain that Theresa May presents to British citizens and voters in favour of Brexit is mainly the last one, a global Britain will be that country which is free to strike agreements with countries from outside European Union, too. That is the primarily meaning she wants to induce to the British citizens, although, from a linguistic point of view, the approach is not correct, it favours some aspects which are supposed to offer comfort, support and empathy on behalf of both sides.

4. CONCLUSIONS

It is not true that political discourse concerns only politicians or actors involved in politics as a field of activity. As we have tried to demonstrate, political discourse is also a matter of mastering language, manipulating people’s minds and having an extensive knowledge about human nature, human psychology and about social and political trends at a certain point in history. If your country decides to leave a community in which she played an important part, you find acceptable arguments in favour of this decision.

The study of language can shed some light on politics, politicians, on their intentions and their concerns. Most of the linguistic researches about political discourse are related to semantics and to theories about constructing meaning. Cognitive semantics is one of these fields that gave us the possibility to understand, on the one side, how meaning is constructed by the speaker, and, on the other side, how meaning is understood by the interlocutor. It is quite interesting to discover how general knowledge, encyclopedic knowledge is used as an instrument by politicians in order to construct the meaning which is convenient to them and to the political party they belong to.

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CORPUS

16. Theresa Mays Brexit speech, January, 17, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/>
17. Theresa Mays Brexit speech, January, 20, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/>

REWRITING INTERCULTURALISM IN QUÉBEC SOME LITERARY EXAMPLES

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Abstract: *The social and cultural fabric of Québec has been profoundly transformed for about twenty years. Québec, and in particular Montréal, have now become increasingly plural. In the younger generation, as in the previous ones, identities are still only defined by starting from a pre-established cultural and family background, perhaps Québécoise, but perhaps also Haitian, Algerian, Chinese, or Polish. In an almost irreversible way, the borders move or are reduced. Marco Micone, Jean Jonassaint, Régine Robin, and Dany Laferrière, all write from a space which is at the same time both within, and peripheral to, Quebec society. Their marginality is expressed both explicitly in the thematic material of their writing and textually through choices of language and form.*

Keywords: *interculturalism; Québec; integration; transgression*

1. INTRODUCTION

The social and cultural fabric of Québec has been profoundly transformed for about twenty years. Québec, and in particular Montréal, have now become increasingly plural. Law 101, which requires compulsory attendance at French language schools for immigrant children or those born to immigrants, has produced a real and unexpected exchange. On the one hand, immigrant children have learned French and have become more familiar with the French-speaking culture of Québec, on the other, some Francophone children have demystified their rigid and preconceived image of the foreigner and thus feel less fear; they have learned about differences directly and not through the intermediation of family and social prejudices. Certainly, in the younger generation, as in the previous ones, identities are still only defined by starting from a pre-established cultural and family background, perhaps Québécoise, but perhaps also Haitian, Algerian, Chinese, or Polish. In an almost irreversible way, the borders move or are reduced. It is necessary to remember that integration is created slowly, like stratifications that are layered one on top of the other.

The immigrant, be s/he man or woman, becomes "illiterate" again, forced to learn new codes in all fields. This recurring image highlights the difficulty of the immigrant who has to rapidly decode a new culture: sometimes it means his survival. The narrator of *Soigne ta chute* by Flora

Balzano remembers this, in an ironic and acerbic style:

On n'est plus sûr de rien. C'est le grand questionnement. On n'est sûr que d'une chose, va falloir s'adapter, on ne sait pas trop comment, on veut apprendre, vite, vite, on sent qu'il faut se grouiller, on ne comprend pas tout, c'est dur pour l'orgueil, on rougit, on se dandine, on s'entortille, on s'excuse, on a de nouveaux six ans, on entre en première année. Tous les immigrants sont des écoliers. Les écoliers c'est l'avenir. Donc, les immigrants, c'est l'avenir (Balzano, 1980:36).

The two words *immigrant* and *emigrant* are very fascinating because of the gestures implicit in their prefixes, a leaving something behind and an entering into something new. The old-world nostalgia of the *émigré* must colour the notion of an emigrant imagination because I think of that imagination as rooted, bound up in, the place left, the "old country", "home", and preoccupied with recreating that place, whether out of nostalgia or fury. The immigrant imagination seems to me to embrace the new place it enters. The situation of being such an immigrant is a perfect seedbed for the writing sensibility. If you don't belong, you can imagine you belong and you can construct in writing a world where you do belong. You can write your way into the world you want to be a part of, even as, from outside it, you witness its specific characteristics. The sensation of having your world turned upside down or inverted also leads to a

sense of the relativity of both language and reality, as much as it leads to a curiosity about other people's realities. It leads to an interest in and curiosity about language, a sense of how language shapes the reality you live in, an understanding of how language is both idiosyncratic (private) and shared (public), and the essential duplicity of language, its capacity to mean several things at once, its figurative or transformational powers.

There is a sensation of living in this place with its real people and things, of being contained in it, but knowing that somewhere else there exists that place, with its real people and things which you can no longer go back to, the sense that the *you* you were in that place is not the same *you* as the *you* you are in this place, though the two overlap. This produces a desire to knit the two places, the two (at least) selves, somehow.

The question of the place of texts written by the Other (whether that odd metaphorical negation of the European is defined as African, Arabic, Chinese, Latin American, Yiddish, or female authors), in the proper study of literature, "Western literature", or "comparative literature" has, until recently, remained an unasked question, suspended or silenced by a discourse in which the canonical and the noncanonical stand as the ultimate opposition.

2. FOUR QUÉBÉCOIS LITERARY EXAMPLES

As countries of immigration, Canada and the United States have established and recognized traditions of immigrant and minority literature. But for Canada this tradition has been mainly if not exclusively expressed in English. The historical context of Québécois literature, reflecting the close association between the French language and a single cultural community, made the inclusion of minority voices within the framework of the Québécois literary institution impossible until recently. In the context of contemporary Québécois writing, the choice of French is a significant decision because for the immigrant writers of the past generation English was the principal language of integration into Canadian society.

As Québécois literature begins to look forward by undertaking exploratory journeys to "foreign" lands, difference at home has become the province of minority writers. Marco Micone, Jean Jonassaint, Régine Robin, and Dany Laferrière, all write from a space which is at the same time both within, and peripheral to, Québécois society. Their marginality is expressed both explicitly in the

thematic material of their writing and *textually* through choices of language and form.

The provocative blend of continuity and difference, affiliation and dissidence expressed in the work of these writers, as well as the importance they give to language, mark this writing as a significant development in Québécois literature.

The question of language, almost always associated with the difficulties of integration and acceptance, is found throughout migrant writing. In any case, in spite of the recurrence of the conflictual dimension of the meeting of languages, some writers also explore the issue of integration, a creator of hybridity and the unprecedented. Language then becomes a symbol of enrichment and transculturalism. It is clear that the theme of language embraces two levels: on the one hand, it testifies to the often conflicting passage from one language to another, as the need to find an appropriate language; on the other, it symbolizes the interior and multidirectional readaptation that the immigrant must go through when he moves from one culture to another.

Polylinguism, according to Bakhtin, is the essential condition of the novel form; it implies a resistance to an overall monologic conception of meaning. This polylinguism can refer as much to the mixture of languages within one national culture as to textual indicators of relationships towards "foreign" languages. The confrontational nature of the encounter of languages becomes more explicit in contexts where the political and social dimensions of language are prominent and where there is a conflict of cultural traditions. For certain writers, in fact, entry into a national tradition is complicated precisely by factors of polylinguism. Antoine Berman has noted the important similarities between what he calls "la catégorie du français étranger" and translation effects:

Dans un cas on a des étrangers écrivant en français et donc imprimant le sceau de leur étrangeté à notre langue ; dans l'autre, on a des œuvres étrangères réécrites en français, venant habiter notre langue et donc la marquer, elle aussi, de leur étrangeté. Beckett est l'illustration la plus frappante de cette proximité de deux français (Berman, 1984:180).

Translation thus becomes a privileged figure of minority writing, not necessarily as the indication of a transfer from one language to another or as the transfer of a pre-existent cultural reality into a new context, but primarily as the operation through which literary traditions are challenged or reinforced through the encounter between two or

several modes of textualization. Literary language is not a “given” but always an expression of affiliation or transgression.

Marco Micone writes plays dominated by political and collective perspectives. He is of Italian origin and dedicates his theatre to an exploration of what he calls “immigrant culture”. For Micone, language differences are problematic. Immigrant culture is a culture of transition between languages. Micone has written extensively on the explicitly political motives which led him to choose French rather than English as a language of expression. In his plays immigrants and children of immigrants speak a French occasionally punctuated by English or Italian words. Their language is not only or even primarily, however, a “realistic” language; it is often highly theatrical, giving his plays, along with songs, symbolic characters and stylized acting, an additional element of distancing.

In addition to its dramatic function, Micone’s language also has an important thematic role. Micone’s plays are filled with references to language and its impact on the characters. The immigrant has no language of his or her own: this is the sober reality which the immigrant must face. In replacement of the myth of immigration as the passage to paradise, Micone suggests the tragedy of loss: this loss is first and foremost that of language.

Micone’s first two plays explore the multiple relationships between language and power: within couples, within the family, within society. The very abundance of language, the tendency to speechify, the characters’ need to articulate explicitly all the various frustrations which language represents for them. This hyperconsciousness towards language makes Micone’s plays an essential representation of the immigrant experience in Québec.

Interestingly, Micone’s play *Biblico* shows a significant reversal of attitude. Centred specifically on the question of origin and personal identity, rejecting political and collective ideals, concentrating on emotional intensity rather than on verbal abundance, the play places much less emphasis on language issues. In distinct contradiction with the theorization of the “transcultural” as developed by the review *Vice Versa*, Micone clearly rejects the joy of cultural mixtures for the tragedy of lost origins and unrequited love. The fact that Micone’s theatrical language becomes more spare, less avid and all-encompassing, is significant: the evacuation of

language issues signals a different understanding of which political problems are central.

In fiction we can see more elaborate textual strategies to signify interculturalism. The most important and thorough attempt to use language as a formal and a thematic device for exploring perceptions of identity in Québec, the most explicit example of a minority voice in Québécois fiction, is a novel by Régine Robin, *La Québécoise*. Robin is an academic of French-Jewish origin: her novel draws an explicit link between the experience of the social outsider and the experience of marginality due to language. Robin’s evocation of marginality clearly goes beyond the individual and the autobiographical to describe a generalizable experience:

Quelle angoisse certains après-midi – Québécoisité – québécoisitude – je suis autre. Je n’appartiens pas à ce Nous si fréquemment utilisé ici – Nous-autres, Vous-autres. Faut se parler. On est bien chez nous...L’incontournable étrangeté...Autre, à part, en quarantaine...à la recherche d’un langage, de simples mots pour représenter l’ailleurs, l’épaisseur de l’étrangeté, de simples mots, défaits, rompus, brisés, désémantisés (Robin, 1983:52).

The novel tells the story of three possible integrations of an immigrant into Montréal society. The narrative is presented as a kind of exercise in memory and linguistic free association, a journal of personal, historical, geographical fragmentation which includes notes for a university course on medieval Jewish messianic movements. It is a demonstration that language is not necessarily the cement which holds together our perceptions or guarantees our political and social identity; language becomes the very agent of dispersion: “il n’y aura pas de récit/tout juste voix plurielle/ une voix carrefour/ la parole immigrante” (Robin, 1983:88). The experience of the immigrant proves again to be a disappropriation of language, even if it is not necessarily a change of language. Language is revealed to be not an instrument of thought, but the very substance of experience. With its broken syntax, its refusal of linearity, its definition of identity and history as disorder, the narrative structure of *La Québécoise* becomes congruent with the fragmented social structure of Montréal. Against the myth of origin and belonging, *La Québécoise* opposes an infinite past and identities so multiple as to be uncountable.

Another example of the rewriting of interculturalism in Québec is *La déchirure du (corps) texte et autres brèches*, in which Jean Jonassaint, a writer of Haitian origin, adopts a

strategy similar to Robin's in proposing a fragmented, non-linear text with resonances which are at once autobiographical and impersonal. Much more than in the case of Robin, this short text declares itself to be unconditionally disjunctive and opaque. The "I" who speaks exists both in the past and in the present; he is the "nègre" traded like a possession and the writer who tells of his impossible integration into Québec. Finding himself refused, he determines that he will adopt the point of view of difference, following in the path of writers as diverse as the Québécois Gauvreau, Joyce, and the Surrealists. Like the writer with whom he shares his initials, Jonassaint delights in Joycian plays on words and considers exile to be his true home. "Mot-dites-farces... Je ne suis point de la tribu" (Jonassaint, 1984:46). The text becomes something of a *manifesto* as Jonassaint declares himself to be one of those "migrants" who must forge his own language:

Voilà quoi motive, active ma démarche d'écriture dans ce Québec que je souhaiterais par rien que québécois-métis, comme moi scribing une langue qui m'engage, à assassiner sûrement comme Gauvreau un exemple (Jonassaint, 1984:29).

It is evident that Robin and Jonassaint are both authors of works in which the main theme revolves around the question of *marginality* as it relates to the Québécois majority. Both propose autobiographical texts, neither respects the conventional structures of the story in order to create a link between collective experience and individual experience.

A very different example of the inscription of interculturalism into Québécois literature is provided by the novel *Comment faire l'amour avec un Nègre sans se fatiguer* by Dany Laferrière. This is the first novel explicitly declaring its colour to have been a popular success in Québec. The novel is written in an irreverent, self-deprecating and laid-back style unusual in Québécois literature. The narrator very clearly identifies himself as Black and of non-Québécois origin, but never defines the precise nature of this origin. In fact, the book plays with the enigma of origin, suggesting a wide range of popular prejudices towards the "primitiveness" of Blacks. Much more than the perspective of a Black on White culture, however, the book proposes the perspective of a Black looking at himself with what he supposes are White eyes. The central activity and metaphor of the book is the "fatal attraction" of White (and always English) females for Black males and vice-

versa. The fact that the women in Laferrière's novel are all "English" suggests a ludic rereading of Hubert Aquin's and Pierre Vallières's use of post-colonial thought to interpret Québec culture. The political intertext of the novel is not used to convey a new perspective on Québec society but rather to enlist the allegiance of the reader through the complicity of a shared code.

It was Hippolyte-Adolphe Taine who made the implicit explicit by postulating "race, moment, and milieu" as positivistic criteria through which any work could be read and which, by definition, any work reflected. Taine's *History of English Literature*, was the great foundation upon which subsequent 19th century notions of "national literatures" would be constructed. In race, Taine concludes, was predetermined "a particularity inseparable from all the motions of his intellect and his heart. Here lie the grand causes, for they are the universal and permanent causes..., indestructible, and finally infallibly supreme". Poetries, as Taine puts it, and all other forms of social expression, "are, in fact, only the imprints stamped by their seal" (Taine, 1970:503-504). Taine's originality lay not in his ideas about the nature and role of race but rather in their almost "scientific" application to the history of literature.

Race has become a trope of ultimate, irreducible difference between cultures, linguistic groups, or adherents to specific belief systems. Language is not only the medium of this often insidious tendency: it is its sign. Blacks and other people of colour could not write. Writing, many Europeans argued, stood alone among the fine arts as the most salient repository of "genius", the visible sign of reason itself.

We must not ask "the reader to understand Africa by embedding it in European culture", says Appiah (1984:146), we must understand how certain forms of difference and the languages we employ to define those supposed differences not only reinforce each other, but tend to create and maintain each other.

The language of Laferrière's novel, curiously enough, is neutral, international French, there are almost no cultural markers. The combination of this neutral language and the eclectic nature of the cultural-geographic references suggests that the "culture" represented is less that of Québec than that of the "Nègre métropolitain", whose existence is hinted at in the novel. Unlike *La Québécoise*, that is, the *Nègre* is not a reading of cultural difference, but rather the opening of a neutral, almost a negative, cultural space. Laferrière's book seems like a cry of rage.

A great deal of this negative energy is directed toward the numerous white females in *Comment faire l'amour avec un Nègre sans se fatiguer*. Obviously, on the level of story the treatment of women in this novel is shocking. They are only good for “fucking”, not even lovemaking. Even when the narrator uses the word “love” he is doing it “at the edge of an abyss” (Laferrière, 1985:48). In fact, we are told that “in the sexual act, hatred is more effective than love” (Laferrière, 1985:49). And there are few if any indications of either sensitivity or tenderness on the part of writer or characters in the performance of sexual encounters. The audience is told “There are no individuals”. Thus, the blacks and the women function as types; in the case of the women we might even say allegorical figures. None of them have any significant individuality. Like many postmodern novels this episodic, almost storyless book full of nihilism works *à rebours*, using humour from time to time to rise above the garbage that functions as an image of contemporary civilization. But the humour is black, an “effective weapon”, more absurd than funny. If this book does have a morality, it is the morality of words, for this is writing about writing. Laferrière is at times making love to his words, at times “fucking” them, at times drunk on them.

In their probing introduction to *The Postmodern Scene* (1986) Arthur Kroker and David Cook characterize the postmodern condition by using Foucault's manifestation of “transgression” as the

lightning flash which illuminates the sky for an instant only to reveal the immensity of the darkness within: *absence* as the disappearing sign of the limitlessness of the void within and without... (Lenoski, 1989:236).

Such definition is a useful touchstone in any attempt to deal meaningfully with Dany Laferrière's first novel, only perhaps, in this case, since the author is black and a Haitian refugee, a negative of Foucault's lightening image would be more appropriate. Like much postmodern literature, this is life seen from below, by those who live on the edges of genre and of what is normally social and moral in our society. For the author, though, and for his narrator, who he suggests lives in a similar physical and mental space, that means that a good deal of the nothingness is white. Accordingly, they are more

voided than the void itself and this book which traces the “cruising” of two blacks in contemporary Montréal is full of rage and sexual violence.

3. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, from this examination, albeit short, we can deduce that Robin, Micone, Jonassaint, and Laferrière, are among the few writers who, starting from very different origins, propose not so much a look at the majority culture, but an expression of their marginal positions. In their works, we do not read about those who are at the center of culture, rather we move around the edges of society. By challenging the norms of literary language and affirming their positions on the margins of society, these writers are currently trying to create a new cultural space within the Québécois society and thus rewrite the concept of interculturality within Québécois literature. Will the opening of this space mark the beginning of a new pluralism within Québécois literature?

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CINEMA AS A TOOL OF INFLUENCE IN THE PORTFOLIO OF IRAN'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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Abstract: *The present article sets as a vector of analysis the emergence of Iranian cinema as a tool of influence in the portfolio of Iran's public diplomacy. Given the speed of propagating symmetrical and asymmetric tensions in the current global security architecture, Iran has made it clear that the use of new cultural, religious and linguistic tools that go beyond traditional diplomacy will help brush up its own reputation. Building its research hypothesis on the question: "Does the Iranian cinematographic art represent an opportunity to shape the minds and hearts of the Western public and to promote a different image of the Iranian people in the world?", the article aims to demonstrate that Iran is in the process of country rebranding, giving public diplomacy an innovative direction, translated by the open and decentralized participation of citizens on the political stage, through the multidimensionality of civil society approaches, and even through the blurring of the role of political entities on the traditional way of thinking about diplomacy. Thus Oscar or other international awards winning directors, actors and films have become facilitators of propagating the Iranian culture and identity throughout the world, while the interaction between aesthetics and the social and political issues of Iran's third millennium creates the space for a debate about the new wave of Farsi films that gives birth to a new narrative of Iranian cultural diplomacy.*

Keywords: *cultural diplomacy; Iranian cinema; soft power; message; aesthetic paradigms*

1. INTRODUCTION

The discourse about public diplomacy involves undoubtedly the universe of international relations and the studies placed both in the conceptualization field as well as the diplomatic apparatus, in which are analyzed the most opportune manners of communication between a government and a foreign public and the best ways to influence the opinions and attitudes of the Other.

In this paradigm of analyzing how public diplomacy tends to establish a closer communication with the civil society, to determine a direct interaction with the target audience and to obtain a real-time feedback with immediate consequences at the level of diplomatic strategies, a lot of countries in the Middle East, area dominated by conflicts, ambitions and competitions, tend to adopt soft power strategies in order to obtain benefits and to gain influence on the foreign policy of another country.

Thus, a state like Iran has adopted this form of strategic diplomacy as a mark of diplomatic mobilization to dilute the hard issues and bring to the forefront the soft tools by promoting its cultural values, pre-Islamic religious beliefs, educational

platforms, in order to cancel the image of the country included on the Axis of Evil by Washington and to re-insert into the international diplomatic club.

Why Iran's public diplomacy? Because Iran is the revolted child of the Middle East catapulted by the West to the rank of regional and global threat, given that, 39 years ago, the Islamic revolution and its religious speech provoked a definitive fracture of the Western values, and its polemic nuclear program, reactivated after the war with Iraq, has become a focus point of fears on regional and global security, and is suspected of being used for military purposes. On the other hand, despite the Iranian nuclear agreement reached in 2015 between Iran and the Western community (the UN Security Council's five permanent members plus Germany), Tehran continues to be a source of tension in the Middle East.

The virulent rhetoric against Israel and the calls to delete it on the map of the world, the Holocaust denial, the financial support of the terrorist entities, the maintenance of inter-confessional conflicts in Yemen, or the interference in Syria and Iraq are marks that Iran can promote a double standard speech, that

includes a lot of engaging messages towards the West and, equally, many other exciting messages addressed to the oppressed of the world. Because Rūḥollah Ḥomeynī has transposed into the political field the Manichean eschatology on the bipartition of the world in Good and Evil, so that he places into opposition the oppressed or the disinherited and the arrogants or the colonialists of the world:

The health and the peace of the world depend on the annihilation of the arrogants, and while these illiterate hegemonists dominate the Earth, the disinherited do not take possession of the patrimony given to them by God (Anṣārī, 1996: 28).

His messages were full of appeals to the world's disinherited to revolt against the arrogant forces for release from the yoke of the American, European and the former Soviet hegemonic forces. It is noted that the Soviet Union is included in the category of Evil as a promoter of the atheistic discourse.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Interpreted to be an amount of efforts to win hearts and minds, the public diplomacy has distanced itself from diplomacy tributary of state secret, of protocol and of hard power steps, so it is a political exercise that continues through a lot of soft and smart means, and, this time, is involving the ordinary citizen. Understood as an instrument in the soft power portfolio, this type of diplomacy forces communicators to make better use the strategies and to innovate the tools of persuasion, because a truly effective diplomacy in the third millennium is no longer the exclusive prerogative of foreign ministries. The encrypted and elitist character is marginalized in favor of a multifaceted vision that brings the simple citizens, universities, social networks or the private sector to the fore, making them part of the big internal or external policy decisions (Potter, 2009: 33) and establish a less vertical and more horizontal communication report. Public diplomacy is defined to be

a form of international political advocacy directly openly by civilians to a broad spectrum of audience, but usually in support of negotiations through diplomatic channels (...). It is not a form of political warfare, although it may be used in combination with political warfare (Smith, 1989: 7).

Conjugated with propaganda, conventional military force, economic and diplomatic actions, public diplomacy occupies a prime position in

political war strategy. (Smith, 1989: 14). Fertile in the field of definitions, the expression "public diplomacy" refers to soft power, a concept established by Joseph Jr. Nye, and which incorporates the ability of a country to achieve the desired results by persuasion and not by coercion (Nye, 1990: 166). Power, in this context, is increasingly associated with education, culture, technology and economic growth, because

power is the ability to alter the behavior of others to get what you want (Nye, 2006).

Placed in antonymy with the notion of hard power, soft power is in possession of the levers of modeling and strengthening a country's image, because

soft power is to achieve what you want through attraction rather than through coercion or reward (Nye, 2002: 60).

According to Nye, the ability of a nation to become attractive in the arena of globalization is given by its culture, political values and foreign policy (Nye, 2014), because, ultimately, the art, literature, culture, religious customs, national characteristics or ideological customs are the defining components of that country that do not perish and which remain deeply rooted in the global collective mentality.

The political scientist Joseph Nye introduces public diplomacy into the soft power category, because by relying on culture, attitudes and values, the desired results are achieved by the ability to seduce (Nye, 2004). In this grille of interpretation, the perception of the message is essential, because communicators have the responsibility to build messages that have credibility among the target receptor, then they project them in the media and duplicate them with actions and events aims at developing inter-human relationships and promoting brands and country brand.

The diachronic exploration of public diplomacy and its multitude of definitions lead to Mellison's idea that

the origins of contemporary public diplomacy, and the current debate on the need for more public diplomacy, are dominated by the US experience (Mellison, 2005: 6).

given that Edmund Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University consecrated the phrase "public diplomacy" and referred to

the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications (Cull, 2006).

However, the events that marked humanity after the year 2000 have also forced the academic environments and governments of many states of the world to focus their attention on the advantages of public diplomacy in international relations, whose key words are "engagement", "dialogue" and "mutuality".

"Expression of broader patterns of change in diplomacy" (Gonesh *et al.*, 2005:4), public diplomacy has the ability to penetrate the environments and to be heard there "where traditional diplomacy cannot reach" (Gonesh *et al.*, 2005:5), and through the nature of its activities, it promotes transparent activities of "direct communication" with other states, in order to shape their thinking. (Malone, 1985:199). Considered to be an integral part of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy "reveals the soul of a nation", because it

seeks to demonstrate national values which might be shared with foreign audiences" and it creates relationships and "a neutral platform for people-to-people contact" (...) in order to foster a mutual understanding (U.S. Department of State, 2005).

3. IRANIAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ECOSYSTEM

Drawings, Iran has the advantage of a "cultural and material power (...) based on its identity and geographical circumstances", but also by the fact that it benefits from the support of all socio-professional segments such as the bazaar, clergy, intellectuals and young people when it is about preserving of national interests. Operating in Islamic terms and aspiring to mobilize Muslim populations around the *ommat-e eslāmī* (Islamic community) concept, Iran appealed repeatedly to a diversified tool to disseminate ideologies and views, but also to blot out the negative image propagated globally. In this context, Iran is

actively pursuing activities in the sphere of public diplomacy, a number of Iranian political and religious entities engaging actively in dissemination missions of political messages, attired in cultural, religious or linguistic forms (Sharp, (2005: 114). In this perspective, a generous Iranian interest-promoting infrastructure has created, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, assisted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being at the forefront in organization and implementation of cultural programs outside of Iran.

Through Iran's cultural centers under the aegis of the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization, which, for its part, is subordinated to the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, which keeps a close watch for the preservation of Islamic culture and the removal of any ideological and cultural influences, Tehran has set a lot of goals and principles for the dissemination of Iran's culture, civilization and realities throughout the world, especially as Imam Ḥomeynī has stressed that culture is the essence of a country's existence.

If, immediately after the Islamic Revolution, Iranian leadership built its public diplomacy portfolio around the export idea of its Revolution, then the emphasis shifted on the strengthening of the Shi'a sphere and enhancing the regional influence, calling itself a defender of the rights of the Third World's disinherited (Sharp, 2005:115-116).

Therefore, into the Shi'a populations in a Sunni-dominated Middle East, Persian Gulf and Central Asia, Iran has used and continues to use soft power tools to increase its influence, proceeding with "reputation and image management", because "Tehran presents itself as a reliable partner and ally and pushes a triumphalist narrative that claims God and history are on its side", to "economic leverage", given that "Tehran has strengthened trade and investment in Shi'a areas for profit and for leverage". Iran also make use of "bonds of solidarity with Shi'a communities around the world that can serve as external bases of support for its policies and as allies should it be attacked" and of "propaganda and spin" through "Arabic-language news and entertainment broadcasts that reflect Tehran's propaganda line" (Eisenstadt, 2011:2).

The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war taught the Iranians to cherish the land of the homeland and the international sanctions on its controversial nuclear program also taught them that they must make compromises to regain their place at the table of the international community. Guided by the motto of the Persian poet Mawlānā Ḡalāl ad-Dīn

Muḥammad Rūmī "Raise your words, not voice. It is a rain that grows flowers, not thunder," Iran of the 21st century seems to be returning to cultural diplomacy, its leadership being aware that the very generous Persian cultural and civilisation fund can open those doors that often remain closed to politicians (Shoamanesh, 2017).

The Islamic Republic of Iran has become aware of the need to resurrect its multi-milenary past in order to win the minds and hearts outside the country by: popularizing the pre-Islamic civilization; developing a lot of cultural programs dedicated to the greatness of Persian imperialism; the initiation of cultural actions dedicated to Iranian traditions and customs such as the *Nowrūz*/ New Year in the entire geographical area of the -stān, running programs dedicated to political days in the Islamic space, such as the Qods International Day; the organization of theological courses in Shi'a theological seminars, which surpassed the Shi'a seminars in Iraq; diversification of full-time educational offers addressed to young people from various forms of education around the world; transferring to the online environment, in a lot of languages, with external addressability, state-controlled Iranian media and, last but not least, by encouraging artistic activities.

At this perspective, it may be talking about a diplomacy of music, of Persian calligraphy, a diplomacy of religion, diplomacy of literature, or Iranian film diplomacy, given that Iranian artists have become Iran's ambassadors around the world, and a soft power source still insufficiently exploited source, which can make incremental changes to the perception of others about Iranian identity.

4. IRANIAN CINEMATOGRAPHY AS A TOOL OF INFLUENCE

The Iranian cinema industry has a history marked by its experimentation, nationalistic effervescence, decline and new opportunities (Naficy, 1979:443), which emerged after 2000, when Iran got in a new era of re-affirmation on the world stage. Thus, despite the censorship, the Iranian film industry benefited from the involvement of generations of intellectuals who have tried to provide an authentic perspective on Iran. Many Iranian films have competed in various international film festivals and have won important prizes, demonstrating to the world that the new generation of Iranian filmmakers is a sophisticated and original one, and Iranian art consumers have managed to get off Ḥomeynī's belief that the cinema is a form of *ġarbzadegī* (West-struckness).

Therefore, films such as "A Separation" (*Ġodāy-ye Nāder az Sīmīn*; 2012) or "The Salesman" (*Forūšandeh*; 2017), produced by Aşġar Farḥādī, won the Academy Award for Foreign Language Film, in 2011, and Golden Globe, highlighting the way in which Iranian cinema, with a relatively low budget, can change the image of this nation accused of having a dual-use nuclear program.

Iran, through the provision of funding, the organization of festivals and cinemas, or the distribution of cinematographic productions via The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), has realized that film art can serve as a tool for capitalizing of its own cultural heritage and influencing world public opinion (Rad, 2012). The delicate exploration of the Iranian social universe and reflections on the disappointment and the desperation of Iran's intellectuals transform Iranian film into the most accessible form of experimentation of the culture and psychology of the Iranian people. Thus, cinematographic productions that emerged after 1997, just after the presidency was taken over by a reformist statesman, are a breath of fresh air by deliberately alienating from the theme of Islamic values and state ideology (Cathcart, 2014:1).

Thus, new stories dominate contemporary cinematography, such as the anxieties and socio-economic problems of the ordinary Iranian family, which got Shannon Kelley, head of public programs at the University of California's Los Angeles campus, to say that it is

a cinema that's very engaged first with its own history and culture. (...) The beauty of their work translates to other cultures (Shakil, 2009).

Iran's award-winning cinematography belongs to the period marked by profound social and political changes, where shy democracy forms invaded Iran and allowed Iranian artists to penetrate the modern society (Cathcart, 2014:5) and to popularize their own cultural values by exploring such topics as "populism, family, nativism, ta'ārof (etiquette) and gender identity" (Cathcart, 2014:6). The characters of Aşġar Farḥādī's and Oscar-winning films

are marked by emotional complexity (...), the narrative structure are intricate (...) and (...) embrace (...) those themes that (...) were absent from post-Revolutionary Iranian cinema: domestic and social conflicts (Rugo, 2017: 3).

But that is astonishing is the success of Iranian productions not only in the West cinemas but also

in Islamic space, given that the social dilemmas reflected in films such as "A Separation" are found in any other Islamic society, noting that the Middle East audience is a good market for Shi'ite religious movies, which enjoys record audiences in Lebanon, Bahrain, Morocco and even Saudi Arabia (Rad, 2012).

In the Central Asia region, due to the linguistic element (Tadjics are Farsi speakers, and in the other states terminated in *-stan* suffix are ethnic groups speaking Persian dialects), religious factor, geographical proximity, holy days and common beliefs such as *Nowrūz* (Azadi, Maghsoodi, Mehrpouyan, 2015: 670-671), Iranian sitcoms and soap operas are successfully exported, so that, in 2011, Armenia's state television recorded the largest rating of Iranian soap opera production (***) Khabaronline.ir, 2011).

Also in Tajikistan, in 2008, an educational miniseries titled "Alphabet Garden" recorded rating among those who wanted to learn Persian, and in Turkmenistan, at the level to 2011, more than ten Iranian films were translated (Azadi, Maghsoodi, Mehrpouyan, 2015:677-678).

The presence and the nominees of Iranian films at various international festivals reveal an unprecedented force in the Iranian film industry where the new wave of filmmakers introduces new aesthetic and thematic elements, transposed into a realistic and neo-realist European-style tradition, which combines equally, a lot of features specific to modern art (De Vault, 2012).

5. CONCLUSIONS

Realizing that public diplomacy can gather adhesions in a very short time and disseminate a lot of percussive messages with benefits at the level of the image, Tehran has reconverted its strategies of diplomacy towards smart area, because the culture, education, and communication programs may reduce the political gap with the Western community, the exchange of ideas being preferred to conflicts of any kind.

Therefore, the international recognition of Iranian film industry denotes the interest shown by all those involved of the filmmaking process to prove that Iran has not only a nuclear program or a bellicose speech to Israel, but it is synonymous with art and culture, where the main Iranian character reveals to the public his political, social and economic issues.

Without the magnitude of Hollywood, Iran's film industry is, according to Richard Pena, the director of the Film Society of Lincoln Center in

New York, "one of the most exciting in the world today" (Miller, 1992), which successfully combines the cosmopolitan and traditional style, reflects Iran's sociopolitical pathway for the last 39 years, and which also brings to the forefront a new generation of artists ready to demonstrate to the world that Iranians can offer a non-propagandistic film, where historical, geographic, aesthetic, economic and political elements provide Iranian cinema with an original cultural framework.

Iran is undergoing a country rebranding process, appealing to the refining of public diplomacy techniques in order to cancel the state image that is hostile to the West, ready to renegotiate its position as a nation to be taken into account in the negotiation of global affairs.

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MAKING SENSE OF THE PRESENT: WAKEFIELD AND THE 21ST CENTURY WELTANSCHAUNG

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Abstract: *Andrei Codrescu is, undoubtedly, one of the most critically acclaimed Romanian-American writers. Born in Sibiu in 1946, Codrescu immigrated to the United States as a teenager, eventually settling in New Orleans where he developed a successful literary and teaching career at the University of Louisiana. The aim of this paper is to analyze, from a cultural perspective, his 2004 novel, Wakefield. Setting off on a journey to understand the 21st century American zeitgeist, Wakefield, the novel's eponymous character, exposes the strangest phenomena in our contemporary society; examples include the appearance of Internet money, ethnic wars, the clash of cultures, globalism gone awry and the perpetual search of one's origins in a country that is constantly on the move. The novel becomes representative, not just for the American society, but for the world community as a whole, since it addresses problems that are pervasive in almost every culture and country.*

Keywords: *the devil; globalization; zeitgeist*

1. INTRODUCTION

During the decades of Romanian communist dictatorship, many writers fled the country in search of new territories, usually settling in Western and democratic countries, which allowed them to express their ideas freely. Although the largest exodus occurred in the last decade of Ceausescu's dictatorship, the numbers had been increasing steadily since the 1970s, so that by the time of the 1989 Revolution, there was a rather numerous Romanian literary diaspora set in place.

One of the most appealing countries for the Romanians suffocated by the dictatorial austerity imposed on literature, culture and life was the United States of America. Mircea Eliade, Virgil Nemoianu, Petru Popescu, Ștefan Stoescu, or Andrei Codrescu, are just a few examples of such writers. In the new geopolitical and especially cultural context, such writers primarily pursued survival paths, just like any other emigrant. Nevertheless, they also resumed their activity, continued writing, edited magazines, set up associations and organizations so as to promote the cultural values of the country that was left behind. Their ultimate goal was to show that "Romania existed as a spiritual presence" (Eliade, 1990: 52). Moreover, some of them started writing in the language of the country of adoption, incorporating topics that are typically Romanian and, by doing so, they became true messengers of

Romanian culture and spirituality in Europe. Such is the case of Andrei Codrescu, a "professional immigrant" as he likes to refer to himself. Born in 1946 in Sibiu, in a family of Jews, Codrescu and his mother were sold by Ceausescu to the State of Israel for \$4,000 in 1966. With the help of HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society), his family managed to immigrate to the United States when Andrei was twenty years of age; the writer says the following about the decision to move to the new country:

I was fascinated by the West. I was listening to music and I was in love with the Beatles and Rolling Stones. I felt there was a world there, outside, that had a different rhythm and I felt freedom. And I left especially because I was after the adventure (Codrescu, 2006: np).

His first American hometown was Detroit, then New York, then he moved to San Francisco with his wife, after that he relocated to Baltimore, eventually settling in New Orleans where he developed a successful literary and teaching career at the University of Louisiana. In 1990 he came back to Romania, but only to do a cover of the Revolution for ABC's famous show, *Nightline*.

Codrescu's writing career spans over more than 40 years and includes essays ("In America's Shoes", "The Posthuman Dada Guide"), novels (*The Blood Countess* (1996) or *Messiah* (1999)), collections of short stories (*A Bar in Brooklyn: Novellas and Stories*

(1999)), and volumes of poetry (*Belligerence* (1993), *Alien Candor* (1996)). After his 2004 novel, *Wakefield*, was published, he joined the classic writers such as Marlowe, Goethe, Hawthorne, Wilde or Borges by becoming a contemporary master of the pacts with the devil. With regards to the Romanian translations of his writings, these started appearing after 2000, and the focus was especially on his novels and less on his poetry and essays.

It is very interesting to see how Romanian cultural aspects are integrated in a type of writing that is targeted at the American public. We are dealing with a Romanian writer who produces his fiction in English and reaches the Romanian audience through translations. Nevertheless, this is not a first for the Romanian literary scene; Eugen Ionescu wrote in French and his *oeuvre* made its way to Romania through the medium of translation and this did not affect his reputation; quite on the contrary. The same applies to Codrescu, who was first famous beyond the Romanian borders and then became more and more appreciated in our country as well. Of course, this "lag" of the Romanian reception can also be attributed to the Romanian communist regime.

The word *weltanschauung* represents a vision of the world and is at the basis of the understanding of the human existence, of spatial and temporal relations and of the primary condition of being. (Heidegger in Calcatinge, 2012:126). It alludes to the idea of a cultural landscape which can be interpreted from as many lens as there are visions of people and, in this way, *weltanschauung* "always bears the connotation of an opinionated stance vis-à-vis the world" (Boehnke, 2009:111). The aim of this paper is to analyze Codrescu's latest novel, *Wakefield*, from a cultural perspective. Setting off on a journey to understand the 21st century American zeitgeist, Wakefield, the novel's eponymous character, exposes the strangest phenomena in our contemporary society; examples include the appearance of Internet money, ethnic wars, the clash of cultures, globalism gone awry and the perpetual search of one's origins in a country that is constantly on the move. The novel becomes representative, not just for the American society, but for the world community as a whole, since it addresses problems that are pervasive in almost every culture and country.

2. WAKEFIELD

A novel that takes the pulse of the American society on the threshold of the new millennium, Codrescu's *Wakefield* brings to the fore the classic theme of the pact between the man of genius and the Devil, the latter constantly in search of new

souls to feed on. The action is placed over the backdrop of a vicious, selfish, consumerist, machine-driven and unsentimental America.

Like many of today's anti-/heroes, the protagonist of the novel, a divorced writer and motivational speaker, feels alienated; he knows neither what he wants nor where he is headed, although he is able to preach in front of others what life is all about. One day the devil shows up in his apartment to claim his soul and Wakefield does what any good literary character would do: he invites the devil for a drink, strikes a deal to extend his life, and then tries to find his true self. If he finds it within one year, then he goes on living. If he doesn't, then his soul will be claimed by Satan, who is going through an existential crisis of his own due to the ever-growing bureaucracy of the afterworld and the younger upstart demons.

Wakefield embarks on a lecture circuit across the United States, searching for his authentic life by observing how others are living theirs. Throughout the places he visits, Wakefield observes ethnic wars, new Internet money and shiny coffeehouse chains, while conversing with day-trading slackers, eccentric art collectors, New-Age Gurus, billionaire techno-geeks, heroin addicts, global pioneers and lesbian supermodels. But the "authentic life" Wakefield is seeking eludes him. The road trip becomes increasingly surreal, an amazing and detailed display of globalism gone bad. The devil may have spared his life, but Wakefield already seems like a ghost at times, meditating about the differences between the various means of transportation that are available today and those of the past:

Once, there were luxurious staterooms on ships, lovely sleeping cars on trains, and airships with elegant lounges where thin women conversed with handsome men, sipping cocktails from crystal glasses. Travel itself was an enviable adventure, though of course only the wealthy could travel. The ungainly masses stayed home. What happened? When did change come? (...) Two world wars redesigned trains, airplanes, and ships to efficiently transport soldiers, weapons and prisoners. Efficiency became the ideal of design, and increased profit its overarching peacetime goal. (Codrescu, 2004:32)

He has a number of intimate affairs with women who demand nothing from him and continues to wander with no responsibility or impact.

Codrescu's novel borrows its title, motifs and the protagonist's name and motives from Nathaniel

Hawthorne's 1835 short story, *Wakefield*. Even the motto that precedes the first chapter is taken from Hawthorne's story: "Imagination, in the proper meaning of the term, made no part of Wakefield's gifts" (Codrescu, 2004:8). In Part One, entitled Old Quarter, there is another reference when Wakefield asks his friend Ivan Zamyatin, "a Russian émigré cabdriver and unknown American philosopher" (Codrescu, 2004:10), if the latter has read any of Hawthorne's works:

"Have you ever read any Hawthorne?" Wakefield asks his friend by way of greeting.

"I know the *House of the Seven Gables*, and the story 'Young Goodman Brown', about this poor young man who meets the devil in the forest (...)

"No, not that one. There's this other story, about a guy who leaves his wife and home and everyone thinks he's dead but the shows up again after twenty years, no explanations, no questions asked. (Codrescu, 2004:10)

Also worth mentioning is the fact that Zamyatin is a representative of the late 20th century migration waves and, in this respect, he speaks for a great number of people. Like many other economic migrants who have chosen to leave their countries of birth behind in search of a better life elsewhere, Zamyatin is well educated; at the time he met Wakefield Zamyatin was working as an Arctic researcher for the Russian government. The idea of the American Dream attracted him so much that he accepted a job which was beneath his level of education. Not only is the idea of brain drain hinted at through Zamyatin's character, but also the brain waste effect. There is so much potential to be exploited in him, but nobody takes the opportunity; the society sees him as being suitable only for menial jobs, hinting at what America has in store for migrants.

Coming back to the idea of disappearance, of being hidden and observing from the world from a distance, we can notice that this is something that characterizes both Codrescu's and Hawthorne's protagonists; they both have what we might call hiding fetishes:

He began to spend nights hidden in a large department store or a museum, enjoying the profound thrill of the moment when the doors shut and all the employees went home. He learned the movements of night watchmen and crept silently from hiding place to hiding place (...) Perhaps he should, like his literary namesake, disappear and return after twenty years as if nothing had happened. (Codrescu, 2004:86)

Just like Hawthorne analyzed the American society of his age through the eyes and experiences of his protagonist, so is Codrescu doing almost 200 years later with his. Being a motivational speaker, Wakefield has plenty of chances to offer an insight into the fabrics of contemporary America. In his opinion, one of the greatest problems of the 21st century America is that people

are quickly bored and they demand greater and greater imagination in their content. Matter of fact, the only certainty driving the economy is the certainty that boredom at faster and faster rates is inevitable" (Codrescu, 2004:75).

For the purpose of countering this new disease, which he calls "TBS (Terminal Boredom Syndrome)", and which affects America and its citizens, Wakefield announces that he has "created the School for the Imagination" (ibid: 79). Wakefield understands that Americans have always wanted to experience diversions from their ordinary existences. One thing that characterizes all Americans is their addiction to entertainment, no matter how ridiculous and deceitful it might be, because entertainment provides an outlet for escapism from daily life. Contemporary American life

was a time of tent revivals, just like in the mid-nineteenth century (...) America was rolling in money and a not inconsiderable portion of that gravy slopped generously into bowls of smooth talkers and charlatans. Wakefield read some history and found that his own age was very like the Jacksonian era before the Civil War. At that time everyone from mesmerists and channelers of the dead to writers like Mark Twain were raking in the chips. It was about that time, too, that Hawthorne's Wakefield decided to drop out. Nineteen-nineties America was just as enamored of bathos and fantasy as Jacksonian America had been. (Codrescu, 2004:105).

Further on, while attending another corporate conference, Wakefield has the chance of meeting the Swedish Minister of Culture who is delivering a speech on the need for portable houses because

these structures are an answer to the most vexing problem of contemporary life: boredom. Here you can move your house, exchange view with your neighbors, or take the whole thing with you for a weekend of fishing in the country. (Codrescu, 2004:165).

On one of his last trips, where he was awaited to deliver a motivational speech at the dinner party

of a Californian billionaire, Wakefield arrives in a town perched along the Pacific Ocean where

he wonders if *l'ennui* can exist in this jewellike beach town sparkling gloriously on a sunny morning. Bored, bored, bored, ma petite (Codrescu, 2004:207).

He realizes that the town's citizens are bored even here in this apparently idyllic place because

before the new economic boom this had been a place with rough characters about, dim bars, working girls, anarchist bookstores. None of that remains: no flophouses, no indigents, no winos, no whores, no sailors - pretty boring (Codrescu, 2004:217).

Whenever he has the chance, Codrescu explores Romanian cultural elements in his fiction, mingling them with American ones. Thus, another inter/cultural aspect exploited in *Wakefield* is to be found in the chapter entitled Wintry City where an old woman from Yugoslavia, Mrs. Petrovich, tells Wakefield a story representative of the Balkan region: the myth of sacrifice, better known in Romania as "Mesterul Manole". Mrs. Petrovich's grandfather, Yssan, was in charge of building a Mosque but its walls kept coming down during the night. Convinced by the Mossul that the only way to have the Mosque built was through a human sacrifice, Yssan caught his first-born daughter, Aleisha, who happened to come to the building site to meet a boy, and built her into the walls. The scene is heartbreaking:

When first girl come by, Grandfather catch her and he ask angry is she love God, and she cries and says yes, yes. So he grab her arms and put her feet in the brick mud and he build his daughter, Aleisha, in church wall. His best daughter, he love her the most, she cries, he cries, too, but what is done now is done. When wall is up to her chin, she says 'I love you', but it's for Grandfather not God, so he cries more but is more angry and covers her all up with bricks. (Codrescu, 2004:127)

The prospect for America is dismal: the country "has no history" (ibid: 150) and, therefore, it has no present and no future: "in our country here the future is in ruins before it is built" (ibid). There are no more people willing to make sacrifices; there are just stories that the migrants bring along with them, but they do not melt, they do not provide any sense of identity to America. The country does have the reflexes of a civilization in search of an identity and authenticity, but they

never materialize. As Codrescu himself put it in an interview,

Part of the point of Wakefield journeying in the 90s America is that the entire culture is against the possibility of change. (...) The "true life" he's looking for is impossible in such a time (maybe in any time) and he finds that no matter how much conscious attention he pays to what befalls him, he will not be allowed to make his experience coherent or "authentic" (in Olson, 2005: 183)

Art itself has changed and has become something that Wakefield does not recognize. For instance, when he visits the town of Typical, he is told the story of a sculpture, commissioned by the local authorities, to counteract the rocketing rate of divorces. This particular statue would stand as a testimony of Typical's family values which they were so proud of. However, when the sculpture is unveiled, the community is shocked to see that

the Typical Family consisted of a naked mother nursing a baby with a naked pubescent girl child standing at her side. There was no father figure, no protector no Man (Codrescu, 2004:38)

Following the unveiling, a huge scandal broke which led to mass protests, riots, vandalizations of the statue by the citizens, until it was finally removed. Extrapolating the story to accommodate the larger context, it is obvious that Codrescu addresses the issue of gay marriages and gay couples and the town of Typical becomes representative of the battle between the two factions (traditionalists vs. gay advocates) in America. The lesbian couple, made up of Tiffany and Milena, that he befriends is just another example of how un-/typical the town really is.

Although the journey allows for Wakefield's analysis of the changes brought about by the new era – globalization, the transformation of art, the gay movement, the rise of technology, migration and ethnic conflicts, America's cultural imperialism – the protagonist gets lost in the inner workings of the 21st century; he does not manage to adapt and remains an outsider. At the end of the novel, Wakefield returns home and ends where he began: alive but alone. "He heads home, to read. What else could a silence-loving man do in a hammer-wielding world?" (Codrescu, 2004:288). Nevertheless, his endeavor has not been in vain as it has given the readers an opportunity to consider such fundamental issues for themselves, in their own lives.

3. THE DEVIL

One of the reasons for the success that *Wakefield* has had in both the United States and Romania is that Andrei Codrescu manages to bring back to spotlight and revive a topic that has long been used and explored in literature - the pact with the Devil. Indeed, the Devil is the character that really makes the book. This particular theme has been revived and repositioned across the centuries in various literary creations, with each author putting his mark on how it is interpreted and symbolized. Thus, the century of technology and speed offers a good chance to pick it up again and it very interesting to analyze the changes that have been made so as to accustom it to the new milieu.

The 21st century pact with the devil is an intriguing one and it is seen as ludicrous, ironic, and even incisive. Codrescu's Devil is different from Goethe's, as the former shares many similarities with the people he deals with: he is lost in a high-tech world over which he has no power, tired of the bureaucracy in the hell's governing structures, and even experiences a slight identity crisis, which stems from the feeling of loss in a whole new world.

“Things used to be more simple, more fun. I enjoyed a frivolous and pleasant existence as a beloved, comic, quasifictional character. It was great – classic literature, opera, ballet ...” He sighs deeply, then leans closer to Wakefield. “Then one year I went from being revived at the Bolshoi to being deified by Khomeini and Falwell. Since then it's been a mess.” (Codrescu, 2004:4)

Characterized by wit, humor and sarcasm, Codrescu's devil has lost his touch in the art of negotiation. Thus, the writer constructs a character that the readers can sympathize with; the devil is not a villain anymore, but a mere victim of the paradigm shift the whole world is undergoing. Even the large list of names that is used to refer to him aims at creating a more humane image of him: the Devil, The Great Malign One, El Diablo, His Interruptiosness, Satan, Lucifer, Beelzebub, His Satanic Majesty, Orpheus, the Evil One, His Malignancy, His Demonic Highness, El Sataniko, Old Goat, the Dark One, His Holy Hoof.

Codrescu's approach pays off: a character that has made history in the literature of the ages is brought into the spotlight of modernity and of the reader, be it American, Romanian, or any other nationality, who manages to identify with him, to understand his fears and crisis in a world that is constantly on the move. To make things even

worse and make the Devil's feeling of alienation more acute, Hell itself has followed the American example and has become a multinational company; globalization leaves nothing and no one behind. Having just arrived at a meeting, the Devil notices that

(...) several hundred devils have already taken their places and more keep coming (...) He catches snatches of their pretentious conversation, buzzwords like *telekinesis*, and *synergy*. These new corporate types make him gag, chasing every new fad, flicking their firm young tails and flashing their perfectly polished horns. And they are willing to work 24/7 for the greater glory of the company (...) devils should not have to work any more than eight hours a day for the collective. (Codrescu, 2004:184)

In the face of these new younger devils holding corporate-style seminars so as to maximize the production of souls, Codrescu's devil feels a little out of date and this is reflected in his dealings with Wakefield in which he sometimes displays a lack of confidence. As both the protagonist and Wakefield struggle to make sense of the present and find the right path, it becomes obvious just how human both of them really are. And during all this time, “God is sleeping, let Him rest in peace” (Codrescu, 2004:67).

4. CONCLUSIONS

Although an ocean and another few thousand kilometers of land separate Romania from the United States, our country is not far from the spirit of Wakefield's America. Codrescu manages to capture many aspects that have to do with the disorientation and uncertainty felt in the post-apocalyptic Romanian society, which followed the events of December 1989, even though the novel is about America and the reshaping of contemporary society. It can be argued that, by blending cultural elements representative of many countries, Andrei Codrescu creates a recipe of literary success even though he is, more or less, the product of a culture torn apart by feelings of inferiority.

The Romanian-American writer speaks a universal truth regarding the 21st century society and draws our attention to the fact that

We lose our stories. We're letting the TV tell stories for us. Our personal stories, the stories about where we come from, who we are, what we all talk about whenever we have a family reunion, all the stories that people say over a cup of coffee, all these stories disappear because we do not have time for them anymore. And it's a tragedy, because people without

stories are no different than machines (Codrescu: np)

As Carmen Firan observed in a 2006 review of the Romanian translation of *Wakefield*, the novel is truly a delight. It represents a demonstration of intelligence, narrative verve, an admirable observation of human psychology, a humorous, ironic and paternal analysis of America at the beginning of a new millennium. Andrei Codrescu uses his acuity as a reporter, his introspective powers as a reputed essayist and his grace as a story-teller to create this brilliant, post-modern, absurd and, ultimately, life-like novel (Firan, 2006: np). By mixing cultural elements that are representative of both the United States and Romania, Codrescu is truly redefining community in intercultural context.

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CULTURAL INFLUENCES IN THE COMMUNICATIVE STYLES OF PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS IN ROMANIA

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Abstract: *Communicative style is one of the variables that visibly influence the process of interpersonal communication. In order to reach their communicative goals, speakers use the language strategically, some meanings being literally transmitted, and others just involved. The full understanding of the behaviour of participants in verbal interactions have to be based on the premise that they are delineated by the cultural context in which they take place. There is a progressive interaction between personal identity, group identity and cultural identity, the most complex particular case of social identity. The professional identity of the teacher is, ultimately, a social construction. The identity of the professional group overlaps self-identity in educational communities. The intercultural identity overlaps the group identity in the context of linking the educational curriculum and the teaching practices to the European recommendations, the obligation of all the Member States of the European Union on the one hand, and in the context of globalization and interconnectivity on the other. The case study regarding the communicative styles of primary school teachers was conducted in the second semester of 2015 - 2016 school year, in a school of Braşov. The supportive, self-centred and playful communicative behaviours differentiate the stylistic profiles of primary school teachers in the investigated educational community. The personalization of the relationship by promoting interactive patterns based on strategic behaviours that satisfy both fields of communication contributes to the construction of group identity.*

Keywords: *cultural identity in educational communities; communicative styles of teachers; personalizing professional interpersonal relationships.*

1. INTRODUCTION

In sociological studies, Romanian culture is framed among cultures with a low degree of assertiveness, a typical feature of collectivist and low masculine cultures (Şerbănescu, 2009). Globally, Romanians show a low degree of assertiveness, aiming at passivity, while discursive aggressiveness manifests emotionally, non-argumentative (Şerbănescu, 2009:154). Romanian linguists considers the following variables determines the process of interpersonal communication:

- The individual peculiarities of the speakers - the set of values, attitudes, behaviors, abilities, personal characteristics determined by the communication situation and previous communication experiences of the interlocutor;

- The individual peculiarities of the listener - individual abilities to understand and decode various patterns of information structuring, abilities to process words, positive attitudes, the ability to process in the semantic memory information, the ability to process the emotional content of the message, the ability to process

information by integrating it into certain cognitive schemes and behavioral scripts;

- The perception;
- The relation between the interlocutors - formal or informal; intense or superficial; equality or inequality of power; competitive, hostile or cooperative, friendly;

- The communication situation – ideological, social, stressful or intercultural;

- The communication goal – personal, domestic or social;

- The individual communicative style - dominant / submissive, histrionic / reserved, conflictual / nonconflictual, vivid / inexpressive, calm / frantic, careful / careless, impressive / insignificant, open / closed, friendly / hostile;

- The communicative behavior - heuristic, reinforcement, supportive, reflexive, explicative, self-centered, playful;

- The emotion – in anthropological sense, as a generic term for affective states (Şerbănescu, 2009:43-60).

A socio-metric study developed by Gallup International and Interact in 2005 highlights the

characteristics of the Romanian culture: collectivist culture, with high score of power distance, predominantly feminine, with a high level of uncertainty avoidance, and with short-term orientation. The concept of cultural variation was introduced by Geert Hofstede, who in 1974 had access to a survey of the values of people in over fifty countries employed in local affiliates of the IBM multinational corporation, representing almost ideal samples, as the profile of employees was identical, except for nationality, which allowed the discernment of cultural differences in their responses (Hofstede *et al.*, 2012). The statistical analysis of country averages of answers to questions about values has revealed common problems and different solutions in terms of social inequality, the relationship between the individual and the group, the concepts of masculinity and femininity, the handling of uncertainty and ambiguity. The four areas of fundamental issues defined by two Americans in 1954, sociologist Alex Inkeles and psychologist Daniel Levinson in a study of English language literature on national culture and empirically confirmed by the IBM study are the cultural dimensions. The four dimensions, aspects of culture that can be measured in relation to other cultures, are: distance from power, collectivism - individualism, femininity - masculinity and avoidance of uncertainty. The scores recorded by Romania are as follows: distance to power - 90 - high distance to power (pp. 64-66); individualism - collectivism - 42 - predominantly collectivist culture (pp. 99-101); masculinity - femininity - 45 - feminine culture (pp. 142-144); avoidance of uncertainty - 90 - culture with a strong avoidance of uncertainty (pp. 188-190); long-term orientation - 52 - short-term orientation culture (pp. 246-249); permissiveness - austerity - 20 - austerity culture that does not like expressing happiness (pp. 272-275). Geert Hofstede's theory on cultural dimensions and differences does not have major educational implications, but it can help explain the social behaviors of individuals. Relationships and interactions between individuals are influenced, in addition to personality factors, by the traits of the culture in which the individual is formed.

The position of Romanian culture appears clearly in comparison with different cultures with which it has different and lasting connections, but for the present stage it is interesting to compare with the American culture given the importance of the American management model in the Romanian companies as well as the influence of English language over Romanian since 1990 (Șerbănescu, 2007:305-306). A market survey conducted by the

IRSOP in 2005, dedicated to setting Romanian values in European context, shows that the typical European is seen in a more positive light than the typical Romanian, and in some areas the difference is very high. Europeans consider that Romanians care less about others and have a tendency towards aggression, authoritarianism, dishonesty, lack of organization, conceit, idealism, superficiality and conservative opinions. The differences between the personality of the European and that of the Romanian are slightly higher in the minds of the more educated Romanians (*Romanian and European Values and Beliefs: the same or not*, IRSOP Market Research and Consulting LTD., 2005). The values of Romanian culture are considered to be eclecticism, mimesis, tolerance for diversity, coexistence of opposites, picturesque, adaptation, instinct of self-preservation, fluctuation, change as an end in itself, moment solution, ambivalence, compromise and nuance, lucid assumption of the laws of nature, the nature of things (ordinance) (Șerbănescu, 2009:310-336). Empathy to the interlocutor is directly proportional to the degree of discursive intimacy. In institutional relations the speaker tends to empathize little and superficially. Relationships based on intimacy imply affection, the dominant role belonging to nonverbal elements. As for the expression of emotions, Romanian culture manifests itself in *vaguely emotional*, in the sense that individuals analyze their emotions a little, make them superficial and impersonal, live short-lasting and fluctuating emotions. Instead, emotions play an important role in raising interpersonal relationships, group emotions prevailing on individual emotions, an effect that can be put on the collectivist feature of Romanian culture where the focus is on the needs of the group of belonging, not the individual ones (Șerbănescu, 2009: 364-367).

2. OBJECTIVES

Our study sets as main objectives:

1. To identify the individual communicative styles of primary-school teachers;
2. To identify the group communicative style.

3. METHODS

3.1. Procedure. The research was conducted during the second semester of the school year 2015 – 2016. The individual communicative style was decomposed in individual communicative behaviors. The communicative behaviors were recorded in common educational practices.

3.2. Participants. The target population of our study consists in 30 primary school teachers of Secondary School no. 2 *Diaconu Coresi* of Braşov. One subject have gone into study leave and has been carried out of our research. All primary-school teachers are women. The structure of the group of subjects regarding their age is homogeneous, starting from 18 to 60, the majority being of middle age ($M=43,83$; $SD=16,17$). Regarding their studies, 73,3% graduated, in addition to their initial teacher training, undergraduate studies and 30,0% of those postgraduate studies. The statistical analysis identified a direct correlation between the didactic degree and age ($r=0,62$; $p<0,01$).

3.3. Measures. In order to identify the individual communicative style used by the primary-school teachers in the investigated educational community we articulated the qualitative data gathered through the creative analytic practices methods, the collaborative interview, and the discourse analysis. We identified the individual communicative style using a five-step observation grid (never, rarely, sometimes, often, and always), starting from the following communicative behaviours: heuristic, reinforcement, supportive, reflexive, explicative, self-centred, and playful (Şerbănescu, 2007:55-59). In order to identify the group communicative style we analyzed all the individual styles in a case-study.

4. FINDINGS AND DISSCUTIONS

In order to identify the individual communicative style we used a Likert scale (never rarely, sometimes, often, always) for each of the seven types of communicative behaviors: heuristic behavior, reinforcement behavior, supportive behavior, reflexive behavior, self-centered behavior, playful behavior. Statistical data processing highlighted the following frequencies:

1. Heuristic communicative behavior ($M = 4,20$, $SD = 0,84$): rarely - 1; sometimes - 5; often - 11; always - 13;

2. Reinforcement communicative behavior ($M = 4,93$, $SD = 0,36$): sometimes - 1; always - 29;

3. Supportive communicative behavior ($M = 2,97$, $SD = 1,37$): never - 7; rarely - 2, sometimes - 11; often - 5; always - 5;

4. Reflexive communicative behavior ($M = 4,87$; $SD = 0,73$): never - 1; always - 29;

5. Explicative communicative behavior ($M = 5,00$, $SD = 0,00$): always - 30;

6. Self-centered behavior ($M = 3,53$; $SD = 1,16$): never - 2; rarely - 3, sometimes - 9; often - 9; always - 7;

7. Playful communicative behavior ($M = 3,43$; $SD = 1,07$): never - 2; rarely - 2, sometimes - 12; often - 9; always - 5.

Certain types of communicative behavior are specific to the didactic activity. We excluded from the analysis the types of behaviors intrinsic to the didactic discourse. Thus, we may say that in the analyzed community, the supporting, self-centered and ludic communicative behaviors are the ones that differentiate the stylistic profiles of teachers for primary education.

As far as the communicative support behavior is concerned, 23.3% of the teachers participating in the research never use it, 6.7% use it rarely, 36.7% use it sometimes, and 16.7% often, respectively, always use it. In terms of self-centered communicative behavior, 6.7% among the participating teachers never use it, 10% of the participants rarely use it, 30% use it often, and 23.3% of the primary-school teachers always use it. The vast majority of the primary-school teachers involved in our research often use this form of revealing themselves to personalize their professional relationships. The playful attitude of participants towards the message fulfills some functions that transcend the communicative situation. This usually demonstrates the transmitter's care and empathic attitude towards the problems and the needs of the receiver. The care to protect the interests of the verbal interaction partner shapes the group identity. The continuous concern towards linking individual practices to the promoted rituals accentuates the group identity. In the investigated educational community, 6.7% of the participating teachers never use this kind of communicative behavior, 6.7% rarely use it, 40% sometimes use it, 30% often, and 16.7% always use it.

In order to identify the communicative group style we used the case study method with the educational community as the unit of analysis. We choose the in-depth perspective of the case study. The phenomena have been investigated in their usual context, and the results of this research are the effect of direct interactions with the teachers involved in the investigation for a long period of time.

The descriptors of heuristic behavior are interrogative statements and manifestation in the question-answer pair. In didactic discourse, justice, medical consultation, psychotherapy, the question-answer pair represents the way of organizing the discourse. The reinforcement behavior is a positive or negative response to the action of the

interlocutor, the purpose of the positive reinforcements being to produce similar future behaviors, and the negative ones to prevent the repetition of the reinforced behavior: representative speech acts (*Well done!, Excellent!, Shame on you!*) or declarative speech acts (*The winner of the contest is..., Insufficient! You will repeat the class!*). The reinforcements are specific to certain types of speeches, especially to the didactic discourse. The supportive behavior plays an essential role in building and maintaining interpersonal relationships by showing the communicative support that the speaker gives to the interlocutor. They contribute to the building of group identity, satisfying the needs of appreciation, approval and cooperation of the interactors. The reflective behavior is a form of response by which the current speaker marks co-participation in dialogue, despite the assumed passive role. Explicative behavior is typical of some types of speeches such as didactic discourse. Self-centered or self-revealing behavior is a constituent part of social relations as it defines the stage of a relationship (initial, advanced or final), degree of intensity (superficial, intimate) or gives indications of the direction that the relationship will follow (constitution, continued, dissolution, relationship repair). The use of self-centered communicative behavior has a strategic function, the transmitter proposing to the receiver a certain self-image he / she will negotiate during verbal interaction. The linguistic marks of self-centered behavior are verbal and pronominal forms of person I; adjective and adverbial determinations; marks of affectivity. The playful behavior or humor creates a common context of interaction, giving the feeling of belonging to the group and mutual support as a form of brand identity; regulating anxiety; the fixation of cognitive patterns and stereotypes (Șerbănescu, 2007:55-59).

5. CONCLUSIONS

The effectiveness of the teaching process is dependent on the effectiveness of communication

in the class of students. The effectiveness of communication is dependent on the nature and quality of interpersonal relationships within the classroom seen as a learning community and in school, a learning organization, seen as an educational community. If, traditionally, effective communication depended on how the teacher, in his capacity of transmitter, built and transmitted the message (Pânișoară, 2014:48), postmodern education implies the repositioning of the transmitter and receiver roles between the teacher and the pupils. The message is the key-element of communication. Its coding at the transmitter level and decoding at the receiver are related to internal factors in the cognitive, emotional and interactive structure of the two poles of communication. They also include external factors belonging to the context of the communication relationship, including its cultural determinants. In educational context, the construction of postmodern education communities will develop by promoting effective communication patterns. The communication context depends on the communication actors or the social conditions that anticipate specific structures, such as proximity, similarity and group fellowship. School curricula for primary education explicitly propose ways to individualize the classes and to build the educational community.

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NATION BRANDING IN ALBANIAN 2018 PROMOTIONAL MATERIALS: A SEMIOTIC PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract: *In this paper, I discuss some of the 2018 promotional materials produced by the Albanian National Tourism Agency. With the increased number of tourists visiting Albania every year, the promotion of tourism has been given great attention by the Albanian governments during the last decade. In this context, serious attempts have been made to create effective and appealing promotional materials to attract tourists from all over the world. By looking into 2018 promotional materials, mainly information brochures, from the semiotic perspective, I intend to read them as nation branding attempts. For this analysis, I will focus on the linguistic and visual contents of these materials and try to point out how the collection of signs and symbols marking national identity and the discourse accompanying it enable semiotic conditions and create the semiosis of nation branding.*

Keywords: *nation branding; promotional materials; semiotics; semiosphere; semiosis*

1. INTRODUCTION

After the fall of Communism in the 1990s, Albania became a reachable destination for many people, who at the beginning visited the country out of a sense of curiosity about its past. Most of them were people who worked for different organizations, diplomatic missions or other similar bodies that had settled in Albania to help its people and governments towards the new path of democracy. Visitors soon discovered that Albania was a beautiful and unexplored country with very intriguing tourist sites to see, with a nice and long coastline and overpowering mountains. This gradually turned the country into a targeted destination for many tourists. So, interest in visiting Albania gradually changed in terms of reasons, opportunities, experiences, preferences and a lot of other things. Obviously, these changes cannot be understood in isolation. In today's world marked by globalization, internationalization, migration and other similar phenomena that enable the movement of people for many various reasons, the need to ostentatiously reveal and promote what one's country has to offer to see is important. What is more, the advancement of technology, especially of information and communication technology, social media, in particular, has empowered public sector communication, thus aiding many enterprises, companies, governmental bodies,

organizations to inform their audiences in real time. In this multidimensional and mobile context, most countries have a nation brand, which they use to single themselves out as a destination to be reached. Albania is no exception in this regard. The increased number of people visiting the country each year has acquired the attention of Albanian governments over the past decade with tourism being prioritized as a major economic sector. In this regard, the promotion of tourism has been particularly emphasized especially in the past couple of years. The Albanian Tourism Agency, originally named the Albanian Tourism Entity in May 2005 and renamed with the current name in 2007, is a unit of the Ministry of Tourism and Environment whose main aim is the promotion of tourism in Albania.

The question then arises what reasons are there for Albania to nation brand. The initial reason for creating a nation brand can be viewed as embedded in the larger post-Communist context and as part of the attempts of all former Communist countries to do away with their past Communist heritage. As Cheregi (2017:28) points out in her examination of the case of nation branding in Romania after 1989, "[...] in transition countries, nation branding is often mentioned because of the constant need to reconfigure national identity by dissociating it from the communist past. If in Western Europe nation branding is an instrument connected to state

power, which uses branding practices to promote the image of a nation in a positive way, in Eastern Europe nation branding is an instrument used to promote the reconfiguration of the political landscape.” The attempts of the Albanian governments to brand Albania should also be viewed in the framework of a globalized world, and, as it will be indicated below in the explanation of the winning brand logo and slogan, as an attempt to achieve uniqueness. These attempts should also be read within the integration process. The country is struggling hard to become part of the EU and as such the attempts can as well be viewed within this context. Last but not list, branding, a term initially used in marketing and related to shopping, is made to convince consumers that they are buying a good and unique product that produces long-lasting effects (Kotler et al., 1993, 1997, 1999; Olins, 1999, 2006).

In this context, in 2014 the Albanian government commissioned an international contest “Branding Albania” to invite applications for designing a logo and a slogan that would speak for the country, would mark the country’s national identity, would be unique and also make tourists curious to visit Albania. StrawberryFrog APCO won the competition with the following logo and slogan (cf. Figure 1):



Fig.1. The Albanian brand logo and slogan.
(Source: Visit Albania.)

In the idea description provided for this competition, the company pointed out that this logo and slogan were meant for people who “seek experiences, and different, and uniquely their own. [...] go their own way, in every sense of the word. And by going their own way, more and more, they will be coming to a new Albania”¹. The then minister of tourism, in her speech, on the occasion of announcing this competition, pointed out the importance of brand as a powerful and innovative tool for marketing a place and added that the competition “Branding Albania” was meant to change the country’s image, to reflect the people’s vitality and energy, culture, heritage, and hospitality through a representative slogan (Kurani, 2014). In

Cambridge International AS and A Level Travel and Tourism Coursebook the Albanian logo and slogan was taken as a realistic example of “a brand that is consistent with the destination’s positioning” (Stewart, Warburton, Smith, 2017: 124).

Besides this logo, what else do tourists get? How is the country promoted through the official webpage of the Albanian Tourism Agency? In arguing about it, I will adopt the semiotic approach as more appropriate for interpreting nation brands because “it allows the architect to be cognisant of the fact that each sign or symbol has a preordained construct of meaning(s) from the onlooker’s own social system” (Nepia, 2013:30). I will draw on cultural semiotics, more precisely, Lotman’s concept of the semiosphere, which I will summarily explain below, because I find it relevant since the argument is embedded in the context of cross-cultural communication.

As far as the methodology is concerned, I will conduct some content analysis, more precisely I will examine the contents of the promotional materials published by the Albanian National Tourism Agency in 2018. My intention is to see how and whether the promotional materials manage to keep up with the “branding Albania” attempts so strongly promoted by the Albanian government and so nicely put in the brand logo. I will view these attempts in the context of destination branding rather than the more general context of place branding because as I pointed out, I am particularly interested in investigating the attempts to promote and nation brand Albania from the tourist perspective rather than from the more holistic country perspective. What is more, I am particularly interested in what makes the Albanian brand unique, that is, I will read their contents in terms of identifying those identity markers that distinguish this brand from others. Since destination branding is a way to communicate a destination’s identity as unique compared to others (Morrison and Anderson, 2002), emphasizing here two functions of destination branding, namely, identification and differentiation (Qu, Kim, Him 2011:466), I find it pertinent to embed this discussion in the framework of destination branding attempts.

2. THE SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO NATION BRANDING

As I mentioned earlier, for the purposes of this analysis, I will adopt the semiotic approach. That the use of semiotics for analysing tourist or promotional materials and texts is not new has already been

¹ Albania: Go your own way. <http://newalbania.tumblr.com/>.

pointed out by scholars as early as the 1990s (Pearce, 1991; Echtner, 1999; Dann, 1996; Mehmetoglu & Dann, 2003; Sternberg, 1997; MacCannell, 1999). When travelling to new and unknown destinations, tourists try to understand or make sense of what they see, what they are told, what they are shown. These are quite commonly representations of that country's or destination's identity. National identity markers that make reference to a country's national symbols, events, cultural heritage and other associations or representations of that country's uniqueness are crucial for branding a nation successfully in order to attract international visitors from all over the world. I should underline here that, in this article, I refer to nation brand and nation branding as two different concepts, with *nation brand* standing for a visual symbol, brand image or a slogan used to market a destination or a country, accompanying all promotional materials about that country and "understood as an advertising sign" (Cheregi, 2017: 29), and *nation branding*, which I have elsewhere defined as "a form of reputation building for a country in order to make itself well-known internationally through the marketing of its own symbols" (Panajoti 2017), and which I discuss here in the context of tourism and in terms of destination branding. Obviously, the two are connected because being an advertising sign, the nation brand "refers to certain meanings and national symbols" (Cheregi, 2017: 29), whereas "nation branding campaigns mobilize a symbolic universe, based on types of national identity discourses and cultural symbols" (Cheregi, 2017: 29), so both engage the semiotic sphere for their discussion. It is important at this stage to distinguish between *national identity*, those features and characteristics that distinguish one nation from another and that collectively identify the people belonging to that nation, *nation branding*, the "process by which a nation's images can be created or altered, monitored, evaluated and proactively managed in order to enhance the country's reputation among a target international audience" (Fan, 2010: 101)², and *nation's image*, which is a negotiable construct as it regards perceptions and definitions of a nation by people from other countries, but which can be adjusted and readjusted depending on how this image is communicated to them. Fan (2010) summarily puts the relationship between them as follows:

National identity → Nation branding ↔ Nation's image
(Self perception) (Nation brand identity) (Perception by others)

² I favour Fan's emerging definition in his 2010 article on nation branding exactly because he sees it as a process.

Fig.2. Fan's distinctions of the three concepts.

Tourism promotion relies on the use of national identity markers to sustain a country's national identity and so build its brand.

Since my reading will be based on the identification of national identity markers, herein briefly defined as those signs corresponding and contributing to singling out a destination from others to tourists worldwide, the reading of promotional materials from the semiotic perspective is more than justifiable. As Saussure remarks, "The relation between a signifier and its signified is not a matter of individual choice; if it were then communication would become impossible. 'The individual has no power to alter a sign in any respect once it has become established in the linguistic community' [...]" (qtd. in Chandler, 2007: 27). So, each of these markers or signs enacts two things, signification and communication, which makes the semiotic approach even more appropriate as it integrates both.

Indeed, nation branding has been approached from various semiotic perspectives, spatial, social, modal, as listed by Cheregi (2017:29). For the purposes of this analysis, I will adopt the cultural semiotic perspective, more precisely draw on the concept of semiosphere, which owes much to Lotman and which he sees as the "semiotic space necessary for the existence and functioning of languages" and "outside [which], there can be neither communication, nor language" (2001 [1990]:123-124). It is "the semiotic space, outside of which semiosis cannot exist" (Lotman, 2005 [1984]:208).

Although several other forms of defining the semiosphere exist (Kull, 2005; Kotov, 2005; Torop 2005), I will draw on Lotman's definition, which views the semiosphere as "the semiotic space necessary for the existence and functioning of advertising discourses and as the space of meaning generation" (Cheregi, 2017:31; emphasis in original). I adopt Lotman's perspective because he relies heavily on the concept of translation, which he defines as the process of receiving information. Lotman's thinking draws on bicentrality and emphasizes the presence of external elements, which stay at the periphery. From his perspective, every culture (semiosphere) needs another culture to define its essence and limits. Therefore, the margins are very important.

In this regard, two more concepts are important for this analysis, *semiotic borders*, which function as translating mechanisms and *semiosis*, which is the process of translation (meaning making). The

borders have a double function, they serve as dividing lines and as filters for external elements entering the semiosphere.

For the purposes of this analysis, I will try to look into the signs and symbols that enable semiotic conditions, the advertising discourses as systems of signs, all of which collectively create the semiosphere. The coming together of these systems towards the creation of the semiosphere will be graphically represented in the following manner, which I have adapted from Ndalians (2014)³:




Fig.3. The creation of the semiosphere.

The diagram, which will be used for the interpretation of promotional materials, represents the intersection of two cultural systems, the native and the international, which interact when potential visitors to a destination read or see these materials. I have adapted this diagram because it clearly brings together, from a visual perspective, what happens during the creation of the semiosphere, it draws on cross-cultural communication, which is crucial for cultural semiotics, translation (semiosis), and semiotic borders, which are important to understand Lotman's concept of the semiosphere. To briefly explain the diagram, Ndalians (2014:12-13), drawing on Clark, sees the intersection space as the translation zone. A and B are areas where no dialogue takes place, whereas T⁴, the periphery

³ She draws on Lotman's theory of explosion and Clark's adaptation of Lotman's model of explosion (2009) to explain how different cultural systems communicate within the semiophere.

⁴ Named T after Lotman's 'triviality', an area of mutual comprehension in an act of communication and where no new information is generated. Clark maintains that these periphery areas suffer from a 'flaw of triviality', which "occurs at the point of meeting between two (or more) systems where signs communicate but no dialogue takes place between them [...]; dialogue instead occurs in the space of intersection (X) which is [...] certain signs from A and begins to translate them

areas or the semiotic borders, which divide the two cultural systems and allow external elements belonging to each of the cultural systems to enter the intersection zone. It is here where semiosis or the process of translation takes place. The more inwards the periphery areas are pushed in, the larger the intersection area and the more successful the translation process or semiosis.

3. THE ANALYSIS

I mentioned earlier, for the purposes of this analysis, I will focus on 2018 promotional materials published by the Albanian National Tourism Agency and made available online to national and international audience (http://albania.al/article/57/albanian_national_tourism_agency/). Three promotional materials will be analysed here: *UNESCO world heritage sites*, *Religious monuments*, and *Albanian cuisine*. I should mention here that the website of the Agency contains a lot of information accompanied by very nice pictures but for this analysis I will not discuss the contents of the website. I want to focus only on promotional materials that target international audience.

By conducting content analysis, which I find more adequate for this discussion as it is a technique that studies human behavior indirectly through the analysis of our communications, I want to see how effective these materials are in establishing a dialogue with the international audience, what types of national identity markers and adverting discourses they employ, and how the semiosphere is created. The visual and textual contents of these materials will be closely examined to see how they function as systems of signs inside the semiosphere. I will refer to the model proposed for explaining this analysis.

As it was explained earlier, the semiotic border or the periphery is very important for cross-cultural communication, which takes place in the intersection area and which enacts semiosis, the process of translation, and therefore enables dialogue. Nation branding is viewed here as a cultural space occupying the centre of the semiosphere and the audience occupying the periphery. The semiotic borders functioning as translating mechanisms differentiate between the

into its own semiotic space, thus generating a process of 'resemiotisation' [...].This dialectic, [...], may be understood as a semiospheric text in that it involves a 'space of two or more communicating cultures'. (Ndalians, 2014:12-13)

native and the international in the process of translating visual and textual signs entering the semiotic space.

Let us see how this is enacted in the three promotional materials. The first one, *UNESCO world heritage sites*, is a promotional material that describes and provides information about Albanian heritage sites in English and in Albanian, which suggests that the information provided is intended for national and international visitors. The information provided is factual and no scenarios or stories can be found here as you can in promotional videos, for instance. Interestingly, no pictures are included here, thus visual signs or images are missing. In their absence, how is the national image promoted?

In my view, the mentioning of UNESCO serves as a translating mechanism which allows the peripheries to push more inwards and enlarge the overlapping zone thus bringing together the two cultural spaces, the native and the international. Announcing the reader that the sites included in this brochure are protected by UNESCO is a sort of label that brands the listed sites and makes them attractive for national and international audiences alike. All four UNESCO-protected Albanian assets are listed here: Butrinti, Gjirokastra, Berati, and the Albanian iso-polyphony. National identity is marked by using factual discourse that makes reference to UNESCO facts about these sites or historical facts relating the places to antiquity. For the first three, information about when these sites were registered as UNESCO-protected sites is provided followed by some information about their old or ancient roots. In the case of the Albanian iso-polyphony, only information about its becoming part of UNESCO-protected heritage is included and no informative description about the Albanian iso-polyphony itself has been provided. Some information about it would have certainly increased the visitors' interest in the polyphony for the simple fact that it is a unique thing in Albania.

The second promotional material to discuss is *Monuments and places of cult*. This document provides an inventory of major religious places to visit in Albania. It lists them by a certain religious order beginning with the churches from the Orthodox religion, continuing with the cathedrals and monasteries from the Catholic religion, then with the tekkes from the Bektashi religion, to finish with the mosques from the Sunni Islam religion. The document is accompanied by the nation brand image "Albania: Go your own way!". The colours used in the nation brand image are also used to contour the document so as to identify

the nation brand logo. The information provided here is in English only and pictures of the sites accompany the factual information about the places. Here, the names of religions and their visual representations, that is, the accompanying pictures, serve as translating mechanisms. Unlike the first example in which pictures were missing, despite the fact that I think they would have branded the sites more effectively, in this case, I think the pictures are needed and serve as translating mechanisms for the audience or reader to identify or associate a religious site with a particular religion. What I also think works as a translating mechanism is the order of appearance of these sites. It is the Orthodox sites that are being listed first, which are indeed many, then the Catholic sites and then the Bektashi and the Sunni Muslim sites. Although the statistics from the 2011 Census claim that a large number of the Albanian population is Muslims, these sites are not listed first in the brochure. Two could be the reasons, in my opinion. The writers of these materials could have listed them by the number of sites to be found in Albania corresponding to each religion or that this ordering could have been intended as a demonstration of religious harmony in the country and also as a strategy to fight stereotypes about the country. Religious harmony is indeed emphasized by the authors in the introduction to the brochure: "Along with their complexity, architectonics, historic, and cultural values those will acknowledge and closely see the faith tradition in Albania and also really feel the religious excellent harmony and coexistence that exists for centuries among Albanians." (Albania.al, 2018). That this could be a strategy to fight stereotypes is again notable in the introduction in the sentence: "We hope your visits in these religious sites will enrich your experience in Albania." (Albania.al, 2018) Although the English language used here is not so correct, one can still note the intent in making the potential visitor discover Albania for themselves.

National identity is marked by images of these sites. The information provided is based on discourses that emphasize history and tradition.

The last brochure is about Albanian cuisine. Because Albania is famous among visitors for its traditional food, a brochure featuring traditional dishes could not be missing. On the cover of the brochure, the reader will spot two logos, the "Go your own way!" logo and slogan and the Agency's logo. Inside, before they get to the table of contents, they will see this picture of a traditional dish, which looks like *fergese* contained in a very plain pan and

served in a rather rustic fashion. This picture is tagged by the nation brand logo and slogan.




Fig.4. Picture image for the *Albanian gastronomy* brochure.



Fig.4. Picture image for the dish called *qifqi* (rice balls) with integrated triangles from the nation brand image.

The discourse in the introduction is more like an appeal to the preservation of traditional food and the importance of geographical and historical embeddedness for the cuisine. Next to it, one can spot a branch of olive tree with some olives in it. The picture on the next page again features three small pots containing three different varieties of olives, as if to tempt the reader. The olives, I think, serve as translators. As signs, they allow readers to translate the following messages, that Albania is an olive-growing country and one can find a lot of varieties here, and also that Albania is a Mediterranean country. As to national identity, the discourse in this introductory part highlights the country's climate, geography, favourable position and location, characteristics, cooking habits, utensils, types of food, sweets and herbs. One can spot here the accompanying pictures of a bunch of

parsley and of some peach compost. Wine and other typical drinks with accompanying pictures of a bottle of wine and of some grapes as the typical fruit for producing this drink follow. Some typical dishes are introduced with accompanying pictures under a title "A mixtue from Gods" before one gets to a presentation of typical dishes by region. Dishes from Northern, Middle and Southern Albania are presented with accompanying pictures and thorough explanations. In one case, a recipe has also been provided, that of a dish called *qifqi*. Elements of the nation brand image are nicely introduced in the brochure as in the picture below or on the edges of each page.

As for the national identity discourse, it emphasizes tradition, region, climate, geography and taste. The pictures contained here are better taken than the ones in the previous brochure and serve as translating mechanisms for the reader who can recognize known ingredients from the pictures. The information provided is extensive and informative, sometimes interpretative aiming towards luring the reader to visit the country and enjoy the food, thus particularly branding food in Albania.

Of the three brochures, the last one integrates semiotic elements more successfully, though more traditional dishes could have been introduced in the brochure.

4. CONCLUSIONS

In this article, I tried to demonstrate that analyzing promotional materials from a cultural semiotic perspective is important to understand how nation brands can be constructed, what symbols and discourses are used to mark identity, and make out the country as a destination to visit, thus reinforce its brand. For the purposes of this analysis, I focused on three promotional materials published in 2018 by the Albanian National Tourism Agency. The cultural semiotic approach, Lotman's concept of the semiosphere, and an illustrative model of the concept were adopted for the purposes of this analysis. The contents of the three promotional materials were closely analysed, namely the signs and the discourses employed in order to illustrate how the semiosphere was created. From the analysis, it was noted that signs that appeal to prior knowledge of the potential visitor or that can help create immediate associations were used in order to aid cross-cultural communication. To use Lotman's perspective, these signs, visual or textual, namely, the mentioning of UNESCO, the pictures of

religious sites, the olives, the well-known dish ingredients served as translating mechanisms and pushed the borders more inwards to create semiosis and establish cultural dialogue. Nation branding was further sustained by a discourse that was primarily factual but that drew mainly on history, fact-related descriptions, geography, antiquity in order to highlight national identity.

In the end, it can be said that the semiotic approach proved fruitful to analyse the promotional materials introduced here, but it should be added that more research needs to be carried out in this field by analysing not only more promotional materials but also other forms of nation branding attempts. In my view, it would be beneficial for this type of studies to find the way to include the visitors' perspectives for analysis and then compare the different cultural perspectives on the matter.

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SEMIOTICS IDENTITY, SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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Abstract: *This paper analyses the relationship between identity and level of socio-economic development and security in contemporary world system. In this context, we will demonstrate the hypothesis that the degree of socio-economic development is directly proportional to the consistency and visibility identity for each country in the world. The impact identity assessment pursues one main objective: quantifying the degree of convergence between propensity identity, security and socio-economic development. This work is an empirical study which uses original data on the national mottos, economic parameters and socio-economic complex indicators disaggregated by states of the world. Our findings suggest the existence of a spatial interdependence between the consistency of national identities, socio-economic development and security status. We attempt to demonstrate that their arrangement with each other maps out a community-wide asymmetry, resulting in a segregated organization of the international system, generating an asymmetric World with more identity-development-security speeds. At the same time, the deficit identity converges with development and security deficit.*

Keywords: *national identities; semiotics; stability and security; socio-economic development*

JEL Classification: *O15; O35; O57*

1. INTRODUCTION

The condition of identity represents one of the most acute social needs manifested at all levels of human organization, which means that identity projects are assumed on a competitive dimension similar to the competition for access to resources, development and security or for power. For this reason, at the level of the international system, a certain osmotic symbiosis functions between national identities, development and security. The symbiotic relation between these three elements succeeds in transcending the shortcomings caused by the anarchy of the system and the huge variety of systemic elements.

The international system consists of state and non-state actors (Buzan, Albert, 2010:334) which establish rules and institutions for managing their mutual relations and preserving their arrangements (Buzan, 1993:330). Each of these entities represents different identities. Therefore, the current international society can be defined as a collection of unique entities with their own identity characteristics, specific security conditions and particular development patterns. In this epistemic context, it is important to analyze the relation

between national identity characteristics, the level of development and security status, in order to establish the place and "weight" of each state actor in the international society.

For quantifying the three categories, we have used a series of associated proxy parameters: the national mottos (as proxy for the semiotics of national identities) and a set of economic and social indicators (as proxy for development and security).

The objective of the research is to evaluate the correlation between self-assumed identity values, the security status and the level of development of states within the current international system. *The working hypothesis* underlines the point that relations between the three categories of values indicate an unequal distribution of convergences and divergences in the system, responsible for maintaining the poor cohesion and the volatility of the anarchic system.

The paper is modular structured and divided into several parts: introduction section, evaluation of the state of knowledge and identification of the appropriate epistemic context, description of the methodology, presentation of the results, conclusions and bibliographical references.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Politically, the foundations of the contemporary international system were established to a great extent by the UN Charter (1945) and the Paris Peace Treaty (1947) and economically by the rules set out in the Bretton Woods Agreements (1944) and the Uruguay Round/ the Marrakesh Agreement (1986-1994). On the roadmap created by the aforementioned arrangements, the dynamic of the contemporary world is known for the multiplication of both socio-economic and security problems and issues related to culture and identity. The latter should not only be interpreted from a Huntington-esque point of view. Instead, they should be analyzed in a combined, neorealist and constructivist manner, emerging from the ambitions of each state actor to become more visible in order to legitimate its economic and security claims. In this context, understanding the identity phenomenon is a key element in explaining the dynamics of security and development in the international society.

Although the study of identities and their imaginary has a long tradition, it became really popular after the collapse of the colonial systems and the communist regimes respectively. The postcolonial and post-communist systemic reorganizations, accompanied by conflictual phenomena that shared a background of identity issues, developed in an effusive manner and raised (again) the academic interest for this field of investigation. In this context, Moïsi and Rupnik believe that the precipitous rediscovery and reevaluation of identities in areas lacking development and security proved to be a cause for major and tense crises (Moïsi and Rupnik, 1991:122). But even in the middle of the stable and developed world, some tense situations shared a background of identity cleavages related to ethno-linguistic and religion aspects (rifts between communities in Belgium, Spain, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Quebec). For this reason, understanding the creation of state identities and their semiotics is essential for shaping the current global architecture and responding to ultimate goal of effectively managing the common cohabitation in a world of equilibrium and stability.

For over a century, the representatives of the French school considered that nations are entities and identities proclaimed unilaterally by the elites at a given moment in time (Renan, 1947:41; Thiesse, 2000:114). They also argued that nationalism manifested itself after the creation of nations, acting as their corollary (Armstrong,

1982:36). From this point of view, Rumford argued that in the last two centuries we witnessed the continued multiplication of facets belonging to the national phenomenon in Europe (Rumford, Buhari, 2014:121). These transformations and their identity accents are analyzed by Holsinger and Kobrin using the theory of neomedievalism, in which current national states are defined as the next stage of Westphalian statehood (Holsinger, 2007:72; Kobrin, 1998:362).

Approaching the EU as an intergovernmental entity, Morin asserts that its evolution imposes the gradual rethinking of the European identities (Morin, 1987:47); as stated by Mattera, the crystallization of identities within the European community should be perceived in accordance to the historicist conception, consolidated over the last two millenniums and a half (Mattera, 2008:32). Wolton believes that Europe should build its own identity format, in which national identities are mixed in the shape of a “European globalization”, just as Europe is part of the “world globalization” (Wolton, 2003:94).

National identities can also be highlighted using the functional differentiations of the international system, as they result from Waltz’s realist conception. In this context, the differences of potential between European states can explain the concept of multi-speed Europe, which would also associate the subsequent identity differentiations. Starting from the aforementioned Waltzian assumption, Buzan and Albert accept the political and identity differentiations of the system as an explanatory source for the stratified differentiation (Buzan, Albert, 2010:316), while Ivan assigns an identity level for each level created by the multistratified organization structure of the EU (Ivan, 2009). Identities show a certain kind of plasticity and are able to withstand transformations caused by the interactions and circulation of ideas (Legro, 2009); in the EU, this fact is highlighted by the numerous legislative, political, economic and social operated at the level of member states and imposed by the *acquis communautaire*.

One of the most popular present-day currents of thought in identity/ security studies highlights a two-way relation between the formation of collective identities and the recognition of the “other”. Nevertheless, Greenhill considers that the lack of a rational and credible procedural mechanism can affect even a well-integrated body such as the EU, implying that the recognition does not necessarily guarantee the identities in a peaceful manner (Greenhill, 2008:344). Another instrument used in the literature for consolidating the identities

is the appeal to affective and emotional memory of lived events (also found in the national mottos). However, Ross argues that the constructivist approach of the topic does not offer all the necessary clarifications, not even for the internal identities found in the EU (Ross, 2006:199). Boia asserts that national identities should not be the result of synthesizing particularities through a process of essentialization and abstraction (Boia, 2013:10), capable of offering the identity indicators used in our research (national mottos) for the semiotic representation of identity.

In the context of ubiquitous globalization in the anarchic global environment, Anholt argues that we are witnessing a competition of identities, alongside a socio-economic competition in which competitive national identities are paired with governmental social responsibility (Anholt, 2011:4). Berens asserts that the competitiveness of identities can be ensured by standardizing them through measureable and/or codifiable country brands (Berens *et al.*, 2011), in the same manner as the national mottos. These identity characteristics are used to provide positive national reputation through events with a desirable image impact which is able to offer identity values to certain places (Braun, 2011) or to create a certain toponymia based on hedonistic perceptions. (Tjøstheim, Go, 2011).

Linking the issue of national identities with state security is a big part of contemporary analyses. Mitzen considers that tensions between states (an effect of their competition) provides them the desired security status, because the competition based on (neo)realist principles consolidates their individual identity particularities (Mitzen, 2006:342). This paradigm is capable of explaining, for instance, the difficulties of the EU in organizing a coherent system of security and defense.

3. METHODOLOGY

In order to define the semiotics of national identities, we have used the category of national mottos, namely the slogans self-assumed by states, which concisely reflect their desires and ideals. The promotion of the identity semiotics in the public agenda is ensured through social technologies (media networks, infrastructures of information etc.) responsible for their diffusion and preservation (Dumitru, Ciupercă, 2014).

The evaluation of correlating identities, the level of development and the global security status was achieved by using the method of comparative interpolation between different keywords promoted by national mottos (Work, Progress, Freedom, Peace, Unity etc.) and quantitative values of the socio-economic indicators (GDP/capita, GDP/person employed, Freedom Score, Global Peace Index-GPI, Social Progress Index-SPI, Bloomberg Innovation Index-BII). Next, we have analyzed the distribution of keywords in relation to different values of the indicators. The data used is taken from databases and reports of relevant international institutions (World Bank, UN Development Programme, Freedom House, Institute for Economics and Peace) and specialized international projects (World Heritage Encyclopedia, Bloomberg L.P., Social Progress Imperative).

For evaluating *the correlation between identity essences and the level of economic development of states*, we have selected the keywords relevant for the economic dimension (Work, Progress, Prosperity) and we have used the GDP/capita and GDP/person employed as parameters for development (Table 1).

Table 1. The correlation between the socio-economic items provided by national mottos and values of some economic indicators by countries (GDP/capita, GDP/person employed)

Items provided by national motto	GDP/capita & GDP/ person employed	
	<i>High Income</i> (>30000 \$/capita; >50000 \$/person employed)	<i>Medium and Low Income</i> (≤30000 \$/capita; ≤50000 \$/person employed)
WORK	-	Gabon, Central African Rep., Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo, D.R.Congo, Guinea, Niger, Rwanda, Togo, Zimbabwe, São Tomé&Príncipe, Costa Rica
PROGRESS & PROSPERITY	-	Brazil, Laos, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Comoros, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, South Sudan, Kiribati
Legend:	- optimal level;	- deficient/critical level

Source: Authors' own representation using data from The World Heritage Encyclopedia (2016) & The World Bank (2017)

For evaluating *the correlation between identity essences and the level of social emancipation/development*, we have selected the keywords relevant for the socio-political dimension (“Freedom”, “Justice/ Democracy/ Equality”, “Divinity” and “National Leader”) and we have used the Freedom Status, Social Progress Index (SPI) and Bloomberg Innovation Index (BII)

indicators as parameters for social emancipation (Table 2).

For evaluating *the correlation between identity attributes and the security status*, we have selected the keywords relevant for the security dimension (“Peace” and “Unity”) and we have used the Global Peace Index (GPI) as an indicator for security (Table 3).

Table 2. The correlation between the socio-political items provided by national mottos and values of some social indicators by countries (Freedom Status, Social Progress Index, Bloomberg Innovation Index)

Items provided by national motto	FREEDOM STATUS	
	<i>Free</i> (Aggregate Score >70)	<i>Partly Free and Not Free</i> (Aggregate Score ≤70)
FREEDOM	Argentina, Ghana, Salvador, Latvia, Namibia, France, Germany, San Marino, Greece, Poland, Hungary, Uruguay, Tunisia, Micronesia	Macedonia, Guatemala, Honduras, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Zimbabwe, Colombia, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Syria, Vietnam, Western Sahara, South Sudan
	SOCIAL PROGRESS INDEX (SPI)	
	<i>High Social Progress</i> (Aggregate Score >75)	<i>Middle and Low Social Progress</i> (Aggregate Score ≤75)
JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY & EQUALITY	Czech Rep., France, Germany, U.K., St. Vincent&Grenadines	India, Laos, Benin, Ghana, Namibia, Tunisia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Comoros, Burkina Faso, Uzbekistan, D.R.Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Mauritania, South Sudan, Western Sahara, Paraguay, Suriname
	BLOOMBERG INNOVATION INDEX (BII)	
	<i>High Level of Innovation</i> (BII >70)	<i>Medium and Low Level of Innovation</i> (BII ≤70)
DIVINITY	Denmark, U.K., U.S.A.	Hungary, Poland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Cambodia, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, U.A.E., Yemen, Ecuador, Dominica, Dominican Rep., Grenada, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Salvador, Mali, Morocco, Senegal, Uganda, Fiji, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Nauru
NATIONAL LEADER	–	Liechtenstein, Cambodia, Jordan, Thailand, U.A.E., Morocco, Fiji
Legend: - optimal level; - deficient/critical level		

Source: Authors’ own representation using data from The World Heritage Encyclopedia (2016), Freedom House (2018), Porter *et al.* (2017) & Jamrisko, Lu (2018)

Table 3. The correlation between the items of security significance provided by national mottos and values of a security indicator by countries (Global Peace Index)

Item provided by national motto	GLOBAL PEACE INDEX (GPI)	
	<i>High Peaceful Spaces</i> (GPI <2000)	<i>Medium and Low Peaceful Spaces</i> (GPI >2000)
PEACE	Laos, Taiwan, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Madagascar, Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Micronesia	Turkey, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Niger, Burundi, Chad, D.R.Congo, Comoros, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan
UNITY	Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Germany, Lithuania, Norway, Malaysia, Indonesia, Argentina, Grenada, Namibia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Micronesia	Georgia, Bolivia, Salvador, Peru, Haiti, Trinidad-Tobago, Gabon, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Rwanda, São Tomé&Príncipe, Zimbabwe, Laos, Papua-New Guinea, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, Central African Rep., Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Western Sahara
Legend: - optimal level; - deficient/critical level		

Source: Authors’ own representation using data from The World Heritage Encyclopedia (2016) & The Institute for Economics and Peace (2017)

4. FINDINGS

The analysis done in the previous section enabled us to create a model for the relations between identity, security and development in the current international society.

The relations between identity and economic development highlight a complete divergence: all 16 states which claim “Work” as one of their identity essences are actually underdeveloped countries with a low level of productivity and low incomes. Similarly, all 15 states which claim “Progress” and “Prosperity” as desired identity characteristics are actually some of the countries with the lowest levels of productivity and incomes. Thus, for the undeveloped world, the propensity for claiming identity values absent from its tarnished universe (“Work”, “Progress”, “Prosperity”) relies on unrealistic semantics. The failure to satisfy the essential material needs led to the inversion of perceptive approaches in the hope of fulfilling their expectations, although there was not any realistic time framework. Basically, in undeveloped areas the material absence was converted into a virtual identity, in a process meant to encourage the minimum eschatological expectations which barely avoid the collapse of the state (as in the case of failed state entities such as Somalia, Western Sahara, Burundi or Rwanda).

The relations between identity and the level of social emancipation/ development enter a more balanced area of convergences and divergences, an aspect confirmed by the relation between the desired identity values and the facts proven by the appropriate indicators. The libertarian condition assumes a convergence of the binomial «affirmed freedom-real freedom» for less than half of the states that claim freedom as one of their identity traits. Only 14 of these states are indeed free according to Freedom House (2018), while for the other 17 state entities, considered to be unfree or partially free, “Freedom” only remains an unfulfilled desideratum instead of a real identity. The public emancipation shows a significant divergence between the extent of social equity claimed as an identity and the real level of social progress. Out of 26 states which claim “Justice”, “Equality” and “Democracy” as part of their identities, only 5 of them (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic and St. Vincent&Grenadines) are validated by a high level of social progress, shown by the value of the Social Process Index, exceeding 75 units.

Therefore, less emancipated societies try to claim the identity of their coveted and yet absent

social values (“Freedom”, “Justice”, “Equality” and “Democracy”) in order to preserve their horizon of eschatological expectations just as in the case of unsatisfied material needs. It is noticeable that socio-political shortcomings are less painful than economic needs, a fact supported by the less significant divergences between social identity claims and the social reality, compared to the total divergence between the economic identity items and the economic reality.

One of the most relevant comparative interpolations involves the relation between identity brands, which pay tribute to “Divinity” and “The National Leader”, and the level of innovation/knowledge, quantified by the values of the Bloomberg Innovation Index - BII (Jamrisko, Lu, 2018). In this relation, divergence is the rule of the game: out of 36 states which mention God as an identity element, 33 of them have a serious deficit of innovation/creativity. Only 3 entities which assume God as part of their identity (USA, the United Kingdom, Denmark) are innovative countries based on discovery and rational knowledge (defined by a BII value of over 70 units). In the case of Great Britain and Denmark, having Divinity as part of their national identity seems to be in complete opposition to their high level of emancipation and rationalism, a fact that can be explained by a historical remanence of inertial identity. The case of USA should be perceived differently, as an exception for the Western world, especially if we consider the point that their current national motto was established in 1956. The same kind of divergence is also highlighted by the relation between the leader’s cult of personality and the innovative development. All 7 states which allocate their leader national identity valences, as indicated by the national mottos, are also lacking in innovative contributions, although some of them are developed countries (Liechtenstein, UAE, Thailand).

The relations between identity and security status illustrate a more moderate asymptote, as shown by the distribution of relations between identity characteristics related to security and the actual reality described by indicators. The relation between identity and security is also divergent for the most part, but this divergence is more balanced: out of 25 state entities which claim “Peace” as an identity item and out of 45, which assumed “Unity” as a referential element of their identity, one third of them confirm the convergence between the assumed pacifism and the real security status (as shown by the GPI value of under 2000 units). In this context, the fear of insecurity is more powerful than the fears of

poverty or lack of social emancipation. This can serve as an argument for a more objective choice of representative identity items related to security/stability. We may be led to believe that this phenomenon is related to the human instinct of self-preservation and therefore security would have priority over development. This assumption seems to be desirable, if we consider the fact that some components of identities act as support for development, while others are more hidden in their mechanisms of stimulating conflicts in the international system.

The reduction of identity consistency is also significant for the analysis of the development and security status. For most of the 37 states with no identity inscription (which lack a national motto), the concealment of identity semiotics is usually convergent to poor socio-economic development and a precarious state of security. Divergent exceptions are found in some developed areas of the EU (Finland, Ireland, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Croatia) and Asia (Israel, Japan), though their number is different on various levels of evaluation.

Therefore, the relations between identity, development and security illustrate a geographical segregation on the map of the contemporary global system, over various areas with different levels of identities, development and security. The contribution of various factors is also different from one state to another, in structuring the relations between identity, development and security. For instance, the influence of ideas was stronger in communist countries, where ideology served as a legitimating element for the elites, playing a bigger role than sources of economic and military power (Shearman, 2015:23). In other situations, the psychocultural background was powerful enough to influence the options for identity, security and development. For instance, Baltic states were strongly linked to the Western solidarities (Pettai, Kallas, 2009:116), on which they based their claims for belonging to the Western areas of identity and security.

4. FINDINGS

The evolution of relations between identities, development and security underlines both their symmetry and asymmetry. In the case of states which assume identities linked to development values, the dichotomy between them and actual socio-economic development is total; their alleged identity is more likely to represent their desires rather than the facts of the reality. Concerning identity claims related to security, the approaches

are more convergent to the reality, since the fear of insecurity is determined by powerful instincts that surpass the fear of poverty or social dysfunctions.

The issue of national identities at global level is just as complicated as the anarchic structure of the international system, without following the same networks of concentric circles found in the organization of the system. In some cases, the consistency of identity brands is convergent to the levels of development and security of the system actors, while in other situations the diagrams of the three parameters are even divergent. The contemporary international system is, without doubt, not only providing multi-speed development, but also multi-speed identities and security. Since disparities of development and security exist worldwide, along with permanent metamorphoses in the evolution of the international system, the identity ambitions can offer positive valences for development, but also dangerous valences for security if they are involved in building intolerant attitudes.

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I AS A POWERFUL MEANS OF SELF-REPRESENTATION AND POLITICAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN TRUMP'S DISCOURSE DURING 2016 PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES

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Abstract: *The primary aim of this paper is to look into the use of the metadiscoursal device I and its communicative effects on the audience in Trump's 2016 presidential debates with Clinton. As a means of self-representation, political identity construction and rhetorical interaction, this first-person pronoun is intentionally employed to explicitly mark Trump's presence in construing his discourse. The intention of the authors is to focus particularly on descriptive and qualitative analyses of I employed in combination with frequent verbs, such as believe, think, mean, want, disagree, pay, know etc. highlighting aspects of Trump's communicative strategy to invite the audience to align with his stances, policies, authoritative voice and, above all, political persona.*

Keywords: *I; self-representation; communication; interaction; political identity/persona*

1. INTRODUCTION

Politicians and their political activities frequently rely on language usage for communicative and persuasive reasons. So, language is seen as central to their verbal exchange activities when interacting with people for achieving their political aims. This becomes even more prominent in presidential election campaigns, in which they “are expected to verbalize their ideological positions” (Jalilifar and Alavi-Nia, 2012:136) and manifest their rhetorical abilities. As I have already highlighted, interactions, dialogical processes and rhetorical abilities are important metadiscoursal components which dictate the choice of particular devices or structures in politician's discourse (Toska, 2015:56).

The aim of this article is to investigate usages of the metadiscoursal device *I* and its effects on the communicative acts in Donald Trump's discourse during the three 2016 presidential debates with Hillary Clinton. I intend to analyse some relevant examples which mark his presence in an attempt to construe his discourse and metadiscoursively interact with his audience. *I* has been chosen for our analysis because it is frequently encountered in political discourse having a range of uses, but also because it explicitly conveys stances, policies, authoritative voice as well as political persona.

The main motivation for conducting such research was to explore the ways Trump uses *I* in his discourse, and since it is always employed with verbs in different tenses, to see the kind of verbal processes in which it is involved and what it communicates with them. This preliminary study would also help me pursue further research in the future concerning this self-mention pronoun from a contrastive perspective.

This work is divided into main parts. The first part includes the introductory part, the theoretical framework and the methodological approach embraced and the second part includes the analysis section and some discussion about the examples extracted for it. Short final remarks and bibliography end the paper.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework embraced in this work is Hyland's metadiscoursal one, mainly elaborated in the recent decades. He observes that metadiscourse is often defined as ‘discourse about discourse’ / ‘talk about talk’, clearly referring to aspects of the text itself and its internal organization (Hyland, 2005:16-18). However, his more promising and encompassing model considers it to be an interactional process “between text producers and their texts and between text producers and users” (Hyland, 2010:125). The

interactional component is extremely important, since it involves speaker-listener/writer-reader negotiations and effects on language use. This involves not only rhetorical interaction and interpretation but also political identity construction as well as usages of particular devices such as the ones considered in this work, that is *I* + verb constructions in the realm of communication. On top of that, Hyland's metadiscourse perspective takes full account of the "direct interaction between the presidential candidate(s) and the electorate in a constantly ongoing and engaging dialogical process" (Toska, 2015:207), which is also one of the main focuses of this work, considering the control and influence that language use and linguistic choices have on political behavior.

3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Trump's transcripts of the three presidential debates have taken from Politico website (<https://www.politico.com>) and the entire Trump's corpus amounts to more than 21,000 words. I could find 645 usages of the self-mention *I* and the contracted forms *I've*, *I'd*, *I'll* and *I'm* (282 in the first debate, 194 in the second and 169 in the third).

Although I have been mainly focused on qualitative analysis, the use of the versatile commercial software WordSmith Tools 6.0 proved to be very useful in compiling the corpus, counting and locating the *I* + verb constructions in it, but also in extracting the examples including in this paper in the proper discursive context. The illustrations have been taken from the three presidential debates in order to have proper representativeness of them. Also, these examples represent some of the most common themes discussed by Trump.

4. *I*, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

In this second part of the paper I intend to analyse particular instances of *I* employed in combination with some frequent verbs in various contexts during the presidential debates and discuss issues related to Trump's political identity construction. As highlighted, there are 645 occurrences of *I* in the corpus, which are relatively evenly distributed in it. I have chosen 27 examples which I have categorized into eight sets according to the thematic features that they convey. I have also attempted to keep the examples as short as possible, but at the same time including enough

contexts in them so as the conveyed messages come across easily and clearly to the readership.

The combination of *I* with the hedge *think* is by far the most frequent *I* + verb constructions in the corpus. As Fraser observes, the hedging process is one of the most effective rhetorical strategies in discourse (2010:201), by means of which language users "recognize alternative voices and viewpoints and so withhold complete commitment to a proposition" (Hyland, 2005:52). Example (1) illustrates this point. Trump's intention is to signal a lack of full commitment to the fact that he and his opponent agree on child care issues.

- (1) As far as child care is concerned and so many other things, **I think** Hillary and I agree on that. (1st debate)

Given the relatively high frequency of this construction in political discourse, it is not surprising to encounter uses of it one after the other in sentences or very short texts. *I think* in the next example foregrounds Trump's "plausible reasoning" and the intensity of "the degree of confidence" (Hyland, 2005: 52) he is prudent to attribute to the message.

- (2) **I think** what the FBI did and what the Department of Justice did, including meeting with her husband, the Attorney General, in the back of an airplane on the tarmac in Arizona, **I think** it's disgraceful. **I think** it's a disgrace. (3rd debate)

I believe is also to be found in the corpus. It is employed in certain particular contexts with similar functions and metafunctions as *I think*, but it does convey the creation of an *ethos* based on Trump's beliefs, and more concretely on world perception. In example (3) Trump explicitly projects his stance and authoritative voice.

- (3) We have enough problems in this country. **I believe** in building safe zone, **I believe** in having other people pay for them, as an example the [Arabian] Gulf states who are not carrying their weight but they have nothing but money and take care of people. (2nd debate)

In Trump's discourse during the three presidential debates I also encountered a significant number of *I mean* usages. As an elaboration construction it is employed to provide additional propositional meanings or further content explanations, which are instantiated in the three following passages.

- (4) Jobs are essentially nonexistent. **I mean**, I've been saying in big speeches where I have 20 and 30,000 people. (2nd debate)
- (5) The companies are leaving. **I could name, I mean**, there are thousands of them. (1st debate)
- (6) We need strong borders. In the audience we have four mothers of - **I mean**, these are unbelievable people that I've gotten to know over a period of years whose children have been killed, brutally killed, by people that came into the country illegally. (3rd debate)

On top of that, the intentional usage of *I mean* aims at marking Trump's own presence in discourse and at ensuring the audience's recovery of the intended and conveyed meanings. The overall contexts may be different, as for example in (4) in which *I mean* "supports" the previous statement, in (5), in which it is used along with *I could name* highlighting ability to provide more details, or in (6), in which it elaborates on Trump's attitude to particular issues.

It is also quite interesting the fact that Trump makes extensive use of the future *will* with I + verb constructions. There is a well balanced dispersion of them in all the three presidential debates. I noticed during my qualitative analysis that this structure mainly comprises dynamic verbs, as illustrated in example (7) with *bring back*.

- (7) **I will bring** -- excuse me. **I will bring back** jobs. You can't bring back jobs. (1st debate)

Careful analysis also reveals that these constructions are employed in a number of different ways, and sometimes very close to the function of boosters, the main function of which in discourse is to "attribute an increased force or authority to statements" (Bondi 2008, 32). The following two extracts also demonstrate this claim.

- (8) **I will knock** the hell out of ISIS. We are going to defeat ISIS. ISIS happened a number of years ago in a vacuum that was left because of bad judgment. And **I will tell you, I will take care of** ISIS. We need to get on to much more important and bigger things. (2nd debate)
- (9) They have no education. They have no jobs. **I will do** more for African-Americans and Latinos that she can do for ten lifetimes. (3rd debate)

Thus, we can see that Trump employs these structures not only to convey promises (*I will knock, I will take care of* and *I will do*), but also to guarantee the fulfillment of the actions in question.

In such cases, his presence and policies are foregrounded projecting him as authoritative to the audience.

Similarly, the *I* usages combined with the progressive aspect are significant in his discourse. They are all related to future actions conveying firm planning or intentionality, as in examples (10) and (11). The undertakings that the verbs *reduce* and *cut* convey communicate strategies to invite the audience to align with Trump's stances for his future actions.

- (10) Under my plan, **I'll be reducing** taxes tremendously, from 35 percent to 15 percent for companies, small and big businesses. (1st debate)
- (11) **I'm going to cut** regulations. **I'm going to cut** taxes big league, and you're going to raise taxes big league, end of story. (1st debate)

Also, continuity of Trump's actions, as in passage (12) below with the verb *watch*, denotes his authority and competence in handling situations which involve care and dedication. *I am going to appoint* in example (13) denotes a mixture of future intentionality and aspiration, through which he represents himself as a future mature and efficient political persona, whom the electorate can trust and support. The appeal for the *ethos* element is in the foreground despite the divergences of opinions that the audience may have.

- (12) She didn't even know what that letter meant. You know, it's amazing. **I'm watching** Hillary go over facts and she is going after fact after fact and she's lying again because she said she, you know, what she did with e-mails was fine. You think it was fine to delete 33,000 e-mails? (2nd debate)
- (13) The justices that **I am going to appoint** will be pro-life. They will have a conservative bent. (3rd debate)

Business and issues related to that is one of the most frequent topoi that Trump touches upon in his discourse. I noticed that within this context there are a number of very interesting usages of *Is* combined with dynamic verbs such as *build, pay, start* or *run*, as instantiated in passages (14), (15) and (16) below.

- (14) Well, for one thing -- and before we start on that -- my father gave me a very small loan in 1975, and **I built it into** a company that's worth many, many billions of dollars, with some of the greatest assets in the world, and I say that only

because that's the kind of thinking that our country needs. (1st debate)

(15) But I will tell, you that, number one, **I pay** tremendous numbers of taxes. (2nd debate)

(16) Well I think I did a much better job. **I built** a massive company, a great company, some of the greatest assets anywhere in the world worth many, many billions of dollars. **I started** with a \$1 million loan. I agree with that. It's a \$1 million loan, but **I built** a phenomenal company. And if we could run our country the way **I've run** my company, we would have a country that would you would be so proud of, you would even be proud of it. (3rd debate)

If we pay attention to the overall logical structure of these passages, we can see that the business topos is forwarded as a strong argument, in which the explicit Trump's projection is foregrounded intentionally to invite the electorate to align with his business and political persona as well as with his future policies. The presence of *I* also reflects Trump's efficient background as a businessman capable of acting proficiently in business terms.

It is also worth mentioning that "political behavior and linguistic behavior are in constant interaction and as a result politician's discourse indicates who they are, what they want to achieve or other metalinguistic aspects" (Toska, 2015:62). As I observed above, the boosting process appears to be relevant in their discourse as it creates a sustainable and efficient *ethos* by means of the self-mention *I* and typical verbs combined with it in similar contexts.

In the following three illustrations *I know* downplays the presence of the audience (Hyland, 2005:52-53) and limits the possibility of disagreement (Bondi, 2008:33).

(17) Look, I've been under audit almost for 15 years. **I know** a lot of wealthy people that have never been audited. I said, do you get audited? I get audited almost every year. (1st debate)

(18) Maybe there is no hacking, but there is - now Russia - and the reason they blame Russia is they think they're trying to tarnish me with Russia. **I know** nothing about Russia - **I know** about Russia, but **I know nothing** about the inner workings of Russia. I don't deal there, I have no businesses there, I have no loans from Russia. I have a very very great balance sheet. (2nd debate)

(19) **I know** Buffett took hundreds of millions of dollars. Soros, George Soros took hundreds of millions of dollars. (3rd debate)

Thus, Trump self-promotes his positive and knowledgeable image increasing his political identity in front of his political opponent and the overall audience. Such metadiscourse strategies attribute more argumentative qualities to his speech and linguistic behavior.

Other important *I* + verb construction include those that denote explicit alignment, as illustrated in examples (20) and (21). Analysis of such instances shows Trump's attempts to communicate to the audience his stances on particular matters.

(20) I'm sure you've probably have heard that. It was a disaster. The fact is almost everything she has done has been a mistake and it's been a disaster. But if you look at Russia, just take a look at Russia and look at what they did this week, and **I agree** she wasn't there, but possibly she's consulted. (2nd debate)

(21) Now John Podesta said you have terrible instincts. Bernie Sanders said you have bad judgment. **I agree** with both. (3rd debate)

Similarly, the non-alignment counterparts are significantly used, especially by means of the *I disagree* construction. Again these structures indicate Trump's attitude to issues in question and foreground his authoritative voice as opposed to alternative positions that his opponent or the audience might have. Examples (22) and (23) typically illustrate my points here.

(22) **I disagree**. Right now, Syria is fighting ISIS. We have people that want to fight both at the same time. But Syria is no longer Syria. Syria is Russia and it's Iran who she made strong and Kerry and Obama made into a powerful nation and a rich nation, very quickly, very, very quickly. (2nd debate)

(23) Because **I disagreed** with Ronald Reagan very strongly on trade. I disagreed with him. We should have been much tougher on trade even then. I've been waiting for years. Nobody does it right. And frankly now we're going to do it right. (3rd debate)

The last set of examples included in this paper concern instances related to psychological states and similar processes in Trump's interactional processes as his texts unfold. The self-mention pronoun *I* in combination with *want*, *am proud*, *understand* or *would love* express dialogical

aspects of his metadiscourse in the three debates (the four following examples illustrate this).

- (24) **I want** you to be very happy. It's very important to me. (1st debate)
- (25) And by the way, my tax cut is the biggest since Ronald Reagan. **I'm very proud of** it. (1st debate)
- (26) They never endorsed a presidential candidate. The border patrol agents, 16,500 just recently endorsed me. And they endorsed me because **I understand** the border. She doesn't. (2nd debate)
- (27) The other things are false, but honestly **I'd love** to talk about getting rid of ISIS and **I'd love** to talk about other things. (3rd debate)

The ideas of wanting, desiring or wishing, as psychological states, contribute to the proper Trump's identity construction and self-representation image in an attempt to open up an efficient path of dialogue with the overall electorate.

The eight set of examples considered in this section of the paper provide some background for further discussions in the realm of the metadiscoursal device *I* in combination with common verbs in order to explore additional topics related to Trump's political identity construction. Hopefully, some aspects of his interactional process with the electorate covered here would be milestones for future considerations and scientific analysis.

5. I, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This descriptive study attempted to highlight a number of issues related to the usage of the self-mention *I* along with some common verbs indicating and conveying particular topoi in the realm of metadiscourse during Trump's three presidential debates with Clinton. The theoretical approach embraced here showed that it was substantially supportive to analyze the examples provided. I believe that the arguments forwarded are indicative of my claims that the usages of *I* along with common verbs dictate Trump's presence and political persona in the given context.

Although I do not claim definite conclusions, I do claim tentative remarks which would help me and other scholars conduct more significant research in *I* and Donald Trump.

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Culture & Communication

SHAPING POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA'S INTELLIGENCE CULTURE: THE DE-COMMUNIZATION OF PERCEPTIONS

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Abstract: *The paper explores the impact of the Securitate archives' declassification upon the intelligence culture in post-communist Romania. It starts from the premise that the declassification of the Securitate archives, seen as a social topic, has had a significant influence on perceptions of national security and on the public profile of the institutions with responsibilities in national security. Starting from this preliminary observation, our aim is to explore the cultural artefacts inspired by the Securitate theme, in other words the alternative cultural forms of expression which along with classic informative processes have the potential to function as a barometer of intelligence culture while also being a factor in influencing and shaping the culture of intelligence. Further on, the paper will analyze the mechanisms emplaced in appropriating and renegotiating the topics of Securitate, archives, lustration and de-communization within the cultural space in Romania. Last but not least and perhaps risking to attach an emotional tone, the paper is aimed to contribute to a deeper and more nuanced understanding of a key historical period that few states share but that keeps imprinting not only national collective imaginary but the overall structure of the debate about freedom, justice and democracy at a global scale.*

Keywords: *intelligence culture; perception; de-communisation; cultural memory; mythology*

1. INTRODUCTION

Intelligence culture in the states that share a democratic present and a communist past, is easily understandable and needs no further justification. In these countries, intelligence culture has developed as a committed approach in the attempt of appropriately positioning institutions of security in the collective imaginary. More directly, in Central and Eastern Europe, developing an intelligence culture is an endeavor which we can date back to early post-communist regimes of the late 80s and early 90s. These initiatives played a central role in the construction of the newly independent states, which began the long and difficult journey towards creating strong, democratic systems. However, although all these states started their democratic journey in a fairly similar moment, the cultural, geographical, historical and socio-psychological variables have taken them along distinct paths in which the transition was differently felt, constructed and imprinted in the collective mentality.

One of the ways in which we can foster a better understanding of the intelligence culture is by investigating perceptions on national security institutions, as well as related topics. Relevant

aspects of this investigation can be found in the analyses performed on public perceptions of security risks and civil rights (i.e. surveys published by Institutul Român pentru Evaluare și Strategie - in cooperation with Asociația Română pentru Evaluare și Strategie, available at www.ires.com.ro). These results illustrate the latent character of mentioned representations and their powerful impact in terms of perception. It must be emphasized that these representations are generated by a particular context that has systematically fed the social representation of the intelligence services as omniscient and omnipresent forces. It is easy then to understand why any attempt to develop an intelligence culture in Romania was conducted on an extremely fragile foundation, representations of intelligence being associated with the repressive apparatus of the communist state. Paradoxically, it is this very fragility that has become a strong argument in favour of a whole range of initiatives to strengthen security and intelligence culture. We can therefore argue that historical realities made Romania a good case study for those interested in investigating intelligence culture.

Today this process of reflection is even more necessary because its implications have a strong

impact on the mind frame of both "ordinary citizens", and policymakers. For the latter especially, the past can generate two types of perceptions: people either believe intelligence services own absolute and all-pervasive power or they distrust intelligence, perceive it negatively and reject any initiative coming from the services (including the intelligence products).

2. THE SYMBOLIC POWER OF LUSTRATION: POST-COMMUNIST (RE)INTERPRETATIONS

One of the questions intelligence culture as a field of study needs to address in the new democracies is how to deal with the trauma of the communist past? The difficulty of advancing an answer comes from the fact that the post communist elites of society were more than involved in collaboration with the former regime. Similarly to other states of Central and Eastern Europe, Romania was being faced at the time with the demand to do justice and reform the political and social structures of society. From this point of view, evaluating the relation between past experience and the process of democratic consolidation is difficult as, in Romania, talking about the Communist past is not only a problem of historiography, but rather a challenge with ethical and political reverberations and stakes.

Furthermore, the debate about the limits of the lustration process and the delays of de-communization have systematically and continuously marked the 26 years of democracy. The long duration and the aggressive content of the debates, the angles taken by stakeholders often overshadowed the academic approach. We can then argue that this particular theme is in fact the core theme that shaped the collective mindset and implicitly the core of any debate about the national intelligence culture. In addition it reflects one of the most delicate experiences of the modern world.

Lustration (from Latin *lustratio* - "purification by sacrifice") has a long history. *Lustratio* was used in medieval times to refer to a sacrifice or a ceremony aimed at purifying cities, fields or populations contaminated of crime, sickness or other trouble. It re-entered the political vocabulary in 1989, after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe when it got a wider circulation in the context of the conflicts between former communists and adherents of democratic liberalism.

The idea of cleansing was overemphasized during past and present debates within the post-communist society of the Central and Eastern Europe, and it attracted the sense of "purification": the purification of state organizations from their "sins" under the communist regime. More broadly, it is related to the process of "vetting", understood as an evaluation and examination process in order to eliminate abusive and corruptive officials through due procedure. Lustration also involves the opening of the archives belonging to the former political police, an act which is perhaps the most important sign of "Communism abolishment". In fact, various states adopted laws regarding the lustration, some of which were significantly stricter than others, entitling the access to one's own Securitate file. In Romania, the term "lustration" was introduced after the 1989 revolution and has been used since for designating the process of removing former communist dignitaries and former officers of the political police as part of the post-communist political process.

However though, beyond assuming a new legislation (Law no. 187 from December 1999, regarding people's access to their personal files and the disclosure of the Securitate as the political police), and setting up special structures to facilitate the research of the archives belonging to the former Securitate, an example being the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (CNSAS), the relatively tortuous evolution of Romania towards reconciliation with the communist Past has proved once again that the application of lustration is "a highly sensitive issue", which has "questionable results" (Michnik, 1998). Therefore, a number of scientific contributions, like those of Paul Dragoș Petrescu (2007) or Paul Madrell (2018) shed light on the process, which, beyond their sometimes critical appreciations, give us the chance to understand the transition process in a structured and constructive manner. But if the opening of the archives and the process of assuming this at both legislative and executive levels can be relatively easy to reconstruct by using historical data, other questions, that we consider necessary to be addressed, are more problematic: what is the content of the archives and to what extent (only) its investigation can provide clear answers and restore in a fair and objective way a past that most of us don't want to address anymore and prefer to forget?

3. THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THE SECURITATE'S ARCHIVES: FACTS AND LIMITS

Facts about the current status of lustration in Romania show that on December 27, 2006, the Romanian Intelligence Service delivered the documents kept in the Securitate Archives to the National Council for the Study of the Securitate. Within this process, 1,587,831 dossiers were submitted, containing 1,930,062 volumes, and representing over 18,000 linear meters of archives. Also, the Romanian Intelligence Service sent the CNSAS management about 1,400,000 record files from the cabinets of the Securitate and over 700,000 records from the database of the former Information and Documentation Centre. To enable the consultation and expeditious retrieval of files and records towards the Council, the SRI also provided this institution with the digital records of these files. Documents that were transmitted came from the Central Archive of the Romanian Intelligence Service and the 40 county archives of the institution (official data according to www.sri.ro).

Also, according to the assessments of the Romanian Intelligence Service, about 75,000 cases, mainly on issues of counter-terrorism and counterintelligence, have remained in the Archive of the Romanian Intelligence Service. According to the law, the CNSAS has access to the files through the Joint Committee. Furthermore, within the Joint Committee and in the context of periodic reevaluation of the content of the archives, the specialists working at the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives and the Romanian Intelligence Service established that some files created by the former organs of the Securitate that deal with national security, are to be declassified. As a result, those folders were handed over to the management of the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives, having been transferred on March 21, 2016, to the CNSAS warehouse in Popesti-Leordeni (www.sri.ro).

Thus, thanks to Law no. 187/1999, a good part of the archives of the former Securitate, namely those that don't contain information affecting national security, have become accessible to a wide category of people interested in the history of the second half of the 20th century, such as the people who were pursued by the Securitate. But on this occasion, many argue that a "Pandora's box" has been opened; there have been numerous questions related to the information recorded in the Securitate files and thus the extent to which the

declassification of these archives can truly lead to the desired effect of "social and political cleansing". Not only that such information was decontextualized, but even where, at least apparently, the file remained intact, the data proved to be, quite frequently, fabricated truths. The first signs in this regard came from the victims, who read about their "official" life. This observation on the limits of reconstructing the communist past based on the archives of the former Securitate was also confirmed by experienced historians and researchers involved in this complex process.

It should be emphasized that the Securitate documents are largely the result of a process of information gathering through informative networks. The information had been provided by the tens and hundreds of thousands of informants (over the four decades of existence), whether they were skilled or unskilled, permanent or occasional, represented the raw data used in elaborating reports, analytical notes and summaries. Obviously, they had to be corroborated with information obtained through operative techniques, like the interception of letters or surveillance. But this was not a given, professionalism being many times an aspiration. So the first level of distortion is found in the way the notes were written. Some informants supplied numerous notes based on their imagination, motivated by financial benefits or the desire to take revenge. Statements obtained during the investigations and then inserted in the Securitate files could not be used in historical research in the first stage, and only after a serious critical analysis they were likely to be a source for the historians. Very often, after being the subject of great torture used by the investigators, prisoners often preferred to sign fabricated testimonials.

Also, it is important to note that in no other country in Central and Eastern Europe the totalitarian and dictatorship system had such longevity and intensity as in Romania. Considering the lack of de-Stalinization and of real reforms in Romania, as well as the personality cult, a topsyturvy Romanian exceptionalism can be assumed. Despite the fact that a mini-liberalization took place in the 60s (1963-1964, 1965-1971), the regime had maintained however an unwavering absolute domination on society, economy and culture throughout the entire communist period (1948-1989).

Obviously, studying the communist regime in Romania is not possible without detailed analysis of the role played by the Securitate therein. By creating such a huge volume of documents, the

Securitate system has shaped the reality of the Romanian society “in its own image”. But despite the existing reflexes of a so-called “File syndrome” still present in the Romanian society, historical research must delineate from stereotypical approach of the past. Critical analysis of the historical sources is badly needed for the last 50 years not to remain a simple “reflection of the Securitate reports”.

4. THE POST-COMMUNIST PUBLIC CULTURE OF REMEMBRANCE. THE ROLE OF FILM IN DEFINING IMAGES OF THE SECURITATE

The recovery of a traumatic past and the reconciliation with the past is a complex process, involving various factors of which only a few are manifested. From this point of view and in the spirit of intelligence culture, we must operate with the distinction between history and memory. If we define intelligence culture as a complex aggregation of ideas, responses and behaviors in relation with intelligence, then the focus must be less on the reconstruction of the process but rather on the manner past events have shaped the collective memory.

Starting from the impact of the violent exit from communism has had on the Romanian democracy, we consider that one of the dimensions that needs to be investigated is the way in which the actions of the Securitate found a place in the public sphere, especially through cultural productions. Such narratives come as complementary alternatives to the academic narratives of historians (as archive research or memories).

From the perspective of the intelligence culture, the investigation of popular culture’s productions, representations, artifacts and trends has the potential to reveal and explain the deviated perceptions which many times mark our understanding of intelligence and intelligence services. It is otherwise an idea fully assumed by academic literature that knowledge and people’s conceptualizations (and beliefs) are enhanced by the propensity of newspaper articles, cinema productions and literature at the expense of academic sources of information.

The need to analyse cultural productions in relation with intelligence culture is based on an understanding of the fact that every society has its own mythology, its own set of persistent narratives, tropes, and beliefs that “spell out that society’s origins, evolution, values and character”

and also “its image of the community of which that society is said to consist” (O’Meara *et al.*, 2016: 27).

Myth is a “discourse opposed both to truth (myth is fiction) and to the rational (myth is absurd)” (Overing *apud* Tănăsioiu, 2005: 114). Simply put, myths are commonly repeated stories about past which are the central mechanism of what can be defined as “cultural memory”. In other words, every society advances and embraces a shared view of the past which has the potential of defining identity, values and the boundaries of that imagined community also tracing the frontier between the “included” and the “excluded” ones.

Post-communism is a particular case study. It is bound to be a highly “mythologised” era derived from its own nature: up until not very far ago, “post-communism was a myth in itself, as life after communism was unthinkable” (Tănăsioiu, 2005: 115). Secondly, the fall of communism led to “a discursive vacuum” which needed to be filled up with a language able to replace a defunct vocabulary. In this context, the old myths have been strengthened (as the myth of the Western savior) and new ones were created. The latter, true urban legend, issued from the context itself, such as “Arab terrorists” (given the good relationships Ceausescu had with Arab countries), “Bucharest underground” (as withdrawal tunnels for Ceausescu and his family) or “water poisoning in Bucharest”. Moreover, the violent historical circumstances, coupled with above mentioned stories, generated immediate effects that made Romania a special case: sending all former officers of the Securitate to prison, closing down its intelligence services etc. – which made Romania the only country to begin its democratic destiny, in a very complicated period, without intelligence.

Cultural memory as preserved in media productions such films serve as mnemonic triggers to initiate meanings associated to past events. The impact of cultural memory as seen by A. Assman (2011) comes from its mere characteristics: it is “freely built according to the demands of the respective present” and it serves as a compelling idea for the future. Although these stories reflect with a greater or lesser degree of accuracy past events, if persistently repeated and invoked, they acquire the force of truth. Therefore, while myths are “crucial to the world view and self-image of the people” (Bruce, 1993 *apud* O’Meara *et al.*, 2016: 28), they are also partial, incomplete and privileging only one of the competitive narratives of an impossible to be comprised past.

As a special type of cultural production, the film represents a material useful in exploring the ways in which post-communist ideas propagate, reproduce, contest and reflect the issue of security and its related topics. Compared to other forms of artistic expression, films are one of the most influential communication channels, having the potential of making the significant difference between those interests, values and social norms which are legitimate and which are not. Films play a vital role in imagining the universe and in shaping the vocabulary, in establishing the mental maps, mindsets, and emotional framework through which we think about ourselves, and our country and the national security. And they can also be considered forms for expressing every society's own social organization of forgetting the past. Because whatever the filmmakers' intentions, no film can escape the cultural, social and political context in which it is made. In this sense, "films are veritable time capsules" (Dan O'Meara *et al*, 2016: 225) deeply embedded with the prevalent values, ideas and social relations of their times.

Among the responses identified by mass communication theorists on the causes of power and force influencing cinematographic communication are: (1) images promoted by film convert easily into mental images; (2) multiplicity and versatility of included codes undertake a large area of cognitive and affective reception; (3) film is a means of evasion, which allows triggering the mechanistic identification (living by proxy); (4) by joining stimuli, experience is characterized by intensity; (5) the feeling of ubiquity and intimacy enhances the impact. Having in mind the need to objectively investigate intelligence culture, it is less relevant if the myths, as they are taken up and promoted by cultural production are true or false:

It is not its truthfulness that is relevant, but its very existence, its content and the fact that there is a community that believes in it (Hosking & Schopflin, 1997:19).

Therefore, in establishing the link between post-communist myths of intelligence and cultural productions, the analysis of myths should prevail, as well as the ways they can be used as a tool for understanding the community or the nation.

In addition, starting from the premise that films function as barometers reflecting this complex social, political and cultural aggregation while also shaping and legitimizing it and in line with our interest and research, we opted for the analysis of post-communist film about Securitate.

5. *QUOD ERAM DEMONSTRANDUM*: PRINCIPAL TENETS OF A POST-COMMUNIST MYTHOLOGY

The film "Quod Eram Demonstrandum" is built around the attempts of a brilliant Romanian mathematician, Sorin, to publish his work in Western journals in 1984. Sorin refuses to comply with "the rules of that time", refuses to become a member of the Communist Party and his academic career suffers the consequences. His profile, basically unproblematic for the communist regime (he is not engaged in politics and his main research concerns mathematics), changes from the moment he tries to submit an article to an academic publication and comes to the attention of the Securitate. His friend and colleague at the university, Elena, who is asked to be the messenger for his paper, wishes to join her husband, an academic who left Romania and had never returned. She also becomes persecuted by the regime. Alecu, the representative character for the Securitate body who interacts with Sorin and Elena, has an ambivalent status. He is a divorcee, a status that was profoundly criticized in the communist era, he cannot be promoted and therefore, to be recognized his merits, he makes sustained efforts by documenting the case of Sorin, referred as "Hoinaru" (equivalent in English for "The Wanderer").

By playing back stories of life on both fronts (ordinary people - subjects of the Securitate's actions, and those officers who investigate the cases), in a context of political, social and cultural coercion and limitation of all action, the movie captures at small-scale the Romania of the 1980s and the image of the Securitate, an institution with great potential to shape human destiny and pervert characters.

The film breaths and plays fairly, tragically, having both a subtle and an ironic atmosphere of a traumatic period in the history of Romania. A history that perverted characters, a time that promoted fake human values, a daily life kept prisoner between physical, professional and moral borders, carefully established in advance. Needless to say their consequences are not fully eradicated today.

Table1. *Quod Eram Demonstrandum*: Principal tenets of the post-communist consensus

The image of the Securitate	power instrument that enforces and exercises pressure on society members
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	omniscient all-powerful	
The grammar of power	consensual relation between the actions, objectives, and the ideology a discourse gap between propaganda and every day reality (regarding living standards)	
	society cleavage: 'them' versus 'us'	
The myth of salvation	the West as the place of all options/prosperity catalyzes despair and provides fast and unequivocal explanations	
The past- present nexus	symbolic framework of de-communization and lustration the fate of values, memory, and ideas in communist and post- communist societ	

deeply illustrative era for the communist period. Its core elements were at the time intensely promoted by radio and television. Their main propaganda role was to 'testify' to how well people lived in Romania, in the best society ever, a golden age, under the greatest leader. In reality, everything was gray, and this "gray colour" has a symbolic dimension (in the sense of colourless). It is emphasized by the fact that the film is in black and white. Not accidentally, the period the film depicts are the 80s, when, for financial reasons, Romania had broken almost all contact with the outside world. This decision generated harmful effects on the academics who were not allowed to foster cultural and scientific contacts, buy specialized magazines or books, or attend conferences abroad (these were accessible only to party members who were also collaborators of the Securitate).

The social system is based on duplicity, treason, schizophrenic relationships, dictatorship over human needs, memories, and hopes, and the almost complete control of the communist party/ of the Securitate over human activities. The film thus depicts a deeply divided society, between those who were part of the Securitate (having a special status and being allowed access to a range of resources) and the "rest", whose lives were marked by the "non-collaboration" with the Securitate.

The narrative is also marked by a red thread, envisioned as the "space of all possibilities", and the idea that only foreign countries/ the West can offer the chance of a personal and professional achievement. Moreover, the projection of a better destiny which can be fulfilled only in the West is constantly reiterated throughout the entire film. The idea is systematically voiced by the characters and depicted in their life experiences. Thus, the film anchors its main elements within a mythology embracing the myth of salvation as the ideological surrogate. This myth functioned throughout Romania as an ideological surrogate whose main function was to unify the public discourse and to provide the citizens with an easily recognizable source of identity. This myth has also favored the politics of anger and resentment in the majority of communist countries, concentrating the feeling of despair, while providing fast, clear-cut explanations for the causes of the ongoing troubles. In the aftermath of the 1989 revolution, the myth of salvation took shape in a European Union and a North-Atlantic Alliance that will save us. The discourse around the idea of a savior, provider of all goods, as "Europe" and "NATO", builds on the promise of a better future and the arrival of a Golden Era.

In this film, "the image of the Securitate" is introduced through people's perceptions of the role it had within society and the reflection of an omnipotent institution. Its role is to put pressure on ordinary people. As one character says, its role is "to give us a hard time." This role is not a stake in itself or a strategic goal. It is rather the image of hopelessness and lack of concerted action at national level. The omniscient and omnipotent character of the Securitate is depicted by the Securitate officer who proves to be able to change roles, being present in different courts and in different situations of controlling destinies (he is an officer but also the clerk from the Passports Office contacting Elena to force her to betray her colleague). The Securitate has the potential to influence the destinies and to exercise control of the destinies of the characters. Like an institutional master puppeteer.

In terms of how "the grammar of power" is rendered, it must be said that the film contains a consensual relationship between the actions, objectives, the ideology of that time, all illustrated by the characters' life stories. The film depicts a

Interestingly, the entire process of making the movie also testifies to the relationship between the communist past – and the democratic present. 26 years after the breaking of communism, trying to find original pieces (Coral computers manufactured in the 80s in Romania, Dacia cars, Ceaușescu paintings, and handmade paper shredders) proved an impossible mission. Once again, one can see how brutal the break with the past occurred in Romania providing additional arguments to understand the symbolic register of de-communization and lustration.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The post-communist history proves that lustration is a highly sensitive issue, and Romania was certainly not an exception in this regard. Debate over the success or failure of the process of lustration in Romania should be understood in the broader political context of regional relations in the early 1990s, which had its fertile soil for “collective passions, fears, illusions, and disappointments” (Tismăneanu, 1998:6).

Romania's case on the other hand illustrates the transition from a violent exit from communism to democracy and the impact of historically imprinted latent perceptions on this complex and difficult process. Therefore we would argue further research is needed on less investigated aspects of intelligence culture: the type and degree of citizens' involvement in shaping the post-communist debate on security, the extent to which we can talk about the “de-communisation of institutions” or/ and the “de-communisation of people and of their perceptions”, the extent to which the process of lustration was accompanied in Romania by a polarization of society: us versus them or continuity in constructing the figures of the “Other” as a demonic figure to meet practical political aims.

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THE BRIGHT SIDE OF MONEY: A WEAPON OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

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Abstract: *The goal of this paper is to describe the way social identity is influenced by symbols people encounter in their everyday life. We studied the modern paper currency of all NATO countries, starting with the year 1960, over a span of 50 years. Our preliminary study reveals that the national currency has an important contribution to reflecting and promoting the peoples' national identity and it is also a variable of building/changing the population's values (political/ cultural/ religious/ historical). We can argue that, from a historical and relational perspective, money mirrors the ideology of a given period and it impacts society by promoting persons and symbols as watermarks on the paper currency. Our article dwells on the power of money, but we do not necessarily focus on its economic power, but on its capacity to become a tool for strategic communication within a nation.*

Keywords: *identity; currency; symbols; values; ideology*

1. INTRODUCTION

The connection between people and society is customized in various aspects of each individual's personality, such as the way we greet, the way we dress, in our artistic preferences, or in the types of behaviors we display. The fact that we are members of certain social groups indicates not only our belonging to a specific community, but the adherence to a set of values, social norms, beliefs and common behaviors. Literature has stored both studies of the specificity of the human being, i.e. of individuality as a stand-alone entity, and of the individual as a part of society - of the indisputable need of person to live in the midst of his peers.

This article aims at showing how national consciousness and positive identity are conditioned by the symbols circulated within the community. To put it differently, we will address the issue of consolidating / diluting national identity according to the particularities of the chosen personalities to be printed on the banknotes used by that state.

The hypothesis that we are advancing is that a country proud of its past and without major historical traumas will include in its panoply of figures personalities relevant to the historical becoming of that nation, while young states, or those that are unsafe, depending on their own historical trajectory, will choose, in particular, personalities with a neutral affective charge in the sphere of science and art.

2. SOCIAL IDENTITY

Each of us belongs, at some point in time, to different social groups, the category of affiliation being often equated with what Durkheim called "manners of doing, of feeling and of thinking". Such affiliation was highlighted by sociologists making up categories that establish the quantitative aspects of the individual's life (Dubar, 2003: 12), thus defending and evolving a series of cultural, demographic, economic or psychological invariants specific to certain social categories. Subsequently, concepts such as social identity, collective identity, and personal identity emerged from the polemics generated in this context.

Definitions of identity are diverse because identity is an ambiguous, elusive concept that can be approached from various perspectives, but impossible to be circumscribed to a sustainable definition. Deeply related to the spatial and temporal context in which they were elaborated, the definitions of identity represent variations of Heidegger's well-known starting point "The principle of identity sounds in a current formula $A = A$ " (*apud* Constantinescu, 2000:149).

Henri Tajfel (1978) has the merit of initiating the study of inter-group relations from the perspective of classifying and identifying the individual with the group, an important result of his efforts being the emergence of the social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978, Tajfel and Turner, 1979). This

particular theory states that as social categorization cannot have the effect of diminishing the self-image of individuals, people choose to identify themselves with social groups that give them a positive social identity. Henri Tajfel conducted several experiments which showed that there is a tendency to emphasize the similarities between entities of the same category (the phenomenon of assimilation) and the tendency to increase the contrasts between members of different categories (the phenomenon of contrast) (*apud* Chelcea, 1998:12). Taking on an identity that is common to that of the group determines individuals to maintain or establish consistency and consensus among the different aspects of common identity: similar behaviors, representations and attitudes.

Through the theory of self-categorization, John C. Turner (1987) proposes a complementary approach to the same issue. From his point of view, each individual acquires a self-concept that integrates several levels of abstraction: from very specific and personalized ego, to the general ego, similar to that of other members of the group. Categorizing the Ego by including it in a certain family of items determines the individual to acquire a certain social identity, and this identification justifies the person's expectations on the similarity of his / her views with those of the group. Taking the aforementioned as the starting point, the authors infer the following theoretical principles (*apud* Doise, Deschamps, Mugny, 1999: 43): (1) Individuals seek to maintain or accede to a positive social identity; (2) Positive social identity is largely based on favorable comparisons that can be made between the membership group and some other relevant groups. The membership group must be perceived as positively different or distinct from other relevant groups; (3) When social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will seek to leave the group to which they belong to enter a more positive group and / or act so that their own group becomes positive.

Therefore, the individual's awareness of belonging to a particular social group and the valorisation of that belonging are measures of self-consciousness and positive grouping. The so often invoked desideratum of originality is, in fact, a way of recovering one's personal identity caught in the vortex of the indestructible bindings to the group,

a conflict between affirmation and individual need and affirmation and collective need; between searching for a personal identity and seeking a collective identity; between what constitutes at the same time the individual difference and the similarity

with the other; between social visibility and conformism; in short, between the individual and the group (Cool, 1979:424).

3. SOCIAL MEMORY, SYMBOLS AND IDENTITY

Identity is a concept that remains actual, yet so complex and difficult to quantify, as it includes both the elements of differentiation from others, and the plethora of similarities with other members of the group. French sociologist Claude Dubar has distinguished between ways of expressing personal or social identity in self-standing languages. He showed that the attempt to "make" a system of unitary concepts linking the social perspective (ethnicity, culture, heritage, nation, class, family, service, religion, politics) to the personal sphere (the self, the intimate, the subjective, the love, the work, the faith) was a process of trappings, ambiguities and uncertainties (Dubar, 2003: 214).

Social identity and, indirectly, national identity, are dynamic processes that are either fueled or sabotaged by the historical and social contexts that the group experiences. Myths, folklore, or symbols are all examples of identity markers that condition the magnitude of possible changes in the sphere of social identity. The suppression or limitation of personal or group identity (professional, religious, national) or, on the contrary, identity consolidation, is impossible to understand in the absence of the discourse on "identity markers" or "identitentials", respectively

attributes defining the individual's personal identity as a unique entity (the set of qualities and defects), and its social identity (social status, nationality, gender, profession, religion) (Chelcea, 1998: 14).

Adams (1984:218) noticed that these identity markers can also be analyzed from a constructivist perspective and he stated that

In the hands of certain individuals, at one point, myths can be created or radically changed through a design...we can have a collective vision and create the society we want (*apud* Chelcea, 1998:14).

Nevertheless, collective memory is not limited to myths, but also includes national creation, official memory, private memory, oral history and written history, the transmission and reconstruction of tradition and values, the memorial and the national myth, the specificity of the group being determined by the combination of these elements. Collective memory is a "lesson", an example of a profound

nature that converts into family images (Neculau, 1999: 179, 183).

In his introductory study in "The Politics of National Identity", historian John R. Gillis noted that "the notion of identity depends on the idea of memory and vice versa" (1994: 3). Identity is the "hard core" of personality, supported by the remembrance of how we have previously perceived other people, society and values. Similarly, the community voluntarily recalls only those images that serve the representations it has about itself. Oblivion is what lies over the rest.

Thus, our identity changes to a certain extent (Chelcea, 1998: 14). Identity and memory are two correlated concepts that feed on each other and are constantly restructured under the pressure of history and society. Interactionist explanations point out that people associate different social objects with meaning, and then interact with each other based on the meanings they have built up through social interaction (Blumer, 1986).

Maurice Halbwachs (1926, 1941, 1950) includes in the mainstream of academic discussions the concepts of framework, mechanism and the emergence of social memory, emphasizing that the national memory involves certain stages and mechanisms of evolution. After creating a generic image, the reverse process of symbolization takes place, i.e. when a particular image engages a whole structural framework: e.g. the evocation of symbolic figures is the means to establish the "illusion of eternity" (Neculau, 1999: 184).

In support of the social memory theory, Andre Micoud (1991), in the introduction to *Les Hauts-Lieux*, shows that "singular places" publicly celebrated by communities play a "catalytic role" by developing an "enthusiastic consensus of interests". The symbolic spaces invite to a "different future", through manipulation of the tradition in favour of change, detaching the example of the trivial background surrounding it. The funerary monuments, the necropolis, the ossuaries are excellent "loudspeakers" of memory. The memorial and the national myth, as monuments of memory, pass on values and preserve tradition as constructive forces. This affective and valorizing function gets new dimensions in relation to social groups: social memory forges both identity and coherence, and also the distinction (moral, cultural, intellectual) with other groups.

The past recalled in memory is a sustainable resource of identity, a "program for the present" (Schwartz, 1996: 910). In the light of European experience, the nation (in the broadest sense of the term) is a community of political worship, having as

its object the worship of the territory and history. An analysis of the content of patriotic songs, as well as the national anthems of the European states, supports this idea; all of them make references to rivers, landforms and, in all of them, the common origin is invoked and the past is glorified.

Researchers of collective memory prestige consider that in recent decades there have been major changes in the memory recall mechanism of past images. Some nations, becoming safe and prosperous, have refreshed their collective memory; others seem to have forgotten the past. In any case, there is a personalization of memory, a constraint at local events, a democratization of it (Chelcea, 1998:19).

4. RESEARCH ON NATO BANKNOTES

While national particularities may appear in a host of identity elements, symbols are the ones that tell a story about what is important, valuable, valued and defended by the community.

Money is an ideal tool for transmitting the values of the society in which it is used. Each banknote tells a story about its country of origin. A banknote usually includes a figure or a country-specific feature on its front, and an item describing the activities of that community on its back; the front and the back images are typically related. For example, Aurel Vlaicu (Romanian engineer, inventor and pioneer of world aviation) appears on the front of the 50 RON Romanian banknote and on the back a sketch of one of his airplanes, Vlaicu II, is used. Money provides us with clues about the political regime, the level of culture and civilization specific to that community at various significant moments in its history. For example, before 1992, Albanian banknotes described activities specific for the population such as: harvesting, working on site or in steel factories. By the end of the 20th century this changed and the new banknotes displayed important historical figures that have helped the development of the state. This can be interpreted as a commitment to the future and a statement about the desire to raise the level of education. Money highlights the hierarchy of social values, which is visible through the association between the value of the banknote and the personality that is depicted on it. In Romania, the national poet, Mihai Eminescu, appears on the most valuable banknote, the 500 RON one. Similarly, before using euro, Austria had positioned Mozart on its most valuable banknote - 5000 schilling. The more important and the more famous a person is on an international level, the higher the value of the banknote that he or she represents is.

The important personalities of a community can be chosen from extremely diverse areas - political, military, religious, artistic or scientific. In order to strengthen its Catholic affiliation and to highlight the ethnical affiliation of Pope John Paul II, Poland introduced the 50 zloty banknote in 2006, with the portrait of the Pope, and on the back of the banknote, a cardinal kissing the Pope's hand. This series had a commemorative message dedicated to the Pope, after his passing away in 2005. Most monarchies, as well as other states that have undergone a revolutionary transformation under the influence of some people they regard as national heroes, chose to impose these effigies on all faces of banknotes in circulation. Although the country has a democratic regime, all Turkish banknotes depict Atatürk (Kemal Mustafa), considered the Father of the Turks, transmitting a message that Turkish elites assumed his way of civilization and secularization of the whole people. Likewise, in the case of the monarchies, (Great Britain) the emblematic figure of the Queen/King is found on all banknotes.

We advance the hypothesis that the lack of continuity in the symbolism of money signals a turning point in the history of that country. In this context, the existence / absence of historical personalities in monetary iconography has no significance in itself. There are states that assume a civilizing role and a cultural or scientific identity with which they pride themselves. For them, the lack of historical figures as monetary symbols does not have a special significance. By analyzing the banknotes that precede the adoption of a single currency by European countries, we can find numerous arguments in support of this hypothesis. Before Austria adopted the euro, its civilization impact was underlined through the promotion of painters, actors and writers. Similarly, the Kingdom of Belgium deviates from the tradition of other monarchies that paint the figures of kings on all the banknotes and makes room for personalities from the field of painting or music. Spain and Italy choose to celebrate important figures from the realms of science and culture.

Other countries, such as the United States of America, are proud of their past; therefore, they constantly remind people about their historical symbols. As long as the symbols remain the same, no historical turning point is signaled. The alarm signal that can indicate either a positive or a negative change occurs when countries include or remove from the specific iconography one dimension or another. In 1919, Finland elected its first president, Kaarlo Juho Stahlberg, who would also appear on one of the future banknotes. Finland

illustrated its money through a mix of historical and cultural personalities – the balanced and solid European path for this country, which has become a model from many points of view, including education, was signaled through its money. In Bulgaria's case, we can notice the addition of personalities with the value of symbol coming from different areas: representatives of orthodoxy (Paisii Hilendarski), famous names (Desislava of Bulgaria, referring to the second Bulgarian Empire) or their national hero (V. Levski). Hungary uses historical figures on its banknotes - King Matias, Ferenc Rákóczi (who campaigned against the Habsburgs in Hungary), Robert Karoly (King of Hungary and Croatia), Istvan Szechenyi, Gabor Bethlen (curiously, this Hungarian prince tried to unite the Romanian Principalities under the name of Dacia). It is worthwhile pointing out the continuity of the symbols used by the communist Hungary and the contemporary elites - the iconography used suggests constancy in the ideals and objectives of the country and the perseverance in achieving them. Similarly, Poland has promoted significant persons of the state on the front of their banknotes, predominantly from the military field (perhaps a reflection of the tumultuous history of the country), but also to highlight its glory moments during the communist era (K. Swierczewski - General Bolshevik, J. Dabrowski - general of the 18th century, national hero, T. Kosciuszko - national hero in Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and in the United States). Choosing a symbolic personality for Poland, and also for the United States, at a time when the country was controlled by the Soviets, offers clues about the Polish collective mentality, the (un)obedience of the elite of the time. Boleslaw Chrobry - the first king of Poland - appears on the most valuable banknote. After a short period of iconographic neutrality, Poland redeemed its historical personalities, including Boleslaw, but also King Kazimierz III Wielki, Vladislav II, or King Zygmunt. In Ireland, the political changes recorded in 1989 led to unprecedented economic growth, which determined the people to give the country the nickname of Celtic Tiger. Interestingly, since 1992, Irish money has included historical figures such as Queen Medb (Maeve), Douglas Hyde (Ireland's first president). Through its money Ireland declared its statement for national self-affirmation.

5. ROMANIAN MONEY

The history of Romanian banknotes is in line with the previous considerations. Adopted by the Parliament on May 4th, 1867, the elite of the time

assumed a currency which they named *leu* as a way of asserting independence from the Ottoman Empire; at its origin, it was the Dutch *leeuwendaalder* that had been used in Romania for more than 100 years. Romania's independence allowed the National Bank to decide on the design, value and issue of banknotes by the law of 29 April 1880. At first, the iconography of the Romanian banknotes included political and historical symbols. Subsequently, the transformation of Romania into a communist state influenced the symbolism of money. After 1947 the first signs of the new communist regime appeared, although the elements of Latinity and the traditional images of peasants remained. During that time, on the most valuable banknote, 100 lei, one could see the symbol of the unity of all social categories valorized by the regime. Later, according to official propaganda, traditionalist images were replaced by some that evoked the industrialization and modernization of the country. Symbolic achievements, such as "Casa Scânteii" or the Danube - Black Sea Channel, are included in the symbolism of banknotes. One can notice a syncretism between art and history on Romanian money, as they used the portraits of the Romantic painters Theodor Aman and Gheorghe Tătărescu to portray the image of Nicolae Bălcescu and Tudor Vladimirescu. Changes in Russian domination were also reflected by banknotes in use. "Casa Scânteii" (of Russian inspiration) was replaced by the Romanian Athenaeum. In the communist years, Romania rediscovered its own history, inserting its great leaders on the banknotes in circulation. The revolution of December 1989 inaugurated a different stage - no historical personality regained its place in the symbolism of the national currency, replaced by prominent figures of culture and science. Does this express a drifting identity? A fear of assuming national history? In April 2018, journalist Janina Necatara launched the "Women on Banknotes" campaign, through which historical figures, such as Queen Maria, Ana Aslan, Ecaterina Teodoroiu or Maria Tănase, were proposed to be printed on banknotes. The campaign is being conducted online and the person to get the most votes will be proposed in a petition to the Governor of the National Bank of Romania to be printed on a banknote. The campaign is based on the idea that Romanian women have left their mark on history and, as such, they should be represented accordingly.

6. CONCLUSIONS

A banknote can say many things about the country that issued it because it contains a specific

visual story. Contact with a banknote produces a first impression of the country it represents, including how popular its symbols are (when that personality is easily recognized). Thus, the holder has an involuntary instant access to the country's past. The indispensability of using banknotes to meet daily needs makes us keep in touch with the culture and history of the country, and their simple sight can stir up powerful feelings and national values in us.

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LANGUAGE OF DIGNIFIED HUMANITY

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Abstract: *In today's world of information technologies, conflicts between intellectual traditions of educated urban elites and common people, inclusive of powerless minorities, have become intensified. Helpless humanity has been subjected to mistreatment by elites with power to make policies and laws, which do not necessarily serve the needs of the majority of people. Additionally, the language of modernity, marked by competitive consumerism and heightened capitalism, has widened the existing divides between multiplicity of dialogues related to categories of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, creed, age and origin of birth. All divides, both individual and collective, have made the universe unsafe, leading to increased violence in thought, word, and action. In a world of strangers, humans are deprived of their innate dignity. This paper will discuss social inequality related to the phenomenon of elitism and the problems it poses to democratic society. Since elitism is a byproduct of education, the paper will explain the role of education and its relationship to elitism. An attempt will be made to reconcile the nature of elitism and education with the philosophical concepts of human being and the humanity's language of dignity that transcends languages of all isms. Finally, the paper calls for quality educational programs, which focus on teaching ethics of diverse humanity through analytical thinking infused with valid reasoning supplemented by pragmatics of non-violent inter-cultural communication. In order to protect the innate dignity of all-inclusive humanity, a balanced and eclectic cosmopolitanism is recommended.*

Keywords: *language; human; dignity; elitism; cosmopolitanism*

1. INTRODUCTION

In the modern era of technology and inventions, people of all cultures suffer from increased personal, social, and environmental disturbances. Cultural biases are rooted in the ideological biases that individuals carry with them. These biases are reflected in the socio-linguistic constructs of identities that societies have formed to categorize and simplify the complexity of diversity for obtaining cohesion for social discourse (Okiihiro, 2001; Xiong & Metzger, 2010). Some constructs include the East and West, Black and White, Male and Female, Civilized and Uncivilized, Educated and Uneducated, Elite Rulers and non-elite Commoners. These dichotomies of social constructs are rooted in the Aristotelian philosophical system in which human existence was distinguished from animals based on human's rationality. The axiom by Rene Descartes, "I think, therefore I am," is reflective of this ideology. This divisive-dualistic philosophy of rational vs. irrational has been promoted through educational methods and doctrines, which resulted in problems of maladjustment and social disturbances at all levels, personal, local, and global, creating polarization

between a class of educated elites and the majority of humanity. The concepts of *elitism* and *tribalism* are socio-linguistic constructs created by educated elites based on an inherited ideology that gives rise to the problems of identity and social inequality. Scientifically speaking, people have more commonalities than differences. After the exploration of elitism and its relationship with education, drawing from an Indian philosophical view, the paper will discuss human nature, and the language of dignity for the health of humanity.

2. METHODOLOGY

In the twenty-first century, interactions between cultures have become more numerous, continuous, substantive and assimilating, creating conflicts at all levels. In this context, it has become clear that the language of power has come to dominate all languages and dialects. Ancient philosophical traditions, which valued the power of analytical thinking and reasoning, are no longer valued in a true sense. The truth is filtered through fierce competition, consumerism and selfish gains.

Until the 1960's, anthropological linguistics and historians used descriptive approaches to the

study of diverse cultural traditions. However, during 1980s and 1990s, scholars began to use broader approaches, adjusting traditional and borrowed knowledge and practice. Following William H. McNeill (1991), who took a broad approach to the study of interactions of cultural traditions with focus on infusion, scholars expanded a Eurocentric approach to world-systems of habitation. Given information technology, political and socio-cultural conflicts, and devaluation of humanity, interdisciplinary and synthetic approaches must form a basis for research. Exploration of the social construction of *elitism* and the concept of human dignity finds a common ground in the philosophy of language. This approach helps in understanding problems of suffering of both the civilized and uncivilized societies. This approach also helps in understanding conflicts and violence related to other socio-linguistic constructs: language, race, gender, ethnicity, religion, and worldview.

The paper argues in defense of equality of all languages and dialects as variants of human *language*. Language is symbolic representation of culture created in response to needs in the context of biological and socio-cultural environments. The paper focuses on the importance of human power in the creation and use of language in adjusting to changing needs and values. Research Inquiry follows the following steps: (1) Language of social identity: Elitism; (2) Elitism and Education; (3) Indian Philosophical Perception of *Human*; (4) Language of Humanity: Dignity; (5) Symbolic and Functional Use of the Language of Dignity; (6) Implication and applications

3. COSMOPOLITANISM: AUTONOMY OF DWELLING

The idea ‘cosmopolitan’ was used in ancient philosophical traditions, which meant ‘a member of the universe. The word ‘politan’ came from ‘a polites,’ which refers to a citizen belonging to and serving a city with loyalty (Appiah, 2006). Philosophers believe that one of the first philosophers of cosmopolitanism was Cynic Diogenes, who was inspired by Socrates and who identified himself as ‘a citizen of the world’ [kosmopolites] rather than someone who is a citizen of a particular place (Kleingeld & Brown, 2003). Societies have formed social categories (Okihiro, 2001), which are based on personal preferences and cultural biases existing at the time. Through voyages and interactions globally, the idea of cosmopolitanism spread internationally.

After the declaration of human rights in the eighteenth century during the American and French Revolutions, cosmopolitan became synonymous with who *feels* at home anywhere in the world. The freedom to occupy some space on earth has been restricted by identity with a nation-state, and this identification has led to immigrants, refugees, and foreigners being seen as ‘other.’ ‘Global’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ disregard place of origin. Elitism and tribalism then are two subcategories of world citizen or cosmopolitanism.

4. ELITISM

This section concerns itself with social inequality due to social class in developed societies, with particular emphasis on the United States. First to be discussed is the social phenomenon of *elitism*—what it is, why it exists, and the problems it poses to a democratic society. Following this will be a discussion of the role of education—its purpose, relationship to elitism, and an empirical examination of its inequality. Lastly, the discussion will make an attempt to reconcile the natures of elitism and education with the concept of human dignity.

4.1 Elitism: Two kinds. Elites inevitably exist (Bealey, 1996). The Italian social-theorist Pareto thought elitism occurred in every walk of life. Whatever the activity, some will always excel above others. In the broader context of society, however, the matter is not so simple, and elitism’s definition is much different. Groups of people will have privileges not available to others—privileges such as wealth, power, and knowledge. In general, elitism can be divided into two main categories: political elitism and socio-cultural elitism (Metzer & Xiong, 2010).

Political elitism has its roots entrenched in society. Wherever there is a group to be governed, there is an elite to govern them. Elitism has been viewed as both necessary and positive. In his utopian “Republic,” Plato idealized a stratified society governed by the elite (Rosen, 2005). The famous utilitarian John Stuart Mill also supported political elitism and viewed acquired knowledge and practiced intelligence of the few as beneficial to the needs of the many (Ryan, 1970). Mill thought that the masses would have insufficient mental qualifications to rule in their own interest. The masses would make short sighted, unwise decisions that would have negative impact on society. Mill’s views upheld the notion that the elite would be selected by a kind of ‘roster-device,’ that is, a roster

ranking those individuals of desirable leadership qualities from greatest to least. The ‘roster-device’ could then be used to draw a line between the political elite (those with the greatest degree of those qualities), and the rest of society (Kendall & Carey, 1968; Metzger & Xiong, 2010).

In reality the problem with the ‘roster-device’ in reality, however, is a good indicator of the problem of political elitism in general. How is it that the ‘roster-device’ would accurately rank those individuals? What qualities would the rankings be based on, and how can a line be drawn to divide the worthy from the unworthy? It is difficult, if not impossible, to place those in political power who are the best fit to have that power. The greatest problem political elitism poses to society is autonomy. If political elites are a law unto themselves, then they can without any checks and balances rule in their own interest. Abuse of power at the expense of the masses becomes a huge risk.

The other category of elitism is that of social-cultural elitism (Metzger & Xiong, 2010). Unlike political elites who are defined by power, social-cultural elites are assumed to be superior for reasons of wealth or knowledge. This is the kind of elitist that is being referred to when the term is used pejoratively to mean a ‘snob,’ or someone who is pretentious. The term usually refers to academics or intellectuals—the very educated and/or the very wealthy. The defense of this type of elite usually considers that they are resources of intelligence. They provide expertise and can produce research/knowledge for the betterment of the masses (Bealey, 1996).

4.2 Social Inequality in Elitism. Experience shows that the existence of elites entails the existence of social inequality; some having wealth, power, and/or knowledge. Given that society upholds ideals of democracy and egalitarianism, is elitism ethical? What makes elitism ethical? Social inequality due to elitism is ethical because of the ability of individuals to have social-movements. A given individual, coming from any social class, is thought to be upwardly mobile to move to any other social class—all that is needed is effort and ability—the resources for upward mobility are available (Simpson, 2009). If this is true, then the main resource for social-movement must be defined as education. There are some instances of social movement without higher education such as the case of Bill Gates. However, in general, education is the most accessible means, a notable case is that of President Barack Obama (Simpson, 2009). Given the ideal of upward mobility, can we say that

everybody has both the ability and opportunity to obtain health, wealth, and happiness—the basic wants and needs of humanity? Status in social hierarchy depends on many factors, some of which include innate ability, effort, will, personal preferences, educational opportunities, cultural factors, environment, parent’s wealth and social class, race, gender, ethnicity, religion, other family and cultural traditions (Barry & Valentini, 2009). If we take an egalitarian approach, internal factors—innate ability, effort, preferences, and perhaps cultural reasons most influence eventual status. The external factors that create inequality can be minimized through educational opportunities. With these factors minimized, one accesses greater freedom and equality over social place. However, this does not guarantee that people will not use their power to control and mistreat people whom they see subservient. Hence there is a need of ‘proper’ education.

5. TWO FUNCTIONS OF EDUCATION

Education’s functions can be divided into two main categories: an economic function, and a function of ‘well-being’ (White, 2002). With respect to economics, it is easy to point out education’s function, which is to prepare individuals for entry into the economic world, to give them the knowledge and expertise to be able to join the working force and provide for themselves monetarily. Since our economic structure is one of capitalism, education is inherently socially unequal due to capitalism’s inherent unequal class structure. Class distinction is not an abstract or arbitrary concept, but a real feature of human economic processes. There is the ‘worker class’ and the ‘ruling class’ and various social levels within these. Education in this view is seen as an instrument to provide and set a pupil’s future ‘utility value’ in the economic system. Education prepares students for competition and the acceptance of inequality in rewards. With this evaluation of education’s purpose, inequality in education is just a necessary component of a capitalist market. Unlike the abolition of racism or sexism, the abolition of class inequalities in education or the market denotes the abolition of something greater—capitalism. So, its abolition is not a viable prospect (Hill, Greaves & Maisuria, 2009).

The other function of education is the promotion of personal ‘well-being.’ This function is a more transcendental-philosophical one and is based on the belief that education aims to help those being educated lead flourishing lives (White, 2002). What is meant by a ‘flourishing life’ and ‘well-being?’

There are two ways to look at what constitutes these definitions—objectively and subjectively. The objective view poses that there is a reliably objective list of components of well-being. The list would include such things as: knowledge and understanding, being self-directed/autonomous in conducting life, accomplishing things that make life meaningful, formation of deep personal relationships, moral goodness, etc. Education, then, should steer students towards these objectives (White, 2002). The subjective view holds that ‘well-being’ consists in the satisfaction of personal subjective desires. There are no objective personal goods that everyone must have for their own good. Rather, personal goods are to be chosen according to one’s own preferences. A way to reconcile these two views is this: the meaning of ‘wellness’ is subjective—but preferences should be well informed to maximally benefit the individual. In other words, information is a prerequisite for maximizing personal satisfaction. Education, then, can be seen as a means to equip individuals for such choices (White, 2002). Everyone has his or her level and version of well-being, and education can provide an informed means for actualizing well-being.

5.1 Inequality in education. Since education was determined to be a universal right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, primary and secondary education have become almost universal in developed countries (Tomasevski, 2003). The inequality, then, lies in post-secondary/tertiary education. Research has shown that inequality in education persists until the advantaged class reaches a point of saturation. Only four countries —Sweden, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have seen marked decrease in education inequality (Grusky & England, 2007). Returning to our egalitarian approach to minimize certain factors in one’s eventual place in the social hierarchy, how can educational inequality best be minimized? The saturation point is difficult to control, so an attempt to lower inequality by reaching saturation point is not viable. The answer is in educational reforms.

5.2 Human dignity in reference to elitism and education. Human dignity is tied to one’s place in society. One’s societal class, then, is strongly connected with this notion. Elitism places greater importance on society’s elite—they are respected for their wealth, power, and knowledge. How is this greater distribution of dignity to be reconciled, when those who are considered ‘less dignified’ are made such by societal constraints?

Opportunities are unevenly distributed in society, but does it then follow that dignity, as well, should be unevenly distributed? I would like to reconcile elitism and education’s inequality with human dignity by positing a philosophical view based on education’s second function: personal well-being. Every individual has a subjective level/quality of well-being. Although inequality exists, each quality of well-being that is attained, from high-school drop-out to college professor, has its own respective kind of dignity. Therefore, human dignity, at all levels, is reserved.

6. HUMANITY AND THE LANGUAGE OF DIGNITY

6.1 Diverse disciplinary perceptions. The concept of humanity is embedded in birth, growth, i.e. evolution in time and space, and human nature. A human, as an embodied being, has been analyzed differently in different disciplines. The triumph in recent years of molecular biology, and consequent achievements in genetics, evolution, medicine, cell physiology and many other fields, has become common knowledge. Despite the deep insight attained by “molecular” biology, the necessity of “organismic” biology has become apparent (Bertalanffy, 2009:6). In psychology, human behavior was to be explained by the mechanistic stimulus-response, conditioning, and according to the pattern of animal experiment. Similarly, widespread confusion and contradictions in contemporary sociological theories led scholars to analyze social phenomena as “systems” because of the unsettled and changing nature of cultural entities (Bertalanffy, 2009:7). In socio-linguistics, we read person’s geographical and social origins, level of education, ethnicity, age, gender and sexuality- the whole range of categorical identities into which we routinely group people (Joseph, 2004:24).

In neurolinguistics, Korzybski (2010:2) has observed that neural disturbances in different individuals vary only in degree, and that they resemble the responses of animals. Korzybski concluded that we humans have not, as of yet, emerged from a very primitive semantic stage of development. The common person’s experience supports Korzybski’s observation that “the more technically developed a nation or race is, the more cruel, ruthless, predatory, and commercialized its systems tend to become. These tendencies, in turn, color and vitiate international, national, capital-labor, and even family relations” (2010:2). Korzybski claims to have found psychophysical mechanisms in all human beings inclusive of

normal, abnormal, educated elites as well as uneducated tribal people. He claims neural disturbances in different individuals vary only in degree. According to Korzybski (2010:3), humans do not use the nervous system properly and that humans have not, as yet, emerged from a primitive stage of development. People have technologically progressed but remained behind in human relations. To abolish the discrepancy between the advancement of science and the power of adjustment of humans, Korzybski (2010:3), suggests the need for the establishment of a science of man, embracing all facets of life.

6.2 Concept of humanity in Indian worldview.

Indian philosophical tradition has extensively developed theories about diverse facets of humanity. Capra (2000) explored the parallels between the

concepts of modern physics and the central ideas in India’s philosophies and has shown that the basic elements of the Indian world-view are also those of the world view emerging from modern physics. India’s philosophical tradition mirrors the geographical, racial, linguistic and cultural complexities of India’s vast subcontinent. Although various philosophical schools differ in many details, they all emphasize interrelation of all phenomena, their symbiotic relationship, and the basic unity of the universe (Junghare, 2009 & 2011). In order to understand the world and the universe, we need to start from the basic unit of humanity, i.e. “human” labeled as “self” in philosophy. The perception of the “self” in Indian philosophy differs from that of the West. Below is the comparative analysis:

7. BODILY-SELF: INDIA AND THE WEST

Table 1. Source: Radhakrishnan & Moore, *A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy* (1957)

Indian View	Socio-cultural implications	Western View
Every life, inclusive of humans, is composed of substance (matter), energy strings, which constantly change according to the laws of nature. Life is marked by probabilities. Theories about origins are assumptions or hypotheses. Absolute reality is indefinable, indescribable and incomprehensible. Both man and nature are organic living entities.	This concept of humanity explains social categories of age, gender, and the place of origin. The categories, ‘young’ and ‘old’, and ‘male’ and ‘female’ are identity labels created through language by cultures. Human is a bi-product of Body + Mind + Spirit (Inner-consciousness)	This view is based on Aristotelian philosophy. Being analytical in nature, it divides human into body-mind categories. It considers ‘rational’ minds of educated elites superior. It is divisive: I vs. You. There is no pronoun in English that is inclusive of I & You. It separates ‘intellect’ from ‘emotion’.
Different life systems—of humans, plants, microbes, and elemental systems – mountains, rivers, and oceans have different properties, attributes, and qualities –but constantly in motion. Language is a representation of thought, ideas and concepts	All systems follow the law of nature – birth, growth, and dissolution. Differences in people and systems should not be viewed as deficiencies, for example, elephant is <i>not</i> inferior to human, nor is the ant.	Humans are composed of permanent substance with properties of finite number. This puts restrictions on human power.
All life systems are inter-connected and interdependent. All life-systems together constitute one universe. Adheres to the philosophy of Unity in diversity. All lives are different but similar in some respects (Junghare 2009, & 2011).	Harming of one person means harming of the whole webbonic social structure. Being of synthetic nature, it respects diversity of people, cultures, languages, thoughts, and beliefs.	Person is divided according to his or her activities, talents, feelings, and beliefs, which are engaged in endless conflicts generating continuous metaphysical confusion and frustration (Capra 2000).

8. LANGUAGE OF HUMANITY: DIGNITY

8.1 Human body language. The scientific concept of a ‘human’ as a ‘psychophysical mechanism’ has been translated as the ‘mind-body’ composite in analytical philosophies of the West.

Religious philosophers have added the dimension of spirituality, making humans the ‘mind-body-spirit’ entities. In Indian philosophy, a human is comprised of diverse body components, including diverse capacities and powers. Since different human beings possess different capacities, it is truly difficult to define a human being. A human is

analyzed as a composite of twenty three parts: five sense organs, five motor organs, five gross elements, five subtle elements, mind, ego-consciousness, and intellect (Puligandla, 1975:118-119). All of these body parts have to work in cooperation in order for body to function properly. Ultimately, it is the body, specifically of ego-consciousness, mind and intellect, that has to take the lead in keeping the body healthy. All body parts are systems onto themselves with abstract linguistic structure. One of the capacities of humans is to create languages, dialects and idiolects. Humans create social constructs or categories for identification. The language of elitism is socially-created language. In reality, the language of the brain and the language of mind, ego and sensations are different dialects of the same human body. None is superior to the other. The language of elitism relates to the brain's processing of knowledge, and the language of emotion is mind's processing of feelings. As a human being, it is hard to create unity in the languages of his/her organs. It is especially difficult to converse with different bodies of different languages and ethnicities because the conceptual deep structures of languages in meaning and function differ just like the languages of elites and commoners differ. A human constantly evolves in response to the socio-cultural and biological environment and so do cultures and languages.

8.2 Language, humanity and the concept of dignity. The concept of 'dignity' has different meanings and usages for different people. For me, as an Indian woman, 'dignity' means to be worthy of recognition and respect; whereas, for my American friends, the word renders the meaning 'pride in oneself.' The first meaning represents the language of my inner feelings that requests the hearer to treat me fairly. The second meaning of self-respect is somewhat egocentric. The role of language in human life is not only to describe the world but also to serve diverse semantic functions: to transmit information, to persuade and control behavior, to create and express social cohesion (S. I. Hayakawa & Alan Hayakawa, 1990). Language utterances have various dimensions: happiness, unhappiness, an illocutionary force, truth value, falsehood, and locutionary meaning (Austin, 1975:149).

With semantic analysis of English and Indian languages, it becomes clear that the language of dignity is a humble/human request to the hearer and to the world for fair and just treatment. On the other hand, the English concept of dignity is

expressive of the value of the self. European languages are subject-oriented, and Indian languages are topic-oriented. In the constant assertion of self or the subject, there is no interaction between the speaker and hearer. The hearer is secondary in value as can be seen in the following example: English: I see you (Subject – verb – object); Marathi: tu mala distes ('You –to me – appear'). The foregoing discussion of diverse perceptions of humanity and the corresponding diverse languages and their deep structures provide us some insight for the understanding of socio-cultural conflicts.

9. CONCLUSION

Being influenced by Cartesian division of body and mind, westerners equate identity with mind, instead of with the whole organism. An individual is seen as an isolated ego residing in his/her body. Further, everyone is split up into various components: talents, feelings, beliefs, and socio-political ideologies. These different components are engaged in endless conflicts and forceful acts. The study of the two dialects of humanity: talent and feelings, elitism and non-elitism, language of power and the language of humanity required the author to look for resolutions in Indian philosophical thought, which is marked by the synthetic approach. Indian philosophy does respect the analytical philosophy of the West that has helped humanity's advancement in sciences and technology. However, it has been seen detrimental to human welfare as an analytical approach mainly focuses on the "bottom line". The Indian philosophical view helps to fill the gap between the language of the machine and the language of humanity. According to the Indian view, a division of the human, nor of humanity, nor of the universe is fundamental. The Indian view of the world is organic. All things and events perceived by the senses are interrelated and are different manifestations of the same ultimate reality. Humanity is a part of the cosmos, one inseparable reality—constantly in motion, alive, organic, spiritual, and material at the same time. The language of humanity is also one language with different dialects and idiolects, which change depending on the needs of adjustment for survival. However, the language of human dignity of recognition and respect stands at the center of humanity as the major language, equivalent to the language of food for human life's survival. The language of dignity also serves as a means for peaceful inter-cultural communication and finding

peaceful solutions for the common problems facing humanity.

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INTERCULTURAL APPROACH IN EDUCATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING PROCESSES

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Abstract: *The need to give coordinates to the new training processes and together with them to the new professional figures that will appear openly to manage them hasn't emerged as much as in these last years. The coordinates could be as follows: the expansion of the needs of knowledge and the demand for greater productivity to learn. Particularly it is good to question the assumption on the possible definition and position that the figure "of the expert in the training processes" has. It is necessary to follow a certain line of development starting with those that are the indicators of the new requirements of professionalism that are originated from different organizations and then with the consequential assignments of the new expansion of training.*

Keywords: *education; training; knowledge, organizations, knowledge*

1. INTRODUCTION

The need to give coordinates to the new training processes and together with them to the new professional figures that will appear openly to manage them hasn't emerged as much as in these last years. The coordinates could be as follows: the expansion of the needs of knowledge and the demand for greater productivity to learn. Particularly it is good to question the assumption on the possible definition and position that the figure "of the expert in the training processes" has. It is necessary to follow a certain line of development starting with those that are the indicators of the new requirements of professionalism that are originated from different organizations and then with the consequential assignments of the new expansion of training. When it is spoken of requirement it is referred to that expressed in the business ambit and some researchers conducted in different European countries confirm the requirement for the best preparation and more elevated levels of knowledge. The enterprises foresee a very consistent growth of the education in the low and intermediate levels and they particularly show a strong interest toward the post-diploma specializations and the university diplomas. Based on this reason, the demands of technical competence and flexibility of the employees are grown which should meet the changes of market, and besides business ambit, they have to reduce the wastes and improve the quality of the products evermore.

Concerning the entirety of the demanded competences which should be concretized in the field of the specific business operation, the most demanded component is that of technical-specific type, with a connotation of diagnostic ability (to interpret and treat the information) and reporting (to know how to communicate effectively, and collaborate with the others), with a significant importance for the decisional abilities. Referring to the ways and typologies of training, the results of the researches concerning the business ambit, openly confirm the expansion in progress of the needs to learn and understand; accordingly the importance of the role of the expert is reinstated in different situations by the traditional forms of teaching in classrooms. Synthesizing from what has been said, some meaningful indications are deduced: the training demand for all the levels is obviously grown; it is finally emphasized that

we are daily more and more affronted with the interlacement among technical components and transversal capabilities of the professionalism among which a great need of "educability" of the people emerges and the diversification of the roles, of the figures of the subjects that are part of the training (Di Nubila, 1997:213-214).

2. THE ROLE OF THE TRAINING PROCESSES

In a more and more shattered and disorientated social reality, the training should contain new

assignments, prepare professional capacities that are able to meet the demands and the unforeseen events, check and govern the new processes of innovation. This is a qualified engagement of the trainers: to participate with a proper original contribution of research and innovation in the processes of change inside which the contemporary world is absorbed. In order to respond to this reality, concerning training, a more and better defined fact starts to delineate which means the emergence of a new logic based on the interlacement of four fundamental dimensions:

the ability of innovation, the reversal of the quality-quantity relationship, the centrality of the human resource, the ability of listening and learning (Lipari, 1994:67).

The assignments of the training are synthesized as follows: first of all devoting attention to the importance that the learning gets, keeping in mind the decisive meaning of the experience and the capabilities of the subject to contextualize, also taking in consideration what is really important for the learning and the capability to catch the significance of proper actions. The increase of awareness that mostly interests the action of the training, except knowing, knowing how to do, (ability) and knowing how to be, (behaviors) it is the ability of the actors to orient themselves in the organizations, having as a constant reference point the dimensions of change and the necessity of the real centrality of human resource. Considering the increasing complexity that today's reality introduces, mentioned above in a very superficial way, the question that comes out is: who should face and guide the challenge that is introduced nowadays in the training actions. The most common answer is the trainer but the profession of the trainer is almost an indefinable one and for this profession it is asked, which is its identity, which can be the new profile of the "expert of the training processes"?

The first thing that is obvious is the concept of profession, by emphasizing the determining importance of knowledge as a premise of the abilities, to the competences and the professional behaviors and apart from this, a clear reference is evident to the relational reciprocity between profession and training process. This represents a new way of considering the profession, which is the combination of knowledge, ability and operational moments together with the culture of the job relationships, environment, and innovation.

3. THE TRAINER AS A FACILITATOR

The new trainer should learn to know the various facets of today's training, the multiplicity of quarters, the variety of needs, and the consciences that training is not, but occurs. The expert in the training processes, therefore, should not be the one who works "to give" a configuration to the human development, according to a model rigidly pre-arranged and according to the classical idea of the training, but a "facilitator" capable to activate proposals with the same subjects of training together and to create opportunities of improvement of the abilities, stimulation, activation and consequent behaviors. In other words, the expert has to accomplish the role of facilitator on learning and towards such role some characteristics are individualized, among which the communicative, didactical and methodological capabilities, the pedagogic and psychological sensibility and, finally, management of situations of organizational complexity. In addition to the above mentioned abilities, it is essential in the training capacity, the ability not only to report in and with the context, but also the involvement of subject agents in the training action. Furthermore, the trainer is the one who perceives the change, and who knows how to drive the change in its training action reducing the fear and the sense of uncertainty that every change can involve; in fact, he can come out as "an expert able to start strategies without operating any manipulations" (Nanni, 1989:54).

In the organizations, the expert should be a strongly integrated figure in the logics of development of the same organization, in his business he is not the expert of the emergent situations anymore, but the expert of learning, the man of cultural stimulation and not certainly the man of teaching. Training becomes strategic and important in the sense of learning and result and the trainer is really the one who teaches the others how to learn and to put people in the circumstances to communicate better, that means establishing common shared values.

He constitutes in the organizations a potential of human resources to improve training and in this way two objectives are satisfied that an organizational context should express:

the first one deals with the training that sets objectives of potential and improvement of knowledge, ability and responsibility of the

individuals, the second is that of development that relatively sets an improving change of the functions of the individuals and accordingly to the operation of the organizations (Colapietro, 1997:24).

Briefly, in different environments as schools, enterprises, the organization is the professional that helps people, the roles and the functions that actually are and those which should be.

In this role, the trainer is the man of listening: a listening that activates the psychic and mental sensors and it is more concerned on the way they are both emerged in comparison to the external and internal environment: it is a listening from monitoring and ability to grab what it is functional in the system at that time.

The different expenditures of professional role of this figure is unusual; in the classroom, in the places of employment, side by side as planner and tutor. This plurality of roles has in common the wealth of a great internal resource created from different competences, professional curiosity and great passion for the interesting human situations. The job of the new expert can be demonstrated somehow an unpublished and original job even if not always easy because it asks for great availability and waste of energies. Regardless of that, however, is a gratifying job: to prepare people for challenging assignments creating with them the runs, the cognitive nets and the learning roads; a job that demands long and constant pedagogic preparation, psychological, sociological and above all professional resources, of tools and a variety of updated methodologies. These are the features that should characterize the new figure of the expert in the training processes that today represents an innovation in the field of training and this event is emphasized by Ammeta, as an expert of training:

to the generations of new trainers that begin to practice the profession today, the challenge is introduced to the new trainers of this exceptional program: to create useful tools for the era of the human ware (Lamietta, 1997:219).

After having delineated a profile of the expert in the training process, it is also useful to underline the knowing of the trainers and accordingly his competences. To this intention, it is useful to clarify some definition words such as “knowing”, “competences”, “meta-quality”, “knowledge”, “ability”, being nowadays also the key terms when talking about experts in training processes.

Concerning the knowing of trainers, it is necessary, first of all, a general knowledge of the dynamics of growth and development of the labour

world, of the productive and organizational phenomena involving the enterprises and of the demands of the emerging professionalism. In addition to this, there is a particular knowledge of the macroeconomic context, in which the enterprise acts from the economic-geographical point of view also in the function of the dynamics related to the competition in the market system; finally,

a series of knowledge is essential, contemplated from what are considered as the demands and characteristics of the enterprise and the subjects to be trained (Alessandrini, 1998:40-41).

On the other hand, the competences refer to the knowledge, to the abilities and the so-called meta-qualities. The knowledge is related to everything belonging to the basic knowing of the trainer and it refers to a circle of professional preparation including, apart from the most different specialized knowledge of technical or disciplinary order, the possession of more general cognitive competences regarding the subject organization on one hand and the subject of adults' education on the other hand.

It is obvious that for such a circle of competences, the required preparation is to be understood not only as acquired knowledge, but also as matured experiences (Quaglino, 1990:187).

Whereas the abilities are a more complex frame of “operational abilities” related to the trainer's role. To be more precise, there are two types of abilities: the first one refers to the management operations of the training process and it recalls abilities connected exactly to the control activity of the process itself, of planning of the training sketch; the second refers to the operations connected directly with the carrying out of educational projects, therefore with the activity that leads to the learning of the consumers. In the entirety of these abilities emerges a typical characteristic of the trainer: the pedagogic sensibility that represents the ability to understand, to be aware of what constitutes a potential event in every situation of learning and that signifies therefore the way how to listen and understand.

The meta-qualities are meta-competences ranking over the abilities and knowledge, and a great importance is to be attributed to the awareness of the trainer to individualize a circle of expressible competence as “transparency of himself” or full knowledge of his own motivations, personal values as well as his own resources and possibilities.

A good trainer is above all someone fully aware of his inner world and the effectiveness of the pedagogic relationship depends on the personal, deep and mature awareness that the trainer possesses and is able to express (Quaglino, 1990:190-191).

As in all professions, the trainer also can incur in a series of errors that are due, at times, to inexperience in the field of planning, to a professionalism not yet completely acquired or to an overestimation of the own professionalism, almost synonymous of infallibility. There are errors that can be attributed to the expert's personality and that therefore are related to the whole subjective ambit, to the formation of the personal identity, maturity, and sensibility. Others are due to incapability of communication that mostly starts with an inattentive observation, with an excess of technicality and, finally, other errors attributed to inaccurate knowledge producing difficulties in transferring the knowing into practice, the knowledge into abilities etc. The expert has well precise duties to perform, coinciding in general with the same training function that has to do with opening the doors to change through new possibilities and modalities of learning, with the help of which is realized the passage from theory to practice. One of the first footsteps to be completed, in order to avoid the errors that can be committed and to produce change, will be that of incising human resources, valorising them; then on the project and, finally, on the project's result.

In the moment when the expert undertakes an action aiming to produce innovation, he brings forth an idea, compares it at first with himself and then with the others, re-examines it in group, elaborates the project, verifies it, and finally produces it: in all these phases he has been, in relation to the organization, a supervisor of the change process (Colapietro, 1997:90-93).

Besides the errors that the trainer can commit, there is also another topic related to his job performance: that of the risks by referring to the entirety of difficulties, obstacles, and also of rules and principles of the trainer's work and generally speaking, of the professional practice. There are three topics inherent to this problem that should be underlined: the manipulation, the imaginations and the triangularity and each of them is equivalent to a corresponding risk. Let's clarify again these concepts. The manipulation has to do with the

preoccupation that has been rather diffused for a certain period, that training as a process would mean, in every case, exercising influence: in which, therefore, the educational action can be transformed, not so much in solicitation, activation, guide and orientation of the learning processes, but rather could be practiced resorting to persuasion, belief, and suggestion. Obviously it is not possible to share on the whole this reasoning that manifests somehow a lack of realism since "the fundamental problem of training or better of the trainer has been much more than incising too much, but on the opposite, not incising at all", (Quaglino 1990:171), on the subjects under the process of learning. Referring to this, it is the topic of imaginations that constitutes the most specific circle of reflection and debate on the trainer's risks to a level of a greater theoretical examination. In this case, the risks would be preferable to the incapability to recognize the plurality of figures that in order to define the trainer, can be evoked or activated in situations of training from the subjects being under this process and everything constitutes a risk and all this expresses confusion in these subjects in relation to their role and identity. Finally, an importance of another kind must be attributed to the triangularity indicating the type of relationship among the different parts, that training activity summons to this cause; the trainer: the one who manages the process or that leads the training action; the committer: those who, by acting inside the organization, find themselves directly involved as promoters of a training intervention. The consumer: constituted by those who will directly get involved in the formation because of their participation in the course. The risk of triangularity is that of every complex relationship in the sense of the possible confusion, of the game of the implicated objectives, of the misunderstandings and particularly for the trainer, to act in a manipulative way in comparison to the other parts involved in the relationship. Therefore, the risk is that of uncertainty, and insecurity of respective roles:

what constitutes an element of complication for the action of the trainer is what requires, obviously and above all, a trainer to be able to recognize, to state explicitly and to resolve effectively (Quaglino, 1990:172-173)

As it was already stated, the expert in the training processes has the essential assignment to sustain the change – a change understood not only as a development and improvement especially in

the business ambit, but also in the traditional sense of the term, which has never been as actual as nowadays due to continuous modifications of the referent parameters related to society, economy etc. – to incise into the human resources and then valorise them. This represents a new way of thinking and working in the organization and refers to a theory that, in the recent years, is spreading more and more: the empowerment.

4. LEADERSHIP EMPOWERING

Another type of expression is also used, “leadership empowering” (Piccardo, 1995:18), intending to say that people need to find new, particular ways of working, in order to respect anyone, despite sex, age, social class, race and position. Empowerment points out a phase of change, the final one, in which the change is consolidated by being spread and promoting apprehension of the new rules of the game, the systems reform. The use of such a term aims to underline the importance of promoting the personal growth that is at the base of possibility, so that the new way of the organization’s functioning becomes an experience of all the individuals. A first difficulty derives from a breaking that is recorded in the literature concerning the opportunity to consider the empowerment as a process rather than as a function. Even in the diversity of concessions and definitions, an element in common is represented by the connotation that the term assumes, denoting situations considered positive and useful. One of the many definitions is the one given by Bruscaioni, according to whom

the empowerment is the process of amplification (through the best use of the actual available and potential resources) of the opportunities the subject can use and make operative and among which he can then choose (Bruscaioni, 1994:124).

It represents the organizational condition, in which everyone manages himself autonomously and is able to interact with everyone else within the system. The empowerment is a mental state, a way of thinking; its process has begun as we become aware that in order to change the bureaucratic organizations and to transform them into entrepreneurial undertakings, we needed to start it from ourselves. It is necessary to put into effect behaviours based on trust, autonomy, being involved in the creation and support of an ambitious vision, considering in the first place the

attainment of the enterprise objectives and only in the second one those of the personal career. All those people who are interested in this theory launch a series of appeals so that a more human enterprise is created, being aware that this means to revolutionize the managerial and organizational theories, to really consider “the people in the first place”, to provide them with the necessary power, so that their energies are activated and committed to the creation of cooperative relationships. In the last analysis,

the empowerment reinforces the idea already consolidated and diffused of the necessity of a new way of thinking and envisioning not only the enterprise, but also the employee, not only the job relationships, but also the leadership model, putting an end to a series of alienations of the worker from the product, process, and profits (Piccardo, 1995:21-22).

In this organizational panorama of a new kind there is a central element of every model of organizational transformation, which is the dialogue. It remains in the basis of effectiveness of every group action. The objective of dialogue is to make the group able to reach a higher level of awareness and creativeness through the gradual formation of a system of shared meanings and a common process of thought. It is not related to the active listening to the one’s and other people’s feelings, promoted by the human relationships, but it concerns the deep analysis of the one’s and other people’s assumed cognitive and the expression of the complexity of thought, relations, prejudices involved in our cognitive processes. In a situation of empowerment also attitudes, feelings, and characteristics of the person involved in this new reality are changed: in this ways, is delineated a profile of narcissist personality, yet able to cooperate with the organizational actors in order to produce that useful performance to pursue the expected collective results.

In a situation of empowerment, people love their job, because they do what better utilizes their potentials, they are entertained by their job, feel optimistic and trust their own capacities. The system of values that sustains this profile of personality is completely different from the hierarchical-bureaucratic model, which values are: the safety, the protection, the deep respect for the authority that generates dependence and, at times, total submission. On the contrary, the system of values of the empowered person includes the personal dignity, the freedom, the respect for oneself and the others, including the possibility of

a critical and conflicting exchange, the responsibility, the gentleness, intertwined with the willpower and determination in search of the truth and synthesis of diversity. The process of empowerment can signify then a true resolution, or better, a passage from an entirety of bureaucratic-hierarchical values to another one that can be defined as entrepreneurial-emancipating.

5. LAST REMARKS

A last concept to be analyzed in relation to the empowerment is the power and the way it is implemented. The exercising of power is always and only within a mutual relationship, even if not symmetrical, where the different degrees of the individuals' freedom are put into question: nobody is totally free, nobody is totally determined, the dependence is somehow mutual. The conception of power can be defined as inter-subjective and interactionist: it is a power that increases the possibilities of individual expressiveness, and not one that limits the personal freedom; the power as resource of cooperation and exchange among equals; the power that doesn't deny the conflict, the oppositions, but intending to transcend them searching for reciprocity and harmony and not peace at all costs without producing neither war, nor domination of a part on the other. And it still remains a self-legitimated power on the basis of the attribution of dignity and elevated potentiality to the other, and in relation to which it is assumed an educative role in the name of the ideal of the other's growth: this is the case of empowering. To know the other and to make him grow, assume in this context the meaning of self-knowing and self-

developing; it is a common birth, a common search, a fertile meeting, from which what can emerge is unknown in departure. In conclusion, it can be stated that the exercise of inter-subjectivity is authentically communicative. The empowerment is a process of total use of the inherent potentialities within the dynamics of the inter-subjective exchanges of the organizational authors at all levels.

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INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION AS AN ASSET FOR ENSURING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *Intercultural communication is a field of study that enables us to interact effectively and appropriately across cultures. The field of intercultural communication is based on the insight that communication everywhere contains traces of culture (s) and that cultural values are displayed in communication behavior. The field is often aligned with socio-linguistics, cultural anthropology, and cross-cultural psychology – however, practitioners in the field of intercultural communication focus on communication in context as their primary theoretical concern. This paper argues that, in today's interconnected world, effective intercultural communication is a strategic enabler of international security: knowledge and skills at the heart of the field of intercultural communication are a natural platform for advancing international security. Therefore, developing intercultural communication skills can improve the quality of intercultural interactions which leads to minimizing misunderstanding and conflict. Cross-cultural relations and negotiation are dependent on communication skills, which make them foundational to cross-cultural competence. The knowledge, motivation, and skills to interact effectively and appropriately with members of different cultures are necessary in order to maintain international collaboration among countries and to ensure international peace.*

Keywords: *intercultural communication; security; conflict; cultural values; strategy*

1. INTRODUCTION

Since an early age, I had to face the challenge of interacting and communicating with people from other countries, who spoke a different language and grew up in a different culture, with a different set of values and norms. At first, I saw this as an opportunity to learn a new language and to get to know the culture that was related to, but it soon became an important aspect of my whole life which turned into a difficult, but beautiful, intercultural journey. During high school, I used to participate almost every month in international meetings organized by the European Youth Parliament where I faced another challenge that eventually formed and developed my intercultural communication skills completely. In less than a week, I had to get to know and understand the different perspectives that my committee colleagues had, despite the fact that each of us was coming from different countries in Europe. We were challenged to communicate efficiently, debate and get to a common ground on a certain topic against the cultural barriers that we all felt at first.

Until today, the committee experience in this international organization has remained the best

example that I can give of intercultural communication, an example that supports the hypothesis of this paper as well. It is very interesting to watch how ten to fifteen teenagers and youth from different countries get together and become a united team in less than a few days, debate the current topic that was given and find solutions to the problems that are raised through an intercultural and interdisciplinary process. The committee work, the resolution writing, the way cultural and linguistic barriers are passed and used in their own advantage still amazes me, and the reason why I am sharing this personal experience at the beginning of this paper is because I strongly believe that it stays at the basis of my hypothesis. It also stood at the bases of my formation as an adult through the influence that it had on the choices that I made afterwards. I moved to a foreign culture to study (the United Kingdom) and from there to another culture (Syria) even more different and, to many, harder to adapt. I formed my family uniting two cultures, and both my professional and personal life became a perfect example of what intercultural communication is. This is how I started to look at the interactions between cultures not only from the theoretical

perspective, but also from the practical, day to day experiences that I have had so far.

Therefore this paper argues that, in today's interconnected world, effective intercultural communication is a strategic enabler of international security because knowledge and skills that are promoted and developed at the heart of the field of intercultural communication are a natural platform for advancing international security and for creating the platform for dialogue and negotiation in international conflicts. Still, it is important to underline that this paper does not argue that intercultural communication alone is the key to solving the international security challenges of the 21st century. It would be naive to assume that just with the promotion, understanding and development of intercultural communication skills the war and intercultural conflict would end. However, the existence of these problems does emphasize the need for both individuals/civilians and people who work in the field of politics, international relations and security to learn more about the interaction with different cultures.

The paper has three main parts: 1) it gives an insight of the concept of international communication and its development; 2) it presents shortly the field of international security and the main challenges that it faces nowadays; 3) it explains the ways in which intercultural communication can become an asset for ensuring international security.

2. INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

Both culture and communication have complex meanings and need to be defined. While the culture that we belong to provides us with a set of standards that govern how, when, what, and even why we communicate, one must first understand the concept of culture itself in order to appreciate how it influences communication.

2.1 Culture. Culture is a very popular and increasingly overused term in contemporary society. Nowadays, we are all familiar with expressions such as cultural differences, cultural diversity, multiculturalism, corporate culture, cross-culture, and other variations that continually appear in the popular media. The field of culture has extended and became connected to other fields like corporate management, health care, psychology, education, public relations, marketing, and advertising.

The use of the term culture is broad and should not be limited to the role that it plays in our day to

day lives. We should first acknowledge that 'culture' means much more than that. And, as a simple example, it often happens to hear about cases of military forces operating in different corners of the world without having the necessary knowledge and understanding of the local culture. Therefore the meaning of culture reaches far beyond our daily activities, conversations and traditions to fields such as the one of security.

It is rather hard to provide just one definition of just what constitutes culture or exactly what culture does. Alike the other term analyzed in this part – communication, the term culture has been treated from different angles and has been given a variety of complex, sometimes abstract, definitions. Some of them will be provided further on.

Sir Edward Burnett Tylor (1920:83), a British anthropologist has defined culture as a "complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society". Although very old, the definition is still prevailing. Personally, I would replace society with group, as the society can be formed out of more than one cultural group and the elements counted by Sir Edwards represent a group better than a whole society. A short but concise definition is provided by Ruth Benedict (1959:16): "What really binds men together is their culture—the ideas and the standards they have in common". This definition is simple and true, but presents just one facet of the term culture – the binding force that it has. However, culture is more than just a binding power; it is also an element of difference, individuality, even conflict, if we take into consideration intercultural conflicts that are becoming more and more present at different levels and scales. Clifford Geertz (1973:89) provides a more complex explanation and defines culture as "a historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life". Among the three definitions that were chosen, I consider the last one to be the closest to the purpose of this paper.

There is also an exemplified, practical and easier to understand explanation of culture that reflects its complexity at the same time. If we think about the word 'football' and try to visualize the representation that we give it according our understanding, the results are: most U.S. Americans will envision two teams of eleven men each in helmets and pads; someone in Montréal,

Canada, would imagine twelve men per team; a resident of Sidney, Australia, may think of two eighteen-man teams in shorts and jerseys competing to kick an oblong ball between two uprights; a young woman in Sao Paulo, Brazil, would probably picture two opposing teams of eleven men, or women, attempting to kick around ball into a net. It is true that in each of the identified cases, 'football' is a sport contest, but the playing fields, equipment, and rules of each game are quite different.

By the use of these examples, the paper provided an applied explanation of 'culture' as representing the rules for living and functioning in society. The analogy with a game is not a coincidence, because culture provides the rules for playing the game of life (Gudykunst, 2004; Yamada, 1997).

2.2 Communication. Alike culture, communication has been defined in various forms, reflecting every time the author's objective or a specific context. In the trial to bring together as many aspect of communication as possible, the authors usually come up with long and abstract definitions that are rather hard to digest for the reader. There are also cases in which the definition provided for communication is succinct or just designed to explain a specific type or instance of communication. Bearing in mind the purpose of this paper and the relation that we draw between culture and communication, a short and precise definition is preferred. Thus, to serve the aim of this piece of work, communication is the management of messages with the objective of creating meaning (Griffin, 2005:167).

It is also relevant in this context to quote the definition provided by the media critic and theorist James Carey who explains communication as "a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired and transformed" in his 1992 book "Communication as Culture." According to Carey, individuals define their reality via sharing their experiences with others (1992:18). In other words, each of us creates his or her reality according to the message of communication. From this angle, the importance of communication becomes crucial.

2.3 Intercultural communication. Made up by two terms that were already of high complexity, intercultural communication can be defined as summoning the "knowledge, motivation, and skills to interact effectively and appropriately with members of different cultures" (Wiseman, 2002:

208). Seen as a skill or competence, intercultural communication must be developed and practiced by any individual of the 21st century and it should be one of the most important elements that provide peace and balance in our societies. In other words and seen from a larger context, globalization has brought about the realization that modern societies must learn to cooperate in order to prevent their mutual self destruction.

Firstly, we should agree that our world has changed and we live in an era where intercultural communication skills are not just an asset anymore; they are a requirement. This observation comes from the fact that it has never been so easy for people from different nations and ethnicities to meet and interact as it is today. This has been achieved through various, fast and amazing advances in technology that now allow people to move quickly and easily across vast distances, both physically and virtually.

Therefore, the role of intercultural communication and its efficient use is to help bridge cultural differences, mitigate problems, and assist in achieving more harmonious, productive relations. In the paper "State of the art themes in cross-cultural *communication research: A systematic and meta-analytic review*", Merkin, Taras, & Steel (2013:15) reveal that the most common hypotheses related to the link between cultural values and communication behaviour are devoted to: indirectness, self-promotion, face saving concerns, attitudes towards silence, openness, interruption, personal space, high context communication, deception, dramatise and ritualism. According to the authors, an understanding of these communication patterns is integral to beginning the process of building relationships across cultures.

3. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

3.1 International security's field. The importance of semantics is relevant for the analysis of the term "international security" in order to understand the sense of urgency and significance that it carries along. Adrian Hyde-Price pointed out that securitizing an issue means removing it from the regular political discourse and "signal[ing] a need for it to be addressed urgently and with exceptional means" (Hyde-Price, 2001: 38). So far, the concept and study of international security has been understood as the study of the use of force between nations, with a particular focus on the role of great powers. This reflected the realist perspective that international security involved the

territorial integrity of nations and the greatest threat to such territorial integrity was posed by wars between states, and particularly between great powers (Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1998:18). But, the spectrum of international security has actually changed in the current times and focused on other elements beyond the state and great powers. This is explained by the current challenges to the security of our international society and the evolution of threats to our international security.

3.2 Current challenges to the international security. The twenty-first century has changed the traditional perspective of 'security' and brought new forms to the international security. Among the changes, we can count the following: the origin of threats (threats are no longer primarily coming from states, or just from states; threats are coming from ethnic groups obsessed by hyper nationalism, from criminal gangs, Mafiosi governance, from epidemics, AIDS, terrorism, dangerous food, from poverty, from economic mismanagement, from over-population, from failed states, from flows of refugees, and, most importantly, from pollution and the effects of pollution, the irrigation and destruction of nature, and the diversification of nature); the victims of the new threats are primarily the single individual (individual or human security), society (societal security), and the globe (global security); the physical and economical survival of the individual is threatened; the survival of societies is threatened, as concerns identity and coherence; the survival of the world as we know it is threatened in the long-run. Therefore, it can be emphasized that there is a common, global awareness of the necessity of fighting for the sustainability of the globe (Bertel Heurlin and Kristensen, 2002:695).

Another proof of the changing spectrum of international security that also emphasizes the role of culture and intercultural communication is the expanded definition of security calls for a wider range of security areas by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA):

- Economic: creation of employment and measures against poverty.
- Food: measures against hunger and famine.
- Health: measures against disease, unsafe food, malnutrition and lack of access to basic health care.
- Environmental: measures against environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters and pollution.

- Personal: measures against physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence and child labor.

- Community: measures against inter-ethnic, religious and other identity tensions.

- Political: measures against political repression and human rights abuses.

Therefore, OCHA's range of security areas proves that human security elements have evolved to a new and wider dimension, as they go beyond military protection and engage threats to human dignity. Accordingly, it has become necessary for states to make conscious efforts towards building links with other states and to consciously engage in global security initiatives. And this can only be achieved through successful dialogue and cooperation based on efficient intercultural communication.

4. THE RELATION BETWEEN INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Firstly, we have to acknowledge the fact that intercultural communication skills represent the essential foundation on which international security enabling practices such as conflict resolution and negotiation are built. There are different perspectives or practical fields in which intercultural communication can help maintain international security: 1) at individual level, through developing culturally-relevant knowledge, increasing self-awareness and other-awareness, transforming mindsets, affective habits and behaviours in order to communicate competently and adaptively across cultures; 2) at regional/national level, through policies that promote and support intercultural communication (such as the ones that focus on migration or minorities), intercultural bridge national programs (culture, music, art, sports or any other field in which organized activities can bring together people from different cultures and get them to know and understand each other and collaborate), educational programs that develop the intercultural communication competences naturally from early age; 3) at international level, through international policies that promote and support intercultural communication (for example, allocating special funds to projects that put intercultural communication into practice), through measures against inter-ethnic, religious and other identity tensions such conflict resolution and negotiation methods that are based on intercultural communication competences (with trained personnel).

The unique contribution made by intercultural communication skills at any of the presented levels is their applicability regardless of the language spoken or the location of the interaction because these foundational skills enable people to interact more effectively in both a newly acquired language and their own native tongue.

There is a field directly related to international security where the role of intercultural communication has been understood and promoted recently – the military who serve in operations outside the borders. In today's culturally diverse operational environment, individuals ranging from commanding officers to strategic sergeants often rely on the war fighting capabilities of negotiating and relationship-building to accomplish their mission. However, if negotiation and cross-cultural relations represent the entryway to success in this environment, communication skills are the keys needed to open the door.

An illustrative example given by Triandis' (1994: 29) who claims that the first Gulf War could have been avoided had the parties involved been better educated about nonverbal communication patterns:

On January 9, 1991, the foreign minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, and the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, met in Geneva to attempt a last-minute compromise that would avoid a war. Seated next to Aziz was the half brother of Iraq's President, Saddam Hussein. The half-brother kept calling Baghdad to provide Hussein with his evaluation of what was going on. Baker used the verbal channel of communication almost exclusively and said very clearly that the U.S. would attack if Iraq did not move out of Kuwait. The Iraqis, however, paid less attention to what Baker said and most attention to how he said it. Hussein's half-brother reported to Baghdad that the Americans will not attack. They are weak. They are calm. They are not angry. They are only talking. Six days later, the United States unleashed Operation Desert Storm ...and Iraq lost close to 175,000 citizens.

Triandis further suggests that if Baker had pounded the table, yelled, and shown outward signs of anger to communicate intent nonverbally, the Iraqis may have decoded Baker's message the way he intended and the outcome may have been entirely different. Situations such as these are the focus of intercultural communication research which examines patterns of interaction in order to predict misunderstanding.

The example given by Triandis is by far not the only one and it can be extended to current

international security operations, whose success depends on micro-relations whether they occur at the negotiation table or on the battlefield. Such high-impact interpersonal interactions determine whether or not the practices of partnership-building or negotiating can even begin. Whereas macro-level international security often focuses on long term strategic goals between nations, micro-level international security entails the interpersonal interactions necessary to put such goals into action. In the book "Powerful Peace", J. Robert DuBois calls for the relentless pursuit of interpersonal and international peacekeeping as an imperative to global security (2012:54). DuBois captures the essence of the relationships that stay at the foundation of the micro-level international security necessary to put such goals into action. And he is not the only one to support it. In the famous Turkish series "The valley of wolves" that present the fight of the Turkish military against the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK, there is a scene that reflects the same message. The commander and one of the officers are separated during the battle from the other members of the army and they shoot back at the terrorists trying to get back to their fellows. Angry and stressed, the commander tells the officer: 'It is all the fault of these bloody Kurds. All the bad things happen because of them'. The officer, shy and frightened, answers: 'Commander, with all the respect, I am a Kurd, too.' The commander replies without any hesitation: 'You may be, but I know you personally.' The scene reflects once again how interpersonal relations can change the rules of the game and redefine intercultural conflicts and collaborations.

As emphasized by DeBois (2012:73), it is here, at the micro-level of international security that the make-or-break policy moments occur. Like any other human relationship, cooperative alliances are formed or dissolved one conversation at a time. Improving the quality and outcomes of such conversations is a main focus of intercultural communication research – which makes it distinct from the study of language alone. Whereas linguistic competence is concerned with the ability to speak a language, communication competence is concerned with the ability to use a language effectively and appropriately in context. Therefore, it is not enough to teach the military only a foreign language in order to send them in special missions abroad, but more important than the language are the intercultural communication competencies that they have to develop in order to adapt and develop useful inter-personal relations that can serve for the success of the mission.

4. CONCLUSIONS

This paper argued that the knowledge and skills at the heart of the field of intercultural communication, promoted and applied at different levels, represent important elements to ensure international security. Therefore, in order to develop the necessary intercultural communication competence, leadership must "ensure proper application and institutionalization of these [knowledge and skill] competencies within education, training, assessment and daily application" (McDonald *et al.*, 2008:2). This can be done at both regional/national and international level through various national and international policies, programs (also educational programs) and activities.

To sum up, although we accept that intercultural communication alone is not the key to solving the international security challenges of the 21st century, developing intercultural communication skills can improve the quality of intercultural interactions which leads to minimizing misunderstanding and conflict at individual, regional, national and international level. Cross-cultural relations and negotiation are dependent on communication skills, which make them foundational to cross-cultural competence. The knowledge, motivation, and skills to interact effectively and appropriately with members of different cultures are necessary in order to maintain international collaboration among countries and to ensure international peace.

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CULTURAL COMPETENCE - A NECESSITY FOR THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS

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Abstract: *The impact of cultural elements on mental health professionals is so powerful that interculturalism is seen as a defining feature of current psychology. Moreover, interculturalism is considered to be "the fourth paradigm" in the field of clinical psychology, along with psychoanalysis, behaviorism and humanism. This study addresses the importance of acquiring a cultural competence in order to achieve and train some of the skills to communicate effectively in a pluralistic democratic society. A lot of European documents underlining the importance of intercultural competence to be active citizens. We will analyze the three basic ingredients of cultural competence required by the clinical psychologist and the psychotherapist: self-awareness of one's own culture, knowledge of other cultures, and the development of culturally appropriate clinical skills. We will discuss the perspectives of several multicultural experts in the field of mental health, as well as the specificities of the Romanian cultural space. Special attention will be paid to the Romanian culture-bound syndromes (the evil eye and the nervous breakdown), and to the variables that clinical psychologists should consider when they appreciate their clients' backgrounds.*

Keywords: *clinical work; cultural competence; Romanian culture-bound syndromes*

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the present study, culture is understood as a frame of reference and, in a broad sense, includes ethnographic variables (ethnicity, nationality, language, religion), demographic variables (age, gender, place of residence), status variables (social, educational, economic) and affiliations (formal and informal). The emphasis is on the "gained experience" of the psychology services beneficiary, a perspective that proposes an inductive, reflective, meaning-focused and contextualized learning method.

In the context of a wide range of social and cultural diversity, a "cultural competence" is required from the mental health specialist. He is often confronted with people belonging to different populations. A common theme in almost all conceptualizations of cultural competence is the practitioner's need to gain a more complete and deeper understanding of the client's "vision on the world" and "cultural frame of reference". Numerous authors have written practical guides for working with clients/ patients belonging to diverse populations (Pope-Davis & Coleman, 1997; McGoldrick, Giordano & Garcia-Preto, 2005; Sue, Ivey & Pedersen, 1996).

In order to make a distinction between universality and cultural specificity, Dana (2005) proposes the terms of *ethic* and *emic* that derive from the field of linguistics from *phonetic* and *phonemic*. The phonetic term is used for those sounds that are common to all languages, and the phonemic for those sounds that are specific to a particular language. The *ethic* perspective, which is prevalent in the early years of psychology, emphasizes the similarities between people, while it attaches no importance to the cultural differences between them. The *emic* perspective differs from the *ethic* one by recognizing and emphasizing specific cultural norms. By adopting the *emic* perspective, as a result of the multicultural boom, the specialist takes into account the customer's feelings, thoughts and behaviors from the perspective of his client culture rather than impose the norms of another culture on the client. Through an empathic effort, persons from different cultural groups should be understood "*in their language*". "With respect to empathic understanding, it may prove helpful for a practitioner to comprehensively respond to a client by maintaining an awareness of a person's functioning from multiple cultural perspectives (Clark, 2007:25).

2. CULTURAL DIVERSITY OF THE BENEFICIARIES OF PSYCHOLOGY SERVICES IN ROMANIA

Along with the Romanian community, there are various other ethnic communities with specific cultural traditions. Transylvania, Banat, Bucovina and Dobrogea are the regions with the highest ethnic diversity in Romania. According to the 2011 census, the minority population represents about 11% of the total population of 20.1 million inhabitants. The most important minorities in Romania are Hungarian (about 58.9% of all minorities), followed by Roma (29.8% of minorities), Ukrainians (2.44% of minorities), Germans (1.73%), Turks (1.33%), Russian-Lipovans (1.13%) and less than 1% (each) of minorities: Tatars, Serbs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Croats, Greeks, Jews, Italians, Poles, Czech and other minorities.

On the other hand, a phenomenon we face is that of the Romanians' migration to Europe. According to a recent United Nations report, our country is on second place in a world's top of migration. More than 3.4 million Romanians are registered as working abroad or settled there with their families (Italy, Spain, England, etc.). Upon their return to the country, the Romanian mental health specialist must take into account the phenomenon of acculturation manifested in their case. Being in a new cultural environment, they respond in a wide variety of ways either by adopting the new elements of the new culture or by retaining the elements of their culture of origin. In recent years, we have seen a significant increase in the number of psychotherapy sessions offered to young people going to study in the West, confronted with various symptoms of depression and/or anxiety.

In the context of current multiculturalism, it is necessary to take into account the specific cultural elements of clients who require psychological help and integrate them into our theories and therapies. Only in this way clients will feel truly understood. We promote in this context the idea of a "*bespoke therapy*" in which the shape, cadence, style of psychotherapy, as well as the cultural aspects of the client will be taken into account in order to be adapted to the needs of each individual client. The basic question is like: "*Who or what better suits this person, couple, family or group in terms of their cultural aspects?*". The mental health specialist will need to determine exactly what type of relationship and therapeutic strategies are best suited to each case and under what conditions. The

problem is how to match or adjust the treatment to the client and not vice versa.

2.2 Culture-bound Romanian syndromes: the nervous breakdown (*crizele de nervi*) and the evil eye (*deochiul*). From a clinical perspective, cultural differences have been shown to bias the accuracy of a therapist's diagnostic impressions of clients from diverse cultures (Clark, 2007:26). Ethnographic epistemology comes to broaden the understanding of the client's cultural frame of reference and provides a way to explore the complexity of that experience from the point of view of those who live it. From this perspective, we will analyze two syndromes specific to our cultural environment: the nervous breakdown and the evil eye in Romanians.

The nervous breakdown is characterized by symptoms of intense emotional upset, including: acute anxiety, anger or grief, uncontrollable shouts or screams, depression, crying, tremor, chest heat sensation, verbal and physical aggression. A general feature of the nervous breakdown is the sense of being out of control. Patients describe the emergence of these crises as a direct result of a stressful event relating to the family, such as the news of the death of a close relative, conflicts with their partner or children, an accident involving a family member. In a small proportion of individuals, the nervous breakdown doesn't seem to be triggered by any particular event. In these cases, their vulnerability to losing control comes from the accumulated experience of suffering.

Related conditions in DSM-5 (2013) with the *nervous breakdown* are: panic attack, panic disorder, major depressive disorder, dysthymia, other specified or unspecified dissociative disorders, conversion disorder. The phrase "suffering from nerves" ("*a fi bolnav de nervi*") by manifestation of a nervous breakdown, is associated especially with anxiety and depression. Related conditions in other cultural contexts are: *nevra* to the Greeks, *nierbi* to the Italians, *crise de nerfs* to the French, *ataques de nervios* to the Spanish, short episodes of *blacking out* in USA.

Another syndrome specific to the Romanian cultural environment is *the evil eye* ("*deochiul*"). It can be a cultural explanation for various medical and psychiatric disorders. In this explanatory model, excessive admiration combined with envy and malice cause people to harm their enemies by sending illnesses such as depression, headaches, nausea, tired sleep or insomnia, the inability to perform activities of daily living. In the etiological model it is admitted that the illness can be caused

by the envy and malice of some people, provoked by the victim's economic success as evidenced by a new job or expensive purchase. It is believed that if a person wins, this will cause a loss to another, and for this reason the visible success of an individual makes him vulnerable to the evil eye. The best cure, in the unanimous sense of the experts, is the red thread that protects you from the evil eye, the wearing of gold ornaments, the wearing of a garment inside out or a clove of garlic in your pocket. Related conditions in other cultural contexts are: *maladi moun* (literally "humanly caused illness" or "sent sickness" present in Haitian communities), the "evil eye" in the Spanish (*mal de ojo*) or Italian (*mal'occhiu*) cultural space. The acute onset of new symptoms or an abrupt behavioral change raises the suspicions of a spiritual attack. Therefore, an attractive, rich and intelligent person is perceived as vulnerable. Related conditions in DSM-5 (2013) are: panic attack, conversion disorder, other specified or unspecified dissociative disorders, major depressive disorder, delusional disorder – persecutory type, schizophrenia with paranoid features.

Mental health specialists from countries where there are important Romanian communities can take into account the two syndromes analyzed above, appearing with a certain recurrence in patients' complaints about their state of physical and mental functioning.

2.3 Cultural competence. C The cultural competence equation includes two factors: self-awareness of one's own culture and knowledge of the cultural background of our clients (Pomerantz, 2011: 66-74). Cultural competence is built from the learning of one's own culture, not just where our parents and grandparents came from, but also the values, assumptions and biases that arose as a result of all cultural influences. The psychologist will also have to realize that differences between people are not necessarily deficiencies, especially if these differences are common and valued in the client's own cultural group. Instead of glossing over the differences between themselves and their clients, the specialists will have to explore their own reactions to these differences and the discomfort that these differences create upon them (Greene, 2007: 47-63). Of course, the process of cultural self-awareness can be difficult and unpleasant for the psychologist, as it may require to admit some belief system that he pretends to have rather than have. We refer here to racism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, ethnocentrism, etc.

Of course, being aware of your own culture is a first step, and the next one is knowing the cultural background of our clients (through reading, direct experience, relationships with people who are part of other cultures). Cultural knowledge should include not only the lifestyle of members of a culture, but also the history of the group, especially major political and social issues. A mental health specialist who does not recognize historical realities and their potential impact on his clients could make misinterpretations that are detrimental to the therapeutic relationship. Of course, we do not have to rely on the premise that each individual is typical of his cultural group. Although the cultural group has a collective tendency, its individual members may vary significantly from this central trend. It would be a bias to consider that a member of a cultural group has all the common features of a group. The specialist will appreciate the rules of the social group, but also the **heterogeneity** inherent in each culture. One aspect of heterogeneity is the phenomenon of **acculturation** (Organista, Marin and Chun, 2010; Rivera, 2010). When individuals are in a new cultural environment, they will respond in a variety of ways, especially with the adoption of new elements of the new culture or the retention of elements that are part of their original culture. Four specific acculturation strategies have been identified (Berry, 2003: 17-37; Rivera, 2008: 73-91): *assimilation*, in which the individual adopts elements of the new culture and abandons those from the original culture; *separation*, in which it rejects many elements of the new culture and retains much of the original ones; *marginalization*, in which it rejects both cultures and *integration*, in which it adopts many elements of the new culture and retains many other elements of its culture of origin. So, there is a remarkable diversity within any cultural group. Knowing that Anna came from Greece to Romania 15 years ago does not tell us much about her cultural identity. To what extent has she adopted the central trends of Romanian culture? To what extent does she carry with her the Greek cultural traditions and beliefs? The culturally competent specialist makes efforts to identify his client's strategies of acculturation in order to gain a deeper understanding of his client's unique lifestyle.

3. CONCLUSIONS

In the context of current multiculturalism, it is imperative that the mental health specialist acquires appropriate assessment and treatment

strategies. The approaches and the therapeutic techniques used for the change must be consistent with the values and the life experiences of his client. Clients in the Romanian cultural space respond well both to action-oriented therapies with a short-term focus as well as to approaches that focus on getting *insight* about their psychological problems.

A dominant note in the mental health services offered to the Romanian clients is represented by the therapeutic relationship factors: empathy, authenticity, respect, warmth, congruence and concreteness (Dimitriu, 2014). Effective psychotherapy begins when the specialist internalizes and uses these basic features of the therapeutic relationship. In addition, the Romanian therapist must show adaptability and flexibility in the use of conventional therapeutic techniques. In countries where there are significant communities of Romanians (Italy, Spain, England, France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, the USA, etc.), the mental health specialist's assessment includes the following elements: resident or citizen status; degree of fluency in speaking "standard" English or other languages; access to community resources; extent of family support or disintegration of family; level of education; changes in social status as a result of coming to other country (immigrant); professional history and level of stress related to the phenomenon of acculturation. Last but not least, the emphasis on empathy, authenticity, respect will be an important positive predictor of success in the therapeutic relationship. Effective therapy with Romanians begins when the therapist carefully internalizes and uses these basic characteristics in counseling settings.

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THE ROLE OF NON-FORMAL ACTIVITIES FOR PROMOTING AND ACCEPTING HUMAN DIVERSITY

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Abstract: *Diversity (human diversity), globalization, communication, digitalization, etc. are social values specific to contemporary society and that create new social ethics. Diversity is the fundament for acceptance and tolerance. Children with special educational needs, people of different religions, or race, with different habits and different culture can live and work together only if they accept the diversity of human beings. This article discusses the problem of the impact of non-formal activities on promoting and accepting the human diversity. The main goal of this study was to analyse the types of activities and their impact on students. A questionnaire regarding students' and teachers' perceptions on children with special educational needs and focus-groups were used. A number of 200 participants were included in the study, teachers and students, from schools from Brasov. One of the main conclusions drawn is that teachers must adopt a new mentality about their role in promoting social values like diversity, tolerance, and acceptance. They must design non-formal activities that are relevant for students' experience. The impact of non-formal activities that promote human diversity through learning by projects, collaboration and cooperation is both emotional and cognitive and changes the students' point of view.*

Keywords: *human diversity; non-formal education; social values; transformative learning*

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses on non-formal activities that contribute to the promotion of human diversity. The theoretical premises of this research can be found in recent studies in education sciences (P. Senge 2016; H. Stolovitch, E. Keeps 2017) that underline the role of non-formal activities such as trips, competitions, social events, etc. with a formative impact on the development of social competences, the promotion of important social values for the present society.

2. NONFORMAL EDUCATION AS TRANSFORMATIVE LEARNING

Why is non-formal education important today? The answer to the above question is, in fact, the solution for a school and learning that are more effective, more attractive for pupils and teachers, closer to social realities. Educational specialists (P. Senge 2016; H. Stolovitch & E. Keeps 2017; J. Mezirow 2014; J. Hattie 2014; H. Siebert 2001 etc.) express more and more vehemently the need to address human learning differently, meaning to offer a personalized learning for each individual, on one hand, and for the society, on the other hand.

This new approach to learning is necessary because both the psychological profile of today's pupils is different (we are talking about the generation of 'digital natives' - Ohler, 2010) and the values of society are re-set and nuanced. Values such as change, diversity, digitization, pragmatism, communication impose a type of learning that leads to the formation of skills necessary for the rapid integration into the labour market, for the individuals' personal and professional development.

Such learning, in accordance with the values promoted by society and the principles of constructivism in contemporary school, as described by H. Siebert (2001), is the transformative learning - "the process by which we transform problematic reference frameworks (mentalities, mental habits, perspectives on meanings) - sets of assumptions and expectations - to make them more comprehensive, lighter, more reflexive and more capable of affective change" (Mezirow, 2014:168). As can be seen from the author's view of the transformational learning theory, this learning is capable of producing a person's profound restructuring at the cognitive, attitude and emotional level, restructurings

objectively required by changing contexts and reference frameworks in people's lives.

Restructuring or transforming people's reference frameworks in order to adapt more effectively to the concrete reality of professional and/or personal life is possible because transformative learning is based on: critical reflection on our beliefs and others' beliefs; using empirical research methods for finding out the truth; free and responsible participation in debates through a well-informed speech; action from the transformed perspective; validating the transformative perspective by engaging in actions / speeches in line with the new perspective. Out of these, two elements are of particular importance, as the author of the theory emphasizes:

reflection or critical self-reflection on assumptions - critical assessment of the sources, nature and consequences of our mental habits and (...) free and total participation in the dialectical discourse to validate the best reflexive argumentation (Mezirow, 2014:172).

In other words, non-formal education is increasingly important nowadays for the following reasons:

1. Non-formal education through its more flexible structure, based on the students' interest and skills, better corresponds to the principles of the constructivist pedagogy in education.

2. It promotes authentic learning, exploiting the emotional potential of activities.

More and more neurobiology research emphasizes the role of emotions in learning. Educational specialists (L.Cozolino, 2017; Adams & Gupta, 2013) recommend teachers to use emotions as a catalyst for learning. Affectivity is a powerful engine of human action, conditioning work efficiency. Non-formal education benefits from a positive emotional load that has to be capitalized on for the human development process. Also, non-formal education benefits from the real, concrete context of the actions that bring learning closer to real life. All these characteristics demonstrate that non-formal education has a strong formative potential and contributes decisively to the formation of the skills necessary in nowadays society: problem-solving abilities, critical thinking, responsibility, tolerance, etc. In fact, non-formal education provides the specific framework for transformative learning.

Another important aspect of non-formal education refers to diversity as a value specific to postmodern society (in form, structure, content). Cultural diversity, an important feature of

postmodernism, is becoming an increasingly active ingredient in our lives that needs to be managed more efficiently by everyone and even by school. The pedagogy of cultural diversity aims to change the perspective on: the relationship with alterity, the fundamental reshaping of the whole space by overcoming ethnocentrism and egocentrism, with the focus on schools, communities, curriculum, teachers.

Efforts to promote diversity in Romanian schools are becoming increasingly visible, especially by promoting diversity in non-formal activities under the 'A Different School' programme, introduced in 2012.

Non-formal activities are the best opportunity to promote and accept diversity, to integrate children / students with SEN into the class and community, to understand and accept the natural differences among people. Interactions with others and the collaborative practices in non-formal activities develop interests and identities and create the sense of community. (Stetsekenko,2008; Usher, 2014). Sometimes students learning more through nonformal activities than did they in schools, demonstrated Adams and Gupta, 2013.

3. RESEARCH ON THE ROLE OF NON-FORMAL ACTIVITIES FOR PROMOTING AND ACCEPTING HUMAN DIVERSITY

Starting from the theoretical background presented above, a research was carried out, having as general aim the identifying of the types of non-formal activities and their impact on the promotion and acceptance of human diversity, especially the integration of children / students with SEN.

The research was carried out on a number of 200 pupils from the urban area, from the schools in Brasov, from primary, secondary and high school, according to the distribution in the chart below.




Fig.1. Participants from primary, secondary and high school

The methods used in the research were:

- a questionnaire addressed to students and teachers about the types of non-formal activities carried out, their frequency, and their impact.

- a focus group with students on the role of non-formal activities in integrating children with SEN into mainstream schools.

The quantitative analysis of the answers to the questionnaires revealed that the most pleasant activities were the following:

Table 1. Frequency of nonformal activities

Categories of answers	Frequency
Trips	48%
Cultural activities (visits to museum, shows)	25%
Sports activities	10%
Other answers	17 %

The impact of these activities is a strong one if we analyse the students’ answers regarding the formative effects of non-formal activities. The charts below show the types of competences that students developed in these activities:

Table 2. Frequency of developed competences

Competences	Frequency Primary school	Frequency Secondary	Frequency High School
Communication	20.89%	24.95%	22.47%
Cooperation	21.47%	19.40%	15.92%
Teamwork	21.80%	26.78%	21.64%
Interest for learning	18.57%	12.10%	6.79 %
Interest for community	16.25%	13.34%	11.52%

As it can be seen from the previous table, students, regardless of the school cycle, state that non-formal activities develop their team spirit, which is a great gain in terms of the skills needed in nowadays society and in accepting differences. Also, the vast majority of the teachers included in the study stated that non-formal activities with students have a formative impact especially on the development of students' social skills. Also, the activities that explicitly aim at understanding and accepting others, being they different or with special educational needs, are considered interesting. For example, as it emerged from the focus groups, primary and secondary school pupils who took part in activities alongside pupils with special educational needs said the activity was useful because they understood that they were "children like us", that they had the same desires and joys.

Another activity that had an impact on secondary school pupils was the debate on the novel “Wonder” by R.J. Palacio and watching the

film with the same name. The discussions about film and the novel unfolded in a non-formal environment made students more empathetic, able to understand and accept people with special needs around them. Some fifth grade students’ statements are interesting from this point of view: "I think that today, through free discussions about painful things in the others’ lives, I have learned one of the most important lessons" (I.A.). Another commonly seen opinion says: "We are learning things that are useful to us. I did not know anything about disabled children. From today on, I will pay more attention to people around me." (C.M.).

4. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Even though this research has some limitations regarding the potential of generalizing the conclusions, the subjectivity of the answers to such a delicate problem, it raises new reflection issues and opens new in-depth research directions related to:

1. The type of non-formal activities that contribute to the promotion of values, to changing pupils’ attitudes towards those who are different.
2. Teacher training for the design and development of non-formal activities that meet the students' interests.
3. The relationship between non-formal and formal activities; the way school can capitalize on non-formal activities in order to get closer to reality and to open up more to the community.

One of the main practical conclusions is that non-formal activities through their transformative learning potential contribute to the promotion of values specific to the current society. The non-formal activities like movies, playing, trips etc. Illustrate how people with special needs share many common problems and solution. Students and teachers need to experience that we are all the same in different ways.

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CHALLENGES IN DECODING AND OBSERVING THE (NON)VERBAL COMMUNICATION

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***Abstract:** IQ and EQ, trending terms in nowadays' research regarding the emotional intelligence, share opposite trends in terms of evolution, from generation to generation. Unlike the IQ, which tends to grow, EQ, while more and more in the spotlight, shrinks as generations pass. Through this theme's integrated EQ development program, the major aim is to highlight the correlation between emotional intelligence and personal life success; the relationship between different components of emotional intelligence and how the value system is structured; validating the effectiveness of an emotional intelligence development program. Our approach is supported by renowned psychological tests, a sociological questionnaire, as well as a semantic software program – Tropes. As per the contextual placement, one of the key elements that define the paper resides in the use of action phrases, placing their orientation in a dynamic environment. The key takeaways include the authentic and masked indicators paramount for a precise verbal and non-verbal analysis, as well as means to further develop the Emotional Intelligence.*

***Keywords:** emotional intelligence; nonverbal; verbal; semantic analysis*

1. INTRODUCTION

All of us are born with certain genetic and attitudinal predispositions that being influenced by some factors concerning the dwelling environment and the received education, but also by the personal attitude, develop or not (remain in unconsciousness, as uncased resources or as vulnerabilities actively through stress, of different intensity). There are geneticists that launched the presumption that through our way of thinking, we may activate certain positive or negative genes that otherwise would remain latent. After many years of research, physician Kazuo Murakami (2012, page 56) also a Japanese professor and one of the most important geneticists in the world arrived at the conclusion that happiness, joy, inspiration, gratefulness and prayer may activate beneficial genes. We have personal or family problems and resources that have to be known and then solved in order to go on. Denial is not an adaptive attitude because it does not help us to overcome obstacles.

2. COMMUNICATION AND EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

William Damon (1988, page 99) mentions that although many researches have been performed in

this field, these are not known enough or are ignored and are not applied adequately. Emotional education including learning and modelling, in time effectively modifies the chemical processes at the level of the brain. Emotions are shaped as biochemical substances produced by the brain and then which the body invariably reacts to. Emotional education can be compared from this perspective to some foods effects, like ice-cream and chocolate that produce serotonin and endorphin. This idea is not new. For example, psychiatrist Michael Norton presents in his book Beyond Prozac, different methods of training the brain to produce serotonin through food control, physical training and sleep management.

Agitated and throbbing way of life equally predisposes adults and children to fury and irascibility, determining increase of preoccupation for developing some personal competences. Society evolution caused those emotions attribution to extend beyond the progressive level of human, as a species. The increase of delinquency and criminality caused us justly to fear of contacting people that we do not know well and to be isolated socially. Thus, we are alone in the middle of millions of people which we dwell with in the great world metropolises. We are not as lucky as the previous generations that have dwelt in united communities

in villages, in which people have known well each other and have supported mutually in trouble. In this context, to be able to develop and maintain a social network, to make friends, it is more important to build and chisel social skills. These are necessary also because inevitably, along the life we confront to different, subtle and complicated situations requiring flexibility, social competences and stress management in order to overcome these. Training the capacity to interpret the nonverbal language may improve significantly the chances of understanding others feelings and to react adequately in the interactions to others.

Not a few studies emphasize the fact that these social and emotional skills may influence the success in life more than the intellectual capacity. For this reason, we mention Allan Fornhan's article (1996) presenting in detail a study of Bell Labs that has arrived at the conclusion that social isolation, possibly caused by low EQ has been the most important factor leading to low work performances.

Contrarily, a high EQ determine children to be considered sedulous by teachers, to be liked by playground friends and helps adults at work and marriage. The first that have noticed the relevancy between EQ and school performances are school psychologists and academy teachers that also have helped to implementing Law 94-142 concerning education of children with special needs in USA (Shapiro, 2012:29-130). But then, IQ correlates with faculty entrance examinations. In no case, we do not have to consider EQ and IQ as opposite because these interact dynamically. Practically, the relation between cortex and limbic system defines EQ. Cortex allows us have feelings to our feelings. However, EQ seems to have a smaller genetic load, hence greater educational potential. Although we know more about emotional intelligence development possibilities, this decrease from a generation to another, unlike IQ that increases (Flynn Effect). Many justifications were found to explain this fact: so many divorces, Internet and media influence and the fact that busy parents spend less time with their children.

In time, work relations seem reminiscences of those in the playground. Playground becomes the conversation place in a company that is used for gossip, but also for important work information exchanges, where advice are asked and help is received or not, depending on everybody's emotional competences. Social skills are an important component of emotional intelligence. These involve many features that can be developed: empathy, assertiveness etc. In this article, we'll focus on two of them: capacity of interpreting the

nonverbal and verbal communication, both very useful in people relations.

Nonverbal communication is the plurality of messages, unexpressed in words and decipherable, making meanings. These signals can repeat, contradict, replace, supplement or emphasize the message sent through words. Even though this subject is back, the preoccupation of deciphering and using optimally the nonverbal language is not new. For example, Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (35-96 d.Hr.), considered the first rhetoric teacher in Antic Rome, dedicated one of the twelve volumes of *Institutio oratoria* (Training of Speaking in Public) to pronunciation- voice and gestures.

Before 20th century, Charles Darwin was one of the most important scientist approaching this subject, publishing his remarks, opinions and conclusions in his book published in 1872, *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals*. Most of the expressed opinions subsequently were validated by different researchers (Pease,1997:27). Man, like other species, obeys some biological laws, controlling his behaviour, reactions and gestures, even if many of us are not conscious of what we transmit or it is communicated to us beyond words. There are not a few cases that certain persons are considered intuitive because they know when they are lied to, because they notice interlocutor's intentions, even if he/she tries to hide these. An explanation of this intuition can be these people capacity of noticing and interpreting nonverbal language.

Jurgen Ruesch and Weldon Kees in 1956 (:89), were the first authors that included the nonverbal communication term in the title of a book. These mentioned that in human communication seven different systems are involved, five of them are nonverbal: aspect and clothes; gestures or voluntary moves; random actions; actions effects; vocal sounds; spoken words and written words. Many scientists share the idea that verbal communication is used mainly to send information and nonverbal communication is used for expressing emotions and attitudes that can be in accordance or in contrast with verbal information, sometimes replacing these (Pease, 1997:29). Many a time, a certain look may replace a multitude of words, transmitting everything we want to know concerning a person's attitude to another. Our posture when we talk to somebody, the way we move our hands, eyes, legs and micro-expressions on our face express much about the dynamics of conversation involvement in different moments of dialogue, but also about the fundamental attitude to the interlocutor. Nonverbal language equally betrays our mood and intentions

that sometimes would like to hide. When we make an effort of keeping a secret, the signals betraying us not a few times are small and occur for a very short period and in order to notice these, training is necessary. Those indicators that are controlled by certain areas of the brain voluntarily lose control and transmit information that even those that make them, do not know about themselves. That's why, when a person expresses an emotion in words, but nonverbally suggests us that he/she has other moods, we'll believe the nonverbal language.

The importance of nonverbal communication was proved by Albert Mehrabian (1972:229-245). After a study, he arrived at the conclusion that only 7% of the message is transmitted through verbal communication, while 38% is transmitted vocally and 55% through body language. Not all the authors share the same ideas concerning the above percentages. F.H. Giedt (1955:407-416) expressed the limits of nonverbal communication through an experiment of filming a physician-patient interview. The film was projected to some experimental groups under three circumstances: without sound; without sound, but with discussion transcription and with sound. The opinion on the patient was different, a fact that according to the author, questions the proportion above-mentioned. Septimiu Chelcea shares the same opinion (2005: 169-174):

Personally, I mention that "55-38-7 myth" should be re-examined because finally, it leads us to the question: Why should verbal language have been invented, as information is transmitted 90% through nonverbal language?

Beyond these controversies, it is clear that in the inter-human communication process, verbal language and nonverbal language work together. NLP introduces the fact that it is impossible not to communicate as an axiom, emphasizing the importance of nonverbal language in communication. It should not be excluded the fact that certain situational factors determine the persons to manage better the nonverbal reactions. We refer to social contexts in which we want to make a positive impression: a work interview, a date with a person that we are interested in etc. Also, when we consider followed, evaluated, we tend to modify our behaviour in order to increase the desirability of verbal and nonverbal answers and to wear different masks, associated to roles that sometimes we play consciously or unconsciously. The culture which we have been raised in also influences the way which we express nonverbally in. Personal distance is a fine example for this reason, it varying from a

country to another. The rules of expressing have the cultural footprint: social rules may dictate us to minimize, exaggerate, completely hide or mask an emotion. For example, watching an accident film, the Japanese tended more to hide the negative emotion with a smile (Ekman, 2009:287). There are also gestures that have different meanings from a country to another, like raised thumb that in Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand has three meanings: it is used by hitch-hikers, it means OK and when it is raised suddenly, it means an insult, while in other countries like Greece, it means something peddling (Pease, Allan, 1997:27). From this perspective, interpreting of nonverbal communication cannot be performed correctly without taking into account the cultural context which it takes place in. There are high contextual cultures that emphasize the context when communicating (like Chinese, Korean and Japanese culture) but there are also weak contextual cultures (like North-American, Australian and North-European culture). For example, looking in the interlocutor's eyes is considered a polite gesture in Western cultures, but an impolite gesture in other cultures. It is not possible taking place a successful business meeting, without taking into account these elements. We would be in delicate positions if we do not observe these, we would make subsequently hard to manage mistakes.

Some people consider that different personality factors influence the predisposition to use nonverbal language in communication. For example, introverts use the nonverbal language less than extroverts. Starting with this idea, we considered interesting to find out how much the emotional intelligence development degree influences the capacity of interpreting the nonverbal communication. For this reason, we launched the presumption that persons with high level of emotional intelligence development are more performing in interpreting the nonverbal language of interlocutors. The following instruments were applied: Inventory of emotional intelligence level developed by Robert Wood and Harry Tolley containing situational subtests of self-assessment characteristic to every feature of the emotional intelligence (Self-adjustment - 24 items; Self-awareness - 36 items; Motivation - 24 items; Empathy - 24 items; Social skills - 18 items) and a checklist for evaluation of nonverbal communication detection capacity, formed of 31 items, each having three answer variations. The checklist has 3 parts, as follows: part I- situations of nonverbal behaviour- 10 items; part II- emotions transmitted through face expressions- 13 items; part III- gesture signification- 8 items.

The instruments were applied for 120 participants, between 18-60 years old. From them, 51 (42.5%) are males and 69 (57.5%) are females. 90 (75%) participants dwell in the urban area and 30 (25%) in the rural area. 91 (75%) have university studies: 31 have graduated psychology, 28- an economical faculty, 19- law faculty and 13 have graduated polytechnics.

The obtained results - obtained correlations between components of emotional intelligence and

the capacity of interpreting the nonverbal language are presented in Table no. 1. As it can be noticed, the presumption has been confirmed. The capacity of interpreting of the nonverbal language correlates not only to total EQ score (Pearson correlation- sig = 0.000) but also to different components of the emotional intelligence, as it can be noticed in the table below.

Table no.1 Correlations between components of emotional intelligence and the capacity of interpreting nonverbal language

Correlation between main EQ components – the capacity of interpreting nonverbal language							
Figure no 1.	EQ_I self- regulation	EQ_II self- awareness	EQ_III motivation	EQ_IV empathy	EQ_V Social abilities	EQ Total amount	The capacity of interpreting the nonverbal language
The capacity of interpreting nonverbal language	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed)	.233**	.303**	.296**	.332**	-.028	.323**
	N	200	200	200	200	200	200

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The capacity of interpreting the nonverbal language correlates to total EQ score, but also to the following components of the emotional intelligence: self-adjustment, self-awareness, motivation and empathy.

2. VERBAL AND NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION - SEMANTIC OVERVIEW

First and foremost, one of the research stages consisted in the implementation into the “Tropes” semantic analysis program of databases extracted from the speech of Dr. Chris Shea, “The Secrets of Non Verbal Communication”¹.

In the context that guessing of the most hidden feelings of the other is another component of the emotional intelligence that is very useful if we want to be successful and the world that we dwell in can be, under certain circumstances a world of hidden interests, in which everybody promotes their interests and use words to hide thoughts and emotions, the training necessity is emphasized to decrypt the message transmitted by a person

through nonverbal and verbal language analysis, under the circumstances that there is a complementarity relation between both languages.

The control place is guessed in the verbal language, in the way we express in different contexts, presenting a series of concepts, cognitive fig., believes etc. The research was based on the introduction of a database made up of passages from the material within the software for semantic analysis "Tropes" that proposes a range of tools for semantic analysis, with which one can obtain answers to questions about the contents of text through a referential analysis. The analysis also helps create own semantic categories, customized according to the beneficiary's interest, which may include nouns, verbs, adjectives, connectors. In addition, they can be extended using software dictionaries, depending on the strategy of targeted analysis. In order to process the analyzed texts, "Tropes" facilitates the operation level, translated in the delimitation of phrases and sentences; resolving ambiguities presence (depending on the occurrence of words in the text); identification of classes of equivalent words.

The main characteristic parts of the material and the semantic division may be considered main reference points that must be included in the process of this Tropes analysis. In this case, figure no. 1, entitled „Context identification”, shows that

¹ works in non verbal strategy analysis for groups and individuals including analyses and skills training in non verbal communication, TEDx talk at TEDxMerseyside 2012 exploring the implications and uses of non verbal psychology.

the style/ the expression used is enunciative (setting some influence, revealing a point of view), the setting involves the narrator (saying about something, somebody, an action), some notions of doubt have been detected (which shows indecision, uncertainty, hesitation), the style is rather argumentative, 29 parts characteristic parts to the text (it summarizes the most characteristic part of the text) and 13 detected episodes of the analysis (which groups together word occurrences that tend to appear in a remarkable density within the limited portion of a text). To exemplify, the program highlighted that there were used phrases beginning with: “I really want...”, “I just think”, “I can be aware”, “I may experience...”, “I mean...”, that underlines the fact that the writer does not try

to impose his own views nonverbal communication and give them an absolute value, but gives the reader the possibility to integrate its interdisciplinary knowledge related to the practice of this domain.

At the same time, starting with the prerequisite that no matter how different successful people are concerning personality, they use the same strategies to obtain a result; thus, concerning the nonverbal communication, they talk efficiently to the interlocutor, make a comfortable environment for the interlocutor and use verbal and nonverbal language, using suitable comparisons and causal connectors (so, because) more than opposition connectors (but) in order to avoid possible dissonances in the communication.




Fig.1 Identifying context

One of the representative elements characterizing the first material results, concerning contextual location, from using of action phrases. Examples can be considered static verbs like: to be, to know, to see, to think and to look.




Fig.2 Words categories²

Within the text, notions expressing the doubt were identified, like probable and possible because in the modern period of time, most of the aspects are uncertain. Today, everything is taken into account and a series of opinions are taken into

² Figure obtained using the software “Tropes”

consideration, from the most plausible to the most unexpected opinions about how things may evolve concerning a certain problematic. This applies in the fields where every detail is taken into account and nothing is considered 100% certain, a series of possible opinions being taken into account- this criterion being applicable including in decryption of nonverbal language, like: training the capacity of noticing of the nonverbal language, cumulative to the verbal language, indicating us the clues about emotional moods and mentality of the respective person; training the capacity of having a real conversation, which we do not make suppositions in (that can be only simple projections, hence the importance of personal development/analysis in the process of training as a therapist) that can be proved to be wrong.

3. CONCLUSIONS

In order to analyze verbal and nonverbal language of a person, we deal with authentic indicators showing what really happens in the people eyes, but also masked indicators, pretending to be something else than they really are (for example, we wipe our eyes seeming that we want to remove dust from them, but in fact it can be a sadness indicator). One of the behaviour indicators along time tend to amplify, while others tend to subdue. Concerning problems of dominance and court, where there is an excessive competition of persons, the features signifying the reproductive power and force tend to emphasize, determining substantial and easily remarkable manifestations.

It is ideal to value our resources at maximum and to manage efficiently minuses or vulnerabilities. Emotional intelligence with everything belonging to it presents the advantage that it can develop much through education, personal effort and perseverance.

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DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND EMERGENCE OF MULTICULTURALISM IN EUROPE

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Abstract: *No civilization can sustain itself in the long run in the absence of a modest rise of its population, as with the required addition in population, a civilization shapes its future course of action. Being the leading and trend setter civilization of modern times, Europe kept the Western cultural dominance with its own population. But due to various reasons, Europe could not maintain its own required population and, as a result, in the late seventies, countries of Europe witnessed migration and therefore the emergence of multiculturalism. Thus, U.K., Germany, or France have become destinations of large migration waves of people from Asia, Africa and not only, which led to the emergence of multiculturalism in Europe, in its various perspectives. The present paper has studied the role of the demographic trends in the emergence of multiculturalism in Europe, the point of discussion being whether the decline in the population of Europe has encouraged migration of the people from non-European continents and subsequently the emergence of multiculturalism. This paper would be helpful to policy makers, scholars and officials of the government to understand the relationship between demographic trends and multiculturalism and how multiculturalism is important for the development and peace of the European nations.*

Keywords: *multiculturalism; demography; European Union; birth rate; migration*

1. INTRODUCTION

As per an estimate the population of the world is 7.6 billion (<http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/>) in which the largest number of the population is of the continent of Asia (59.6%) followed by Africa (16.5%), Europe (9.8%), Latin America and the Caribbean (8.5%), North America (4.8%) and Oceania (0.5%) (*Distribution of the global population 2017, by continent*) The continent of Europe stands on the third position in terms of population. There are 51 independent nation-states in Europe, while the European Union, the powerful block, consists of 28 countries. (*European Union. About the EU*) The study of present paper starts with data before the establishment of European Union in 1993. So, many countries which were in Europe and now in the European Union are in focus of the study of this paper.

The study of the demographic trends of the European Union is an important point for this paper as this represents an attempt to establish a relationship between the demographic trends and the emergence of multiculturalism. To settle this relation one has to see the trends of the demographic movement in terms of the natural

growth rate and immigrants from inside and outside the European continent.

There were numerous minority indigenous communities present in many countries of Europe but the policy of multiculturalism got momentum only when the immigrants set their feet on the European soil. With the coming of the immigrants, multiculturalism also draws the attention of indigenous communities from another perspective. The scholars, the policy makers and the political parties, along with the national and international human rights activists, were also interpreting the various issues of the indigenous communities from new perspectives. The present paper has put more emphasis on the immigrants rather than on the indigenous communities.

Multiculturalism is one of the important ways to live in unity and peace in the present day global world where a large number of people move from one place of the globe to another, for numerous reasons, particularly for economic reasons. The migration of people in many countries, particularly people from other cultural backgrounds, creates problems and challenges to the well-established cultural models around the world. The case of Islam phobia based on hatred, the emergence of violent

struggle in the Islamic world and the sharp reaction against the westernization around the world are some examples of anti globalization and cultural clashes. As a result there emerged a need to find such a model which could calm the reaction and bring peace and adjustment. The trend of Multiculturalism is emerging as an accepted model for adjustment of various races, religions, languages etc. in a country. Europe as a block of diverse races, languages, cultures and religions needs multiculturalism. This multiculturalism becomes more vital when Europe and particularly the European Union receive a large number of immigrants from various cultural backgrounds. Some cultures are pro-western ethos while others are in opposition to the very basics of the western culture.

Multiculturalism has been seen in relation with the balance between the ethnic and aged population and immigrants from the Middle East. Kosherbayev *et al.* (2016:145) states “The rapidly aging Europe, regularly suffering from many economic, political and demographic factors, has faced an acute ethno-cultural problem today and the reason for this problem is migrants actively populating the EU, leaving the Middle East region. Designed as a tool to control and create conditions of mutual existence, the policy of multiculturalism leads not to mutual understanding and enrichment but to inciting ethnic and religious hatred” while other scholars like Casals (2014) sees multiculturalism in the context of the identity crisis due to coming of the immigrants and cultural differences found in the minority groups of the European nations. He says that “Identity cleavages are more apparent in an age of intense inter-cultural encounters and connections that have virtually transformed society as they are, too, the relative privileges or vulnerabilities experienced by members of different groups. International immigration and refugee flows – both significant side effects of globalization – have further accentuated identity politicization by altering the composition of Western societies and potentially disturbing their core values.” (Casals, 2014:6)

Manyakin (2015) states that the reason for adopting a multicultural policy is the establishment of a diverse society due to coming of the migrants. In his words “Definitely, the complex historical and social processes that followed World War II were the main reasons why multiculturalist policies were adopted. Most importantly of all, societies in all of the mentioned countries became, and continue to become, increasingly diverse as a result of massive immigration from other countries and

continents in the second half of the 20th Century caused by the demand for additional labour and skilled force” (Manyakin, 2015:16).

Yegeenoglu (2003) sees multiculturalism in the context of the global capitalist system for the purpose of the management of the migrants to exploit the resources of the west. He says that “Globalization, according to the advocates of this position, marks the beginning of a process whereby difference is dissolved within the logic of sameness and cultural homogenization” (Yegeenoglu, 2003). So he believes that globalization is the point behind the emergence of multiculturalism.

Against the background of such studies the present paper has attempted to look into the question of the effect of demographic trends on the emergence of multiculturalism. How is multiculturalism linked to the various trends of population? Would immigrants increase in case of a perfect natural growth of population? Would natural growth encourage multiculturalism? Is the rise of multiculturalism associated with the decrease in population and rise of immigrants in Europe?

It is not possible to study all the European countries in detail in order to understand the relationship between the demographic trends and the emergence of multiculturalism. Only a general trend encompassing the whole Europe has been taken into the present study with the hope that in future more and more scholars would study the relationship between demographic trends and the emergence of multiculturalism at a micro level.

2. THE DEMOGRAPHIC TREND OF EUROPE

The demographic trends of Europe and after the establishment of the European Union depict a peculiar pattern. Starting from the post World War II to 2017, the demographic trends show the decline of natural growth in population and the growing role of the immigrants in increasing the population of the nations of Europe. What are the demographic trends of Europe after World War II? Table-1 shows the demographic trends of Europe from 1955 to 2018.

Table 1 shows an increase in the population of Europe of 165,537,650 from 1955 to 2018. Yet it declined from 1955 to 2018 in terms of the overall population in share of world population. Rank of it in share of world population has declined and reached from 2 to 3. The fertility rate of Europe declined from 2.66 in 1955 to 1.61. The share of

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Europe in the world population also declined from 22.8 percent in 1955 to 9.7 in 2018. The early

change in the population was more due to natural birth than migration till 1995 and later vice versa.

Table 1 Population of Europe from 1955-2018

Year	Population	Yearly Change	Yearly % Change	Fertility Rate	Migrants (net)	Europe's Share of World Pop	Europe Rank
2018	742,648,010	574,157	0.08	1.61	1,058,329	9.73	3
2017	742,073,853	626,695	0.08	1.61	1,058,329	9.8	3
2016	741,447,158	633,199	0.09	1.61	1,058,329	9.9	3
2015	740,813,959	730,076	0.10	1.60	810,747	10.6	3
2010	737,163,580	1,374,780	0.19	1.55	1,760,364	11.3	3
2005	730,289,682	617,749	0.08	1.43	1,710,154	11.9	2
2000	727,200,939	-176,731	-0.02	1.43	742,665	11.6	2
1995	728,084,593	1,277,201	0.18	1.57	1,048,115	13.7	2
1990	721,698,587	2,694,354	0.38	1.81	533,762	14.8	2
1985	708,226,818	2,803,896	0.40	1.88	314,570	15.9	2
1980	694,207,337	3,320,504	0.49	1.98	391,545	17.0	2
1975	677,604,816	4,050,936	0.61	2.17	420,966	18.3	2
1970	657,350,134	4,403,580	0.68	2.37	-84,454	19.7	2
1965	635,332,234	5,881,359	0.95	2.66	-275,255	20.9	2
1960	605,925,437	5,763,015	0.98	2.66	-563,385	21.9	2
1955	577,110,360	5,547,068	0.99	2.66	-275,255	22.8	2

Source: Worldometers, Eurostat and UN

The natural growth of the population declined after 1995 when the differences between ratios of births and deaths became zero. The migration took a positive node after 1975. In 1975 the net positive migration reached 420,966. This was the first time in post World War II when more people came to Europe than left it. What is an important thing to note is that with the passage of time more and more immigrants reached Europe. This period is also the period of starting of the policy of multiculturalism in many European countries. Was this policy started in the response to the increasing number of immigrants?

In another study by Avdeev, Eremenko, Festy, Gaymu, Bouteillec & Springer (2011) based on the data from Database of developed countries (INED) and Division database of the centre for population Studies (Moscow), the demographic trends of Europe show the decline of the natural growth of population and the increase of net migration in the total population of Europe. In 1950, the annual growth rate of population was ranging between 10 to 11 percent. After the growth of 1950, the population of Europe subsequently declined and reached zero by 1995-96. What is important in the study of the demographic trends of Europe is the addition of population more from the net migration than the natural growth (the more birth than death). As per the data, the addition in the population from 1962 to 1985 due to net migration was zero. It was only after 1985 that two thirds of the European countries experienced positive migration which added more in population.

According to data, the population of Europe was 692.5 million on January 1980. As per the data of Adeev et al. (2011) in *Populations and Demographic Trends of European Countries, 1980-2010*, the highest growth in three decades was recorded in the decade of 1980-1990 when except Bulgaria (-0.9%), Hungary (-3%) and Macedonia (0%) the population of every country increased. Between 1990 and 2000 the population of Europe increased to 725 million with 4.5 million addition or 0.6 percent increase in the population. (cf. 18)

In recent years, the European Union has become the destination of the world immigrants. With Europe there is need to know about the population of EU along with other nation-states of Europe to understand the demographic trends and multiculturalism in a better way.

The European Union came into existence in November 1993. At present there are 28 nation-states as members of European Union. The total population of European Union is 508 million (2015-28 Countries). (*European Union. About the EU*) In 2016, the total population of EU was 510.3 million (*Eurostat*), while as per Eurostat the population of the 28 EU countries is 511 million (Jan-2017) (*Eurostat*). As per the population of Jan-2017, Germany is the most populated nation with 82.8 million or 16.2 percent followed by France with 67 million or 13.1 percent, UK (Until the whole process of BREXIT is not completed) with 65.8 million or 12.9 percent, Italy with 60.6 million or 11.8 percent, Spain with 46.5 million or

9.1 percent and Poland with 38.0 million or 7.4 percent. Out of the rest of the nations which are members of EU, nine have a population share between 4 percent to 1.5 percent and thirteen nations have less than 1.5 percent. (*Eurostat*)

If we take the whole European Union as a single entity then it has the third largest population after China and India, residing over a 4 million km² area. In each study above there is a rise of population of Europe or EU but not due to natural growth but to net positive migration.

3. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND MULTICULTURALISM

The present paper is about finding the relation between demographic trends and the emergence of multiculturalism in Europe. One should perceive the relationship taking into account the indigenous communities residing for a longer period of time and the migrants who came from other European or non-European nation-states.

Europe is a continent politically strong and economically advanced. The rise of multiculturalism in Europe is due to many reasons, as many scholars suggest. Some scholars make multiculturalism a product of historical development. Many countries, before the rise of the modern nation-states, functioned on the basis of race which advocates for the unity of a particular culture (the 16th century). Later they formed their own cultural zone in the rise of nation-states. This was the emergence of diverse cultural zones in the form of the nation-states. So, the whole European continent can be perceived as an example of a multicultural world. If we could call Europe a multicultural continent before the rise of nation-states may be a matter of debate.

In recent years, the rise of multiculturalism in Europe is a post-World War II phenomenon. The important thing to observe is the rise of numerous minority groups of people on cultural, political marginalization, economic ghettoization, languages and social structure in an already established diverse culture on the basis of nation-states. This is the reason why Marina Lukšič Hacin (2016) sees multiculturalism in the context of between exclusiveness and inclusiveness; between majority and minority; between marginalized and non-marginalized. This condition makes modern multiculturalism more complex and fearsome among the people divided on the cultural line and who believe in the superiority of their own culture.

In the words of Kymlicka (2010:98) Multiculturalism is a “feel-good celebration of

ethno-cultural diversity, encouraging citizens to acknowledge and embrace the panoply of customs, traditions, music and cuisine that exist in a multi-ethnic society.” This definition makes multiculturalism not only the acceptance of diversity but also a celebration of it. The diversity is nothing to worry but to make it useful for the advancement of the community and the nation. Was this thought to be found before 1970, the year of emergence of multiculturalism in particular nation-states?

Another important view regarding multiculturalism is that of Taylor who considers the whole Europe as a multicultural entity and rejects the negative outcome of multiculturalism like ghettoization etc. He believes that multiculturalism is a unity force to unite the diverse groups of the people.

As per the data and scenario of Post-World War II, multiculturalism is the new phenomenon in the European nation –states, which emerged due to the immigrants. In the European nation-states the policy of multiculturalism started not to keep in mind the minority groups living in the respective countries but the migrants. The already existing minority groups of the nation-states got their political rights based on equality and dignity through the democratic process or they were so weak to assert their influence to get their due rights against their governments. Equally, they were representing the western cultural life, imagination, Ideas and thoughts. It was the immigrants whose arrival to many western nation-States of Europe on the economic and political grounds that complicated the well-established system of governance, economic structure and cultural equilibrium.

The coming of immigrants to many nation-states of Europe and the discrimination that they faced on racial, cultural, economic and political grounds led to the demand for equality, dignity and address all of the problems of the migrants. The demands of the immigrants and their different way of life created tension and tussle in many nation-states of Europe. The emergence of many far right political wings and advocacy for controlled migration are few examples which show how the European nations took to immigrants. The emergence of tussle between the minority and the majority groups led to the policy of emergence of multiculturalism in Europe. The main aim behind this multicultural policy was to bring numerous cultures into harmony by accepting the uniqueness of each culture. The essay of Charles Taylor, “Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition”

(1992), highlighted the necessity of the right to recognition and the right to dignity for both to ensure universal dignity” (Hacin, 2016).

The demographic trends which were negative on natural growth made the policy makers of many European states follow a liberal policy towards immigration. The policy of “Guest Workers” (Gastarbeiter), the policy of “oil Crisis” and the liberal policy of post 1980s are some examples which show a close relationship between demographic trends and the immigration policy of Europe. As per the data, the total migration from 1955 to 2017 shows many demographic trends. From 1955 the trend started was neutral with both net positive and net negative migration. It was only after 1985 that the net migration started to show an upward movement with more positive net migration than net negative migration (Avdeev *et al.*, 2011)

If we see the data of Eurostat regarding the European Union with 28 nations in its fold, the total population of EU increased from 406.7 million in 1960 to 510.1 million in 1916, adding 103.4 million people. The average increase in population was about 3.3 million per year in the 1960 decade, which declined to 1.5 million persons per year in the year 2015-16 (*First population estimates EU population up to almost 512 million at 1 January 2017*).

Being the leading colonial continent in the world, Europe is economically powerful. To continue with the development, there was a constant need for labour supplying. For the continuous supply of required manpower there was a need to sustain the natural growth of population, which means the higher birth rate over the death rate or to allow the migration of the people from other countries to Europe or allow the surplus labour from one nation of Europe to another one.

The other worrying points were the increasing number of the aged population (65 and above) and the decreasing number of the working population (15-64 years). As per an UN estimate as to the European Union the aged population rose from 9.5 percent in 1950 to 15.5 percent in 1995 and the working population fell from 7.0 percent to 4.3 percent from 1950 to 1995 (*United Nations Population Division, Replacement Migration*). On the basis of these two economic necessities there was the need of an increasing population.

On the basis of the data of 1995 for aged population and working age population the UN projection for Europe till 2050 shows the need of immigrants to sustain the economic development of Europe. UN saw the need of migration from 47.4 million to 153.6 million due to loss of

working age population in various scenarios (*United Nations Population Division, Replacement Migration*). Another projection by OECD (2014) regarding working –age population (15-64) of Europe states that between 2013 and 2020 this would decline by 7.5 million (-2.2 percent). In another estimate of OCED (2012), (Migration Policy Debates (2014)) over the next ten years the need for work force would increase by 70 percent in Europe (Dumont, Liebig, 2014).

The study of Avdeev *et al.* (2011) (Population and Demographic Trends of European Countries 1980-2010) about the population of Europe for three decades from 1980-2010 shows that from 1980 to 1990, the number of births was higher than number of deaths and as a result “the population of Europe increased by 3.6 percent with an average ‘political’ natural increase of 3.2 percent”. (In Avdeev *et al.*, 2011) During this period deaths were higher than births in two European countries – Hungary and Germany.

From 1990 to 2000, Europe witnessed different trends. Twenty seven countries of Europe during this decade with a total population of 331 million maintained positive natural growth while thirteen countries with a population of 404 million experienced negative growth. Russia, Germany and Italy recorded more deaths than births. During this decade natural growth suffered a setback with a decline from 0.3 percent to -1 percent (Avdeev *et al.*, 2011).

What was the position of migrants? As per the data from the study of Avdeev *et al.* (2011), there was a 26.5 million or 3.8 percent addition in the population of Europe from net migration from 1980-2009. There was a record of positive net migration in 24 countries in which Spain and Switzerland received 15 percent migrants; Greece received 13 percent; Germany, Norway and Austria received 8 to 9 percent. Some countries lost a significant percentage of their population due to migration: Albania 30%, Macedonia 16%, Moldova 24%, Bosnia-Herzegovina 21% and Montenegro 14 % (Avdeev *et al.*, 2011).

Due to these demographic trends caused by natural growth and migration, Europe experienced the inflow and outflow of people from the continents and determined it to adopt the policy of multiculturalism.

4. POLICY OF MULTICULTURALISM ADOPTED BY EUROPEAN NATIONS

European nations reached such a condition where they had no option but to choose either the

economic advancement at the cost of its own culture or save their own culture by saying no to the immigrants, all this having happened due to the decline of the natural growth of the population.

The migration of people and their settlement in many countries of Europe led to the change in the policies of the governments on the basis of multiculturalism. The approach varied from assimilation, integration to the rejection of the immigrants. In the views of Kymlicka (2012:99) the multicultural policy is a historical process but in modern times the emergence of multiculturalism is of modern western democracies. He says that "It is important to put multiculturalism in its historical context. In one sense, it is as old as humanity-different cultures have always found ways of coexisting and respect for diversity was a familiar feature of many historic empires, such as the Ottoman Empire. But the sort of multiculturalism that is said to have had a "rise and fall" is a more specific historic phenomenon emerging first in the Western democracies in the late 1960s."

In the view of Banting (along with Will Kymlicka), on the basis of eight indicators of Multicultural Policy Index (MPI) concludes that "multicultural policies have been maintained or expanded from 1980 to 2010 in most OECD countries, except Denmark and the Netherlands" (Huddleston, July 28, 2011)

On the basis of his Citizenship Rights for Immigrants Index (ICRI) which is based on 41 indicators, Koopmans (2012) concludes that the policy of multiculturalism became more inclusive in nine western countries, from 1980 to 2008.

In 1970 a number of European countries followed the policy of multiculturalism. Germany, particularly West Germany, due to the economic boom and shortage of labour, was to follow a multicultural and multi racial policy after 1970. The purpose of this policy was to integrate the migrant labourers into the German society (Kim, 2012).

The policy of multiculturalism started in UK from 1970-1980 when the policy towards immigrants was based on the principle of cultural differences, the government coming with a policy to bring equality on democratic principles and recognition of the cultural rights of the immigrants. (*Multiculturalism Policies in Contemporary Democracies*) Another country of Europe which started the policy of multiculturalism was Netherlands, in 1950-60. Beside these nations, some other nations to be mentioned were Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Norway, Ireland, Greece, Finland, Belgium, and Denmark (*Multiculturalism Policies in Contemporary Democracies*).

This policy of multiculturalism was challenged in the early decade of the 21st century in many nations of Europe on various grounds, yet there is no denial of the fact that the demographic trends determined the multicultural policy of many countries around Europe.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The present paper is about the study of the relationship between the demographic trends and emergence of multiculturalism in Europe. The continent of Europe is one of the leading continents in the economic development and the power house of the world politics. Being the single powerful continent in the policy of colonialism, this continent integrated well with the people of the other continents.

The devastation of World War II eroded the political power and determined the loss of a large number of the working population, which made Europe face a crisis of population. This continent passed through various stages of demographic trends which affected its economic, cultural and political policies. Due to the decline in the natural growth of the population, the nations of this continent promoted the policy of immigrants to sustain the economic development by meeting the demands of the labour market. The demand of the economic development led to the coming of an increasing number of immigrants in Europe which determined the emergence of multiculturalism in Europe. Many nations like Germany, UK, Sweden, Ireland etc followed the policy of multiculturalism to assimilate, integrate or treat their migrants with equality and dignity. There is no doubt that the policy of multiculturalism evolved due to the coming of the immigrants and not due to the presence of minority communities in these nations.

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THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE CONCEPT OF "MARTYRDOM" IN IRANIAN SHI'ITE KEY

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Abstract: *This article analyzes the concept of "martyrdom" in the Shi'ite Islamic key, originally built on the opposition of the Shi'a partisans to the Sunni political factor, then reinterpreted in the work of 'Alī Šarī'atī, the ideologist of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, in a political and ideological key. Thus, by operating the distinction between muğāhid (the warrior capable of the supreme sacrifice in the name of Islam) and the šahīd (a martyr who, through his physical sacrifice, inspires others to fight against the unjust order), 'Alī Šarī'atī outlines a new interpretation of martyrdom as a symbol of galvanizing the energies of the people in favor of social justice, and Husayn's martyrdom, the third imam of Imamite Shi'ism, becomes a mobilizer of oppressed Muslim consciousness, a space of self-realization, in the conditions of a hopeless future. However, it should also be noted that this article is based on the research hypothesis that martyrdom in the Iranian Shi'ite was revived with the Islamic Revolution, which succeeded to imprint a new militant soul to the Iranian society and which, in the Iranian-Iraq war, constituted a source of ideological motivation of the Iranian soldiers. Associated with the political protest, Shi'ism brings to the forefront the sacrificial death of Karbalā', which has strong emotional springs and transcends the temporal and spatial boundaries, since any death in the name of justice and truth is transposed into the referential universe at Karbalā'. In the context of the Islamic Revolution, wrapped in a revolutionary coat, martyrdom becomes a pivotal notion of the political rhetoric, through which Shi'ites can build a society of true rationality and religion, dominated by virtue and freed from the exploitation of mustakbarīn-s (oppressors).*

Keywords: *martyrdom; Imamite Shi'ism; religion; ideological key; sacrificial death*

1. INTRODUCTION

The destiny of the Middle East is dominated by violence and persecution, concepts such as martyrdom and *ghihād*, marking definitively the Islamic confessional space, which, by excellence, has the vocation of distress. The analysis of the interpretation of martyrdom in Shi'ite Islamic sources calls for an initial analysis of the etymology and its evolution in the religious sphere, as it designates the persecuted person for a religious cause. Subsequently, the term penetrated the political area, including, equally, those who sacrificed their lives in the name of political beliefs. By having a wide range of perspectives, from sociological, theological, cultural to psychological, the martyrdom is essentially related to sufferance, injustice and, ultimately, to death in the name of a belief or principle. In the Iranian area, people have been inspired many times by Husayn's devotion to defend the own homeland.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Emile Durkheim's theory of suicide, doubled by the theory of Edwin Shneidman (1999),

according to which suicide is the consequence of unsustainable psychological suffering, provides the frame of self-sacrifice understanding. Thus, each culture and society has the predilection of providing a suicidal pantheon (Durkheim, 1897:16), suicide being treated as a social phenomenon, driven by a series of behaviors and motivations.

Starting with the definition of suicide understood as

any death resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act done by the victim himself (Durkheim, 1897:3)

Durkheim appeals to a suicidal typology dictated by the level of social integration and moral regulation. Thus, there are four types of suicide: egoistic, anomic, fatalistic, and altruistic. By defining egoism as a state in which the person self prevails in the face of social self, Durkheim claims that egoistic suicide results from "an excessive individualization" (Durkheim, 1897:223), whereas altruistic suicide is the consequence of detachment of man from society (Durkheim, 1897:233). On

the other hand, anomic suicide occurs in the face of crises or "collective disturbances", because any rift of equilibrium entails a voluntary death (Durkheim, 1897:271), while fatalist suicide opposes anomic suicide, being the result of the excess of regulation and the privilege of those whose passions are violently repressed by oppressive discipline (Durkheim, 1897:311).

Drawing attention to the altruistic suicide, specific to the primitive peoples (Durkheim, 1897:235), Durkheim's analysis of this particular suicide indicates three types: obligatory, optional and acute altruistic suicide (Durkheim, 1897:240-245). Thus, the altruistic suicide refers to the voluntary death of an individual perceived as an organic part of the social group, profoundly dependent on the social codes and the community to which it belongs. In this case, suicide is "a duty", society being the one that forces it to sacrifice its self from a sense of identification with collective values (Durkheim, 1897:236). This type of suicide illustrates the role of society, which does not hold of much account on the human being and his life, and who does not hesitate, in fact, to ask him to die because the self belongs to the membership group (Durkheim, 1897:238).

Claiming that suicide in the name of an intense altruism is "a virtue of excellence", Durkheim points out that this type of suicide is socially rewarded, and therefore, since childhood, the human being is encouraged to give up himself without a particular reason. Being induced by this state of impersonalism, the human being places the interests of society above physical survival, in which case death becomes a symbol of honor (Durkheim, 1897:240) and of social solidarity among members of a given society. This category includes the intense altruistic suicide that corresponds to mystical suicide, where the human being, conjuring the divinity, carries out the self-sacrifice, the memory of a so-called martyr being "in deep reverence" (Durkheim, 1897:242-243). But such religious conceptions are the product of his social environment, the individual being animated in this case by a purpose, even if he is outside his life (Durkheim, 1897:243-245).

Product of a society in which the human being is worthless, the mystic suicide urges the denial of any incipient form of individualism, the individual ultimately being the product of a social group that provides a particular picture of the world itself (Durkheim, 1897:245). Privilege of the primitive societies, altruistic suicide is also encountered in such civilizations that have developed the cult of religious martyrs, who in turn sacrificed

themselves in the name of an idea and perceived truth as the only meaning of life (Durkheim, 1897:246) Subsequently, in the modern age, under the pressure of collective solidarity and under revolutionary, patriotic or resistance standards, the ultimate sacrificial act embraced fanatic forms under the slogan "to die for the homeland", where the individual, prepared to sacrifice his life for a cause, shows no respect for the lives of others (Durkheim, 1897:263).

In his turn, Edwin Shneidman, the father of the modern suicidology, focuses his research on the psychological needs of the individual, claiming that suicide is ultimately caused by a psychological suffering called "psymal" (psychache). Stressing that "the enemy of life is the pain", Shneidman (1999:124) believes that psymal is a condition in all cases of suicide, and people appeal to the fatal gestures because of "pain, anguish, regret, suffering, misery that tortures the spirit" (Shneidman, 1999:157).

However, martyrdom calls for an audience, in front of which the death is dramatized, and the author becomes a mythical figure, and the audience is the one who creates his aura of hero and propagates the narrative of the ultimate sacrifice. In this context, David Cook argues that martyrdom is conditioned by historical memory, which contributes to the dramatic dissemination of that sacrificial form among subsequent generations. The narrative is modeled in such a way that the martyr takes on the outline of a national hero who sacrifices himself for a just cause, under these conditions the public assuming the obligation to build and perpetuate a tradition (Cook, 2007:3-5).

The personal sacrifice for the benefit of the community requires the activation of the tragic-heroic register in the Iranian Shiite cultural area, the martyr becoming the subject of *ta'zīeh*, that is, of that type of popular theatre that is commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Ḥusayn. The auditor of such theatre is an initiate, knower of the Shi'ite mythology, "familiar with all the rituals and the epic thread" and living the drama with pathos, and with the whole conviction that, by the death of Ḥusayn, the justice triumphs (Taqiyān, 1370/1991:2).

3. RELATION *ŠAHĀDAT* - *ĠIHĀD* IN ISLAMIC CLASSICAL SOURCES

The manner in which Islam deals with the martyrdom has become the subject of multiple researches, given that this concept goes beyond the boundaries of the spiritual and temporal

dimensions, because, in its construction, the ideological, identity and symbolic factions are involved. A complex and polysemic notion in Islamic eschatology, the martyrdom involves a dimension of sacredness, because a *šahīd* sacralizes the struggle in which he has engaged, Muḥammad himself recommending that the dead people in the name of Islam be buried in the place where they have fallen into battle.

Analyzed from an etymological point of view, the term *šahīd* comes from *šahida* the first verbal form, which has the meaning of "seeing, being witness; to testify, to certify, to confirm." The dictionary article *šahīd* designates "witness; martyr, a person killed in the battle with infidels" (Wehr, 1980: 488-489), in other words, is the person who dies in the testimony of God (Dizboni, 2005:71). The *šahādat*, or martyrdom, also comes from the same triconsonantic Arabian root - *š-h-d*, which has the first meaning of the word "testimony" and which, in the religious lexical register, means "the profession of faith", that is the first pillar of Islam.

Given that the Islam gave the war waged in the name of the spread of the Word of God a transcendental interpretation, the martyrdom, in Sunni key, is associated with the *ḡihād* concept, the first martyrs being companions of the Prophet whose sacrifice in faith brings the promise of eternal life to Paradise. The martyrdom and the *ḡihād* have their origin in the Qur'an, the source of all teachings, al-Baqara Surah (2:154) and Āl 'Imrān Surah (3:169), highlighting the promise of bringing all those "killed in the way of God".

The Islamic tradition of war brings to the fore the concept of *ḡihād*, which, however, has a particular interpretation. From the etymological point of view, the term comes from the Arabic triconsonantic root *ḡ-h-d* which means "to strive, to endeavor, to take pains" (Wehr, 1980:142) and does not have a military connotation. In the theoretical interpretation level, the verbal name *ḡihād* means "fighting with himself", and not at all "holy war," but the meaning of "battle" with which it is used in the Qur'an gave rise to multifaceted interpretations of its significance. *Ḥihād* means, above all, the believer's struggle to fight with the inner evil, but also with the one spread in society, without abandoning the path of truth at any time (Heck, 2004:95-96).

In the Islam's debut age, in the equation *dāru l-islām - dāru l-ḡarb* (the house of peace - the house of war), triumphed Islam precisely because the fight against the occupation of the infidels has become a sort of "personal obligation" for any

Muslim to struggle in the name of the liberation of the territories, otherwise, the Muslim who refuses to trigger the *ḡihād* being Hell reserved (Bar, 2004). It is worth noting, however, that this form of *ḡihād* is a defensive one, because enlistment became obligatory only in the situation where *dāru l-islām* was subjected to an unexpected attack by the unbelievers. On the other hand, in Ḥadīṭ, the *ḡihād* has the meaning of armed action, most classical Islamic theologians treating this form of *ḡihād* as one offensive, serving to Islamic hegemony and conquering of new territories (Streusand, 1997:3).

A concept with multiple interpretations, the *ḡihād* has a violent and a non-violent side, in this respect Muḥammad himself, after his returning from the battlefield, distinguishing between the small *ḡihād* and the great *ḡihād*, where the first refers to the army implication, while the second is the most difficult to achieve because it is a struggle with the ego (Esposito, 2007).

The most important function of the little *ḡihād* doctrine is to mobilize the masses of believers in the wars against unbelievers, and the active participle *muḡāhid* designates the combatant, or the participant to *ḡihād*, while the one who dies for the cause of faith becomes *šahīd*.

4. MARTYROLOGY IN IRANIAN SHI'ITE KEY

Outperforming the political doctrines, the Shiite theological doctrine is a sophisticated one, due to its interaction with the mysticism and religions of pre-Islamic Persia, the Qur'anic precepts being storage of hidden and esoteric meanings that can only be deciphered by the most worthy of the believers. Thus, the Shi'ism enlarges the concept of martyr and gets the size of death for a desperate cause, where the death becomes a place of self-realization, because the future is blocked. Built on opposition to the oppressive Sunni power of the day, martyrdom in this key of understanding has a particular ritualistic, political and ideological specificity, given that all twelve imams of Duodeciman religion are persecuted or killed by the Sunni caliphs.

According to Khosrokhavar, Ḥusayn's martyrdom becomes the emblem of Iranian Shi'ism (Khosrokhavar, 2003: 35), by his supreme sacrifice in the name of truth. A symbol of the ordinary Muslim, Ḥusayn embodies the ideal of the Muslim believer and becomes a symbol of mobilizing the masses against any form of injustice. Thus, the Karbalā's sacrificial death goes

beyond spatial and temporal boundaries, leading to the politicization of martyrdom and the sacralization of the leading character, which also acquires the aura of a hero and a saint.

Shifting the emphasis on the tragedy of the Karbalā' narrative, the Iranian Shi'ites managed to "transform the historical tragedy into a myth" (Armstrong, 2000: 47), and the struggle is endless until the final battle with Mahdī's return to Earth. °Alī's supporters set the rules of a life in the service of devotion and piety, built around the cult of suffering and mystery, the Shi'ite literature being dominated by

the theme of passion and martyrdom (...), the expression of mercy for all defuncts, the idea of sacrifice for the final cause and the reason of spending of the life as a preparation for finale salvation (Tartler, 2014: 68).

The Karbalā' tragedy and Ḥusayn's martyrdom symbolize the struggle for justice and truth, Ḥomeynī's speeches consolidating this belief:

The uprising and the movement which you imam Hussein (...) initiated and the battle in which he himself was martyred but overthrew Umayyad concepts, the protection of this battle, movement and uprising is necessary. If we want to make our state and its freedom permanent then we have to protect this secret (...). From this, oppressed will get energy and oppressor will be disgraced. Like karbala we have also given young sons. We have to keep this point in front of us (Khossa).

Engaged in a total struggle to establish a righteous world and against the aggression of the "arrogant" forces of the world, the Iranian Shi'ites perceive martyrdom as a form of self-defense against the other (Vahdat, 2003: 602), which, in Persian, is designated by the term *istišhād*. Thus, amid the domination of imperialism and the Western decadence, martyrdom, which has acquired social and symbolic values, has revived and has succeeded in impressing Iranian society with a new breath with political consequences, given that the *istišhād* has become a subject to encourage Iranian soldiers in the conflict with Iraq. The revolutionary discourse of the charismatic Rūḥollah Ḥomeynī is built on the writings of °Alī Šarī'atī and Morteza Moṭahharī, who have developed a particular reflection on the status of the human being in society. According to Morteza Moṭahharī, the martyr is compared to a society's candle, which has the pivotal role of emanating light on the darkness of despotism and repression,

its motivation and logic being different from an ordinary citizen, the reason for which the martyr is which is "surrounded by an aura of Holiness" (Muṭahharī, 1980: 3-14). On the other hand, °Alī Šarī'atī, the ideologist of the Islamic Revolution, deals with the martyrdom as a result of the trauma experienced by the Shi'ites as victims of Sunni usurpers. Thus, Šarī'atī operates the distinction between the martyr and the *šahīd*, where the first has Latin roots and means "death," i.e. "the one who dies for a cause", while a *šahīd* "is always alive and present", "he embodies the connotation of sacredness", and

the blood of the *šahīd* is a candle light which gives vision and [serves as] the radiant light of guidance for the misguided who wander amidst the homeless caravan, on mountains, in deserts, along by ways, and in ditches (Shariati, 1997).

Thus, according to Šarī'atī, *šahīd* is immortal, Ḥusayn's sacrifice bringing to him the sacredness, especially as he "encounters death in a conscious manner", testifying to the innocent and oppressed victims who opposed the usurper Yazīd. Putting the martyrdom over the *ḡihād*, Šarī'atī claims that the *muḡahid* is the combatant who goes to battle to defeat the enemy, his act being an individual one, while the act of the *šahīd* is a collective one, being understood as a mean of asserting what is denied, blocked or mutilated by the political system (Shariati, 1997).

On the other hand, Benazir Bhutto points out that

the Karbalā tragedy is, for the Shi'a Muslims, the lesson has taught the history about the price to pay if you want to follow the path of truth and do not interfere with the tyranny. It is said that each generation has its Karbalā' when people rise against an almighty tyrant, knowing that they are overcome numerically but incapable of remaining silent in front of oppression (Bhutto, 2008:58).

4. CONCLUSIONS

The classical Sunni sources have a particular perception of the martyr concept, while in the Islamic era, it is associated with the supreme sacrifice in the battles carried by the mass of young believers in the name of the new religion. Thus, Muḥammad himself glorifies the value of the supreme sacrifice in the wars waged for the restoration of order, but, after the Prophet's time, the term has gained a number of meanings over the centuries, "probably facilitated the transition

between (...) the so-called lesser jihad and the greater jihad”, given that a martyr is also the one who does not fall on the battlefield but who remains faithful to the cause for which he fights and receives, according to the Qur'anic text, a privileged place in Paradise (Cook, 2015: 27).

The martyrdom, in Shi'a view, has a particular significance, given that it contributes to maintaining the unity of the Shi'ite community in front of the persecution of temporal foreign powers. The remembrance of the tragic death of the first descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad, namely ʿAlī ʾibn ʾAbī Ṭālib, the fourth and last of the Ḥulafāʾu r-Rāšidūn (Rightly Guided Caliphs) and for Shi'a Muslims seen as the first imām and the first lawful caliph, assassinated while he was doing a prayer service at Kūfa, and then the assassination of his little son, Ḥusayn, plays a crucial role in the history of Shi'ism, being considered two living symbols that are at the center of Shi'ite identity formation. According to Mahmoud Ayoub,

The martyrdom of Imam Hussein has been regarded by the Shi'a community as a cosmic event around which the entire history of the world, prior as well as subsequent to it, revolves (Ayoub, 1978: 141).

In Iran of the twentieth century, the martyrdom is reactivated amid the start of the Islamic Revolution and then the Iranian-Iraqi war, both events favoring the feeding of the cult of martyrdom. In this context, Ḥusayn's sacrifice has gained strong emotional springs, becoming a mobilizing pivot of the masses, and an instrument for perpetuating the Shi'ite religious ideology.

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INTERCULTURAL COROLLARIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PENTAGONAL MODEL OF SOCIO-EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

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Abstract: *Emotional intelligence is a success in scientific research around the world. This paradigm has resulted in the emergence of new constructs, relations with other variables, the rethinking of social intelligence, all of which being, in fact, intercultural points of reference. In this article we examine these aspects of complementary plans of the socio-emotional human personality, such as: using our own emotions, engaging the abilities of socio-emotional intelligence, knowing, experimenting, understanding, processing, and using the environment and our own psychism for professional purposes. Following the analysis of these intercultural benchmarks, correlated with Goleman's, Bar-On's, and Albrecht's researches, we propose a generative model of socio-emotional intelligence from the point of view of a unitary intelligence.*

Keywords: *emotional intelligence; social intelligence; intercultural benchmarks; socio-emotional intelligence*

1. INTRODUCTION

What is social intelligence? But the emotional one? These two notions have given way to a large number of interpretations, since human intelligence is not a singular attribute, as claimed by partisans of the intelligence coefficient cult. All those who have contributed to the development of multiple intelligence theory have invited us to pay attention to the other dimensions of intelligence. In the multiple intelligence framework, professor Gardner's concept, we will address the two categories of intelligences that allow people to adapt to the social environment closest to or away from them: social intelligence and emotional intelligence.

We will try to answer the question: are social and emotional intelligence distinct constructs or do they have significant overlaps? Furthermore, we will present some intercultural benchmarks of complementary plans of the socio-emotional. These benchmarks will indicate the importance that some cultures attribute to this concept. As a result of the analysis of the main theories of emotional and social intelligence and integrating the intercultural points, we propose a theoretical model of socio-emotional intelligence, based on those elements that allow a person to demonstrate the intelligent use of emotions in managing their own professional profile and effective relationship with other people.

2. EXPLANATORY MODELS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOCIO-EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE CONCEPT

For several decades, the two notions, emotional intelligence and social intelligence have been analyzed, with ambiguous results. Research has shown that there are explanatory patterns of the two concepts that use overlapping terms. Also, the importance that has been given to the two concepts is different. Thus, the models proposed below are most often cited in the literature as well as those proposing measuring instruments for one of the two types of intelligence.

In our analysis of the theories of defining the two concepts, we will further pay attention to social intelligence because, on a chronological scale, it was defined before emotional intelligence (Hăhăianu, 2016:19). A first model is that of researcher Thorndike who tried to identify a unique set of skills other than those associated with the idea of intellectual intelligence. Thorndike's theory (1905, *apud* Bar-On & Parker, 2011) occupies an important place in the perspective of social intelligence: the focus falls less on behavior itself and more on the intended effect. As for Thorndike's definition, this is complemented by Goleman (2007) who considers pure manipulation as a mark of interpersonal talent. He identifies social intelligence with that intelligence "which

manifests itself not only in relation to our relationships but also within them" (Goleman, 2007:19), that is, the ability to relate. The author proposes a look beyond the individual, to what actually comes out when people interact. Goleman (2007:102) proposes a model of social intelligence, organized into two broad categories: social consciousness (primary empathy, emotional resonance, empathic precision, social cognition) and social unconstraint (synchronicity, self image, influence, concern).

A simpler description of social intelligence is made by Karl Albrecht (2007:14): the ability to get along well with others and to make them cooperate with you. By rearranging the components of the multiple intelligence within Gardner's theory into a common and simplified language, he sees social intelligence as a dimension of exterior-oriented skills. It provides a relatively simple but rather comprehensive model of social intelligence (Albrecht, 2007): a sense of the situation, presence, authenticity, clarity and empathy. Even if the terms used are different, we can notice the relationship between the two models. As for the construct of emotional intelligence, it is associated with many more definitions. We present here three of the explanatory models of this construct, in relation to the effects they have produced in the literature.

Emotional intelligence, the term used by Salovey and Mayer (*apud* Bar-On, & Parker, 2011: 92) to define the ability to understand and regulate emotions, includes the ability to accurately perceive, evaluate and express emotion; the ability to access and / or generate feelings when they facilitate thinking; the ability to understand emotion and emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to promote emotional and intellectual development. By this definition, the two authors emphasize the positive interconditioning between emotion and thought (Roco, 2001: 140). Therefore, the model of Peter Salovey and John Mayer perceives emotional intelligence as a form of pure intelligence, a cognitive ability.

Reuven Bar-On, a doctor at Tel Aviv University, described emotional intelligence as "a series of non-cognitive abilities, skills and aptitudes that influence a person's ability to succeed in adapting to the demands and pressures of the environment" (Bar-On & Parker, 2011: 109). Following the studies, he builds an Emotional Intelligence Inventory (EQ), indicating that emotional intelligence can be subdivided into five broad categories as follows (Roco, 2001:140-141): intrapersonal aspect, interpersonal aspect,

adaptability, stress control, and general mood. The first two factors recall Gardner's personal intelligence concept. More recently, following the review of this model, the area of general mood is considered to be a facilitator of emotional intelligence. As can be seen, certain attributes of the model seem to extend beyond what is generally meant by the terms of emotion and intelligence. Therefore, this second model presents emotional intelligence as a mixed intelligence, made up of cognitive ability and personality aspects, emphasizing how cognitive and personality factors influence the general mood of the individual.

The third model is the one introduced by Daniel Goleman, who perceives emotional intelligence as a mixed intelligence, made up of cognitive ability and personality aspects, but the model focuses on how cognitive and personality factors determine success in professional activity. He considers emotional intelligence a personal ability for self-control and control of impulses (Goleman, 2008). In his view, the constructs that make up this form of intelligence are (Goleman, 2008): self-consciousness, self-control, motivation, empathy and social skills. So Goleman does nothing but synthesize the paradigm of emotional intelligence in the five concepts.

This presentation of the three models of emotional intelligence highlights a common core of the basic concepts. Research has shown that there is a relationship between the three models of emotional intelligence, even if the terms used vary.

We adhere to Goleman's view that we should not clutter the two types of intelligence (social and emotional) under the same umbrella, as there is a distinction between social and personal skills, as Gardner (Goleman, 2007) acknowledged. We can not talk about emotional intelligence without referring to the social one. The constructs of the two types of intelligences complement one another. All of the above models include constructs from the two areas. That is why we aim to talk about a socio-emotional intelligence from the point of view of a unitary intelligence.

3. INTERCULTURAL COROLLARIES IN DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIO-EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Beyond the approaches broken down in evolutionary stages, socio-emotional intelligence, especially the emotional intelligence, is a success in scientific research around the world. As a result, this paradigm has resulted in the emergence of new constructs, concepts, and relationships with other

variables, all of which being, in fact, intercultural benchmark. These benchmarks, which will be examined below, will aim at complementary plans of the socio-emotional component of human personality. They are significant, being related to: using own emotions, engaging the abilities of socio-emotional intelligence, knowing, experimenting, understanding, processing and using the environment and own psychism for professional purposes.

In the US, researchers believe that what determines the quality of relationships depends on the development of the ability to perceive interpersonal emotions (Reis & Sprecher, 2009). For example, students who are much better at recognizing emotions on faces in photos and recorded voices have been found to relate much more easily. Similarly, men in happy marriages are much better able to identify the meaning of their wife's tone than those in unhappy marriages. Just like intellectual deficiencies, the lack of social intelligence leads to individual's lack of adaptation to social conditions of life (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 2000). At present, American education focuses on managing emotions in problematic situations, educational curricula aim at building a vocabulary of emotions and reading emotions from facial expressions, controlling impulses and regulating negative feelings, forming resistance to pressure to engage in risky sexual behaviors, alcohol or drug consumption (addiction behaviors) (Levinson, Ponzetti & Jorgensen, 1999). Karen Stone McCown (2011) even proposes introducing a new discipline into the curriculum: social development, also known as self-knowledge or social-emotional study. In terms of the army, emphasis is put on improving the emotional intelligence of soldiers by helping them resonate with their emotional responses and recognize uncontrollable emotions that can induce violence, aggression, or even suicide.

In the literature in Russia, Kurgan Lyudmila (2011) admits that emotional intelligence is an important component of emotional culture and compares it to what Goethe called "education of the heart". She also believes that this education should begin in the early years of school. In Germany, Bar-On and collaborators (2000) examined emotional intelligence in relation to emotional expressiveness and adaptation to occupational culture, on three types of samples: police officers, baby-sitters, and psychiatrists. Out of these categories, police officers seem most emotionally adaptable. Taking advantage of technology resources, American researchers in collaboration with the Japanese (Yamada *et al.*,

2008), propose an ASIs-based application software platform. ASIs are software agents that display social intelligence. They focus on two types: (a) social intelligence for emotional support; and (b) social intelligence for cognitive support. By applying these types of social intelligence, ASIs are capable of simulating social human behavior. In Spain, researchers focus on exploring emotional intelligence in the educational area. Raquel Palomera, Pablo Fernández-Berrocal and Marc A. Brackett (2008) advocate the inclusion of emotional skills as core competences in the training of future teachers, so that they could, in turn, train students, both socially and academically.

A study of Norwegian Army employees (Hjertø, 2009) presents evidence of a positive prediction of emotional intelligence for learning outcomes and conflict of work, as well as a negative prediction of learning outcomes from people in the emotional conflict. In particular, the dimension that contributes most strongly to this relation is the ability to use your own emotions, as well as to apply emotional self-assessment. In countries like England, Israel and Canada, researchers have focused on the professional field. A comparative study between two German and English contexts, initiated by Wolfgang Scherl *et al.* (2005), revealed that for corporations, where individuals work together and interact with clients, where they face conflicts or problems of intrinsic motivation, emotional intelligence is very important. Vigoda-Gadot and Galit Meisler (2010) at the University of Haifa conducted a study that showed that employees with a high level of emotional intelligence are more dedicated to work and more satisfied with the job than other employees. The study also shows that those with a high emotional intelligence rarely exhibit negligent behavior, the desire to quit the job or exhaustion. The results of the study prompted Meisler to say that it will not be long before emotional intelligence is tested upon hiring until standard training will include modules on emotional intelligence and this will play an important role in employee promotion decisions.

In Romania, the topic of emotional intelligence is often invoked, much more than that of social intelligence. Ioan Neacșu (2006) explores the roots, meanings and values of emotional intelligence of the psycho-educational literature, in order to capitalize and integrate it into the coordinates of the professional competence training of the teachers. Fundamental emotional intelligence "parts", as well as its overall structure, can be enhanced by training and experience in a creative workshop group

(Anghel, 2010). M. Roco (2001) highlights in a study, the fact that the best marks are obtained by students at psychology, followed at a short distance by those at medicine and journalism. Noteworthy is the fact that most of the students at these three faculties are oriented towards the knowledge of people's emotions. In an interview with Felicia Niculae (2010), Daniel Bichis, the only Romanian having an international certificate on the measurement and development of emotional intelligence, says "Women in Moldova have the highest level of emotional intelligence in Romania." He also made a study that proposed realistic assessment of the impact that emotional intelligence has on the activity of employees and managers of Romanian companies (Ilovniceanu, 2007). The results show that over 80% of the factors that determine professional success and achievement of a high level of life satisfaction are associated with the level of Emotional Intelligence (IE) and independent of rational or academic intelligence (IQ). If emotional intelligence is developed as an end in itself, it can be dangerous, giving birth to cognitive errors. Elisabeta Stănciulescu (2011), warns that emotional intelligence is the main tool of manipulation. To be able to make a person or a group do things they would not want to do without manipulative intervention and sometimes to even act against their interests, you need to address not their reasoning but their emotions and feelings. Other researches in the field show that there it is interest in developing programs to stimulate the emotional intelligence of soldiers in NATO missions, or to discover which features of socio-emotional intelligence are more accentuated and which are less manifested in the military environment. Such approaches could have the benefit of increasing the performance of both employees and the military system itself.

From the presentation of these instances we can see a great contribution of the American researchers, the proponents of this concept. The instances are found in different cultures and sometimes they resemble. In particular, the concept of emotional intelligence is tackled; the concept of social intelligence is associated with the former, or somewhat less researched. The military domain, especially the army, is of interest, mainly for Americans, Russians and Romanians. Of all these intercultural guidelines, we retain some complementary axes of socio-emotional intelligence: the development of emotional resilience, socio-emotional and gender differences, the way of adapting to occupational culture.

4. A PENTAGONAL MODEL OF SOCIO-EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

In the following, we will describe a model of socio-emotional intelligence (Figure 1) based on those elements that allow a person to demonstrate the intelligent use of emotions in managing their own professional profile and effective relationship with the group / team / others. Taking as a starting point and integrating the research of Goleman, Bar-On and Albrecht, we will present a generative model of socio-emotional competence with 21 competencies / even subcompetences, grouped into five clusters, complementing one another and performing synergistically : self-awareness, self-control, self-motivation, social consciousness, social skills.




Figure 1: The pentagonal model of socio-emotional intelligence

Clusters have a formatively progressive, experimentally evolutionary relationship. For example, the cluster of self-consciousness is necessary for the associative manifestation of the competence elements of the self-control cluster. The cluster of social consciousness is necessary for the efficient manifestation of competence elements in the social skills cluster. Self-consciousness is part of the intrapersonal component of socio-emotional intelligence and involves self-awareness, both in terms of emotional mood and the impact of one's own behavior on others. Therefore, the components of this cluster are awareness of own emotions, self-confidence, objective self-assessment. Self-control involves managing emotional reactions depending on situations and people. This category includes the following elements: stress management, impulse control, resilience, conscientiousness, adaptability, problem solving. Self motivation is the

identification of your own interior springs that can trigger an activity that leads to success. We can mention as elements of this cluster, with relevance for the professional field, the following: initiative, orientation towards achievement, optimism. Social consciousness covers a broad spectrum, from instantly sensing the mood of the other person to understanding his or her feelings and thoughts or understanding complicated social situations (Goleman, 2007): empathy, sense of the situation, presence. This will make it easier to avoid possible misunderstandings. Social skills are the ability to interact and collaborate. As skills, this cluster includes: persuasion, effective communication, relationship setting, conflict management, assertive character, team spirit.

Summarizing, in many professions such as education, public relations, communication, but not only, success depends on a number of factors of socio-emotional intelligence, factors that we have tried to capture in this pentagonal model. We believe that success is the result of combinations, including several elements of competence, some of them very new, unexpected.

5. A PENTAGONAL MODEL OF SOCIO-EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Considering that emotional intelligence and social intelligence have evolved in parallel, sometimes intersecting, sometimes being confused due to proximity, we have focused our efforts on constructing an informative and scientific presentation of the concept designated in the literature as socio-emotional intelligence, given that in Romania the definition of the concept in this form has not been achieved until now. Why do we say that there was no such definition? Because, until today, psychologists have failed to agree which human abilities are social and which are emotional. The two domains intertwine, just as the social property of the brain overlaps with the emotional centers (Parkinson, 1996). Therefore, we tried to answer the debate on the legitimacy of the construct, the superiority of one model or another, promoting the contingency relationship between intrapersonal and interpersonal aspects and developing a pentagonal model of socio-emotional intelligence.

Invoking prof. Neacșu's statement (2010: 220), who considers that "at the most general level, emotional intelligence refers to the abilities to recognize and regulate emotions in ourselves and in others", we can define socio-emotional intelligence as and the ability to recognize and

control emotions our own and others, and to adapt to relationships with others. Beyond the different approaches and theoretical modeling, it is widely accepted that socio-emotional intelligence is an important component of the human psyche, very important for social and professional success, sometimes even the most important one.

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SOCIAL PROSPECTIVE OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

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Motto: "It is our responsibility to amplify the good effects and mitigate the bad - to continue increasing diversity while strengthening our common understanding so our community can create the greatest positive impact on the world.."

Mark Zuckerberg, Building Global Community, February 2017¹

Abstract: *The Internet is a completely different thing from the so-called mass media. It is not a "medium" like the press, the television or the radio. It is an integrated system in which many different things coexist and we pursue very different objectives, from strictly individual communication to all sorts of group activities, from small or large communities, looking for information in something that is not entirely "universal library", but offers a vastness and freedom of choice that no other instrument had ever made possible. What matters, as always, is not technology, but the way people use it. The multiple possibilities of exchange, meeting, dialogue, knowledge, the infinite wealth of relationships, ideas, feelings, similarities and diversity, the possibility for each person to build a "his" custom network and finally the immensity of available resources that would be disorienting if it were not possible - as it is actually - to build a little at a time a system of choices and relationships "on a human scale" in which to move in a pleasant, flowing, stimulating way nothing but cumbersome or tiring. To all this are added the new forms of communication, Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn ... in a word, social networks, born to be facilitators in communication processes and today are found to have become a battleground on which governments and other organizations the possibility of manipulating public opinion is played out. But how much did the formation of ideas change or potentially change? Civic participation in political life is allowing a rapid and continuous evolution of the information ecosystem, forever changing the playing field and the rules of electoral competitions. It was 2011 when that movement of people then called by the journalists "Arab Spring", began the use of social networks to report news and report abuses due to corruption of law enforcement. Thanks to the web bloggers have made many people aware and participate in politics by transmitting their indignation and activism. The viral and sudden character of social media has caused police videos, tweets and news about demonstrations and protests to expand at an impressive rate, adding more people to the cause. But the web and social media, these catalysts of opinions and revolts, which effectively accelerate the processes of organization and facilitate the exchange of opinions, can they ever replace traditional means, such as flyers, faxes, meetings, etc.? Is all that glitters gold? Only a few years have passed since the Arab spring, but in reality an era for the compressed times of the Web. Recent reports by the two greatest actors of this great change, Mark Zuckerberg, creator and CEO of Facebook and Evan Williams, co-founder of Twitter, can be considered almost "coming out" compared to results as much desired, as disliked and betrayed by the network towards citizens. Facebook calls it "information operations" and explains that they go beyond the phenomenon of false, inflated news, fake news. Williams is much less diplomatic and speaks openly of the "now broken internet" and apologizes for Trump's recent election as US president, thus admitting a key role that 140-character communication would have in routing consensus. Behind this apparently spontaneous and deregulated phenomenon, complex and well-financed efforts by States and other organizations would be hidden in order to hijack and pilot the consensus. The Internet, our greatest instrument of emancipation seems to have turned into the most dangerous contribution to totalitarianism that has ever been seen. Starting from the description of the current situation of intelligence in the Net, the objective of these pages is to compose the pieces of a puzzle that is as close as possible to the future of the WEB, and therefore to the future of our world. The chosen guideline is consistent with the "wonderful dream" of Tim Berners Lee, who has forged the WEB to date: • sharing knowledge and intelligences enhanced by the use of the Internet; • the possibility that computers will talk, and understand each other, thanks to the development of the Semantic WEB.*

Keywords: digital information; Internet; communication

¹ <https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/building-globalcommunity/10154544292806634>

1. THE DIGITAL INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM

The convergence between the telecommunications and the audiovisual industry, which has been underway for some time, has now undergone a process of rapid acceleration with the development of the Internet. The European Commission with the Green Paper of 2014 has, for the first time, associated with the term -convergence the adjective -pial to underline the importance of the phenomenon that is changing the connotations of the communications industry and consumption habits and the lifestyles of citizens. The factors of this change must certainly be placed within certain processes such as disintermediation, the possibility of both using content without "institutional" intermediation (file sharing, social network), and creating and distributing own content (user generated content). The implications on the socio-cultural level are also important: the disintermediation of content on the one hand has led to the birth and proliferation of blogs and social networks, also aimed at the non-institutionalized production of content, on the other it refers to the diffusion of the logic of open source. These factors have radically changed the architecture of the markets and the value chain of the communications industry.

The new forms of communicating what has changed or potentially can change the formation of ideas? Civic participation in political life is allowing a rapid and continuous evolution of the information ecosystem, forever changing the playing field and the rules of electoral competitions. Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn ... in a word, social networks, born to be facilitators in communication processes, risk becoming a battleground on which governments and other organizations play the possibility of manipulating public opinion. The amplification of the dissemination of messages made by the professionals of political communication 2.0, employees of governments or other professionals, like coordinated to make relevance to certain posts, the creation of groups that disguise the propaganda putting it together with real information and spreading material racist often through false accounts, seem to have taken unfortunately in the landscape of political debate. To say it is precisely the inventor of the most widespread and used social in the world, today CEO of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg with a study published in a 13-page report, announcing he wants to take new measures

to cope with this phenomenon (Weedon *et al.*, 2017).

The Facebook report, with the announcement of new measures that include the suspension or cancellation of fake accounts after identifying them, reflects a change of perspective compared to when, at the end of 2016, Zuckerberg called "a crazy idea" the fact that the fake news transmitted through the social network could have influenced the outcome of the presidential elections in the United States. And the US presidential elections were chosen as a case study: in the report we read that false characters on Facebook have spread stolen e-mails and other documents in the context of coordinated efforts, efforts that US intelligence agencies have attributed to Russia; and other false characters then pushed those stories forward by expanding that material.

Facebook calls them "information operations" and explains that they go beyond the phenomenon of false, inflated news, fake news. Behind this apparently spontaneous and deregulated phenomenon, complex and well-financed efforts by States and other organizations would be hidden in order to hijack and pilot the consensus. This is how the Zuckerberg staff concludes this report, to be considered a "coming out" of the Net and its ability to influence the minds: We recognize that, in today's information environment, social media plays a role in facilitating communications - not only in times of civic events, such as elections, but in everyday expression. In some circumstances, however, we recognize that the risk of malicious actors seeking to use Facebook to mislead people or otherwise promote inauthentic communications can be higher. For our part, we are taking a multifaceted approach to help mitigate these risks:

- Continually studying and monitoring the efforts of those who try to negatively manipulate civic discourse on Facebook;
- Innovating in the areas of account access and account integrity, including identifying fake accounts and expanding our security and privacy settings and options;
- Participating in multi-stakeholder efforts to notify and educate at-risk people of the ways they can best keep their information safe;
- Supporting civil society programs around media literacy.

Just as the information ecosystem in which these dynamics are playing out is a shared resource and a set of common spaces. We have made concerted efforts to collaborate with peers both within the technology sector and in other areas, including governments, journalists and news organizations, and we will be working together

support strong, informed, and civically engaged communities.

In political communication 3.0 is the "amplification" effect or the "denigration" effect of the adversary more productive? According to Giovanni Sasso, spin doctor among the most popular of the moment, criticizing political opponents is not a taboo. Indeed, it is a duty, under certain circumstances. The problem is that often all the political debate focuses on a constant rebound of mutual accusations, and in this deafening noise the *pars construens*, or the political proposal, ends up getting lost. Sasso believes this is one of the causes of Italians' growing disaffection with politics. "I turn on the TV and watch two hours of talk show in which everyone is committed exclusively to denigrate the opponent, without proposing anything, fatally I will consider politics a clumsy imitation of bar fights between fans, Monday morning. And at that point, I'll choose the original".

However, the question remains at the center of the debate: Can the use of social media be enough to win people's consent? Sasso says no and adds: - but not only, I would be much more drastic. To win people's consent, not even the other traditional media are enough. In essence, political-electoral communication, by itself, even if done in the best possible way, is never enough. Communication, and therefore also the correct and strategic use of social media, works only when it is based on a solid base made up of convincing political proposals, put in place by credible people and movements. I always say that there is no good advertising for a poor product. Or better, it can give some results in the short term, but then in the medium-long it turns into a boomerang.

Referring back to the international system, before winning the Florida and Pennsylvania elections, Donald Trump had already won them on Facebook and Twitter. He has had double Hillary Clinton fans for the last six months of the campaign. It would therefore be wrong to say that who-wins "on social networks wins in the country?"

In planning communication strategies, a candidate or a party must necessarily rely on the Net to maximize the impact of a statement or slogan or fundraising and must be prepared to respond adequately to the attacks and counter-offenses of the adversaries. Candidates must invest substantial financial and human resources to keep control of flows via social, employing many experts.

Italy, like the whole planet has been colonized by the social networks with stars and stripes.

Obama, in 2008 won big thanks to an intelligent use of Facebook. Trump has won this year, but it is still difficult to say how much of the success is due to the social and how much to the huge media coverage combined with his undeniable ability to speak to the belly of the American middle class. In Italy, despite Renzi being a social leader, the constitutional referendum has lost. But even here communication is not everything. In 2013 and the last municipal M5S has certainly not won because he knows how to use the Internet, but because he has intercepted the anger and antipolitics that characterize the current Italian political phase.

To compete in the new media ecosystem, even Italian parties have long since been in power on social media. But with reaction times and different weights. If the M5S is a case apart, Renzi and the PD have invested increasing resources until relying on the last referendum, without success, to Obama's guru, Jim Messina. While other parties such as the NCD, but also the Lega Nord and Forza Italia, count more on the movement or presidentialism of their respective leaders than on the widespread management of communication on the Net: they still rely on old memberships refreshed by new slogans or new proclamations. According to a recent study conducted in seven countries including Italy, 72.5% of politicians have not really taken the social step yet. The universe of Big Data collected on the internet has opened up vast and disturbing spaces for the "profiling" of users and voters. Through the crossover of social surveys with public or payable personal data and applying psychometry (which measures the psychological characteristics of an individual), a Big Data giant like Cambridge Analytica is able to offer a sort of search engine for people, capable of identifying, for example, all undecided democratic voters, who may become the target of a political communication - on a measure. It is microtargeting, based on the measurement of voters' personality based on their digital traces.

Of course, in Italy, television is still the main source for political information. The Net is the place where everyone expresses his opinion in a chaotic, irresponsible way. One wonders, however, if thanks to their interactivity, social media are not also the virtual agora where voters change opinion more easily than with old one-way media. In part yes, at least in the United States. According to a survey by the Pew Research Center in Washington, overall 20% of social media users say they have changed their position on a political or social issue due to material seen on social media and 17% say social media have contributed to change their opinion on a specific political candidate. At the

same time there are also phenomena of rejection, electors frustrated and dissatisfied by the quarrelsome and insulting tone of the political debate on social platforms. The primary information that feeds the web is still derived from traditional sources on the Internet (newspapers, magazines, etc.) but today the most used site to learn is Google and Facebook is the fifth. This shows that there is certainly a radical change in the way in which information is offered, enjoyed and shared. The Network generally tends to amplify, radicalize and propagate processes, dynamics and effects generated within the media ecosystem. Then there is the question of the so-called Troll, provocateurs who poison the debates distracting attention on the subject matter and find fertile ground in the field of political debate on the Net. All these actions of using social tools are used by political leaders just to guaranteeing the legitimacy of the media and thus acquiring - media capital" (De Blasio *et al.*, 2012).

The Net is a crossroads of relationships, a flow of communications, an ever-changing arena and within which horizontal relationships are established and one often follows a leader who exercises increasing influence over habits and decisions.

2. THE INTEGRATIVE GOVERNMENT AND THE CITIZEN

Promoting citizen participation in a democratic society is also possible thanks to the interactive government; they can participate in political affairs at local, regional, national and even international levels. The Network can respond to this need, putting itself at the service of the State to reform it, making it more efficient, closer to the needs of the population, and from the public sector expects the same quality of services offered by the private sector. The right of citizens to be informed of what happens in the palaces of power, has been amplified thanks to the Internet. In fact, in traditional media, service information is almost absent, while it is easier to access it through the websites of the Municipalities, Regions, Ministries and Parliament, through numerous portals. At the base there must be greater transparency of information, procedures and decisions.

By transparency we mean less corruption and more trust in institutions; the citizen, therefore, participates in the choices of the government, thanks to the consultation and access to information, previously only accessible through paper material. But the pioneering phase of P.A. it has already been completed for some time, so it is

no longer enough to automate and digitize the processes, but we need to think about the contents both from the point of view of the internal organization, and in the methods to interface with the public. It is a question of accelerating a process that has already begun to create real virtual service environments, destined for both citizens and businesses, to replace or integrate the traditional public office, so as to change the face of the PA, streamlining the bureaucracy through the adoption of digital technologies. European States must now guarantee digital access to all public services and facilitate the various forms of electronic commerce. This is a strategic choice, to increase efficiency and transparency, reduce costs, speed up administrative procedures to favor citizens and businesses. Generalized electronic access is the engine of the transition to digital citizenship. Electronic democracy could therefore be a reality, but often in the administrative dimension there are trends that can lead to the use of technological opportunities that endanger individual and collective liberties, and therefore democracy itself.

In fact, there are also some who report some critical aspects regarding network communication: some think that computer-mediated communication could reinforce existing modules of interaction, instead of creating new ones. In addition, the introduction of new technologies could be a win-win situation only for those who already have good skills in this area. For this reason, the presence of more information can not always lead to an increase in citizen participation.

Consequently, the body that chooses to activate a civic network must take into account these problems and take responsibility for ensuring that those who access the network have access to the necessary information to participate concretely in the planned activities, freeing themselves from the role of passive spectator.

3. WEB USABILITY AND INFORMATION ON THE WEB

On the theme of usability of websites we must also dwell on the recent guidelines provided by the usability guru, J. Nielsen. There are aspects that would come in handy with a view to SEO13, because now the search engines tend to standardize the indexing criteria to the behavior of users, then to usability. It would also be very useful to consider, also in light of some advertising campaigns, the considerations made by Nielsen on the welcome pages (homepage).

These are some of the words used by the authors (J. Nielsen - H. Loranger) of the volume "Web usability 2.0, The usability that counts, Apogeo, Milan 2006 (page 111) on the subject: 1)The welcome pages were among the first sins of a web design that despised its users to the point of preventing them from having what they came for [...] but there are still sites that insist on slowing down users with this technique imbecile. 2)The new sites of small and medium-sized businesses seem particularly sensitive to the charm of the welcome pages, perhaps because the owners insist on wanting to take the stage instead of taking care of the customers and their needs. 3)The welcome pages must disappear. The user immediately gets the impression that a site is more interested in its image than in solving its problems. It is true that a homepage must immediately communicate the purpose of the site and what the user offers, but must also communicate respect for the visitor's time, or the visitor will leave. 4)For a site a visual design is useful, but it is also one that assigns the right priority to information and guides the user's eye towards the main functionalities.

From an SEO perspective, search engine algorithms aim to assimilate searches to the main characteristics of user behavior; so if on 10 links only 1 only then actually falls on the page of the product you are searching for, it means that the latter will have a weight in the indexing of 1/10 compared to the whole of all links.

The other limit that can be underlined is the weight of the texts in the Index. The trend of the engines goes towards a prominence of the function of the index; GG (Google), in particular, is favoring index-oriented indexing on indexes, which can lead the latter to inherit indexing scores on internal pages, unless the indexes re-propose the fulcrum elements (keywords and links) of internal pages. Therefore, depriving ourselves of the text in the index, as well as contravene usability logics, is equivalent to strongly limiting the text indexing.

The previous guidelines on the homepage, from my point of view, are even more true if we consider the different attitude taken by the user depending on whether its origin is direct (already know the site URL) or indirect, if search engines or from other reference sites, through banners or hypertext links. The user who comes from the search engines has an exclusive orientation to the content: therefore seeks immediate answers exclusively in textual descriptions and, at most, in the detail of the images (especially if he is looking for products). This makes it more demanding from

the point of view of seeking an answer to his questions.

The structure of a site will increasingly condition long-term indexing. The structural interventions, therefore, are also those for which there are more needs for spending, economic (for those who support it) and time (for those who make them). As for the speech of acceleration of the intervention phases, it is obvious that the greater the indexing intentions, the greater attention must be paid to technical interventions and since only the first page will guarantee visibility (93% of users find on the first page, between Adwords¹⁵ and SERP¹⁶) this reasoning will become even more relevant, also in light of the exponential proliferation of sites.

Information on the Internet is everywhere, because it is present in large quantities and is continuously created and modified. This information embraces a wide variety of genres (facts, opinions, stories, interpretations, statistics) and is created for different purposes (to inform, to persuade, to sell, to present a point of view, to create or change an attitude or a belief, etc.).

For each of these genres and purposes, information has various levels of credibility, oscillates between good and bad, and includes every nuance in the middle. It is essential to ask initial questions such as: - Which source or type of source would be the most reliable to obtain information on this particular case? Or: Which sources are more likely to be correct, objective, without ulterior motives and qualitatively verified? It is important to keep these considerations in mind, not to simply accept the opinion of the first source you meet. Keeping these things in mind during the research, you will be able to expose suspicious or questionable sources faster. Since there are so many sources to choose from in one search, there is no reason to dwell on unreliable material.

You should choose sources that offer as many of the following information as possible: Author's name; Title and position of the author; Affiliation of the author to some organization; Date of creation or modification of the page. Information, practically synonymous with culture, serves as a basis for: beliefs, decisions, choices, and the understanding of our world. If decisions are made based on wrong or unreliable information, one does not receive a power, but a defeat. If we eat something dangerous that we believe is safe for us, we can get sick; if instead we avoid something good because we believe it to be harmful, we would have done nothing but limit the enjoyment

of our life without any reason. The same thing can be applied to every choice: traveling, buying and carrying out an action, and every attempt to understand. The lack of trust in a source puts the individual in a situation of stalemate, from which he will be able to go out only when he finds a - guide or someone, or something, that has reliable information. The circle closes on itself.

4. THE INTERNET, THIS STRANGER. THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948 states that each individual has: - the right to seek, receive and disseminate information and ideas through every means and without regard to frontiers. In terms of access, therefore, it will be necessary to distinguish between -access and -accessibility. The first term refers to inequalities in access to and use of the so-called "information society" technologies (the so-called Digital Divide); the second term instead refers to the possibility of making universal Internet access (usability). The big, age-old problem of the Internet is given by the "conflict of interests" between the need for leadership and the attempts of "dictatorship" by political states and economic forces. The Internet being a structure with a high degree of organizational complexity, can only work if there are precise rules to be respected and bodies that oversee their respect.

The central apparatus of the Internet is located in the United States: it is formed by some organisms responsible for various functions necessary for the development and maintenance of the Net. Then there is a territorial apparatus with a hierarchical pyramidal organization (similar to a feudal model), and at the base of the pyramid are the intermediaries who cooperate to allow access to cyberspace by the individual user.

The main bodies that are placed at the top of the hierarchy and which currently govern the Internet are: ISOC (Internet Society): is based in the United States and has purposes aimed at encouraging the international development of the Internet, ensuring the establishment and functioning of the necessary bodies; IAB (Internet Architecture Board): is an ISOC organization that is responsible for the general organization of the Internet. It is composed of 13 members with voting rights. For many years he was president Vint Cerf, one of the founding fathers of the Internet;

IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority): is the central coordinating body for the assignment of the parameters for the Internet protocols, for the

determination of the rules with which IP addresses are assigned and for the determination of the rules for the assignment of domain names. It is based at the University of Southern California; ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Number and Names): founded in 1998, it is a private non-profit corporation subject to the laws of the state of California. It has the task to register the DNS and develop new standards for Internet protocols. ICANN is administered by a Board composed of 18 directors and a president; of these nine are appointed directly by the institution, the other nine should be elected by the world community of the Internet. In reality, only five of the nine members are actually in charge, following the first elections held, among many controversies, in 2000.

Among the polemics against the repression of freedom of expression in Tunisia ended the world summit of the information society organized by the UN. A Tunis Agenda was also adopted that envisages a strategy to bridge the digital gap between rich and developing countries to enable them to get on the information and ICT (Information Communication Technology) train. But no commitment wanted to take the "rich" countries to contribute to the Digital Solidarity Fund launched in Geneva in 2003, during the first phase of the summit, by Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade.

Access to the Internet and information technologies, and to the social, economic and cultural development that follows, is still a dream for over 80% of the world's population. Wade said he put a lot of hope in the \$ 23 laptop computer for the children of developing countries invented by Nicholas Negroponte, who presented it to Smsi along with the UN Secretary-General. However, the road ahead is still long to reduce ICT costs - which, according to Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, depends only on the political will of the industrialized countries - because the 800,000 villages that are still lacking appeal can become part of the "planetary information village" by 2015, as the UN secretary general wishes. Up to now the Internet has been managed, and governed, exclusively by the American company ICANN. During these months many proposals have been put forward to give the network an international control, reducing the American influence in the control of the new technology.

In this regard, a long negotiation was conducted to find a satisfactory solution to the evolution of the network government. In fact, there are various currents of thought to delineate the future of Internet users. On the one hand, ICANN

wants to continue its role of control and supervision. On the other hand, the users themselves, individuals, associations and companies are wary of any kind of external intervention, political or administrative, in the world of the Net and delineate a self-regulation of the online world.

One of the most reliable hypotheses is the establishment of a completely international government, presided over by a body in the UN. The effort was to collect and analyze all the proposals, to consider the needs of users and to harmonize the opposing positions. Finally, it was decided to set up a 5-year forum, naturally on-line, managed directly by the staff of the UN Secretary-General. The forum will be open and all the issues of the Net will be discussed, from spam to pornography, to user rights, etc. Once the solutions have been shared, a more and more international supervisory body, Ican, will take care to control the applications of the defined rules.

5. RETURN TO AGORA

The digital revolution determines risks and opportunities. When digital technology breaks into communication, it changes both search method in the Web, both the language of its representation and this transition to digital communication produces another mutation of cybernauts enhancing their experiences and emotions. One risk is the deterioration of the quality of professional information due to the difficulty of publishers to remunerate the productive factors and a structural crisis of the publishing industry that could lead to concentration phenomena and a lower level of pluralism in information.

On the opportunities side, digital technologies offer an extraordinary tool for disseminating information and enriching it thanks to multimedia contents. All of this is a great business opportunity for companies that are able to better interpret change. The technology is neither good nor bad nor neutral, says the first law of technology of the American historian Melvin Kranzberg (1986), only three years before Tim Berners Lee's launch of the World Wide Web. Technology is and will continue to be an instrument in our hands. Political marketing on the social network can also provide tools to multiply fake news, the infamous post-

truth and replace with political automata the political supporters in the flesh, thus doping the numbers of political consensus. The problem is intertwined with that of hacking for political purposes, brought to the fore with the recent Russian-American cyber war.

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DIALOGUE BETWEEN DIFFERENT CULTURES THROUGHOUT HISTORY

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Abstract: *Throughout history the merging of cultures of civilization has resulted in different cultural practices, such as the exchanges on the Silk roads, or the imposition of cultural values through the wars, the various settlements or conquests. Today, in a world characterized by cultural diversity, one feels the need to propose new approaches to intercultural dialogue, overcoming the model of "dialogue of civilizations" to initiate new cultural interactions regarding an understanding needed in a intercultural world. The preconditions to ensure a better consideration of the cultural values that they have in common, shared goals, along with a list of the difficulties to be solved to overcome cultural differences. In addition to this there are the processes of globalization that have made possible regular exchanges, facilitating much intercultural dialogue.*

Keywords: *culture; history; dialogue*

1. INTRODUCTION

Probably in the course of history there has never been talk of cultural diversity since the beginning of the 21st century. However, the variety of debates, as well as cultural diversity, is such as to make the notion assume its changing meaning. In fact, for some, cultural diversity is considered positive because it evokes in itself the sharing of the treasures stored in every culture of the world. For others it is less because it is thought to make the sense of our common humanity lose and therefore be seen as a source of numerous conflicts; today this reflection has a strong proportional credit due to the fact that globalization has multiplied the points of contact between cultures exacerbating the identity issues.

2. WHAT WE MEAN BY CULTURAL DIVERSITY

2.1 Cultural diversity: which challenges

First of all, cultural diversity is a fact, there is a great variety of cultures that differ without difficulty in ethnographic observation, although what defines a given culture can be considered more difficult than one can believe. It can be said that the cognition of diversity has been so trivialized, because the knowledge of others has been facilitated by the globalization of exchanges and by a greater openness by the various

societies. The diversity of social codes has also rapidly contributed to making cultural diversity a real social issue. Faced with this diversity of norms and conceptions of the world, states find themselves inexperienced whether it is to respond to them, often urgently, or to try to profit from them for the common good. Here, with the UNESCO World Report dealing with this situation, we tried to propose a renewed framework for understanding the challenge represented by cultural diversity. To this end, it would be important to identify, beyond the very fact of its existence, the theoretical and political difficulties involved.

The first challenge will be oriented towards the examination of the various policies implemented without losing sight of the object of such reflection: cultural diversity and not the substitutes to which it is too often reduced.

A solution could be an extensive definition of culture (in the spirit of consensus established by the 1982 Mexico City Declaration) which has the merit of not promoting a too restrictive definition, without privileging a particular trait of a culture, for example religious, to the detriment of everyone else to define what characterizes it, but to encourage the union of cultures.

A difficulty in this sense could depend on the characterization of the constituent elements of cultural diversity and in this regard we can cite as an example the way in which UNESCO intends

the notion of civilization, refers to a process under construction, aimed at reconciling each individual culture of the world, on the basis of the recognition of their equal dignity within a continuous universal project.

A third and last difficulty depends on the relationship of cultures to change, and it took the first seven decades of the twentieth century for cultures to begin to be perceived as changing entities. One gets the impression that culture is better understood if one considers it as a process: societies change according to paths that are specific to each of them. The concept of difference is well aware of this particular dynamic by virtue of which a culture changes while remaining the same.

It is therefore necessary to define policies that give a positive inflection to these cultural differences, to make sure that the various groups can come into contact instead of entrenching themselves in closed identities, discovering in the "difference" a stimulus to evolution and change. It is a new cultural and social approach that could be used to accompany cultural change, helping them to live in the right way.

2.2 Cultural interactions. Cultures are not autonomous or static entities. This is one of the main obstacles to intercultural dialogue, after all Samuel Huntington has made important objections to the "clash of civilizations". Speaking of fractures to describe the differences between cultures is equivalent to ignoring the particularity of cultural boundaries and the creative potential of people.

The intermingling of cultures throughout history has translated into different cultural forms and practices, such as loans and exchanges (the ways of silk) or the imposition of cultural values through wars, conquests or colonization. However, exchanges also take place in the extreme context of slavery, due to the momentary processes of inverse acculturation in the dominant culture. Today the recognition of the universality of human rights allows us to reason in terms of "authentic exchanges" based on equality between all the cultures of the world.

The processes of globalization now make meetings, loans and exchanges possible. These new transcultural links can greatly facilitate intercultural dialogue. The awareness of history and the understanding of cultural codes are decisive factors for overcoming stereotypes and for making progress on intercultural dialogue.

2.3 Cultural stereotypes. Cultural stereotypes, while serving to distinguish one group from another, entail the risk that dialogue will fail in the face of differences. In fact, cultural tensions are often linked to conflicts of memory and opposing ways of interpreting past events, conflicts-values, particularly when referring to religious values.

When the desire to excel and manifest one's power does not distance the forms of dialogue, the latter remains the decisive solution to put an end to rooted antagonisms and to defuse political expressions that are often too violent. Today, today society must try to aim at recognizing and respecting the cultural peculiarities of all by seeking to promote universally shared values, originated by the interaction of cultural specificities.

In this way the tension between different identities can become the driving force of a renewal of national unity that rests on a new understanding of social cohesion capable of being able to include the diversity of different cultures.

2.4 Education. Education, considered in terms of transmitting knowledge and developing social and behavioral skills approaches, is the right solution. A pedagogical program determined by learning processes and standardized contents can not in any way respond to everyone's needs, any more than it corresponds to their living conditions. This is increasingly evident in a number of countries seeking to explore new roads within their educational path.

However, information on the types of education dispensed in the world and on what distinguishes them from one country to another has not yet been the object of a systematic analysis. In the name of quality education that is both well-conceived (in the sense of culturally acceptable) and flexible, ie adapted to an evolving society), program development must aim at increasing teaching relevance by adapting pedagogical contents, in addition to teacher training.

This means multicultural and multilingual programs based on multiple voices, on the stories and cultures of all groups in society. This approach, sensitive to the diversity of learning, should also include certain special measures to reach the most marginalized and vulnerable groups, and then try to improve the school and educational environments.

3. CONCLUSIONS

Cultural diversity, understood as a dynamic process whose dialogue, historical, religious and social can become a powerful lever for renewal, favoring the development of peace, based on universally recognized human rights. This diversity is at the heart of international cooperation and cohesion policies in line with the efforts of the international community to achieve global development.

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THE POWERS OF THE NINTH TRACK. AN APPLICATION OF THE MULTITRACK MODEL TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

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Abstract: *Good leadership, based on cultivating values and a shared identity have proven essential, yet not sufficient in the rise and fall of empires, social movements and religions. In a profoundly diverse contemporary society, the control of social perceptions of the large masses has become the heel of Achilles of current power games as well as the frontline of modern warfare. So how can digital civil engagement and new media be kept in the service of a positive peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as conceptualized by Johan Galtung, the father of peace studies? Media and communication have been widely used by individuals and groups to advance their political projects. This article applies the model of the ninth track of communication from the multitrack peace negotiations framework of Diamond and McDonald (1996) to provide an interpretation of the usage of media and communication tools in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This allows us to understand the growing importance of new media in the conflict and to indicate how this framing might generate questions for empirical research.*

Keywords: *digital communities; negotiations; positive peace; multi-track diplomacy; Israeli-Palestinian conflict*

1. MULTITRACK PEACE

1.1 What is 'peace'? The concepts of peace and conflict are perceived very differently by the Israelis and by the Palestinians. The social cosmologies of the civilizations that are confronting each other in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have a fundamental role in modelling the ideological and cultural substrata of all those involved, from the civil societies all the way to the official negotiators and the leaders.

Johan Galtung, the founder of the discipline of peace and conflict studies more than six decades ago has defended through a prolific bibliography the importance of positive peace, particularly in protracted conflicts (Galtung, 1996, 1985, 1981, 1969, 1964). Positive peace is defined as "the integration of human society" in contrast with negative peace, which is "the absence of war" (Galtung, 1964:2). For what good is a peace maintained by isolation, and the threat of violence? It will only last for as long as it takes to breach the enclosure, overcome the fear, revolt against gender, race, class and family violence, stand up to socio-economic and political structures of exploitation and repression (Galtung, 1985).

"Peace is a concept applied to a system" Galtung (1985:75) warns, and this concept is imbued with the characteristics of the system,

including the creation of concepts, traditions, ways of thinking, perceptions of the self, of the other and of the rest.

The 20th century passage from classic to contemporary diplomacy has also seen important changes in its components. Most prominently, trends like increased transparency and participation of the broad public in decision-making, increased democratization of international public and private affairs, have led to the emergence of new types of diplomacy, such as public diplomacy and digital diplomacy.

In order to create the premises for positive peace, the activities undertaken in different sectors of society and by a wide range of actors need to be convergent when not correlated. There are two frameworks of analysis which have gained more traction in the academia and specifically in peace studies, aiming at classifying the multitude of activities taking place in one conflict and aimed at bringing the prospect of peace closer. For the purposes of the current article, the Nine-Track framework of Diamond and McDonald (1996) is more useful than the Three-Track of Agha et. al (2003), since it focuses on the types of activity, rather than the political outcome or level of authority of the participants. The Nine Tracks are government (Track one); non-government and professional (Track two); business (Track three);

private citizen (Track four); research, training and education (Track five); activism (Track six); religion (Track seven); funding (Track eight); communications and the media (Track nine) (Diamond and McDonald, 1996:5).

1.2 Multi-track diplomacy. Alternative negotiations proved essential for the beginning of the Oslo Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization / Palestinian National Authority (PLO/PNA). But the lack of a feasible and coordinated strategy of multitrack diplomacy was a major reason for the decline and death of the ground-breaking Accords. Since then, every round of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict rewrites the same chapter of historic failure, with ever stronger highlights of frustration, uselessness and despair.

The concept of “multitrack diplomacy” is an umbrella descriptor encompassing the variety of forms of interaction between nations and a broad range of other actors, venues, objectives and methods for advancing the same aim: a positive, sustainable, mutually-beneficial peace across all areas of activity.

Despite repeated collapses of official inter-governmental negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, also known as Track I, informal or unofficial diplomacy – the other eight tracks – is taking place and it has been at times the only avenue of communication for the two societies.

The particular characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including among other issues nationalities, religions and ideologies involved, time span, geographical scope and peaks of crisis - have led to prolonged negotiations. As such, Track nine diplomacy has also evolved and at time fused with the other tracks.

In the past 25 years, the peace focus on Galtung’s dial has fluctuated from negative peace during outbursts of violence¹ to positive peace for the more optimistic observers and peace activists.

This research is based on desk research anthropological observations and benefits from the insight offered by 20 interviews with negotiators who set the groundwork for agreements between

Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) such as the Oslo I, II, Geneva, Annapolis and Ayalon-Nusseibeh Agreements.

These interviews reflect the general view expressed by opinion polls, theorists and politicians alike *an almost absolute consensus* about the final status, taking as a departure point a two-state solution based on June 4th 1967 borders, with necessary territorial swaps and compensation, solid security assurances for Israel, a national homeland for the Palestinians and a satisfactory and final solution to the refugee problem and Jerusalem. There is a very vivid debate about the details of what can be acceptable, but the majority has no doubt that these issues must be on the table, along with the so-called secondary issues, such as economy, relations with the Arab world and democratic guarantees.

2. THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN IMPASSE

2.1 Whither the peace? Although the opinion polls² as well as the majority of negotiators interviewed for this study (Gadi Baltianski: 2014; Yossi Beilin: 2014; Abu Ala’a: 2013; Gibril Rjoub: 2013) show that over three quarters of both societies want a two-state solution, their practical involvement towards achieving it has so far been weak. The possible resolutions to the conflict have been explored and presented in great detail and it is only political will for implementing them that is still lacking (Mohammad Shtayyeh, Ephraim Sneh, Samieh al Abed, 2013).

The Geneva Agreement outlines in 50 pages and details in almost 500 more pages a proposal for resolution of the conflict, one that is acceptable and reasonable for politicians and experts on both sides. This comprehensive permanent-status agreement was reached by Israeli, Palestinian and international professionals in the different areas of dispute, such as security, resources demography, history and sociology.

Twelve of the practitioners who have been interviewed for this article believe that after Geneva there is little if any role for unofficial

¹ The First Intifada (1987-1993), the Second Intifada (2000-2005), the Summer Rains Operation (2006), the Gaza Operation (2007), the Cast Led Operation (2008-2009), the Pillar of defence Operation (2012), the Protective Edge Operation (2014) as well as other outbreaks of hostility of a lower intensity, following provocative gestures and declarations such as the July 2017 events at the Al-Aqsa Compound or President Trump’s declaration on Jerusalem in December 2017.

² The most constant poll recording the pulse of the feelings between Israelis and Palestinians has been the Peace Index, analysed in *Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll*, conducted by the *Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research* (TSC), Tel Aviv University and the *Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research* (PSR) in Ramallah, retrieved 14-04-2018 available online at http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Joint%20PAL-ISR%20Poll%20%20English%20Summary_9%20February%202017.pdf

negotiations (tracks two through nine) aimed at finding solutions to the conflict. There is only one possible solution and that is a positive sum game.

Direct negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians were interrupted in September 2010 and they collapsed altogether on by April 2014. The US, who had sponsored the talks, insisted that “both sides did things here that were very unhelpful”³ referring to settlement expansion plans, threats of international legal action, delays in agreed prisoner releases and military reprisals. There were other significant regional developments, such as general elections in Israel and building a unity government in the Palestinian territories, which strongly influenced the attention of political leaders towards their constituencies, rendering them less likely to make the unpopular and brave decisions required for a breakthrough. This failure once again showed the importance of sustainably cultivating the desirability of peace for the conflicting populations, both top-down and bottom-up. In lack of a bold and powerful leader, able and willing to build peace, the importance of honest, meaningful, substantial and positive communication between the conflicting populations becomes a quintessential prerequisite and possible solution to this lengthy crisis.

2.2 Peace and its circumstances. On the multi-track dial, the focus has increasingly shifted from supporting First Track and generating possible solutions acceptable to both sides, to engaging the public. This is happening through projects aimed at mainstreaming the preoccupation with peace and the positive interest of the peoples towards each-other, including agreeing on some general framework for uniting the narratives of the two sides (Geneva Initiative - Baltianski, 2014). Other initiatives aim at fostering private encounters between students or professionals of similar fields (Shades Negotiation Programme at the IDC, Neve Shalom) or even the general public through public

³ Marie Harf, Deputy Spokesperson of the US Department of State 5/05/2014 Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC form <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/05/225613.htm> retrieved 18/04/2018. The unhelpful steps mentioned are „On the Palestinian side, the appeal to 15 different treaties while we’re actively working to secure a prisoner release [... o]n the Israeli side, large-scale settlement announcements, a failure to release the fourth tranche of prisoners on time, and then the announcement of 700 settlement tenders at a very sensitive moment, really combined to undermine the efforts to extend the negotiations.

Negotiations Conferences, such as Minds of Peace (Handelman, 2014). All these have emerged from the desire to improve a faulty process and aim it in the direction of the ideal communication of Jurgen Habermas (1990). Downey and Fenton argue that an application of Habermas’ theory to the internet age needs to differentiate between a political public sphere, when Track Nine “provides for a discourse about shared societal concerns”, or a counter public sphere, when “the ethical framework of a political public sphere is undermined or deliberately overturned”, warning of the irrational and anti-democratic dangers of this framework (2003:191).

The dialectical relationship between the unit and the ecosystem is maintained transversally from the individual to the community, the nation or any other unit and the context in which they operate (Ortega y Gasset, 2004:757) A broad range of actors, from private citizens to more organised groups and media-specialised branches of every institutions take to the social media in order to overcome the biases of mainstream media and to keep the pulse of the general public on the specific issues of their interest. The Palestinian protests from 2011 through to 2018 have brought to prominence the role of social media beyond sharing real-time information, to generating and spreading ideas and identities, organizing social movements creating and reshaping discourse and choices, leading some analysts to argue that these media potentiated the movements (Aouragh, 2011:105; Shirky, 2011:28). Further research is warranted to clarify how the dynamic equilibrium between emission and reception of information and ideas on Track Nine favors an incremental peace or at least the re-humanization of *the other*.

2.3 Media, Communication and Digital Civic Engagement. The primary, declared aim of the media is to inform and engage the public, based on the core democratic assumption that well-informed individuals will make the best political decisions for their social groups (Downing, 2001; Diamond and McDonald, 1996:120). The immense relativity of the terms of this assumption have caused splits, wars, alliances and more recently the emergence of alternative and social media. In a world where political clout translates directly into power and money, the importance of how public opinion is shaped cannot be overestimated.

Traditional media relies both on advertisers for funding and on state institutions for access to information, therefore, it tends to be more conservative, averse to risk and novelty. In order to

balance out this likely bias of mainstream media, alternative - yet still centralized – forms content creation, sourcing, production and distribution have emerged, like zines, magazines, info-sheets and later blogs circulated since the emergence of the printed press, with radically increased production capacities generated by the invention of the printed press, photocopying technology and the internet. The liberalization and democratization of information flows was taken to a new level by social media.

In the internet era, but pre-social media, Downey and Fenton show how the internet permits radical groups from both Left and Right “to construct inexpensive virtual counter-public spheres to accompany their other forms of organization and protest (2003:198).” Technology like virtual private networks (VPNs), proxy servers and specialized smart-phone applications with integrated encryption technology, such as Telegram or Whatsapp have helped groups surpass national boundaries and restrictions, as well as attacks by adversary groups and institutions.

In order to ensure sustainability and the transition towards positive peace, it is essential to maintain contending societies engaged on the different tracks of diplomacy and at the various levels of each track. The lagging behind of one or more of the tracks, such as people-to-people activities in the framework of Agha et. al. (2003) or digital civic engagement in the framework of Diamond and McDonald (1996), along with the lack of coordinated efforts on all tracks are central factors for the failure of bilateral negotiations in the multi-track framework.

Chris Wylie of Cambridge Analytics, the company behind Donald Trump’s Social media engineering explains the very simple inference at the foundation of this unexpected 2016 US election surprise: “If you control the stream of information around your opponents, you can influence how they perceive that battle space and then you can influence how they’re going to behave and react⁴”.

The ‘Breitbart Doctrine’, based on the idea that Politics is downstream from culture has been promoted on Breitbart’s website⁵ since 2009, with

⁴ In an interview with *The Guardian*, 24/03/2018, retrieved on 29/03/2018 from <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/24/cambridge-analytics-week-that-shattered-facebook-privacy>

⁵ Retrieved 29/04/2018 from <http://www.breitbart.com/big-hollywood/2009/01/08/changing-an-industry-culture/>. The term ‘Breitbart doctrine’ was used for the first time by William Warren, although only coined by Chris Wylie – see note 4.

the aim of creating a movement countering Barack Obama’s success in the 2008 elections. This doctrine claims a causal chain relationship between a series of shifts. The assumption, is that a change in politics is based on change in culture, which is based on influencing the way individual people think. The 2016 US presidential elections and the ensuing investigations have surfaced how easily influencing digital civil engagement can turn into fraud and corruption.

The recent scandal about the improper use of users’ data by Facebook and the manipulations by third companies, such as, most prominently, Cambridge Analytica, have surfaced leadership strategies that shocked and enraged the general public. Their response, including public campaigns, hash tags, a media uproar and culminating with the shameful questioning of Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg in the US Congress was fast to come and fast to go. Despite the scandal and anticipation of the end of Facebook⁶, the company did not see a significant decrease in revenue or in revenue or value. In fact, Facebook’s April 2018 dip did not reach the level of the company’s cheapest shares on Nasdaq or Dow Jones in May-June 2017 (a minimum value of 144\$ on June 2017 versus 150\$ in April 2018 due to the Cambridge Analytica scandal⁷).

2.4 Keep in touch. In the 90s, the Oslo Accords were breaking ground in creating a geographical, administrative, social and political space for the Palestinians to develop. This complex labour of building material and immaterial institutions is paralleled by the global expansion of alternative and social media surging in the 90s. This is demonstrated by the multiplication of the number of media outlets and a communications culture flourishing in a much more accelerated pace than previously.

A major reason for the death of the Oslo process and, with it, the decay of prospects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians, is the alienation of the public from the decision-making process. The

⁶ Hash tags like #deletefacebook, #facebookfree were used to call for users to delete their Facebook profiles and stop using the platform due to the breach of confidentiality. Compiled from Twitter on 20/04/2018 https://twitter.com/hashtag/deletefacebook?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.a bc.net.au%2Fnews%2Fscience%2F2018-03-27%2Ffacebook-after-cambridge-analytics%3A-what-now%2F9586604.

⁷ Compiled from Nasdaq and CBS News websites on 28/04/2018.

public was expected to accept the 'tough decisions' that leaders had to make, yet these often hid behind the unpreparedness of their constituents to accept such decisions. And preparedness is to be constructed. Various web-based initiatives of alternative conflict resolution are trying to fill this gap. These processes are of the people, by the people and for the people. They offer safe and cost-effective environments to engage and re-humanize former adversaries, even enemies, reverting them to potential partners for peace.

Aouragh applies Habermas' public sphere framework, claiming that the 'virtual escapism' and the physical environment of the internet cafes in Palestine has resurrected the possibility of a public sphere (2011:231). The next wave of developments – the spread of smart phones and therefore of social media access created the virtual space where the principles of communicative action could apply.

The further study of communication and new media use for advancing the Israeli-Palestinian peace prospects can reveal critical mechanisms. Questions to be raised include: the range of uses of Track Nine, such as organization, propaganda and types of online social activity; the relationship between online and the offline activities, such as the role of Track Nine activities in organizing offline activities, demonstrations, coordinated non-violent or violent acts; the role of Track Nine in enhancing group identity amongst the participants, attracting new members and supporters, mainstreaming the idea of peace and coexistence outside the peace camp; whether the construction of a virtual public sphere can lead to a virtual peace and whether this reduces or strengthens the need for off-line peace; and whether the expansion of Track Nine activities in the Israeli-Palestinian context has hindered the prospects for peace at turning points of heightened violence or during Track One peace negotiations.

3. CONCLUSIONS

Civic movements, including those promoting the universal suffrage, women's empowerment, green causes and an ample range of national and independentist movements need to rely on their ability of rallying followers in order to compensate for other resources which are less readily available to them than to leaders with an established power infrastructure. The cases of the Jewish and Palestinian national movements are no different,

neither in 2018, nor in the past 70 or indeed 2000 years, both milestones in the conflict in the land holy for the three main Abrahamic religions.

This article has applied the Ninth Track of the Multitrack diplomacy framework of Diamond and McDonald (1996) to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and has elaborated on relevant further research. The impact of different forms of Media and Communications and particularly the different forms of digital civic engagement can be major for the possibility of peaceful coexistence in the region, regardless of when reality and tensions will settle down and where on the broad spectrum between the one- and the two-state solutions.

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THE IMPACT OF VIDEO-WATCHING ACTIVITIES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

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Abstract: *Social behavior refers to children's abilities of forming social functional relationships with other children or adults from their lives. In other words, the formation of these abilities aims at facilitating positive interactions adequate to social norms, understanding appropriate behavior in groups, caring for other people's needs, developing social skills and learning how to manage one's feelings. Children learn through direct and indirect observation, through verbalization that each social context has certain rules whose role is to prevent the appearance of some problems of behavior in society. In general terms, prosocial behavior refers to voluntary actions that are intended to help or benefit another individual or group of individuals. As such, prosocial behaviors are presented in terms of their intended consequences for others. The paper aims to study the impact on the formation and the development of prosocial behavior through the video-watching method in children from kindergarten and primary school. The video-watching activities are developed within the following disciplines: education for society (man and society development area) for kindergarten and personal development (counseling and orientation curricular area) and civic education (man and society curricular area) for primary school. By general definition, the common element of all these disciplines is the formation and development of prosocial behavior. The video-watching activities offer the basis for conversations, case studies, detailed explanations, debates, personal reflections etc. The study proposes a series of items based on specific literature, included in a questionnaire applied to a sample of one hundred kindergarten and primary school teachers. The data obtained are processed using the SPSS analysis. The results of the research can be of use to teachers who want to improve the process of prosocial behavior development in their students.*

Keywords: *prosocial behavior; positive interactions; video-watching activities*

1. INTRODUCTION

The use of video in classrooms has been a common feature in the didactic activity for many years as it allows students a look at situations far beyond their classrooms. Through video-watching the spatial and temporal barriers of communication have been overcome as our understanding is not limited anymore by the necessity of physical presence in the places in which the events observed occur (Thompson, 2001:43). Video-watching activities support the effort of learning by making more accessible the content of lessons, facilitating their understanding and receptivity, by intensifying the rhythm and volume of acquisitions etc. The instructional aspects of the video-watching activities are doubled by their formative value seen in prosocial behavior modeling as they ensure a diversity of didactic expressions, give the possibility of witnessing new experiences, of illustrating good / bad behavior and drawing conclusions and morals.

In general terms, prosocial behavior is presented in terms of their intended consequences for others, as it refers to voluntary actions that are intended to help or benefit another individual or group of individuals. Prosocial behaviors represent important resources we aim to develop in our children in order to ensure their adjustment to life in society. Preschool and primary school ages have an important relevance in developing prosocial behavior as the child is exposed to the first formal contexts in which they learn the social rules. Their later adjustment to the social environment and social integration depends to a great extent upon this period. In order to have a desirable prosocial behavior the child needs practice. Activities based on video-watching aim to exemplify good/bad behavior in society allowing conversations among children and peers or children and teacher, detailed explanations, case studies, role play, debates, personal reflections etc. All these provide the children with the basic information about the meaning and the development of prosocial behavior.

2. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

2.1 Literature review. Each human activity, however simple it may be, implies rules that must be obeyed in order to have things done. As well, communication develops according to some norms which ensure proper understanding. Children must learn these norms since early ages, as basis for their prosocial behavior. Ethics in communication targets such behaviors as: listening actively to the interlocutor's message without interrupting him/her, avoiding interfering in others' conversation, be they adults or children, approaching certain topics in the right contexts, speaking in a normal voice, not too loud or too low so as not to burden the listener, avoiding assuming complete control of the conversation etc.

Non-aggressive behavior allows children to maintain functional social relationships based on understanding, tolerance, affection, cooperation. All these result into a solid educational climate in which direct, open communication; mutual trust will have positive effects on learning (Anghel, 2003). Important steps in learning behaviors valued by society are describing facts, teaching children to talk about behavior and not about the person, teaching children to avoid labeling and blaming as these acts start and amplify a conflict. At the same time, verbalizing negative feelings is crucial for the child's emotional relief and makes less probable the use of aggressive behavior. Children need to be aware and exercise every step in order to learn to manage aggressive tendencies in future similar situations. As they learn strategies to deal with conflictual situations, the frequency of aggressive behaviors decreases, replaced by non-aggressive interaction (Petrovai *et al.*, 2012:62).

Cooperation represents the ability of working together with other persons to reach a common goal. In the didactic activity cooperation is essential for a good relationship among children. It refers to sharing means of work, availability to do what is required, coordination of the events in order to reach a goal, accepting the ideas of the group members, negotiation and compromising within the group. Cooperation involves explaining and understanding. Sometimes children may refuse to cooperate as an activity may not be perceived as interesting. In such cases, the teacher must intervene creatively, integrating the task into something pleasant, interesting for the child. In the environments where cooperation is laid emphasis on, children feel relaxed and self-confident as they need support and recognition of any form of

progress. Promoting cooperation reduces problematical behavior, stimulates the development of positive social contacts, increases the acceptance of individual differences, decreases marginalization of some children and offers children the opportunity of developing and exercising social academic abilities (Ștefan, Kallay, 2007:28).

In a broad sense, altruism is synonymous with caring for others, generosity, kindness. Altruism involves the desire to help others, to give support when asked for or just needed. This behavior is done voluntarily without any material gain. Children's need for help means the recognition of proper limits, of insufficient development of some abilities. In cases where the help is asked from peers, the possibility of cooperation and formation of friendly relationships increases. In such situations it is important for the teacher to talk to children about altruism and explain its consequences. In order to encourage children to help, it is useful to play roles by means of which they develop a sense of responsibility. It is also useful to do specific activities such as donating clothing, food, things done by themselves to other children in need. Such activities can be done for over a long period of time until children acquire this behavior. The teacher could also make a list with the names of all the children who do things/ tasks to help others. The adults' encouragement and appreciation support the manifestation of altruism in children's behavior (Petrovai *et al.*, 2012:81).

Obedying a code of conduct is a very efficient tool of teaching prosocial behavior. Rules have the role of preventing the appearance of behavior disorder as they are the verbal expressions of the relationships among antecedent, behavior and consequences (Botiș & Mihalca, 2007:64). Rules guide children's behavior in different social situations. They learn best certain social behavior when limits and rules are clearly set. Adults should repeat the rules constantly and monitor their observance. As soon as children start integrating adults' requests and explanations into their own language, they themselves adjust their own behavior. In classroom the frequency of prosocial behavior manifestations (asking for and offering help, using polite words, waiting turns etc.) can be increased through observation, constant repetition, a system of reward etc.

Emotions are the results of someone's interpretation of a certain event. Emotional abilities make reference to understanding, expressing, adjusting emotions (Botiș & Mihalca, 2007:23). Children's emotional abilities development is

important as it contributes to the formation and the maintenance of the relationships with the others, it helps children adjust to kindergarten and school, it prevents emotional and behavior disorders. Social adjustment implies that children should be able to identify their own emotions and the others' in various situations, to identify the emotions associated to a specific context, to recognize emotions based on nonverbal elements such as facial expressions, posture etc., to express empathy towards other persons, to find solutions to comfort themselves when they are angry, to consider an upsetting situation from other points of view etc. In classroom all these can be easily exercised, commented upon, discussed, recognized by means of video watching activities as they provide a large range of authentic situations to which children could not have access otherwise.

Politeness represents behavior characterized through respect, amiability, kindness in relation to the others. It facilitates human relationships and adds certain aesthetics in any civilized stage of a society (Paleologu, 2009). Politeness involves rules and social conventions which children learn in their family and in school, at first through imitation and later through deliberate manifestation. Certain examples of politeness can be greeting formulas, adequate addressing formulas with peers, grown-ups, waiting turns etc. Through video-watching activities children can perceive manifestations of politeness in different contexts, can discuss the consequences of rude / polite behavior, can draw conclusions and learn lessons which they can use later to adjust their own behavior.

Punctuality is generally defined as rigorous fulfillment of some obligations on regular basis or on deadlines. Punctuality is a proof of respect we show to the others. Time is a precious resource that is why it must be learnt about at early ages. On the other hand, children's punctuality is influenced by their ability of reading the clock, which makes the young ones dependent upon their parents.

2.2 Methodology of Research. The research objectives. Our research objectives are:

a) to identify the elements of prosocial behavior developed through video-watching activities in children from kindergarten and primary school. The identification of such elements was based on theoretical background and focus-group discussions. The video-watching activities held within the disciplines education for society (area of development / domain human and society) for kindergarten and personal development (curricular area counseling and

orientation) and civic education (curricular area human and society) for primary school.

b) to realize descriptive analyses of the selected items to determine a hierarchy in the two school levels, kindergarten and primary school.

The sample for research was made of 100 teachers from Vrancea County, Romania, 50 from kindergarten and 50 from primary school. They possess ten to thirty years of experience in the educational system. They were involved in the research on a voluntary basis. The main method of research was the questionnaire-based investigation. The questionnaire was conceived based on specific literature and focus-group discussions with teachers from the two school levels. This procedure allowed the identification of a series of elements which describe prosocial behavior: politeness, punctuality, ethics of communication, obeying a code of conduct, cooperation, altruism, adequate expression of emotions, non-aggressive behavior. The respondents had to choose one of the following options of a five-step scale: (1) to a very low extent, (2) to a low extent, (3) to an average extent, (4) to a large extent, (5) to a very large extent. These steps were meant to show the impact of video-watching activities on the development of prosocial behavior in children.

2.3 Findings and results. For the descriptive analyses, we used SPSS software, the t-test for the independent samples.

Table 1. Means and standard deviation of prosocial behavior items

Items	Kindergarten Mean (Std. dev.)	Primary school Mean (Std. dev.)
Politeness	4.58 (0.548)	4.36 (0.891)
Punctuality	2.90 (0.990)	2.94 (0.577)
Ethics of communication	4.16 (0.661)	3.98 (1.003)
Obeying a code of conduct	4.52 (1.446)	4.70 (1.132)
Cooperation	4.42 (1.311)	4.62 (1.086)
Altruism	4.38 (0.668)	4.04 (0.925)
Adequate expression of emotions	3.80 (0.735)	4.32 (0.780)
Non-aggressive behavior	4.26 (0.564)	4.02 (0.781)

Based on these means we established a hierarchy of prosocial behavior items for the two school levels. As such, the indicator ranked 1 was considered highly relevant in terms of impact of video-watching activities on the development of

prosocial behavior in children, whereas the indicator ranked 8 was less appreciated in this respect.

Table 2. Descriptive of hierarchy of the prosocial behavior items

Rank	Kindergarten	Primary school
1.	Politeness	Obeying a code of conduct
2.	Obeying a code of conduct	Cooperation
3.	Cooperation	Politeness
4.	Altruism	Adequate expression of emotions
5.	Non-aggressive behavior	Altruism
6.	Ethics of communication	Non-aggressive behavior
7.	Adequate expression of emotions	Ethics of communication
8.	Punctuality	Punctuality

The registered means were between 4.58 and 2.90 for kindergarten and between 4.70 and 2.94 for primary school. There were six items which registered means above 4 in kindergarten: politeness, ethics in communication, obeying a code of conduct, cooperation, altruism, non-aggressive behavior and seven items which registered 4 or close to 4 (3.98) in primary school: politeness, obeying a code of conduct, cooperation, altruism, adequate expression of emotions, non-aggressive behavior, ethics of communication. These high means demonstrate that teachers consider video-watching activities to have a significant impact on the development of prosocial behavior in children.

The items with the highest means were politeness for kindergarten and obeying a code of conduct for primary school. The lowest means were registered for punctuality with 2.90 in kindergarten and with 2.94 in primary school. These lowest means show that video-watching activities have minor impact on the development of politeness as prosocial behavior in children. On the one hand, children till the age of 5-6 do not know all numbers, which makes reading the clock difficult. In their case punctuality, understood as the effort of being on time or starting an activity on time, depends upon adults, either parents or teachers. On the other hand, children in primary school perceive punctuality more clearly as they can read the clock and feel the pressure of being on time. They are aware that they should be in time

for school, at least five minutes before the classes begin, so that they have a short interval to prepare for the classes. However, their being in time is still conditioned by their parents who overtake the responsibility of punctuality. What children can do by themselves is to be seated in their desks at least one minute before the class begins during break time. Practice shows that they fail to do so, even if they know the rule.

At both school levels, only one item was ranked in the same order by the teachers: 8th rank for punctuality. This similar hierarchy demonstrates convergence of opinion on the impact of video-watching activities on the development of these prosocial behaviors.

We used the T test for the independent groups in order to determine the differences in teachers' opinions regarding the impact of video-watching activities on the development of prosocial behavior in children. The significance level was set to 0.05. Two items recorded a statistically significant difference: altruism and adequate expression of emotions. At kindergarten altruism was ranked the 4th in the hierarchy, with a mean of 4.38, and at the primary school it was ranked the 5th in the hierarchy with a mean of 4.04. The higher mean recorded in the kindergarten level for altruism indicates that the impact of video-watching activities on the development of this behavior is appreciated as being more important at this school level. In kindergarten, altruism is much easier to manifest, as there are many more joint activities involving cooperation, goodwill and help. Even when they play, children can show altruism and help others. By comparison, teachers believe that at primary school, the moments when children display altruism are significantly less than in kindergarten, although this kind of behavior is highly promoted in school activities, especially in civic education lessons. The other item with statistically significant difference was adequate expression of emotions which ranked the 7th in kindergarten hierarchy, with a mean of 3.80, whereas and at primary school it ranked the 5th in the hierarchy with a mean of 4.04. This significant difference demonstrates that teachers consider video-watching activities to have a more important impact on the development of adequate expression of emotions as prosocial behavior for primary school children. In kindergarten, children express more easily their emotions, sometimes in excessive ways: they cry more often, they cry or laugh loudly and imitate gestures which are often exaggerated. Primary school children adjust the expressions of

their emotions much better to the context, they recognize them more easily in others.

Statistically insignificant differences were registered for six items, which indicates convergence of opinions of the teachers from the two school levels.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The intellectual, moral, civic or aesthetic education of children has registered a qualitative leap in the recent years. The modern school, preoccupied by the quality and the efficiency of its actions, ensures a diversity of learning resources for the student. Video watching seems to be one of the best choices as a method of modeling social behavior because it offers the possibility of getting out of the limited context of the classroom, of ensuring variety in exemplification, of discussing these behaviors and drawing conclusions related to the necessity of manifesting them in society.

Video watching activities display a large range of instructional and formative aspects. Our study showed that video watching activities have a significance impact in forming and developing prosocial behaviors in children from kindergarten and primary school for seven of the social components selected in our study. The research

could be extended to other school levels where we expect a different hierarchy due to age differences, social experience and independence in action.

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CYBERSECURITY. RISKS, THREATS, AND TRENDS OF MANIFESTATION IN ROMANIA

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Abstract: *Over the past three decades, the internet has become a vital engine of contemporary life. In addition, a nation's electronic systems are seen as being part of its critical infrastructure, firstly because its malfunction implies a series of dangers in all societal aspects, and secondly because modern life is impossible if it's not "connected". While the need for cyber-security has emerged with the development of the first military computer networks during the later part of the Cold War, the implications of security incidents in cyber-infrastructure have multiplied exponentially since. Thus, the security of individuals and of cyber networks gained political significance in relation to the state, to the society, to the nation and to the economy. Given that the cybernetic infrastructure intersects with the financial, transportation, energy and national security infrastructures, Romania has been increasingly confronting cyber-threats, the citizens, the nation as a whole, and also the business and the governmental environments being affected. The paper analyses the reflection of the concept of "cybersecurity" in strategic documents and in the European legislation, as well as the trends of causes of cyber-insecurity at the level of the state and the individual, focusing on the situation in Romania. The analysis aims to track and describe the threats, the risks, the vulnerabilities, as well as their manifestation and the policies developed and implemented in order to ensure cybersecurity in Romania.*

Keywords: *cybersecurity; cyber infrastructure; cybersecurity policies; cybernetic consumption behaviour*

1. INTRODUCTION

The internet has become over the last three decades a "vital engine" of the contemporary life, and the cybersecurity system is considered one of the most important infrastructure worldwide, once because its malfunction can lead to damaging results, and second, because of the "connected" characteristic of the modern life. (Simon *et al.*, 2009). The concept of "cybersecurity" has emerged as a reply to the technological innovations during the later part of the Cold War, when the first military computer networks have been developed. As a reply to the geopolitical conditions occurred after the Cold War, the security of the individuals and of the cyber networks became central factors of political interest in relation to the state, to the society and to the economy (Hansen, Nissenbaum, 2009: 1155).

Security threats are hard to identify, and, as such, are difficult to counterattack in an equal manner to the impact of their risks. Because functional fields at national level have become dependent on the cyber infrastructure, Romania has been confronting cyber threats in important sectors, like the financial system, transportation,

energy, national defense, the business environment, the government, and the citizens as users. Seen as an interaction and communication facility, the cyber space offers different advantages too to the modern society, through the channels it provides for different actions, like: the promotion of national policies, the development of the business environment, the raise of quality of life as a result to the access to information, the understanding of national strategies, the access to warnings regarding the avoidance of risks and threats to the national security etc. (HG 271/2013: 10, 11).

Even though statistical data indicate a low level of internet utilization by Romanians, in comparison to the situation in other European states, the majority uses it to access social networks, a friendly and easy environment for cyber-attacks: 62.8% of the Romanian population in comparison to 80.2% of the European population (Internet in Europe Stats, 2017). At the same time, cyber-threats have increased over the last years, in Romania, and are set to follow an ascendant trajectory, justifying the necessity to define cybersecurity policies as a state priority.

2. THE CONCEPT OF CYBERSECURITY

The concept of cybersecurity has been initially used by scientists in the computers field at the beginning of the '90s, to describe the insecurities of the computers which were network configured (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009: 1155). The term may have been included in a document for the first time in 1991, in the report of the COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD (CSTB), which described security as “protection against exposing, changes and unwanted destruction of data from a system and, also, the protection of the systems themselves” (CSTB, 1991:1, *apud* Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009:1160). Cybersecurity has gained significance in the technical field regarding computer security when it was found that digital technology can become a threat for the society (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009: 1155). The cyber-space is non-governmental, according to Barnard-Wills and Ashenden (2012), who describe the internet through the filter of the vulnerabilities of the IT&C to cyber-attacks.

Cybersecurity is defined by THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT through the HG 271/2013 as “the normality state resulted after the implementation of and ensemble of proactive and reactive measures, which ensures the confidentiality, the integrity, the availability the authenticity and the non-repudiation of information in electronic format, of resources and public or private services, from cyber-space” (HG 2017/2013:7).

3. CYBERSECURITY: THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK AND MEASURES

The modern society is dependent on IT&C in its daily file, and the alert development of the technological system imposes drastic adjustments of the economic, political, cultural systems, and even at the level of the individuals' living styles. The dynamic, the freedom and the anonymity of the cyber space act as opportunities for transferring information, but also as functional risks, factors which determine the necessity of promoting a cybersecurity culture among the state institutions, among companies, and among citizens.

The fight against cybercrime at the level of THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) and The NORTH ATLANTIC ORGANIZATION (NATO) has started as a reply to the exponential increase of cyber-attacks and organized criminal groups who attack critical cyber infrastructure at the level of the member states.

The idea of cybersecurity has been included on the NATO agenda in the summit from Prague in 2002, reintroduced at the summit from Riga in 2006, and in the summit from Bucharest in 2008 has been adopted a cybersecurity policy. Because of the amplification of cyber-attacks, the field has gained a higher importance; as such, in the summit from Lisbon in 2010, a strategic concept has been adopted, which addresses the types of cyber-threats, their impact over the critical infrastructures, and prevention, counteraction and reaction proposed strategies. The summit from Wales in 2014 placed cybersecurity in the responsibility of NATO in what concerns the collective defense; the member states are also responsible for protecting the national networks. During the summit from Warsaw in 2016, cyber-space has been ascertained as an operational field, which is to be treated with the same importance as the air space, the terrestrial space and the maritime area (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: MAEb).

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC) has identified the priorities and the strategic actions in the field of cybersecurity, at the level of the EU member states. The process resulted in a cybersecurity strategy, which targets to ensure a free and safe cyber-space. The strategy has been elaborated as an effect of the necessity to respect the fundamental rights, the democracy and the legislation in the online area. The EC (2013) underlines the importance of the collaboration between the government and the private sector in the process of ensuring cybersecurity at national level, both parts holding and using a significant amount of the cyber-space. Cybersecurity is defined by the EC (2013) through the actions implemented in the direction of protecting the cyber-space, both in the civil and in the military worlds. The cybersecurity strategy at European level starts from the premises that the threats can be of any nature: political, terrorist, disasters or simple errors. The document states that the EU's economy has already been affected by cyber-crime, which targeted the private sector and the citizens, manifested through data theft, economic espionage, fraud, the mass distribution of hate materials, or attacks of cyber-systems. The strategy establishes five strategic priorities to be assumed by European institutions and the member states:

- 1) the achievement of a high level of cybernetic resiliency, by developing a cooperation environment between the public and the private sector, and by benefiting of the support of THE EUROPEAN NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY AGENCY (ENISA) and having as base The NIS

Directive. The EU strategy (2013) proposes the implementation of a legislative framework in every EU member state, in order to appoint an authority to implement the NIS Directive, to develop a computer emergency response team institution, to adopt a national strategy and a cooperation plan similar to the NIS Directive. In order to facilitate these measures, in 2012 has been established an emergency team, responsible of the cyber systems of the EU, THE COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (CERT-EU); an EU financing line (Connecting Europe Facility – CEF) is destined to the key infrastructure of an efficient cooperation in this area.

2) the drastic decrease of the level of cyber-crime. According to the EU Strategy (2013), cyber-crime includes a series of criminal acts, which implies computers and cyber systems, used as instruments or as targets, aiming to attack them or to spread offensive information. The solution proposed is to implement a collaborative and coordinated inter-state approach, in accordance to the regulations resulted in “The Convention of the Council of Europe on Cybercrime”, from Budapest. The development of a specialized entity in the field at the level of each EU state is a precondition in order to achieve this priority. THE EUROPEAN CYBERCRIME CENTRE (EC3) is a center which supports the EU states in this area, responsible for the alignment of counteracting cybercrime, using a selection of good practices.

3) the elaboration of cybersecurity policies and the development of afferent capacities, having as base the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The defense dimension represents a pylon of cybersecurity, which targets the increase of the resiliency in the case of communication and computer systems, through detecting, response and recurrence measures. In order to achieve this priority, it is necessary a better cooperation between governments, between the private sector and the academic one, and between civil and military communities.

4) the development of technological and industrial resources for cybersecurity, including the hardware and the software components, used by critical services and infrastructures; they have to be safe and trustful and to guarantee the protection of personal data.

5) the establishment of international policies concerning cybersecurity. These policies must contribute to maintaining a free, open and safe cyber-space and can be implemented only with the cooperation of EU, international organizations, international partners, the private sector and the

civil society. (European Commission, 2013)

The EU aims to respect freedom, security and justice for the citizens, no matter the place they migrate to. As a response to the last years’ threats and terrorist attacks, radicalization and violence manifestations, the EU elaborated a cooperation synergy through The European Agenda on Security (2015). The document prioritizes for each EU state the security against terrorism, organized crime and cyber-crime. The Agenda (2015) argues that the main pylon in confronting cyber-crime is by strictly implementing the afferent European legislation.

In 2016, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL have elaborated the network and information systems (NIS) Directive, which provides measures of ensuring the security of cyber networks and systems in the EU. The Directive substantiates the essential impact which the computer systems and services have over the society, as their security represents a vital factor in the efficient functioning of economic, social and internal market spheres. The document places the responsibility of cyber networks and systems in the yard of each EU member state, through the essential services operators (“entities which offer an essential service for the implementation of societal and/or economic activities of high importance”) and the digital service suppliers (The NIS Directive, 2016: 14, 27-29). Considering that a high and common level of cybersecurity can be achieved more efficiently at the level of EU instead of at the level of each state, the Directive imposes the development of a support group in the process of strategic cooperation between the states. The group has the role to “support the member states in adopting a coherent approach in the process of identification of the essential services operators” (*idem*: 14). The document also imposes the functioning of an intervention network (CSIRT), the adopting of a national strategy of cybersecurity by each member state, and the establishment of national contact points of CSIRT; this last entity has the responsibility to ensure the border cooperation with other member states, with the cooperation group and with the CSIRT network.

The UE Directive (2016) considers necessary the institution of a cooperation group at the level of the EU member states, composed out of representatives of the states, of the EC and of ENISA. The group would support the strategic cooperation in the area of cybersecurity, and would help to implement a general and common mechanism, able to reply to the dynamism and

amplitude of the risks and threats, as not every EU state has the necessary response capacities. As such, ENISA organizes CyberEurope exercises every year, which have the role to prepare the states for possible incidents: the exercise from 2016 involved over 1000 participants from 30 European states, representatives of over 300 organizations from IT&C and experts in cybersecurity (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: MAEc).

The "EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy" (2016) is another instrument that targets the security at UE level, which resulted after the consultation of the EU member states, of the European institutions and of the civil society regarding the characteristics and the common needs of the countries. This strategy establishes among its priorities the guarantee of cybersecurity at the European level. As such, it states that this desiderate will be possible only after the proper endowment with the necessary equipment and by ensuring an assistance service at the level of each state. The strategy establishes that each state must implement a process of consolidation of the technological capacities, by implementing innovative IT&C systems, by including it in the political priorities, and by developing cooperation platforms. Also, the promoting of a cybersecurity culture is an essential step in ensuring cybersecurity, as a result of the cooperation between the EU member states, institutions, the private sector and the civil society.

The constant communication of the support proves to be an essential factor in the inside – and between states-cooperation. As such, in 2017 the EC published "A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action", which ensures the support from EU to the member states in the process of raising of resiliency level to the global challenges, through a process of developing capacities to anticipate, prevent and prepare. Jean-Claude Juncker, confirmed the priority of actions in cybersecurity in the Address from 13 September 2017. He argues that it is necessary to cooperate in order to protect Europeans in a digital era, by implementing new rules of protecting the intellectual property, of cultural diversity and of personal data, but also through a better equipping for preventing and counteracting cyber-attacks. Juncker evaluates that cyber-attacks can be "more dangerous to the stability of democracies and economies than guns and tanks". He continues with the proposal to establish an European Cybersecurity Agency, as a reply to the approximately 4000 cyber-attacks per day registered at European level.

4. CYBERSECURITY AT NATIONAL LEVEL: THE ROMANIAN FRAMEWORK AND MEASURES

Romania answers through its objectives and actions to the EU and NATO initiatives, understanding the risks and the vulnerabilities of the country to possible cyber-threats and attacks. As such, "The Cybersecurity Strategy of Romania" shapes the directions and lines of action of cybersecurity at national level, aiming to promote the national security interests and the objectives in what concerns the cyber-space.

The measures proposed through the strategy include anticipation, protection, identification and counteraction of threats, attacks, incidents and even actions against acts of cyber-terrorism and cyber-espionage. The cyber-terrorism is seen as "premeditated activities implemented in cyber-space by individuals, groups or organizations politically, ideologically or religiously motivated, which can result in material destructions or victims, aimed to provoke panic or terror" (HG 271/2013:8). The cyber-espionage, on the other hand is described as "actions developed in the cyber-space, aiming to obtain unauthorized and confidential information, for the interest of a state or non-state entity" (*ibidem*).

As such, these measures can be included in policies, guides, regulations, security instructions, and their implementation can begin with technical solutions for protecting the cybernetic infrastructures (HG 271/2013:7-8). The measures imply a series of principles of relationship between the responsible entities: the coordination of the activities in an unitary vision, cooperation, the efficient management of available resources, the prioritization of securing the cybernetic infrastructures, the dissemination of good practices, the protection of the right to privacy and other human fundamental rights, the assuming of the responsibility of the security of cybernetic infrastructures by owners and users and the separation of internet networks from the networks that ensure the functioning of the state. (*idem*: 8-9)

In order to implement the proposed measures, the strategy establishes ten steps:

- 1) adapting the normative and legislative framework to the specific of cyber-threats;
- 2) identifying and applying security standards of cybernetic infrastructures with impact over the critical infrastructures at national level;
- 3) educate the competent authorities, the state institutions, the companies and the individuals in the field of cybersecurity and resiliency;

4) using cyber-space to promote the national interests and objectives;

5) promoting cooperation and partnership between the private and the public sectors, and also with other international entities;

6) elaborating instruments for developing cooperation and a mechanism of warning, alert and reaction;

7) promoting trust at international level in using cyber-space;

8) stimulating research and innovation in the field of cybersecurity;

9) developing resiliency of cybernetic infrastructures;

10) supporting the functioning of public or private entities in the field of cybersecurity. (HG 271/2013:6, 7, 11, 12)

The most of the times cyber threats end through cyber-attacks over the national infrastructure, which disturbance constitute a danger to the national security. These actions can lead to damages, or blackmailing legal or private actors. The main actors who are a threat to cybersecurity are, usually, individuals or organized crime groups who exploit vulnerabilities in order to obtain different benefits, terrorist or extremists who use the cyber-space to communicate, state or non-state actors who collect information or initiate threats to national security. (*idem*: 10).

The main purpose of the cybersecurity strategy is the establishment of a national entity who would supervise the logical implementation of the warning and resiliency measures to cyber-attacks, which target national private or public institutions. The proposed entity, THE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY SYSTEM (SNSC), gathers public authorities and institutions who act in the field of cybersecurity, targeting to coordinate the cybersecurity activities, including the collaboration with the academic field, with the business environment, with associations and non-governmental organizations (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: MAEa). SNSC provides the necessary information in order to implement cybersecurity measures, and ensures the efficient reaction to cyber-threats and cyber-attacks (HG 271/2013:12-14). SNSC is coordinated through THE OPERATIVE COUNCIL OF CYBERSECURITY (COSC), which includes representatives of ministries and entities with responsibility in ensuring cybersecurity; THE ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ensures the technical coordination of COSC and THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT coordinates the security activity in the field of electronic

communication conducted by public authorities which are not members of COSC (*idem*: 14-15).

As a response to the EU requests, THE ROMANIAN NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAM (CERT-RO) has been created through HG 494/2011. Its role is to offer support in case of informatics emergencies, to manage risks and incidents and to cooperate with other CERT institutions at European level and with the EU. In 2012 ENISA has launched the “European Cyber Security Month – ECSM”, an awareness campaign among European citizens, where CERT-RO took part in every sessions, as a national partner (cert.ro, July 2017).

In case of cyber-attacks over Romania, SNSC collaborates with homologous institutions from other countries. SNSC also has established “the national cyber-alert system (SNAC), targeting to prevent and counteract cyber-risks and attacks; as such, SNAC evaluates the risk management of cybersecurity in Romania and establishes the levels of cyber-alerts (NAC). (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: MAEa)

The National Strategy regarding the Digital Agenda for Romania 2020 (2015) proposes the development of the IT&C sector, as base in the process of economic development and aiming to increase the country’s competitiveness on the international market. In this context, CERT-RO represents a confirmation of the development process in the national cybersecurity field. The agenda (2015) foresees the collaboration between the private and the public sector to protect the cyber-space and considers that there is a need of improvement of the afferent legislation.

Taking into account the international legislation in the field of cybersecurity, the Romanian state is working on the national normative framework, aiming to facilitate the cooperation between and with the responsible and competent entities in order to combat the use of critical infrastructure in terrorist or criminal purposes. The law project published in April 2016 addresses public authorities, legal and private entities who own, manage or use cybernetic infrastructures. The institutional working group (GLI) is the main actor responsible with the promoting of the cybersecurity law. (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: MAEa)

HG 718/2011 provides measures of protection for the critical infrastructures, the cybernetic dimension of equipment being considered a category with major risks in the functioning of computer systems (European Commission, 2016).

The Romanian National Strategy of Defense for the period 2015-2020 (SNAP) sets among its objectives the consolidation and the protection of critical cybernetic infrastructures (SNAP, 2015).

The SNAP (2015) characterizes the current security environment as complex and dynamic, open to multiple challenges, ones predictable, and others unpredictable. The document finds that the cyber-threats are 1) launched by hostile organisms, state or non-state ones, with an impact over the cybernetic infrastructures of the state institutions and of companies at national level, or 2) developed by criminal groups, or 3) by hackers.

A comparison to the priorities established through SNAP (2015) and the previous version of the security strategy, that is "The National Security Strategy of Romania" (SSNR, 2006), shows that the concept of cybersecurity has been first introduced in the SNAP. SSNR treats the critical infrastructures with the same level of importance, referring to the computer systems and networks. The document identifies computer aggressions as asymmetrical threats, military or civil, originating from external sources and only a few from internal ones, with a harmful impact over the citizens, over the state institutions and over the security entities of the state.

The SNAP guide (2015) a sequential process in establishing ways of eliminating cyber-aggressions and attacks, of identifying possible sources and targets of it, and also of understanding the final purpose of the whole process of cybersecurity, in relation to the national objectives and interests. (SNAP guide, 2015:25-33)

In order to implement the lines of actions proposed, the SNAP guide (2015:27-32) proposes also ways of implementation, targeting a gradually route in the process of eliminating cyber-threats and accentuates the importance of communication, of dialogue, of cooperation and partnership, at internal level and also at external level. The measures target to install reaction capabilities, the learning from good practices, and collaboration with diverse entities from the field of cybersecurity, all of it being actions which can strengthen the Romanian state's capacity in crisis situations.

5. CYBERNETIC CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOURS

Cybersecurity has gained importance after several European countries have been subject to cyber-attacks in the last years. The special Eurobarometer on cybersecurity (2017), which collected data in June 2017 at the level of 28 EU

countries, on a sample of 28,093 respondents, shows that for 56% of the subjects cyber-crime represents a very important challenge for the internal security of the EU, and only for 7% it is not important. The data show an increase in perception regarding this aspect with 14% from 2015 and with 13% from 2011. 37% of the respondents consider that the public authorities in their countries aren't doing enough to fight cyber-crime. The data show an increase in concerns regarding internet usage, in comparison to the situation registered in 2014 and 2013: 45% of the subjects (N=22,236) are worried about misuse of their personal data (43% in 2014 and 37% in 2013) and 42% are concerned about online payments (35% in 2013). Out of the respondents who are internet users (N=22,472), 45% have installed an anti-virus or have changed the software because of security privacy issues and 39% of them declared that they are less likely to give personal data on websites. At the same time, 51% of the respondents declared they are not well informed regarding cyber-crime. Romania registers the lowest proportion of respondents who declared that are very well informed about the risks of cyber-crime (4%) after Italy (2%). The most frequent form of cyber-crime people have experienced (N=22,236) was discovering malicious software on the devices (42%), followed by receiving fraudulent e-mails or phone calls, asking for personal data (38%). In case of people who were victims of cyber-crime, 85% said they called the authorities in case of theft, 76% for banking fraud, and 76% for encountering child pornography. In 21 of the total EU member states, the majority of people would contact an authority in case of bank related fraud; the lowest proportions have been registered in case of racial hatred speech, or religious extremism.

In Romania, CERT-RO has received during the whole year of 2016 110,194,890 cybersecurity alerts, out of which 1,363 have been manually solved, registering an increase of 61.55% in comparison to the situation in 2015. The safest operation systems in Romania have proved to be Windows (0.57% of the alerts) and UPnP OS (8.08% of the total alerts). The most alerts were classified as fraud (37.05%) and only 2.71 as cyber-attacks. Romania has been the subject of cyber-attacks several times: the GoldenEye effect in 2017, which blocks the computer system and requires 300 \$ to unblock it, the malware campaign which urges people to click on a virused message, or the Scam campaigns in 2013, which tricked people to register for fictive vouchers or plane tickets (cert.ro).

Any malicious action in the cybernetic sphere is made known to people accompanied by a solution of response (whenever it is possible), by the associated risks, and by ways of prevention and detection. The development of an attitude and of a behavior in accordance to a cybersecurity approach is, thus, supported by national entities, which addresses the citizens; they are the ones who represent the essential element of ensuring cybersecurity.

5. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The establishment and the maintaining of cooperation and partnerships between the public and the private environments are primordial actions in order to ensure the cybersecurity at national level. As such, communication and dialogue are the base for a functional relationship, and also the share of available resources as instruments to implement the measures and lines of action established through the strategies and norms of regulation the cybersecurity field at national level. Thus, the cooperation with partner or ally international entities, and adapting international efficient measures, are aspects that strengthen the capacities of the responsible entities with cybersecurity, at national level.

Although the statistical data show a low level of usage of the internet in the case of Romania, in comparison to other European states, the majority of the people uses it to access social networks, the most common and propitious channel for cyber-threats. At the same time, the level of cyber-threats is set on an ascendant trajectory, justifying the need to treat cybersecurity in relation to the state's priorities.

The authors take full responsibility for the contents and scientific correctness of the paper.

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PRACTICAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF PERSISTENT BEHAVIORAL AND NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL MONITORIZATION FOR HUMAN PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION

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Abstract: *While not a new concept, human performance optimization (HPO) was virtually reorchestrated in the last decades by the rapid advancements in neurosciences, artificial intelligence, human-machine/computer interfaces, human medicine and microelectronics. Widespread acceptance and implementation of this concept especially at the university level and in specialized professions, both in civilian and military environments, raised technical and ethical questions and dilemmas. For example, persistent performances monitorization is an essential tool for recruitment, selection and optimization process that requires an extensive physiological, neurophysiological, emotional status and behavioral data collection. Multiple methods of data gathering can be employed – from direct (contact), limited in time and informed techniques controlled by the subject to non-contact, anonymous and indirect methods, for long periods of time, sometimes involving other subjects. The technical capabilities are rapidly expanding and are already allowing the anonime surveillance of large number of persons in situ (during normal routine, in public and even private spaces). The same problem is commune in digital medicine (for example, in behavioral digital phenotyping) and several initiatives are in progress, their scope being limited in particular by ethical and legislative issues and less by technical problems. In our paper we discuss the particular topic of performances monitorization from the perspective of several researches, from scientific literature and our own scenarios, in the field of human performance optimization. A comparative discussion based on the presentation and analysis of several systems and configurations used in our own research will allow us to provide an answer to the question “Are the pragmatic benefits of persistent performance monitorization outweighs the moral, ethical and security concerns for military professions?”.*

Keywords: *human performance optimization; human factor; persistent monitoring; neuroaugmentation; ethics*

1. INTRODUCTION

In the post-bipolar period, technological and social progress, as well as the prospect of accelerated development of artificial intelligence, generate strong pressure on human resources. In the military and intelligence field, an integrative vision of the role of the human factor, combining the permanent need for improvement, the impact of the technological environment and the new forms of conflict manifestation, has developed since the first decade of the 21st century.

Technical and scientific progress in the field of national security has forced the reconceptualization of human performance, defined as "the capacity of the individual as a unitary and biological entity to adapt to special conditions that exceed the functional limits for which man is conditioned ontologically and genetically". Exceeding parameters may be adverse (extreme

environmental conditions, high stress, etc.) or intentional (performance gains, physiological or mental activities, etc.)

This vision represents both a new chapter in which the human factor is adapted to national security requirements and a prospective approach that takes into account the estimates of the role and technology of the 2050s. The events involving the United States military forces in recent decades, such as the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, the global war on terror, have helped to validate the concept and accelerate research into the optimization of the human factor.

The concept of human performance involves measurements and comparative studies of the functional parameters that define the state of the individual or the collectivity investigated at a given moment and the evolution over time. This aspect presents a number of peculiarities in the field of human performance for national security, such as

the need to identify indicators that can characterize neurocognitive and emotional functions in dynamics, rapid and /or in-depth interpretation grids and the possibility of continuous monitoring, even in rest periods, training, simulation of the missions and post-action/recovery. These requirements include the need to secure data transfers, especially during missions, confidentiality of the personal biophysical data, judicious and impartial management of medical information, anonymization of data without the possibility of reconstruction or theft of the biometric fingerprint, etc.

The identification of descriptive functional parameters (both quantitative and qualitative), that are able to carry out an adequate assessment of the neurocognitive and emotional performance, is still a challenge for neuroscientists. Current solutions use a range of biophysical indicators, including neurophysiological parameters, acquired in real-time through non-invasive sensor networks, dermally (wet or dry) or contactless, and transmitted via tactical kits (smartphone, tablet) to a command center where raw information is automatically processed in real time based on specialized algorithms and interpreted by the mission medical officer.

During the last decade, superior cognitive functions and complex behaviors are monitored using advanced systems that are collecting digital indicators (the activity of a person in the virtual environment, regardless of the access method, including how to interact with the interface and peripherals) or by automatically monitoring and interpreting behavior in photo, video, audio, and other formats.

These approaches are derived from precision and personalized medicine initiatives, which represent the framework for the development of concepts such as digital behavioral phenotyping, remote behavioral monitoring and development of non-invasive mobile neurotechnologies (eg brain-computer or human-machine interfaces). These methods are more effective for the long-term monitoring required to establish a baseline activity level and algorithmic identification of behavioral anomalies or performance abnormalities.

In the course of two separate experiments, we used different monitoring strategies and devices that allowed us to evaluate to what extent persistent monitoring of functional parameters is useful in devising strategies for optimizing human performance. We have independently assessed to what extent persistent monitoring has the capacity to disclose personal issues, individual intentions, or

to be a way of identifying a person where anonymity is required or solicited.

2. ETHICAL ISSUES

A controversial dimension of the concept of human performance optimization refers to the ethical issues that arise from the possible widespread application or the efficiency of the process. The idea of human performance optimization (or HPO) itself is questioned, but also the reasons (potential developers and users, public perception and opinion), the means used and its consequences are also a matter of debate. Debates on this issue is addressing to different topics, highlighting the challenge of rapid development in the research to improve human performance and the convergence of advanced technology.

One of the most debatable issues are the institutions that will regulate and influence technologies designed to improve human performance at a national and international level, the legal ways of approach and the type of political control that will be responsible for the development of prospective developments.

Unlike other similar practices operational neuroscience is not recognized and regulated in an international treaty, which leads some researchers to say that all five approaches (prohibition, permitting, encouragement, or laissez-faire) are potentially relevant. There is a difficulty in undertaking complex HPO studies which involve the practice of exposing healthy people to potentially detrimental procedures and also publish articles in top scientific publications due to ambiguous status, lack of consensus or the existence of specifically authorized organizations. Changing the design of clinical trials so that the control group can be used in neuroscientific studies is a practice at the limit of ethics and is difficult to validate as a current methodology (Farah *et al.*, 2004).

Healthy volunteer studies should be well defined and exclude exposure to significant medical risks (establishing therapeutic and health-related limits). Currently, most authors believe that regulations should be made by state authorities, and then be developed at the international level, given the potential social, medical and security implications - according to Robert Dingwall, 'the state has an obligation to ensure that inequalities already existent will not be aggravated and there will be no more harm by validating inefficient, unnecessary or dangerous technologies.'

It can not be ignored that the attitude of public opinion is changing rapidly, with a growing degree of enthusiasm and acceptance in the technoprogressive environments in the vanguard of the liberal society based on knowledge (young people from major cities, Silicon Valley, university cities, corporatist, etc.) or, on the contrary, rejection by traditionalists and conservatives.

Arguments for the development and use of human performance optimization bring into discussion concepts such as virtue, cognitive freedom and cognitive autonomy, utilitarianism, the acquisition of new superior capabilities, issues considered fundamental for the ethical use of HPO.

Thus, the use of performance optimization is justifiable from the point of view of utilitarian morality (according to which an action is moral if it brings an improvement for as many people as possible, in the absence of other prejudices) and the principle of autonomy (a right of the person, expression of individual liberty), but condemnable from many other points of view (social injustice, security risks, unpredictable consequences).

Another aspect is the management of the medical resources and the correct distribution of medical services, given that the improvement in performance requires a highly qualified human resource and medical equipment, a mechanism that can help reduce access to health services for disadvantaged socio-economic individuals, increasing the social and cognitive gap or may increase the cost of complex medical services. As a conclusion, most authors find the need to regulate issues related to HPO and related emerging technologies, in the context of a competitive (social, economic, political, military) race globally, which tends to increase inequalities between different social categories, professional or ethnic.

For national security institutions, resource management is essential, given the unpredictability of the security environment, so benefits and risk control must justify the investment in HPO technology. In turn, these institutions can be involved in building a legal basis for advanced technologies in issues related to combating high-risk drug trafficking, the proliferation of dual-use technologies, illegal services to optimize the human performance of criminal or terrorist organizations, discrimination, social injustice, stigmatization, banning political trends that harm human dignity, etc. In the context of a lack of regulation, the risks generated by the research in the field of human performance optimization are far from being defined and known, therefore a prospective approach is necessary.

Another aspect is the risk of proliferation of dual-use technologies, human performance optimization technologies making use of or using a range of high-tech dual, civil and military dual-use technologies such as artificial intelligence, neurobiometry, brain-computer interfaces, advanced robotics, nanotechnologies, genetic engineering. Even if these technologies are strictly controlled and regulated, their convergence can generate products with potential military applications.

The approach is quite similar to that encountered in the case of autonomous artificial intelligence, considered to be another dual-use technology generating major security risks, difficult to predict. The preventive argument, so invoked in relation to emerging technologies over the last half-century, stipulates that although the current development of neuroaugmentation does not pose a serious threat, the next generations of neuroaugmentative technologies will generate major security risks, difficult to anticipate and counteract, so the overregulation or prohibition of military-purpose research should be a priority of science policy.

Invoking the similarity with artificial intelligence, there is a growing concern that augmented individuals will have both an increased interest in improving these methods, as well as cognitive resources and other means to self-perform faster than the rest of the unrelated individuals. The fusion of human and artificial intelligence through advanced neurotechnologies is theoretically possible, but it also does not offer predictability in terms of finality and morality, especially in the military field (Stibel, 2016).

Affective modulation is another area of interest for national security services, offering the possibility to significantly influence individual and collective behavior, memories, the way of perception and interpretation of reality, social relations, crowd control, decision-making, persuasion, and dissuasion, etc. Even though it is not one of the direct aims of HPO and especially neuroaugmentation, however, the technology, working methods, and expertise have major similarities. A series of researches conducted in military institutions aims at improving current techniques of emotional manipulation, including developing advanced elements of affective computing (Dugan, 2015).

Neuropsychological aggression is increasingly a component of new forms of conflict, such as informational conflict or hybrid warfare, which also has the effect of degrading the cognitive and emotional capacities of the population subjected to

cyber-informational aggression. Research in the field of neuroscience has made it possible to achieve a high degree of refinement of psychological operations or marketing campaigns, being affected by the decisional capacity through simultaneous cybernetic operations (Barna & Dugan, 2015).

A feature of future conflicts will be the use of "Enhanced Human Operations", centered on the use of man-machine concept (the centaur approach), advanced robotics, exoskeletons, directed-energy weapons, augmented soldiers. There is fear that some hostile countries are involved in the development of military augmentation means to provide an asymmetric advantage, benefiting from the lack of legal regulation, encouragement by the authoritarian political factor and use in proxy conflicts.

Probably the most important legal aspect of optimizing human performance is the conceptualization and, in particular, setting boundaries and interface areas with similar practices. Although there is a consensus on the finality of the optimization process and, to a large extent, on the methods that can be used, a number of issues remain unclear and require an ethical and legal disambiguation. The process is not a purely academic one, with multiple interests in the commercial, social and political area.

It is to be expected that in the coming decade, as new efficient means of cognitive augmentation will be validated and operationalized, the debates in the legislative and political spheres will become more and more intense, tensions and precursor elements of these conflicts being identifiable at present.

The seemingly disproportionate interest in ethics in relation to medical and societal risks is largely due to some of the historical aspects associated with human performance research. During the Cold War, human performance research has become more extensive, diversified and sophisticated, with particular concern for individual and collective manipulation and behavioral modeling, neuropsychological optimization, methods of protection, interrogation techniques, remote information attacks, social engineering techniques, etc.

Although it is not possible to carry out a detailed evaluation of these experimental programs, based on disclosures and declassified documents, we can say that there have been numerous violations of codes of ethics and human rights. In view of this approach, ethical discussions aim to contribute to the understanding and

clarification of HPO concept, contributing to the creation of a legislative foundation aimed at preventing the health consequences, the dignity of the person and facilitating the development of the positive aspects of the field (Szafranski, 1994).

For national security organizations, the concept is undoubtedly of interest, especially in its operational part, as an asymmetric methodology of obtaining supremacy in the infosphere. There is so far a sufficient amount of research and practice to justify involvement in the development and use of these techniques for the staff in national security institutions, but also to study a number of related themes (targeted neuropsychological deterioration, personal neuroprotection, implications of political nature).

3. EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH

Project CONCEPT ONE (short for "Computer aided system for opto-neural performance evaluation and optimization"), consisted of an evaluation mock-up, which represents the first generation of a human-computer interface that is meant to assess neurovisual performances. We used the following devices: an eye tracking device (The Eye Tribe – which calculates the eye gazing, pupillometry and the movements of the mouse), a 14 channel EEG headset (EMOTIV EPOC +), a multi-frame camera (330/500 frame/sec – which captures facial micro-expressions and micro-saccades), a galvanic skin response evaluation sensor, an automated analysis software of facial emotional expressions from video (7 basic emotions), a pulse meter.

We used multiple pre-processing, processing and visualization programs (LabVIEW, Matlab, NeuroSim, BioExplorer, BioPack Student, NeuroGuide etc.), due to very large differences in between the softwares pertaining to each recording channel; this also led to the carrying out of an offline analysis of data. Two main applications were implemented: an efficiency testing and evaluation of a neuroaugmentation program for pre-flight security screening officers and an evaluation of neurophysiological and visual reactions following exposure to (photo, video, audio) Russian propagandistic materials. Although technically speaking one may conclude that the two research endeavors have many features in common, they are in fact separate and are proof of the human-computer interface capacities and versatility.

Another application targeted evaluation of neurovisual behavior while taking intelligence tests

during an HR recruitment and evaluation type scenario. Starting from large-scale utilization of intelligence tests during recruitment processes, we evaluated neurovisual performances during the application of test batteries (comprised of Raven matrices, mental rotation tests, spatial intelligence tests, chromatic discrimination tests and pareidolia tests). The objectivation of visual search patterns yielded the most relevant information regarding strategies for solving intelligence tests.

The pilot-research aimed at evaluating neurovisual behavior of a cybersecurity expert was inspired by an experiment carried out by Sandia Labs in 2015, and published in an article entitled “Measuring Human Performance within Computer Security Incident Response Teams”. In lack of a large number of IT experts that could form a relevant group of subjects, we focused instead on implementing a number of situational scenarios as designed by a cybersecurity expert. Interesting results were obtained in one scenario in which two IT experts had to simultaneously react to a critical security breach (although each of them used its own computer, coordination and cooperation between the two experts constituted significant elements of the scenario).

The research of cognitive optimization was aimed at facilitating fast learning and identification of those factors involved in national security personnel cognitive performances augmentation and degradation. The research of neurophysiological and emotional reactions following exposure to propaganda allowed us to produce comparative analyses in between different groups of subjects (selected by age, gender, command of the Russian language etc.) and to evaluate their involuntary reactions.

Project “**Integrated System for Support and Management of Interventions in Crisis Situations**” (acronym SENSOR CENTRIC). The project produced a series of solutions for the following challenges facing a set of actions which are carried out in a multi-agency context in order to manage interventions in crisis situations: 1) increasing the efficiency of information flows (EFUXION), 2) optimization of human factor performance (OPTIMUM) and 3) tactical awareness for the decisional architecture (CARDINAL).

The Human Factor Performance Optimization component (OPTIMUM) represented an application of the human performance optimization concept that was implemented by the US army and NATO, with focus on the neuroaugmentation component. The real-time monitoring of

neurophysiological parameters in resting periods, during drills or in tactical and post-response operations aimed at producing a precision digital medicine type approach in operational conditions, which in effect meant a detailed understanding of the capacity for physical and intellectual effort, medical vulnerabilities and maximal performances within the limits of safety. The approach enables monitoring of drill and optimization strategies, thus generating competitive advantage by means of human factor efficiency, risk conditions predictability, flexibility and resilience. The process is coordinated by the medical officer whose role is to evaluate the general medical and operational state of the personnel, to inform and advise the head of mission, to offer first aid help in usual situations or in case of incidents/emergency, and to formulate recovery and performance optimization strategies.

Within the OPTIMUM component, a wearable biosensors subsystem was developed at conceptual level, that was aimed at distance monitoring of physiological parameters of intervention teams, and composed of a biosensors vest, an external environment sensor, an electroencephalography helmet for evaluation of cerebral electrical activity and an optional eye tracking and ego-centric vision (first person vision by using a wearable camera) system.

The biosensors vest is based on a specialized commercial product (for the military and/or athletes) that was tested in the US and in the European Union. It is adapted for long-term wear (> 24 h), intensive effort and prolonged rest (including sleep), and comes in multiple designs according to dimensions (for adults, children), gender and thermal comfort (for summer, winter or extreme weather conditions). The device is light, ergonomic, resistant, can be reused, and can be subjected to customization according to individual needs. In addition, in combination with a protective garment (e.g. neoprene swimsuit), it can also be used by divers or parachute jumpers. Its sensors enable recording of the following biological and nonbiological direct or derived indicators:

1. electrical activity of the heart by means of a single channel electrocardiogram (ECG): heart rate, linear and nonlinear analysis of the cardiac rhythm and ECG morphological aspects;
2. respiratory activity by means of a two-channel sensor – respiratory frequency, spirometric indices –, and acceleration by means of a three-channel sensor – activity type, pedometer, cadence,

active and resting periods, distance calculator, energy expenditure and caloric consumption;

3. activity during sleep: automatic detection of sleep and wake-up reaction, hypnogram, body position changes and sleep efficiency;

4. position and field localization by means of a GPS sensor.

The sensors can be modified, supplemented, reconfigured, redistributed and calibrated. This flexibility enables further adaptations according to the profile of the monitored activity or mission. In case of an incident, the biosensor system would perform the function of a medical monitor, that also enables the uploading of the data flow directly into the national telemedicine system. The data flow transmissions would be carried out on a real time basis both by means of the device and by an independent and supplemental transmission system, thus ensuring data redundancy and security as well as resistance to jamming of wireless transmissions.

The mobile electroencephalography helmet with dry electrodes for monitoring of the electrical activity of the brain ensures real time recordings in tactical conditions, without suppressing hearing. The product is commercial, modular, resistant, ergonomic, expandable and filters mechanical and electrical artefacts. Several configurations are possible (8, 16, 24, 32, 64 electrodes), to which other biosensors can also be attached. The device can be used in resting periods, during drills and simulations, for personnel evaluation and increase of performance, but also to a certain extent in real life situations.

Simultaneous recordings of the cerebral electrical activity of the members of a team offers data on group synchronization, comparable reactions to stress stimuli, degree of attention and concentration, physical and psychological stress resistance etc. Simultaneous integration of physiological information sent by the vest-embedded biosensors together with the results of the electroencephalography offers a much more detailed insight on the individual and collective performances and on their influencing factors.

The eye tracking and ego-centric vision system enables video recordings of the visual field of the user and reconstruction of the visual dynamics. It is useful for optimization of training and simulation strategies as well as for evaluation processes of staff that works with monitors, maps etc. (in general, any visual information that is displayed on short distance bidimensional screens). Visual information integration with that produced by the EEG enables a multidimensional

characterization of neurocognitive performances of high-level personnel.

One drawback is that although the information obtained by means of the eye tracking device can be used immediately, in-depth evaluation can last for a longer period of time and can be semi-automated. Integration of information produced by the EEG and that obtained from the rest of the biosensors is yet another time-consuming process, which results in nearly-real time sending of information. The problem can be overcome by application of big data solutions or developing of early warning alarms that signal significant performance variations etc.

5. CONCLUSIONS

One of the findings of the experimental research presented is that by knowing in detail (some) neurophysiological or psychological peculiarities, behavioral patterns, relational configurations, possible health problems, etc. offers the decision maker a profound insight into the capabilities and vulnerabilities of a person of interest. This oversight can address both adverse and high-value human targets. Similarly, the selection and recruitment process can be improved by persistent, noncontact (anonymous) monitoring of neurocognitive performance and affective status for a prolonged period, in normal work conditions. Digital behavioral phenotyping, along with (mobile) methods to monitor neurophysiological parameters in simulated and real conditions, provides a more detailed picture of the ability and potential of a candidate's aptitude.

The development of countermeasures for specific demands within the military professions is another direction of capitalizing on the concept of human performance optimization. This pragmatic approach, encountered in special professions (astronauts, deep-sea divers, climbers, extreme sportsmen, arctic explorers) can generate innovative solutions capable of revolutionizing weapon systems or reaching a maximum human performance threshold (used in operations with augmented personnel - enhanced human operations).

A more general approach allows the development of countermeasures in usual situations commonly encountered in military professions (chronic deprivation of sleep or a longer time, reduction in operative performance during prolonged activities, loss of combat capacity due to physical fatigue, etc.).

The concept of human performance optimization is also a platform for cutting-edge research into the field of neurosciences, applied neurotechnologies, artificial intelligence, and related branches. Accelerated technological development, particularly in the field of neuroscience and information and communication technology, has increased the probability of materializing "technological surprises" based on niche strips, generating asymmetries in the information market. Branches of the mentioned domains are vast and have a great commercial and military potential.

As a final remark, we consider that a worrying expectation is also the social pressure to use performance optimization methods in response to existing demands in an increasingly competitive and motivated society. In reality, this demand is fueling a vicious circle, augmentation causing even greater pressure on the need for social and professional success, as well as generating a new cycle of optimization and augmentation, usually more radical and risky.

In this context, we consider that the unauthorized and non-supervised use of HPO techniques by employees of national security institutions represents a risk, given the extremely competitive environment during the training period and the restrictive requirements in the operational environment. We underline the importance of ethical research and the legislative impact when adopting and using the concept of human performance optimization.

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THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SELF BETWEEN THE VIRTUAL WORLD AND THE REAL WORLD

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Abstract: *The paper aims to describing, from a theoretical point of view, the construction of identity and social construction in a context strongly influenced by social media. In particular, individuals form their identity thanks to the various experiences. This is a self-training process that has used, for centuries, face-to-face interaction and physically living environments. Today, the development of the means of communication has exerted a considerable influence and the knowledge passes, increasingly, from local to peripheral. There are, therefore, countless symbolic resources available to the individual; many of which are mediated by modern communication tools. For the postmodern the self is a social construction (Berger, Luckmann 1966) as it is determined by the differences existing between one's own individuality and that of others with whom one interacts in a given social context. The peculiarity of the interaction on the net, in addition to the new forms of sociality, determines a more intimate change of the individual, since the identity of the concept itself is modified. A pivotal aspect of this theme turns out to be, in the family environment, the use of the virtual by minors. The question is often addressed in the family context; as experts, if you think about the first months of life of the child, it is clear that the child needs to touch the objects, put them in their mouth, smell them, manipulate them and throw them. The first months of life are, in fact, necessary for the discovery and stimulation of all the senses and it is clear that the time spent in front of a screen makes it possible to use only two: hearing and sight. Technological innovation does not only lead to negative consequences, as it does not even lead to exclusively positive consequences. There are many areas of innovative applications including that of learning. Therefore, this article aims to retrace the latest research in progress and its future perspectives in a psycho-pedagogical perspective.*

Keywords: *community; intercultural context; communication; identity; social age*

1. INTRODUCTION

You can compare cyberspace to a real square where you can meet, chat, argue, make friends, just like in real life. What distinguishes being present and living in it, is a substantial condition of incorporation. Rheingold (2003) claims that in cyberspace we do everything we do when we meet, leaving our bodies behind. The fact of leaving the bodies behind means that their own existence and being present in the cyberspace-place are elements that are bound exclusively to a name or a pseudonym and a pure description of themselves. From this moment on, it is no longer possible to consider identity as an internalization of the values and dominant normative models in a social system (Parsons 1968), since we are dealing with a plurality of values and models present within the same system, from an excess of alternatives that causes a growing indeterminacy of the collective culture (Rositi 1983).

2. THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY AND THE SELF IN THE DIGITAL AGE

Thompson (1998) believes that the Self is a symbolic project that the individual actively constructs on the basis of symbolic materials at his disposal. The individual forms his identity during the course of his existential journey. This is the self-training process that, before the development of the media, used symbols acquired in the face-to-face interaction contexts. For most people the formation of the self was therefore bound to the places where they lived and interacted with others. Subsequently, the development of the media, has exerted a significant influence on the self-training processes which, starting from the press, are increasingly linked to access to forms of mediated communication. Thus we move from a local knowledge to a non-local knowledge, reproduced through the media. The latter gave rise to the overcoming of the spatio-temporal distances in the

quasi-mediated interaction. In this way individuals can broaden their horizons of understanding that are no longer limited to the models offered by face-to-face interaction, but pass through the mass media that constitute social "multipliers of mobility" (Thompson, 1998). The transition from a local knowledge to a non-local one means that the symbolic resources available to the individual for the formation of their own self are increasingly abundant and are mediated by modern communication tools. This also implies the possibility, for individuals, of experimenting with alternative life forms, ie of passing to what can be defined as mediated experience. It follows that this specific evolutionary phase concerns a redefinition not only of the concept of corporeity but above all of the meaning of man as multiple identity: the self can no longer be conceived as a stable, univocal and invariable product of a particular historical moment but, moving away from the behaviorist perspective, the subject on the net has the possibility to represent himself in an autonomous and personal way. For the postmodern the self is a social construction (Berger, Luckmann 1966) because it is determined by the differences existing between one's own individuality and that of others with whom one interacts in a given social context.

The peculiarity of the interaction in the network, in addition to the new forms of sociality, determines a more intimate change of the individual, since the identity of the concept itself is modified. The computer screen, divided into several windows, in each of which the individual can be committed to managing a different role, is the image that Sherry Turkle uses to describe postmodern identity. In this regard, Giuliano (1997) believes that, if, on one hand, the Internet "the decentralized postmodern era system" represents identity crises, on the other hand it believes that it constitutes enormous potential for development as regards the problem of identity formation. In other words, the relationship between computer communication and identity can be interpreted from two complementary points of view. On one hand the network, making camouflage in the game of identities very easy, accompanies the process of obfuscation of identity characterized by increasingly blurred borders. The Internet is therefore the instrument of this fragmentation as the masks are immediately available. However, at the same time, the Internet represents the possibility of transforming the pitfalls of the fragmentation of identity into new resources and potentialities for the individual. The typical incorporation of "cyber-interaction" shapes

a new concept of parallel identity and superimposed on the real one. In fact, in network communication, there emerges the possibility of constructing different identities, contiguous and differentiated from that linked to the principle of a stable identity of a modern mold. The postmodern identity that defines a wandering subject is born from the mimetic capacity (in the sense of Aristotelian mimesis) of the individual, from the multiplication of pseudonyms or avatars. The postmodern individual feels the need to answer the question "who am I?" Without referring unequivocally to "institutional" identities - such as those of wife / husband, father / mother, etc. - because he refuses to identify himself in rigid schemes. The postmodern individual wants to be a pastiche personality (Gergen, 1991), that is a social chameleon that borrows fragments of identity everywhere, to combine them in order to construct a self that is as appropriate as possible to the situation-relationship in which the individual is inserted, rather than coherent with that "true identity" of which modernity went in search (Mantovani, 1995). This is how nomadic identity (Boccia Artieri 2000) can be defined as a multiple and evolving ego, moving within the cybernetic space, with greater ease and freedom than in real life.

Other authors point out that we are in a complex and liquid society (Bauman 2008) in which the transition and the complexity dominate, nothing is lasting; a lot of information is worth just a few hours. In this context we live multiple realities, hyper-reality (whose beginning happened with virtuality), and the mind has to adapt and transform itself to new dynamics; the ego is fragmented by living a multiplicity of the self, multipersonality, changing identities, certainties fall, the spaces of multiple questions advance, communication dominates anyway and everywhere, with any medium; everything must be experienced by sharing experiences, relationships, in real or virtual groups of short duration, or created for the occasion, or lived in community of interests. It would seem that the play of the different identities that takes place in the network and sees the fragmentation/multiplication of identity itself, is the direct consequence of the individual's will to find expression in a "space" free from any social constraint about the way it should appear. The identity that everyone can form in the network, would be in this sense a projection of the real identity and so it bears a name that guarantees its social recognition.

3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

Social networks allow us to decide how to present ourselves to the people who compose the network (impression management) and to have a central role in defining and sharing our social identity. The American psychologist Katelyn McKenna showed how people are more willing in social networks to reveal their true self than they are in real life. This is because within a network of "friends" it is possible to share one's own convictions and emotional reactions with less risk of disapproval or social sanctions. This makes the network an ideal tool for narrating each other, deciding in first person which roles and events to present. In this perspective, the social network can be considered the perfect environment of empowerment, as it allows to experiment new ways of being without paying a too expensive cost of the failed experiments. This state of anonymity paves the way for hoped-for possible selves (Yurchisin, 2005), that is to say possible ones. In real life one of the main problems related to the possibilities of self empowerment is that the subject can not change radically, if not with high effort (think about how difficult it is to overcome shyness), while thanks to the use of social networks the individual can choose new ways of being, experimenting with new identities and new roles with the reassurance that nothing happens before a failure. Social psychology, in fact, underlines the importance, in the development of the individual, of acquiring the ability to manage numerous roles; social networks allow us to decide how to present ourselves and therefore represent an ideal tool for narrating, deciding which roles and which events to present. This allows us to play a central role in defining our social identity. In this context, for example, Facebook is a non-anonymous space that offers the user the concrete opportunity to emphasize parts of their identity and to stage a more socially desirable self-image. This image should not be considered as a mere virtual mask: on Facebook we do not tend to disguise or hide our real identity but to modify it.

The Facebook selves seem to be socially highly desirable identities that individuals aspire to have offline, but have not yet been able to embody for one reason or another (Zhao *et al.*, 2008).

The self presentation is an essential component of the communicative experience (Boccia Artieri

2004) in social networks like Facebook. Suffice it to think of the fact that once registered, the first operation consists in building a profile. This requires above all a self-saying that goes through the basic description content of the subject and extends to shared posts and their own relational network (Boyd, Ellison, 2007). An example of online self-presentation is offered by personal home pages which respond to the need to "publish on the web" (Artieri, Mazzoli, 2000) to satisfy a need for protagonism, communication of one's own thought, one's own existence to many subjects. It is possible to distinguish different categories of self presentation through the home pages: individual, with the description of personal characters; as a member of an organization where we present ourselves through a structure defined by others; as a member of a family with individual and personal elements; essential characteristics, where basic information is provided; work, of three types, depending on the objectives to be achieved: essential, curriculum, professional skills (Turkle 1995). In the Goffmanian perspective the home page can be considered as a limelight or a stage on which the subject tries to interpret his own role and where, sometimes, he can exercise self-promotion activity. Being present in a social media therefore has not only an effect on our experience of use, but also on the two components of our subjectivity: the "Self", the subject aware of acting and knowing (Self seen within the minds of the subjects) and "identity", the product of the activity of the self, object of self-reflection and of others (Self seen outside the minds of the subjects). The influence of new media on the Self is twofold. In the first place, the media, for their ability to structure the interactive experience, create, through use, brain schemas that influence the ability of the subject to "situate" the representations and implement their intentions. Secondly, through their contents, the media can propose narratives that can change the emotional state of the subject and its interpretation of what is narrated (persuasive effect). It is therefore possible to use social media effectively to change our social identity (self empowerment) but it is also true that even external intervention can more easily modify the way in which the other members of the network perceive our identity (fluid identity); in social media it is also easier to decide how and what features to emphasize their social identity (personal branding) but following the traces left by the different virtual identities, it is easier for others to reconstruct our real identity (privacy management).

4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

The digital revolution and the pervasiveness of new technologies in which the man of the twenty-first century is now immersed, have changed not only the perception of the reality in which he lives but also the essence of his uniqueness: his identity. Molded on a virtual human scale, adapted to the phenomenology of the Net, rewritten on the screen of a computer, the identity of the post-modern individual loses its fixity and physicality to express, free from the constraints of the body, its multiple selves. The interaction with the media, in fact, has become so intense that it takes the traits of a real symbiosis: this is the position of some authors (Longo 2005; Marchesini 2002) who, eschewing the idea of the fixity of human nature instead, they advocate the perpetration of a "biotechnological evolution", in which it is not only technological artefacts that transform themselves and become more sophisticated and versatile, but also the human being, which has always been a "technological symbiote", the which evolutionary phases have been defined in parallel with the acquisition of new techniques. And if they insist on the body level, certainly the new technologies do not fail to exert their influence on the level of self construction and identity: to anyone who interfaces with the network is offered an almost unlimited package of identity options and membership between to choose from. There is talk of digital splitting of the self (Turkle 1985, Granelli 2006), but it would be even more correct to talk about fragmentation and multiplication of virtual selves, in a sort of "one, none and one hundred thousand" Pirandellian. The individual, therefore, has the perception of being increasingly freed from conditioning and belonging through the seizure of the experience that allows him freedom to manipulate content and self-build identity. Bauman has defined our time "the age of identity": imposed, negotiated or created, its function has always been to make stories and personalities visible and narratable, to distinguish uniqueness and at the same time to manifest its multiplicity.

Kunstler speaks of self-futurology referring to studies on the development of human identity in relation to the progress of the socio-cultural context: The study of the future of the self is concerned with how we define the subject, or the notions through which we imagine it, who we are, how we behave, the qualities we attribute to ourselves. (...) and our notions about the status of

being man have changed over the centuries and continue to change, especially with the great transformations currently occurring in our societies and technologies.

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COUNTERING ONLINE RADICALIZATION - LESSONS LEARNED

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Abstract: *A feature of contemporary conflicts is the increasing number of actors who are willing and able to create both online and offline effects through online activities, and social media are an integrated part thereof. To that end, social media was used by terrorists as recruitment, propaganda, and information tool and the intelligence structures had to find the necessary awareness programs to react to. In this paper we tried to make an analysis of some national awareness strategies (the US, the UK, France, Italy, and Germany ones) in order to set up a guideline of the positive results registered by some countries in this field.*

Keywords: *awareness; radicalization; intelligence; social media; lessons learnt*

1. CONTEXT

Availability of personal, commercial and public sector information and the potential use of infrastructure and control systems represent new sources of vulnerability for society, exacerbated by the growing use of mobile devices and wireless networks, including by a number of non-state actors like Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Daesh, Al Murabitoune or other terrorist groups. Technological development has led to the emergence of new types of actors in addition to traditional state actors and probably non-state actors (for example, rebel movements and terrorist organizations), such as online activist groups and corporate entities starting to become direct participants in conflict. To that end, one of the contemporary conflicts feature is the increasing number of actors who are willing and able to create both online and offline effects through cyber activities and social media are an integral part of this process being used by all kind of ill-intended persons including terrorists. In order to understand and counter their actions the intelligence services have develop specific programs aimed mainly at finding the way to react to radicalization and counter its effects. As far as the online radicalization is concerned, many times the strategy to counter this phenomenon included both cyber actions and awareness programs. The last ones are part of the communications strategy the intelligence services are promoting and this is why we considered important to underline the communication framework first and then to present the methods used to counter online radicalization.

2. COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES

A look on the public activities of the intelligence services in the US, the UK, France, Germany, and Italy has revealed some cases in which the use of communication strategies can be subsumed to the concept of awareness. They can be segregated according to the type of communication chosen in two categories influenced, most likely, by the socio-cultural features of each state: direct communication (the US, Germany) and the indirect one (the UK, France and Italy).

The main element for making the differences is given by the action model: organization, types of used instruments, and types of activities, target audience, as well as consistency of the send institutional messages. Thus, the US intelligence services rely on "Hollywood Style" communication. Relevant here is the collaboration with the entertainment industry, and also the extensive exploitation of technological tools in the field of communication (websites, social platforms, video sharing and photo platforms).

On the other hand, European services (from the UK, France, Germany and Italy) resort to communication through the media. In particular, the German intelligence services act together in order to fulfill the stated objective of building a profile of the institutions deeply rooted in the social system, essential for modern professional services. Whatever the type of speech practiced, the activities, the techniques or tools used there are some common trends in terms of services public

communication that focus resources towards achieving the specific objectives which we will explain below.

2.1 Institutional Values and Mission Promotion. Official websites, social platforms continue to be used as instruments by American and British services, along with prestigious media outlets (Forbes, Washington Post / the US Financial Times, Daily Telegraph, The Guardian / the UK, Le Nouvel Observateur, Le Point, Le Monde / France). Communicators come mainly from the institutional leadership and their appearances are limited: occasional interviews in prestigious publications on specific occasions (after terrorist attacks, the capture of some terrorist), statements at conferences / debates involving the participation of the institutions they represent or on the services' sites. Complementary activities are undertaken: awareness campaigns, "open doors" events, films, publications, brochures, newsletters.

2.2. Security Culture Dissemination. In the US, CIA is an example of the efforts to promote security culture, including on online radicalization topics, and many tools are used in order to deliver the message that develop social responsibility from programs for parents and children to support to the work of some foundations. FBI has also the Safe Online Surfing Internet Challenge program for pupils and students to learn how to recognize and respond to cyber threats and online radicalization signs. In Italy, some similar efforts were launched by the Department of Information Security and were aimed at primary and secondary pupils.

In this respect, one should also take into consideration German services concerted actions on two relevant components for the security education: understanding intelligence as a social mission and emphasizing the role of history in order to help employees identify themselves with their work and tasks. We also note the strategy used by German services to send institutional messages through: participation in events organized by associations / foundations / civil society organizations or official institutions; exhibitions, conferences, symposium on threats to national security.

Taking into account these strategies we note that European states have understood the need to strengthen public trust as far as intelligence services and state institutions are concerned, while US Administration still adopts a direct approach toward the audience.

3. COUNTER RADICALIZATION STRATEGIES

The dangers of online terrorist narrative caused a series of counter-measures implemented by governments and international organizations that can be classified into two types: repressive and soft measures. The repressive measures are focused on denying access/spread of extremist messages by terrorist organizations and their supporters by blocking sites and prohibiting message or communication spreading radical content and thus prosecute those who propagate it. Worldwide efforts have been made to counter Daesh messages. The response of governments and corporations focused on "blocking strategy", meaning they suspended numerous supporters Daesh accounts on Twitter, YouTube, Facebook and other Internet content platforms. The method has a limited effect because it is very easy to set up new sites unknown to authorities. Deleted accounts are opened again under other names, gaining more followers and even a higher level of legitimacy and celebrity.

Intelligence collection works hand-in-hand with the removal of content, as practiced by the 'Check the Web' portal, an EU database created in 2007 to map jihadist online activities. The intelligence-led approach has proven to be very successful if ordinary internet users were made part of the process, as in the case of the wannabe assassin who plotted to kill Macron, whose chat messages were reported by anonymous internet users to Pharos, the French online portal designed to prompt government action by investigating the authenticity and threat level of reported messages and online content.

At the EU level, among the most notable efforts is the creation of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2012 and especially RAN's Communication and Narrative Working Group that focuses on creating communication and counter-messaging strategies to challenge extremist content online. As far as the soft measures are concerned, the main strategy used is the counter narrative and strategic communication. There are several categories of strategic communication which addresses how actors can respond to jihadist organizations narrative and the activities of jihadist organizations are covered in media. The first one relates to public information campaigns about Western involvement in the conflict and aims at explaining foreign policy on sensitive issues and promoting an alternative discourses about Western values. Such alternative messages are the UK "Radical Middle Way"

program, created after the 7 July 2005 attacks on London's transport systems, and the US public education campaign "MyJihad".

Another element of strategic communication is counter narrative. Among the examples we mention the US campaigns "Say No to Terror" and "Think again, turn away", the Australian @Fight_DAESH program, as well as the #notanotherbrother of the British Quilliam Foundation.

All these programs have been tailored to take into account the developments in security environment and national risks posed by the impact of radicalization process. Therefore, in some cases the intelligence services adopted their communication strategies to include ways to counter radicalization, especially as part of their counter terrorism strategy.

Following the terrorist attacks in 2015, the French government launched the stop-djihafisme.gouv.fr online platform dedicated to preventing and combating terrorism among radicalized young people or those at the risk of being radicalized. In the same year, it launched a hotline available from Monday to Friday between 09:00-17:00 where people can call if they detect any danger of radicalization at someone they know.

Nowadays the hotline is a common method that is used by all intelligence services and the contact data can be found on their websites or social media platforms. Sometimes the intelligence services adopted the methods they already have been using for other purposes. Thus, since 2007, Germany has implemented, at the federal and also regional level and in particular by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution/BfV, a series of information campaigns on the risks to security, focusing on the cyber and extremist ones, and lately they included online terrorism.

Another aspect to be considered was the establishment of some institutional platforms of expertise. Thus, the National Center for Countering Cyber Attacks/NCAZ¹ was established in February 2011 in Bonn.

BSI has published several issues on cyber security and countering online radicalization for programs/projects of research and development. One of these is *IT-Grundschutz* an educational and

professional training program aimed to increase public awareness, promote cyber security courses in higher education and certification of professionals in the public and private sectors. In September 2013, BfV established *Hatifa* program (Arabic translation phone, an acronym for *Heraus und Aus Terrorismus Islamistischem Fanatismus*) which aims to help people who want to leave terrorist or extremist organizations. Thus, any person who wishes to be deradicalized can call or email BfV and a specialist will provide him psychological counseling. In order to support national radicalization programs from 2014 the lands of Hesse, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bavaria, and Baden-Wurtemberg launched the *Violence Prevention Network*, based in Frankfurt, whose mission is to advise young radicalized people and their friends, families, teachers or colleagues.

The success of this approach was translated at the EU level and led to the creation of the *European Network of Radicalization* (EnoD), an interactive platform consisting of NGOs directly involved in the deradicalization actions conducted by various Member States (Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Britain, Poland, Slovakia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Hungary). NGO activists regularly meet to exchange information on methods used, target groups, criteria for best practices, difficulties and support received from Member States.

The US changed the way in which it delivers countering terrorist narratives moving from a direct to an indirect approach, and focusing on facilitating other actors with more credible voices to deliver messages. In previous years, it had attempted to counter terrorist narratives directly, through the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), whereas it now often takes the role of facilitator through the Global Engagement Center (GEC), encouraging other counter narrative organizations, such as the Sawab Center and Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Communication Center (RDC3), to become the messenger.

4. POTENTIAL GUIDELINES

An evaluation of the projects carried out at international or national level has not been made, but from the available public information on their effects we noticed a set of lessons learned that may be adopted in implementing a strategy to counter radicalization online, taking into account the objective of these projects and the way they were

¹ Within NCAZ as central authority there are BSI, BfV, and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Population and Disaster Support / BBK, as well as other authorities such as the Federal Office for Combating Crime/BKA, the Federal Intelligence Service/BND, Federal Police, Federal Army (and the Military Intelligence Service) and the Customs Investigation Office/ZKA.

disseminated. In our paper we took into consideration studies on security policy compliance (for example Bulgurcu et al, 2010; Herath and Rao, 2009; D'Arcy et al, 2009;) that indicate that, in order to influence the security users' behavior one should change the way people perceive risks and make decisions related to security. To that end, as we presented above, some intelligence awareness programs go beyond simple communication of information related to security and are tailored taking into account cultural theory of risk, that is individual prejudices biases resulting from cultural and social values.

As we noticed, strategic discourse could be built on political or ideological considerations by different actors, who should take into account that social media discourses are more open, indefinite and give the public the possibility to participate and create new "elements" in the speech, which essentially are controlled by the author. In the cases presented a common strategy was to promote a single narrative disseminated through various media and supported by stand alone stories, which despite the fact that the public can change them, support the message as a whole, but are different from a classic strategic communication based on narrative and characterized by multiple actors distribution. These features are also visible when examining how Daesh uses social media to promote its discourse on "caliphate".

Taking these into account, in designing an alternative counter narrative one must take care to be a clear consensus on the strategy and purpose, meaning we need to answer the following questions:

- "who is the target audience?" - an individual, a defined group or mass public opinion?
- why we target that audience? We take into account vulnerability, risk or other variable?

Depending on the target audience, it is important to determine what influence the audience (emotions, reasons, combination of problems). This helps us to identify the reasons and therefore the content to be disseminated. Scale and scope will determine messengers, content and campaign assessment taking into account the following: a clear definition of the mandate; available budget and resources; the duration of the campaign and how it designed to be - reactionary in direct response to a recent incident or prolonged aimed at a slow change in public opinion.

Different messengers should be used for different types of narratives and they can work in a formal or informal type of cooperation.

Cooperation is the best way to shape the broader context in which the campaign is to be developed. To that end, we identified five types of messengers that can promote our message:

1. Officials: government leaders, experts in communication and political advisors are best suited for promoting political and religious counter narrative;
2. Civil society and media representatives: members of civil society groups and journalists are considered credible for moral narratives. Families, social workers may also play a role in this field;
3. Religious, institutions and communities leaders: for countering religious narratives;
4. Former radicalized members: messengers may be appropriate to promote the message that there is nothing heroic about violent extremism;
5. Victims: are considered to be credible messengers to determine the (potential) radicals to refrain from violence.

Credibility is as important as the message sent. Given that extremism is fueling itself from the feeling of distrust towards authorities, it is important to rely on third parties. "People like us" that connects online with "people who do not like us" is often as important as the existence of a group to send the message because it humanizes both sides offering alternative identity frameworks that promote the translation of the experiences of those who are not "us" for the target audience.

Dissemination channel must be chosen carefully according to the target audience and purpose. For example, an activity on a discussion forum needs months and has only a profound impact on an individual, while a counter narrative campaign can reach a much wider coverage of hundreds of users. Both traditional media (newspapers, radio or writing journalism) and new media (blogs, forums, discussion groups and video channels) can be used for dissemination.

Other method is to direct approach target persons to specific group events, for example, in schools. Messaging services like WhatsApp or Telegram can be used on a smaller scale. The websites tend to be information depositories and therefore provide more opportunities for interacting taking into account the following: they provide information, inspiration, and awareness; build social networks; offer workshops and media expertise.

Counter narrative time of delivery is determined by the project scope. If we are implementing a reactionary campaign, the best moment would be in the immediate aftermath of the incident. If we are developing a short to

medium term campaign in response to a prolonged event, such as the Syrian conflict, the timing should be strategically planned for maximum impact. In order to do that we should have in mind the following questions: how often we have to produce content and how often should that content be updated or promoted using alerts? If we need a larger audience a good starting point would be to take into account some events considered to have impact, as for example local and school holidays and celebrations that can amplify the emotional impact. A successful online campaign is part of branding and advertising campaign, and therefore should effectively use all kind of manifestations of music, films or video production. Content and messages must remain "live" and relevant and to appeal to human emotions. However, we should avoid negative emotions, like fear, because they can dehumanize and strengthen extremist messages. On the other hand, humor can be a way to disseminate the counter narrative.

To create an effective model to counter jihadist narrative, one should have in mind extensive analysis that requires time and technical know-how to develop the guidelines that include interests and online communication ways to be used on the target group. Analyzing the studies on counter online communication, we identified the following types of alternative narrative that can be promoted:

- political narrative - disseminated by government leaders, counselors and communication policy that focus on combating the idea of "us" against "them";
- moral narrative - key members of civil society representative groups (including victims) families, social workers and colleagues who focus on immorality, murder and violence;
- religious narrative - religious leaders, institutions and communities that send the message that atrocities and crimes are against religious values;
- social narrative - former violent extremists who promote the idea that there is nothing heroic about violent extremism.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Security awareness program is designed to meet the different needs and attitudes of the participants. By identifying cultural biases and using them as a criterion for the identification and separation of target groups, we can improve program effectiveness without using significant additional resources, based on informed choices tailored to participants need.

Effective governance of online security is largely associated with security awareness programs whose purpose is to influence the users to comply with security policies. Security managers develop standards and best practices guidelines to plan and implement these programs. However, standards and guidelines adopt a normative-prescriptive approach assuming that the communication of security-related information will inevitably lead to compliance with security policy. Studies in various fields such as behavioral economics and health and safety, however, demonstrate that people interpret and internalize information about risk in terms of cognitive and cultural biases.

Beyond the economic and social benefits, opportunities to collect, store, and use data for illegal purposes will increase proportionally. Therefore, the capacity of all stakeholders to protect fundamental human rights and to respond effectively need to keep pace with these developments. From this perspective, any strategy to counter online radicalization should aim at creating an environment in which production as well as consumption of these kinds of materials not only become more difficult, from a technical perspective, but unacceptable, and less desirable.

The conflict participation of several actors along with opportunities that are created by information and communication technology development and democratization of technology have resulted in several of ethical and legal policy challenges, considerations and options. On the other hand, it seems that non-state actors can completely avoid legal issues regarding the use of social media, as long as they remain under the jurisdiction of civil liberal democracies and conditions of use set by the provider of social media.

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FAKE NEWS - A CHALLENGE FOR OSINT

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Abstract: *"Fake news" is one of the major themes on public agenda in recent years, with a high potential for affecting social systems and democracy as a whole. Against this background, the increasingly use of fake content or alternative facts, coupled with the dynamics of social networks, has generated a special concern to understand and counteract this phenomenon. In the intelligence activity, the extent of the phenomenon and the magnitude of its consequences, amplified by the facilities provided by the social platforms, create significant difficulties in collecting and analyzing the information from open sources (OSINT), that obtained a considerable role in intelligence. In this context, this article aims to address the conceptual aspects and the implications of "fake news" as a reference point in identifying response measures meant to ensure - in a specialized way - the counteraction of the phenomenon.*

Keywords: *fake news; disinformation; OSINT; social -media*

1. INTRODUCTION

Flooding the public space in the past few years with misinformation, highly publicized under the name fake news, requires - as first steps in understanding these developments - the necessity of conceptual clarification of the term as well as the origins of the phenomenon. From this point of view, the working hypothesis from which we start this article is that the fake news do not represent a new phenomenon and could be placed in the sphere of rumor, manipulation and misinformation used by open sources throughout history.

Particularly, the assumption we take into account is that at present, the combination fake news – social media challenges the intelligence services: from the prospective of threats to democracy; in obtaining useful intelligence for national security from open sources (OSINT).

2. ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF FAKE NEWS

According to linguist Anatoly Liberman (August, 2017) from Minnesota University, etymologically the term fake news has a pejorative meaning, derived from the jargon of London thieves in 18th century. It could be related to Germanic verbs which means 'to cheat'. Subsequently the meaning of the term expanded, being associated with the verbs 'to steal' or even 'to kill'. According to Miriam-Webster site (2017), a well-known company for its dictionaries, the

term fake news came into the generalized public language in the sense of false news at the end of 19th century and it was found in many press articles between 1890-1891.

This sense is not fully accepted and clarified in scientific community. The term begins to be assimilated by itself in the dictionaries starting in 2017, and the definitions are nuanced. The online edition of Collins Dictionary defines fake news as 'false information, often sensational, disseminated under the guise of news reporting', and Cambridge Dictionary as 'false stories that appear to be news, spread on the internet or using other media, usually created to influence political views or as a joke'. Researches (Kleis, Graves, 2017:2-3) based on focus-groups also pointed out different prospective of the public opinion (figure 1) over the meaning of the term 'fake news' - from satira, to unprofessional journalism, to political propaganda, negative advertising and false news.

From our perspective, coupled with the above mentioned examples as well as the current context, a defining definition of fake news could refer to false or biased narratives and omissions of parts of truth, deliberately created and targeting the sensational and extreme components which generate emotional involvement or the strengthening of prejudices.

A retrospective over time demonstrates/proves that fake news is multiplying after the discovery of print and the appearance of mass-media (Jacob Soll, 2016).



Fig.1. Public perception of fake news/ <http://www.digitalnewsreport.org>

A series of publicly exposed cases show that newspapers, radio and then television were commonly used to launch false news (Allcott, Gentzkow, 2017:211).

- spectacular, based on popular prejudices related to monsters, witches, sinners, who usually served to consolidate religious beliefs;
- fabricated in order to obtain political, financial or notoriety benefits.

The discovering life on the moon – 1835 ‘The New York Sun’, the death Mark Twain, in poverty, in 1897 in London – New York Journal, the extraterrestrial attack on USA – 1938 Columbia Broadcasting network are only a few of the fake news in the sensational area that was being circulated at a certain moment.

Besides these, there were investigated fake news cases that marked a series of major political and diplomatic decisions:

- the alleged letter of Grigori Zinoviev, the president of Comintern, calling on British Communists to mobilize the sympathetic forces of Labor Party. Published on 1924 by Daily Mail, the letter contributed to the loss of the Labor Party’s elections;
- covering the Soviet crimes of starvation of Ukraine’s population, in the articles signed in 1931 by Walter Duranty, the chief of New York Times office in Moscow, which have resulted in an extension of the US willingness towards URSS;
- constant promotion by the Nazi of the protocols of the elders of Zion, a false text published in Russia in 1903, which suggested the idea of a global Jewish secret conspiracy;
- the existence of weapons of mass-destruction in Irak, which conducted to the American military intervention in the region.

Starting to US presidential elections in 2016, the term fake news stimulated intense approaches, studies and researches in academic, journalistic, political domains as well as technology companies. According to them, the goals of fake news are currently different, from the political ones, with the perverting of political dialogue (agenda, propaganda) – (Marwick, Lewis, 2017:107-110), to the business ones (traffic, financial gains) or are part of the global hybrid war, misinformation being a technique of the informatics - psychologic war (Trenin, D., 2018:2). The studies showed that subculture groups (the far right wing, trolls, the conspiracy theory supporters, conservatives) develops hacking techniques in order to increase their ideas visibility, but there is also the tendency to label, (especially from the political area) as fake news any piece of news that is against its their interests (Marwick, Lewis, 2017:108). Among these groups there are preferences for one type or another of the social media. A study realized by Oxford Internet Institute between November 2017-January 2018 underlined that Donald Trump’s supporters network spread fake news especially on Twitter. According the same study, the far right groups were extremely active on Facebook in spreading fake news.

3. THE FAVORED FACTORS

The particular elements of the phenomenon today are related to the increasing trend of fake news, most of them produced and posted on the obscure sites. Their spreading is facilitated by the social platforms, that extended the possibilities of generating content directly by the user and global coverage of publishing.

If in the past manipulation was attributed especially to the driving political factors and the strong figures today the socialization platforms transformed the user into a possible manipulator. In this context there is a major difference between the level of filtration of message (compare to traditional market media), socialization platforms allowing the news to go directly to a great number of consumers.

Many researches pointed out that there is also a connection between social media algorithm and the advertising/commercial systems, exploited by persons interested in rapidly spreading of a message. (Wooley Howard, 2016:10). At the same time, the consumers play an important role both in generating content and in modeling of a certain type of journalism. According to specialized researches, the evolutions on fake news market are determined by the fact that people are open to fake news, especially to those based on prejudices they intensely shared (De Keersmaecker; Roets A, 2017:108).

4. VULNERABILITY OF DEMOCRACY

The magnitude of the debates on the subject imposed fake news one of the `words of the year` in 2017, in Collins Dictionary. The developments are directly connected to the multiplication of concerns to limit the negative consequences of the fake news spread. Exponents of the academic, politics and business drew attention to the risk of

erosion of the fundamentals of democracy and the erosion of trust in mass-media.

It's edifying the fact that World Economic Forum/WEF included digital major misinformation as one of the most important threats to the current society (WEF, 2018). Fears are strengthened by the survey realized between 5 and 7 of February by the European Union, which highlighted that most of the Europeans consider fake news is a real problem for every country and for every democracy in general (The Eurobarometer, March, 2018:1).

5. EFFECTS ON OSINT ACTIVITIES

For intelligence analysts who count on open sources (OSINT), this level of mistrust in mass-media has significant and permanent implications on the way they do their job.

We refer in this article to OSINT as defined in NATO Open Sources Intelligence Handbook (2001), respectively the selected, filtered and analyzed information from open sources, in order to answer to a request.

OSINT activity is carried out both in governmental and in private institutions, the domain finds one to provide a competitive advantage to any type of organization. A general look over the entities at global level with OSINT activity for the national security and the domains in which the open sources contribute is offered in the image below, published by Homeland Security Research (March, 2018).




Fig.2. Open Source Intelligence Global Market/ <https://homelandsecurityresearch.com/>

As it was mentioned above, the OSINT analysts' main work front is open sources. In this category enter the well-known classical sources (mass media, newspapers, web sites, magazines, TV shows, blogs, social media). Practically, there are the same types of sources, which, traditionally, were associated with misinformation and persuasion. Besides the challenges generate by the continuous increase of data volume, the traditional limits of related to linguistic barriers, the amplification of the fake news phenomenon increase the difficulties faced by OSINT. This fact produces effects upon all intelligence system. Especially if we take into account the role of the open sources information considerably increased (being evaluated - a former director of CIA - James Woosley - at 90% from the whole intelligence activity).

6. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

To limit the effects of the fake news phenomenon, we consider that any organization which is dealing with OSINT needs a framework to rapidly assimilate the initiatives from bussiness and academic areas. It's worth mentioning in this case proliferation of the identification of those online fake news (as BuzzFeed sau Bellingcat, Snopes, Full Fact and FactCheck), as well as recommendations of multidimensional, meant to build the processes through which the news are consumed. In support of OSINT experts, there are

also the analytical techniques based on analysis and critical thinking, which must lead to putting those questions that are suitable and, let us add, to finding responses to the extent by revealing a logical scheme based on evidence and inferences, induction and deduction, recognition of the patterns and identifications of possible tendencies.

Applying the principles of credibility of the source is a compulsory component in OSINT activity, but these could become time-consuming in the context of proliferation of obscure sources and in the absence of reliable technological solutions to automate collection and analysis from open sources. We believe that one of the solutions would be to perform analyzes of cloud based media markets that provide on one hand visual understanding of the media map as a whole and the correct placement of sources within it, internal relations, and on the other hand – tendencies. We consider that the mapping model of the media markets proposed (2016) by Erik Kleinsmith, vicepresident for Business Development in Intelligence, National & Homeland Security, and Cyber for American Military University, can be a solution for OSINT.

The proposal, presented in figure 3, offers the advantage of understanding the behaviour the different types of media (traditional mass-media, blogs, forums, social media), area of influence and the contribution in forming and promoting some news.




Fig.3. Map of Media/ <https://inpublicsafety.com>

The OSINT activity, either governmental or private will depend on common public-private effort for ensuring the right of correct information.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The examples presented in this article show that fake news took part in the disinformation, manipulation and propaganda arsenal of the interest s groups in history. Fake news phenomenon highlighted the fact that non-state entities or groups of individuals could catalyze major political changes with minimum costs, wherever in the world by means and platforms with global coverage, unsubordinated to any

government. The solutions promoted in public space cover a wide range of from returning to rules and strict editorial standards to legislative interventions and collaborative civil initiatives to expose the fake news.

Against this background we consider that in OSINT activity (figure 4, reprezentare a autorilor) there is a need for a combined approach between the rigor of analysis – critical thinking, application of structured methods and techniques as those like validation of sources and models of understanding the media landscape. All these must be supported by investments in tools of automatic collection, Data Mining, Web analysis and Big Data.




Fig.3. Map of Media/ <https://inpublicsafety.com>

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SOCIAL MEDIA INTERACTIONS AND THE EXPRESSION OF EXTREMIST BELIEFS. CASE STUDY: CYBERBULLYING IN THE ROMANIAN VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENT

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Abstract: *Harassment is characterized by intentionality, repetitiveness and the existence of an imbalance in the aggressor-victim power balance. With regard to online harassment, known as cyberbullying, there is currently no unanimously accepted definition and no academic agreement on how the three components of the definition of offline harassment might overlap with online harassment. The latest study by Bitdefender company shows that in 2017, four out of five Romanian teenagers said they were bullied online, most often aggressions being focused on the way the targets shows or dresses, and on the second place is the passions of free time, followed by the financial level of the family of origin, school results and sexual preferences. So far, concrete cases of cyberbullying with targets or authors among Romanian citizens have been extremely limited in quantity, a possible explanation of the lack of visibility could be the absence of a tragic outcome or the retention of victims from telling their story. Another dimension of online aggression is based on racial or ethnic intolerance, exemplifying situations being those where anti-Semitic or anti-Muslim views have been catalysed by punctual events, sometimes without immediate significance, but which have been speculated for the liberation of negative narrations in the virtual environment, maybe expressions of dormant resentment of historical character.*

Keywords: *cyberbullying; offline aggression; online aggression*

1. INTRODUCTION

Intuitively, aggression in the virtual environment is manifested at the level of several social segments and has different modes of expression, depending on the criterion that formed the basis of a community. The way in which verbal attacks occur, including online attacks, between groups of *tiffosi* differ from those taking place between supporters of political ideas or those that are right extreme sympathizers when they criticize traditional targets - Jews, Masons or, more recently, emigrants from the Syrian-Iraqi space. Similarly, Christian-Orthodox fundamentalists, when aggressing, more or less veiled, the members of other religions (see discussions on the opportunity to build a large mosque in Bucharest), use a different type of vocabulary than the one used by supporters of the traditional family versus the followers of sexual liberalism.

The accelerated development of Web 2.0 technologies and the multitude of collective communication channels in the virtual environment, coupled with the exponential evolution of mobile-related technologies, fosters

not only useful interactions in the personal development of individuals but also new ways of expressing feelings and experiences with negative connotations, favored, *inter alia*, by the possibility of anonymizing broadcasters and rapidly disseminating real-time views. Virtually any field of social life can be reached by the phenomenon of discursive aggression and online harassment, as well as by the launching of rumors or the expression of unfavorable opinions towards an individual, a social group (regardless of the catalyst that underpinned its creation - ethnic, religious, professional or other) or a community.

Multiplication of the aggressive transfer cases from real to virtual aggression has generated a new form of harassment, called cyberbullying.

Characterized by the use of information and communication technologies, it can reach wide-ranging dimensions (and, consequently, effects) when action support is socialization platforms that promote rapid content distribution, along with adhesion and rallying such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram or Youtube. Extensive availability of mobile applications, such as WhatsApp, or the possibility that, in addition to classic SMS, video

files can be transmitted and processed via the phone, it facilitates cyberbullying.

At the level of general perception of cyberbullying, the forms in which they are conducted do not differ from conventional harassment and include: repeated humiliation of a person; sending obscene text or video; sending offensive content to intimidate; the use of adult content during online conversations; ridicule by creating a fake blog or profile containing biased information; the proliferation of threats; posting videos or personal photos online without the consent of the person concerned. From the same perspective, cyberbullying can have multiple effects, manifested individually or together: diminishing self-esteem and sense of security; feelings of fear, anger, shame; students' refusal to attend classes; increasing anxiety; avoiding group activities; changes in mood, behavior, sleep or appetite; feeding prejudices of race, religion, sexuality.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Indeed, harassment in the offline environment has a widely accepted definition among scholars, an act of harassment being considered an aggressive action characterized by three components: it is intentional, implies an imbalance of the power balance between the aggressor (individual or group) and victim, has a repeated nature over a period. This definition was introduced by Olweus (1994) and so far has not undergone significant changes in the literature. Intentional character has been highlighted to make a distinction between harassment and simple or accidental injuries (Finkelhor *et al.*, 2012; Smith *et al.*, 2008). As far as the power imbalance is concerned, it can be interpreted broadly as a difference of a physical, social or any other kind of difference that would put the victim in the position of not being able to defend himself, at the level of the researchers being assessed not (Olweus, 1993; Felix *et al.*, 2011). Regarding the repetitive character of harassment, it refers to intentional prejudice occurring over a period and is not occasional, and incidents of this latter type are not interpreted as harassment (Olweus, 1994).

In order to be able to distinguish between harassment and other forms of online aggression, cyberbullying researchers often resort to the definition of offline harassment, the components of which are accompanied by an explanation of the connection to information technology and communications or other related technologies virtual environment. However, there is currently no

scientifically research-based consensus on a unanimously accepted definition of online harassment and no agreement at the academic level on how the three components of the definition of offline harassment could overlap the online harassment.

Thus, the definitions of cyberbullying contain either traditional traditional classical bullying, with an enumeration of devices through which harassment is online (Vandebosch and VanCleemput, 2009) and have a large variation of the range, addressing the phenomenon predominantly as on a bullying subject of bullying, bounded by the communication environment (Ybarra *et al.*, 2012). A potent example is the Patchin and Hinduja (2012) definition that "cyberbullying occurs" when someone repeatedly harasses, treats adversely or otherwise plays online, or by using cell phones or other electronic devices". Another definition of the mentioned researchers is that cyberbullying is

any kind of behavior that has electronic or digital media support and belongs to individuals or groups that repeatedly send hostile or aggressive messages with the intention of generating harm or discomfort to others people (Patchin & Hinduja, 2012, p.15).

From the victim's perspective, Lenhart (2007) approached descriptive aspects such as gender patterns (e.g. girls are more likely to be cyberbullying boys) or comparisons between online and offline aggression. Girls declare the occurrence of the phenomenon to a greater extent - 38% of them say they have been assaulted online, compared with 26% of boys. Older girls declare the phenomenon to a greater extent than younger girls than boys, 41% of girls aged 15-17 report such experiences. Differences in offline aggression, where boys are often both victims and aggressors, appear to be obvious. Furthermore, it seems that girls are more attracted to boys than "boys online" (Goddard, 2008).

Some studies have highlighted the blurring of the border between aggressors and aggressors, which is an indicator of the difference between traditional and online harassment. For example, there are situations where the victims of cyberbullying respond to the aggressors in the same way they were attacked. At this point we should mention Tokunaga's opinion (2010:278), which showed that in the case of cyberbullying "the identity of the aggressor may be known or not; aggression can occur in school through electronic mediated communication, but it can also work well beyond school.

In a study of a group of 733 young people aged between 11 and 18, the subjects' responses showed that it was easier to distinguish between forms of cyberbullying than to the roles of those involved victim, aggressor or witness (Law *et al.*, 2012).

The same study revealed that many of the respondents were individuals who both fulfilled the role of victim and aggressor in linked incidents. The study suggested that revenge takes place frequently, which confirms the tendency to reduce clear separation between the authors and the victims of the aggressions, which in turn are involved in reactive aggression (Law *et al.*, 2012). Based on a survey of a group of 283 final year students, it was concluded that about 50% of the aggressors were also victims of online aggression (Englander *et al.*, 2009).

Researches on ages where cyberbullying is more common were inconsistent or inconclusive, many of which highlight a lack of a clear association between age and victim, but highlighting a high vulnerability to the 12-14 year age position object of aggression (Tokunaga, 2010). One aspect highlighted in studies of 5,600 pupils in 5th, 8th and 11th grades revealed that online aggressions with physical and verbal aggression were significantly associated with a negative school climate, the lack of support from the group of friends or colleagues, and the neutral attitude of those who witnessed aggression. Offline harassment has a peak of intensity during the gymnasium and decreases with aging, being less common in high schools (Espelage and Horne, 2008; Nansel *et al.*, 2001; Pellegrini and Bartini, 2000; Smith *et al.*, 1999).

3. THE CASE OF ROMANIA

The Save the Children Romania organization conducted in 2015 a study on the use of the Internet in the family, according to which about 47% of the respondents said they had been disturbed / offended in the last year offline, and 45% said this was which happened in the virtual space, results that, compared to the data obtained from the Save the Children Romania in the year 2013, showed that cyberbullying has increased by about 13%, as classical bullying has remained at the same level.

The evoked study shows that the hierarchy of the means by which they had discursive aggressions was: social platforms - 52.8%, chat rooms - 45.2%, gaming sites - 15.5%, instant messaging - 12.7%, e-mail - 3.2%, other forms of online communication - 7.5%.

In terms of the mode of action, the most common were direct or offensive direct messages (texts, images, videos) - 49.6%, threats - 14.3%, unfavorable messages about the victim (texts, images, videos) - 11.1%, exclusion from a group created in the virtual environment - 10.3%. A consistent segment of respondents (13.5%) declined to say how they were assaulted. One aspect of interest is that the share of children who declared themselves victims of online harassment was higher in rural areas (46.1%) than in urban areas (43.9%), and the disproportion between urban and rural areas in terms of direct aggression, of 42.9%, respectively, compared to 61.8% of those questioned. The "contamination" with cyberbullying is indicated by the fact that 32% of the children questioned in 2015 said they had offended somebody in the last year by mobile phone, compared to 22% in 2013, the cases being more often in urban areas (36%) than in rural areas (21%).

The latest study by the Romanian IT company Bitdefender shows that in 2017, four out of five Romanian teenagers aged under 18 said they were being harassed online. The most common (67%), discursive aggressions were centered on the way in which the targets show or dress, the second being leisure passions (30%), followed by the financial level of the family of origin (13%), school results (12%) and sexual preferences (8%).

It draws attention to the fact that 2/3 of those who were assaulted did not tell anyone else about the situation, for reasons such as fear or distrust in the possibility of solving the problem. The aspect is placed in the logic of the reduced weight of notifications received by the Children's Telephone Association on this dimension from October 2011 to October 2013 - out of 2,907 cases of bullying, the physical forms - 45.72%; verbal - 22.86%; emotional - 15.24%; relational - 14.28%; online - 1.90%. Victims were mainly adolescents (girls aged 12-17 years - 28.58%, boys aged 12-17 years - 57.14%), but also pre-adolescents (girls aged 8 to 11 years - 6, 67%, boys aged 8 to 11 years - 7.61%). According to the Bitdefender study, the hierarchy of social platforms where such harassment occurs is Facebook, Messenger and Instagram, and forms of expression are, in order, threatening messages and negative comments received on private chat channels, followed by depreciative comments on photos and of identity theft.

The study concluded that 65% of young people admitted that they were directly marked by online harassment and also observed involuntary behavioral changes following the aggression. Most said that incidents of this kind have lowered their

self-confidence and made them isolate themselves from others. Fewer, but not neglected, are those who said they have entered depression (20%) or compensated for the lack of online friends by alcohol or drugs (5%).

Moreover, 84% of respondents admitted they witnessed such an attack without being aggressors or victims, but only 36% intervened in the conflict between the two sides. Although most would have liked to take part of the harassed one, most people become indifferent or even aggressor for fear of being attacked and turn into casualties.

3.1 Online sexual harassment. Until now, the concrete cases of cyberbullying with targets or authors among Romanian citizens have been extremely limited in quantity, a possible explanation being the absence of a tragic outcome or the retention of victims from telling their story.

A case of cyberbullying involving a Romanian author as a moral author took place in 2015 and ended with the suicide, on June 5, 2015, of an Irish teenager, Ronan Hughes, aged 17, blackmailed with pornographic materials in which he appeared while expressing explicit sexual behavior. The author of blackmail was identified in a 31-year-old native of Timisoara, named Julian Enache.¹ Iulian Enache claimed 3,300 pounds in order not to publish the compromising material on the Internet, warning him:

You will do what I say or otherwise publish all this crap for your friends and not only: porn sites (20 or more), torrents and DC++ !!! Okay, did I get your attention? So you should know what's good for you! What I want? Money! I have no interest in sending your nonsense to your friends. I just want the money!

As the teenager did not send his money, on June 5, the Romanian sent several pictures and videos to Ronan Hughes's friends. After materials were sent to his friends, the teenager did not resist the pressure and shot in the head with his brother's gun.

More recently, in June 2017, a 17-year-old in Ploiesti claimed to have been sexually trafficked through Facebook by an unknown CounterStrike player. Facebook messages show that the stranger insisted on the idea of an offline meeting, but was denied the amount of 50 lei for a sex party.²

3.2 Online ethnically motivated bullying.

Another dimension of online aggression is that of racial or ethnic intolerance, exemplary being a 305-word article posted on the Hotnews news portal about an incident at a German border crossing point between a family of Israelis and a border guard. Within 35 hours, the news generated 85 comments, which totalized 4449 words and contained aggression indicators that we categorized into 10 discursive registers:

- Harsh / Coarse - Use of pejorative appeals by Jews or Israelis as well as their derivatives (jid, jidan, jidov, ovra, jidoavca, ovraic, ovraic, jidovit etc);

- Indictment - views on Israel's involvement in various developments in the Middle East (e.g. the Palestinian issue);

- Pecuniary - opinions on the economic and financial purpose of the actions of the Jews, regarded as their prime concern and one of the characteristics of the ethnic group;

- Inciting - opinions on attitudes considered provocative / agitating and aimed at generating social tensions;

- Criminality - opinions on the assimilation of Jewish / Israeli behavior with facts contrary to legal or moral law;

- Machiavellian - opinions on the scandalousness of the Jews / Israelis, including the use of distortions of facts and their interpretation in a manner that allows the achievement of unlawful purposes;

- Offensive - offensive opinions without justification, be it subjective; in other words, offense for the sake of insult;

- Rudimentary - opinions about Jewish / Israeli primitivism, derived from the rural character of communities of the same name;

- *Foetur Iudaicus* - opinions derived from widespread prejudice in Europe dating back to the Middle Ages, concerning the so-called hereditary ugly smell evolved by Jews;

- The Final Solution - opinions on the elimination, including physically, of Jews or Israelis from society; this register also includes the explicit assumption of anti-Semitism.

The analysis of the incidence of each discursive register showed that most of the commentaries were based on the conviction of the authors that the main purpose of actions by Jewish people is to obtain material / economic / financial benefits and advantages, most often through the evocation of the Holocaust. On the second place there is a belief that Jews / Israelis have a behavior

¹ <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-41088814>, accessed in April 8, 2018

² <https://www.republikanews.ro/un-pusti-din-ploiesti-hartuit-sexual-de-un-necunoscutfoto/>, accessed in April 8, 2018

marked by lies and victimization in connection with the same Holocaust. Harsh expressions, offensive and generically called "Final Solution" registers were equally represented, interpretable in terms of belonging to the same type of affront, the frontal one. Incidentally, if these three registers would be merged into one, they would place themselves in the top position of the rankings.

Interesting is the presence of anachronistic registers, the one about the rudimentary character of Israeli society - an anachronistic idea having regard of the current economic developments of Israel - and to the odor of the Jews - a prejudice whose persistence could be explained by the informational fundamentals of emitters, most likely based on classical antisemitic writings.

3.3 Online religiously motivated bullying.

Social media is the scene of the expression of latent or momentary resentment, which manifests itself as a reaction to events perceived as negative. Exemplary is the case for the construction of a large mosque in Bucharest, whose first step was the Government Decision 372 of May 29, 2015, whereby a land of 11,000 square meters was transferred from the private domain of the state and the administration of the Autonomous Administration "Administration of the State Protocol Patrimony", in the public domain of the state, the administration of the State Secretariat for Cults and the free use of the Mufti of Muslim Cult of Romania.

The Facebook page "We do not want the megamosque in Bucharest" was created shortly, with the stated aim of "repealing the HG 372/2015 by an Emergency Ordinance, whereby the land of 11,295 sqm will be returned to the private property of the state". Beyond the discussion of the situation, the discourse of the participants in the talks deviated sensitively, placing themselves in the area of the verbal aggression, so that, over the 800 pages as a summation of the comments on the megamosque, several types of aggressive opinions were identified.

Resentment over Muslims appear to be crystal clear, in view of the fact that the verbal aggression directed obviously on them was represented by 121 items, at a suitable distance from the insults of a general nature (51) and followed by suggestions on the so-called "solution to the problem" (77). The most directly verbal attacks have been addressed to Muslims and Islam and have outgrown the aggressiveness directed to the discussed issue. Moreover, the debate has often deviated from the situation that generated the dissatisfaction, becoming a topic often secondary, only a pretext for launching imprecations.

Regarding advanced solutions, they indicated overwhelmingly physical elimination (52 items out of 77), which shows on the one hand the desire for rapid resolution of the situation, and on the other the awareness that the Muslim community in Romania belong many Islamic followers who are Romanian citizens and can not be expelled, as suggested in 17 cases.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Due to the possible retention of victims from telling their story or the absence of a tragic outcome, in Romania the concrete cases of cyberbullying are extremely limited in quantity even though various studies have shown that this type of incidents is increasing in our country as well.

The most visible situations that could be considered as cyberbullying cases can be found on the social networks or as comments posted on articles published by news sites, but, at least at a first glance, those situations lack a characteristic that could confirm them as cyberbullying: the repeated nature over a period. From this perspective, what remains to be studied is whether the authors of verbal attacks against group targets manifest themselves on several social platforms, synchronize their actions and express their hostility continuously, even if apparently this is discontinuous due to occurrences and successive disappearances. It also remains to be noticed whether the resentments that lead to verbal aggression manifested online are generated by punctual events or has a constant character.

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LOST IDENTITIES! BUILDING AND DISMANTLING SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS IN ROMANIA

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Abstract: *Social intelligence approach provides a useful theoretical framework for looking at various social intelligence processes within society that can be initiated and developed in two complementary ways: actor-initiated process from top down and emergence social processes from bottom up. On the one hand, one of the actors that can initiate this process is the state. In this case, state institutions are supporting and maintaining the emergence and development of social intelligence processes within society. On the other hand, various agents within society (i.e. citizens, private firms, NGOs, so on) are the product of social intelligence emergent processes through their interactions. By this position paper we propose a complementary social intelligence approach. Our focus is Romania, a small state that provides interesting historical examples of both social intelligence processes. Our study is in a great measure descriptive, but in the second and third part, it provides an explicative and predictive viewpoint by the social mechanisms identified. Thus, in the first part of the paper, we present our theoretical framework based on social intelligence approach and the idea of network approach. We argue that there is a co-determination relationship between the concepts, social intelligence viewed through the agency lens and network approach viewed as structure. In the second part of the paper, we provide two examples of social intelligence processes. As a state-initiated process we provide Haret-Gusti social intelligence networks approach and as an emergent social intelligence process we provide at the enterprise level, the examples of MICA COMPANY BRAD and MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK. In the third part of the paper, we investigate a social mechanism that act as a mediating process that play a key role in dismantling of social intelligence networks. In this sense, we provide two study cases by which we explain the dismantling of social intelligence emergent networks within society. These will underline the orientation risk toward future in building social intelligence resilient networks within society.*

Keywords: *actor-initiated social intelligence; emergent social intelligence processes; subversion; social mechanisms; security culture*

1. INTRODUCTION

Social intelligence is an approach situated on a succession series from Marquis de Condorcet, John Dewey, Stevan Dedijer (Sebe, 2010). In France, Condorcet introduced his social instruction program in order to generate and diffuse knowledge within society. In 30s, John Dewey in USA supported that citizens must be engaged in public policy issues and they must be educated in this sense by universities (Dewey, 1930; Carpenter, 2006). Thus, he proposed the concept of social intelligence as a mechanism for preparing the citizens through learning processes within universities, as a continuous flow to secure the future generation of human capital (Sebe, 2010).

Dedijer (1978; 1982a; 1987; Dedijer and Svensson, 1994; 2002) defined social intelligence as the overall capability of a social system that

anticipate, learn, manage and adapt to environment and environment rapid changes in order to assure its security and future development. According to Dedijer, social intelligence is proper to every social entity (i.e. citizens, corporations, NGOs, nation-states so on). Thus, Dedijer conceptualized social intelligence approach as agency-initiated process. In this process, the political elites within the state are responsible for initiating, supporting and developing social intelligence processes within society. He regarded also, multinationals as agents that initiate and develop social intelligence processes within the host nation (Dedijer, 1982b).

Dedijer observed that the most important economic sector in every society was gradually taken by knowledge industry. Its size, density and quality of information networks condition the social intelligence capability of that country (Dedijer and Jéquier, 1987). At the theoretical

level, we extend Dedijer's social intelligence approach viewed as agency, connecting it with the idea of network structure. Thus, we arrive at the agency-structure issue. We argue that social intelligence agency and network structure are co-determinate.

A complementary approach is that of emergent social intelligence processes. In this sense we use as reference framework the theory of emergence proposed by Epstein and Axtell (1996), that defined emergent structure as "stable macroscopic patterns arising from local interactions of agents" (Epstein and Axtell, 1996: 35). Thus, in their social interactions the agents (e.g. citizens, private firms, NGOs so on) can generate collective behavior of a certain complexity. In the social intelligence approach, agents are developing their capabilities based on knowledge accumulation processes generated and diffused to other agents through social interactions embedded in the network structure. The process of knowledge diffusion to other social agents clustered in social segments may generate the emergence of social intelligence processes, so far as, the network structure is not constraining the manifestation of them. Here is important to underline briefly, how agency and structure can constrain each other in the development processes of a small state, such as Romania, considering several social mechanisms.

Dedijer dedicated a long time to the study of less developed countries (LDCs) and particularly small states in their path to development based on social intelligence function. He stressed that social poverty, lack of education, corruption, ignorance are social mechanisms produced and reproduced that impede the developmental processes (Dedijer, 1982a). Moreover, small and less developed states that were subject to different historical negative social processes, such as communism experiment, that produced serious pathologies in their social structures and generated long-term social effects at multiple levels, have to transfer the research, innovation and culture from developed countries and to adapt them to their needs, qualities and vulnerabilities in order to catch-up and develop in an acceptable time interval. Romania is such a small state that was subject to a social experiment imposed through subversive processes by an external actor (i.e. USSR).

We propose the concept of social intelligence networks that allows us to conceptualize the social intelligence as agency and the idea of network viewed as structure. Thus, we extend the social intelligence approach proposed by Dedijer linked with network approach. The later approach

represents both a knowledge and action tool, that has institutional utility, such as in the work of intelligence services, police systems to dismantle dark networks through different strategies (i.e. Duijn and Klerks, 2014). Its scientific roots are traced back to Moreno (1941).

This is a position paper by which we argue for a complementary social intelligence networks approach that can be initiated, supported and developed both: as actor-initiated process and as an emergent process.

2. STATE-INITIATED SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS

2.1 Haret-Gusti Social Intelligence Approach. In Romania, Spiru Haret was the first who undertook a social intelligence approach to reform the social structure of society through social networks. As a model of reference, Haret took Nordic model, particularly Denmark villages, the most developed at European level in that period (Haret, 1905). Haret sent researchers to Denmark to study how they developed their villages. He understood that education was the vehicle to prepare and develop citizens' capabilities. His social intelligence approach was both top-down and bottom up. He identified the main agents of influence at national level. At the village level, the brokers were teachers and priests, that received the mission to inculcate locals with knowledge (Haret, 1905).

Moreover, he conceived a national network of researchers that needed to conduct field works in villages to identify population needs, qualities and vulnerabilities. He conceived focus groups as the main device to understand locals' needs and problems (Haret, 1905). Also, he identified social agents of influence such as: the prefect, the municipal inspector, mayor, notary, municipal council, village council so on (Haret, 1905). They were viewed as the brokers in their networks, that have knowledge about the local situation and resources to solve problems.

From top, the political elites were responsible with implementing public policies that minimize the social suffering and maximize the social welfare (Haret, 1910/1969: 191). He stressed the human security approach, that everyone has the right to a minimum level of welfare comprising: liberty, personal security, food, hygienic dwelling and clothing (Haret, 1910/1969: 191). Moreover, political elites must conceive a mass program of social instruction and diffuse knowledge throughout society, to achieve the integrated

civilization (Haret, 1910/1969: 186-191), that is systemic social intelligence. Haret suggested three components of social intelligence approach, that may be extended and sub-divided: economic, intellectual and moral (Haret, 1910/1969).

The first step to develop social intelligence networks was rising awareness levels of the importance of education. He operated through channels of contacts at highschool level (directors) and at regional level he contacted the prefects (Haret, 1905). They constituted contact brokers that were subject to influence in order to promote the importance of educational reform.

Among the most important social network in promoting educational reform was political elites. Haret built gradually a political network of influence through strong and weak ties in order to fulfill his mission. A key constraint was the political opponents that impeded the reforms and supported their obsolete traditional views. He fulfilled to extend his political network in order to influence other politicians from different parties who started to support his reform and, at the same time, Haret reduced the political influence of opposition cliques. Gaining access and support to different politicians who were willing to accept that reform was necessary was very difficult. The mechanism used in order to gain political influence was to target the main brokers in the social networks, influencers within their networks that have the power to inculcate ideas. The political network was extended at national level through communication channels as sending notices at regional and local levels in order to understand the situation, diffuse ideas and propose solutions.

Haret saw intelligence as Aristotle – human capability subject to continuous improvement (Haret, 1910/1969:156). He stated that if material and moral components are developed to an acceptable level, intelligence will become the most powerful force (Haret, 1910/1969:156-157). However, he suggested the necessity to find an equilibrium state between each component. Haret (1910/1969:157-158) distinguished between the medium intelligence and maximum intelligence. The medium intelligence represents the intellectual fond of society that determine the type and degree of development. The medium intelligence is influenced by the past social processes and its development depends on social innovation positive processes. Haret ([1910]/1969:158-186) considered also the negative social innovation processes and natural hazards that may impede the development of a social system.

Actor-generated social intelligence processes initiated, supported and developed have to be adapted exactly to the needs, qualities and vulnerabilities of a social system, in order to stimulate the latent social mechanisms accumulated through social learning processes that can accelerate change and the emergence of social intelligence processes from bottom up. The social intelligence networks were initiated from the state institutions at three levels: national, regional and local. Their dimensions were political, social, economic and knowledge. At the local level, it was conceived an interactive network between teachers, priests, locals and researchers.

Dimitrie Gusti continued the work of Haret and conceived a “science of nation” program (Gusti, 1937) that implied building social networks in order to generate social intelligence processes within society. Thus, he built a network of researchers as a knowledge tool and a political network as an action tool for implementing public policies. Gusti devised as devices teams of researchers to study villages and after that, he implemented social services institutes formed of young students, priests and teachers. Also, he considered building social networks through identification of persons that left the village, namely internal migration networks. Gusti approached holistically the social system through four components: health, education, work, psychology. His approach was that of knowledge-based action. Thus, Gusti has formed interactive social networks at local level, but the main limit was linking villages between each other generating social interactions between neighbor villages and larger networks at regional and finally at national level.

At the core of his social intelligence approach was the social mechanism of social learning for producing and diffusing information and knowledge throughout society. The academic realm was charged with knowledge generation processes through which human resources were produced. Likewise, it was interesting how Gusti viewed the interaction between technological innovation and social innovation for developing a science of nation, a project that today corresponds to social intelligence approach and civic intelligence approach (Schuler, 2010; 2016).

2.2 Emergent social intelligence networks: Mica Company Brad and Marmorosch Blank Bank. Building social intelligence networks in the realm of business is a process perpetuated from the ancient times. Among the most successful business

networks models of Romanian history were MICA COMPANY BRAD and MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK. They represented examples of building social intelligence networks within and without Romania, contributing to the reputation and image of Romania outside.

2.3.1 Mica Company Brad (1920-1948).

From ancient times, gold was a resource that generated wealth, but also represented a curse for the people who mismanaged its utility. At the end of 18th century, in Romania was formed RUDA 12 APOSTLES ASSOCIATION, that was sold to a German mining company, HARKORTSCHEN BERGWERKE UND CHEMISCHE FABRIKEN ZU SCHWELM UND HARKORTEN A.G. ZU GOTHA in 1884. The German company has transformed the RUDA 12 APOSTLES into the most important mining exploitation of the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire and the entire central and southeast European area. In the interwar period RUDA 12 APOSTLES ASSOCIATION was sold to Leonhard Buchrucker of Brad, who handed over it to Adolf Sieber (Baron, 2006: 222-287). In 1931, under the name of MICA BRAD, the former RUDA 12 APOSTLES ASSOCIATION became a branch of the MICA COMPANY.

MICA COMPANY BRAD developed its social intelligence capability to procure, process, assess and disseminate knowledge throughout a social complex from Brad region, Transylvania. It was based on the basic resources: knowledge, secrecy and scientific research. Its social complex was formed by 44 villages that comprised 2800 workers (Societatea „MICA”, 2012). MICA COMPANY developed a social doctrine, a program of action, a future-oriented vision and a security culture. Its action mechanisms were based on Gusti's integrated approach. MICA COMPANY extended its influence in the entire Golden Quadrilateral of Transylvania through economic and social networks. The Company used subversive processes to penetrate other companies and to impose its own people at the decision-making level and consequently its exploitation policies (Baron, 2006:63).

In order to manage threats such as gold theft, MICA COMPANY instituted a social instruction program and created a surveillance hierarchical network of individuals. The company created the social conditions and infrastructure for workers and their families in order to assure their security and development. They provided social security, food security, energetic security. Thus, they created a proper level of security culture.

Another important element in social intelligence capability was foreign technological transfer. MICA COMPANY continued to keep the supply networks from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and Germany. For example, the Company acquired from Germany, spare parts, tools, machinery and equipment from SIEMENS, KRUPP, HUMBOLDT DEUTZMOTOREN A.G. (Rișcuța, 2001-2002:643-644).

Also, the resilience of MICA COMPANY throughout the economic, social and political crisis is interesting to study. The Company absorbed the shocks of personnel turnover, financial volatility and external shocks such as, the Great Economic Crisis of 1929-1930, Second World War, the volatility of gold prices at global level, political instability, strikes of workers from trade unions so on. It is important to stress that MICA COMPANY contributed to many economic sectors, especially national defense. Today, MICA COMPANY BRAD represents a model for EURO SUN MINING COMPANY (former CARPATHIAN GOLD) that operates in Rovina Valley Project in Transylvania.

2.3.2 Marmorosch Blank Bank (1848-1948).

MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK is another successful model of a social intelligence network that extended at global level. Jacob Marmorosch a trader that bought goods from Leipzig, London and Vienna markets, developed a contact network, especially with the famous JOSEPH MEYERS firm of London (Boambă, 1924). In 1863 he associated with a young man just returned from abroad studies, one of the first Romanian diplomats in the economic and financial sciences, Maurice Blank. In 1874, the bank become MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK. The new company was commissioned by LOBEL BANK from Vienna, the Austrian branch of an old Romanian bank operating under the same company in Galați (Boambă, 1924: 11). As Romanian economy started to develop, it required credit. The bank developed its social intelligence capability to anticipate the economic, political, social trends from the global security environment and managed to identify threats and opportunities for investment and influence in order to survive and grow.

The commercial banks have the widest contacts among all corporations (Browaldh, 1992: 53-58) and they need relevant and timely information for their operations. In the beginning of Independence War, the bank identified the opportunity and necessity to invest in military defense and to support the country interests. Also, the bank identified post-war investment

opportunities in railway strategic lines. Moreover, the bank identified potential investments in forestry industry, petroleum industry, food industry, cultural industry so on. In the cultural industry, Aristide Blank created in 1923 Publishing House “National Culture”, endowed with state-of-the-art technology brought from Switzerland (Surcel, 2012). This organization was a tool for mediatic campaigns for supporting its economic interests. The bank supported actual and potential customers to export their products on external markets, advised investors on what industries and assets to invest.

Another opportunity detected by the bank was the rice husking industry, that was introduced in the country in 1904 (Boambă, 1924). It is interesting to see how the bank adapted to the security environment and how it managed the threats. The bank adapted continuously to the foreign policy of the country and built networks with the allied countries, such as Germany, Italy and Austria. In 1879, The bank formed foreign partnerships with the HUNGARIAN COMMERCIAL BANK (Lampe, 2017) and in 1899 the bank established relations with DARMSTADTER BANK and BERLINER HANDELS-GESELLSCHAFT. In 1906, the bank established its relations with the BANQUE DE PARIS ET DES PAYS-BAS, from France, that received two seats in the board of directors of the bank.

It is important to understand how the bank built its foreign networks in four countries: France, Austria, Turkey and USA, establishing branches and other external connections. In order to build international networks, the firms need contacts in the host countries such as ambassadors, academics, businessman, bankers. In 1918, Aristide Blank was sent by the Romanian government to mediate a trade deal in China (Suruianu, 2016).

In the postbellum period, the bank opened a branch in Paris, for the first time a bank with Romanian capital. In 1919, the bank opened a branch in Istanbul and in 1920, the bank established a branch in New-York. The Paris branch played an important role in marketing and image-building of Romania in attracting foreign capital (Boambă, 1924: 69). At the national level, the bank established networks based on strategic alliances in all the historical regions of the country, controlling around 100 firms. The initiator of Paris and New-York branches was Aristide Blank, who developed his contacts through his diplomatic and economic missions, being sent by the Romanian government. In 1931, MARMOROSCH BLANK

BANK was the second bank that had the most participations in the Romanian economy. Within its internal structure, the Bank had a “marketing intelligence” department focused on market research, identifying the market changes and clients’ preferences and needs. Another department was research department (“competitive intelligence department”) preoccupied with environmental scanning and monitoring functions, identifying the threats and opportunities in the country and on external countries, preparing the decision support system for bank managers (Kirson, 2010:40-41).

2.3 Dismantling social intelligence networks.

“There is nothing more dangerous than [the feeling of] security” (Sir Francis Walsingham).

In this section we investigated the subversion mechanism that played a key role in the dismantling process of social intelligence networks. Understanding the disruptive social mechanisms implied in dismantling social intelligence networks such as, MICA COMPANY BRAD, that sustained about 30 years and MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK, that survived 100 years is of crucial relevance for today’s intelligence services and police systems for a couple of points. Firstly, in understanding the subversive mechanisms of revisionist actors that try to undermine national security. Secondly, in the relation between intelligence services and policy-making, intelligence services must alert the decision-makers to take the proper decisions in order to prevent and manage threats and risks that could affect national security. Finally, in devising effective strategies in prevention and intervention to dismantle dark networks.

2.4 Subventing.

2.4.1 Subventing Mica Company Brad.

Subversion is a capability of a social system to influence through several mechanisms (i.e. economic control, agents of influence, propaganda, assassinations, organization of events so on) the sub-systems of another social system in order to control its future evolution. Subversion is interfering from within and it is a tool of any statecraft (Blackstone, 1964; Codevilla, 1992:355-386). In this paper, subversion is treated as a socio-economic mechanism used in a negative way by the agents of influence supported by an external revisionist actor (i.e. Nazi Germany, USSR).

The political changes after Second World War brought the rising power of communist ideology in Romania. USSR undertook subversive processes to

impose communism in Central and Eastern Europe implying long-term changes of the social structure (i.e. Honig and Yahel, 2017).

The Communist Party of Romania, supported by USSR started to penetrate the enterprises through its agents of influence who infiltrated in the trade unions and took over the control of business mechanism. Through trade unions, the agents of influence imposed their control on the production, goods and decision-making processes (Baron, 2006: 301). They have targeted the key nodes in the decision-making processes and removed the leaders and the personnel, created a network of agents for extending the gold theft that culminated with a decrease in production. These agents had extensive financial means and recruited accomplices among the workers and employees of the Company. They also managed to introduce people among the workers' representatives (Baron, 2006:306).

The network of agents used rumors as a mechanism in order to disseminate false information about low productivity, targeting the top management of MICA COMPANY BRAD in order to denigrate and affect their reputation (Baron, 2006:312). From 1947, the network of agents undertook radical measures and the structures were dismantled, following that, by the nationalization law of 1948, MICA COMPANY BRAD was abolished.

2.4.2 Subventing Marmorosch Blank Bank.

With the emergence of negative ideologies in the interwar period, such as Fascism, Nazism and Communism, there was an unfriendly security environment for young democratic small states with a short tradition, as Romania. Moreover, the Great Depression from 1929-1930 generated great difficulties for enterprises worldwide. MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK was affected by two major factors: the economic crisis and Nazi ideological penetration using agents of influence against the top management of the bank, who supported a different political ideology and interests. Likewise, having in mind the ethnicity of the founder fathers of MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK it was susceptible that they will be targeted by legionaries. In the challenging context of economic crisis, the capacity of banks to project confidence in their investments was useless (Gavrilă, 2016). The bank was demanded by customers to refund their bank deposits. In October 1931, MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK became insolvent and bankrupt.

Despite the interventions from the National Bank of Romania (NBR took some of the debts

and gave it the concession of tobacco and salt disposal) and King Charles II, the bank was not able to completely recover, but it survived. The depositors caused riots and the bank was forced to close its branches (Gavrilă, 2016). With the coming in power of the Antonescu regime, an unprecedented vengeance operation was triggered by all those who were perceived as close to King Charles II (Surcel, 2012). From 1927, Aristide Blank was involved in the power struggle at the top of the country and supported King Charles II to return to the throne. In this sense, through his Publishing House, initiated informational campaigns supporting King Charles II. From 1930, he became the economic counselor of the King Charles II.

At the beginning of 1940, Aristide Blank was the target of a missed, planted, legionary attack. The new political establishment wanted to liquidate the bank and accused Aristide Blank with distortion of balance sheets. The bank was forced to pay around 800 million lei to the state (Gavrilă, 2016). Until 1948 the bank payed all its debts by selling the properties and lands it owned, marketing products made of tobacco and salt, opening a new firm "DISCOM", that took over its obligations on behalf of the bank, paying a 14-year loan granted by the National Bank of Romania (Suruianu, 2016). However, the communist regime liquidated it, as MICA COMPANY and all private enterprises.

The main evidences indicate that negative ideological agents of influence opposed concurred for controlling the resources of the bank and revenge against perceived threats. The mechanisms used by legionnaires, supported by Nazi Germany were assassination attempt, instigation, denunciation so on. In subversive operations, the intelligence services of an external party are supporting the insiders (i.e. agents of influence) and operate to eliminate the opposition elements (i.e. Codevilla, 1992:355-386; Maguire, 2015; Honig and Yahel, 2017). In our investigation we found a connection between Aristide Blank and his assistant and businessman Constantin Bursan ("Doctor Bruno"), who was (high degree of probability) a double agent of the German Abwehr and Intelligence Service (Suruianu, 2016).

In the social networks analysis targeting authority individuals such as Aristide Blank is a strategy for disrupting networks. The legionnaires had a strategy, from which subversion was an essential tool. Their strategy was to remove the leaders, to breach the trust within bank and between its clients and whole network, thus

triggering internal and external distrust with the aim to disintegrate and control the resources. These subversive mechanisms weakened state resilience and undermined the national security, culminating with larger subversion processes imposed by communism.

3. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we supported that (1) actor-initiated social intelligence networks and emergence social intelligence networks are complementary approaches and provide an integrated approach for initiating and developing social intelligence processes within society, an approach that goes hand in hand with developing and diffusing security culture; (2) there is a perennial strong relationship between social intelligence (agency) and network (structure) in the emergence and development of social intelligence networks; (3) subversion as a social mechanism has a key role in disrupting social intelligence networks.

The study cases investigated in this paper present a series of actual and relevant lessons for intelligence services and police systems. Firstly, understanding the overwhelming use of subversive mechanisms by revisionist state and non-state actors operating through agents of influence within society. The mechanisms used such as, targeting, influencing or removing decision makers, instilling distrust among employees within companies, spreading rumors that affected the reputation capital of leaders, agitation of workers, penetrating business mechanism and controlling the resources are only few examples of the multitude of mechanisms identified. Also, industrial subversion of large companies was part of a strategy to weaken state resilience.

Both companies investigated, contributed to many economic sectors of the state (especially, national defense) and had corporate social functions in society, producing and distributing welfare. Penetrating those companies and controlling their resources weakened economic capacity of the state, that is a pillar of national security. Secondly, the two models studied emphasize the need to develop social intelligence networks capabilities, both within and without company.

Learning these lessons of the past are very relevant and useful today, at the global level, when subversion is one of the key mechanisms of different revisionist states and terrorist networks, that is directed to weaken our democratic

institutions and values, and consequently our security. Even more, looking at the future we must pay attention at the orientation risk and to integrate resilience thinking in building social intelligence networks within society.

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SOCIAL MEDIA TAKES A TOLL ON DEMOCRACY

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Motto: "The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country."
Bernays (1928:10)

Abstract: *Typically, crisis spur when political systems reach a standstill, when all resources are finished and the last option that could get the government out of the struggle is military force. As history has shown, this is not the best way out. Crisis and conflicts are the motion power of permanent transformation of international interaction. They have all impacted mostly civilian population through numerous casualties and refugees that determined humanitarian efforts, thus crisis resolution and conflict mediation becoming one of most important concern in security. The post-Cold War world gave means and opportunity for states to try and assert their global influence through peaceful means, remotely control the ex-soviet countries through economic and energetic domination and influence western countries with a set of strategies that define hybrid warfare aimed at the core of its adversaries' source of political power, at population. This paper will analyse how social media is weaponised to achieve political gain over recent elections as a part of an effective toolset aimed at influencing public scrutiny. The purpose of this article is to establish if turning social media into a means of control over the population is a part of a greater operation to generate popular misperception and increase one actor's power, or it represents the new age exertion of soft power beyond privacy rights and international regulation.*

Keywords: *active measure; influence operation; private data; social media*

1. INTRODUCTION

Data brokers, advertising, social network providers and other digital business actors have ample information on individuals participating in today's digital society, and people are slowly losing track over their digital footprint. Targeted, profiled and assessed by actors¹ often beyond their control or knowledge, feeling somewhat helpless and in need of need being able to take control of their digital identity, people are starting to question the system designed to bear profit on personal data, even though *notice* and *consent* to terms and conditions are given (Buttarelli, 2016:5).

Considering the broad parts of our daily lives social media and the technology behind it interact and change, it comes naturally that issues like

¹Actor: person or organization, including state and non-state entities, within the international system with the capability or desire to influence others in pursuit of its interests and objectives (NATO, 2011:1-3).

security, privacy, activism or terrorism are also influenced by networking in this manner. Nonetheless, it is changing the dynamics of soft power, turning interpretation into influence.

2. SOCIAL MEDIA GENERATES POPULAR MISPERCEPTION TO INCREASE ACTORS' POWER

Recently declassified the March 22, 2018 United States (U.S.) House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Report on Russian Active Measures shows how beginning in 2015 Russia aimed influencing the U.S. presidential election basically by using covert tools and techniques mastered after the end of the World War II. The investigations started in January 2017 and were set to clarify the role played by Russian influence campaign in the cyberworld, and if it was purposely aimed at the U.S. and its allies to undermine confidence in democratic process.

The report shows how Russian active measures unfolded over the past years and outlines methodically the processes involved providing recommendations for future prevention.

Soviet government has long used combined propaganda and intelligence activities, diplomacy and political assertiveness to achieve its goals (Bittman, 1985:43), and exercise its influence through third parties. The term *active measure* is actually the translation from Russian of *aktivnyye meropriatia* which was used by KGB (*Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti*, or Committee for State Security) for many of the influence activities used during the Cold War (Department of State, 1987:viii). Others have defined *active measures* as soviet influence techniques to determine the way public perception and decisionmakers behave positively towards soviets and negatively towards their opponents, also called perception management.

KGB influence activities included forming and funding front organizations (*grey propaganda*²), clandestine broadcasting, media manipulation (*white propaganda*³ and creating and distributing false stories), forgeries and disinformation (*black propaganda*⁴) and bribing agents of influence (Romerstein, 1989: 1-5). These techniques surpassed overt and secret operations to manipulate perception by turning to incitement, assassination or terror attacks.⁵

Pieces of news like “the US intelligence community was actively involved in the assassination of J.F.Kennedy in 1963 or the United States and Israel coordinated the attack on Mecca in 1979 or American scientists created AIDS as a bioweapon in 1983” (Patriot apud USIA, 1988:2-11)⁶ are outspoken examples of Cold War Soviet

² Grey propaganda is where the correct source of the information is never directly credited, and the sponsor’s identity is concealed.

³ White propaganda uses standard public relations techniques and one-sided presentation of an argument.

⁴ Black propaganda is false information and material that purports to be from a source on one side of a conflict but is from the opposing side. It is typically used to vilify, embarrass, or misrepresent the enemy (Doob, 1950).

⁵ Alleged Soviet support for terrorism and assassination have been controversial topics for ideological and diplomatic reasons. However, defectors such as Ladislav Bittman (1985) have detailed many of these Soviet activities in their memoirs and books.

⁶ In 1983, the *Patriot*, a pro-Soviet Indian paper that published pieces provided by KGB agents, released a story claiming that the U.S. military created the AIDS virus and released it as a weapon. For a couple of years,

propaganda and dissemination campaigns that remain on Russian public agenda (Schoen, Lamb, 2012:8-12), as Putin mentions in a recent interview in 2017 – he refers to Kennedy assassination while talking about the American intelligence community running false-flag operations to blame Russian secret services (Kelly, 2017:1). Other nations have developed diplomacy and disinformation programs based on active measures such as Iran and its proxy Hezbollah (Boghardt, 2006: 20-26), but also non-state actors like terrorist groups.

As Colonel Rolf Wagenbreth, long-time head of active measures operations for the East German Stasi, reportedly said,

a powerful adversary can only be defeated through [...] sophisticated, methodical, careful, and shrewd effort to exploit even the smallest ‘cracks’ between our enemies [...] and within their elites (Rid, 2017:1).

While the technology has evolved, Russia's influence toolkit has transformed, like one Russian military intelligence textbook said, “Psychological warfare has existed as long as mankind itself” (Kovalev, Bodner, 2017: 1).

Nowadays the resources that Kremlin uses in malign influence operations are both state and non-state, including the intelligence community, media outlets, social media and internet trolls, private and public companies, organised crime, think tanks and foundations, and social and religious groups.⁷ These endeavours have weaponised traditional and social network media, ideology and culture, crime and corruption and the energy market. The goal is to discredit politicians and democratic institutions like elections and independent media, to disrupt social cohesion and follow Kremlin's point of view, to influence politicians and infiltrate decision making bodies and to control vulnerable foreign governments (Galeotti, 2017:1).

the story appeared in minor publications that were mostly KGB controlled or sympathetic to the Soviets. After this incubation period, the slander was picked up in 1985 by the official Soviet cultural weekly newspaper, the *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. After that, the story began to spread rapidly. In 1987 alone, it appeared over 40 times in the Soviet-controlled press and was reprinted or rebroadcast in over 80 countries in 30 languages.

⁷ The European Parliament passed a resolution recognizing the wide range of tools and instruments that Russia uses to disseminate disinformation and propaganda (see the *EU Strategic Communication to Counteract Anti-EU Propaganda by Third Parties*, 2016/2030).

Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats told the US Congress in 2018 that *hostile actors viewed elections as* “opportunities to undermine democracy” (White, 2018:1).

3. SOCIAL MEDIA THE NEW AGE EXERTION OF SOFT POWER BEYOND PRIVACY RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

Traditionalist intelligence experts tend to put the emphasis on the importance of communications for their impact on perceptions, believing that strategic deception – the open deceitful side of strategic communication – is of utmost importance, and that efforts should be aimed at understanding the adversary's intentions and to disseminate our own intentions in a manner that strengthens the political support of the nation's interests. Others are more concerned about capabilities, to rely and support national institutions, believing that maintaining public trust in the nations values will send a better message rather than diplomacy. While other experts would not choose between strategic communications and strategic capabilities but rely on comprehensive approach upon certain circumstances – like Ben Hiller, Cyber Security Officer at the OSCE Secretariat's Transnational Threats Department who stated the first meeting of the Organization of American States' (OAS)⁸ working group on co-operation and confidence-building measures (CBMs) in cyberspace in Washington DC on 2 March 2018 “Many states now consider cyber capabilities a legitimate and necessary part of their strategic toolbox alongside diplomacy, economic influence and military might. ...This requires decision makers to become involved and identify measures to prevent potential fallout from their use” (OSCE, 2018:1). The bottom line is that the importance of strategic communications and the need to counter disinformation is dependent to the threat assessment and international environment (Schoen, Lamb, 2012:117-118).

Private data has become the subject of intense debate whether the way technology has turned into a vast system based on limitless data gathering and analysis regardless of ethics or regulations afflicting on personal choices regarding various

domains from consumer choices to influencing political views, thus endangering democratic institutions such as elections. Major actors at the centre of this system are the digital platforms feeding on digital advertising, gaining power as it revolves around users and their personal data much needed to segment, target and customise messages. Public treats lightly personal data and the system repays sensational by turning it into viral content without distinguishing whether the message advertised is commercial or political. Recent disclosures about how *fake news* – deliberate disinformation – works in this system have fuelled the suspicions that the integrity of democracies is under threat. Current solutions are focused on transparency, on exposing the source of information, rather than accountability of players who profit of the malign measures (EDPS, 3/2018:2).

Fundamental rights to privacy and to personal data protection should play a crucial part in each legislator's policy to keep up with such developments, and independent data protection authorities set it as a strategic priority. In 2005 the *Montreux Resolution on the Use of Personal Data for Political Communication* outlined the fact that data protection regulators identified an increase in processing of such data by non-commercial actors, referring specifically to the analysis of ‘sensitive data related to real or supposed moral and political convictions or activities, or to voting activities’ and ‘invasive profiling of various persons who are currently classified - sometimes inaccurately or on the basis of a superficial contact - as sympathizers, supporters, adherents or party’. The outline of the 2005 Resolution urged the international community to issue and enforce data protection rules on data minimization, lawful processing, consent, transparency, data subjects rights, purpose limitation and data security (EDPS, 3/2018:5).

The European law on data protection and confidentiality of digital communication applies to data collection, profiling and microtargeting⁹ so by using the toolset drawn by the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)¹⁰ little harm would

⁸ The OAS, after the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, is the third regional organization addressing practical measures to enhance cyber stability between states.

⁹ To differentiate from *commercial microtargeting*, the term ‘political microtargeting’ has been defined as the use of different means of communications (mail, phone, canvassing, direct mail, and social media advertising, etc.) to communicate and build a relationship with prospective voters (Bodo *et al.*, 2017).

¹⁰ The European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is the most important change in data privacy in 20 years. After four years of preparation and debate the GDPR was finally approved by the EU

be produced when influence attempts on groups or individuals would appear. Political actors processing personal data fall within the scope of the GDPR while stating the exact cases when it is allowed.

The idea of the EU GDPR is to treat the data subject 'as an individual not simply as a consumer or user' and highlight the ethical issues that predictive profiling and algorithm-determined personalisation raise¹¹.

As stated by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of *Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia*, "free elections and freedom of expression, particularly freedom of political debate, together form the bedrock of any democratic system. The two rights are inter-related and operate to reinforce each other: for example, freedom of expression is one of the "conditions" necessary to "ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature". For this reason, it is particularly important in the period preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are permitted to circulate freely. In the context of election debates, the unhindered exercise of freedom of speech by candidates has particular significance" (ECHR, 2017: para. 110).

The U.S. Department of State reports that Russian efforts to influence elections and referendums in Europe include "open and secret support for far right and left political parties, funding front groups and NGOs, and making small, low-profile investments in key economic sectors to build political influence over time" and that the techniques employed "focus on exploiting internal discord in an effort to break centrist consensus on the importance of core institutions" (U.S. Department of State, 2017). In the same keynote, a study by the German Marshall Fund's

Parliament on 14 April 2016. Enforcement date: 25 May 2018 - at which time those organizations in non-compliance may face heavy fines. GDPR replaces the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and was designed to harmonize data privacy laws across Europe, to protect and empower all EU citizens data privacy and to reshape the way organizations across the region approach data privacy.

¹¹ Profiles used to predict people's behavior risk stigmatization, reinforcing existing stereotypes, social and cultural segregation and exclusion, with such 'collective intelligence' subverting individual choice and equal opportunities. Such 'filter bubbles' or 'personal echo-chambers' could end up stifling the very creativity, innovation and freedoms of expression and association which have enabled digital technologies to flourish (EDSP, 4/2015:13).

Alliance for Securing Democracy reveals that the Russian government has used cyberattacks, disinformation, and financial influence campaigns to meddle in the internal affairs of at least 27 European and North American countries since 2004.¹²

The New York Times reveals that fake news and social media trolls have been used by Kremlin against its own citizens and have increased in intensity after the 2011-2012 anti-Putin protests. Centered on social media domination and online platforms used by opponents to spread doubts of electoral process and to mobilize protesters, Kremlin developed and used software to monitor online public opinion and flooded social media with its own vision, paying bloggers to lobby for Kremlin (Chen, 2015: 1). In 2014, after winning undisputedly the elections Putin enforced a law that legitimizes the government to block sites hosting extremist content or that represented a public threat without court order, resulting in blocking 3 opponent news sites and Alexei Navalny's blog (The Guardian, 2014: 1).

Government has since been blocking IP addresses imposed by RKN (*Roskomnadzor* – Russian media and communications authority) the recent winner of a yearlong battle ended with the 13th of April court order to shut down *Telegram* (web encrypted messenger service), meaning immediate blocking of vast numbers of IPs causing interoperable internet services (from supermarket cashiers, purchase websites, ATM machines, to traffic apps) to meltdown (Lokshina, 2018: 1).

The disinformation measures used by Russians in the 2016 US presidential elections has by far been the most efficient of all times. Powered by botnets, social media trolls and by media outlets like Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, Kremlin has succeeded in making the public sympathetic to Russian views (Treverton, Chen, 2017: 1).

In the Brexit Referendum campaign Russian press agencies have given extensive media coverage presenting one sided coverage of the debate, that of voting to leave European Union and the speeches of UKIP¹³ representatives.

¹²The countries included Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States (Dorell, 2017:1).

¹³ The UK Independence Party is a hard Eurosceptic and right-wing populist political party in the United Kingdom.

At that time, Facebook and Twitter internal inquiries of the allegations that massive manipulation campaigns were enacted by Russians did little to acknowledge that more than 400 Russian controlled accounts were actively posting both in the American elections and the Brexit referendum as research conducted by the Edinburgh University shows¹⁴. Moreover, the conclusions of a common team or researchers from Berkeley University and Swansea University has identified 150.000 Twitter accounts directly tied to Russian government, that have spread messages about Brexit (Adam, Booth, 2017: 1).

During the French presidential campaign RT and Sputnik have covered ample materials depicting president Emmanuel Macron as the puppet of American political and economic interests, accused him of having a secret bank account in Bahamas to avoid paying tax and fuelled rumours of being in an extramarital homosexual relationship, all publicly denied (Bremmer, 2017: 1). In 2017 Facebook declared that 70.000 accounts were suspended during the French campaign for spamming or propaganda, that were proven to be controlled and used by the GRU (*Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye* - the main military foreign-intelligence service of the Russian Federation) in 2016 to attack the National Democratic Committee during the US electoral campaign (Reagan, 2017:1). In counterpart, the Russian sponsored media has channelled its efforts to depict an alternative image of how living in Germany is dangerous, depraved and undemocratic, presenting gratifying and biased news materials about AfD¹⁵ (Shuster, 2017:1).

Kremlin's malign influence and hybrid warfare activities have inherently led to international sanctions, while many started when Russia illegally annexed Ukraine's Crimea and financed and backed separatist in Eastern Ukraine, they continued by both E.U. and U.S. sanctions as a response to cyberattacks, human rights violations or corruption. The aspects that make these influence campaigns effective also make them hard

¹⁴ In 2016 a multi-disciplinary team in Edinburgh University has started to explore the role of social media in today's international affairs, and it began by analyzing big data from Twitter to track the UK's social media influence around the world. It contributes to a growing body of evidence that the future of soft power will include the capture and analysis of big data from digital media and the crafting of responses to what that data reveals.

¹⁵ Alternative für Deutschland - a right-wing to far-right political party in Germany.

to counter, even so, establishments and media representatives in Europe have already begun to take actions to address and mitigate the threat of manipulation campaigns by raising public awareness, anti - fake news regulations, enforcing privacy laws and funding cybersecurity organizations, thus more is to achieve to make responsible parties assume actions.

4. CONCLUSIONS

As part of the global community it has come to the point where we need to reflect, understand what recent events mean to us and our culture, find effective solutions and coordinate actions to counter any active measures directed by adversaries.

The possibility to use social network media as a means of strategic communications to assert power in conflicts or to achieve political goals has risen ethical issues that we only begin to address, by rewriting personal data policy, internet governance, diplomacy and by having a comprehensive approach to what technology brings in our lives to ensure that fundamental rights are not overlooked.

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THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF SMURD AIR AMBULANCE SYSTEM IN ROMANIA

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Abstract: *The analysis of the social impact of the Romanian air ambulance system is an indispensable tool for retrospective and monitoring the efficiency of a governmental organization. The SMURD Air Operator in Romania is the General Inspectorate of Aviation (G.I.o.A.), an organization of major importance in the National Security System as an integral part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The greatest benefit for the citizens of Romania is the fundamental right to life a right materialized by the unconditional medical act of granting emergency medical assistance in the shortest time possible. When it comes to the concept of intervention timing, it is well known that aviation is the fastest way to provide emergency care. Shortly this analysis consists of a presentation of the air ambulance system in Romania and the social impact of this organization. A National Review Barometer from February 2017 of the Avangarde Socio-Behavioral Studies Group with a sample size of 780 people is used.*

Keywords: *aviation; life-savers; emergency; social impact*

1. INTRODUCTION

Helicopters and airplanes, as a mean of transportation, have facilitated a significant decrease in intervention time at the site of request, increasing the chances of survival of the critical patient. Since 2003, SMURD has managed to form a fleet composed of ten helicopters and two airplanes. From an operational and strategic point of view, the SMURD intervention unit, set up seven Aeromedical Operational Bases (A.O.B.) equipped with helicopters and materials necessary for their operation. Specialty literature has clearly demonstrated the positive impact on the survival of critical patients assisted by airborne crews, so it is necessary for the Romanian air rescue system to grow up.

2. SMURD AIR RESCUE IN ROMANIA

2.1 Air rescue concept. An air rescue helicopter is an aircraft equipped in accordance with the legal provisions in force for emergency aero-medical interventions to rescue critically ill patients requiring rapid and high-level intervention. A critical patient is defined as having unstable vital functions or with conditions that may have irreversible complications requiring special investigation, intervention and / or special care

provided by a complex, multidisciplinary team in a general or specialized intensive care clinic or department.

Airborne transfer is used when a suitable transfer cannot be secured by land, or if the transfer time on the terrestrial route is longer than the condition of the patient permits, causing worsening or irreversible complications. The traumatized or non-traumatized patient, unstable or with a high potential for worsening during transport, requiring inter-hospital transfer to a specialized facility, should benefit from an optimal transport mode to ensure safe and timely delivery.

2.3 The beginnings of air rescue in Romania.

Thus, in 1935, on the territory of Romania a donation from the Bucharest City Hall to the civil aviation, consisting of a medical plane, was the first structure of this kind. This aircraft was exclusively for aero-medical missions in Romania and was the first of its kind.

The transportation of the wounded carried out during the war by the squadron, proved that the suitably equipped aircraft is one of the most effective means of rescuing human lives. These aspects lead to the development of sanitary aviation in Romania, therefore on 14th of November 1946 the first Aviasan sanitary aviation unit in the country was established. This aviation

unit was directly subordinated to the Ministry of Health of that period.

In September of 1990, an Emergency System named SMUR was established in Târgu-Mureș and later after collaboration with the Fire Brigade (operational part of the service for the decommissioning) became the current SMURD which is a mobile emergency, rescue and extrication unit. Over time, besides the usual missions performed with specialized ambulances, this organization saw the need and importance of the use of air transport for shortening the reaction and transport time of patients in need of medical intervention, so it started to rent aircrafts from private operators. These aircrafts were helicopters or planes of various types, belonging to the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of National Defense or to the Utility Aviation from the Ministry of Transportation. These aircrafts were also used to transport critical patients from Targu-Mures to other medical centers in Bucharest or abroad. In such situations, the medical crew consisted of two medical professionals, one of whom was a physician with experience in the field of emergency medicine or intensive care.

In 2003, the current SMURD form of air-medical interventions was born, a strong organization that exceeded the SMAR project by far. Through the initiative of SMURD - Mureș,

directed by Dr. Raed Arafat, in 2003 the foundations were laid for a national helicopter emergency medical assistance system. A major factor that determined the increase of the efficiency of SMURD operations, was the development of the air-lift department. The helicopter, as a means of transport, has contributed to a significant decrease in reaction time at the place of request, increasing the chances of survival. The year of 2003 represents the start of the SMURD cooperation with the Special Aviation Unit of the Ministry of Interior. The context in which this collaboration began was, first and foremost, linked to the major shortcomings represented by the need for SMURD to hire helicopters from private operators.

Since 2003, SMURD has managed to form a fleet of ten helicopters and two airplanes. From an operational point of view the SMURD organization established seven operational bases equipped with helicopters and equipment necessary for their operation (the eighth Aeromedical Operational Base is to be opened in Jibou, Salaj County), with a primary intervention time of 25 minutes of flight for each base. Since 2008, the Special Aviation Unit has been transformed into the General Inspectorate of Aviation (G.I.o.A.) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. G.I.o.A.-is the air operator that performs independent SMURD missions.




Fig.1 Primary missions chart with 25 minutes of flight intervention time in Romania

2.4 The impact of SMURD Air rescue upon population The social impact of the SMURD Emergency Service in Romania has seen a significant increase once with the development of the emergency aviation component. Besides the fact that aviation is the pinnacle in a field such as emergency medicine, a positive image with a great impact on the population is formed by the use of aircraft, especially helicopters. The impact of SMURD in Romania helps the system to grow through population support, both through political involvement in the development process and through the donations and funding provided to SMURD through SMURD Foundation.

The National Review Barometer dated from February 2017 of the Avangarde Socio-Behavioral Studies Group conducted a study on a sample of 750 individuals over the age of 18, a study with a maximum tolerated error of +/- 4% for a confidence interval of 95%. The result of the survey shows that the Romanian people's confidence in the institution represented by SMURD is 95%, a percentage that places SMURD on the first place in Romania as an organization in which the Romanians trust.

3. CONCLUSION

A positive social impact of an organization like SMURD represents the fuel for development and progress. Without substantial public support, a government organization has no sustainability. The airborne component of SMURD is an effective means of increasing the notoriety of the rescue due to the fact that when a helicopter lands at the accident scene, it represents the point of maximum interest for the population.

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THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL INTERACTIONS IN MULTINATIONAL MILITARY MISSIONS

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Abstract: *The presence of multinational forces in conflict zones helps to strengthen the legitimacy of operations, sharing responsibilities, costs and risks. Co-operation within a multinational military mission in crisis or conflict situations should also take into account cultural differences and their effects. In the current multicultural military context, knowledge of cultural differences and cultural sensitivity is, in our view, the key to making cooperation more effective within the multinational military coalition. The question that arises is the following: "In a complex multicultural environment, what are the most important factors that, by interaction, can affect the effectiveness of the mission?" The culture of nations, multiculturalism, cultural factors, items that through the difference in manifestation and perception, produce major effects within the multinational mission, are the issues upon which special attention must be paid. Papers must be prefaced by an abstract in English up to 250 words. The text will be written in 10pt high, Italic, justified, left-right alignment. A number of maximum 8 keywords will be written 10pt below the abstract. The words will be 10pt high, Italic, left alignment, and separated by a semicolon.*

Keywords (max.5): *multiculturalism; multinational missions; cultural differences; crisis and conflict; theater of operations*

1. CULTURE AND ITS COMPONENTS IN THE MILITARY FIELD

Nowadays, the national armies' adversary is non-Western, transnational as an area of application, clandestine in approach, and operates outside the context of the nation-state. Its form of war, its organizational structure, and its motivations are determined by the society and the culture in which it originates. At the same time, the national armies are undergoing transformations, moving from massive armies to defending national territories against other states' armies, to smaller armed forces of professional forces engaged in global stabilization missions.

For more than a decade, military forces have been involved in wars where communities face, on behalf of their own values, a political legitimacy capable of justifying their own struggle.

The end of the Cold War generated a new paradigm in which national identity prevails. Situational uncertainty is a major cause of the decline in the efficiency of multinational missions, uncertainty that can be generated by both the lack

of knowledge of the battlefield and the cultural differences. Any process of situational interaction in theaters of operations has a multitude of unknowns that affect interoperability within the mission to varying degrees.

Cultural diversity can be seen as an obstacle, but it can also be an asset for the organization, as it stimulates different approaches from the perception and the different participants' experience in making decisions.

In multinational military operations, the effectiveness of the mission increases proportionally to the level of linguistic knowledge, cultural knowledge, harmonizing cultural differences, and the cultivation / strengthening of common cultural aspects of military subculture. Culture is a model of thought and behavior that helps the individual or group adapt to the environment in which they operate. At the societal level, culture helps to explain the differences between groups. Culture refers to everything that makes a particular environment unique. This includes: values, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, spatial relationships, knowledge, experience, beliefs, etc.

Culture is an inheritance transmitted through specific communication codes such as gestures, words, writing, arts, media (press, radio, television), interactive media (the phone, the internet).

The popular "Iceberg Model" of culture, developed by R. Selfridge and S. Sokolik in 1975, completed by W.L. French and Cecil H. Bell, in 1979, identifies a visible surface consisting of behavior, clothing, symbols, artifacts, language and an invisible level of values, consisting of beliefs, norms, prejudices, common experiences, experiences and common dreams. When a group of people live together, even with relative isolation from the rest of the community, they have a specific place in society, common problems and perhaps a common enemy, and then the community develops a particular culture.

Translating the Iceberg model of culture into military subculture, we find the explicit, accessible aspects of common observation, easy to understand and interpret. It is the place where the behaviors, practices, military rules and traditions, the uniform, the rank, the greeting, the tone of the national anthem on ceremonies (change of order, honoring the heroes etc.), the flag of the unit, emblems, badges, etc. are rooted. Here we find aspects concerning active, retired and / or veterans. It is the strongest part of the military subculture in which we find beliefs, skills, value judgments (which affect how the "rest of the world" is seen), daily discipline, teamwork, sacrifice, and values in battle, loyalty. These are elements that any military knows, but whose formulation is made more difficult because they are related to the individual's spiritual level.

Cultures are dynamic systems that appear in a certain ecological context. People who share an ecological context tend to share the characteristics of the culture. The context includes the physical environment, the social and the political environment. When food sources are changed by climate change, successful cultures change their subsistence patterns to ensure survival. With the technological changes of the industrial revolution, the roles of rural and urban residents, land use patterns, time concepts and logical styles have changed. Cultures evolve or disappear due to context changes.

Finally, cultures are composed of integrated components. Balanced cultural elements help to achieve the survival, interaction and propagation objectives. If survival challenges depend on the cooperation of many people, individuals have an interdependence of self-concept, a network of

obligations, and behavioral patterns that strongly support group ties. Cultural values are important components of culture as they guide the behavior of individuals. The general idea in sociology about values is that they diminish the conflicts between individual and collective interests. They have a functional significance, favoring the joint work of individuals to achieve the desired common goals. When we talk about values, especially in the multinational military environment to which we refer, we take into consideration the following aspects: the general values held by the group in attention, how strong the belief in these values is the priority that the group / individual grants of these values compared to other groups.

Multicultural, trans-cultural, intercultural, are terms whose common root is "culture," a concept that emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century. Later, at the beginning of the 20th century, we witness the stage of cultural codification in which it becomes both a national and an ethnic symbol.

The multiculturalism and inter-culturalism concepts are often confused and / or used synonymously.

Subculture means a way of life, habits, ideas, behaviors of a group of people within society, a group that is perceived as being different from other members of society. A subculture proposes an ensemble of non-identical symbols, norms, values and modes of life with those of the dominant culture in a society, not in contradiction with them, but in addition to them.

Despite the fact that militaries from an alliance bring different national military traditions within the mission, the military profession has a common matrix. Military organizations are a specific occupational culture that is relatively isolated from society, yet included in it. Militants not only work in separate spaces and separate military bases, but sometimes they even live in these bases with their families. Multinational military operations include participants who have a variety of reasoning styles and who can interpret situations differently. A multinational force is not homogeneous from a cultural point of view. Moving from macro to micro level, we discover a variety of subcultures. These subcultures are differentiated at both structural and geographic levels. Structural subcultures appear to be at least two different types: horizontal, between services, and vertical, across different categories of staff, such as the classical vertical structure of officers or non-commissioned officers.

We consider Anthony King's contribution to the transformation of European armies at the end of the Cold War, the military trans-nationalism, interoperability and cultural aspects of the NATO mission, a contribution that presents a personal view of the evolution of the armies in the current political and economic context of a globalized world. The author captures the changes made by multinational military coalitions at the level of national military subcultures.

2. INFLUENCES OF MILITARY CULTURE IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

The "internationalization of military life" over the last twenty-five years has led to new organizational challenges. Collaboration of forces in different armies and weapons, information and communication requires not only technological interoperability but also adaptation to a multinational environment, with different languages, different styles of leadership, rotation systems, training, military traditions, hierarchy systems, etc. Thus, interaction within a complex socio-technical system in which the structure, processes, people and culture are aligned to achieve the goals that are essential for the successful and effective fulfillment of missions. The multinationalism of these coalition operations often hinders organizational effectiveness. For these operations to achieve and maintain organizational effectiveness at a high level of adaptation, flexible and mobile forces are needed. NATO fulfills this challenge through a process of transformation highlighting "reduction in size and availability", "increasing flexibility and mobility" and "multinational".

Cultural incidents occurring in theaters of operations appear rather rare, but when they occur, they are caused by misunderstandings and disagreements about culture and language. Language, in a multinational context, is an individual power tool for those who are English experts, as this knowledge allows them to dominate interaction and decision.

Communicating in a secondary language, even for fluent English speakers, can be an effort due to the rhythm of speech, technical terms and abbreviations. Communication problems can be exacerbated by the stress and lack of rest that often exist in theaters of operations.

The professional, organizational structure, contingent composition and their physical and moral status are of great importance in interrelation. Military culture all over the world has

adopted a hierarchical organization, so at first sight there should be no problems between contingents in terms of command and control, but the reality is different. There is a difference in the perception between the levels of training of professional military staff, the volunteer or the recruiting staff. This level may affect interoperability. The same problem exists between the reservists and the personnel of the active forces. The high level of technology has led to an increase in the number of reservists, specialists in certain areas. Advanced countries have already developed staff policies to reduce the friction between activists and reservists. Increasing the rhythm of operations, along with an acceleration of technological development, plus social, group and legal issues, require the presence of specialists in theaters.

Religious diversity increases operational capacity, international employability and social balance.

There are concerns about the poor representation of non-Christian religions in the army that is part of the multinational mission. The composition of the quotas also varies in terms of gender composition. Some nations restrict or even exclude the presence of women in the army (some Arab countries), while others allow women access to all departments, including participation in combat activities. The role of women in the various armies has increased much since 1980, offering the opportunity for additional jobs for women.

The inclusion of women in combat troops has attracted a possible risk that has put a great deal of attention from politicians and human resources managers. Another aspect of the "operational problem" is that of the influence of the societal culture and is represented by the reaction of the public opinion to the war and the human and material losses generated by it. It is an important aspect speculated in the information struggle. The fulfillment of the first objective (convincing its own population of the need for action to punish the guilty) seems to be quite easy for US administration's communication strategies, for example, because the shock and brutality of the attacks created an almost unanimous domestic consensus, perhaps for the first time throughout the US history. However, efforts have been intense, because it has been understood that the sustainability of support for the anti-terrorist campaign is dependent on the solidity of the construction of that support.

Knowledge of the language of communication and the stress generated by it. For non-native

speakers of English, even if the level of knowledge is very high, communication is a problem because they think in their mother tongue, the structure of which may be completely different from English. Speaking at a rapid pace, the use of acronyms, dialects and accents, can pose problems of understanding and interpretation even for native speakers. In intercultural conversations only about 50% of the volume of information is retained, while about 75% of the amount of information is retained during intra-cultural communication. This happens even if the level of knowledge of the language is expert level.

"Individualism - Collectivism" and communication, it is the most important dimension in the communication process.

Individualists tend to use direct, precise, clear messages that leave no room for interpretation. They do not perceive that there is a large psychological distance between them and other groups. They use direct confrontation when there is a problem that needs to be resolved. They focus on solving the task and not on establishing relationships when communicating. Thanks to clear, direct messages in multicultural communication, this is the category that generates direct friction.

In collectivist groups, the interest of the group prevails and there is a tendency for actions to be directed towards preserving the facade image of the group. In multinational groups in which there is a majority collectivist tendency, the members of the group who are discordant about the actions and beliefs of the group will be marginalized, the information will not circulate equally to that person and he/she will be given inappropriate tasks. Collective groups have the tendency to deliver inborn, ambiguous, context-sensitive messages. Loyalty to this type of group is expected to be total and assumed. In collectivist groups it is important that established relationships be cordial and lasting. The culture of work in Romania is a reflection of how society is organized and has its roots in recent history. In private companies, focus is on performance, teamwork being considered one of the most profitable ways to achieve goals. This is possible because there are adequate personnel policies, procedures and remuneration. In state-owned companies, the attitude of the employee is usually obedient, and determination in achieving the goals is minimal because of poor pay, lack of professionalism, and promotion of staff on principles other than merit. Due to the fact that in families, in general, parents were educated in the communist or post-communist period, they plant in

their own children the seed of individualism. Reality demonstrates that in an economy where the labor market is so narrow, where it is very difficult for the individual to get a job, it will be very hard to believe that he will not use the team to promote and/or to keep his job. Returning to the culture of work of the Romanian personnel within the observed organization, it should be mentioned that they are former active militaries, trained in a system that respects the rules, procedures and orders. Obedience is also a consequence of education and training. The dimensions of "distance to power" and "individualism" generate a typical behavior, with respect to superior degrees and lack of initiative. Tasks are fulfilled with conscientiousness, punctuality has never been a problem.

What must be highlighted is that Romanians who have seniority in international organizations have reached levels of knowledge of procedures and have a level of expertise comparable to any developed country of the world. Knowledge of procedures, rigorous planning, material motivation, teamwork, trust, leadership are key to adapting the Romanian culture of work to the culture of the multinational organization in the Resolute Support Mission Command. An important factor to be mentioned here is the relationship with the other Romanians in the field, on a professional line. It is recognized by all the participating nations that Romanians are very united and dependent on each other, regardless of the department in which they operate. Another fact appreciated by the staff of other nationalities is the high degree of professional expertise and level of linguistic knowledge of the Romanians.

3. CONCLUSIONS & ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Most basic human behaviors are common, irrespective of the culture the participant interacts with. Culture is an important factor not so much as to change the fundamental principles of war, military strategies or military profession. It is not a crucial factor for the fate of a war. Experience shows that cultural differences such as religion, language, habits, values, and cohabitation affect military operations. Often major cultural differences make it extremely difficult for groups to collaborate, but the establishment of joint procedures makes it possible for military collaboration on a professional basis.

Important elements in intercultural interaction are the level of general culture and communication skills. In order to be able to interact effectively

with another culture, the first condition is to get to know ourselves first and then to be open to knowing and accepting the values of other cultures.

In multinational military operations, the effectiveness of the mission increases proportionally to the level of linguistic knowledge, cultural knowledge, harmonizing cultural differences, and the cultivation / strengthening of common cultural aspects of military subculture. Leadership requires a deep knowledge and cultural expertise. With the growing importance of cultural knowledge at operational planning level, the option used in the past - part time cultural consultancy - can no longer meet the need for ongoing counseling needed for security and stability operations. Commanding at any level implies the existence of complex structures with specialized positions in providing cultural recommendations, which are an integral part of the planning, decision making and execution process. The ideal person for the position of cultural counselor is one who has a high degree of specialization, anthropology and/or sociology studies, a thorough knowledge of the environment acquired through direct, participatory observation. The overall conclusion is as follows: current and future conflicts will take the fight to another level. The armies will undergo major changes: the number of soldiers will decrease, the role of sophisticated technologies, the influence of the media and coalition armies will increase. Linguistic knowledge and cultural adaptability are just some of the keys to making international military cooperation more effective.

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